OPENING THE CITIES
Comparative Perspectives on Desegregation

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INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA
THE PRIVATE SECTOR COUNCIL ON URBANISATION (PSC)

The PSC comprises representatives of 6 private sector organisations and 42 individual members. The PSC receives research and administrative support from the Urbanisation Unit of the Urban Foundation.

Established in November 1985, the PSC set itself the task of formulating proposals for a new urbanisation strategy for South Africa.

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OPENING THE CITIES
Comparative Perspectives on Desegregation

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# OPENING THE CITIES

## COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening The Door</td>
<td>Ann Bernstein and Jeff McCarthy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Divided City: Group Areas And Racial Segregation</td>
<td>Jeff McCarthy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Elusive Deal: International Experience Of Desegregation</td>
<td>Lawrence Schlemmer and Louise Stack</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Neighbours: The Namibian Experience</td>
<td>SP Cilliers</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities In Transition: Urban Renewal And Suburbanisation</td>
<td>Johan Fick</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Coalitions: Integrated Neighbourhoods In A Segregated Society</td>
<td>Daniel J Monti</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentric Symbols: Attitudes To Group Areas Reforms</td>
<td>Lawrence Schlemmer and Louise Stack</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Youth Speak</td>
<td>Phinda Kuzwayo</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Settlement Or Free Cities?</td>
<td>Ann Bernstein</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening The Cities: Post Group Areas Urban Planning And Management</td>
<td>Ann Bernstein and Jeff McCarthy</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

All the papers in this Issue Focus, except two, are based on work originally commissioned or done on behalf of the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation. The exceptions are the contribution by Johan Fick which is based on a paper he presented to the Carlton Conference on the Witwatersrand in July 1989, and that of Phinda Kuzwayo, based on research commissioned by the Tongaat-Hullet Group.

The PSC is a forum which brings together the major urban communities and the Urban Foundation (see inside cover page). Over the last several years the Urban Foundation and the PSC have commissioned research from a wide range of academics, both locally and abroad, focused on a number of problems relating to urbanisation and how it might be managed in South Africa for the benefit of all.

This special Issue Focus is one of several special issues of academic journals which are being supported and widely distributed by the Urban Foundation as part of the process of disseminating the PSC’s research findings. The Urban Foundation hopes that in actively encouraging publication of selected research papers it will be sharing valuable information with the wider body of informed specialists in South Africa.

The PSC project has been one to which many have contributed, and it is appropriate to thank in particular the Chairman, the individual and organisational members of the PSC, the Chairman and members of the Working Groups, the large number of academics, researchers, and consultants, those who participated in the many discussions to test the thinking that was emerging, and the members of the UF’s Urbanisation Unit who managed what has been an extremely demanding process.

The goal of the PSC project has been that ultimately the lives of millions of South Africans should benefit through the implementation of new policy frameworks that address South Africa’s pressing development challenges.

Ann Bernstein
Executive Director: Urbanisation
The Urban Foundation
PREFACE

OPENING THE DOOR

By Ann Bernstein and Jeff McCarthy

The articles collected here have to do with a critical issue for South Africa's immediate urban future: that is, the issues of group areas, desegregation and the need to repeal discriminatory legislation relating to the cities. Government statements on this issue remain ambiguous, with promises at this stage only to 'look at' the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts in the next parliamentary session (interview with FW de Klerk, Washington Times, 14/06/1990).

In the meantime, South Africa's cities have undergone a substantial degree of de facto desegregation. Research conducted for the Urban Foundation, for example, reveals that, whilst there are no exact estimates of the number of black people living in housing officially designated for whites, there is now some degree of integration on a very wide array of 'white' group areas. For example, in a 1988 survey of Pretoria-Witwatersrand region whites, 11 percent overall indicated awareness of 'non-white' families occupying property in their neighbourhoods (domestics and occupants of domestic quarters not included). Only in Krugersdorp were there none who were aware of a level of desegregation (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989).

Moral arguments, unfortunately, have seldom had much force in South African politics and it is therefore necessary to point to the cold facts of South African urban areas.

The disjunctive between de facto and de jure settlement patterns not only causes considerable personal hardship, but given the broader pattern of demographic and housing market forces at work, nothing short of massive forced removals on a par with that of the 1960s will achieve a pattern of complete segregation, as originally envisaged in the Group Areas Act. Needless to say, even debate on the prospects of such removals at this stage would provoke a local and international political and economic backlash of disastrous proportions.

If only for this reason, rational policy debate on Group Areas will henceforth have to focus squarely upon processes of integration and desegregation, or else be marginalised from reality.

It is in this context that the papers in this Issue Focus here assume their special significance. Most of the papers derive from research previously conducted for the Urban Foundation and Private Sector Council on Urbanisation, and their release forms part of a broader programme for communicating these research results. The papers present a complete array of data on segregation and desegregation in South Africa, and elsewhere. What emerges, in broad terms, is that whilst South Africa is hardly unique in experiencing high levels of de facto racial segregation, the legally enforced nature of segregation in South Africa is an anachronism. As Johan Fick, a previous Deputy Chairman of Johannesburg's Management Committee comments in his article: "any usefulness that the Group Areas Act may have had as an instrument to pattern residential settlement has disappeared". Professor S P Cilliers, Dean of Arts at the University of Stellenbosch goes further still, and concludes on the basis of his research into the Namibian experience that group areas will cause more harm than good: total abolition of the Group Areas Act is the preferred route.

The evidence on patterns of segregation and desegregation elsewhere in the world, as presented by Schlemmer and Stack, and Monti, is such that it is clear that broadly homogeneous neighbourhoods tend to persist, even without legislative support as is the case in South Africa. However, as Schlemmer and Stack and Monti indicate, each in their separate ways, it is possible that both local governments and private corporations can enhance the prospects for successful integration. Clearly, given the severe social costs of segregation not only in South Africa, but elsewhere, it will be important that these more positive prospects be actively nurtured in a post-Group Areas future.
Schlemmer and Stack’s article on attitudes to Group Areas reform indicates that positive measures to enhance urban environmental quality will be acceptable to a wide spectrum of South Africans, but that these measures should be strictly non-discriminatory in racial terms, and democratic in their formulation and implementation. This will obviously be a delicate policy issue for the future, although experience from other Southern African contexts (e.g. Matikeng, Windhoek, Harare) indicates that the transition to ‘open’ housing markets has much less impact than the current white stereotypes in South Africa would suggest.

Moreover, it is striking how, in the South African context, white attitudes tend to be strongly influenced by the leads offered by their political representatives. The Immorality Act, for example, is now widely regarded by whites as an embarrassing relic from the past, yet prior to its repeal most whites assumed that it should be retained (Rhoodie, 1989). Moreover, research by Relief (1978) indicates that it is often simply uncertainty over the group areas status of neighbourhoods which leads to aggressive behaviour amongst whites in integrating neighbourhoods. Presumably, once the uncertainty is removed, the propensity towards such resistance will greatly diminish.

Besides, ‘white fears’ have to be balanced against black aspirations for a just, equal-opportunity society. The legacy of the Group Areas Act is such that it constitutes a major violation of such aspirations, and it is for these amongst other reasons that the Urban Foundation has on numerous occasions expressed itself in favour of the immediate repeal of the Group Areas Act (cf Urban Foundation, 1990).

This is not to say that there can be any easy or problem-free path towards residential reform in South Africa. The articles collected here should, if nothing else, dispel such simplistic illusions. For us, the obvious choice is to go for the route that opens up the best chance for a positive future for all in South Africa’s cities, and then to capitalise on the advantages of such a choice. This choice must not be prevented, inhibited or diverted away from the core urban challenges into detours that act to prevent, put off or complicate the inevitable. For this reason, the penultimate article in the collection reflects on the pitfalls of the Free Settlement approach, whereas the final article offers our reflections on an option that provides the best chances for all, and which capitalises on the advantages of that choice.

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BACKGROUND

THE DIVIDED CITY

GROUP AREAS AND RACIAL SEGREGATION

By Jeff McCarthy
The Urban Foundation

Many of the core problems of South African cities derive from a historic legacy of central government policy and planning which impacts on urban residential patterns, encapsulated in the Group Areas Act. The main features of this legacy are summarised here, followed by the author’s evaluation of the main socio-political, economic and welfare consequences. In conclusion, the de facto breakdown of group areas is discussed.

Current central government policy on residential patterns in South Africa’s cities is framed around the Group Areas Act which was originally written into law in 1950. The Act has since been amended on several occasions, but its essentials have remained that South Africans must live in separate residential areas designated for the use of members of different groups as defined in terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950 (i.e. on the basis of statutory race groups).

It is this legal enforcement of urban racial segregation that makes South Africa anomalous in international terms. In terms of the Group Areas Act, a Group Areas Board was established for the purposes of identifying specific neighbourhoods within all cities and towns that would be reserved for the exclusive use of a given race group. To date, some 1,700 Group Areas have been proclaimed following the recommendations of the Board, and effectively, all residential areas of South Africa’s cities and towns are now legally reserved for the exclusive occupation of one or another race group.

In order to appreciate the significance of the Group Areas Act in both urban and political terms, it is important to situate it in a historical context. South African cities have always been characterised by high levels of de facto racial-residential segregation. Even prior to the implementation of the Group Areas Act during the 1950s and 1960s, South African cities recorded high ‘segregation indices’.

A segregation index is a quantitative measure of the degree of racial segregation/integration which varies from 0 to 1 where 0 represents perfectly proportional distribution of the different groups in each neighbourhood, and where 1 represents maximum concentration in different neighbourhoods. In the 1940s in South Africa (i.e. prior to the Group Areas Act) segregation indices for South African cities varied between 0.8 and 0.9. Davies (1976) points out that only marginal increases in these figures were achieved after the application of the Act, despite hundreds of thousands of forced removals.

Segregation prior to the Group Areas Act was partly brought about by informal social pressures and individual choice, and partly by a range of discriminatory local by-laws, title deeds restrictions, the Black Land Act (1913) and ‘Pegging Acts’.
The planning model envisaged by the Group Areas Act was not consistent with actual patterns of settlement existing at the time.

As a result, in the forced removals that took place between 1960 and 1983, some 860,000 persons were moved.

(1943 and 1946). Segregation indices were as high, and often higher, than their equivalents in the cities of America’s ‘Deep South’ at that time. The application of the Group Areas Act, however, resulted in significant structural transformation in South African cities.

Planning Instrument

Whilst a loose, zonally-organised pattern of segregation prevailed in most South African cities by 1950, what emerged after the application of the Act was a ‘city more structured and quartered than anything which had preceded it’ (Davies, 1976). This was because the Act was used as an instrument of ‘urban design’ by planners during the 1950s and 1960s as part of the application of a particular spatial-political vision.

The Group Areas Act implied a particular urban planning framework which consisted of six interlinked points:

- There should be consolidated residential areas for each race group.
- Each consolidated area should be so placed as to have access to a growth hinterland for future development.
- The consolidated areas should, wherever possible, be separated from each other by strong natural barriers (eg a river valley). As a second option strong manmade barriers should be used (e.g. railway, highway, etc). In the event neither of these options being available, ‘buffer zones’ of open space should be employed as a divide.
- Each racial group should have access to and from the work zone where interaction is permissible. In the process of movement to and from the work zone, however, no racial group should cross the residential areas of another group. Consequently ‘ethnic islands’ should also be avoided.
- The black areas should be located as close as possible to work centres, since it is they who have to bear transport costs at low wages.
- Each area should become self-governed and should become as functionally independent as possible of all other areas. Areas should proceed towards equality in all respects.

This interpretation of the main planning implications of the Group Areas Act was derived by the Durban Housing Survey, University of Natal (1952) and Western’s (1981) study of the Group Areas Act in Cape Town reaches similar conclusions, as do McCarthy and Smit (1984). Not all of these points were realised in practice, however, particularly the last two objectives. It has been noted that only one urban planning model could satisfy the first four of these conditions simultaneously ... a sectoral model in which members of designated race groups are located in different residential sectors, and where each commute to centrally located production and exchange facilities (see figure 1).

It has been widely observed that this planning model, in turn, was not consistent with the actual patterns of settlement that existed in our cities at the time of the passage of the Group Areas Act. In consequence, very significant numbers of people had to be moved, the great majority of whom were black (see Davies, 1976; Western, 1981; McCarthy and Smit, 1984, for actual figures). In the Durban case, sixty per cent of the ‘non-white’ population were displaced in terms of Group Areas by comparison with ten percent of the white population (McCarthy and Smit, 1984).

The initial forced removals occurred in the 1950s, often sparked symbolic confrontations between the government and black political organizations, for example, in Sophiatown in Johannesburg (see Lodge, 1983). Even after the 1950s and the suppression of resistance, many thousands of people were affected. One estimate is that between 1960 and 1983, some 860,000 persons were forced to move as a result of their disqualification as legal residents in terms of the Act, the majority of whom were ‘coloureds’ and Indians (Surplus Peoples Project, 1987).

Official statistics are not markedly different. According to Hansard (1983, Question 92:230, 25/02/85) some 745,000 white, ‘coloured’ and Asian persons had either been removed or were under threat of removal in terms of the Group Areas Act (assuming average family size of 3.3 for whites, 5.5 for ‘coloureds’ and 6 for Indians). The proportions involved were 1% white, 65% ‘coloured’ and 34% Asian.

Costs & Consequences

There are a number of important reasons why the Group Areas Act poses barriers to the efficient and equitable planning model.
management of our cities. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is possible to isolate three broad categories of consequence of the Group Areas policy in terms of efficiency, welfare and socio-political impact.

**Efficiency consequences**

Group Areas planning has imposed limitations upon the ability of South African cities to operate as efficient economic entities. Parcels of disused land are located in central areas which otherwise might have been released decades ago as part of the development of efficient and compact urban growth, e.g. Cato Manor in Durban and District Six in Cape Town.

Land use mismatches are another legacy of Group Areas planning. The rigid, sectoral structuring of residential opportunities has led to expensive commuting patterns between home and work. For instance, seventy per cent of central Johannesburg's employees are black yet there are no centrally located legal residential opportunities presently available for blacks; two-thirds of industrial land in Durban is in the southern sector, yet the main direction of both planned and unplanned black settlement is to the north, with numerous other examples.

The distortion of residential property markets is evident, where the price of land is differentially affected by variable supply constraints in the declaration of Group Areas, and where black housing shortages are accompanied by white housing surpluses.

There is some debate as to the exact size of these deficits and surpluses, but figures of the magnitude of an 800,000 unit shortage for blacks, and a 40,000 unit surplus for whites, are commonly used. Maasdorp and Pillay (1977) found that, even during the 1970s, these differential supply constraints significantly increased the price of black housing opportunities vis-à-vis the equivalents available to whites. A Cape Town property economist has calculated that houses in 'coloured' group areas in 1989 were up to 80 per cent more expensive than equivalent houses in adjacent white group areas, as a result of these same forces.

The distortion of commercial markets was initially felt in terms of the group areas concept being applied to restrict rights to trade in certain areas; and subsequently felt in terms of the mismatch between optimal trading locations and enforced residential locations of (black) informal sector traders, product distribution inefficiencies, and 'costs of entry' problems for small entrepreneurs (all of these have restricted the growth of black entrepreneurs).

Industrial inefficiencies are evident where the locational freedom of the firm was circumscribed and linked to deconcentration policy; and centralised control over the allocation of industrially zoned land was used to further the aims of segregated urban development. For example, the provision of subsidies to industries locating in places such as Atlantic or Bronkhorstspruit; and restricting industrial land supply in the Witwatersrand.

Lastly, public sector inefficiencies are linked to the duplication of certain services and amenities, the increased cost of servicing a spatially disaggregated, compartmentalised urban structure, the need for transport subsidies, etc. For example, half-empty, whites-only teachers training colleges and schools cost over R1 billion per annum; commuter transport subsidies cost R1 billion per annum in 1985 already; etc.

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**FIGURE 1: A model group areas city (after Davies, 1976)**

Group areas have not only distorted housing supply, but have also restricted the growth of black entrepreneurs.
DATA BASE

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION

1974 Johannesburg City Council removes ‘whites only’ signs from park benches.
1975 The Carlton Centre is allowed to establish South Africa’s first non-racial, sit-down restaurant.
1975 Mixed audiences are allowed in theatres for the first time.
1976 20 hotels acquire ‘international’ (multiracial) status; 21 applications refused.
1976 Durban’s Mayor calls for CBD desegregation. Theron Commission recommends the same.
1977 ‘Coloured’ and Indian business people given more freedom to trade outside of group areas in terms of Section 16 of the Group Areas Act.
1977 Bus services in Cape Town desegregated.
1978 58 ‘international’ hotels exist, permanent permits for mixed audiences at theatres granted.
1979 Riekert Commission recommends desegregation of areas of CBD’s.
1979 East London’s bus service granted permission to desegregate.
1980 Cape Town City Council decides to no longer enforce beach segregation.
1980 Government delegates power to decide on desegregation of sports facilities to municipalities.
1981 President’s Council investigates the possibility of open trading areas.
1982 Group Areas Amendment Act (62 of 1982) repeals restrictions on mixed sport meetings and mixed clubs with liquor licenses.
1982 The verdict in the State vs Govender case has an impact on the application of the Group Areas Act - forced removals now more difficult.
1982 President’s Council recommends that families not be evicted in terms of the Group Areas Act unless alternative accommodation is available, and that trade exemptions should be granted more easily under Section 19.
1983 74 hotels, 34 restaurants and 6 racecourses now have ‘international’ status; 15 multiracial cinema applications received of which 11 are successful.
1984 Strydom Committee Report urges desegregation of CBD’s.
1984 The Transvaal Provincial Administration blocks Pretoria City Council’s attempt to close 17 of its parks to blacks.
1985 78 cinemas now open to all.
63 local authorities had submitted applications for open trading areas by March 1986. The first two allowed were Durban and Johannesburg, but in the course of the year 29 areas are declared 'free trade areas'.

Durban's bus service desegregated and three routes desegregated in Johannesburg.

Port Elizabeth City Council applies for beach desegregation and all municipal signs enforcing segregation are removed.

Liquor Amendment Act allows all hotels to desegregate (still subject to provisions of Group Areas Act).

