## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Enemy Within</td>
<td>Kerry Gibson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current violence is more damaging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and there are fewer support networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Suffer Little Children</td>
<td>Noreen Ramsden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence is very traumatic for children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and thousands need rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mental Health Care for Victims</td>
<td>Paraskevi Stavrou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government has at last recognised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the importance of health care. A service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>driven policy is needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Post Election Conflict in KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Antoinette Louw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'New' elements in the conflict have in fact been</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>part of the problem for several years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The Nowhere People</td>
<td>Anthony Minnaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence has displaced thousands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>but little is known of these people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Prison Politics</td>
<td>Marie Wentzel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In just three months, prison riots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wreaked destruction and death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>A Ticket to Ride</td>
<td>Suzi Torres &amp; Anthony Minnaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic pressures and competition over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>routes have caused more taxi violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political meaning

It is not simply the overt forms of the violence which have psychological consequences. Even more importantly, it is the meaning ascribed to the experience which mediates psychological reactions.

While we often mistakenly imbue children with lack of political knowledge, it seems clear that their political ideas are fundamental in moulding their psychological response to political violence. In the 1980s, there was a clearly defined enemy and a clearly understood rationale for 'the struggle' against apartheid.

Children living in the townships at this time would also have experienced the power and courage expressed through the political climate of resistance. Younger children often responded to the high levels of energy expressed and translated it into a personal feeling of power and excitement.

It is unclear to what extent this excitement did not also serve as an outlet for anxiety about the violence itself, and the powerful feelings as a defence against powerlessness. Even young children often show the less positive flip side to this excitement in the form of racial fears and prejudices.

Ideas about the political meaning of the violence developed early among South African children and are well integrated into political beliefs by adolescence. Young people are more likely to desire 'peace and justice' above more personal concerns. Older children, in the height of the struggle, were fundamental in organisational activities and were involved in debating complex political and economic questions.

The recognition of children's political ideas is important in understanding their psychological reactions to the violence. They do not simply experience the violence as random incidents. Rather, they seem to actively use their understanding to mediate and to make sense of what is occurring.

In most cases, it is these sorts of beliefs that seem to enable them to cope with alarmingly high levels of stress. Less positively, the ideas themselves are transformed by the experience of violence and sometimes become a malignant framework of meaning.

This has led to fears that a whole generation of children find human life cheap and violent as the only means of achieving political survival.

Hopelessness

In the short term, however, the discourse of the struggle contained a strong element of optimistic hope for the future. This hope, which is fundamental to coping, was most often expressed as 'when Mandela is released', and even small children would repeat this idea.

Nelson Mandela's release from prison and the major changes that have occurred since then have changed little in terms of material circumstances, and the violence has continued. This has created a great sense of disillusionment.

This, along with opaqueness of the motive for violence, limits the possibilities of conceptualising or engaging in proactive responses which are so important in helping people to cope. The lack of clarity in the political understanding of the violence also clouds what is to be hoped for and thus prevents hope itself.

This hopelessness was reflected in children's drawings during a post-reform outbreak of violence in Alexandra township. While in earlier drawings with children the most common sorts of themes were the military shown in opposition to a powerful township resistance, in the present violence they appear to be much more focused on themes of death and helplessness.

There also seems to be a shift in children's expression of feelings. Research conducted through the Political Violence and Health Resources Project at the University of the Witwatersrand in the late 1980s indicated that while children experienced anxiety about violence, it was often balanced by a probably more healthy anger towards the perpetrators, even among young children.

In the current violence, however, the predominant feeling appears to be utter helplessness and depression, shown in drawings through lack of facial features on the human figures, windowless houses, empty streets and dead bodies. In a smaller number of drawings there is evidence of extreme denial, suggesting unmanageable feelings related to violence. There appears to be a shift, even among children, from relative political hopelessness to despair.

In the absence of a clearly defined enemy the anger that children experience is often displaced onto adults in their immediate surroundings. Teachers being trained to work with child victims of violence, in Johannesburg in 1992, said they had noticed an increase in children's aggression towards them and in their aggressive play generally.
Issues of power have become fundamentally important and are played out in classrooms as children defend against their real experience of powerlessness. Finally, in the absence of grassroots political structures that operate outside of the violence, there is little opportunity for the children to redirect their anger constructively into activities aimed at reconstruction.

Support networks

One of the most commonly acknowledged mediators of difficult life conditions is some kind of social support. Often, however, this factor is treated as if it operated independently of the general political climate. Importantly, the social environment of those who are victims of political violence has inevitably also been transformed by the violence.

Families and schools are regarded as particularly important places where children might receive the support that will enable them to deal with difficult life conditions. But in the case of South African children, families and communities cannot serve a supportive function as they too have been eroded by the physical and the structural violence of apartheid.

Structural violence has eroded South African family life for years. Whole families had their conventional functioning disrupted by repression. With the detention of a family member, roles were altered in ways which created problems when detainees returned and exacerbated old conflicts within the family, and the demands of years of political commitment often placed tremendous strain on families.

Sometimes political divisions in the broader community were mirrored within a single family. These exacerbated existing weaknesses within the family and so, for example, children confronted with their parents' impotence in the face of danger often experienced disillusionment which fed into the process of separating from the family at adolescence.

However, as much as violence often placed further stress on an already stressed family, it also sometimes created a kind of 'political unity' in families. In many cases previously conservative parents were, through a threat to their children, drawn into sharing their children's more progressive beliefs and uniting the family against an external enemy.

With political disillusionment, the beliefs that sometimes held families together are not always able to prevent years of strain from showing. As in the past, there is some attempt to deal with threat by bonding together more strongly, and parents and children often show their distress through their concerns for other family members and intense needs for the protection and safety afforded by them.

But as the family is faced with greater and greater threats from outside, the demand on it becomes insupportable. Children may, for example, begin experiencing anger at their parents' incapacity to make them feel safe. This is likely in the long term to decrease the possibility of the family being able to support children against exposure to political violence, and become a further source of stress in itself.

Often where families are unable to support their children, the demand on the broader community to do so becomes greater. The community as a whole may be used to provide support for children, directly through schools or indirectly through general community support available to whole families.

Schools

Schools in South Africa have been one of the prime sites of conflict between the state and the youth, rendering them unable to serve as conventional support systems to children. Following the political changes there have been attempts to restate the importance of formal education, but the years of distrust between schools and their pupils have left their mark.
The wider community now provides even less social support than previously available to violence victims.

There is no direct relationship between reform and an end to violence, and its psychological consequences for children.

Teachers, who are often inadequately qualified, experience the antagonism of the pupils as a further affront to their competence and retreat into helpless silence or aggression, leaving children without the option of claiming their support.

Teachers who often come from the same violent community as the children they teach are also often unable to find the emotional resources to deal either with their own experiences or those of their pupils.

In terms of support within the wider community there seem to be similar sorts of processes occurring. In the pre-reform period, violence, communities were often quite united in opposition to the state, but inevitably there were those afraid of what an association with the resistance would mean for their own safety.

The fear beneath this sort of behaviour was created partially by the seeming randomness of acts of repression: children and adults with no history of political involvement were also subjected to repression.

This resulted in attempts to put some kind of psychological distance between one’s self or family and those who had been subjected to the violence in the hope that this would serve as a magical kind of protection. The climate of fear was further exacerbated by the state’s strategy of deliberately sowing seeds of suspicion within communities about possible ‘informers’.

While community support was undermined by violence and related activities, repression also provided the impetus for strong social support to be developed through other means, primarily through political and progressive service organisations. But these organisations were also targeted for state repression, hampering their capacity to give support to those in need.

In the post-reform period many of these kinds of service organisations closed or curtailed their functioning in response to what was seen as a reduced need, and the functioning of remaining organisations was often left weakened by the years of repression.

Further, many organisations have experienced a period of dis-equilibrium as they reorient themselves to the demands of a new political climate and, where necessary, adjust their aims and goals. These sorts of difficulties, in addition to community divisions created by the current violence, have resulted in even less social support than previously being available to victims of violence.

Conclusion

Indirect forms of political violence in South Africa have psychological implications for very large numbers of our children, whose suffering is connected in a variety of subtle ways with changes in the political climate.

While politically the recent changes are obviously positive, it is important to recognise that there is not a direct relationship between political reform and an end to violence and its psychological consequences for children.

