A New Deal?
Development and Security in a Changing World
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A New Deal? Development AND Security IN A Changing World

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Foreword

The Cold War ended with an unintended consequence: East–West tensions eased but instability and conflict exploded in other parts of the world – especially in Africa – where Cold War proxies were abandoned to their fate. Detente, however, made it possible for the international community to respond to these conflicts in a more comprehensive, intrusive and less ideological manner than was the case in the days of the Cold War. Wars within states were no longer off limits. The international policy response to the upsurge in violent conflict found its apotheosis in the development–security nexus. This policy emphasised an integrated approach to conflict prevention and resolution, based on an apparent correlation between violent conflict and low levels of development. Or, as Kofi Annan put it: ‘there can be no long-term security without development; there can be no long-term development without security; and no society can long remain prosperous without respect for human rights and the rule of law’ (Annan 2002).

That perspective reshaped development cooperation programmes over the last decade. Policymakers and practitioners – within and outside the UN – began advocating and funding a broad set of interventions targeting both the causes and consequences of violent conflict, including human rights violations, inequality, discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion. Aid agencies from major OECD donors increasingly focused their resources on the reform of national institutions, particularly those with a direct impact on the rights, safety, security and wellbeing of the individual – the political structures, the judiciary and the security services. As the head of several UN peacekeeping missions, I was both a witness and a participant in the reshaping of the development–security agenda. In Sierra Leone, for example, the UK launched an ambitious reform effort for the national army and police using development funding; in Liberia the US was willing to do the same. The UN itself, through its peacekeeping, development and human rights departments and agencies, supported this multidimensional path to conflict prevention, made possible by the more consensual approach to conflict resolution that developed in the Security Council following the end of the Cold War.

So what has been the impact of these changes in policy and practice? The authors of this paper look at the outcome of this ‘New Deal’. They ask rightly, have these changes helped to stabilise countries experiencing violent conflict? Has development–security integration worked out in practice? Fire development and security mutually reinforcing? They question the assumption that there is linear link between development and security, ineluctably leading to more stable and peaceful states. And they wonder if the prevailing, largely Western-led, development-security paradigm is one that new and emerging donors will seek to emulate.

In conclusion, they suggest a new approach, one that recognises the limitations of donor understanding and influence in complex situations of conflict. They argue in favour of the concepts of entrustment and brokerage, which should be locally defined and managed and deployed alongside the current donor approaches. This paper is an important and timely contribution to the debate on how best the international community can assist countries afflicted by conflict because, as the paper suggests, ‘the key question for development partners is not whether development and security should be linked but how and for whose benefit’.

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Executive summary

Development policy and practice in fragile and conflict-affected areas needs to be rethought. A growing proportion of aid budgets is going to fragile and conflict-affected states and conflict prevention is becoming an important focus of aid spend even in countries that are not affected by widespread violence. Thus, there is a rationale for development and security being increasingly brought together. The issue is how to do this most effectively to promote the security of the poor. While development in violent environments is very different from development in stable and peaceful areas, the same is true for security. One of the key differences is the fragmentation of power and authority which makes it more difficult for outsiders to operate. Development stakeholders need to invest more in understanding local realities, politics and power. This report proposes a ‘new deal’ based on concepts of entrustment and brokerage to help them do so.

Introduction

With an increasing volume of official development aid directed toward fragile and conflict-affected states, the question is not whether development and security should be linked but rather how and for whose benefit. Improvements in governance and security do not emanate from a central state that attains a monopoly on violence but rather from a constellation of non-state actors who form hybrid political orders, sometimes in partnership with formal state actors and governance structures. The spaces for development in fragile and conflict-affected areas are qualitatively different from contexts that might be considered to be peaceful and stable and, hence, discrete models and approaches are needed to work effectively in these. For development actors the challenge is how to work in situations where authority and power are fragmented and influence is abridged by the existence of multiple actors who seek to mediate the exercise of domination. However, limits of knowledge, capacity and influence to operate effectively in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a major impediment to crafting development–security responses that more effectively address the forms of violence and insecurity that undermine development and wellbeing for people living in these areas.

In light of rapid shifts in the broader political contexts and conditions of fragile and conflict-affected situations, this report seeks to provide practical insights for development actors cut from a more traditional
cloth – including OECD bilateral donors and developmentalist non-governmental organisations – on the nature of these changes as well as to suggest ways to effectively engage in contexts characterised by greater uncertainty, fluidity and multi-polarity.

Changing politics

Developmentalist thinking has often emphasised the need to delineate and clearly separate the field of activities and actors associated with ‘development’ and ‘security’. Yet, development and security are often closely integrated in the stated needs of civilian populations in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; the actions and political positions of non-state actors; the priorities of aid-recipient governments; and aid approaches of newly important non-OECD donors such as China, India and Turkey. Non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Mungiki in Kenya have claimed the development mantle, seeking to provide services and social assistance that are often the preserve of ‘traditional’ development agents such as non-governmental organisations, community organisations and religious authorities, and, indeed, of states.

The New Deal endorsed by the G7+ grouping of fragile and conflict-affected states at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 was the latest example of how aid-recipient governments are increasingly vocal about setting their own priorities for aid and development, which often closely overlap with actions to strengthen security and political stability.

The confluence of development with security is also readily apparent in the aid approaches of non-OECD donors including China and Turkey, whose assistance including subsidised loans, technical support and preferential trade status maps closely onto their commercial, security and political interests.

What complicates developmentalist efforts to separate development from security is that physical safety and security in everyday life are top priorities for civilian populations in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Thus, development that responds to local needs in these places often requires supporting measures that reduce the impacts of conflict and political instability on the poor.

Toward more effective development – security integration

A different approach is needed to overcome these challenges and one that calls for more critical engagement and leadership by development actors. This necessitates a ‘new deal’ that not only reflects the policy interests and priorities of fragile and conflict-affected country governments but also places relationships with local providers of security and basic services at the centre of new policy analysis and approaches.

One of the primary objectives of development–security integration is to address the dynamics of insecurity in certain areas, which are by nature quite localised. The need to understand the dynamics and effects of development–security integration at the local level is essential but often overlooked. Development and security actors from OECD countries need to find ways to respond effectively to local security dynamics even though their influence in these settings may be attenuated.

Two alternative concepts – entrustment and brokerage – can be used to shape development–security responses in these environments alongside other existing approaches. Entrustment involves transferring to local actors the powers to make decisions, define and assess problems, and the resources to act on this. Brokerage involves actions to build a shared understanding amongst actors whose interests may vary significantly and whose capacities to act in support of these interests may be unequal. Facilitating negotiations, trust-building and supporting conditions for dialogue to continue are all roles that local development partners can fulfil, provided the right external support. These also contribute to strengthening governance and local agreements that improve security and safety. We draw on an extensive literature as well as two case studies from Kenya and Sierra Leone to show how entrustment and brokerage have contributed positively.

Any new deal is about more than the integration of security and development. It is about new ways of doing development and security, ways that will increasingly become mainstreamed as development aid focuses increasingly on fragile and conflict-affected areas. However, the pressures to spend greater volumes of aid, with a larger proportion in more fragile contexts, but often with fewer staff, make it difficult for aid agencies to practise entrustment and brokerage.

To operate effectively in fragile and conflict-affected settings, aid agencies need to (1) commit more staff to the field in recognition of the localised nature of the issues, (2) recruit staff with complementary skills in security, diplomacy, brokering and negotiation, (3) be prepared to take more calculated risks, finding ways of pooling risk with other actors to minimise political fallout at home but not so that accountability is weakened, and (4) resist rotation of staff.

Renewing commitments to local partnerships and redirecting resources to strengthen these is risky but essential to build and sustain innovative responses to complex challenges that transcend simple categorisation as ‘development problems’, ‘political crisis’ or ‘security challenges’. Aid agencies have not gone overboard in linking development and security. They have in fact tinkered at the edges. What is needed is a reinvigoration of development in fragile and conflict-affected areas.

1 Introduction

Few debates in development are as contested as how development actors and resources should relate to security planning and activity. Development and ‘security’ alike are contested concepts. Development is notoriously difficult to define precisely – a task that has become even more complicated by greater mobility, fluidity and multi-polarity as well as the shifting distribution of wealth at a global level. Security is conflictual and ultimately about compromise between competing interests (Marriage 2012). Understandings of both concepts are inseparable from who is speaking and to whom. Does the international community – and do different actors within this – define ‘development’ and ‘security’ differently from emerging powers, from state elites, from local elites, and those who would be considered to be poor and/or vulnerable?