Proclamation R17 (in terms of the Group Areas Act) exempts restaurants in 'free trade areas' from permits for desegregation.

Hospitals placed under 'general affairs' Provincial Administrations'.

Durban's beaches (except two) desegregated.

President's Council Committee recommends retention of principle of residential segregation, but that a mechanism is needed for desegregating some areas.


The President's Council's Constitutional Committee recommends the Repeal of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act.

The Free Settlement Areas Act and Local Government Affairs in Free Settlement Act are promulgated, enabling selective residential integration.

Group Areas 'task forces' appointed to 'police' the Act.

Pretoria Supreme Court disallows Carletonville Council's reimposition of petty apartheid measures.

Johannesburg City Council opens buses, swimming pools and recreation centres.

First Free Settlement Board hearings begin. Board recommends four such areas to government.

State President announces intention to repeal Separate Amenities Act, and requests local authorities to desegregate beaches.

Johannesburg City Council votes to declare the whole municipal area a free trade area (Queenstown and Durban Councils recommend the same).

Separate Amenities Act repealed.

Source: Urbanisation Unit, Urban Foundation Research.
Welfare consequences

The inefficiencies referred to above have reduced the level of material welfare available to all South Africans, but it is also important to recognize the disproportionate impact of Group Areas planning upon specific, particularly income-related, racial groups. It would appear that the main negative impacts have been on the urban poor, and in the context of South Africa’s high levels of welfare inequality, this is a most disquieting conclusion.

The poor are affected by the lack of (legal) central residential options. Whereas typically the poor tend to locate as close as possible to the centre in order to maximize their access to scarce economic opportunities and money spent on travelling, the poor in South Africa have limited access to comparative price advantages in the more competitive central areas (goods cost 30-40% more in remote townships), etc.

Group Areas also place further constraints upon the already insufficient allocations of land for the poor, thereby increasing costs and residential densities beyond those which might be expected under normal market conditions. Further, it results in the effective removal of deprived groups from access to public facilities such as libraries, health care facilities and other support services important to the self-improvement and often mere survival of the poor.

Socio-political consequences

Some of the most important consequences of the group areas framework for our society are difficult to calculate in money terms. Amongst these are poor communication, insofar as Group Areas manufacture an inward, group-oriented consciousness which, in turn, is one basis for race-based political mobilisation and intergroup conflict.

Another consequence is the inequalities of opportunity in the workplace. Group areas planning makes it difficult for senior black personnel to translate job achievement into lifestyle improvement. Moreover, there are difficulties in promoting extramural interactions amongst multiracial groups of employees, and restrictions on the inter-city transfer of black managers.

Fragmented, duplicated planning often leads to costly inertia because several bureaucracies are often simultaneously trying to plan for one area. For instance, a recent Provincial study in Natal shows that at least eleven levels of government authority dispassionately plan for the Durban Functional Region. This number could be much reduced without the Group Areas framework.

Several studies have shown the extraordinary injury to human sensitivities resulting from forced removals, and prosecutions under the Group Areas Act. The last mentioned of these socio-political consequences - a sense of discrimination and rejection - is probably the most important in terms of black opposition to the Group Areas Act.

Western (1981), in his careful study of removals in Cape Town, certainly demonstrated the enormous hurt that has been imposed upon people who have forcibly been removed from their homes. This point is often emphasized by black political leadership. For example, the Reverend Alan Hendrickse described the Group Areas Act during the joint debate on the Group Areas Amendment Bill in 1988 as ‘an Act of violence because it is an Act of dispossession’ (Hansard, 1988: col 16653). He also noted in relation to criticisms of emotionalism ‘that it is easy to reject emotions, the feelings and the experience of other people when one is not in a position of having gone through that experience’ (Hansard, 1988: col 16665).

In any event, whatever the range of reasons might be for black opposition to the Group Areas Act, there is little doubt as to the extent of that opposition. The Urban Foundation’s research indicates that 62% of black residents in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region favour immediate abolition of the Group Areas Act (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989:157), and similar figures have been recorded in other surveys (eg Rhoodie, 1989; Retief and Kelbrick, 1990).

Incremental Breakdown

In summary, whilst de facto racial-residential segregation has always existed in South Africa, the Group Areas Act extended this segregation and resulted in a centrally-controlled ‘urban design’ which has had major consequences for efficiency and equity in
Urban Foundation research shows that desegregation of private and public amenities proceeded rapidly during the 1980s. By 1989 a high level of desegregation of private amenities had occurred, varying from over 90 per cent of such facilities in the metropolitan centres, to 50 per cent in smaller, more conservative towns.

The desegregation of public amenities has not only been slower, but commenced later and has varied considerably from one local authority to another. For example:

- Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg have now desegregated all local public facilities;
- in other major urban centres fifty percent or more of public amenities are desegregated;
- some local authorities of smaller urban areas had not at the time of the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act opened any public amenities to blacks.

How the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act will affect broader processes of desegregation is not yet clear. What does seem clear is that the Group Areas Act has and will crumble in the wake of desegregated public life in the cities.

The 1982 Govender case verdict in particular slowed the rate of prosecutions in terms of the Group Areas Act. This verdict implied that suitable alternative accommodation must be found prior to a Group Areas eviction. In consequence, for example, in 1987 the police investigated 1243 complaints in terms of the Group Areas Act, but only 3 parties were charged and tried (prosecutions) (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989:75). However, this rose slightly in 1988 with the police investigating 1689 complaints leading to 98 prosecutions (Hansard, 16/03/1989, 42f; 15/03/1989, 411). The latest figures are for the period of 07/1989 to 02/1990 during which the police investigated 1249 Group Areas contraventions, but no charges were laid (Business Day, 16/03/90).

By the mid-1980s, there was also a more flexible approach to the granting of permits, for members of other race groups to reside in white areas. For the period 1/9/85 to 31/8/86 a total of 280 such applications were received of which 113 were granted, 119 were refused and 48 were still under consideration. In 1987 the Transvaal Provincial Administration (which took over the function of considering Group Areas applications in September 1986) approved 940 out of 961 applications from blacks to live in white
areas; 15 out of 46 Indian applications; and one out of 18 coloured applications (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989:74). In 1988, 1393 similar applications were received, although figures are not available for refusals/permissions (Hansard, 15/03/1989, 411).

The rate of official relaxation of the Act has therefore increased but, much more dramatically, unofficial relaxation has occurred via the 'grey ing' process (see Schlemmer and Stack 1989). In the meantime, despite all of these adjustments, the core segregationist legislation the Group Areas Act remains on the Statute Books, and government has not yet indicated an unambiguous intention to repeal this legislation.  

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Evidence from other societies makes it abundantly clear that restrictions on freedom of residential choice can be powerful and pervasive even where the formal provisions of law nominally encourage race integration. International evidence briefly reviewed here suggests that the ideal of open residential opportunity has been elusive in situations which, very broadly, might be compared with South Africa. The authors demonstrate that future policy in South Africa's cities will have to take account of issues which go beyond the repeal of legislation.

The nearly forty-year old Group Areas Act has been unique in the world as a massive, legally entrenched form of social engineering. There can be little doubt that the abolition of this Act, an intention announced by the State President on April 19, will in itself constitute a very significant step towards a more normal society in South Africa.

The existence of statutory race segregation should not obscure the fact that race segregation does not depend on statutory provisions alone.

As in South Africa, race segregation in the USA has long historical roots. Until a Supreme Court ruling in 1917, formal municipal residential segregation was fairly widespread in the Southern states. Thereafter white property owners resorted to restrictive leases and covenants (agreements not to sell to blacks). The Federal Housing Administration aligned its policies with prevailing norms and until well into the fifties tended to regard infiltration of non-whites into white neighbourhoods as a threat to social stability. Thus a dual housing market became entrenched.

Furthermore, a much higher proportion of whites than blacks received assisted housing and black areas were regarded as a financial risk and hence denied effective subsidisation inter alia in the form of mortgage bond insurance. The combined effects of these and other practices institutionalised segregation and condemned the predominantly black
patterns indicate integration, although more discriminatory legislation remains high despite two decades of outlawed legislation.

From the sixties onward the US Department of Housing and Urban Development sought to eliminate these unfair housing practices, armed with a number of Executive Orders and statutes, including the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Executive and legislative mandates that do not occur and these authors conclude in sum, all the actors and institutions in the housing market. This, manifestly, did not occur and these authors conclude that: ‘Despite the apparently clear executive and legislative mandates that racial discrimination in housing be ended, segregation has in fact increased in many cities since 1962. For instance, one study found that integration on a block by block basis actually declined on average’ (Lief and Goering: 240).

In 1977, Farley (1977), after a study of 29 cities, concluded that ‘residential segregation by race is considerably greater than by social class’. Subsequent research based on the 1980 census suggests that ‘... with some variation from city to city, there was on average a modest decline in segregation levels ... several studies suggest a decline in the proportion of blacks and whites living in racially exclusive areas between 1970 and 1980 ... but a decline in racial exclusivity does not imply changes in segregation at other levels of racial mix ... and it is clear that most blacks and whites live in areas predominantly composed of people of their own racial groups’ (Farley, 1987: 99-101).

Several studies confirm that the level of urban racial segregation in the US remains high despite two decades of outlawed discriminatory legislation. Levels of racial segregation in US Standard Metropolitan Areas (at the scale of the ‘census tract’) were indexed on a continuum ranging from 0% (no segregation) to 100% (complete segregation). An index for 1980 was 67.7% compared with 74.5% for 1970; only a slight improvement.

Observers in the USA had hoped that the move by middle class blacks to the suburbs would break patterns of segregation. Here again, however Farley (1987:111) notes that ‘... segregation within the suburbs is only slightly less intense than within central cities and ... the forces perpetuating segregation are as much at work in the suburbs as in the cities’.

There is a view sometimes expressed that the pattern just outlined is most typical in the North and West USA, but in the South, although more favourable for integration, patterns indicate segregation at the city block level. Other studies also confirm that the level of urban racial segregation in the US remains high despite two decades of outlawed discriminatory legislation. Levels of racial segregation in US Standard Metropolitan Areas (at the scale of the ‘census tract’) were indexed on a continuum ranging from 0% (no segregation) to 100% (complete segregation). An index for 1980 was 67.7% compared with 74.5% for 1970; only a slight improvement.
Generally, the broad patterns reflect an interrelated yet distinct expansion of urban systems. The US Association for Urban Studies reported in 1987 that "Our most basic conclusion is that none of the well-known economic, social and statutory changes have fundamentally altered the ghetto system. Ethnic concentration and segregation of integrated neighbourhoods are still taking place". (The Star, 16/2/88).

**Trends in Europe**

In Europe the influx of foreign migrant workers to many cities has created situations somewhat similar to the USA, although obviously the proportions of non-European residents is relatively lower. The patterns of residence are very similar to those in the USA. A few examples of research are noted below.

In Germany, O'Loughlin (cited in Messy, 1980) examined patterns of ethnic segregation in Bremen, Dusseldorf and Stuttgart and found that at the ward level:

- groups perceived by Germans to be foreign, such as Greeks and Turks, were highly segregated with dissimilarity indices ranging from 27 to 45;
- those groups perceived to be closer, such as Italians and Yugoslavians, were found to be less segregated, with indices ranging from 24 to 51;
- French and Dutch immigrants were found to be hardly segregated at all with indices under 15;
- segregation measured at the city block level revealed dissimilarity indices of 70 for Spaniards, 69 for Turks, 65 for Greeks and Italians and 62 for Yugoslavians;
- at the level of the apartment building, however, there was almost total segregation between groups with indices ranging between 75 and 100.

In a similar study by DeLannoy (1975) in Brussels, Turks were found to be most segregated from the rest of the population with a dissimilarity index of 68, followed by Crooks at 63, Moroccans at 58, Spaniards at 51, Germans at 45, Britons at 39, Dutch at 26 and French at 22. A cluster analysis of residential dissimilarity revealed three basic clusters: Western Europeans, Southern Europeans and Turks.

In London, the clustering of West Indian settlement in the west of the city and black settlement in areas like Brixton, which have undergone rapid transition to black majorities, is self-evident. Apart from voluntary residential congregation for purposes of cultural cohesion and support and the lengthy residence conditions required to qualify for council housing, informal, de facto discriminatory measures also operate to maintain residential segregation (Jakubs, cited in Wills et al, 1987).

Christopher Bagley (1968) observed that in the early post-war period in the Netherlands, the assimilation of black minorities from the colonies proceeded very favourably. He suggested that the greater initial success achieved with racial integration in the Netherlands as compared to Britain, may have been to a strong Dutch social cohesion based on a "consensus in the commitment to an ethic of tolerance of social diversity in a single society in which there is division on religious and political grounds".

This tolerance, as Bagley puts it, results in a strong commitment to the "right of other pillars (social segments) to exist. It is not a tolerance based on insistence on homogeneity but on an acceptance of diversity. In addition, a consistent policy was followed in terms of which housing for immigrants was provided in many parts of the country thus avoiding the development of ethnic concentrations.

Generally, however, the position in Europe is one of very distinct patterns of informal segregation, which are closely correlated with the degree of cultural dissimilarity between native Europeans and foreign minorities.

**Segregation Mechanisms**

As the analyses in the volume edited by Tobin (1987) suggest, in earlier periods in the USA various official and semi-official measures established a base pattern of segregation, and in this sense parts of the USA were comparable with South Africa under Group Areas Act. Of particular interest however, are the informal mechanisms which have persisted since the seventies to perpetuate the patterns of residential zoning, it is these informal processes which are going to constitute the policy challenge for South African cities once statutory measures are removed.

In Europe the influx of foreign migrant workers to many cities has created majority-minority ratios similar to the USA.
Informal measures used to manipulate racial residential settlement patterns include 'red-lining' - the selective granting of housing loans by mortgage companies and banks. This is seldom done on an overtly racial basis. Appraisals of areas into which black families are moving are adversely influenced by perceptions of economic risk. This leads to a lack of finance for such areas, a drop in property values, a white exodus, and thereby further black in-migration due to vacancies in the area.

Measures also include so-called 'routing' or 'steering' - of certain groups to particular areas by estate agents, and 'block busting' by estate agents - the artificial inducement of panic selling by means of rumours that a certain area is going to go black and in some cases by going so far as to back this up with financial support to some blacks to move into the area. Whites then leave and property values drop. Once the area becomes increasingly sought after by blacks, property prices can rise again to new heights.

These practices are part and parcel of a process referred to as 'invasion and succession' or 'tipping', a well known phenomenon in terms of which a rapid transition occurs within an area from white majority residence to majority black or all-black residence, as described by Fick, de Coning and Olivier (1988). The people least tolerant of a change in composition of the area move out first. It seems that different groups experience differing tolerance thresholds. Among the more tolerant groups in the USA are young professionals without family commitment, socially marginal groups and white ethnic minorities whose social networks isolate them from their immediate social surroundings.

In the USA a traditionally white family suburb 'tips' once the percentage of the black population in the suburb reaches between 12 and 20%. A reverse tipping has also occurred in some American cities where a process of rehabilitation and revitalisation (gentrification) turns a neighbourhood from black to white.

Efforts by residents associations to halt a white exodus by controlling real estate solicitation, maintaining and enhancing community standards, building neighbourhood morale and correcting stereotypes about blacks may in fact speed up the rate of transition of an area by making it more attractive for middle-class blacks while having little impact on whites for whom a wider variety of housing choice is available (Varnoy, 1979).

A study conducted by the University of Chicago found that although majorities of both blacks and whites support the principle of open housing, in opinion surveys, blacks typically support their ideal neighbourhood configuration as 40% black whereas whites indicate discomfort once blacks 'cross into double digits' (Newsweek, 7/3/88:35).

Given this imbalance of 'ideal images', although theoretically compatible colour mixes in neighbourhoods exist, the dynamics of movement determines that any such mixture will attract outsiders. Such immigration cumulatively tilts the balance and thus '...there are only two stable equilibria. One consists of all blacks and no whites, the other all whites and no blacks' (Schelling, quoted by Fick, de Coning and Olivier, 1988:10).

In a variation of the same theme, a report of recent research indicates a displacement of blacks in the Western states of the USA, seemingly due to Hispanic immigration (Lee, 1986). Once a process of tipping begins, a characteristic feature appears to be an increase of negative perceptions and anxiety levels in neighbourhoods immediately surrounding the 'tipping' area as contrasted with a softening of ethnic attitudes in the area itself, probably due to the experience of shared residential space. The fact that most of the less tolerant original residents are no longer present would also contribute to the improved social climate in an integrated area.

Although some evidence suggest that 'tipping' is more likely to occur in areas where rental units predominate as a result of losses being more apt to 'bleed' than established homeowners, homeowners are also apt to migrate in due course due to anxiety concerning anticipated property devaluations. It is also clear that it is in general more typical for whites to retreat from transitional areas to compete over them (Varnoy, 1979:15), which in a sense avoids conflict.

It is obvious that fears of property devaluation are a major factor in the responses of whites. Evidence on
Segregation Causes

The tendencies outlined above, whatever their detailed origins and characteristics might be, reflect a pervasive colour-consciousness and sensitivity to race and to lifestyles broadly associated with race. It is necessary to explore the factors underlying this sensitivity which seem to characterise both American and European cities.

As already suggested, race segregation is not an overt ideology (or is no longer such). A recent keynote study by Schuman and Bobo (1988) suggests the following:

*National trend data on white racial attitudes show sharply increasing support for the principles of residential and other forms of integration... By 1985, for example, 74% of the whites claimed to disagree with the statement that "White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighbourhoods and blacks should respect that right" up from 39% in 1963..."* Simultaneously, however, the same survey notes another dimension: "...white support for the implementation of black rights through open housing laws has been significantly lower and less consistent in growth, reaching only 48% in 1985..."

After reviewing their own evidence based on national surveys in which hypothetical 'experimental' situations were employed, the authors conclude that there is 'general resistance' to the enforcement of open housing, and that it is relatively greater than when it is based on local referenda.

It seems clear, therefore, that there are very persistent and consistent motivations underpinning informal segregation, which survive in the face of general values which incline American whites towards inter-racial tolerance and equality. We need to consider some of the major findings relating to these motivations in order to understand them more fully.