At this point there is certainly no cause to be optimistic about children’s exposure to violence and, if anything, it seems as though the current violence may be even more psychologically damaging in terms of the kinds of violence, its political meaning and the resources children have to deal with it.

In responding to the psychological needs of these children it is not enough just to demand changes to political structures. A great deal of work will be needed in the new South Africa to stop the spiral of violence, to restore positive political hope and to rebuild family and community life.

REFERENCES


Political and other violence has severely traumatised hundreds of thousands of South African women and children. A national programme aimed at rehabilitating the survivors of violence is urgently needed to help families cope with trauma that is undermining their ability to socialise and nurture their children.

Political violence in South Africa has compounded the negative effects on women and children of an already violent society. Our society is violent in many different ways, and the spiral of political violence is impacting on families already barely able to ensure the rights of their children to survival, protection and development.

Violence is the use of physical force or intimidation which causes physical or psycho-social hurt to any person. 'Political violence' may be defined as violence committed for a political end, to achieve power for a political group or reduce another group's power.

By this definition much violence labelled 'criminal' is in fact quasi-political as it is aimed at maintaining or extending control by a group over a geographic area.

In *A National Programme of Action for Children in South Africa - an Outline*, the United Nations Children's Educational Fund and the National Children's Rights Committee list political violence as one of the factors that seriously undermine the capacity of families to socialise children and provide a secure and nurturing environment for them.

Families, and in particular women and children, have been suffering from 'institutional violence' for decades in the disruption of their lives by mass removals and migrant labour. Violence has merely compounded this disintegration of family life. Political violence has subtle effects as well. According to reports by the Centre for the Study of Violence, the increase in domestic violence over the past decade is directly related to the rise in political violence.

This linkage, it has been suggested, is due to the fact that the dominant cultures in our country are autocratic and male-dominated and tend to glamourise warfare, accept violence and treat women and children as inferior. In such societies domestic violence is always more prevalent.

Another factor that compounds the effects of violence is lack of resources and services such as health, welfare and education in the communities most affected. The poorest 40% of the black population has suffered an income drop of 40% since 1975.

One indicator of the plight of black South African children is the infant mortality rate, which is estimated by the World Bank to vary between 70 to 130 per 1 000 for rural black children, with KwaZulu, the Northern and Eastern Transvaal falling in the higher rate. This can be compared with six per 1 000 for white children, or with 52 per 1 000 in Kenya, 61 in Zimbabwe and 62 in Botswana.

Other indicators confirm the poverty levels in informal settlements, and that family structures are collapsing under economic and social pressures even in comparatively 'well off' townships. These include rising illegitimacy rates, the number of babies abandoned in hospitals, the number of...
Images of violence affect children and lead to fears and stress.

The HRC has estimated that on average, for each death four children are bereaved of a parent or close relative.

Some statistics stand out, for example that 20% to 25% of rural black pre-school children suffer from chronic under-nutrition even in times of peace. Of the 2.3 million South Africans requiring nutritional assistance, 35.9% are children between six months and five years and 55.8% are children between six and 12 years.

**Stress**

While political violence affects black families most, all children in South Africa suffer from trauma because of high anxiety levels within all sections of society. This stress is exacerbated by the large numbers of homes that have guns, and a culture of militarisation and violence.

Especially but not exclusively in the media, children learn from role models that conflicts are solved through force. Images of violence, particularly on television, affect children and lead to fears and stress. The effects of these images, along with the racist indoctrination of large numbers of white, Indian and coloured children, will need to be addressed in any national campaign for rehabilitation from violence.

The actual numbers of women and children reported killed or injured in political violence have been relatively small. Of the totals, about 6% are children and 12% women. But children as casualties are often under-reported as ages are not known, and the figures usually refer to children by size.

In 1992 police records show only 12 children killed and 102 injured, and 261 women killed and 292 injured. But since the total number of people killed in political violence that year was 3 059, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) estimates that the actual figures are 10 times higher than reported.

Police reports for 1992 indicate that 5 685 people were injured, and Disabled People South Africa calculates three out of every five people injured in situations of violence are disabled.

In 1993 the figures were much higher - more than 5 000 killed. The HRC lists 126 children as killed in that year. This is also under-reporting as 20 children died in the Port Shepstone area alone, according to the burial records of Practical Ministries.

Children who survive physically unscathed can be deeply traumatised by bereavement.

The HRC has estimated that on average, for each death four children are bereaved of a parent or close relative.

Applying this ratio, the 15 000 people killed in political violence in South Africa in the last nine years have resulted in a staggering 60 000 children losing a relative. A University of Natal study showed that there was scarcely a Zulu family in Natal that had not lost one member of the extended family.

Death and injury, however, are not the only cause of severe trauma in families, especially among children. A far more widespread effect of political violence is the forcible displacement of families and the burning of homes.

Accurate figures for affected families are not available, but it can safely be said that hundreds of thousands of children have been adversely affected by being forcibly chased from their homes in situations of maximum fright and confusion.

In the words of Tseliso Thipanyane, speaking at the International Conference on the Rights of the Child at the University of the Western Cape in 1992, there is no area of people's lives that is free from the influence of violence. It has "permeated the very fabric of society".

What happens to displaced children? Relief organisations, some of whom are now subsidised by the state, have been able to meet some of the basic, short-term needs of families for food, shelter, clothes and medical attention.

Church halls, community centres and tents often provide temporary accommodation. Some relief organisations are able to help with burial costs. Most displaced families are then absorbed into informal settlements where their presence places an even heavier burden on those already deprived communities.

The burden on women is heavy as it is the male bread-winners who are usually killed; most deaths are of men between 18 and 40 years. Displaced people who have found somewhere to build in informal settlements have often been further harassed. Some have had second and even third 'homes' burnt.

Even when most of their immediate physical needs are met, adults and children still need to recover from the psychological trauma. Pre-school children are particularly vulnerable: Their needs are seldom realised because, as University of Natal psychiatrist Bev Killian points out, they seem easily distracted and "subject to mood shifts in
which they seem to be intensely grieving at one moment and then engrossed in happy play the next".

Healing

Most traumatised children will recover sooner or later if their minimum emotional needs are met through sympathetic adults and friends. These minimum needs are extra affection and attention so they feel secure and less alienated, alone and helpless, the need to tell their story, verbally or non-verbally, to reduce their confusion, anxiety and feelings of guilt, and the need to play and be occupied so as to rebuild their lives.

These needs are usually not understood and parents, numb with emotional trauma themselves, are often unable to give the extra attention their children need. Within the community and at school, children are usually discouraged from 'dwelling on the past', and tears and expressions of grief or anger are often received negatively.

Most children do recover to the extent that they build a shell around a traumatic experience, so that they can ignore it in day-to-day life. But the effects of violence on many children who seem to be coping may surface later in the form of learning problems, an inability to form lasting relationships, socially inappropriate behaviour and even delinquency when they are teenagers.

Then there are children who will need extra help achieving even a minimum recovery from violence. These are children who may have suffered more than others, are less resilient or have not been helped by emotional 'first aid'.

They display some of the following symptoms of 'post traumatic stress syndrome': depression, apathy or anger; continual regression to an earlier inappropriate behaviour pattern; fear, anxiety, nightmares and memory 'flashbacks'; hyperactivity, obsessive behaviour, aggression and destructiveness.

Even if only 1% of children suffer from post traumatic stress syndrome - and that would be a very conservative estimate - then at least 5,000 children in Natal are in urgent need of professional help and therapy. Post traumatic stress syndrome, if untreated, prevents normal development in children and has long-term and sometimes permanent deleterious effects.

At meetings of groups working with Child Survivors of Violence, a support group in Durban, many individual cases have surfaced.
An estimated 1.7 million children in South Africa between the ages of five and 14 could be suffering from some form of psychiatric disorder.

In 1990 children in KwaZulu-Natal were reported to be so scared of dead bodies that they went daily to watch the process of decay in an unburied corpse. North of Durban there are complaints that a group of displaced children, taken in by a community, are disruptive and that almost all of the very young teenage girls have fallen pregnant.

Displaced children lose at least a year at school because schools in the new area are full or refuse to take them, or they have no past school records, fees or uniforms. Families lose their children's clinic cards, with the result that immunisation rates in KwaZulu-Natal have plummeted.