Discursive shifts between these different levels and between actors within these are the essence of the development–security debate.

While opinions remain divided over how development should be delivered in fragile and conflict-affected settings, how closely to work with military and security actors, and for what ends, there is growing recognition that the
spaces for development have changed and that new models and approaches are needed to work effectively in these. In practice, development agencies and organisations increasingly recognise that development programmes that do not take security into account are unlikely to succeed and may even create harm for those suffering from violence. Judgments regarding the need for and effectiveness of development-security integration should be made in relation to how these address the insecurities experienced by poor and vulnerable groups. Enabling safety and security in people’s everyday lives and livelihoods is what development is fundamentally about in these contexts.

Far from keeping on the sidelines, development actors must be front and centre in discussions on when and how to link development with security, for whose benefit, with what consequences and for whom. While the projection of power and influence as well as promotion of trade and security ties have long been closely associated with development aid, renewed efforts to link development with security in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks ushered in a new politics of aid resembling those of the Cold War (Christian Aid 2004). Since then, tackling fragility and strengthening security have become core objectives of many bilateral and multilateral development donors. Policy coherence and coordination have been promoted in order to join up development resources in a larger framework to effect lasting change. The latest incursion in development-security thinking in the UK is the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (DSFID, FCDO and MoD 2011). The strategy formalises as policy an integrated cross-government approach to address conflict as signalled in the September 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

While many security and military actors recognise the need to incorporate aspects of development into wider responses to complex situations characterised by fragility, conflict and violence, some developmental actors – including developmentalist, international NGOs, mixed mandate relief agencies, human rights activists, and sections of civil society in aid-recipient contexts – have objected to the closer integration. They argue that it infringes on core development principles of independence and impartiality and dilutes the focus of aid resources that should be allocated according to need, not the security and political imperatives of external actors. Traditional development actors have also questioned the efficacy and effectiveness of development-security initiatives, arguing that they are poorly conceived and endanger development personnel in the course of their work. A string of attacks on aid workers, such as the brutal killing in 2004 of Margaret Hassan, the Irish head of CARE in Iraq, fostered a backlash against military-led development work, which aid practitioners argued had blurred the lines between development action and military intervention. Since 2006, the global incidence rate of violence against aid workers increased by 52 per cent, with Afghanistan, Somalia and Darfur ranking as the most dangerous contexts for aid work (PILNAP 2010). In 2010, 225 aid workers were killed, injured or kidnapped in violent attacks, compared to 85 in 2002 (Oxfam 2011).

Still, most governments have embraced development–security integration at strategic and programmatic levels. Development–security integration has gathered pace through the use of pooled funding, alignment of policy strategies across different government departments and the military, moulding of organisational cultures to promote better working relations and coordination across civilian governmental departments and security agencies and the military, and the piloting of experimental initiatives on the ground that use development resources to tackle the perceived causes of instability and conflict. Across OECD donor countries, there is a wide embrace of the whole-of-government approach (Patrick and Brown 2007; OECD 2006). The fact that an increasing proportion of official development assistance is directed toward fragile states means that development-security integration is becoming commonplace. While shifting geo-strategic priorities after 9/11 heightened the importance of fragile states in security approaches and frameworks, and for some offered a new ideological rationale for development aid, attention to the need

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**Figure 1: Timeline and influential events of strategic approaches to development in conflict regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Collapse of the Soviet Union and The End of a Bipolar World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>‘Agenda for Peace’ by Boutros Boutros Ghali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Kosovo begins civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>‘Causes of conflict and durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>‘Do No Harm’ is published by Anderson Human Security Network is established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>US-led invasion of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>OECD – ‘Principles of Good International Engagement’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>EU ‘Doctrine for Human Security’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>‘Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development… Resource Pack’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Guidelines for Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Do No Harm’ is published by Anderson Human Security Network is established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>NATO adopts comprehensive approach in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>September 11th terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>‘Responsibility to Protect’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>NATO creates CIMG policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>President Obama’s integrated Af-Pak strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>OECD – US shift in Iraq policy to a Joint Strategic Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>United Kingdom’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to address conflict and violence has been growing for some time, as signified by the 2011 World Development Report.

Developmentalist critiques of the so-called ‘securitisation of aid’ are falling behind the curve of rapid shifts happening in the political and security contexts of fragile and conflict-affected areas.

These raise new challenges for traditional development actors, including OECD donors and non-governmental organisations and sections of civil society in aid-recipient contexts. First, while the focus of development–security integration has been on the most fragile contexts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan, most violence now occurs outside classic conflict environments, which implies the need for a different approach to development–security integration. Fifteen of 56 lower-income countries in the World Bank’s 2011 list also appear on the OECD’s list of fragile states, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Angola and Pakistan. Aid volumes are much less significant in these contexts relative to other sources of foreign exchange and income growth. This raises critical questions around the scope for development assistance to influence more stable and peaceful social conditions.

Second, demographic change in fragile and failing states is putting pressure on entrenched political and governance structures and, hence, unsettling aid politics. Security sector reform has been a key focus of development–security integration since the 1990s, yet in places such as Sierra Leone it has had little effect on the youth. The interests and politics of the burgeoning youth population in fragile and conflict-affected states cannot be ignored, as events in the Arab Spring made clear (Ezbawy 2011). Jobs is the new watchword alongside security and justice in these contexts, yet it is unclear how to create broad-based employment for the youth. In the meantime, inequalities are worsening, straining governance structures and testing the responsiveness of development actors (Jolly, Sabates-Ucheeler and Chattopadhya 2009).

Third, policy processes are becoming more uncertain as the influence of traditional donors wanes. Recent experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia highlight the important role of regional players such as Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Newly important donors such as China, India and Brazil also exert considerable influence, which sometimes runs counter to the interests and principles of OECD donors, diverse as they are.

A ‘new deal’ is required to reshape development–security integration in light of these developments – one that recognises both the limits of understanding, influence and capacity to act in insecure environments and the importance of local providers of security and basic services.

This report is divided into the following sections. The first section examines the changing international and local political contexts for development–security integration and the major policy problems facing international donors. Section two discusses why current international policy responses are inadequate in this changing environment and calls for a ‘new deal’ in the way that development–security integration is conceived in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Section three assesses experiences from Kenya and Sierra Leone of combining development and security. Section four introduces two concepts – entrustment and brokerage – for debate and action to anchor a ‘new deal’, while the conclusion explores the practical challenges and implications of adopting a new approach for combining development with security that is embedded in local security needs.
For many development policymakers and practitioners, the incorporation of development within broader regimes for security and stabilization has challenged the idea of development aid being an instrument to reduce poverty that is targeted to the neediest and delivered by actors who are ‘impartial’ and ‘independent’. Although meanings of development are deeply contested, the idea of development as a disinterested, altruistic enterprise has long resonated with development planners, practitioners, and campaigner. Yet the political and security contexts for development–security integration are rapidly changing. Many donors now openly acknowledge the inherently political nature of development funding and by association the activities this supports – particularly in fragile states – and no longer treat aid as something technocratic and ‘neutral’. Still, some development stakeholders struggle to come to terms with this reality. For a ‘new deal’ to emerge, the shifting political and security environments of fragile and conflict situations and the implications of these changes for the political positioning of ‘development’ actors need to be known.

2.1 Greater multi-polarity, greater fluidity

The political context for development–security integration is increasingly fluid and shaped by an expanding array of actors. While traditional OECD donors have assumed a privileged position in international affairs, their influence is waning. Non-OECD donors such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey are expanding their engagement on issues of peace and conflict. Recent examples include China’s mediation efforts to avoid a resumption of full-blown war between Sudan and South Sudan and Turkey’s humanitarian and diplomatic engagements in southern Somalia, as described below. The OECD provides general indications and a set of principles to guide the directionality of development aid in fragile states. These include maintaining a focus on statebuilding as a central objective, promoting good governance, instilling accountability and transparency, reducing poverty, and ensuring aid activities do no harm, promoting non-discrimination and avoiding inadvertent exclusion of certain areas and groups in aid activities (see Box 1). Yet non-OECD donors such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, and by association the OECD provide a set of principles to guide the directionality of development aid in fragile states. These include maintaining a focus on statebuilding as a central objective, promoting good governance, instilling accountability and transparency, reducing poverty, and ensuring aid activities do no harm, promoting non-discrimination and avoiding inadvertent exclusion of certain areas and groups in aid activities (see Box 1).