Varady's study of Wynnefield, Philadelphia, among many others, indicated that house type significantly influences the decision of whites to remain in an area of transition. Those living in large attractive detached houses were far less likely to move than those living in attached homes or apartments. Those who indicated that they were interested in residential integration were only interested in living in a racially mixed community if whites are in the majority (Varady, 1979:134-5).

Tumin, like most more recent researchers, concluded from his study of white male attitudes towards desegregation in North Carolina that the most important variables influencing readiness for desegregation are high levels of education, occupational status, income and media exposure. This implies that racial discrimination declines as the potential threat of competition for limited opportunities for status improvement is overcome through status attainment (Tumin, 1958:80).

Darden (1987), on the basis of his research demonstrates that segregation does not vary significantly according to the income or class status of either whites or blacks. Even where status similarity exists, significantly greater integration of black-white residence does not occur.

Findings such as these show that race segregation is a general tendency, which is not reduced by similarity of status between black and white, but which weakens somewhat where the whites are high-status, well-educated professionals. This general tendency has led many authors to explain the phenomenon in terms of race prejudice and discrimination. For example, in the work by Tobin (1987) virtually all the authors, including the editor, conclude that prejudice among white residents and/or white estate agents, perpetuates the entrenched and institutionalised separation of the races which developed in earlier decades.

The diagnosis of race prejudice and discrimination does not necessarily explain anything, however. The vast majority of the whites in the USA are not narrow-minded bigots with deviant
Although prejudice toward outsiders, the drive toward social dominance, etc., are universal tendencies, as explanations they miss the point. Personalities who are antagonistic towards out-group members. If it is race prejudice, then it is of so generalised a type that it is fairly meaningless as a sociological ‘cause’ of segregation. The argument becomes circular to boot—discrimination exists because most white Americans, in their housing preferences, discriminate.

One must, therefore, seek some substantive content in the motivations. Some authors have offered even more general explanations than ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’. Massey argues that urban ethnic segregation initially occurs because migrants ‘do not select destinations randomly, but follow social networks of family and friendship connections to specific jobs in particular neighbourhoods of selected cities’. This pattern is then reinforced by institutionalisation once a threshold of ethnic density is reached. Shops, churches, clubs and local publications emerge and increase the attractiveness of the area to potential immigrants of the particular ethnic group. Massey suggests that the degree to which segregation persists is a function of social distance between ‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’, acculturation and socio-economic mobility (Massey, 1984:318).

Varady (1979:35) resorts to an even more general explanation when he refers to Down’s explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the ‘Law of Dominance’: ‘Whites ... want to be sure that the social, cultural, and economic milieu and values of their own group dominate their own residential environment ... The best way to ensure that this will happen is to isolate oneself and one’s children in any everyday environment dominated by— but not necessarily exclusively—compromised of—other families and children whose social, economic, cultural and even religious views and attitudes are approximately the same as one’s own ...’

All these general explanations are true of human communities in general. Prejudice with regard to outsiders, the drive towards social dominance, etc., are universal tendencies but they miss the point. If one equalises or controls for social status, education and income then black Americans should be simply Americans with darker pigmentation. Insider-outsider problems should not apply. There is no meaningful ‘cultural’ difference between native-born white and black Americans.

Yet the patterns in the USA show that there is less residential segregation between white Americans and (culturally distinct) Hispanics and Asians than between whites and blacks. Massey and Denton (1988) refer to the ‘extra burden of being black’. (See also Woolbright et al, 1987). More specific answers seem to be required.

Most of the literature quoted suggests that a major particular factor, which locks onto the general motivations referred to above, is that whites in the USA have
developed a specific fear that new residential areas into which a large number of blacks move will deteriorate (see Dain, 1987, inter alia). Black integration has come to be associated with slum conditions or with rising levels of social deviance.

In very large measure, this perception is due to precisely the fact that whites move out of integrating neighbourhoods causing property values, high grade services and lifestyle benefits that racial 'balance' could provide only to find that 'white flight' recreates a racial ghetto.

This has not happened in some parts of Southern Africa, in particular in Windhoek and Mafikeng (see review in Scholte and Stack, 1989) but particular conditions applied in those towns. In Windhoek, the numbers of blacks moving into white areas was very limited, as has been the case in Mafikeng, which also has the special provision that schools and hospital facilities have been allowed to remain segregated. South African cities are likely to be closer to the US pattern once laws providing for racial zoning and separate amenities are lifted.

Apartheid has contributed to blacks, of continuing social segregation, political expectations in South Africa are such that a reproduction of urban race segregation might turn our cities into arenas of conflict. What would be most desirable is an integration process which is spread throughout the city, which does not substantially alter the social characteristics of neighbourhoods, and in which whites do not retreat into social enclaves with high cost barriers or informal 'steering' mechanisms, as exist in the USA, to keep blacks out.

Judging from the US and European experience, it is essential to attempt to minimise neighbourhood deterioration in integrating areas, since this would become the focus of fears which would cause whites to avoid or resist desegregation. Where such conditions are developing, well planned efforts should be made to protect or upgrade the areas.

Needless to say, this is no easy task, as US experience shows. Where upgrading succeeds the risk is that the disadvantaged black residents that prompted the upgrading will be effectively forced out.

Varady (1979) demonstrates that in the US most integration has occurred within three contexts:

- large scale private projects where the central management used 'benign quotes' to maintain stability;
- redevelopment areas in the central city consisting primarily of fairly expensive apartments (where the level of black housing demand is usually relatively low); and
- suburban communities distant from existing black ghetto areas. He points out however, that most of the integration in these contexts is relatively slight or of a token variety.

Furthermore, Eisinger (1980) points out that the pattern of white response in the US persists even in cities where political power has shifted to the black constituency and whites accept the political change. They tend to maintain social enclaves nevertheless.

South African cities have to do better than the USA in achieving a stable balance of ethnic groups in the cities. The image of community deterioration has to be avoided. This is not the place to debate strategies and techniques, but suffice it to say that very active involvement by local authorities, using innovative methods, with adequate funds to deploy, will be essential.

Lessons for South Africa

Evidence from Southern African countries other than South Africa is not covered in this article since it is more appropriately assessed in combination with evidence from South Africa (see following article by Sp Cilliers, for instance).

The above review, however, shows just how easily a situation could develop in South Africa in which segregation is reproduced in formerly all-white neighbourhoods. The US data present a tragic picture of blacks seeking the services and lifestyle benefits that racial 'balance' could provide only to find that 'white flight' recreates a racial ghetto.

It is essential to attempt to minimise neighbourhood deterioration in integrating areas, so as to allay white fears of desegregation.
REFERENCES


The demographic, social, economic and ideological forces at work in South African society continue to impact on changing settlement patterns, particularly in larger urban areas. Under these circumstances the author reviews research findings on the reactions to the emergence of deracialised residential settlement in Namibia. The study was commissioned by the Urban Foundation to investigate settlement issues relating to the Group Areas Act.

The passing of the Local Government Affairs in Free Settlement Areas Act, No 103 of 1988, in conjunction with the Free Settlement Areas Act (No 112 of 1988), provided proof that the deracialisation of urban settlement patterns through the scrapping of the Group Areas Act would inevitably require a reconsideration of the whole system of local government in South Africa.

Effective government at whatever level can only be achieved where there are clear areas of jurisdiction designated by geographical boundaries. A racially structured system of local government as exists at present in South Africa would be drastically affected by deracialised settlement patterns. This is particularly true with regard to the kinds of interests which local government serves.

Under these circumstances it may very well be argued that a review of the Group Areas Act should only be considered in conjunction with proposed negotiations concerning a new constitutional dispensation for the country as a whole. In this regard, the process of deracialised settlement in Namibia may offer some instructive lessons for the reform process in South Africa.

Namibian Parallels

In Namibia, the institution of separate areas for different racial groups began during the German colonial period (1884-1919) and was consolidated and expanded during the period of South African rule (1920-1989). It was a gradual process culminating in the Odendaal Commission Report which was published in 1964 and recommended the extension of the homeland system to SWA/Namibia.

When South Africa took over control of Namibia as a League of Nations C Mandate Territory in 1920, it found the system of racial zoning of land already well entrenched. There were rural reserves set aside for certain tribal groups only and 'natives' were confined to locations in urban areas. The Native
When South Africa took control of Namibia in 1920, they simply consolidated the existing system of racial zoning.

In the late seventies, the National Assembly abolished racial land use and opened public facilities, with the exception of health and education.

Regulations of 1907 had provided that 'natives' could only occupy land or obtain land rights with the permission of the governor.

The South African authorities introduced their own legislation to consolidate the position. In 1922 the Native Administration Proclamation Act provided for the establishment of segregated reserves. Residential separation was given legal force by the Native Administration Proclamation Act of 1928 which provided for segregated African locations.

On 11 September 1962, the South African government appointed the Odendaal Commission of Inquiry to investigate social, economic and political conditions in SWA. The report of the commission was published in 1964 and became the statement of policy for all subsequent constitutional and economic developments in the Territory up to 1975 (Du Piani 1986:161).

The report recommended the creation of ten homelands for the various black ethnic groups, but left the 'coloureds' without a specified territory. Whites would have their own area which they would control themselves.

Six of these homelands were created by the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act of 1968. They were Damara, Herero, Ovaherero, Ovamboland (later Kaokoland), Kavango (later Caprivi) and Ovamboland (later Okavango). The Bushman reserve, Bushmanland, was established in 1970. By 1978 the Namas had their own homeland and the Rehoboth Gebiet functioned as a homeland for the Basters.

Abolition Of Racial Zoning

The circumstances which enabled the abolition of the racial zoning of land in Namibia to be achieved came about as a result of a policy change by the South African government towards the territory. In September 1974 the National Party in (then) South West Africa announced it would invite members of other population groups to discuss the political future of the territory.

The result was the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference which opened in September 1975 and was attended by representatives of the territory’s various ethnic groups. Although firmly rooted in the politics of ethnicity, the black delegates were opposed to institutionalised apartheid. A declaration of intent by the conference included a commitment to the promotion and respect of ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex or creed’.

The Turnhalle Conference led to one-man, one-vote elections in 1978. The party which gained the majority of votes was the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), an alliance of various ethnically based political parties. In May 1979 a National Assembly was established in which the DTA was the majority party.

Part of the DTA’s election platform had been the abolition of racial discrimination. Accordingly, on 8 June 1979, the chairman of the DTA, Mr Dirk Mudge, introduced the Abolition of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Bill. This measure (including amendments to it in 1980 and 1981) provided for the opening of white urban residential areas to all races and the opening of public facilities including hotels, restaurants, cinemas and recreation resorts. The Bill was passed by the Assembly on 2 July 1979.

The Act, as later amended, became the Abolition of Racial Discrimination (Urban Land and Public Amenities) Act. It is the key to the abolition of racial zoning of land use in urban areas as it contained a catch-all provision that any law which went against the provisions opening facilities and residential areas would cease to have the force of law.

It might be added that two important areas where the separation of facilities for different races remained to a large extent were health and education. The administration for whites, the second tier of ethnic authority responsible for white affairs, maintained essentially segregated hospitals for whites only. A concession had been made to coloureds and bushmen who were given wards in under-utilised white hospitals, but wards remained segregated and no blacks were admitted (except to theatre in dire emergency).

The white administration also maintained schools for whites only and a teacher training college for whites only. On 17 September 1986 the then
A Namibian Cabinet announced that for the first time the race and color would play no role in admission to all educational institutions. The white administration never refused to amend its Ordinance prohibiting for whites only schools. Instead, it issued a directive allowing local parent committees to request the transfer of their children to schools under the Department of National Education in various areas in Namibia and various other second education authorities have for some time operated schools, however.

Reactions to Repeal

Many whites in the territory were opposed to the abolition of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Bill. Opposition within the National Assembly came from the all-white National Party and the all-white Herstigte Nasionale Party. The NP leader, Mr AH du Plessis, speaking under the banner of the conservative alliance, AKTUR, said in the Assembly that the Bill was aimed at "violating the identity" of the white population group. HNP leader Sarel Becker called it "treason.

Both parties voted against the passage of the Bill (Windhoek Advertiser, 9/6/1979). The Bill sparked a heated controversy throughout the territory. White anger almost spilled over into violence as newspaper reporters were physically threatened at an AKTUR and HNP public meeting to protest the Bill and politicians were jostled by a demonstrating crowd outside the National Assembly (Ibid, 11 and 12/6/1979).

Emotions were whipped up and the Windhoek Advertiser reported that political leaders, Afrikaners and German church leaders, women's societies and a large section of the white man on the street have become embroiled in heated exchanges about the bill. The Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk in South West Africa sent a telegram to the South African Prime Minister protesting the Bill. The Windhoek City Council petitioned the National Assembly not to open white residential areas.

In the highly charged and confrontational atmosphere prevailing in Windhoek at the time, a grenade was thrown into the city's Masonic Hall, killing one man and injuring five others on 26 June 1979.

Against this background, a survey was conducted in Namibia in 1987 to investigate issues relating to the effects of racial zoning.

The Property Market

The effect of the abolition of racial zoning of land on property values was evaluated on the basis of the 1987 survey of the property views and experiences of property agents, both in Windhoek and in the smaller towns and villages of Luderitz, Swakopmund, Usakos and Keetmanshoop. The survey consisted of structured interviews aiming at:

- identifying higher, middle and lower class residential areas;
- identifying changes in property values in such residential areas immediately after the abolition in 1979 and at a later stage, and;
- identifying the time and rate of in-migration.

In those towns/villages where there were no estate agents, information was obtained from the relevant local authorities.

Estate agents generally agreed that changes in land values since July 1979 were primarily a function of market factors and not a result of the abolition of racial land zoning. It would appear that such factors had a gradual effect and that no dramatic changes occurred at any stage. By and large the opinion was that the scrapping of racial land zoning over time contributed to the stimulation of the demand for land/housing.

Estate agents in Windhoek were also unanimously of the opinion that mixed settlement since July 1979 occurred only very gradually and that specific residential areas were preferred primarily on the basis of affordability and/or location vis-a-vis certain facilities/needs.

For the platteland towns and villages, the extent of in-migration was limited although land values were positively affected.

For the platteland towns and villages, the extent of in-migration was limited although land values were positively affected.
Survey On In-migration

A survey of households in Windhoek, Swakopmund, Usakos, Keetmanshoop and Luderitz to test reactions to the process of in-migration was conducted in conjunction with the study on the property market. The towns selected were ones in which a degree of residential mixing had occurred since the change in legislation and which were geographically widely distributed. The findings therefore cover both the plateau and the one major urban area, viz Windhoek.

Windhoek itself is divided for census purposes into more than eighty census zones. Sixteen of these were covered in this survey, selected to represent different classes and types of residential areas, varying from traditional black areas such as Katutura and Khomasdal to Etosha Park, a new higher income residential area.

These towns and the residential areas of Windhoek were allocated for surveying to different field workers acquainted with the relevant areas. Fieldworkers were instructed to identify and survey all in-migrants in these areas/towns. Once in-migrants had been identified, other residents were to be interviewed on a random basis, each field worker ensuring that at least an equal number of settled residents to the number of in-migrants surveyed be included in the survey.

The total sample consisted of 489 heads of households interviewed, of whom 243 (49%) were white, and the balance coloured and African. Some 203 (42%) consisted of in-migrants while the rest were established residents of the relevant residential areas. In-migration had overwhelmingly occurred through 'non-whites' moving into what had previously been exclusively white neighbourhoods. Of the 203 in-migrants only fourteen were white.

As may be expected, therefore, resettlement after the scrapping of racial zoning consisted mainly of a movement on the part of members of other racial groups into previously exclusively white residential areas. Proportionally less in-migration occurred into high class areas.

In-migrant responses

It is mostly younger people who in-migrated (70% under 35 years of age). In-migrants, like residents, mostly occupied houses/maisonettes rather than apartments or rooms, although a significant proportion did occupy apartments/rooms. The majority (63.2%) rented the property occupied.

The gradual in-migration process described by estate agents is confirmed by in-migrants. Only 5.4% of in-migrants had moved to their present address during the first 12 months after July 1979. Job-related and financial considerations (transfer, promotion, employer's policy, etc.) were listed by almost half (47.5%) of the in-migrants as the chief reason for migration, while quality of housing and family needs accounted for 30.9% of the reasons.

The most important reasons for choice of the specific neighbourhood were:

- Employer's policy 28.1%
- Quality of environment 27.1%
- Housing shortage 23.6%

The majority of in-migrants (65.0%) did not feel that the in-migration of people of a different colour had any effect on property values. Of those (a minority) who felt that property values had been affected, the vast majority thought the values had increased.

The majority (73.4%) of in-migrants reported regular (at least once a week) contact with new neighbours and with other residents of the neighbourhood (50.6%). The minority who reported no contact with new neighbours, when asked for the reason, gave a variety of reasons which did not reflect rejection on racial grounds.

When asked specifically about acceptance by their new neighbours 89.2% reported acceptance while 77.8% felt that they were being accepted by the residents generally. When asked to validate their reactions, 80.1% reported regular involvement and/or friendly treatment, while only 4.8% reported no communication as the basis of their feeling of rejection.

When asked how they felt about their decision to move, 93.6% reported satisfaction. This was validated on the basis of grounds relating to the quality of life in the new neighbourhoods, such as peacefulness, privacy, adjustment, acceptance and centrality.
Residents’ responses

Residents, on their part, when questioned about their reaction to the in-migration of people of different racial/colour groups, reported as follows:

- A significant proportion (46.6%) reported contact with in-migrants as neighbours and 36.5% reported contact with in-migrants in the neighbourhood.
- The nature of the contact with in-migrants’ neighbours was typified as ordinary social contact by 75% of those replying on their contact.
- Those reporting contact with in-migrants in the neighbourhood also overwhelmingly typified the contact as of a social nature (67%).
- Only 8.5% of residents answered ‘no’ to the question on whether they accepted the in-migrants as neighbours, and 11.7% did not accept them as residents of the neighbourhood.
- When asked for reasons for their reactions, the large majority who had reacted positively, mentioned reasons such as mutual respect, the absence of disturbances, satisfactory personal relations, and a respect for other people’s privacy.
- Likewise, about four-fifths of the residents reported that they treated new in-migrants in the same way as their other neighbours or fellow-residents.