Young boys often have to separate from their families and fend for themselves, and many end up on the streets. Because youths from 12 to 18 years old are the most easily identified and targeted of any group, they have particular difficulty in escaping from violence and becoming settled again.

Even where they have found or built homes, or have been able to return to their old homes under fragile peace agreements, many of their sons have not been able to join them because, if they do, violence is likely to break out again. After several years of separation, family re-unification may well be impossible.

It is mostly in this category that another grouping of children, severely traumatised by violence, is to be found: child perpetrators.

They need counselling and rehabilitation into society.

National programme

A priority need identified in research conducted by Robin Lee Associates in 1992 is for services to help people cope with bereavement, trauma and loss. It is estimated that 1.7 million children in South Africa between the ages of five and 14 could be suffering from some form of psychiatric disorder, including dysfunction as an after-effect of violence.

The extent of the problem makes it obvious that it is not possible for children and families to be counselled according to conventional therapy by a degree therapist interacting one-on-one with each client. Various alternatives have been suggested and some are being tested as pilot projects.

Simple therapy involving discussion and sharing of feelings within a sympathetic group can help victims of violence to accept traumatic events and work through strong feelings that have been churned up and may later be misunderstood and misdirected at any tyrant.

A facilitator with counselling skills could help form and maintain these support groups. Effective support groups have been established among child survivors of violence, using a 'child to child' approach.

All those who are concerned with children and families, such as teachers, educate personnel, doctors, ministers of religion, leaders of youth and women's groups and so on, should learn about the effects of violence on the psyche, and the emotional needs of survivors of violence.

Within support groups, and in schools and the community, those needing deeper and more expert therapy could be identified. The community would need to be informed as to services available locally, and the stigma attached to psychological help would need to be minimised.

Individual counselling services at a deeper level could be made possible by psychiatric social workers, school counsellors, ministers of religion, doctors with counselling skills and other leaders in the community volunteering to be trained and to offer their services to the survivors of violence. Part of the training would be the identification of post-traumatic stress syndrome, for referral to qualified therapists.

Trauma centres with tertiary trained therapists and field workers would need to be established to provide a professional service of in-depth counselling. Mobile units would be needed, so that people could have ongoing access to long-term counselling. Group therapy models might still be needed to cope with the numbers needing help, but with community help the case load could be kept within reasonable bounds.

Trauma centres would need to cooperate with health and welfare services, and also with similar centres proposed for children with special educational needs, so that a multi-disciplinary approach could be implemented. Government would need to provide resources for a national programme, in collaboration with non-governmental agencies.

In the longer term, says the Unicef and National Children's Rights Committee report, the root causes of violence, whether political, criminal or domestic, must be addressed through improved policies of social and economic development. To promote political reconciliation, peace education and conflict resolution should be taught in all schools.
Violence or the threat of violence is a fact of life for all South Africans. The stress which this causes is compounded by the rapid socio-political changes and uncertain economic climate in the country.

The social and psychological impact of violence is devastating and long term. Research shows that 60% to 80% or more of people exposed to violent situations, whether directly or indirectly, suffer from symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Merely living in a society where the media is filled with images of violence and messages of doom and destruction can result in people experiencing symptoms of PTSD.

It appears that the mental health needs of victims of violence will be prioritised by the new Government and Ministry of Health. The priority areas demarcated thus far are maternal and child health, nutrition and environmental health.

This prioritisation will have significant implications for mental health care in general. The devastation caused by political violence is proving to be a powerful political tool which the mental health lobby can use to put broader mental health issues firmly on the Ministry of Health's agenda.

There are a number of mental health and welfare programmes and direct services aimed at victims of violence currently operating around the country, the efficacy of which has not been clearly measured.

Welfare agencies offer these services in the form of material aid like financial grants and refuge crisis aid. Non governmental organisations (NGOs) also provide crisis counselling aimed at sexually abused children and adults.

Limited mental health intervention in the form of trauma counselling, training and direct service provision is offered by a small number of mental health workers, most of whom are based in the NGO sector. The state health sector has as yet not come up with any policy or programme to deal with the issue.

The African National Congress's (ANC's) policy formulations for mental health care prioritise supporting and developing services for survivors of violence and civil conflict, as well as rape, child abuse and family violence.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) very broadly acknowledges the problem:

"The RDP must aim to promote mental health and increase the quality, quantity and accessibility of mental health support and counselling services, particularly for those affected by domestic or other violence, by rape or by child abuse."

The urgency of the problem is widely recognised, but no nationally caucused, intersectoral policy framework and intervention strategy exists. The production of a coordinated, interministerial national policy will not be an easy task in the current climate.

Political paralysis with regards to implementing the regional powers and the tension of running a Government of National Unity are obstacles. A major advantage, however, is the consensus in the state and non governmental health sector on the adoption of the primary health care approach.

The policy formulations presented in this article are based upon the principles of primary health care (PHC), namely the need to:

The effects of political violence have helped put broader mental health issues on the Ministry of Health's agenda

At present some welfare agencies and NGOs provide direct services for violence victims
Mental health care for violence victims should be integrated into the existing state primary health care structures.

Violence victims usually need short term trauma management and trauma counselling with follow-up and emergency facilities.

Existing mental health and general health workers need retraining to the primary mental health approach.

- Recognise the inextricable relationship between social and economic structures and mental health;
- Develop community participation and empowerment, and a multisectoral approach in the planning and delivery of services;
- Emphasise prevention and promotion; and
- Provide everyone with access to competent, cost effective care.

Following the PHC principles, an approach which integrates prevention, direct service delivery and mental health promotion is proposed.

**Prevention and delivery**

The proposed services focus on the state and NGO general health and mental health sectors as well as on educational, community, security, legal and social workers to provide a variety of victim aid services that are both curative and preventive. Examples of direct services are:

- Trauma management and trauma counselling, for example face to face and telephone counselling, individual and group counselling;
- Violence prevention and stress preparedness programmes; and
- Community reconciliation and reconstruction programmes.

Experience has shown that service delivery to clients needs to be sustained and supervised by a coordinated system of administrative, managerial and supportive backup services such as staff support, professional supervision, training, specialist referrals for clients, and research and development, with ongoing evaluation.

Within the context of scarce mental health resources, it is usually suggested that the mental health care offered to the victims of violence is integrated into the existing state primary health care structures. An example of this would be community psychiatric nurses who, in the course of their work, are able to identify symptoms of PTSD and offer trauma counselling.

This service delivery system is generally viewed as the optimum use of resources and client care for psychiatric and psychological disorders. But victims of violence are usually not the ‘average’ client presenting to health points for psychological care. Most tend to be people going about their daily lives until they are caught up in a violent incident or civil conflict.

Their psychological distress does not necessarily require hospital or community psychiatric clinic treatment. With violence victims, the treatment indicated tends to be short term trauma management and trauma counselling, with the need for community based follow-up and emergency counselling facilities.

Local and international experience has shown that while state services can provide this treatment, the most appropriate approach to trauma management is where state services are complimented by non government and government subsidised organisations.

Examples are trauma and crisis clinics, and school and business driven promotive and preventative programmes. This is particularly relevant where the state is involved in violating the victim in some way. These organisations should be encouraged to initiate projects within an overall mental health care policy framework yet retain autonomy in their functioning.

**Training**

Developing both the state and the non governmental sector requires an extensive programme of training new and existing workers in individual and community mental health care, trauma management, and trauma counselling.

An extensive retraining and reorienting of all existing mental health and general health workers to the primary mental health approach is required. The RDP aims is to train or retrain 25% of district health personnel by the end of 1995, and 50% by the end of 1997.

**Target groups for training include:**

- Community mental health and community health workers
- Psychologists and psychiatrists
- General health workers
- Community workers
- Teachers and others educationalists
- The South African Police Service (SAPS)
- Legal workers
- The South African National Defence Force, and
- A training the trainers programme aimed at educators and trainees in the above sectors.

It is envisaged that the training would enable workers from the different sectors to apply the trauma counselling techniques in a manner which is appropriate to their work.
In 1986 the World Health Organisation pointed out that: "It is vital that a high profile, nationally coordinated promotion programme be adopted by the Ministry of Health. Promoting mental health and involving communities in mental health issues is a difficult task, especially in competition with priority areas such as housing, education and physical health. In 1986 the World Health Organisation pointed out that: "If the value attached to mental health is high, the motivation to undertake measures to prevent or treat mental illness is high; community participation in such programmes can be expected; and societal support for appropriate programmes will be forthcoming".