Box 1 OECD: The 10 Fragile States Principles

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
4. Prioritise prevention
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid creating pockets of exclusion (‘aid orphans’)

In some cases, the political context for development–security integration is rapidly changing. For example, Ethiopia’s engagement is based on a core principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs, which in practice has meant that it has prioritised maintaining stable bilateral relations and supporting a top-down model of stability (Campbell, Lilie, and Thorpe et al. 2012). This makes the pursuit of and adherence to an agreed set of principles for ‘development’ in fragile and conflict-affected situations even more difficult.

The influence of rising powers such as Brazil, India, and Turkey as well as regional powers such as Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran is greatly changing the political space for development–security integration (Woods 2008: 19) explains that emerging donors are introducing competitive pressures into the existing system of international development assistance. They are weakening the bargaining position of western donors in respect of aid-receiving countries. This has meant that the influence of traditional OECD donors is becoming attenuated in politically unstable and conflict-affected contexts where they seek to intervene. Sri Lanka, which in recent years has been a large recipient of Chinese subsidised loans, is a clear example of this. Western donors in Sri Lanka have been in full retreat. Relations with its government led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa soured after it abandoned an internationally backed peace process and sought a military end to a long-running insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north of the country. The offensive culminated in the LTTE conceding defeat in May 2009. At the height of the fighting between January and April 2009, the UN estimated that around 6,500 civilians may have been killed and another 14,000 wounded. Displacement was widespread. Since then China has provided concessional loans to the Sri Lankan government to fund an infrastructure blitz to link the hinterlands with Colombo instead of pushing the need to strengthen security. Western donors have sought to promote a peacebuilding approach including pover-sharing and constitutional reform to protect the interests of minority communities.

In Somalia, Turkey has positioned itself as a key player in the country’s ongoing political negotiations as well as a humanitarian provider, although this is to the disquietude of some development and humanitarian actors. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in 20 years when he travelled with his family and a retinue of advisors to Mogadishu in August 2012. Turkey has since opened an embassy in Mogadishu and pressed the United Nations and other foreign missions to relocate their offices to the city, which is still mostly based in Nairobi. The Turkish government has financed a 400-bed hospital, provided garbage trucks for Mogadishu, and pledged to build a waste disposal facility, pave the road between Mogadishu’s airport and the city, renovate government buildings and rehabilitate agriculture and livestock-related infrastructure (Erdogan 2013). Turkish Airlines also began twice-weekly commercial flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu. Turkish engagement has made a lasting impression on Somali political leaders. Fadulcudsi Mohamed Ali, interim Prime Minister in the outgoing Transitional Federal Government, told a Western paper in July 2012: ‘Since the coming of Turkey there has been a paradigm shift… You can do it [reconciliation and warfare] simultaneously. You can create peace and stability by working on the security side, but also on the development side at the same time. That is what Turkey is successful at’. Yet Turkey’s expanding role in Somalia has been challenged as ‘politically naïve’ by some diplomats in Nairobi as well as humanitarians. The representative of an international development and relief organisation working in southern Somalia observed, ‘The UN has lost its relevance because of the Turks, Iranians and other non-traditional actors. The (former Transitional Federal Government, TFG) is playing everyone off against one another. The government has become stronger because of the multiplication of actors. You are either in or you’re out, is what the TFG tends to say. I would say that the UN has not pushed back more strongly against this… There is a pragmatism about what is happening and need to engage with it, but also a sense that engagement is not happening in a principled manner. Sometimes it is more important to take a principled stance – if Turks and Qataris act that’s fine but we [Western donor and aid agencies] won’t’.

The UN has lost its relevance because of the Turks, Iranians and other non-traditional actors. The former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is playing everyone off against one another. The government has become stronger because of the multiplication of actors. You are either in or you’re out, is what the TFG tends to say. I would say that the UN has not pushed back more strongly against this... There is a pragmatism about what is happening and need to engage with it, but also a sense that engagement is not happening in a principled manner. Sometimes it is more important to take a principled stance – if Turks and Qataris act that’s fine but we [Western donor and aid agencies] won’t.
Families flee their homes in Ajdabya, Libya, after prolonged fighting between rebels and forces loyal to Gaddafi.

It is of course not the volume of aid that matters, but what it does – and in particular how it is linked to other forms of investment. This is where aid – seen by some (mistakenly) as a pure form of giving – gets messy. Aid... is also linked to trade interests, investment opportunities, security and foreign policy agendas. And if this is what the US or UK does, why not China and the rest?

For example, in recent years Turkey has opened or upgraded 31 embassies in Africa, mainly to expand its commercial ties and provide a beachhead for Turkish private investment. Official statistics also indicate that Turkey’s trade volume with sub-Saharan Africa increased tenfold from US$742 million in 2000 to almost US$7.5 billion in 2011 (Farrell 2012). Deeper security, investment, trade and humanitarian engagements by non-OECD countries such as Turkey and China are challenging the prevailing dominance of OECD donors in a number of political contexts, but how this might change power relations and political formations within particular fragile and conflict-affected contexts is less certain.

This greater fluidity of aid relations in fragile and conflict-affected states is also apparent in the efforts of aid-recipient governments to organise and push for new aid priorities that closely couple development with security. The g7+ grouping representing the governments of 19 conflict-affected states endorsed a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011. The New Deal defines several overlapping areas of development and security cooperation (Box 2). At their core, these seek to resolve conflict while improving people’s security and strengthening their access to justice and gainful work.

Thus, even while many traditional donors have struggled to define and operationalise development–security agendas, political actors in aid-recipient countries affected by conflict have long realised that enabling safety and security in people’s everyday lives is what development is fundamentally about. Improvements in security and reducing conflict often rank among the top concerns of populations in fragile and conflict-affected states. Local understandings of ‘security’ may well differ from ‘security’ as it is conceived within broader global or regional security frameworks, which themselves are complex and multifaceted (Luckham 2009). Security for who is essential to understanding not only the power relations that permeate discrete interventions but also their likely effectiveness and implications for development actors. In Mogadishu, public security concerns centre on how to improve neighbourhood security, not hunting down terrorists. Likewise, in Kenya, where some Western allies of the government have pushed it to introduce controversial counter-terrorism measures and laws, criminal violence, impunity, and access to justice for the poor dwarf any public concern with terrorism and extremism. In Sierra Leone, while the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone has planned its exit strategy in relation to the 2012 national elections, conflict-affected communities still contend with issues of truth, reconciliation and violence.

The political context for development–security integration is also increasingly shaped by non-state violent groups and opposition actors, several of whom have grabbed the development mantle by currying public favour through the provision of basic services and delivery of social support. Prominent examples include the delivery of social welfare and services by Islamic social welfare organisations in the West Bank and Gaza, many of whom are allied with Hamas (Lind 2010) and the delivery of relief assistance to victims of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmiri Pakistan by members of militant groups.

The nexus of development–security is shifting. Despite efforts to integrate development and security – in all its complexity, there are limits to influence, capacity and knowledge needed to understand complex situations on the ground. Understanding the politics of complex situations of conflict and violence where ‘traditional’ development actors and donors may have little influence is a precondition for crafting effective aid interventions in these
promoting peace and stability and meeting the needs of the most vulnerable.

The challenge for development actors in these situations is to locate ways — both strategically and operationally — of working in conditions of mediated power and authority. This central need is often missed within statebuilding — the strategic framework and overriding objective for intervention in such contexts. Yet a range of recent experiences from fragile and conflict-affected situations shows that improvements in governance and security do not emanate from a central state that attains a monopoly on violence but rather from a constellation of non-state actors who form hybrid political orders, sometimes in partnership with formal state actors and governance structures.

In Somalia, a quasi-state that has achieved an impressive level of public security and reconstruction, successful statebuilding and peacebuilding emerged from below through non-state actors and the establishment of local institutions that built on the coupling of national and clan politics (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009). These local political arrangements provided better security for most people compared with formal state structures under the government of former Somali President Said Barre. Bradbury argues that what collapsed after its downfall was not a functioning state but rather an oppressive regime that in the words of Virginia Luling ‘was suspended above a society that would never have produced it and did not demand it’ and which for many Somalis was ‘an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harasing the rest of the population’ (Eubanks 2010).

In northern Kenya, local peacebuilding processes in the 1990s and early 2000s led by influential community members and local civil society working with district political-administrative officials, helped to reduce levels of violence. These were galvanised through local efforts and encouraged by the Kenyan state, which ceded authority to non-state actors to improve security in a region that was largely beyond its control (Menkhaus 2008).