Residents were asked how they felt/feel regarding the scrapping of racial zoning of land use under different circumstances. Those expressing positive feelings reacted as follows:

- % Reacting positively
  - At the time of scrapping: 50.9
  - When new in-migrants became neighbours: 46.3
  - At the time of the survey: 71.7

There was therefore over time a significant growth of the percentage of existing residents who reacted positively to the in-migrants. When asked why their reactions had changed over time, 57.0% of those who had reported changes in attitudes listed positive experiences such as the in-migrants had lived up to expectations in terms of adaptability, etc., or that prejudices had proved to be unfounded. Only 4 cases (out of 100 reporting changes in attitudes) reported that in-migrants had not proved to be adaptable to the expected standard of development or reported negative experiences.

A more detailed analysis, on the basis of in-migrant status, shows that all types of in-migrants had retained significant contact with their previous residential areas, primarily at the social level.

Highest incidence of contact with new neighbours is reported by African in-migrants into coloured areas (95.8%), followed by coloureds who had moved into African areas (85.0%), then white in-migrants (71.4%), while coloureds (68.8%) and Africans (57.7%) who had moved into white areas reported the lowest incidence of contact with their neighbours.

Acceptance of change

Among all types of in-migrants, a majority did report contact with residents of their new neighbourhoods. All types of in-migrants as well as all types of residents reported social rather than other functionally oriented contacts.

Further confirmation of the acceptability of in-migrants by other racial groups was that 88.6% of white residents of white residential areas, 93.1% of coloured residents of coloured areas and 95.7% of African residents of African areas indicated that they were prepared to accept in-migrants as neighbours.

Particularly significant is the finding that while only about 40.2% of white residents reported that they had felt positive about the idea of in-migration at the time when the scrapping of racial land zoning was announced, and even later when new in-migrants moved into the area, this percentage had over time grown to 66.5% at the time of the investigation (1987).

The subjective reactions of both in-migrants and residents therefore suggest that the scrapping of racial zoning of land use in due course came to be accepted by the overwhelming majority.

Socio-economic criteria

One may, however, ask how in-migrants compare to residents on the basis of objective socio-economic criteria. The results show that the average size of the households of in-migrants tend to be smaller...
more or less similar to those of the residents of the areas into which they move. In-migrants tend also on average to have higher education levels than the inhabitants of their own racial zones, but - with the exception of white in-migrants - slightly lower than that of the receiving areas.

As may be expected, white in-migrants on average have a higher income than the inhabitants of the areas into which they migrate, while the income of coloureds and Africans moving into white areas tend to be on average slightly lower than that of the white residents of such areas. Yet, at the same time coloured and African migrants into white areas have on average higher incomes than the average coloured and black residents surveyed in their relevant areas.

Minority resistance

As is clear from the preceding analysis, a small minority (approximately 25%) of white residents had not viewed the scrapping of racial land zoning positively. Detailed analysis showed these to be predominantly Afrikaans-speaking (60%), to have on average a slightly lower educational status than those viewing the repeal positively, to have on average a lower income than those favouring repeal and to have less contact with in-migrants.

Nevertheless, even here an overwhelming majority of those who have in-migrants as neighbours accept them, and treat them in similar fashion to other neighbours.

In sum, subsequent to the abolition of racial land zoning in SWA/Namibia in 1979, a process of in-migration very slowly gathered momentum. Relatively few whites migrated to residential areas for non-whites. In-migrants consisted mostly of coloureds. There does not as yet appear to have occurred a large-scale resettlement, and the consensus of opinion appears to be that property values had, if at all, over time been positively affected by the legislative change.

At the time of the survey, the overwhelming majority of inhabitants surveyed, both in-migrants and residents, appeared to feel positively about the change. This preponderance of positive reaction tended to increase over time.

Positive Influences

The findings of this study on the experience in areas where the statutory protection of the racial/ethnic group in which the in-migrants reside has been lifted shows that subsequent population movements tend to be a gradual and uneven process.

Initially, this often evokes strong fears, which subsequently tend to abate on the basis of real life experiences and in general tend to have a positive influence on intergroup relations. This conclusion is confirmed by the findings of other independent researchers (see Simon, 1986).

These findings throw some light on the fears and expectations expressed with regard to a possible repeal of the Group Areas Act in South Africa. Some of these are as follows:

Firstly, it is feared by some people that large masses of out-group members will move into previously exclusive in-group areas. This did not occur in Namibia. Residential relocation is strongly influenced by property values and by the property market. Since in traditionally white residential areas most properties are owner-occupied, only a low rate of turn-over in occupants occur at any stage. In-migrants into such areas are overwhelmingly buyers who have to be able to compete at market price for available properties.

It is probably true that due to the relatively rapid socio-economic advancement currently experienced by those in the coloured, Indian and African communities able to compete with whites in the property market, a larger proportion of these groups will be able to compete for available residential facilities in South Africa than was the case in Namibia.

It is also true that there is a severe housing shortage in coloured, Asian and black communities. This has already resulted in a significant degree of 'greying' of many previously all-white residential areas - evidence of the importance of market forces. It must be assumed that these in-migrants already occupy much of the residential properties that may become available should the Group Areas Act be repealed. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the scrapping of the Group Areas Act will
be followed by a massive influx into some white residential areas.

Secondly, it is anticipated that there will be a concentration of in-migration in specific areas, resulting in the emergence of 'black spots' or the development of ghetto's. This has not occurred in Namibia, presumably because racial land zoning was scrapped for all urban areas. In this regard, one of the undesirable characteristics of the present situation in South Africa is the penetration of penetration into specific buildings or neighbourhoods which then, given the limited range of options available, tend to become areas of concentration and/or overpopulation.

Thirdly, it is feared that conflict may erupt between residents and in-migrants. The research findings reported above tend to support the opposite likelihood - relatively few cases of rejection were reported by in-migrants, while residents, including those who had originally opposed the idea of free settlement, in general maintained civil interpersonal relations with in-migrants. This finding is in agreement with what may be expected on the basis of social-scientific analysis. Experience has shown that open conflict in residential areas overwhelmingly involves non-residents, that is, individuals or groups from outside get involved in conflict with residents.

Lastly, it is often argued that standards will be lowered as a result of differences in the social status of in-migrants. Again, this did not happen in Namibia either. Since property values and rent levels in residential areas usually reflect the status of the neighbourhood, the process of in-migration is selective.

On the basis of the above, it would appear that a piecemeal strategy for moving away from racially based settlement in urban areas may well be less appropriate than the direct strategy of scrapping the total system.

Acknowledgement

The study of the Namibian experience was executed in 1987 by SP Cilliers with the assistance of a team of researchers. Annelie Odendaal, Department of Sociology, Academy, Windhoek, acted as project leader in Namibia. Her team consisted of Brian Jones, a journalist, who investigated the historical background of racial land zoning and its abolition; Innes Botha, who compiled the questionnaires; Anchen Parkhouse, who conducted the investigation on property values and some 24 staff and students of the Academy who acted as field workers. Pieter Lombard of the Department of Sociology, University of Stellenbosch undertook the statistical processing of the survey material.

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Many of the fears concerning the total scrapping of group areas in South Africa are unfounded if compared to the Namibian case.
Race Zoning Patterns in South Africa

Schematic Diagrams of Various South African Cities

Cities rank among the most dynamic of all the institutions invented by mankind. The relationship between space and society is constantly remodelled according to present day needs, challenging prevailing cultural values and political institutions by vigorously exploring new social meanings for cities and by refusing planned spatial forms induced from the outside. In this universal context, the author explores the impact of the Group Areas Act in South Africa and the current move to deregulation of residential planning.

About five and a half centuries ago humans commenced living in large, dense and permanent agglomerations associated with a fundamental structural, demographic and behavioural transformation of their life-styles. Since the first cities were formed 3500 - 3000 BC in Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley, the process of urbanisation has gradually gained momentum reaching a peak in our times. Presently, about 40% of the world population are city dwellers. It is estimated that this figure will grow to 50% by the end of the century and that by the year 2050 more than 90% of all humans will be living in cities (cf Potter, 1985:19-45).

Over time the city developed into a metropolis, the metropolis into a megalopolis, and now we are witnessing, what Doxiades and Papaioannou (1974:14-31), have labelled the emergence of an ecumenopolis, or a single world city, sustained by an astounding network of infrastructure and of complex managerial capabilities.

Cities have, however, throughout the ages been more than barricaded military fortresses, religious shrines, bustling market places, smoggy industrial centres or micro-chip programmed technocratic terminals. Cities have always been living systems, made, transformed and experienced by people (cf Mumford, 1961:93). Urban forms and functions are produced and managed by the interaction between space and society - by the close relationship between human consciousness, matter, energy and information.

Although cities are without doubt the most remarkable and ingenious creation of man, they are not without problems - problems that stem from both the physical and social dimensions of urban life such as traffic congestion, housing crises and environmental contamination as well as alienation, stress, poverty and violence (Downs, 1976:29-49; Moynihan, 1971:180-208; Smith, 1979:1-48).
The centrifugal dynamic of urban sprawl is still the dominating force of population movement.

A recent study of thirteen major US-cities found that 'resegregation' rather than inter-racial accommodation had become the dominant residential pattern.

Inner-City Decay

The onslaught on the physical fabric of city life is particularly directed to inner-cities as the process of residential settlement had become the process of suburbanisation continues. Although unique topographical features, cultural values, political forces, historical inertia and transport lines can significantly influence the outcome in particular situations, a concentric-circle pattern does emerge as a crudely accurate universal description of this process. Fischer (1984: 46-47) summarises the typical situation as follows:

In the central circle are usually found bureaucratic enterprises (financial institutions, corporate headquarters) and specialised retail stores. The next ring usually includes manufacturing and warehouse districts. Around these business areas are deteriorated neighbourhoods housing low-income families and transients ... residential areas tend to be higher in quality the further they are from the centre. And the further out, the less dense the neighbourhood, the smaller the proportion of minority (i.e. ethnic) residents and the higher the proportion of children in the population.

A variety of inner-related push and pull factors perpetuated the flight from city centres to new suburbs on the outskirts of metropolitan areas. The physical ageing and decay of inner-city housing accompanied by a decline in infrastructure and social services (together with surging crime rates and declining tax bases) all helped to portray negative images of downtown living.


As the process of suburbanisation continued, cities were under threat of becoming necropoles, or abandoned cities, devoid of life and inhabited as if by only the dead. In an effort to prevent the stranding of central cities by suburban noise, many city governments have initiated major schemes of slum clearance and CBD revitalisation, or have embarked on a process of incorporation of new suburbs into the city limits (Chudacoff, 1981:297-301; Jackson, 1985:138-156; Judd, 1984:156-161).

So-called 'gentrification' has of late awakened new hope amongst city administrators of luring young middle-class people back to the central core (Hening and Gale, 1987:399-404). My own conclusion, after studying this phenomenon in various American cities, is, however, that gentrification is fairly limited in scope and that the centrifugal dynamic of urban sprawl is still the dominating force of population movement. Other studies have confirmed this pattern (Fischer, 1984: 237-269).

Like urban renewal and redevelopment, gentrification has exacerbated housing problems and, in many cases, merely transferred blight somewhere else, pushing low-income cities by a suburban domino effect and even contributing significantly to homelessness (Chudacoff, 1981: 298-301).

Resegregated Suburbs

The growing isolation of suburbs from the inner-city was, however, not only spatially structured but differentiated according to the social characteristics of residents. Residential patterning thus today also reflects economic status and class orientation (Horwitz, 1970: 120-1350; family stage - unmarried people and childless couples typically tend to congregate in city centre apartment neighbourhoods and families with children in areas of detached dwellings in outlying districts (Fischer, 1984:48); or group affiliation, particularly race and ethnic background (Glazer, 1970:5-30).

In a recent study of thirteen major US-cities, the author found that 'resegregation' rather than inter-racial accommodation settlement had become the dominant notion in terms of residential settlement in that country (Fick and de Courten, 1989: 9). The same pattern has also emerged in prominent European cities (cf Rees, 1982; Husband, 1982:21; Amsterdams, 1980:135-136; Latin American cities (cf.
The persistence of residential segregation in many multi-ethnic cities, and within a wide spectrum of socio-political as well as economic conditions, is astounding. This phenomenon is perhaps the most visible manifestation of the growing importance of ethnic loyalty and conflict as a vibrant force shaping human affairs (Horvitz, 1983:3-54). In the residential context, the pattern seems to be clear; if groups are differentiable, the social dynamics underlying the process of residential settlement invariably manifest a strong tendency towards the maintenance of mono-colour neighbourhoods (cf. Schelling, 1978:137-166).

1980s Transformation

Government policy since the late forties led to a significant divergence in South African urban centres from the typical spatial pattern of residential settlement described above. The poorest persons were, through legislative determinism, moved farthest away from the city centres, jobs and shopping facilities (cf. Mandy, 1984:82-93).

For some time at least, South African cities, such as Johannesburg, did not experience the problems of marginality caused by urbanisation in the United States and elsewhere. Suburbanisation did occur, but until very recently, this process occurred mostly within the city limits of Johannesburg. The later formation of Randburg, Roodepoort, and Sandton, etc. on the periphery of Johannesburg, did not dramatically affect the viability of the primary urban unit.

The pattern started changing slowly during the early 1980s, gaining momentum between 1984 and 1986. It was also as if an unseen hand was correcting the results of induced social engineering - the general economic decline and other factors now led to substantial vacancies in apartheid-type housing units in the inner-city as well as adjacent areas. This created the opportunity for poorer people to migrate from the periphery, where an acute housing shortage had developed due to intensification of urbanisation, to the central city, and closer to their jobs.

At first the newcomers were mostly Coloured and Indian but black people gradually swollen their ranks despite the retention of the Group Areas Act on the statute book. Because of the illegality of their presence, statistics on the actual number of these migrants barely exist and are highly unreliable. There is, however, a general agreement that a substantial majority of residents in the CBD are now 'non-white' (Mandy, 1989:3).

In our Hillbrow study undertaken in 1986, we estimated that about one-third of residents in greater Hillbrow were Coloured, Indian and African (de Coning, Fick and Olivier, 1986:7). In our Mayfair study conducted during 1988, we found that Indians had become the largest ethnic group (47.7%) in this so-called 'white group area' (Fick, de Coning and Olivier, 1988:15-16).
There is no denying that Johannesburg's inner-city residential terms has been transformed into a typical racial ghetto.

Over a remarkably short period of time the inner-city of Johannesburg underwent a dramatic character change and today it approximates the typical American urban pattern in various important ways. Urban decay has begun in some areas, particularly parts of the CBD and Joubert Park, accompanied by other typical phenomena such as high crime rates and overcrowding. The unique exception is Mayfair where ethnic tipping caused a major rehabilitation of the housing stock and revitalisation of the neighbourhood as reflected in, for instance, property values (Eck, de Coning and Olivier, 1988:24-27).

These central city areas are, therefore, in line with the international experience, in transition from one mono-colour situation to another through an intermediary phase of shared residence. Joubert Park and Mayfair have substantially progressed on this road.

The length of the transitional phase can, of course, be influenced by a variety of factors. For instance, the cosmopolitan character of Hillbrow has prolonged this phase in that neighbourhood. There is no getting away from the fact that Johannesburg's inner-city in residential terms has been transformed into a typical racial ghetto.

**Forced Lessons**

What can and should be done especially against the background of the strong dynamism inherent in the process of residential settlement? The record is poor where authoritative sanctions have been employed, regardless of good intentions and well-sounding political rhetoric, as the dominant instrument to steer the process in preconceived directions. Forced integration did not work in America, and forced segregation did not work in marginal residential areas of the major urban centres in South Africa.

What has clearly emerged from all the research undertaken is that any usefulness that the Group Areas Act may have had as an instrument to pattern residential settlement has disappeared.

The perception amongst many white South Africans that this legislation guarantees an own community life for them is simply a myth. The fact is that community-based interests are not threatened in the vast majority of neighbourhoods - why should the general pattern be any different in South Africa from elsewhere in the world?

Government and city council action should primarily be aimed at finding the inevitable outcomes of residential patterning in these marginal areas. The handling, however, of race and conflict in neighbourhoods going through the transitional phase of a character change should receive particular attention. This process, which can be traumatic, should be cushioned by mechanisms such as the enhancement of the mobility of leavers (especially the older and poorer segment or 'trapped category'), by way of subsidy strategies, and by placing a strong emphasis on the maintenance of standards, security and the quality of life in these areas (e.g. the prevention of over-occupation of housing units by newcomers).

The intrinsic nature of the typical white middle-class lifestyle makes it highly improbable that significant numbers of this group can be persuaded to give up their lush gardens, sparkling swimming pools and tasty patio braai's for the crowdedness of inner-city living, even if substantial and imaginative rehabilitation were to occur. A revitalised CBD, will thus, apart from remaining the major commercial and financial centre for the country, have to come alive as a pleasant shopping and recreational areas for suburbanites to visit during daytime, but also at night. The thrust of city planning and private sector investment should be directed towards these goals.

The recognition of multi-ethnic residential areas, made possible by the Free Settlement Act of 1988, is the first serious attempt by government to address directly the particular needs and problems of these areas as unique entities. This is undoubtedly an important step towards the deregulation of residential patterning and the acceptance of the primordial role and meaning of social forces in spatial group formation. One is, however, somewhat perturbed by three impressions:

- the possible new townships on the urban periphery, and not the already existing multi-ethnic inner-city areas, are receiving priority attention;
- the vagueness that surrounds the functions of the proposed 'management committees' for these areas, as well as the financial implications of their declaration,
which might dramatically erode the 
4 the arbitrary demarcation of free settlement areas appears to be based on perceived expediency rather than sound planning requirements. (For instance, the exclusion of central Hillbrow.)

It is clear that the Group Areas Act cannot serve the broader process of political reconfiguration that is presently underway in South Africa. Free settlement areas must not be perceived as a vehicle to perpetuate discriminatory practices in the field of housing but, in order to make any sense, can merely serve as an intermediate strategy whereby the end goal of complete freedom of association should be attained as quickly and as smoothly as possible.

To conclude, spatial forms, economic functions, race and ethnicity, political institutions and cultural meanings are interwoven worldwide in the highly dynamic process of urban residential pattern. The fates of cities and societies are shaped by the outcomes of this interaction. It is only by understanding the complexities of these processes better that we can constructively plan and work for a meaningful future, here in our own metropolis - Johannesburg.