Ironically, the problem of coping with extreme and endemic violence has made it easier for South Africans to become aware of the importance of mental health issues in general, and of the impact which social events have on the individual psyche and on community life. This awareness needs to be harnessed and consolidated through a topical, attractive and hard-hitting multimedia campaign.

A promotion strategy must be planned by the National Health Authority regarding policy, standards and finance. However, the impetus needed to conceptualise a striking and creative intervention may well lie in an alliance between NGOs, professional societies such as the Psychological Society of South Africa, and the statutory mental health bodies.

Conclusion
A focused, service driven policy needs to be put into place to meet the urgent needs of the victims of violence, and to prevent more long term psycho-social damage from taking place. The following suggestions should be set in motion:

- The mental health lobby must coordinate their efforts to produce national policies and ensure the Government prioritises the issue of mental health and violence.
- The Ministry of Health should institute a training and direct service delivery programme which can be implemented within the current health structures as soon as possible.
- An interministerial taskforce, which includes key representatives from the non-governmental sector, must prepare to coordinate the intersectoral nature of the intervention. 1993.

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Promoting mental health will be difficult, especially in competition with priority areas such as housing, education and physical health.

Lay counsellors can provide community based support and boost the numbers of mental health workers.

The mental health lobby must ensure the Government prioritises the issue of mental health and violence.
POST ELECTION CONFLICT IN KWAZULU-NATAL

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Initiatives by political leaders and the police have helped reduce violence since the elections. There is less war talk and trading of accusations between the Inkatha Freedom Party and African National Congress. But the nature of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has hardly changed, although crime is playing an increasing role in political violence.

In the months since the election, fewer people have lost their lives through political violence than in the months of the past year. In KwaZulu-Natal particularly, the horror of the pre-election period has almost been forgotten now that violence levels are so low.

But these ‘headcounts’ say little about the hundreds of people forced to flee their homes, the many communities where people still live in fear of attack, and the massacres which demonstrate that well organised, brutal attacks on families are not a thing of the past.

Regional and local leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have made progress in resolving political animosity in the region. Sounding warning signals is not an attempt to undermine this, but to consider existing and potential conflict areas.

Although fewer people are dying, several features of KwaZulu-Natal’s conflict still threaten many communities. Some problems which have recently received attention include: attacks on police officers; the escalation of crime generally; and the increasing difficulty in distinguishing criminal and political violence.

The statistics

According to data from the Conflict Trends in Natal project, fatalities have decreased significantly in KwaZulu-Natal since the election in April. While figures are lower in the PWV, a similar trend is in evidence, including a small increase in July (Figure 1).

In KwaZulu-Natal, the Zululand and Durban sub regions continue to be the scene of most violence. In June, the quietest month this year, most deaths occurred in the Durban region. More people were killed (109 deaths) in the Ntuzuma magisterial district here in the first six months of 1994 than in any other district.

Conditions in many parts of the Zululand sub region, like Eshowe, have hardly improved since the election. The Natal Monitor reports that better policing and reductions in violence are often cyclical, depending largely on the amount of attention focused on the area.

In terms of violence or the threat thereof, the North Coast is the worst affected area, according to the Natal Monitor. Violence has also continued in parts of the Ndwedwe area in the Durban sub region, including two massacres in July in which two families were killed.

Sections of Ndwedwe which were extremely violent before elections are now quiet since successful peace meetings between the ANC and IFP, according to the Human Rights Committee (HRC, July 1994).
Although fewer people have died in the South sub region than in Zululand and Durban, this is the only region in which monthly events, as a proportion of all events in the region, increased steadily since February (Figure 2).

The second most deaths (100) in KwaZulu-Natal were recorded in the magisterial district of Ezimpumelo near Port Shepstone in the first six months of this year. Practical Ministries report that peace initiatives bring only temporary relief, which is eventually disrupted by criminal elements and fuelled by ineffective, partial policing.

Violence along the South Coast has spread to rural areas like Mhwayilwane and Gcilima. Over a five day period there in July, 10 people were killed, 20 injured, 50 homes burnt down and around 500 people forced to flee the area (HRC, July 1994).

Fighting occurred between IFP and ANC supporting communities after the local chief fled the area in January following attempts on his life. The community favours his return, but the leadership vacuum has led to struggles over power and other issues which fuel tensions in the area (HRC, July 1994 and Practical Ministries).

Statistics reflecting the intensity of violence show that the use of lethal weapons, mainly firearms, has increased from March this year, despite the state of emergency in the region.

Over the first six months of the year, these weapons were used most often in the North-West sub region (in 65% of violent events), while in Zululand the proportion is the lowest of the sub regions (53%).

In contrast to this increase, the proportion of events in which five or more people were killed and/or injured has dropped from almost 8% in March to less than 3% in June, for the whole region. While massacres and faction fights still claim many lives, on average, one person was killed per event in 1994.

Signs of peace

There are definite signs that the IFP and ANC are trying to reduce tensions between their supporters. When a chief was attacked in Gezuhlu in the Midlands, an IFP leader in the area, David Ntombela, appealed to all to commit themselves to peace.

After the massacre of IFP supporting families in Ndwedwe in July, the local IFP leader blamed marginalised youth claiming allegiance to the ANC, not the ANC directly. At the funeral there were calls for reconciliation rather than revenge.

Peace meetings have also been organised since the elections. In July the HRC received almost daily reports of peace initiatives in various areas, and community leaders appeared committed to the peace process.

A scheduled meeting was cancelled when violence intensified in the Margate area on the South Coast, but a community prayer meeting went ahead as planned. Similarly in Ndwedwe, after the massacres in July, a peace meeting between the IFP and ANC proceeded as planned. Unfortunately, the geographical area which this meeting covered did not include the distant sites of the two massacres.

In Durban's Ntuzuma township, a joint IFP-ANC peace rally was held in early July. Residents were called on to fight crime and drugs, and the youth were urged to attend school.

The police have also been involved in several initiatives throughout the region. In the Midlands and Port Shepstone areas Community Policing Forums have successfully mediated between warring parties (HRC, May 1994). In the Wembezi area conflict between the ANC and SACP was resolved after regular meetings and social events between those involved and the police (HRC, May 1994).

Community policing is fraught with problems originating from within the police and from the public, but even regular police functions like arrests have been effective in reducing violence.

In Draycott near Eshowe, police attributed the peace between IFP and ANC supporters largely to the arrest of three suspects in connection with the massacre of eight people in April 1993 (HRC, May 1994). Police have also arrested six suspects for the massacres in Ndwedwe in July.
More than ever, restrictions on free political activity encourage conflict. In June the HRC reported that the use of criminals for political ends is common throughout the country. The continued existence of 'no-go' areas and restrictions on free political activity encourage conflict. In June the HRC reported several 'no-go' areas in the Midlands where ANC members are allegedly refused entry by Inkatha chiefs.

Past problems

The continued existence of 'no-go' areas and restrictions on free political activity encourage conflict. In June the HRC reported several 'no-go' areas in the Midlands where ANC members are allegedly refused entry by Inkatha chiefs.

Elements within the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and South African Police Services (SAPS) continue to be implicated in violence. Elements within the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and South African Police Services (SAPS) continue to be implicated in violence.

Despite the resignation of the former Commissioner of the KZP, General Roy During, and the suspension of SundumBah station commander, Major Zana, KZP activities in the North Coast region still drive much of the violence.

Criminal activity and gangsterism by people affiliated to political parties are not new to the KwaZulu-Natal conflict. In Inanda, a criminal gang of about 40 Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) members has been terrorising residents of the ANC/South African Communist Party community of Amasuts since late 1993. The murder and injury of policemen and women escalated in 1990, and the continued existence of these attacks since the elections is worrying (Figure 3). The challenges facing the police are probably the greatest of any government sector, as society's demands on the police are immediate rather than long term. A Goldstone Commission report released in May this year suggested improving the reputation and image of the police to stop them being targeted for attack. This is a 'Catch-22' situation because these attacks damage the morale of police which negatively affects policing, particularly community policing. The Goldstone report found that renegade ANC self defence units played a major role in these attacks, along with Mkhonto we Sizwe and Pan African People's Liberation Army members. Most deaths of policemen in the past six months were carried out while police were off duty which suggests they were targeted for their firearms.