Such successes contrast sharply with donor-supported statebuilding efforts in Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere, which have failed because they have not articulated with local processes or the ways in which power is constituted within local political orders. Healy and Hill (2010: 14) explain that in Yemen and Somalia ‘power is only partially structured through government ministries, if at all. Real power remains diffused among a host of local actors, with overlapping boundaries among clans, business people, Islamists of different hues, and a sizeable overseas diaspora’. The approach used in northern Kenya and Somalia draws on an idea of a ‘mediated state’ — rather different from the notion of a Weberian state that is so apparent in the statebuilding framework pursued by the aid mainstream. Drawing on recent political developments in the Horn of Africa, Menkhaus explains that the strategy of a mediated state is a government–civic partnership to execute core state functions and that, while not statebuilding, can contribute to building locally recognised and trusted modes of local governance. These are ‘intrinsically messy, contradictory, illiberal, and constantly renegotiated deals’ (Menkhaus 2008: 78). In a mediated state, ‘the government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions of public security, justice, and conflict management’ (Menkhaus 2008: 78). These local authorities ‘mediate’ relations between local communities and the state. He writes in this approach, the top–down project of building a central government and the organic emergence of informal political relations are not viewed as antithetical, but are instead harmonised or nested together in a negotiated division of labor. The nascent central state limits itself to a few essential competencies not already provided by local, private sector or voluntary sector actors.

He goes on to explain that so-called ‘local mediators’ gain recognition from the state by providing core functions of public security or other services demanded by local communities, and earning legitimacy as a result (Menkhaus 2008: 103).

Thus, while development–security initiatives are often quite localised, their effectiveness is contingent on actors, relationships, agendas, processes and events happening in wider political settings. Further, power is configured by competing stakeholders whose own authority is circumscribed and shifting, and not often allied with liberal notions that are at the heart of Western peacebuilding and conflict prevention work. Recognition of this realpolitik is too often absent in efforts to integrate development with security, as explained in the following section.

**3 Greater complexity, inadequate responses**

Greater multi-polarity and fluidity present many challenges for development–security integration. Many current integration efforts are framed in terms of stabilisation. In the years following the declaration of the War on Terror, stabilisation emerged as a doctrinal approach to managing threats emerging from areas that were thought to be ‘ungoverned’, such as Somalia and the Pakistan–Afghanistan borders, where it was feared that terror networks and extremist groups would organise and plan attacks. However, many subsequent stabilisation efforts — such as in Afghanistan — have not overcome constraints on influence, capacity and knowledge, and thus their effectiveness has been limited, as described below.

**3.1 The current framing of the development–security nexus**

Donor governments continue to pursue ways of integrating development and security as increasing volumes of development assistance are committed to fragile and conflict-affected contexts (see Box 3). Operationally, development and security are being combined through the use of pooled funding, policy alignment and the establishment of protocols for pairing analysis and planning activities in particular contexts, as well as transcending organisational cultures of ‘development’ and ‘security’ through the creation of liaison positions and regularising the exchange of information.

Stabilisation is the latest incarnation in thinking on how to combine development with security. It stabilisation approach stems from an understanding that political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent; failure in one risks failure in all others (OECD 2005). Therefore, effective responses to conflict and fragility must include an appropriate balance of political, security and development activities. The operationalisation of the stabilisation doctrine has been done through the whole-of-government approach.

**Stabilisation is the latest incarnation in thinking on how to combine development with security.**
where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives. (CECD 2006: 14) Humanitarians as well as some development stakeholders have strongly contested stabilisation. In the UK, the representative of an international NGO engaged in both development and humanitarian work commented, ‘I think the rolling out of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy will make it very dangerous for humanitarians. If you bring everything together, there is no humanitarian space’, adding, the project of stabilising societies is not a neutral project. It is about imposing a vision of what you want that society to look like. As long as there is this hypocrisy [within stabilisation agendas generally] that we need to preserve humanitarian space, even though it is fatally compromised, we won’t get anywhere.5

The centrality of the humanitarian imperative and being perceived as independent of competing political standpoints (apart from the aim of assisting those in need) are core principles of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the touchstone for humanitarian relief agencies. Yet these principles run counter to the objectives of development-security integration that form the base of peacebuilding and statebuilding work. An advocacy official for an international NGO that delivers humanitarian aid explained, In environments like the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, where there are pockets of war but also pockets where development is happening, an integrated approach doesn’t work. If I am working with the government in one area, but working with a rebel group in another, I may not be able to access all areas where assistance is needed if the overriding objective of the mission is a political one... Stabilising societies is taking a large-scale view. But in most fragile situations, the approach is a micro-level view. Every area is a micro context. You need to negotiate access separately with local actors, whoever these may be.6

Box 3 The merging of development and security in UK Overseas Aid

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In common with many other donors, reducing fragility and conflict has become one of the core aims of the UK’s bilateral development assistance. The 1997 International Development White Paper first mentioned that conflict was an impediment to economic progress and sustainable development (DFID 1997: 5). The same year, DFID established the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department. In subsequent years, there was an intensifying focus on conflict-affected contexts within DFID’s strategic thinking and operations. The new collaboration between DFID, FCO and MOD resulted in the setting up of the Stabilisation Unit, replacing what had been the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. Further, peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives were integrated within the mandates of each department, as well. For example, the DFID practice paper on Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations notes that DFID’s mandate is to strengthen institutional capacities to reduce and prevent conflict and human suffering and to reach the MDGs in situations of fragility and violence (DFID 2010b).

As a result, aid allocations to fragile states have expanded significantly, doubling over the period 2006–2011. The 2009 White Paper commits at least 30% of all new bilateral country aid to fragile states, with a focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Of all aid to developing countries, one third is allocated to fragile states. For some critics, this trend confirms that there is a ‘securitisation of aid’. The definitional criteria of overseas development assistance (ODA) has been relaxed to allow aid spending on some aspects of the security sector (i.e. SSR) but still excludes direct support to foreign militaries. In the United States, ODA managed by the Pentagon has jumped from 3.5 per cent of overall ODA spending in 1998 to 22 per cent in 2005 (Malan 2008). But there is no common use of reporting on foreign security assistance amongst DAC donors and it is therefore difficult to clearly identify any trend. In the UK, the International Development Act of 2002 has helped to ensure that potentially competing objectives of other foreign policy and national security priorities do not overwhelm development objectives.

The Chilcot inquiry, together with the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) mark an evolution in strategic thinking on how to couple development and security, with a greater emphasis on upstream conflict prevention and, implicitly, less emphasis on statebuilding.

The logic of integration nonetheless remains central to BSOS, and was recommended in the SDSR. BSOS seeks to: strengthen the UK government’s strategic assessment for early warning and prevention; create an Early Action Facility within the Conflict Pool incorporating both ODA and non-ODA funds to support the rapid deployment of UK resources in conflict situations; and expand the use of Stabilisation Response Teams that integrate military, police, civil servants and other experts—a mechanism that was deployed in Libya to support the National Transitional Council in Benghazi.

The UK: Percentage of total bilateral Overseas Development Assistance

- Humanitarian aid: 10%
- Action relating to debt: 17%
- Programme assistance: 8%
- Production: 6%
- Economic infrastructure: 44%
- Social and administrative infrastructure: 2%
- Other and unspecified: 2%
Debates around stabilisation and its implications for humanitarian action and local development work highlight the political nature of development–security integration. They also reveal the fragmented and constructed categories that external donors and agencies have created. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, these distinctions are often not so neat, hence the difficulty of seeking to carve out clearly separate fields of practice between development, humanitarian and security work.

3.2 Beyond stabilisation and statebuilding

Building and rebuilding institutions is now the core activity of most security–development interventions. Under the rubric of stabilisation and statebuilding, donors have focused on recreating a new political order that would reproduce a Western state-centric model of security and development. While earlier peacebuilding experiences have failed largely as a result of the lack of focus on institutional building, the current approach has many shortcomings, in particular the tension between human and state security priorities and the short-term political agenda to achieve this goal.

The international community has failed up to now to realise the limited influence, capacity and knowledge it can have through development–security integration. The focus on statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is symptomatic of this thinking. Rather, the key is to find ways to work alongside informal power structures that can often involve actors with decidedly illiberal aims. The international community has yet to find ways to address this gap in providing technical and governance support alongside more traditional security approaches.