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Free settlement areas merely serve as an intermediate strategy whereby the end goal of complete freedom of association should be attained.
The process of dismantling a non-statutory system of segregation in the United States and undoing the harm it caused has proven more difficult than many persons expected. The author evaluates the social trends of the post-war decades, drawing on a case study of integrated urban redevelopment in St Louis, Missouri. He warns that if the changes in race relations experienced in the USA carry any lessons for other nations, then the adventure upon which South Africans are embarking holds both promise and disappointment.

One can provoke a spirited debate over how much integration or desegregation Americans, black as well as white, really wanted. More important to the prospects of building a pluralistic society were changes occurring across the United States after World War II. Notable among these were the movement of many city residents and industrial employers to suburban communities or smaller metropolitan areas some distance from the larger concentrations of black Americans.

The spotty success of efforts to promote racial mixing in public accommodations, the workplace, schools, and the polity can be understood better, perhaps, in this context. All these things, however, had a bearing on how well and even whether persons from different races could live among each other in relative harmony.

Major Trends

The degree to which US communities are integrated varies widely. Based on the best available evidence, however, several general trends do stand out:

- Most minority citizens live in racially segregated communities.

Over the last few decades, the degree of residential segregation has declined somewhat. Much segregation remains, however. This is true in both the central cities and suburbs.

- Suburban communities are only slightly less segregated than inner-city neighbourhoods.

Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians still tend to live in central cities; but they have begun to follow whites to the suburbs. The suburban communities in which they live may have some white residents, but the number is often small or decreasing.

- New areas populated by racial minorities, especially blacks, tend to be extensions of old areas populated by that same group.

It is not uncommon to find city and suburban neighbourhoods with a few minority residents, and for these individuals to be living a good distance away from large numbers of other minority people. It is much more
Persistent Segregation

Residential segregation persists for several reasons. One reason may be that whites and minorities are more willing to support integration verbally than they are with their actions. A second reason involves the actions of private and public institutions which continue to discourage interracial contact.

A third reason has more to do with gross changes in the economy of US urban areas and the timing of minority immigration to cities in this century. In general, more recent immigrants to US cities faced several problems that earlier immigrants did not confront. These problems made it more difficult for them to establish a foothold in urban job and housing markets. As a result, these newer immigrants found it harder to be accepted and have not been as mobile as their predecessors.

The number of Europeans coming to the US decreased dramatically after the imposition of immigration quotas following World War I. It was only during World War I and afterward that black Americans began to leave the South in large numbers and move to northern cities. Continuing harsh treatment and the gradual mechanization of agriculture in the South convinced many blacks to find employment in northern industrial plants that were still expanding at that time. A second major wave of black immigration occurred after World War II.

After 1950, other non-European immigrants also began to come to United States cities. Like black Americans, these Hispanic and Asian people looked different from the Europeans who preceded them, even if they were no less or more skilled on average than the earlier European immigrants had been. Furthermore, these racial minorities had the misfortune of arriving in US cities at a bad time. Not only were white people beginning to leave central cities in large numbers for newer suburban communities, but so too were the industries that had initially employed unskilled European immigrants.

This combination of factors made it especially difficult for racial minorities to become better integrated in the work force and housing market. Many blacks and some branches of the Asian and Hispanic populations found themselves confined to large inner-city ghettos. It was, and still is in many instances, hard to find work and a decent place to live. The absence of federal funds to build low-income housing and the reluctance of suburban municipalities to pursue such funding as does exist make it virtually impossible to disperse these large concentrations of low-income people.

Whether persons of African American descent should be encouraged to leave inner-city areas is a matter that sparks much controversy. I am not one of those who believe that such a 'voluntary'
migrants would be in the African Americans’ best interest, even if it were feasible. For that reason alone, it is important to consider what in the American context can be done to encourage more racial mixing inside cities.

A serious but uncoordinated effort to rebuild large portions of United States cities began forty years ago. Much has been accomplished, much remains to be done. Among the more troubling pieces of unfinished business associated with these campaigns has been how minority citizens based in neighborhoods were redeveloped around them or without them.

On most occasions, urban redevelopment favored the more prosperous and powerful. Less prosperous and powerful groups, among whose number minority groups were listed conspicuously, were not likely to benefit directly from redevelopment efforts and more likely to be discomforted by them. There were exceptions, of course. Low-income or minority groups occasionally stopped a particular project or shaped its outcome. Much of the time, however, no accommodation was reached between those who typically benefit from urban redevelopment and those who do not.

What makes St Louis exceptional is the way local political and corporate entrepreneurs undertook projects that helped change the city’s economic base.

St Louis Model

St Louis, Missouri had many of the same problems apparent in older US cities, and it shared similar possibilities for rebuilding. During the first half of the century, the city lost some population and industry to the surrounding suburbs. Older sections of the city were abandoned or looked shabby. They were not rebuilt. The population of the city, though still large at about 885,000, was changing. More minority persons - in St Louis this meant people of African American descent and not Hispanic or Asian people - came to live and work in the city. More prosperous whites were replaced increasingly by lower-income whites with as much practice in urban living as many of their black counterparts.

After World War II, the city experienced a mass exodus of people and jobs of all types. The population dropped by 30 percent between 1950 and 1980, and it became nearly evenly split between whites and blacks. The northern third of the city had a predominantly black population. The southern third remained predominantly white. The middle third of the city, which had been the city’s population and institutional core, lost more people and employers than other parts of St Louis. It also offered the best opportunity for rebuilding the city to meet the economic and social demands of a post-industrial world.

Sections of the city’s ‘central corridor’ were redeveloped in much the same way that much of St Louis, Missouri. In five parts of St Louis, in the city’s midsection or contiguous to it, major private corporations and public institutions helped to rebuild run-down neighborhoods in a way that accommodated modern professional, technical, or service industries and attracted a racially economically-mixed residential population.

Many communities across the United States have populations composed of persons from different social classes and ethnic groups. However, segregation on the basis of racial classifications or wealth, and sometimes both, is still commonly practiced in most places to varying degrees. St Louis is no exception in this regard. What makes St Louis exceptional is the way local political and corporate entrepreneurs undertook projects that helped to change the city’s economic base, from heavy industry to professional and service industries, even as they fostered racial integration in the neighborhoods around these modern industries.

They built a loose coalition of business leaders, elected officials, civil servants, and some grassroots leaders. The membership changed over time and parts of this coalition worked on different redevelopment projects. In the process of putting together these projects, coalition members also had to fashion a set of practices, understandings, and more formal agreements among themselves that enabled them to carry out their work...
In a relatively predictable, if not entirely secure, political and economic environment.

Some individuals made a great deal of money or acquired much influence, or lost their position and reputation in the community. Regardless of who happened to be in the coalition at any particular moment, the rebuilding of St Louis continued. St Louisans created a redevelopment process in which the practice of politics figured prominently, politics which compelled corporate leaders, public officials, and community activists to work together.

That hospitals and research institutions, corporate headquarters and city government sponsored the rebuilding of the areas surrounding them with an economically and racially-mixed population is noteworthy. Much popular and ‘scientific’ speculation holds that such entities are not supposed to be adventurous, particularly when no clear profit and much potential trouble could be realized in such a risky venture. Two things happened in St Louis that made a difference. First, local political entrepreneurs provided corporations and housing developers with substantial incentives to build or rehabilitate dwellings that would appeal to a diverse population. Second, any number of private leaders quietly expressed an interest in promoting residential integration. They thought it important to see whether something could be done to make the city less segregated even as they were rebuilding large parts of it.

Renewal Coalition

None of these efforts succeeded as well as some people may have wanted, but they usually succeeded more than many persons expected. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of any particular project, a number of positive lessons can be drawn from their combined experiences. The most important are these:

• The situation facing a community must be sufficiently desperate before public and private leaders are likely to experiment with novel ways to rebuild their city.
• Political entrepreneurs can help to fashion and direct a coalition of parties whose primary interest is to protect their own corporate assets or political base.
That coalition sometimes can accommodate the interests of both corporate and grassroots leaders.
It is possible to rebuild residential areas around a large institution or corporation so that they hold a diverse political base.
Public assistance in the form of federal grants and loans can be used to leverage much larger sums of private money that go to projects that serve a relatively broad public interest.
One could wait a lifetime for individuals to do 'the right thing' for the right reasons; it is better and certainly more efficient to put one's faith in the redeevelopment policy of what and how to get 'right things' done.

The kind of public and private sector cooperation that have been evident more recently in St Louis could be reproduced in other cities. How similar the results would be remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that corporations and institutions can redevelop residential areas. Moreover, the communities in question can be tolerant places in the sense that a variety of people find them comfortable places in which to live.
Finally, what happens in these places tends to excite people and make them more involved in local affairs. Even when redevelopment proceeds relatively smoothly, which is rare, residents pay at least a little more attention to what is going on around them.

Redevelopment can help to enrich and energise local politics. Conservative advocates of community action would expect such a process to be led by a 'steward class' of business leaders. This idea would not appeal to advocates of community action with a more left-of-centre bias.

Yet, what happened in St Louis could not be viewed as a plutocrat's dream come true, even though real and wouldbe plutocrats helped to fashion it. There was much more public arguing about redevelopment and mixing of odd combinations of people than a selfrespecting plutocrat would have tolerated. The whole enterprise was handled much too sloppily and its results were far too novel.

The public and private leaders responsible for rebuilding St Louis' development industry and nudging it into action were aware that they were doing something different. They did not spend much time worrying about the historical significance of their work, however, events were moving too quickly. They left it to others to make sense of their work. Private institutions and corporations immersed themselves in city politics and neighbourhoods in a way that had not been seen since the nineteenth century. They created an atmosphere in which great things could happen. This atmosphere made the results of redevelopment possible for persons from different social classes and races to live together. They did not run away from the problems endemic to urban America.

The situation facing St Louis after World War II had become grave. A variety of entrepreneurs had been waiting to rebuild the city to fit in a postindustrial world that was more and more commercial. Some worked better than others. Commercial redevelopment in the downtown area was taken seriously and still is today. Residential redevelopment was paid less attention and did not fare especially well between 1950 and 1970. Mistakes were made in the earlier clearance and demolition phases of redevelopment activities, and these mistakes were taken seriously. One attention turned to the areas referred to here, adjustments were made. Public and private leaders explored ways to blend commercial and residential redevelopment in a less disruptive and more beneficial manner.

The incorporation of grassroots activists and neighbourhood leaders into the redevelopment process was not an accident. Such parties demonstrated excellent organisational skills and no small amount of commitment to their effort to keep areas being rebuilt for modern corporations as residential sites. No one involved in the rebuilding of these areas claimed much interest in ethics, except when they talked about someone else's behaviour. They were tough, intelligent men and women who faced difficult conditions and made the best deals they could in order to protect themselves and improve their part of the city.
Less Positive Lessons

It's all well and good to say this about St Louis. It may even prove true for other cities. Yet, it also is important to keep in mind some of the less positive lessons that can be drawn from the experience of rebuilding these parts of St Louis. The following are the most important of these lessons:

- It is not clear that private leaders will push for continued neighbourhood improvements, once their own areas are relatively secure.
- It is difficult to sustain even the most progressive of pro-growth coalitions over a long period of time.
- It is much more difficult to rebuild a neighbourhood with many persons still living in it.
- Displacement of many, if not all, existing residents from an area may be necessary, if that area is to be rebuilt in a timely and effective way.
- The absence of long-term federal assistance to promote racial and economic mixing in neighbourhoods is likely to reduce the chances that integration can be sustained over an extended period.
- There probably are limits to how much integration can be achieved in a redeveloped neighbourhood and on how many neighbourhoods can be integrated across a city.
- Despite some impressive redevelopment efforts, rebuilt neighbourhoods and the city as a whole remain vulnerable to overlooked problems that do not vanish and may grow to threaten otherwise good works.

Most corporations and institutions that become involved with redevelopment are in the business of rebuilding cities. They are hospitals, food manufacturers, computer firms, or any number of things other than a development corporation. The caretakers of these organisations are interested primarily in making their part of the city more attractive and safe. They rebuild the area around their headquarters and then try to retire from the redevelopment game.

There are times when corporate officials with some redevelopment experience are asked to advise the sponsors or another rebuilding campaign, and corporations may contribute to a fund to help promote that campaign. It is difficult, however, for them to sustain their interest in work conducted in other parts of the city and sometimes even in their own part.

For this reason, perhaps a pro-growth coalition is a fairly brittle thing. There may be some instances in which growth is good but that does not take the members of the coalition terribly far. Often there are fundamental disagreements over where the city's limited public funds should be spent and on what type of projects. Even the most adept political entrepreneur will have difficulty keeping coalition members interested in new projects and areas when resources are thin and the areas in question are thought to be unattractive.

The individuals living in or around a redevelopment site often are among its least attractive features. They can be troublemakers or merely troublesome to developers who would rather not have to work around established residents or pay to have them relocated. This is why most or virtually all of an area's residents usually are moved out of an area before the developer moves in to restore it. This response is not unique to wealthy developers or big corporations. In one area of St Louis just north of the central business district, tenant management firms run by low-income persons of African American descent took aggressive steps to remove 'bad' elements from their public housing sites. The only mitigating factor was that other low-income people took their place and did quite nicely in the redeveloped area.

Low-income individuals may fit in a rehabilitated neighbourhood, but they are not likely to stay unless they continue to receive some kind of assistance to pay for housing. Otherwise, they will not be able to afford the rents that typically rise as a neighbourhood is improved. Unfortunately, the federal government has cut back on the subsidy programmes that proved so helpful in integrating several St Louis neighbourhoods. Private owners are not likely to pass along much of the cost of housing low-income individuals to their more well-to-do tenants. No matter how successful racial and economic integration is in redeveloped neighbourhoods, therefore, it may be only a temporary feature in the city unless housing subsidies are continued.

Other problems must be overcome as well when one builds a racially or economically mixed neighbourhood.
The alliances between business and public officials that critics decry may prove instrumental in addressing the lingering effects of poverty.

Most important, perhaps, is the reluctance of persons to live among people different from themselves. It is hard for developers to attract and hold a diverse residential population. Moreover, even as parts of St. Louis's midsection were becoming integrated, the northern and southern thirds of the city generally remained racially segregated.

Limits to Integration

The limits to which one can foster or push racial integration are evident in St. Louis. Residential integration has not yet resulted in many economic advances for low-income minority persons. The corporations and institutions sponsoring redevelopment projects generally have not tried to train or employ the minority persons living around them. This is, perhaps, the single greatest shortcoming in the redevelopment efforts highlighted here. No matter how well minority citizens fit in these newly redeveloped neighborhoods, they will not find a secure niche in their updated city until they find gainful employment in area industries. This is the next great problem awaiting the careful attention of public and private leaders who have tried to rebuild large portions of the city.

In the face of such an appraisal two final lessons are to be drawn. First, there is no such thing as a guaranteed success or 'sure thing' in rebuilding cities. Contrary to what many critics of redevelopment think, politicians and big corporations do not have the redevelopment game so well rigged that their pet projects are assured success even as the city around them continues to decline. Second, the very alliances between business leaders and public officials that critics of redevelopment decry may prove instrumental in addressing the lingering effects of poverty and despair left in the shadow of a city's rebirth.

Although they might be reluctant to admit it, there is no easy way for business persons to return to the comparative safety of their corporate headquarters once they revive the idea that they can act as stewards of the city's future. They are condemned to a dialogue with parties who until recently have had little to say about the way the community was being rebuilt.

Persons in other cities, or countries, will no doubt find parallels between their own situations and the events summarized here. They are just as likely to find differences that could make it difficult to repeat what apparently happened in St. Louis, Missouri. The important point is that private and public leaders can do things that help to change the social character of a community even as they rebuild or expand its economic base to fit in a more modern world. It is a world into which racially and economically mixed neighborhoods can comfortably fit as well.

REFERENCES


The new reforms, and in particular the intended abolition of racial zoning, represent an untested situation as far as the reactions of the white community and white political constituency are concerned. This analysis of recent attitude survey findings is intended to shed some light on what these reactions may be.

Government reforms to race laws in the past have not directly affected white rank-and-file constituencies. The abolition of influx control, the legal recognition of black trade unions, the desegregation of central business districts and even the abolition of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act have directly affected only certain categories of whites or only certain social situations.

The new range of reforms which have been announced by government are all likely to have a direct effect on the ongoing community existence of whites. These include the intended abolition of the Separate Amenities Act, new provisions for the opening of schools to all races (admittedly only where a majority of parents agree) and the intended replacement of racial residential zoning with new legislation to protect neighbourhood standards broadly intended to be non-racial in its effects.

South Africa is in the very initial phase of residential integration after a long history of separate spheres of residence for its different races. During this history residential segregation, as it applied to whites, so-called coloured people and Asians, was largely informal after Union up to the latter years of the Smuts regime, when the first rigid legal entrenchment of segregation occurred in the form of the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Act of 1943 and the Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation of Indians Act of 1946.

Increasingly whites have come to realise that the 'natural' state of affairs in South Africa is both morally and in terms of practical political requirements, fundamentally problematic.
To people other than white the situation would appear to be simple, since they have been the people excluded from access to most residential areas.

Hence whites as a collectivity are caught in a tension between two realities: residential life as they have always known it and the inevitability of change. To people other than white the situation is much simpler, since they, by and large, have been the people excluded from access to most residential areas. Yet even for coloured people and Indians the issue might be complicated by the knowledge that the possible entry into their areas of large numbers of Africans if the Act were abolished might entail some disruptive changes.

For Africans the issue is simplest of all. The constraints of racial zoning have been accompanied by hardly any benefits, other than the fact that forced segregation might have created more cohesive political communities, with middle-class and well-educated leaders living right among the rank-and-file, and the fact that black businessmen have enjoyed 'captive' markets. This, however, could hardly be expected to qualify their rejection of the Act very perceptibly.

Yet even among Africans, reactions to new conditions of life in integrated communities might be more complex than the universal moral condemnation of racial zoning would suggest. Here one takes account of the fact that virtually the whole world over, ethnic and socio-economic or class communities have a tendency to live in areas of cultural or class concentration.

These very broadly are the simple social and political parameters within which attitudes towards racial zoning in South Africa may be approached.