Police targeted

The usefulness of this distinction must be considered, in solving violence, whether domestic, political or criminal will need a holistic approach. Events since April have proved that the long awaited election of a new Government has not solved even the political violence.

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The formation of self defence and self protection units resulted in the training and arming of many youths. In several areas renegade members of these units formed gangs and terrorised communities.

The HRC received reports in recent months of criminal activity, including rape, in Eshowe, Bhoyboji outside Port Shepstone, and Edendale in Pietermaritzburg. In the Bhoyboji area youths aligning themselves to the ANC are disillusioned, claiming they fought for the ANC for years and now expect their 'reward' (HRC, June 1994).

At Imhali in Pietermaritzburg, criminals affiliating themselves to the ANC were recently released from prison and have renewed their attacks and harassment of residents. According to the HRC, the police classify the activities of this group as criminal, but the gang recently ambushed an IFP leader in the Midlands, because of his political affiliation. This kind of overlap illustrates the difficulty of separating criminal and political objectives.

Perceptions

In addition to the realities of the present violence, in some cases the perceptions and reporting on violence has also changed since the elections. The Press has, in the last few months, focused the public's attention on criminal violence, while little of the continuing political violence has been reported.

The perception has been created that since elections, political violence has dropped dramatically, while crime has soared. Figures 4 and 5 show that crime levels in the region are extremely high, but that levels have increased steadily since January 1993, rather than since elections.

The one type of crime that has increased dramatically since April 1994 is armed robbery of motor vehicles. In the first week of 1994, 19 incidents were reported which by the second week of July had more than doubled to 50 events (SAP, MIOVSCIAIC).

Even those closely involved with political violence have treated events more carefully. The Ndwedwe massacres were not immediately blamed on ANC-IFP rivalry. Instead a local IFP leader blamed marganaised ANC youth, and the gunmen were described as 'known criminals' (Natal Witness 21/7/94).

According to the HRC (July 1994), community workers and leaders blamed the attacks on criminal elements opposed to peace and unwilling to cooperate with leaders in this regard. Events which may in the past have been hastily labelled 'political', are now treated with more caution, and the criminal element of violence is given more consideration.

Many more people have died in criminal violence than political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. This does not mean that dealing with one type of violence should be prioritised over another.

Before the election, political violence was emphasised because the conflict was inextricably linked to the problems of the previous government and apartheid. The competition between political groups was also thought to have become violent due to the absence of the ballot.

Tackling crime effectively before a national political settlement had been reached was also difficult. Now that there is a new Government, reducing crime should be given the attention it desperately deserves. The reality of the situation, however, is that political violence has not been resolved, and the challenges which this presents should not be forgotten.

REFERENCES


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Hundreds of thousands of South Africans have been displaced from their homes over the years by forced removals and political violence. This massive, moving population of people find shelter in the bush, in the homes of relatives or in informal settlements. They are a living legacy of apartheid, and they represent a major socio-economic challenge to the new Government.

Over the past few months widespread media coverage has focused public attention on the problem of refugees in Africa, specifically the refugee crisis in Rwanda. South Africa has a refugee problem of a different kind.

Here refugees are not a homogeneous group who can be easily identified and targeted for assistance. There are external refugees who cross international borders seeking refuge, safety and jobs and there are internal refugees who for various reasons have been displaced within the borders of the country.

The extent of these internal displacements has until recently barely been acknowledged by the authorities. As yet there is no coherent or official policy for assisting or rehabilitating them.

External refugees

External refugees in the past were mainly people who clandestinely crossed the border from Mozambique fleeing the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo and economic hardship. The demobilization of Renamo and Frelimo in the run-up to elections in Mozambique has put more pressure on that border.

Continuing retrenchments on the mines in South Africa has increased levels of Mozambiquan unemployment, adding to those seeking jobs in South Africa, particularly on Eastern Transvaal farms. Besides these cross-border refugees there are 'economic refugees' - also termed illegal aliens - who originate from countries as far afield as Zaire and Malawi.

Internal refugees

The internal displacee problem in South Africa is difficult to quantify since many of those displaced, especially by the political violence, are difficult to identify. They do not congregate in official 'refugee' camps but simply disperse elsewhere.

Some are accommodated by family or friends or take up residence in backyard shacks. Many simply swell the increasing numbers of squatters in informal settlements. A small number even take up residence in public buildings, such as the group at Durban Station, or sleep wherever they can in the streets. Many never return to their original homes and in essence have become permanent 'refugees'.

There are different types of internal displacees in South Africa. Some of the earliest were those displaced from their land or properties by legislation, for example under the Group Areas Act.

An investigation by the Surplus People Project estimated that 3.5 million people were forcibly removed by government decree from "black spots" or were labour tenants evicted from what became "white" farms, between 1960 and 1983, and resettled on densely populated and agriculturally poor land in the homelands or independent homelands.

Many of the homelands could not provide for the subsistence needs of these additional inhabitants and many people were regrouped into non-agricultural villages which in effect functioned as labour dormitories for decentralised industry.
Allied to the problem of forced removals was the evictions of farm labourers and tenant farmers. In 1969 the government tried to end the labour tenant system by limiting the number of families allowed to live on one farm. This was followed in some districts of Natal by mass evictions, sometimes accompanied by bulldozing or burning the huts of people resisting eviction.

Evictions were supposed to have stopped in 1986 with the abolition of influx control. But in 1990 investigations by various organisations found that scores of evictions continued to occur in Northern Natal. Most of these displacements appeared to have been legal, as vestiges of the tenancy system still remained in existence.

The Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) believes that by 1993 more than 300,000 labour tenants had been evicted in Natal from the land where their ancestors were born. In the Weenen district alone three emergency camps had to be established to accommodate evictees from white farms.

The situation in the Weenen district had been exacerbated by the establishment by a number of families of the Weenen Biosphere Park which the evictees feared would permanently prevent them from returning to the land they once occupied and farmed as tenant farmers.

The Land Charter emanating from the Community Land Conference held in Bloemfontein in February 1994 demanded that the mass evictions of labour tenants and farmworkers be halted. However, as the elections approached the National Land Committee (NLC) reported widespread evictions.

The problem was especially serious in the Eastern Transvaal and Northern Natal, where entire families totalling thousands of people received eviction orders in the months prior to the elections. The NLC believed this was mainly due to the fears of white farmers about a future land reform programme and an effort to pre-empt future land claims by labour tenant or farm labourers.

**East Rand**

Displacement as a result of political violence has occurred on a large scale in the Katorus - Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus townships including Phola Park - area on the East Rand since mid 1990. The East Rand has had three sets of displacements:

- Residents expelled from hostels in the first round of violence in 1990.
- Pro-Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hostel residents were prevented for a time from re-entering the Pholaeng Hostel by the other hostel residents. As the violence escalated Inkatha supporters managed, in most cases, to evict the non-Inkatha hostel residents, especially Xhosa speakers. These hostel evictees sought shelter in the surrounding squatter settlements such as Phola Park.
- Zulu-speaking township residents who were attacked by youths and sought refuge in the hostels. These residents, who were not necessarily IFP supporters, were targeted for attack merely because they spoke Zulu. Many sought refuge in nearby hostels in the Katorus townships or in KwaMudala Hostel in Alexandra. By early 1991 a number of IFP-controlled hostels were housing entire families and became known as 'refugee' hostels. They became isolated and alienated from the surrounding township.

Residents living in houses near the hostels who were forced out by the hostel residents and the other displaced. In the Katorus townships those houses vacated have either been vandalised and left unoccupied, or have been taken over by other displaced. By mid 1994 it was estimated that at least 2000 houses in Katorus had been damaged and left unoccupied because of the violence in the area.

**KwaZulu-Natal**

Since it began in mid 1985, the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. While these people are hard to locate, the effects of their displacement are very visible. In rural KwaZulu-Natal row upon row of houses are empty, doors slightly ajar, windows open, chickens pecking in the dust.

It is estimated that at any one time the province has around 100,000 displaced people, while some estimates put the total number of people that have been displaced since 1990 at between 300,000 and 500,000 people.

There are essentially three kinds of displacements in Natal: people who flee their homes and live in the bush close by hoping to return within a short period; people who take up residence in formal structures with family or relatives, squat in backyards or are accommodated in halls or tents; and people who have become integrated into other communities. The three types need to be dealt with in slightly different ways.
In Bambayi outside Durban leaders of the 'Green' and 'Red' factions refused to allow displaced residents back.