Beyond stabilisation and statebuilding, development–security approaches in general suffer from linear and equilibrium thinking. Indeed, conflict is often correlated with fragility and is seen as an impediment to development rather than as something intrinsic to the dynamics and processes of change. For example, the UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy targets the tier of countries below the ‘fragile’ threshold to activate its early warning strategies. However, shocks may be more important than long-term drivers of fragility, as shown in the recent revolutions and uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Herman van Rompuy, President of the EU Council, noted, ‘The events in Tunisia and Egypt remind all of us that stability can lead to immobility. Betting on stability alone therefore cannot be the ultimate answer’. Overall, the underlying logic that development and security are mutually reinforcing is questionable. It is assumed that insecurity is anathema to development and that development can contribute to stability and prevent conflict. However, the resilience and even expansion of various forms of trade and marketing activity in Somalia show how markets do often continue to function in situations that are unstable and where there is no functioning central political authority. Economies continue to grow in so-called fragile states – sometimes rapidly – such as Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia and Côte d’Ivoire. Development transitions are often deeply fraught, giving rise to new forms of conflict and violence, rather than resulting in more peaceful and stable conditions. This critique essentially points to a poor understanding of political dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

The focus on stability also fails to qualify whose development and whose stability. While it may be already questionable whether development brings stability, this correlation ignores how the structure of society may have changed, and who benefits, and who loses from these transformations. This tendency to see a one-way relationship between development and conflict misses the potential impact of development (and elections) on conflict.

Overall, there is a significant gap between policy and practice (OECD 2011). While development and security planners alike are aware of the many challenges and contradictions inherent in implementing development–security initiatives, policy responses are dealt with in technocratic or strategic terms: increasing funding and political commitments or developing better technical knowledge of staff involved in reform (de Coning 2011). However, poor understanding of political dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected situations is a major impediment to crafting development–security responses that more effectively address the forms of violence and insecurity that undermine development and wellbeing for people living in these areas.

4 Learning from the ground: development–security integration in Kenya and Sierra Leone

Much development–security work is localised. However, debates on development–security integration often focus on overarching policy and strategy, thus tending to highlight differences in broad principles and ideologies rather than shared difficulties of responding more effectively in complex political and security contexts. Insights are missing from the ground where development and security actors converge as well as work separately on a range of objectives. Drawing from examples in Kenya and Sierra Leone, this section critically assesses the experiences of discrete initiatives that sought to combine development with security. In both countries, development has been incorporated over a long period into wider responses to conflict, instability and violence. Yet the push for development–security integration in Kenya and Sierra Leone has arisen from very different places.

In Kenya, donors have supported a variety of initiatives to address the perceived priority of radicalisation and violence, which are nested in wider...
responses to internal conflict in the country as well as instability in Somalia. The case study examines a DFID-supported initiative in Kenya’s Coast Province that operated through a remarkable degree of trust and ownership with local civic society groups, who redefined both the implied understanding of ‘security’ in the programme as well as approaches to address locally felt insecurities. The case study shows how global security concerns are filtered through a desire to both prevent a recurrence of election-related violence and engage thoughtfully in a complex sub-national political economy marked by the drug trade and ethnicised political violence.

Sierra Leone is widely viewed as one of the more successful cases of post-conflict reconstruction, which has been spearheaded in part through the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone. Since the civil war officially ended in 2002, the country has avoided a relapse into wide-scale conflict, and successfully organised national elections in 2007 and 2012. Yet significant challenges remain, including youth marginalisation and violence carried out by gangs and ‘secret societies’. There have been effective local efforts to address these challenges, which implicitly link development with security. Yet, so far, these efforts are largely disconnected from larger peacebuilding operations in the country.

4.1 Risky business: crafting a role for development in Kenya’s changing political and security contexts

4.1.1 Background

Kenya embodies the challenge faced by official development actors across many contexts that were long thought to be relatively peaceful and stable: how to adapt development responses to the changing dynamics of internal politics and violence while also maintaining a position that does not compromise fundamental principles and public attitudes of development as advancing wider public interests and needs. The Horn of Africa emerged as a frontline in the Global War on Terror as attention shifted beyond Afghanistan and Iraq to Somalia and its neighbours. Several countries including the US and UK quietly pressured the Kenyan government to institute a raft of counter-terrorism measures that were strongly opposed by sections of Kenyan civil society as well as Muslim leaders. The involvement of multiple foreign governments in renditions of terror suspects and the passing of draconian anti-terrorism laws in donor countries was feared were being recruited by terrorist groups. Youth were enlisted by different political factions to carry out violence in the aftermath of the disputed election in December 2007. Since then, the Kenyan government and many bilateral development agencies have sought to tailor initiatives for young people to prevent conflict. The Kenyan government established a Youth Development Fund that provides low-interest loans to youth through banks. ‘Yes Youth Can’, a $45 million US-funded five-year programme, supported the establishment of a national youth forum composed of elected representatives as well as an innovation fund for youth ‘economic empowerment’.

Sporadic violence compounds fears that Kenya’s political institutions are ill-equipped to respond to youth unemployment and widening inequalities. There were development initiatives in the early years of the Ujar on Terror to support outreach to Muslim youth who it was feared were being recruited by terrorist groups. Youth were enlisted by different political factions to carry out violence. The Horn of Africa emerged as a frontline in the Global War on Terror as attention shifted beyond Afghanistan and Iraq to Somalia and its neighbours. Several countries including the US and UK quietly pressured the Kenyan government to institute a raft of counter-terrorism measures that were strongly opposed by sections of Kenyan civil society as well as Muslim leaders. The involvement of multiple foreign governments in renditions of terror suspects and the passing of draconian anti-terrorism laws in donor countries was feared were being recruited by terrorist groups. Youth were enlisted by different political factions to carry out violence in the aftermath of the disputed election in December 2007. Since then, the Kenyan government and many bilateral development agencies have sought to tailor initiatives for young people to prevent conflict. The Kenyan government established a Youth Development Fund that provides low-interest loans to youth through banks. ‘Yes Youth Can’, a $45 million US-funded five-year programme, supported the establishment of a national youth forum composed of elected representatives as well as an innovation fund for youth ‘economic empowerment’.

Development is having a great impact. In the north, communities are trying to position themselves in how they’ll fit in with the county government system. In Moyale [on the Kenya–Ethiopia border], it is about whether the Gabra or Boran will build a coalition with other tribes to capture the government. It is competition for political power. For the marginalised counties, people are looking at the resources that will flow to the counties. Clans are positioning themselves to get a share of the cake. In Moyale, people have burned farms, schools and homes. People were being killed on site. They [attackers] were destroying ID and voting cards… Because of the expectations that there will be devolution of resources to counties, this is fueling a scramble. [Local-level political leaders] are eager to get a chunk of the funds.11

Y Ugoman preparing vegetables share a joke in Kibera, Kenya. Kibera is one of Africa’s largest slums and home to some 1 million people.
Over time there has been a shift from designing development–security initiatives for narrow counter-terrorism purposes to reshaping development–security initiatives to address the factors contributing to violence and instability in Kenya’s fast-changing political economy. These responses are still inflected by the security interests of donor countries to promote regional stability and thwart terrorist activity, but they are filtered through more immediate concerns to prevent Kenya fragmenting along ethnic and regional lines. However, development donors are coming up against limits to understanding the intricacies of political and security dynamics, particularly at the local level. The representative of a European bilateral agency explained, “Very few internationals have the scope or intelligence to understand county politics in this country. We don’t know what happens, we only know who says what. If you look at previous election-related violence, you look at the candidates for parliament and president to understand the situation. But there is a far more complex picture now.”

4.1.2 DANIDA Peace, Security and Development programme in Coast Province, Kenya

The coastal belt of Kenya centreing on the port of Mombasa has been an important focus of development and security efforts in Kenya since the declaration of the ‘War on Terror’. Predominantly Muslim, the coastal belt has a unique social and political history rooted in the region’s Swahili-speaking societies as well as its administration by the Portuguese and the Sultans of Oman and Zanzibar in Kenya’s pre-colonial period. Security concerns have focused on Kenya’s weak intelligence and ineffective policing and prosecution capacities, making it difficult to track and detain terror suspects. There is also concern that a ‘complicit society’ engendered by underdevelopment and political marginalisation of the coastal island population since the country’s independence in 1963 has tolerated the presence of extremists. The Coast was spared the worst of the post-election violence in 2008 but since then violence has flared around a complex set of issues, including regional inequalities and the perceived domination of ‘upcountry’ elites, land tenure disputes, and large-scale ‘development’ – such as the establishment of large commercial farms and the development of a new port facility at Lamu – that preclude local interests. A movement for secession of the Coast region, spearheaded by the Mombasa Republic Council (MRC), has gained momentum. The MRC has grown into a potent political force, morphing into a network that is repeatedly implicated the MRC whenever violence flares, and also, in many cases, against limits to understanding the intricacies of political and security dynamics, particularly at the local level. The representative of a European bilateral agency explained, “Very few internationals have the scope or intelligence to understand county politics in this country. We don’t know what happens, we only know who says what. If you look at previous election-related violence, you look at the candidates for parliament and president to understand the situation. But there is a far more complex picture now.”