Broad Patterns

Among whites, previous studies of attitudes towards racial segregation have shown a trend towards a gradual liberalisation over time (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989:137-8). An example of this trend is seen in the responses over time to an identical question put to its nationwide representative panel of just under 2000 whites by Market and Opinion Research (Pty) Ltd.

The results suggest a fairly slight shift over the past four years; most of the attitude change having occurred in the early eighties. The major recent shift appears to have been a weakening of resistance to integration rather than a strengthening of positive endorsement of integration.

There is some variation in white support for integration as regards different groups. In the 1988 survey of Market and Opinion Research (Pty) Ltd, reflected above, the support for an opening of respondents' own areas to coloured people, Indians and Africans was as follows;

Marked differences exist nationwide between English speaking and Afrikaans speaking whites regarding the abolition of racial zoning. Results from Market and Opinion Research (Pty) Ltd polls show the following pattern nationwide:

Obviously one would expect white attitudes to differ from those of other races, against whom racial zoning laws are directed. In a study by Marketing and Media Research (Pty) Ltd, the research company of the Argus press group, any probability samples of whites, Africans, coloured and Indian people in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand area in October 1988, produced the following comparisons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suppose a referendum were to be held among the people living in your residential area to establish their feelings about opening the area to blacks. How would you personally vote in such a referendum?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP AREAS ACT SHOULD BE?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENTAGES OF WHITES IN FAVOUR OF THE COMPLETE RETENTION AND STRICT APPLICATION OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT BETWEEN JANUARY 1982 AND JULY 1988:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE ENDOREMENT OF OPENING OWN AREA TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE ENDOREMENT OF OPENING OWN AREA TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It would appear, therefore that differences in response between races are what one would expect. Indians and less affluent coloured people are most conservative among groups other than white, among whom attitudes tend towards the pattern found among English-speaking whites.

It is perhaps significant, however, that in this sample, somewhat less than 50 per cent of South Africa's 'intermediate' racial groups - coloureds and Indians - endorse the immediate, summary abolition of the Group Areas Act. Coloured and Indian people are most constrained by racial zoning since a larger proportion than is found among Africans could afford to move into white areas. Their rejection of Group Areas as already suggested, is somewhat constrained by the fear of massive African movement into their existing areas if the Act were to be abolished.

White voters are of most concern in regard to racial zoning, however, since they represent the primary constituency of the present government and hence their attitudes will weigh heavily in the nature of policies which the government formulates to replace the Group Areas Act.

The first co-author fielded a range of questions through the Market and Opinion Research (Pty) Ltd stratified random panel of white adults in May of 1989. The sample size on which the results were based was 1,379. In this investigation respondents were offered a choice between a wider range of policy options than those reflected in previous questions.

After being presented with a balanced description of present trends towards desegregation, respondents were asked to provide a first and second preference as regards future policy on racial zoning. The policy alternatives presented to respondents are paraphrased in the summarised results which follow.

This question was followed by a supplementary item which added to the types of policy choices which were presented.

Space does not permit a full presentation of the results. The following table depicts the broad pattern of findings derived from the first and second choices between alternative options presented.

### TABLE 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY PREFERENCES AMONG WHITES AS REGARDS RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION - INTEGRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Strict segregation as a policy applicable everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Group areas combined with Free Settlement Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Gradual integration controlled to protect standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Areas given local choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Complete abolition of Group Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Endorsement of acceptance of complete abolition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results suggest that where the possibility of gradual desegregation with control on standards and numbers of new residents is introduced, or a possibility of the exercise of a local suburban option is suggested, some support for both strict segregation and unqualified desegregation is drawn away.

The shift in responses between the two sets of options can be interpreted in two ways. One is that people who are able to be convinced of the need to accept abolition of racial zoning become more cautious when more comfortable options are presented. Another is that the support for abolition is partly idealistic and that a more realistic policy position is taken in response to the second set of options which include gradualism and local option. Both these interpretations may combine to explain the shift.

National Party supporters, as the constituency to which government is most directly accountable, are particularly interesting. Generally they lean towards reform and change. Results for this group show the following:

### TABLE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY PREFERENCES AMONG NATIONAL PARTY SUPPORTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Strict segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Complete abolition of Group Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Gradual integration controlled to protect standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Areas given local choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Complete abolition of Group Areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government supporters, therefore are less likely to hold 'extreme views' (complete retention or complete and unqualified abolition of racial zoning) than one finds in the white population as a whole.

All these results are in response to general policy preferences and do not necessarily reflect how people will respond in the context of their own
The dominant preference is for controlled or phased reform of a type likely to protect the social character of neighbourhoods or in the context of wider political dynamics.

On both these issues research conducted by ourselves on behalf of the Urban Foundation in 1988/89 is relevant.

One study was based on personal interviews among a representative sample of 1000 white householders in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand area. The other was a sample of 500 mixed residents of 'grey areas' in Johannesburg. A further investigation covered a random sample of 1019 Africans in townships and 'shack' areas in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand area. All the samples were random, probability samples, stratified to represent geographic spread. Interviewing was conducted by professionally-trained commercial interviewers of the same race as the respondent. Results across a range of items are presented below, commencing with relevant results based on the white sample. (For details of interview schedules and other aspects of methodology, see Schlemmer and Stack, 1989).

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paraphrased Items from Survey</th>
<th>Total Sample (n=1000)</th>
<th>NP Supporters (n=404)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>How respondent would vote in official referendum in opening own area</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- For opening</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Against opening</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Blacks should be allowed to live in any area if they can afford to</em></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Acceptance of blacks of same income and lifestyle in neighbourhood</em></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All new areas should be open</em></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Would feel comfortable in neighbourhood with:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Respondents were shown diagrams)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15% blacks</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30% blacks</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% blacks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Policy choice: retention of GA</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- local option</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- white areas remain mainly white</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- open choice</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Policy choice if change inevitable:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reject change</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- only certain areas open (Metropolitan overcrowding)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- all areas open with suites</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- open choice</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Choice if State President issued appeal for acceptance of open areas with controls on standards:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- supporters' appeal</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- not supporters' appeal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that in the interviews present policies (i.e. Group Areas and Free Settlement Areas) were fully described, including the implication that Free Settlement Areas would become overcrowded.

These results tend to suggest that government supporters are slightly more accepting of change in racial zoning than the Pretoria-Witwatersrand white population at large. The greatest endorsement of desegregation occurs if the average white voter can contemplate people of the same class and lifestyle as himself/herself entering the neighbourhood (almost 6 out of 10 NP supporters), but clearly when given a choice of policy options or asked to make a categorical choice in a referendum, only between 20 and 30 percent of whites and of NP supporters endorse free settlement.

The dominant preference is for controlled or phased reform of a type likely to protect the social character of neighbourhoods. Even a special appeal by the (previous) State President does not appear to have very significant impact, which is surprising since the question also included a reassurance about 'standards'. In fact just such an appeal has subsequently been made by President FW de Klerk.

It is of interest to note that a US study allows a comparison to be made with the 'comfort ratings' under different degrees of integration obtained in our survey. In Detroit, the proportion of whites 'comfortable' with a + -15% level of integration is roughly 30% higher than among our total sample and at the + -40% level of integration more than twice as many Detroit whites say they feel comfortable compared with 20% in our sample.

Hence it would seem that South African white attitudes are considerably more negative as regards residential integration than those of whites in Detroit, as one might expect. Given the fact that despite the more accommodating US attitudes, spatial segregation has been maintained in that country, the South African attitudes do not augur at all well for an unresolved process of informal integration (Farley, Bianchi, Colosanto, 1979).
**Motivational Factors**

If of interest to identify the relative importance of different kinds of motivations for resistance to integration, the type of motivation is likely to indicate what kinds of policy emphasis and policy instruments are most likely to address constituency fears and perceptions.

The following is a synopsis of major results from three open-ended questions on motivations for desiring segregation, cross-tabulated against indicators of class background.

The pattern of results in the table suggests that the single largest type of motivation is a poorly articulated and very generalised perception that race-segregation is somehow the natural order of things (motivations 2, 3 and 4: 43%). On the one hand, this may suggest a vacuous or thoughtless resistance to integration which may readily weaken when people are exposed to the facts, as it were. Hence one might expect resistance to integration among people motivated in this way to be fairly shallow and easily altered.

### TABLE 8

**Motivations Underlying Segregation: Proportions of Respondents Giving Various Types of Reasons for Rejecting Residential Integration:**

**Percentages Based on a Combination of Three Questions Allowing for Spontaneous Answers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Motivation</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLD INCOME</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>&lt;2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural difference/incompatibility</td>
<td>(n1005)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confessed racism: Personal dislike of mixing</td>
<td>(n206)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfamiliarity</td>
<td>(n584)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual, educational &amp; religious reasons</td>
<td>(n62)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic class factors &amp; material standards</td>
<td>(n289)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disparities in levels of development</td>
<td>(n532)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of unrest and concern with public order</td>
<td>(n1177)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived social pathology and moral weakness among blacks</td>
<td>(n364)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is significant, however, that the assumption of segregation as natural is relatively less important among poorer whites than among others. Among poorer whites other considerations weigh more or equally heavily.

Perceptions of cultural incompatibility, of class incompatibility and of the presence of social pathologies among blacks are all roughly as salient as the poorly-motivated assumption of segregation as natural.

The trend in the results, although not strictly statistically significant, is for the importance of class factors to increase with income and education (as established elsewhere) and for the importance of perceived social pathologies among blacks to decrease slightly with increasing income and education. In other words, class factors may retain their importance at higher levels of status more than cultural or social motivations.

In more general terms, however, the table shows that education is the background variable most clearly associated with variations in attitudes to integration. The less-well-educated respondents are significantly more inclined to assume segregation as natural or to base their convictions on perceived social pathology among blacks than is the case with better educated people.

It is also of interest to examine the different motivations and explanations given by respondents for the general phenomenon of race segregation in housing, in terms of how they relate to acceptance or rejection of integration among the respondents themselves. One question was as follows:

"In South Africa there are opposing views about group areas but some people seem to feel that separate areas for different groups should remain. Thinking of people you know with such views, what are their main reasons for keeping groups separate?"

This question was cross-tabulated against whether or not 'non-whites' would be accepted in neighbourhoods, and whether respondents would vote for or against integration in a local referendum.

The tabulation above (table 9) suggests that a perception of segregation as being rooted in culture and social behaviour tends to be associated with greatest resistance to integration. On the other hand, explanations linked to class and material standards and to the fear of displacement as a result of in-migration are generally associated with less-resistant attitudes to integration.

It seems quite clear that a perception of fairly basic social, cultural and moral differences between the races tends to weigh most powerfully in inducing or rationalising resistance to residential integration.

In parenthesis, while not sufficiently central to this analysis to require tabulated demonstration, the specific factor of class status sensitivity (narrower than the class-standards variable employed earlier) tends to decrease in importance with increasing income and education. It may well be that the categories of people most likely to feel their social-status threatened by integration are the less-affluent but well-educated families that struggle to maintain a social facade in keeping with their education.

This anxiety would not extend to affluent people in upper-middle class suburbs in which property values, large plots and the general ecology insulate them from threats of status-dilution.

It is frequently assumed that resistance to integration is partly or substantially a rejection of residential penetration by members with lower socio-economic standards or class status. A comparison of responses to three items, roughly equal...
comparable except for a reassurance as regards the 'class' factor in the latter two, allows a tentative assessment of the relevance of socio-economic status. The comparison can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>&lt;R2,000</th>
<th>R2,000-R3,999</th>
<th>R4,000</th>
<th>&lt;Std 10</th>
<th>Std 10-R12</th>
<th>&gt;R12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would vote for integration in local referendum</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for freedom for blacks to buy property if they can afford it</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results above suggest that 'class reassurance' (i.e. similarity of income and education, the purchase of property which blacks can afford) indeed raises the level of acceptance of integration by a factor of some 40 to 80%. We must be somewhat cautious however, since the rather stark suggestion of a referendum may incline respondents to an abnormally conservative response. The results are nevertheless suggestive of the fact that class reassurance is a significant factor.

What is interesting in the results immediately above, however is the fact that the 'class reassurance' increases the level of acceptance of integration more dramatically for poorer and less well-educated people than for the higher status respondents. We may venture to suggest that poorer people, living in communities with lower property values, are more keenly aware of the dangers of integration causing a decay of material standards than more affluent people.

The latter live in upper-middle class suburbs where firstly, the efforts of material deterioration are less visible and secondly, where higher property values more effectively discourage poorer blacks from acquiring accommodation.

A completely different kind of probe was included in the research. Respondents were asked why they thought the tendency for different races to live in different neighbourhoods persists in the USA and Europe despite there being no laws controlling where people can live. In both 'grey' (integrating) and white suburban areas, the overwhelming majority of respondents (over 70%) gave 'ethnic' reasons, related to the maintenance of identity in terms of race/culture/custom - a 'soort soek soort' (birds of a feather ...) response, also encountered in our earlier results. The second and third most cited reason (between 7 and 12% each) involved a preference on the part of similar income groups to stay together and reference to the existence of 'apartheid' all over the world.

- In the grey areas, the predominant 'soort soek soort' response is highest (between 75 and 90%) among:
  - Indians, the 40-49 age group, the relatively low R2,000-R2,999 income group and surprisingly, those with English as their home language. Those with neighbours of a different race also predominantly gave this response. Those who believe that blacks should be allowed to buy or rent in any white areas also predominantly gave this response. Those who believe that blacks should be allowed to buy or rent in any white areas also predominantly gave this response. Those who believe that blacks should be allowed to buy or rent in any white areas also predominantly gave this response. Those who believe that blacks should be allowed to buy or rent in any white areas also predominantly gave this response. Those who believe that blacks should be allowed to buy or rent in any white areas also predominantly gave this response.

- The ethnic 'soort soek soort' response is lowest among:
  - Blacks, the 50 plus age group, the lowest income group, and those with a low education level.

- Class reassurance (similarity of income and education, the purchase of property which blacks can afford, etc) raises the level of acceptance of integration from 40 to 80%
Results in 'grey areas' suggest that attitudes that endorse integration are 'ideological' preferences rather than behavioural orientations.

Those who think blacks should not be allowed to buy or rent in white areas, and those who would vote for an all-white area in a referendum also gave less prominence to the ethnic response. Thus the ethnic response tends to be found among more tolerant and more middle-class respondents, not among the materially threatened poor, as we have already seen in the patterns of results for the major survey among whites on the PWV.

Finally, one further important finding should be noted, albeit briefly. In the areas of Johannesburg that had already become mixed ('grey areas') and from which a large number of people who rejected integration had already moved, some 40% of whites wanted all-white or dominantly white areas and 53% indicated that they would vote for a return to segregation in a hypothetical local referendum. Other results from the study in these 'grey' areas indicated that very little social mixing among the different races occurs.

Even among those white residents of 'grey' areas who endorsed residential desegregation, very little social contact of a meaningful kind with black neighbours occurred, prompting the description of these people as 'closet liberals'. This strongly suggests that in part, attitudes of endorsement of residential desegregation are 'ideological' preferences rather than orientations which directly affect behaviour.

Focused Resistance

Thus far residential integration has generally occurred in three types of areas: apartment house areas which have had large vacancy rates (e.g. Hillbrow, Joubert Park in Johannesburg, Albert Park in Durban), single-dwelling unit areas in (formerly) deteriorating areas of the city in which white residence has become increasingly marginal and transient (e.g. Mayfair before recent 'gentrification', Judiths Park, Bertrams, Doornfontein in Johannesburg, Woodstock in Cape Town, Lower Berea in Durban, etc.) and in very wealthy areas with large plot sizes and great privacy (e.g. Houghton and Lower Houghton in Johannesburg). An exception has been Kelvin in Sandton which is a fairly typical middle class area.

Apart from a few demonstrations of resistance in Mayfair in Johannesburg, there has thus far been little reaction from conservative whites, possibly because typical white areas have not yet been affected. We do not know what is likely to happen once integration starts occurring in typical white lower-middle and middle class areas of family residence in which whites have an interest in staying. Attitude survey questions are not always valid indications of what behaviour will occur, but in as much as they provide some idea of what the predispositions underlying behaviour are, they are relevant.

The following results from the study among 1000 white voters in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand area are relevant to the question on counter-mobilisation. In response to a question of what respondents would actually do if a black family, with about the same income and educational level as themselves, were to move into their areas, the following results are of interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income (%)</th>
<th>All (n 1000)</th>
<th>Under R2000pm (n 206)</th>
<th>R2000-R3000pm (n 231)</th>
<th>NP Support (n 404)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive reaction</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will move out</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially reject</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complain or mobilise against</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: answers exceed 100% due to double answers)
We should bear in mind that the question related to a single black family with social status compatible with the neighbourhood. The results suggest a roughly 40% potential among whites for negative reactions. This represents a considerable minority out of which a substantial political dynamic of one form or another could arise. National Party supporters represent what one may term the modal position on these issues. They are only slightly at variance with the attitudes of the white population as a whole in a positive direction.

A question arises, however, as to whether or not typical white sentiments have not been swept along by the new climate of reconciliation associated with Mr FW de Klerk’s negotiation politics, to have significantly softened their attitudes since our surveys were undertaken.

With this in mind, we fielded a question in the May 1990 white national panel survey of Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd: ‘In future negotiation, which of the following forms of protection for the white minority are absolutely essential — in other words non-negotiable’ (inter alia) ‘The right to decide on the composition of one’s own neighbourhood’. The results which indicated that at least a local community self-determination is felt to be essential were:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total whites</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaners</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-speakers</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party supporters</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results contain nothing to suggest that a general swing towards unqualified openness and integration has occurred.

Policy Observations

Broadly, the results of the investigations reported on above and others which could not be covered in the space available suggest that some five out of ten whites and at least four out of ten government supporters are consistent in their rejection of residential integration. There is also a potential among between two and four out of ten whites for some form of mobilised opposition, or reaction to, the entry of blacks into their own neighbourhoods.

The patterns of motivations underlying these responses suggest a combination of what we have called broadly ‘ethnic’ sentiments; i.e. the desire to live in areas of social familiarity and homogeneity, concerns over material standards, physical conditions and the ‘class’ character of neighbourhoods, and a fear of social pathologies and crime emerging in integrating suburbs. Concerns over standards were most marked among poorer whites living in areas which in terms of market factors are more vulnerable to deterioration. Among better educated whites concerns about neighbourhood social and ‘ethnic’ character assume greater prominence.