Despite the massive, moving population of internal refugees, little is known about these people. Obtaining statistics is nearly impossible. Displaced people range from impossible. Displaced people range from homeless to pensioners. Wealthy business people have been forced to flee. Doctors and nurses have been forced to flee. People are no longer in control of their homes. Those in control of an area believe it is a sign of weakness to allow opponents to return.

The violence forces out people who could play a constructive role in restoring peace. Older, contributing to reconstruction. Professional people also flee and control is lost. Tensions between the villages in the district. Tensions between the villages in the district. People who left in the hands of a few radicals who only understand the rule of the gun.

Richmond is a good example. From 1990 the politisation of the African National Congress (ANC) supporting youth posed a threat to traditional authorities controlling the villages in the district. Tensions between the groups developed into a struggle for control which soon became a violent war.

In one incident in February 1991 more than 150 homes were torched. An estimated 15-20 000 people sought refuge in nearby Ndaleni and in Richmond, taking up residence in the backrooms or garages of employers.

Officials were sympathetic to the influx of refugees. The local police provided food and clothing, and attempted to control the situation. The Defence Force members who claimed that the refugees could return to their homes since the area had been stabilised.

Attacks continued and many of the refugees fled to Pietermaritzburg, where the local ANC made arrangements for those who had been displaced. Many of the displaced found refuge in nearby Ndaleni and in Richmond, taking up residence in the backrooms or garages of employers.

By April 1991, the number of displaced was estimated to have reached 50 000, with Ndaleni almost completely depopulated and Richmond having lost about half of its residents. This later round of displacements tried to set up a camp on a vacant plot of land opposite the military headquarters in Richmond, but they were forcibly removed and the plots fenced with razor wire to keep them out.

Eventually the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA) provided tents on an open piece of land and between 500 and 700 displaced moved in. Another 400 took refuge at the Methodist Mission.

A number of peace meetings were held to organise the return of the displaced, but the local chiefs were reluctant to allow a return since they perceived the young displaced as 'troublemakers'. They refused to allow any youths back unless they acknowledged chief's authority and control.

In the informal settlement of Bambayi, outside Durban, people have also been displaced in continuous fighting between the 'Green' and 'Red' factions. Refugees are housed in a camp near the Nkuzuma Police Station in NPA tents. Lenders of both factions refused to allow residents back once they had been displaced.

Vacant shacks or plots were allocated to supporters of whichever faction had made territorial gains in the previous round of fighting. Displaced people are not protected by the law and people who force others out are not sought for arrest. In any event, displaced residents are extremely fearful of those who displace or who amnesty against perpetrators of violence as witnesses have been threatened with punishment or death.

The youth

Many displaced are young people who, since 1980, have been targeted by local chiefs for expulsion because they are considered to be enemies of the liberation of rural areas. Once the youth become displaced, no-one wants to take them in since they are afraid of becoming targeted for attack themselves. Political parties see young people either as targets or as potential recruits, so they are not allowed to remain neutral.

After the first clashes in Umzini and KwaMashu in Durban in 1985, many United Democratic Front aligned youths fled for safety to rural areas. After 1990, when they tried to take over tribal structures, chiefs retaliated and targeted them for expulsion.

On the South Coast, young people fled to Gamalaleke, near Port Shepstone, which also caused problems within this nominally ANC-aligned township. By the beginning of
1992 refugee youths had alienated township residents by demanding shelter and food. High unemployment and tension between township residents and refugees. Many of the youths launched attacks against chiefs and their supporters, who refused to let them return to their homes.

In the last two years the South Coast has been particularly violent. After every massacre a new flood of refugees occurs. This happened recently at Gcilima near Port Shepstone, where 600 people ended up sleeping at the local clinic but returning during the day to feed and look after their livestock and crops.

Whole communities are abandoned when violence becomes too intense. There are rural areas on the South Coast and hinterland which have become almost completely depopulated. A recent example is the rural community of Mtengwane, south of Port Shepstone, where in almost two months 10,000 people fled the area leaving nearly 700 houses standing empty.

After the so-called 'Seven Days War' in the Pietermaritzburg area, thousands of refugees fled their homes. While most eventually return, many young displacees did not. Someone sought safety in the rural area of Table Mountain, an extension of Chief Maphumulo, who offered them safe refuge.

At the time Chief Maphumulo was president of Contralesa, an association of traditional leaders and chiefs perceived to be ANC supporters. Subsequently Chief Maphumulo was accused by local IFP leaders of using displaced youths to form his own private 'army'. The displaced youths were targeted for attack by IFP supporters. A cycle of attacks erupted, and is continuing.

Chiefs

In some areas where chiefs failed to gain effective control of local townships, supporters were 'imported' from outside to help push out people not supporting the chief. As in most cases, youths at school were targeted for attack.

A recent example of this occurred in the Gezinsela township near Eshowe. Families whose sons and daughters had been attacked and driven away were forced to sleep in the bushes for fear of attacks on their houses. Some families also began sleeping in the cells of the local police station for protection.

In a twist to the situation the local chiefs began demanding that the children who had fled the area should return. These youths refused, fearing that they would be killed. Chiefs then fined families whose children did not return R200 each. It was all alleged that the fines were used to pay for bail for supporters of the chiefs who had been arrested for their involvement in some of the attacks.

Informal settlements

In informal settlements around Durban, many residents are displaced when people are brought in to occupy land made vacant during an attack. This pattern is linked to problems associated with tribal or communal tenure.

In many areas no one knows exactly who owns or controls the land. This allows for the emergence of strongmen, the so-called 'warlords', who impose control by force and then begin charging 'rent' to people occupying land. The rent is used to pay for 'community guards', who are essentially vigilantes, for buying illegal firearms.

Many people brought in to occupy land are economic refugees from impoverished rural areas seeking work in the city. They usually have close familial or clan links to the local strongman. Displacement in some informal settlements around Durban, such as Lindelani and Barbagari, is an extension of the problem of migration and rapid urbanisation.

Some displacement has occurred as a result of faction fights in rural areas. The losers, if they see no chance of regaining lost land or winning a fight, move off to another area or migrate to the urban areas, usually taking up residence in an informal settlement.

Assistance

Nobody has taken overall responsibility for coordinating relief and assistance for displaced people. There is no long term policy for solving the problem. But several initiatives to deal with victims of displacement and violence have been launched.

One of the first organisations to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem in the Durban area was the Pinetown Child and Family Welfare Society, who were able to obtain funding from the Independent Development Trust for the victims of violence.

Part of the funding was used to support refugee youths by paying for their food, accommodation and schooling with selected families. This financial support was stopped as soon as the youths left school.
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The Society also tried to negotiate their return home with chiefs in the areas from which they had fled. A Community Development Programme was initiated with a number of self-help projects teaching displaced people to make bricks, blocks, candles, fencing material or toilet kits for rural areas.

The Natal Crisis Fund also played an important part in assisting displaced people. This organisation was started by a number of Durban based church organisations to provide relief for the victims of political violence.

Relief was provided in the form of blankets and food, organising accommodation in church halls and other buildings. The Fund also made money available for the repair of damaged houses or for displaced people to start a new home in another area. Similar work was undertaken in Pietermaritzburg by the Natal Midlands Council of Churches.

In Eshowe, the Christian Women's Group established a number of Refugee Committees, which provided families with temporary shelters. It also helped organise the reconstruction of homes with materials donated by local businesses and farmers.

On the South Coast, the Practical Ministries organisation has been instrumental in organising relief supplies and accommodation for victims of violence.

Another relief organisation in the region is the Ziphakamise Organisation, which has a Victims of Violence Fund providing assistance to people whose houses are burnt down, families whose breadwinner has been killed, and sponsoring schooling for displaced youth.

The only government-sponsored relief initiative has been the Social Relief Fund based in Pretoria. The Fund provides a straight financial grant of R 100 per family, irrespective of its size, for a maximum of three months. The problem with this grant is that it is a one-off payment and does not address the longer-term needs of displaced people.

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Local structures

Local Peace Committee structures have tried to deal with displaced people. The Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development Committees (Serds), which should have been set up in all regions as part of the National Peace Accord, have struggled to address the problem.

One difficulty associated with Serd plans for reconstruction has been targeting only displaced people for assistance. Many communities maintain that the homes of people who have remained have been damaged and any programme to rebuild houses must be extended to all houses.