The Peace, Security and Development (PSD) programme was initiated by the Danish embassy in Nairobi in 2005 under the rubric of the Danish government’s broader framework of the Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance for the Fight against New Terrorism. It began as an experimental initiative of the Danish ambassador to Kenya and was precipitated by the crisis that emerged following the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. A specific objective of the programme is ‘stabilisation in Kenya and the region by the promotion of human security through “soft” interventions aimed at countering radicalisation and violence’. An official familiar with the programme remarked:

This programme recognises there are unique challenges in Coast Province. There are ingredients for radicalisation. So the programme is working in different areas where it can promote dialogue, help the citizens in the area to come together and improve our welfare so that you reduce the interest of anyone in activities that may foster or encourage them to go into radical activities. By radicalisation, I am choosing not to say “terrorism”, even though there is a relation. If you look at the election process in the area around the ‘war on terror’, it was an attempt to address global and local security concerns alike. While global and local security concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive, too often the overt pursuit of external political and security interests through development, and the perception that development donors are aligned with states in the region that are antagonistic to the interests of some communities and populations, belies any notion of development–security initiatives serve local needs and priorities.

DANIDA officials approached a number of civil society groups in the Coast Region to help shape the programme. At times, the initiative’s Clerics’ Council (CICC), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Likoni Community Development Programme (LICODEP), Ujamaa Centre and the Council of Imams and the military police (LPU) worked across a range of local security issues and curried local favour and legitimacy. When DANIDA began working with these groups, not all of them were legally registered and some relied on volunteer time and contributions, yet all of them were rooted in grassroots networks. Entrusting these local partners to help define the security issues to be addressed was a way for the Danish government to negotiate the delicacies of pursuing its political and security interests in a local political setting in Kenya where its influence was negligible and perceptions of its power were unfavourable amongst the targeted populations. Following an initial meeting, the groups went about for one year tasked with helping to define their respective priorities and activities for working in the programme. The groups redefined the programme’s scope to focus on locally felt security concerns, including facilitating inter-faith dialogue, monitoring human rights abuse by the police and other actors, and preventing and resolving conflict. At the outset, the groups insisted that any reference to ‘terrorism’ be removed from official programme documentation as this did not reflect the interests and concerns of Coast populations and that to be relevant the programme needed to articulate with local conflicts, tensions and frustrations among them. They wanted to contribute to security. For example, raids in Muslim neighbourhoods by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit had caused public outrage and the intimidation of Muslim leaders whose support was vital to the programme. Moreover, the police would hold terror suspects for lengthy periods in undisclosed locations, moving them frequently between different police stations so that it was more difficult for them to maintain contact with their families or legal representatives. Some were sent to Somalia and Ethiopia and, in one instance, to Guantanamo Bay. In 2011 the PSD was formally incorporated into the governance portfolio of DANIDA in Kenya and funding was extended for a further five-year period, with an overarching objective to enhance engagement with government and society groups in the Coast region to promote peace and security as the basis for democratic development at the coastal areas of Kenya. "Working separately, the groups have partnered with local religious leaders, elders and youth to organise forums to discuss community security and inter-faith cooperation, peace sermons (khuwus), football matches, and poetry competitions in schools and madrassas (Islamic schools). The radicalisation of youth is a widely shared concern amongst all of the PSD groups, and was an important rationale for introducing the programme. Youth were enlisted by political leaders to perpetrate violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s last disputed national elections in 2008; some youth have travelled to southern Somalia drawn by the prospect of being paid to fight for armed groups such as Al-Shabaab. LICODEP, a community organisation focusing on youth issues, is different from the other PSD groups in that it operates only in the Likoni and Kuau area south of Mombasa that are the base for extremist groups such as Kaya Bombo, which was involved in political violence that rocked the Coast in 1997. LICODEP established a microcredit facility to provide capital for at-risk youth to start businesses. Similarly, a pilot initiative of CICCU, the Kuale Inter-Faith Youth Association, began as a self-help project in 2006 and now provides small business loans to youth. Between 2009 and 2008, 2,000 youth benefited from the scheme, starting businesses such as motorcycle taxi firms (boda boda) and beauty shops as well as investing in farming. The initiative has since branched out into an independent, youth-led initiative providing business skills and credit opportunities to youth.

The PSD groups address issues having a strong resonance with local communities. An evaluation of the PSD found that the organisations were highly motivated, competent, and had successfully cultivated the local legitimacy needed for the programme’s success (Rölli Consulting 2013). The PSD-supported groups feel empowered to address their needs, and engage in shaping their activities and the partnerships they form on the ground. While PSD is rooted in an anti-terrorism framework which envisions the groups contributing to Danish security interests, in practice the groups have...
encountered little fiddling by Danish officials in setting their agendas and cultivating ties with local stakeholders, which have included armed youth, mosque preachers, and terrorist suspects. An evaluation of the project concluded that the high degree of local ownership was an encouraging sign of the potential sustainability of these groups, even though they relied substantially on Danish support (Fdbii Consulting 2009).

To explain how the groups were able to make space for addressing locally defined security interests, a Kenyan analyst who had studied the PSD programme argued:

The first person who kicks the ball [the Danish government] is not what matters but rather it is the interactions and decisions between actors that make all the difference to what happens. The PSD-supported groups reshaped the project in their own interests, depending on their own contacts and other resources they could bring in. This greatly affected the outcomes that were seen.22

Ironically, the success of the PSD programme – now a pillar of DFNDR’s governance work in Kenya – raises new challenges. In the current phase of the programme, DFNDR is seeking to professionalise the PSD groups through training in financial and programme management. The PSD groups now must reconcile this greater emphasis on professionalism with attributes of being nimble and accountable to local actors in Coast Province.

Although Danish security interests were key motivations for starting the PSD,23 Danish officials have tried carefully to embed the programme in local security concerns. Still, the enmeshing of Danish political and security interests in the PSD has been criticised (Bachmann and Honke 2009). One aid official in Nairobi who was familiar with the PSD programme commented, ‘You must also understand the political benefit of this programme for Denmark. Whenever these anti-Islam sentiments crop up [in Denmark], our relationship with these groups allows us to quell any protests that might come up.’24 At times Denmark has struggled to address the inherent contradictions arising from its support for the PSD and its wider political and commercial engagements in Kenya. For example, some PSD local actors have strongly opposed the Kenyan government’s plans to develop a port facility at Lamu, which has attracted interest from the Danish shipping giant Maersk. Rid, even when used innovatively in the case of the PSD programme, cannot be neatly separated out from security and trade interests, or from the wider political economies of places where development donors seek to intervene. yet this does not preclude the possibility of external assistance enabling worthwhile activities around local security priorities in challenging contexts.

4.2 Security first, development forgotten in Sierra Leone: is the ground not teaching us what it is all about?

4.2.1 Sierra Leone, a ‘success’ story for UNIPSIL and its Agenda for Change

Sierra Leone is viewed by the international community as a success story in terms of the development–security nexus. ‘One of Africa’s most successful post-conflict states’ (Africa Research Institute 2011), it has one of the highest youth unemployment rates worldwide. An estimated 60–70 per cent of young people do not have a job, and there are few prospects for a regular and stable income. It is the world’s 11th poorest country (UNDP 2010), ranking near the bottom of the Human Development Index. This may be surprising given the country’s mineral wealth, particularly in diamonds and iron ore. However, donor-driven mineral-for-development reforms have failed to significantly reduce poverty due to elite-driven patron–client networks surrounding mineral exploitation (Zulu and Wilson 2012). Thus, even though international observers have hailed Sierra Leone’s progress in preventing a relapse into wide-scale conflict, this has not translated into significant development progress.