One should add to these general conclusions the fact that broad acceptance of integration does not appear to be significantly greater than what is typical for all whites in areas which have already become integrated; the so-called ‘grey’ areas. Some 80% of whites in these areas (data not yet referred to) evince concerns over mounting crime and social pathologies and very few of the whites have established social interaction with black neighbours. Needless to say, the concerns about pathology and crime seldom relate to neighbours as such but to street phenomena, which may or may not be a consequence of desegregation. Broad comparisons with survey data from the USA show, not unexpectedly, that the degree of sensitivity to desegregation is greater among South African whites than among Americans. In the accompanying analysis of international evidence, it is abundantly clear that segregation, informally secured, has tended to persist in the USA and Europe, based on much the same motivations as are evident from our South African data. Regrettably, it can be fairly confidently predicted that after the abolition of racial zoning in South Africa, phenomena such as neighbourhood ‘tipping’ and white withdrawal from rapidly integrating neighbourhoods are very likely to occur.

At the same time, however, the damage done to race relations, the costs of segregation for blacks, considerations based on the wider political climate and the economic need in South Africa to eliminate formal apartheid make it inevitable that the Group Areas Act be abolished, and the government has stated this intention. The results of the research referred to above show that some 55 to 60% of white government supporters will support or accept residential desegregation.

Results of a survey conducted after de Klerk’s February announcement did not suggest a swing to greater openness or integration.

It can be confidently predicted that after the abolition of racial zoning in South Africa, white withdrawal from rapidly integrating neighbourhoods is likely to occur.
The State President has indicated that, because most white areas have a well-established character, with low vacancy rates and hence a low potential for black entry, fears of white reaction are over-rated. In general he is correct. The results of this research show that a small percentage of blacks in white neighbourhoods will not give rise to negative reactions.

Against a background of the results from the research, however, there are certain kinds of residential areas in which there might well be either mobilisation against black entry, or rapid white retreat. As suggested, these will be areas into which an entry of new black residents will be relatively rapid. Such areas will be those with high vacancy rates, apartment house areas in which many aged whites live, deteriorating inner city areas and certain new lower-middle or middle class suburbs with lower than average market values but which normally attract whites with young families: people who have aspirations toward stable suburban existence but fairly limited means. The character of schools will weigh heavily in the latter type of area.

If South Africa is to avoid the kind of reproduction of segregation that has occurred in the USA in the seventies and eighties, some careful management of desegregation is required, not in most areas, but in areas in which rapid and disruptive transition could occur, leading to white reaction and new segregation of black people entering areas in search of shared and stable suburban life.

At this point it is appropriate to point out that the surveys conducted among Africans, the group most resistant to race zoning, showed that there was quite surprising tolerance of measures to protect social and socio-economic standards in integrating areas. Over 80% of the 1,019 blacks interviewed endorsed strict controls over behaviour on the streets, nearly 60% accepted values against multiple family occupation of houses and flats, and as many as 51% said that they accepted some form of control over the process of desegregation by existing white residents (forms of local option) (See Schlemmer and Stack, 1989: 194).

In other words, there is evidence of a convergence of white and black attitudes around the principle of control over standards and a protection of the "social"
Research indicates a convergence of white and black attitudes around the principle of control over standards and a protection of the 'social' character of areas.

In this context, it would therefore seem to be desirable that:

- local authorities become more effectively involved in the formulation and implementation of residential quality and be provided with the resources and guidelines to do so;
- local residents be given an effective form of participation in the drawing up of these standards in the context of the necessity to move away from race segregation;
- the larger cities, in which the greatest readiness for desegregation exists immediately, should be encouraged and given material support, to provide operating models of how desegregation, which will be of benefit to all residents, can occur.

REFERENCES


Since its inception, the Group Areas Act has had its greatest effect on the African population, with at least one generation not knowing an alternative. The following are responses of black youth from around the greater Durban area on matters concerning the future of group areas. The information is extracted from an attitudinal study which was commissioned by the Tongaat Hulett Group.

Three groups of 10 each were interviewed. The first two were selected from two high schools in Umlazi township. The other was made up of 'comrades' (youths whose organisations are affiliated to the United Democratic Front) from Clermont. The questions are those relating only to group areas issues and form part of a much larger questionnaire.

**SCHOOL GROUP 1**

**Q**: You all seem confident that in future there will be equal opportunities. Where do you think you will be staying in 10 years time?

**R**: I will be staying at an improved Umlazi.

**R**: In Cape Town, where there is a nuclear power station, because I want to study nuclear physics, but in the township.

**R**: Where there are all races.

**R**: In the city.

**R**: In town.

**R**: In one of the flats in Durban.

**R**: I will like to be in Umlazi because that is where I was born and bred.

**R**: In white areas.

**R**: At Umlazi.

**Q**: Those of you that say they will be living outside the townships: What makes you think you will be living there?

**R**: There will be no restrictions then.

**R**: Seeing the changes taking place in South Africa, I think in 10 years time the Group Areas Act will be abolished and one will live wherever one likes.

**Q**: Those who will not go out of the township: What makes you decide to live there? Is it Choice or restrictions?

**R**: It will be out of choice.

**R**: The township will have improved and I would like to see it improve.

**R**: It will improve because more (black) people will be employed.

**Q**: What makes you think more blacks will be employed?

**R**: More people will obtain better education.

**Q**: What changes do you expect to find in your residential circumstances in 10 years time?

**R**: I will be living in a multiracial society and money will be playing an important role.

**Q**: What will that (money playing an important role) do to black people's residential circumstances?

**R**: There will be a big financial gap within the black society and we will have to do something to close it.

**Q**: How?

**R**: The government should open job opportunities.
SCHOOL GROUP 2

Q: You all seem positive about the changes taking place, those of you who say they will be living in the township, is it out of choice?
R: Yes.

Q: What makes others want to live in the city?
R: In the city everything seems easy, the shops are near, life is fascinating for people who have never been exposed to it.
R: I like to mix with people of other races.
R: There is too much trouble in the township.

Q: And those of you who say they will be in the township, why?
R: I will be living with people who understand me, of my own race.
R: I like township life, I enjoy it.
R: There is too much noise in the city, cars are running around.

Q: What makes you like it?
R: People living in the township are easy to socialise with.
R: We understand each other because we are of the same race group.
R: It's difficult to contact ancestors in the city.

Q: What makes it difficult to contact ancestors?
R: The ancestors will not go to the city because they have never known it.
R: Slaughtering cows for the ancestors will be impossible in the city.

COMRADES GROUP

Q: Where do you think you will be staying in 10 years time?
R: In Klerksdorp (township).
R: There will be change enough to allow me a choice.
R: In Clermont because of my parents. But if it were not for them I would stay wherever I like.
R: In Clermont out of choice.
R: In Clermont.
R: It will be possible to stay in town. There will be changes enough to enable me to stay in town.
R: I will be staying in town.

Q: If there were changes enough where would you be staying (musician)?
R: In Clermont.

Q: Why?
R: Because that's where I was born (out of choice).

Q: So six of you think there will be changes enough to allow you to stay anywhere?
R: There will be changes, but as it is now they seem to be taking long.

Q: What do you think are the changes taking place now. Do you think the laws will change?
R: Some political organisations have been unbanned and opening of 'grey' areas.
R: Unbanning of organisations. There will be a socialist system in 10 years time.
R: Yes, laws will change.
R: There are no changes.
R: There are small changes but not enough.
R: I regard the unbanning of organisations not as change, but as a step towards change.
POLICY REVIEW

FREE SETTLEMENT OR FREE CITIES?

By Ann Bernstein, The Urban Foundation

In presenting a case for the need to repeal the Group Areas Act without delay, the author makes the following propositions:

• that Free Settlement Areas are an unworkable, flawed concept for the management of change in South African cities;
• that Free Settlement Areas do not provide an appropriate route towards 'open cities';
• that current policy on Group Areas and Free Settlement is ambiguous and confused; and
• that instead of becoming sidetracked into the Free Settlement debate, we should rather focus on the real urban priorities of the post Group Areas Act city.

In February 1990 the Free Settlement Board advertised a proposed Free Settlement Area (FSA) for central Johannesburg (see map). This area illustrates some of the problems associated with the demarcation of free settlement areas in general. A number of areas were omitted - for example Hillbrow, Mayfair, Pageview, CBD/Newtown/Fordsburg, Troyeville, Bezuidenhout Valley - which research has shown to be significantly integrated.

Indeed, it is quite paradoxical that Hillbrow was originally excluded since, not only is this area now very significantly integrated; it also happens to be the one central Johannesburg area in which white attitudes are most favourable to integration (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989). Likewise, it is paradoxical that one of the few integrated neighbourhoods that has actually expressed a desire to become a Free Settlement Area - Pageview - was also excluded.

It should be clarified that these remarks are not a plea for bigger as opposed to smaller FSAs. On the contrary, they simply serve to highlight the arbitrary nature of FSA boundaries. For example, after an outcry Hillbrow itself is now the subject of an FSA investigation, but it must be emphasised that these are necessarily arbitrary boundaries. Research has shown, for example, that there is hardly a Witwatersrand neighbourhood today that does not have some level of black occupancy (apart of course from domestic servants) (Schlemmer and Stack, 1989). So simply expanding the FSA boundary is not a sufficient response.

Free Settlement Areas have harmful implications for local government, as any local government which has studied the issue now understands. FSAs perpetuate the failed experience of advisory 'management committees' in local government, lead to a further fragmentation of decision-making and duplication of effort at local level, threaten the juridical status of existing local governments and do not provide for meaningful non-racial local government alternatives.

There has been the suggestion that FSA legislation could provide an avenue towards the realisation of 'open cities' but it is important to notice the limitations of this route. For example, a
Central Johannesburg Free Settlement Areas

Proposed February 1990
For those who look forward with vision to a non-racial future, they must wonder why this complex route is being followed.

Free settlement areas are largely parochial response to change which ignore the reality of widespread integration.

recent statement by the relevant Minister has been interpreted as a significant step towards the reality of 'open cities' in the near future (Sunday Times, 04/03/1990). It is important to note precisely what the Minister said:

• 'there was nothing in the FSA legislation which forbade the conversion of an entire local authority into a free settlement area' (Citizen, 28/02/1990);
• 'however, this would have to be dealt with by the Free Settlement Areas Board which had to weigh up a number of factors before making a recommendation to the government' (Citizen, 28/02/1990, emphasis added);
• 'the government would require reliable evidence that a request for 'open' cities was not simply a 'political move' by the local authority, but the genuine desire of the majority of a city's inhabitants' (Sunday Times, 04/03/1990);
• 'areas or suburbs within cities might wish to retain an ethnic character and the free settlement areas legislation would allow this' (Sunday Times, 04/03/1990);
• 'there were problems over the laws governing local government and government would "look at" the Local Government Affairs in Free Settlement Areas Act (Sunday Times, 04/03/1990);
• 'voting rights at local government level had to be structured to protect minority rights' (This Week in Parliament, No3/1990).

These comments and qualifications indicate the wide difference in interpretation between current government positions, and what is commonly understood by the phrase 'open cities'. FSA's, then, are a largely parochial response to change which ignore the reality of widespread integration. The concept of FSA's is once again a futile exercise in 'social engineering', with the notion being that an 'Official Board', be it Group Areas or Free Settlement, can regulate the complex dynamics of everyday life.

Free Settlement Areas are also an arbitrary policy which treats citizens unequally, based upon ad hoc reactions to the past. For those who look forward with vision to a non-racial future, the questions must become: Why go this complex route? Why manage the transition to post Group Areas Act cities like this?

Official Policy

The current official policy position on Group Areas and Free Settlement is complex and ambiguous. Some examination of this position will help to clarify why it is important to press for the urgent repeal of the Group Areas Act at this time.

The official policy position has of course been marked by certain recent legal changes, including the Free Settlement Areas Act, the Local Government Affairs in Free Settlement Areas Act and other modifications or attempted modifications to the Group Areas Act (e.g. the attempt to 'decriminalise' transgressions of this act by establishing a body of officials to 'negotiate' with transgressors).

Looked at as a whole, these changes together with a number of recent statements by government spokespeople (see box) provide an impression of a number of policy themes.

Flexibility

The Free Settlement Areas Act and other variations are designed to allow for some flexibility in the application of the former act. In the words of a high level government spokesperson: 'The Free Settlement Areas Act does not replace the provisions of the Group Areas Act, but provides greater flexibility alongside the rather inflexible provisions and enforcement of the latter' (R Meyer, RSA Policy Review 253, 1989-90).

During the course of the debate on the Free Settlement Areas Bill it was stated, however, that Free Settlement Areas would be declared only in exceptional circumstances (Hansard, 26 August 1988, Col 13718).

Since then, the government's position has evolved to include an ambiguous endorsement of applications for the opening of entire municipal areas (but with qualifications, and the suggestion that FSA legislation provides an interim measure to manage the transition to the repeal of the GAA) (see box on government statements).

Unworkability

It has been noted by a Deputy Minister that the reason for the required flexibility is that the original Group Areas Act is currently unworkable. If one considers
the implementation of the Group Areas Act in its current form the fact of the matter is that it cannot be implemented successfully because a large sector of the community finds it unacceptable’ (R Meyer, Hansard 1988, Col 167, see also 1988 statements by C Heunis and R Meyer in box).

Options
The unworkability of the Group Areas Act is envisaged as being solved by the application of the Free Settlement Areas option in grey areas. At a political level, this is conceived as providing for options between ‘own’ and ‘shared’ communities: ‘We also accept the principle - in fact we are embodying this principle in legislation - that alongside the general pattern of own residential areas, own community life and so on, there are also the needs of other people who do not want that, and that provision should also be made for the fact’ (C Heunis, Hansard, 22 March 1988, Col 4477).

Similar views are expressed by R Meyer (RSA Policy Review 2(5) 1989) and the National Party’s new ‘Action Plan’ (1989-2). The above position has recently been restated, in another form, by Minister Kriel (Sunday Times, 04/03/90).

Experimentalism
Current government policy also appears to be such that it is treating the free settlement concept as something of a sociopolitical experiment: ‘Government accepts that through the implementation of the Free Settlement Areas Act it will gradually discover the reaction of the South African population to open residential areas where people can settle freely. One possibility is that free settlement areas will be ‘open’ in the full sense of the word and there will therefore be residential areas of various population groups, another is that such areas will mainly be inhabited by a specific population group’.

The same government spokesman noted that the actual outcome in free settlement areas will influence perceptions on the need for the Group Areas Act itself (R Meyer, RSA Policy Review, 2(5), 1989:9).

Negotiation politics
Leading government spokespersons have indicated that they recognise the Group Areas Act as one of the more important obstacles to broader political negotiations (e.g. R Meyer cited in The Star 29/6/89, and FW de Klerk cited in Sunday Star 17/9/89). As Schlemmer (1989) has put it ‘... it is difficult to imagine a process of political and constitutional negotiation between major political contenders getting under way while irritants and social barriers like the Group Areas Act and enforced school segregation exist’.

On the other hand, Minister Viljoen has recently forecast ‘that the scrapping of the Group Areas Act would be one of the first issues to be tackled in negotiations’; and he said that ‘the government simply asked to be given the right to argue the merits of group rights and the possibility of protecting them without discrimination’ (Star, 08/12/89).

‘Own’ communities
In contrast with the above, government has repeatedly stressed the view in the past that ‘own’ communities must be maintained. During the debate on the Free Settlement Areas Bill, for example, the view was stated that ‘the right of every population group to an own community life is recognised, which includes the maintenance of a general pattern of own residential areas’ (Hansard, 26 August 1988, Col 15717).

This point was reitered by Viljoen and Kriel (Sunday Times, 04/03/90, Star, 08/12/89). However, at the same time the mechanism for maintaining ‘own communities’ remains unclear since, as early as 1987, a senior government spokesman noted that it was not the government’s intention to remove illegal residents in terms of the Group Areas Act (P Badenhorst, Hansard, 11 June 1987, Col 787)

‘Notification points’
Following the decision to withdraw the Group Areas Amendment Bill of 1988, government indicated an intention to ‘decriminalise’ the Group Areas Act. This has led to the development of so-called ‘notification points’ to process information on transgressions of the Group Areas Act.

In the words of the policymakers: “Until such time as an effective and generally acceptable measure can be substituted, own residential areas will be protected by the Group Areas Act. This will be done by the firm, yet sensitive
Some Recent Government Statements on Group Areas and Free Settlement

1987 'As a result of the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts of 1913 and 1935, people of colour possess and own more land than they would have possessed had it not been for the Acts' (C Heunis cited in The Citizen, 14 March 87).

1987 'As long as I am head of this government I am not prepared to allow the established rights of these communities - white, black, coloured and Indian - to be undermined. These rights must be protected... Own residential areas are of the utmost importance particularly in the big cities, for the protection of poor white workers' (PW Botha cited in The Citizen, 28 March 1987).

1987 'The government is not busy with the removal of people in terms of the Group Areas Act' (P Badenhorst, Hansard, 11 June 1987, Col 782).

1987 'The government really has a serious intention of taking reformatory steps in the field of group areas and the use of public amenities' (PW Botha, Hansard, 5 October 1987, Col 6668).

1987 'When will the Conservative Party realise that South Africa simply cannot be divided into water-tight compartments where communities will have no contact with each other?' (FW de Klerk cited in The Citizen, 6 October 1987).

1987 'Of course it is true that various groups are living together in certain residential areas, but is it not also true that there is an oversupply of housing for one group and an undersupply for others?' (C Heunis, Hansard, 25 February, 1988, Col 2206).

1988 'We also accept the principle - in fact we are embodying this in legislation - that alongside the general pattern of own residential areas, own community life and so on, there are also the needs of other people who do not that, and that provision should also be made for that fact' (C Heunis, Hansard, 22 March 1988, Col 4477).

1988 'What is reform if not an adaptation of the status quo?... [The Free Settlement Areas Bill is] an adaptation of the status quo to make it fairer and make provision, to a greater extent, for the needs and choices of the communities which comprise the South African population' (C Heunis, Hansard, 25 August 1988, Col 15059).