It has also been argued that displaced people should not be isolated since this would create the perception that violence is being rewarded. The challenge has been to provide relief in the form of developmental work without creating dependency. This has created tension between ANC supporters and the chiefs, leading to renewed attacks by displaced people who believe they have to gain back their homes by force.

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Prison Politics

By Marie Wentzel
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The countrywide prison riots which occurred before the April elections over the issue of voting rights, and afterwards over amnesty, caused dozens of deaths, hundreds of injuries and millions of rands worth of damage. Several reasons for the violence have been given, but ways have yet to be found of preventing future political violence in prisons.

The biggest prison crisis in the history of South Africa erupted in mid-March following a decision by the Transitional Executive Council that only certain categories of prisoners could participate in the elections on April 27, 1994.

In terms of the Electoral Act, prisoners not eligible to vote included those convicted of murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault, child stealing, kidnapping, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, robbery, fraud, corruption, bribery, malicious damage to property, and breaking and entering.

Widespread violence and unrest erupted in prisons countrywide after the South African Prisoners Organisation for Human Rights (Saphor), with former prisoner Golden Miles Bhudu as chairman, announced a mass action campaign in prisons to protest against the fact that the right to vote was not granted to all prisoners.

According to Saphor the campaign would be peaceful and consist of hunger and work strikes, among other actions. However, during the strikes violent riots erupted and property belonging to the Department of Correctional Services, estimated at R3 million, was damaged. Prisons were seriously disrupted, 23 people were killed and about 265 people, including 15 warders, were injured.

The countrywide rioting in prisons began with a revolt on March 17 at the St Alban’s Prison near Port Elizabeth. An estimated 1200 prisoners set fire to beds and bedding in the cells and warders were refused admission.

The next day teargas and a water cannon were used to restore order. Several handmade weapons were confiscated. In response to the action taken by the authorities and the outbreak of violence at St Alban’s Prison, hunger strikes were started at other prisons countrywide.

On March 18 the violence spread to the Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town, where around 300 prisoners fought among themselves and windows were broken. Teargas was used to bring the riot under control, but a number of prisoners and warders were slightly injured. Unrest also spread to Boksburg Prison, where 44 prisoners held two warders hostage.

Serious riots

From then on the prison riots became serious. Besides millions of rands of damage, loss of life and serious injuries occurred. On March 19 two prisoners were burnt to death and two seriously injured at the Paardeberg Prison near Paarl, when 300 prisoners set fire to blankets and mattresses in eight cells.

Fires and vandalism also occurred at the Brandvlei prison in Worcester, St Alban’s, Grootevlei near Bloemfontein, Modderhee in Benoni, Pollsmoor, Middelburg in the Cape, Aliwal North Prison, Makwange Prison in Ciskei, Rustenburg Prison and Goedemoed Prison in the Eastern Cape.

In the most serious incident during the prison unrest, 21 prisoners were killed on March 21 in the Queenstown Prison after they set their cell alight and barricaded the door with steel beds. Most of the prisoners probably suffocated or died as a result of smoke inhalation.

In another serious incident 120 prisoners were injured and several cells and offices were destroyed at the Pieternelitzburg Prison when about 2 000 prisoners escaped from
prisoners had been 'goaded' into committing acts of violence by prison officials. Bhudu said officials and prison mass action called for the release of Correctional Services blamed the uprising on Saphor, for violence by prison warders. In a reply to these allegations, published in the Business Day he claimed that any form of protest by the prisoners had been met with brutal force by prison warders. In a reply to these allegations, published in the Pretoria News, the Department of Correctional Services blamed the uprising on Saphor, for their 'irresponsible and reckless call' for mass action. Shortly before the elections, on April 21, Golden Miles Bhudu announced that Saphor members would once again embark on a hunger and work strike because the then President, PW de Klerk, had refused to sign the proclamation which granted general voting rights to prisoners. Luckily the strikes were contained and no serious incidents of violence in prisons occurred in the last few days before the elections. The elections proceeded peacefully in all prisons countrywide.

Post-election
Early in June, largescale rioting erupted again. It followed an announcement by Saphor that its members would embark on a peaceful protest to insist on general amnesty. At that stage there was a rumour of indemnification solely for politically-motivated offences committed in the past.

On June 9, bloody violence erupted at the Modderbee Prison in Benoni and sparked off unrest at other prisons. Millions of rands worth of damage was caused to Modderbee when about 500 prisoners burnt down, among other things, 18 cells, offices and the library. An injured warder was held hostage.

After two days of violence two prisoners were killed and an estimated 30 people, including warders and prisoners, were injured. During the Modderbee Prison riots 104 prisoners escaped, but most were soon apprehended. Also on June 9 two warders were held hostage by prisoners at the Noorse Prison in KwaZulu.

In the unrest that followed 30 prisoners were injured and one was shot dead. At the Brandwlei Prison in Worcester about 200 prisoners took part in a sit-in demanding their release, while at the JC Steyn Prison in Kirkwood, Eastern Cape, about 500 prisoners rioted setting clothes and bedding alight in an attempt to enforce their release.

On June 10 rioting spread countrywide. At the Victor Verster Prison near Paarl a whole section was almost destroyed when 650 prisoners refused to be locked up again. Fighting erupted amongst the prisoners and one prisoner was killed by the inmates. About 11 prisoners and several warders were injured.

Rioting also occurred in prisons in Upington, Tshabangu, Bethal, De Aar, Keeromstad, Worcester, Grahamstown, Polimoor, Johannesburg, Witbank, Umtata, Mosselbay and Port Elizabeth. At the Brandwlei Prison in Worcester the juvenile section was burnt down in a riot when about 200 prisoners refused to be locked up again, and 31 prisoners were injured.

Damage
After three days of countrywide violence Saphor called off the mass action and urged its members to be calm. By June 14 the situation had returned to normal in most prisons.

According to preliminary estimates, damage of more than R50 million had been inflicted on cells and prison buildings. Around 1 000
cells had been damaged or destroyed. Besides many prisoners and guards were killed and injured. Four people were killed in the post-election prison riots.

A day after violence erupted in the Modderbee Prison, Minister of Correctional Services, Sipho Mzimela, announced that imprisonment terms of all inmates, excluding psychologically disturbed people and people serving sentences for debts, would be reduced by six months.

The Minister said the announcement did not stem from the demands of inmates, but from a promise made by President Nelson Mandela in his inauguration speech. However, Saphor remained dissatisfied with the mitigation of punishment and requested a committee to be appointed to investigate the whole question of amnesty.

Some Correctional Services personnel said after the riots that they were dissatisfied with the behaviour of a number of members of the Police and Prisoners Civil Rights Union (Popcru). An article in Rapport on June 12 reported that at several prisons Popcru members had allegedly associated themselves with inmates' amnesty demands and openly assisted inmates to communicate outside the prisons.

Their cells were unlocked, prisoners were allowed to roam freely around prison complexes, and in certain cases could phone out. These actions appeared to have seriously undermined discipline in the prisons and placed the lives of several warders in danger.

Reasons

Various reasons have been put forward to explain the pre and post-election prison violence. For example, that the decision to allow only certain categories of prisoners to vote led to friction among inmates which heightened existing tensions resulting from the granting of amnesty to only political prisoners in 1991 and 1992.

Expectations that prisoners would be released after the elections had been raised by public statements by various people and organisations. Prior to the elections Saphor had openly called for a general amnesty while the ANC had made promises about amnesty. Also, President Mandela's inauguration remarks about possible amnesty could have led to tension when a general amnesty was refused.

Another explanation is that the political situation in South Africa before the elections led to increasing politicisation of a people, including prisoners. They became, through organisations such as Saphor and the media, more aware of human rights, including political rights.

This resulted in a surge in Saphor membership and widespread support for the organisation's national campaign for prisoner rights. Saphor was established in 1989 in the Modderbee Prison, and until early 1994 had enjoyed the support or membership of only around 20% of prisoners.

Blacks proved to be a source of publicity and, in the lead up to the elections, were able to focus media attention on Saphor by appealing in prisons' garth and draped in heavy chains. Much of Saphor's earlier campaigns had been focused on making representations for the release of prisoners, especially on the grounds that apartheid was the reason for their imprisonment.