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was created in 2008 as a follow-up to the peacekeeping mission (UNOMIL). UNIPSIL, along with UN agencies, funds and programmes working as the UN Country Team in Sierra Leone, adopted a Joint Vision under which they agreed to combine their efforts to bring together the UN’s various political, humanitarian and development mandates. The Joint Vision has 21 programmes defined with four programmatic priorities, namely the economic integration of rural areas, the economic and social integration of the youth, an equitable access to health services and an accessible and credible public service. The Joint Vision defines the UN’s contribution to implementing the Government’s Agenda for
Change', the government’s poverty reduction strategy. Key strategic priorities are underpinned by measures to consolidating peace, ensure good governance and develop an enabling environment for economic growth.

4.2.2 Youth marginalisation and violence
Development–security integration in post-war Sierra Leone, encapsulated in the objectives of the Joint Vision and the Agenda for Change, is also thought to have had limited success as the peace process relapsed into widespread violent conflict. Yet this overlooks many challenges that still threaten renewed conflict in the country, including youth marginalisation and its continuing ramifications for unmet aspirations of youth.

In Sierra Leone’s diamond mining district, local informal governance closely couples actions of the traditional elders and the youth. The youth assert what they consider to be their personal rights to dispose of real property at the expense of older practices that subject property to the dictates and rights to dispose of real property at the expense of older practices that subject property to the dictates and interests of ‘customary authorities’ that many view as corrupt. The decision by the international community to restore the Paramount Chief system of local administration in Sierra Leone and their customary rights to land is not without problems and has created and continues to create conflict and violence between the traditional elders and the youth.

Luurhereas official approaches to development–security integration assume first the need to establish peace followed by development and a resumption of ‘normality,’ local informal governance shows this is a myth. Local informal governance closely couples actions that might be regarded as ‘development’ with the maintenance of order and efforts to stymie tensions and violence. While the prevention of a resumption of wide-scale conflict might suggest that development–security integration has indeed succeeded in Sierra Leone, this masks wider structural issues including the unmet aspirations of youth, their continued marginalisation, and localised violence.

The youth Commission is now finally alert to the need to build youth self-esteem and promote their voice in policy spaces. They have set up youth advisory committees and empower them to manage and monitor projects within the community.

4.2.3 On the ground: an alternative to official development–security integration
In the Eastern and Southern provinces – an area rich in mineral resources especially alluvial diamond mining – many ex-combatants never participated in DDR programmes. The central government remains quite suspicious of these combatants, as most of them were part of the CDF (Civil Defence Forces). International and national efforts to integrate development and security have had little impact on the ground in this part of Sierra Leone. An executive of the Bike Riders Association (BRA) in Boasia Toun, Bo district, commented:

No one contacted us and we believe there are many independent entities in the Youth Ministry. The new formed Commission, but we are constantly marginalised because we are either former combatants or we are maybe in a village or possibly because we have tried to create some form of employment for ourselves and our compatriots…We are gradually concluding that the government only helps those youths who are involved in politics or who do not use their own initiative to start any business or create employment – or that it is a crime to be ingenious.

While youth are still viewed as a risk group, they have developed their own networks (Fanthorpe and Maconocho 2010). These are often organised around the discrete economic interests and livelihood needs of youth, such as the BRA, the Cassette Sellers Association (CSAs), the Swiss Sellers Association (SSA), and the Belgium Sellers Association (BSA). The BRA, for example, represents a group of mostly ex-combatants, mainly from the CDF that were transporting troops and now use their skills as taxi bike drivers, while the SSA works on foreign currency exchange. These examples show how the youth, even before the involvement of NR/WCM, have managed to organise themselves to address their needs without any form of government or donor intervention. Solidarity has developed among the youth members of these associations. While most observers regard these associations as an encouraging sign of peaceful development, these also play a role in providing security and safety at the local level through a set of informal rules and through their collaboration with the security forces. In a post-conflict local context, one can see that...
A New Deal? Development and Security in a Changing World

Toward a New Deal

Overall as well as the successful holding of presidential elections, the main criteria for gauging the success of Sierra Leone’s internationally backed peacebuilding mission is based on the improving security situation in the country overall as well as the successful holding of presidential and legislative elections. The peace accord, which involved the two major political parties (All People’s Congress – APC, and Sierra Leone People’s Party – SLPP) and the Paramount Chiefs, who are the District Chiefs in Sierra Leone and nonpartisan Members of Parliament, enabled a return to stability. However, both the 2007 and 2012 elections mark a clear continuity in the political use of violence that existed in the pre-war years. Old-guard politicians, with the support of ex-combatants, still dominate the country’s electoral politics, with many young people calling ‘political tricks’ and ‘democratic’ leaders to the question of whether there has been any real transformation in Sierra Leone’s governance and political structures (Christensen and Utas 2008).

It is widely assumed that security-development integration was a success due to the nature of the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding approaches and its integrated Joint Vision. However, while exploring the impact of some specific programmes of the UN Joint Vision, the limited influence and capacity of these at the ground level became clear. Development and security integration was happening and relatively successful, but not as a direct effect of these programmes. The ex-combatants and youth more generally, who have been excluded from the internationally led peace accord and have been viewed as a risk group by the government and the international community, have managed to create their own and livelihood strategies while playing an important role in the maintenance of order at the local level. As it currently stands, Sierra Leone has managed to contain violence. The question remains whether the local governance and associational life arrangements described above will be strong enough after the departure of the UN mission to sustain a political order that is legitimate and peaceful.

One could raise two doubts in this respect. The first one is that the successful transition to democracy has reinstated rather than replaced the key actors and players in the political game. It is therefore unclear how these actors will react and behave after the retreat of the international community. UNPILS’s exit strategy is related to the successful outcome of the elections. This is significant as the UN has been there for more than 15 years. The peace accord was strongly internationally driven and it is unclear how the two key political parties will behave after the departure of the UN mission. The second one relates to the conception of the internationally driven security-development nexus. It has been concentrated in a narrow and linear way on stability and focusing on key ex-combatants, ignoring the wider security and development concerns of the youth. While an alternative form of development-security integration is taking place on the ground, it is unclear how this local hybrid order will be able to recreate legitimate and popular institutions given its disconnect with internationally driven initiatives.
The spaces for development in fragile and conflict-affected areas are qualitatively different from contexts that are peaceful and stable. The question is not whether development and security should be linked but rather how, with what consequences and for whose benefit. Linking development with security need not be about pursuing the security interests of donor countries. In Kenya, linking development with security is regarded as necessary to address political violence that is inflicted with ethnic, regional and generational differences, and which closely intermingles with criminal violence and the drug trade. Efforts to combine development with security in Kenya’s Coast Province have prioritised local security needs such as conflict resolution and promoting accountability in politics and policing. Development and security are closely integrated in informal governance and associational life in Sierra Leone, as well, irrespective of official international strategy in the country to promote an integrated peacebuilding approach. In both countries, while there have been some local successes in improving development-security integration, their fate remains tied to wider political dynamics.

A different approach is required to integrate development and security, one that moves beyond the polarising views of stabilisation and statebuilding and emphasises the need to take local context as the starting point with international actors as it requires specific local knowledge, flexibility, and long-term sustained commitment. As Faria (2012: 12) notes, ‘International actors must base their priorities on an understanding of the interaction and mediating processes between state and society at their various levels, as well as between social groups.’ There is no prescribed set of measures, policies or practices to guarantee that development-security responses result in more peaceful outcomes. The OECD Fragi States Principles emphasise the need to take local context as the starting point and align with local priorities. Understanding local culture and context, being adaptive, and empowering local counterparts are emphasised in the UK Stabilisation Unit’s guidance on how to deliver stabilisation activities (Stabilisation Unit, 2013). Political and conflict analysis, as well as the use of a ‘bottom-up’ approach that engages with non-state and community-level institutions, are core elements of an integrated approach to statebuilding and peacebuilding outlined in the DFID Building Peaceful States and Societies practice paper.