1988 'It is the actual policy of the NP to stand for own residential areas as far as possible... the right of every population group to an own community life is recognised, which includes the maintenance of a general pattern of own residential areas' (G Viljoen, Hansard, 26 August 1988, Cols 15716-17).

1988 'The conversion to free settlement areas in existing residential areas must be subject to the support of the vast majority of the legal occupants' (G Viljoen, Hansard, 26 August 1988, Col 15718).

1988 'Property value in Mayfair has increased much faster than the average for the rest of Johannesburg, despite the influx of about 6 000 Indians into the area in recent years' (R Meyer cited in The Citizen, 6 July 1988).

1988 'Once legislation has been passed the declaration of the new open residential areas can take place on a speedy basis' (R Meyer, cited in Business Day, 15 August 1988).
1988 'We cannot, in any period of reform take away people’s feeling of security and safety. That would lead to chaos. They would rebel, not because they do not want reform but because their safety and security of tenure of land are endangered' (R Meyer, Hansard, 29 August 1989, Col 15834).

1988 'Special legislation provides for separate committees for residents in Free Settlement Areas to facilitate negotiation with the municipality regarding matters affecting them. The general principle of self-determination at local level, as well as separate franchise, will not be affected... As yet no open or free settlement areas have been identified. It will remain the exception. The existing general pattern of separate residential areas continues. Where and how you live is your choice' (NP newspaper, Vol7(9), September 1988).

1989 'It has to be accepted that the Group Areas Act cannot adequately be applied. The non-application of the Act leads to reactions by some people who want to take the law into their own hands... Others ask whether the law could not be scrapped. But mixed living has led to over-occupation, as in Hillbrow. The current perception, unfortunately, is that if that is how mixed conditions look, then it is unacceptable' (R Meyer, cited in The Star, 8 February 1989).

1989 'Free settlement areas do not nullify the principle of own residential areas. Own residential areas still remain the basic pattern in South Africa. Free settlement areas can specifically be an important protective mechanism for those who choose a community life of their own. Free settlement areas will drastically reduce the pressure on own residential areas caused by encroachment' (NP newspaper, Vol8(3), March 1989).

1989 'In no way do free settlement areas encroach upon the principle of own schools' (NP newspaper, Vol8(3), March 1989).

1989 '[With regard to the Group Areas Act and Separate Amenities Act] we are prepared to talk, enter into dialogue and negotiate about what must happen in these spheres' (FW de Klerk, cited in The Sunday Star, 17 August 1989).

1989 '[Dr Viljoen] said that the government simply asked to be given the right (in the negotiation process) to argue the merits of group rights and the possibility of protecting them without discrimination... (he) forecast that the scrapping of the Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act would be one of the first issues to be tackled in negotiations' (The Star, 8 December 1989).

1990 Minister Kriel said 'there was nothing in the [Free Settlement] Act to prevent the opening of an entire local authority area' and that he had 'a sympathetic attitude regarding the opening of municipal areas' (This Week in Parliament, Issue No 3/90, 28/1, 28/12). Minister Kriel however also said that 'the Government would require reliable evidence... [such as] referendums... that a request for "open" cities was not simply a "political move" by a local authority, but the genuine desire of a majority of a city’s inhabitants... areas or suburbs within cities may wish to retain their ethnic character, and the FSA would allow this' (Sunday Times, 4 March 1990).

1990 Minister Kriel said that the implications of the National Party’s five year plan (announced in 1989) was that eventually the Group Areas Act would have to disappear but it would have to be replaced with a ‘suitable alternative’ (Sunday Times, 4 March 1990).

1990 President de Klerk said that the Group Areas Act would be replaced possibly in 1991 by new non-discriminatory measures which would ensure a general pattern of residential settlement... In the interim, it is important that the application of the Free Settlement Act be continued in order to broaden the available options immediately' (Hansard, 19/04/1990, cols. 6665-66).
The repeal of the Group Areas Act would assist in the negotiating process by removing unnecessary discriminatory baggage from the table.

Application of law and the instruments created for that purpose:
- Identified notification points will be created where transgressions of law can be reported;
- The circumstances will be investigated and an attempt made to solve the problem without legal intervention, through a process of assistance and negotiation with the people involved;
- For this purpose a special housing component has already been established in the Department of Land Affairs;
- Additional notification points will be created where transgressions of law can be reported;
- The circumstances will be investigated and an attempt made to solve the problem without legal intervention, through a process of assistance and negotiation with the people involved.

In this perspective, the maintenance of the Group Areas Act is the core policy and legal obstacle to effective urban management. The abolition of racial laws is therefore essential, but cannot alone guarantee a vibrant urban environment with improved neighbourhood quality.

In short, then, the current official policy is complex and ambiguous, subject to many different interpretations, and is in a state of some fluidity. Nevertheless, it is still based upon the maintenance of the Group Areas Act, and the Free Settlement Areas Act remains, for the reasons already explained, inadequate and unacceptable. The politics of negotiation is now being offered as the principal excuse for not breaking out of this quandary, since there appear to be many who hold to the view that the Group Areas Act should be a 'bargaining chip' in the negotiation process.

Need for Repeal

A more realistic position, however, would be that repeal of the Group Areas Act will assist in the dynamics of the negotiation process by removing unnecessary discriminatory baggage from the table. In addition, however, the position of the Urban Foundation is that the Group Areas Act is an urgent priority in order that attention can be focused on the real urban challenges and opportunities, instead of petty and distracting issues of who is living near whom.

The challenges include: unemployment, housing shortages, low economic growth, growing urban debt, lack of services and facilities, an education crisis, health care 'collapse', political instability, inefficient urban structure.

The urban opportunities that await us in the post Group Areas period include:
- Normal land and housing markets;
- Enhanced development of small businesses;
- The realization of the investment potential of compact, deregulated cities;
- A growing cross-cutting urban culture;
- Private sector/community joint development projects;
- Other ventures which, together, will assist in the creation of a shared vision of a South African future.

Instead of diverting attention and wasting time on a 'groupthink' oriented, parochial, free settlement approach to the cities, government should rather commit itself to residential freedom for all, the establishment of a free property market, neighbourhood quality and upgrading, enforcement of democratically formulated 'rules' to prevent decline of urban neighbourhoods, and a proactive wider urban policy.

All of this will not be possible until the Group Areas Act is repealed, and until there is a clear commitment to address urban residents' needs and aspirations in direct terms, instead of through a distracting, racially-based framework.
Concluding Article

The repeal of the Group Areas Act is the critical first step (and only the first) in an incremental process of tackling the structural changes necessary to create more efficient, equitable and compact cities better able to provide jobs, services and shelter for an expanding urban population. In this concluding article, the authors examine some of the important urban planning and management issues involved in achieving these aims in a post-Group Areas era.

Together with the repeal of a wide range of discriminatory legislation, a new proactive policy framework will be required to meet the emerging urbanisation and development challenges. This will include the establishment of non-racial local government as a critical first step (see later), but this article is not so much about local government policy as it is more concerned with a national urban policy in a post-Group Areas period. The Urban Foundation and Private Sector Council on Urbanisation has recently released, and is in the process of releasing, detailed policy proposals on a wide range of subjects relating to these challenges (Urban Foundation, 1990). In the context of this particular collection of articles on group areas and desegregation, however, it is possible to isolate a number of policy 'signposts' that are of special relevance to national urban planning in a post-Group Areas era.

South Africa's metropolitan areas are expected to double their population sizes in the next 25 years, with the PWV region reaching 16 million by 2050.

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The maintenance of the Group Areas Act has been the core policy and legal obstacle to effective urban management in South African cities, since separate residential areas form the basis for dividing functionally integrated cities along racial, political, administrative and financial lines.

We have no doubt that the Group Areas Act will go, but what are some of the urban planning and urban management issues that await us in the post-Group Areas Act era? For decades South African cities have been planned and governed as if they were small, colonial towns, but the realities are now becoming so obviously at variance with this supposition that a complete policy realignment is needed.

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Reconstruction

Post-apartheid metropolitan planning frameworks cannot, unfortunately, assume a tabula rasa — cities that are examples of an apartheid past. There is considerable social investment in existing urban form, and what is required is a planning approach that builds on opportunities and constraints imposed by the past. In other words, what is required is a new urban policy which aims to reconstruct South African cities into fundamentally different growth-oriented and inclusive cities.

To some extent, the simple repeal of the Group Areas Act and the emergence of non-racial local government structures will assist in this process. However, given a legacy of deliberate segregation, buffer strips, consciously fragmented townships, etc., a programme is now required to specifically channel new development in every South African city and town away from dispersed and racially divided urban growth patterns, towards more compact, integrated, accessible and productive urban systems.

This programme should include, for example, inner-city development on a non-racial basis; high density infill development; and multi-purpose development corridors connecting previously segregated parts of the city. It should also pay special attention to reinforcing the natural economic efficiencies of cities, and encouraging developmental relationships between the informal sector, smaller businesses and larger firms. Practical consolidation of the informally housed populations of our cities should also become a major priority of urban policy.

There are many existing apartheid-created 'gaps' in the urban fabric where planning of this kind can immediately begin. For example, in Johannesburg, there are segments of unused mining land between Soweto and white suburbs, and these may be suited to the multipurpose development corridor concept, which would meld the city's segregated suburbs back together again. Similar possibilities exist on the farmlands between black and white residential areas to the north of Durban.

Other prospects include infill development - perhaps along the lines of the 'cities-within-cities' planning concept [see data base] - in areas from which forced removals have occurred in the past. Examples of such localities are the Cato Manor area of Durban, or the District Six/Woodstock areas of Cape Town. Apart from the fact that such developments would be important symbolic interventions aimed at the deliberate reversal of the apartheid planning legacy, they would also contribute towards the realisation of a more compact, efficient and equitable urban form and assist in breaking down barriers to inter-racial movement and communication.

Of course, given the anticipated scale of urbanisation, infill development alone will not absorb the full weight of numbers, and there will of necessity be the much expansion of the urban fringes.

What is not required in this process, however, is the deliberate deconcentration of industry and low-income settlements beyond the urban fringe, as has tended to be the case until now. Botshabelo, some 60km east of Bloemfontein and the Winterveld informal settlement, some 30km north of Pretoria, are examples of this unfortunate trend. The costs to the poor and society at large of this type of development are enormous, not least because of the extraordinary commuting times and costs that are imposed upon people living there (Figure 1).

Rather than the expensive creation of new towns and deconcentration around deconcentration points then, policies should in future be designed to make maximum use of all existing urban investment. This applies to both physical plant (e.g. existing cities, schools, technical training colleges, recreational amenities) and urban management personnel (town clerks, city engineers, etc). It also applies to the easing of restrictions on land use and development, which will enable market forces to play a more constructive and creative role in the rational, efficient allocation of land to more intensive and productive use.

Urban Quality

Cities, and the quality of life that they offer, are not simply determined by physical considerations. Indeed, given the legacy of the past, new urban policy frameworks would be incomplete...
with a view to enhancing urban quality. These will have to be programmes political centre. The present system of new, non-racial forms should be restructuring local government towards preferable that a process of local government will have to emerge in the period of uncertainty that will follow the repeal of Group Areas. They are also important national urban policy goals in their own right.

It is clear that a new, non-racial system of local government will have to emerge in a post-Group Areas Act period, and it is preferable that a process of local government change should proceed interactively with national constitutional change. In practice, this means that current local initiatives concerned with restructuring local government towards new, non-racial forms should be encouraged and supported by the political centre. The present system of local government cannot form the basis for sound urban management, yet world experience shows that it is just such sound management that distinguished positive from negative urban outcomes in rapidly urbanising societies.

A related point is that community participation (defined here as - democratic, representative local and central government; participation in key decision making between elections; and participation of the relevant community in development projects) and active involvement is essential for effective urban and rural development policy, and this will be an especially important consideration in a period of post-Group Areas urban reconstruction. In respect of

DATA BASE

TWO URBAN PLANNING CONCEPTS

The notions of 'cities-within-cities' and 'mixed use activity corridors' provide two possibilities for metropolitan spatial planning in the post-Group Areas period. As Smit and Todes (forthcoming) point out, these concepts originated with Currie (1978) and Dewar et al (1978), but each offers a way of managing the densification and re-integration of South African cities in the future.

In terms of the 'cities-within-cities' concept metropolitan growth is accommodated in a 'cluster of compact, walkable, planned communities of sufficient size to be true cities (say 50 000 to 100 000 in developing countries)' (Currie, 1978, p.182). The idea is such that cities-within-cities would cluster around the metropolitan core to yield a compact overall metropolitan form, and each city-within-city would be relatively self-contained with a complex land-use mix.

Curries' ideas have been implemented in Bogota, Columbia, where urban development has also been successfully linked to an economic growth strategy for the country as a whole (Urban Foundation, 1990a).

The implementation of a cities-within-cities approach would also make sense in many South African cities -- for example, in the Cato Manor area of Durban where a yawning gap has been inserted into the metropolitan fabric, as a result of Group Areas removals, at a distance of some 7km from the heart of the CBD.

The mixed use activity corridor concept derives from metropolitan planning ideas developed specifically in a South African context first by Dewar et al (1978) and later by Mills (1987) and Naude (1987). The concept provides a general approach towards managing metropolitan growth in South African cities, and takes its cue from the existing spatial forms of those cities. The emphasis is upon promoting the growth of mixed use corridors between the disparate parts of our cities -- corridors which would act as 'seams', tying together these disparate parts. A variety of measures are envisaged to encourage such corridors to be areas of intra-metropolitan movement, meeting and interaction.

Public facilities, commercial and small business activities and high density residential development, for example, would be encouraged into such 'seams', many of which would be areas previously used to discourage interaction between group areas.

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Note that because black settlement in the region has been largely constrained to areas behind the Bophuthatswana boundary, the flows from this area have increased greatly over time. Moreover, these people are commuting across areas between Pretoria and Bophuthatswana which are currently underdeveloped or are at low-intensity small-holding use.


urban economic and financial policy, for example, if services are to be introduced at a level which is both affordable and popularly acceptable, community participation in their development is essential.

Even with the best designed policies, tensions can be expected over the levels of state assistance to various groups. If policies are imposed upon groups without their consent, these tensions could erupt into active resistance. Indeed, it is not only servicing issues which will require community participation in future. In the absence of active community participation in urban development projects - for example, urban renewal in the inner-city or development projects in potential infill areas of the city - these are likely to be laden with controversy, and will not meet the social needs for which they should be designed. In the post-Group Areas era therefore, special emphasis should be placed upon community participation in planning and development.

**Housing**

There is, at present, a housing surplus for whites and housing shortages for other groups. The removal of the Group Areas Act will assist in restoring the balance between supply and demand forces within the housing market as a whole. In addition, price distortions which have arisen due to differential supply constraints - such as the higher prices per unit land in 'Coloured' and Indian group areas by comparison with white areas - should be ameliorated following the repeal of the Act.

Nevertheless, it is critical to bear in mind that there is already an enormous shortage of low-cost housing (approximately 850,000 units) and that our metropolitan areas will be doubling their population by the year 2010. In a context of such scale, the normalisation of supply and demand forces operating with respect to the existing housing stock in the post-Group Areas era will be a relatively minor adjustment. The really important housing challenges that lie ahead in the post-Group Areas period concern the mechanisms necessary to activate a massive supply of low-cost housing and associated services and facilities. There is no technical reason why South Africa cannot meet this challenge, but policies will clearly have to be adjusted to facilitate and activate low-income housing supply.

It is clear that in meeting the demands for post-Group Areas planning and development, greater allocations of financial resources will have to be made to urban development. At various points in South African history, specialist institutions have been created by the state for particular development purposes. One may cite as examples the Industrial Development Corporation, the National Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. In
Group Areas: Issue Focus

Each case, seed capital (in a single sum or series of instalments) has been made available on concessionary terms on the condition that the institution would operate on a commercial basis as soon as possible. This principle could now be applied to urban development in the form of a Cities Development Fund.

The Cities Development Fund could, for example, 'kickstart' private sector support for new urban development that will be required in the post-Group Areas era, provide general capital for the provision of services, as well as making available a per capita subsidy to municipalities containing neighbourhoods that fall below certain minimum standards of service provision. At the local level, urban development corporations or consortiums involving private, community and local government representatives could become channels for major private sector investment in the cities, as well as utilizing finance from the Cities Development Fund. Finally, at the local government level, effective local urban management will require greater decision-making autonomy and finance.

Policy Process

There are, of course, a wide range of other policy issues raised by the prospect of post-Group Area planning, but to conclude this brief article we would prefer to emphasise aspects of the process of arriving at a post-apartheid urban policy framework.

As was remarked in a previous paper (Bernstein, 1989), it is possible to envisage three stages in the formulation of a new urbanisation strategy for the country:

The first phase was marked at the one end (post-1976) by the opening up of the entire debate in the establishment - the irreversibility of black urbanisation - and could be said to have culminated with the legislative abolition of influx control in June 1986 and the partial restoration of limited citizenship to black people. The second phase, the substance of which was always inherent in the debates on the abolition of influx control and is now more clearly focused, is characterised by a multi-faceted debate concerning where and how black urbanisation should occur. It is only when this question is satisfactorily resolved that a number of important housing challenges that lie ahead concern the activation of a massive supply of low-cost housing and associated services.

As was remarked in that article, there is, of course, nothing inevitable in moving from one phase to the next, and had the political realities of South Africa been different, it would have been preferable to start with phase three. In formulating a specifically post-apartheid urbanisation strategy and parallel concepts of urban planning and urban management, however, it is critical that non-racial and democratic processes operate to determine final policy outcomes.

The policy proposals which have been developed and put forward by the Urban Foundation and Private Sector Council on Urbanisation, and which have been briefly alluded to here, have been widely tested and revised in the light of commentary received from numerous discussion groups. This has included months of discussions with black community organisations, trade unions and similar bodies.

Nevertheless, it is important to see the proposals for what they are: as one contribution to a national debate on the future of the cities and the development process in South Africa. The negotiation of a non-racial, democratic political future and the promotion of a development process that expands the opportunities and level of material well-being available to all are co-requirements for the realisation of the society to which most of us aspire. Of one thing, however, we remain sure - neither will be possible until there is an unambiguous commitment to the repeal of the Group Areas Act and related discriminatory legislation.

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