In addition, the confined space of prisons proved to be an ideal breeding ground for the incitement of mass action, and this could be a reason why rioting spread to quickly and widely. Calls for action by Saphor and events in prisons were reported countrywide, and it is alleged that information was also disseminated to prisoners by some members of Popcru.

Prison authorities also maintained that many prisoners seized the opportunity created by the issues of the right to vote and amnesty to strike over other, unrelated grievances. It also appeared, as the conflict progressed, that many prisoners hoped that the more violent their actions the quicker the authorities would accede to their demands.

In addition, some prisoners tended to blame apartheid for their criminal behaviour and maintained that they were therefore entitled to amnesty after the first democratic elections, which signalled the demise of the apartheid.

Throughout the mass action campaign in prisons it remained disquieting that grievances over the terms of voting rights for all prisoners and amnesty should have sparked off such widespread violence.

Surely there were more acceptable and effective ways of bringing prisoners' grievances to the attention of the authorities?

Another question is whether the channels of communication in the prison system are so blocked and bureaucratic, or the authorities so unwilling to negotiate or acknowledge prisoners' grievances, that an explosion of frustration by prisoners was inevitable?
Levels of violence in the taxi industry are increasing, particularly assassinations by hired hitmen. The underlying cause is economic pressures and attempts to eliminate competitors operating on lucrative routes. A system of route allocation and control by local authorities is urgently needed if peace in the taxi industry is to be achieved.

For most South Africans, April 1994 heralded the birth of democracy and new hope for peace in the country. But this was not so for some sectors of society, such as the minibus taxi industry.

Taxi conflict has increased substantially since the beginning of the year, particularly in areas once thought to be the calmest in the country, introducing levels of violence never matched before in the history of this industry.

Although taxis and commuters have been targets in the ongoing political violence, especially in massacres, the taxi conflicts that emerged in late 1993 and early 1994 were more of an intra- and inter-organisational nature.

Causes

From 1990, conflict in the minibus taxi industry was primarily concentrated in the Western and Eastern Cape and often took the form of drive-by shootings or random attacks on minibus taxis.

In 1991, levels of violence increased between the Western Cape Black Taxi Association and the Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga Taxi Association. Conflict between them affected whole communities and often took the form of low intensity attacks on minibus taxis and the homes of minibus taxi owners and drivers.

One of the causes for the Western Cape 'taxi war' was rumours of widespread corruption within the Local Road and Transportation Boards. They were seen as siding with dominant associations in their areas, stoking violence between taxi operators by granting preferential licences to selected individuals or allowing only one association to ply a particular route.

While the taxi conflict in the Western Cape was, to a certain extent, contained by a brokered peace agreement and an amalgamation of the main rival organisations, conflict began emerging between competing organisations - long distance and local - in the Transvaal.

Overtrading appeared to be the major cause of taxi conflicts in the PWV, the Northern and Far Northern Transvaal, where in the first six months of this year taxi violence has become an almost daily occurrence. These areas were once 'peaceful', but that changed towards the end of last year.

In September 1993 taxi conflict emerged in the form of a massacre in Wadeville near Germiston on the East Rand, which claimed the lives of 20 people. According to Peace Action reports, the attack was 'notable for the military precision and efficiency with which (it) was carried out'.

Hitmen

It was also reported last year that minibus taxi operators were hiring hitmen for sums ranging from R5 000 to R64 000 in brutal warring over routes in the PWV region. This introduced the industry to mafia style operations.

The cost of operating came to include human lives. Commuters became a trading commodity in the taxi wars and their 'value'...
decreased. Attacks on commuters escalated to levels never seen before. Operating routes became completely overtraded, fuelling greed and jealousy between operators.

One of the first 'hitman' incidents, as subsequently established in the court case of one of the attackers apprehended by bystanders, occurred in November 1993 in Mamelodi near Pretoria. Five people were killed at a taxi rank in the area, and investigations discovered that a hitman had been hired by the Brits based Letlabhile Taxi Association (LTA) to carry out the attack.

The LTA had become a target of violence and retaliated with matched intensity, not only attacking minibus taxis transporting commuters but also taxi operators and officials of taxi associations.

On further investigation it was discovered that the hitman was 'hired' by members of Askaris now operating minibus taxis in Brits. Askaris were members of the liberation movements "turned" by the South African security forces and then used as undercover agents. A number of Askaris were retrenched and used their retrenchment packages to invest in minibus taxis.

Feuding in the PWV and Northern Transvaal region is reported to be between the LTA, the South African Long Distance Taxi Association (Saldta), the Venda Long Distance Association (VLDA) and the Pretoria United Taxi Association (Puta).

The implication that certain attacks were carried out with "military precision" was corroborated recently when police investigations uncovered evidence linking members of the South African National Defence Force to attacks on minibus taxis in the PWV and Northern Transvaal.

**Deaths**

In the first six months of this year 57 people have been killed and 75 injured in minibus taxi related violence around the country (Figures 1 to 3). These figures are extremely disturbing when compared to the total of 60 killed for the whole of 1991.

These statistics show the extent to which commuters have become victims caught in the crossfire between feuding minibus taxi associations and minibus taxi operators. On May 28 this year six people - overnight travellers from Zimbabwe coming to buy goods in Johannesburg for resale in Zimbabwe - were gunned down in Johannesburg.
Later that day a taxi operator was gunned down in an apparent revenge attack. This incident set a precedent for other related taxi conflicts in which attacks carried out on minibuses are followed by a cycle of revenge and retaliatory attacks.

Economic problems and warring over routes appear to be at the heart of feeding within the industry and the present taxi violence, although in certain areas the conflict has become very politicised.

In a recent incident in Klerksdorp the opening of a taxi rank adjacent to another led to intense rivalry between two local taxi organisations. One, the Terminus Taxi Association, was dominated by Xhosa-speakers and the other, the Jazz Bar Taxi Association, by Sothos and Tswanas.

Rising tensions led to the kidnapping of three young drivers from the latter association who were then circumcised with broken bottles and left to bleed. According to one victim, the attackers said unincriminated people like him were “the cause of the violence” and that “it was this blood that made us aggressive and must come out”.

Conclusion

Although numerous peace agreements between warring taxi organisations have recently been reported, the level of violence in the taxi industry has not decreased. In fact, violent incidents are increasing, particularly assassinations by hired hitmen in the continuing competition for control and domination of routes.

The economic factors influencing the conflict in the minibus taxi industry should not be underestimated. They play a major role. One of the underlying factors is the recent increase in taxi-related violence which has been the collapse of the South African Black Taxi Association (Sabta) Foundation.

The Foundation was established in 1986 as a fund to provide security for minibus taxi owners against loans to purchase minibuses. At first the fund was set up with R10 million and it seemed as if it would work, but in September 1993 it collapsed.

The cause of the collapse is not known, but it was reported that foundation money had disappeared, possibly embezzled by Sabta officials, leaving taxi owners who invested in the fund without coverage for vehicle loans. Although Sabta has said taxi owners would be refunded, it is not certain where funds for reimbursement will come from or when repayment will take place.

The collapse of this fund increased the economic pressures of operating a minibus taxi and led to intensification of competition for routes and passengers. Taxi owners were forced to increase their turnover to earn more than before in order to pay instalments on vehicles. This indirectly fuelled taxi-related violence.

Since lucrative routes are the core of a successful minibus taxi operation, rival owners have increasingly resorted to violence to “eliminate” competitors. The use of “hitmen” in the assassination of rivals has added a new dimension to the conflict.

It has become obvious that halting taxi-related violence will require a comprehensive system of route allocation and control by local authorities. Up to now self-regulatory measures have failed, especially in the light of the ongoing internecine nature of the conflict.

Sabta, as a national organisation, has lost all credibility and control over its member associations. There are also numerous “independent” or “pirate” associations who do not owe allegiance to any national or regional association. The industry is operating in a “free-for-all” which holds out no hope in the near future for a peaceful solution to the problem.

**TABLE 1: TAXI CONFLICT 1994**

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<tr>
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<td>White Commuters</td>
<td>Taxi attacks</td>
<td>Taxi operators 3</td>
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<td>Taxi rank attacks</td>
<td>Commuters</td>
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<td>Low intensity attacks</td>
<td>Taxi operators 2</td>
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Note: In all but two cases the actors/organisations involved are unknown.

SLDTA = Soweto Long Distance Taxi Association

STA = Soweto Taxi Association

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