This suggests that a ‘new deal’ is required, one that provides an alternative vision of development-security integration grounded in local security needs and priorities, diverse and conflictual as these often are in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In Kenya’s Coast Province, linking development with security is necessary to address violence affecting the poor that is enmeshed in ethnically divided political divisions, widening socioeconomic inequalities and uncertainties engendered by political devolution. In Sierra Leone, the failure of internationally supported peacebuilding to engage with the needs of youth more wideley – and not just those of ex-combatants – threatens to give rise to new violence. A ‘new deal’ will put the safety and security of citizens first and find ways to deal with situations in which diverse and competing claims to power and various spheres of authority co-exist, overlap and intertwine. For development-security integration to be effective, it must create a new social contract between the individuals and the community and then between the community and the state before attempting to address broader state–society relations (Leonard, 2013). The key operational question is to what extent international actors have sufficient expertise and contextual knowledge to carry out effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding work at the local level. A bottom-up approach is necessary but fraught with risks, not least because of intricate power dynamics at the local level, which are often hard for outside observers to see and understand. The international community all too often finds itself entangled in local agendas over which it has limited control and which can have perverse outcomes. Local actors, be they politicians, the military and police, local armed groups or chiefs, can be extremely resourceful in diverting external assistance to support their own local (and not necessarily peaceful) agendas. There is a real risk of failure. Moreover, within aid cultures, there is a profound resistance to taking risks and failing (Bellagio Initiative, 2013). This risk aversion in part has intensified owing to anti-terrorism legislation and associated regulations since the September 11th attacks that prohibit material support to ‘terrorist’ organisations and extremists (Kibedi and Lind, 2009). Yet the very aversion to risk that permeates development aid is an important reason why so many development-security interventions have failed or have had only limited outcomes. As a Kenyan analyst noted, ‘One of the biggest weaknesses [of development-security work] is that we fail to see that failure is necessary for development.’24
5.1 Working with the grain

Taking risks is precisely what development actors need to do in order to uncover new approaches and ways of working that will have an impact. Below we propose two concepts – brokerage and entrustment – that could be used to help anchor a ‘new deal’ encompassing different approaches and better ways of working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The crux of these is to find ways of working with the grain in situations of mediated political authority.

5.1.1 Brokerage

Brokerage involves actions to build a shared understanding amongst actors whose interests may vary significantly and whose capacities to act in support of these interests may be unequal. Brokerage has been used to highlight the agency of social actors in building social, political and economic roles rather than simply following normative scripts (ibid: 12). ‘Broker’ is a concept that is also important in literature on social capital, in which it is used to describe actors who are uniquely positioned to ‘bridge’ different sets of actors and interests. In social capital studies, ‘brokerage is about coordinating people between whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust’ (Burt 2005: 156).

Brokerage is instructive for how to shape development–security responses in situations that are characterised by fragmented authority and where power is mediated through local processes to reconcile the interests of different actors. Rather than predetermining security outcomes and the governance arrangements that sustain these, development–security initiatives are likely to be more effective where they seek to support locally brokered agreements as well as spaces for such agreements to be continually reassessed and negotiated. Aid funders by definition cannot act as brokers in most fragile and conflict-affected settings because of their political ties and associations with discrete interests. Yet as a concept it is helpful for directing attention to what entrusted partners in these settings can achieve. Facilitating negotiations, trust building and supporting conditions for dialogue to continue are all roles that local development partners can fulfil, provided the right external support. These also contribute to strengthening governance and local agreements that improve security and safety.

Brokerage as a practical concept has two broad meanings. Firstly, it has been thought of as a tool for donors to deal with complex situations where their influence is limited. Another use of the term, by West African anthropologists, is how local agents can act as brokers between outside aid actors and locals. In Sierra Leone, Local Unit Commanders have linked international actors and youth, whose active participation is critical for successful peacebuilding but who are also difficult to reach. In Kenya, the approach taken by DANIDA is to fund trusted local partners who in turn provide platforms for dialogue and action on locally identified security concerns.

5.1.2 Entrustment

Within development, entrustment is the principle of shifting real powers and capacities for action to levels of decision-making and organisational ability that are much nearer to populations and groups that are the stated focus of intervention. Entrustment encapsulates ideas of participation as well as subsidiarity. It embraces the idea that better development outcomes are likely to arise from more inclusive processes where there is a transfer of not only funds and responsibilities to ‘lower’ levels but also trust in locally developed analysis and understanding of development challenges and solutions.

Although the idea of entrustment is commonly used within development and aid work – usually in the sense of sharing resources and responsibilities with a partner who delivers development – there is little scholarly work on entrustment as a concept to steer aid practice. Ribot writes about entrustment in the context of accommodating multiple interests in decentralised approaches to natural resources management and specifically as a way to empower local government and build up its capacities. Ribot (2001: 334) uses the term in the sense of ‘transferring powers to’ and as a way to conceptualise the relationship of local government to both central government as well as populations they serve: ‘entrustment with powers is a key element in creating productive local government’ (ibid: 17). While there remains a danger of lapsing into a top-down view in which international actors ‘entrust’ local people, entrustment is conceived as an alternative to externally orchestrated ‘participation’.

Entrustment moves beyond glib assertions of the need to ‘empower’ local actors, as it proposes to transfer to local actors the powers not only to make decisions but also to define and assess problems as well as the resources to act on these. Operationally, entrustment can radically shift the practical focus of aid inputs. This was the case in the Peace, Security and Development Project supported by DANIDA, Denmark’s development cooperation agency, in the Coast Province of Kenya. Entrusting local partners to define the scope of PSD entailed recalibrating the project away from an anti-terrorism purpose and instead to focus on interventions that addressed interrelated threats to people’s everyday safety and security.
Aid agencies have not overreached in linking development and security. Development in fragile and conflict-affected areas is very different from development in stable and peaceful areas – the same goes for security. Fid stakeholders have tinkered at the edges when what is needed is a wholesale reinvigoration of development and security. With increasing volumes of aid directed to fragile and conflict-affected states, the issue is not whether development and security should be linked but rather in what ways, for whom and with what consequences?

Powder is fragmented in conflict and conflict-affected areas, which makes it much more difficult for outsiders to operate. This knowledge, capacity and power of traditional OECD donors to influence long-lasting change in these places is limited. Donors should be far more explicit about when they cannot and should not intervene, as well as about when and how they should.

6.1 Overcoming challenges

Any new deal is about new ways of doing development and security, ways that will increasingly mainstream as development aid focuses more and more on fragile and conflict-affected areas. There are four key changes that aid agencies need to make. First, they need to commit more staff to the field in recognition of the localised nature of the issues. While there is a case for increasing the size of aid bureaucracies to more effectively manage funds directed to trusted local partners, moving aid personnel out of capital cities to regional centres will help aid organisations to learn more about the contexts in which they seek to intervene. One possible model is the ‘American Presence Posts’, which are very small US diplomatic facilities usually staffed by a single foreign service officer in outlying major cities and regions. While these are used for diplomatic and commercial purposes, there is clear advantage to establishing similar decentralised posts for the purposes of improving the delivery of official development aid.

Second, aid agencies need to recruit staff with complementary skills in security, diplomacy, brokering and negotiation. Different types of staff than currently exist in aid bureaucracies are needed. Proficiency in accessing and interpreting information in complex environments as well as the skills to continuously manage the relationships that provide such knowledge are required. This is especially important when trusted local partners assume a far greater responsibility in analysing a problem and shaping and implementing an approach to address it.

Third, aid agencies must be prepared to take more calculated risks, finding ways of pooling risk with other actors to minimise political fallout at home but not in ways that weaken accountability to aid-recipient populations. Operationalising entrustment and brokerage will require that traditional OECD development actors reassess the trade-off between ensuring outcomes and taking risks. Implicit in both concepts is risk, and the need for specific local knowledge, flexibility and long-term sustained commitment. Many efforts to combine development with security have disappointing results because of an institutionalised aversion to risk and to failing. And there are many reasons why actors cut from a more traditional ‘development’ cloth are unable to take more risks. These include the need to ensure the safety and security of development personnel, local partners and their respective governments rather than to act effectively at the micro level. Much development-security efforts acknowledge the need for local participation or ownership. Greater insight and guidance is required on how to create constructive local partnerships as well as to minimise the impediments that make it difficult to nurture a real sense of ownership amongst local security stakeholders. Renewing commitment to local partnerships entails taking risks, and sometimes these will fail. Recognising and accepting this is an important step toward realising a ‘new deal’.

Fourth, aid agencies should resist rotating staff. The lack of intimate knowledge of fragile and conflict-affected states is a major impediment to reinventing development in ways that promote the security of the poor. Indecently, donors have contributed to the problem by moving to establish in-house professional cadres, with technical advisers rotating every few years.

What is often required alongside technical expertise is a more rounded knowledge and understanding of the policies, societies and histories of particular places.
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## Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CiCC</td>
<td>Coast Interfaith Clerics’ Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIPK</td>
<td>Council of Imams and Preachers Kenya</td>
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<td>DRAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DRIIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>LiKONI</td>
<td>Likoni Development Programme</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MUHURI</td>
<td>Muslim Human Rights Institute</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCRRR</td>
<td>National Commission for Resettlement, Reintegration and Reconstruction (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierre Leone People’s Party</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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