THE STATE, THE CITY AND MEANING:  
TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

Doreen Atkinson

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THE STATE, THE CITY AND MEANING: TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

‘People make a town, but citizens make a city’ (Rousseau)

INTRODUCTION

States are complex phenomena, and can be studied from many different theoretical perspectives. The South African state has largely been studied from perspectives which emphasize conflictual relations. The state (possibly in alliance with certain class interests) is usually conceived of as pitted against the ‘people’, the black working class, or the forces of democracy. This perspective, however, tells only one side of the story. It should be integrated theoretically with another dimension of our social experience— that which highlights the subtle and complex forms of mutual recognition between elements of the state and the populace.

In this paper, an alternative approach will be developed in an attempt to explain the strange contradictory images of the South African state as it relates to civil society. On the one hand, South Africa appears to be a very state-permeated society. People regard the state as powerful, and extensive penetration of state power into people’s private lives is often tolerated fatalistically, regarded as normal, or even advocated as appropriate. In spheres as diverse as education, town planning, business, transport and sexual ethics, the state has laid down rules and norms, and has attempted to police them.

Yet the South African state also seems a huge, sprawling, unco-ordinated, internally divided divided machine. It has, on occasion, seemed to lose control over some of its segments, especially at the geographical and institutional peripheries. There have been several competing centres of power: central, provincial and local levels are often not well synchronized; different departments may have conflicting goals; different geographical regions influence government officials with different social ethics; and officials from different ethnic groups often interpret their tasks and interests in conflicting ways. The South African state has too many internal tensions to be the state of Orwell’s 1984.

These two apparently contradictory images need to be explained and reconciled, without collapsing the one into the other. The claim has been made several times in recent political analysis, that the South African state is not a monolithic entity (for example Swilling, 1988; Swilling and Philips, 1989; Dubow 1989). However, the nature of intra-state fragmentation, and its implications for state-citizen relationships, still need to be explored. In this paper I will suggest one possible avenue of inquiry, which I have termed ‘the constitutive approach to the state’. This approach involves several sequential claims.

First, whereas many studies of South African society have hitherto begun from the theoretical concepts of ‘race’ or ‘class’, it seems that there can be a different starting-point, which could lead to new insights. I will use the term ‘modernization’, not in the sense of the American students of third world countries during the 1960s, but in the Foucaultian sense of the need to subject society to grids of order and ‘discipline’. South Africa in the 20th century has been groping its way to establishing institutions and patterns of social interaction which would fit new forms of technology.

Seen in this light, the era of segregation, as well as the era of apartheid proper (i.e. under Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Vorster) were not an era of social irrationality or aberration. Nor were they a cynical form of class mobilization. Rather, there was a fairly incompetent but entirely understandable attempt to make sense of the fundamental social
dislocations that were following in the wake of urbanization and technological change. With the benefit of hindsight, we see the pathos of beleaguered and perplexed officials, caught in the maelstrom of modernization, grasping for appropriate social categories with which to make sense of events, and attempting to impose these categories on a social reality more or less out of their control. In this paper, I will attempt to understand the notion of 'interests', which has informed so much of South African political analysis and historiography, and instead I will bring to the fore a sensitivity to historical irony and pathos.

The second claim is that the imposition of 'discipline' necessarily depends on a coherent conception of what is the community. Who are the insiders? Who are the outsiders? This paper will trace the growth and spread of the Foucaultian notion of 'discipline' as an inescapable element of modernity. This impulse was perfectly compatible with the recognition of rights. However, differentiated rights within the community could only be recognized (and obligations exacted) if people were categorized. It had to be clear who was an insider and who was not, and to which category of insider or outsider people belonged. The remarkable thing about South Africa has been that the identification of 'the community' has been extremely problematic. While much attention has been devoted to achieving liberty and equality, the development of 'fraternity' has hardly been addressed in progressive South African thinking.

Third, the notion of 'community' is an inherently normative construct. This perspective emphasizes the normative definition of community, and the subsequent ways in which people are recognized as citizens, non-citizens, or semi-citizens. People are accorded rights considered appropriate to their status as members or non-members of the community, and social actors' sense of moral decency depends on recognizing these other people's rights.

Fourth, I will argue that black people have been 'recognized' in very different ways by the state since 1950, and that they, in turn, have affirmed or challenged these forms of recognition. It will be argued that the dual qualities of the South African state, described above - its extensive yet unequal penetration of civil society, and its inner fragmentation - can be explained by reference to the different notions of community and citizenship which prevail in different parts of the central and local state.

Fifth, it will be argued that the cities and towns were an important stage on which these different forms of recognition were played out. The definition of the 'urban community', or the 'city', as a moral and political unit, has been a very controversial issue in South Africa. The different views of the 'community' have had profound implications for the definition of citizenship of the city, the rights accorded to various categories of the urban community, and, significantly, the appropriate relationship between the central and the local state.

Sixth, this paper will present a genealogy of the concept of the city in South Africa. It will be argued that the paternalist era was a crucial underpinning of all subsequent perspectives on the city. Paternalism was fundamentally ambiguous, and was a rich source of divergent moral imperatives which later developed into distinct and conflicting views of the urban moral community. These views employed different combinations of categories, rights and obligations.

The final section will therefore briefly outline (a) the emergence of totalitarian views of the city, culminating in the Administration Boards of the 1970s; (b) the garrison state view of the city in the 1980s; and (c) the emergence of new forms of city autonomy and identity in the last few years.
PART I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: MODERNITY, DISCIPLINE AND COMMUNITY

1.1 Modernity and Discipline

Until now, the state in South Africa, especially in the 'revisionist school', has been regarded almost exclusively as a repressive institution, either in its own interests or in the interests of specific classes. I propose that we now need to look more carefully at the subtle normative processes of the constitution of 'community' in South Africa. Foucault's approach moves a long way in this direction, by postulating what may be called 'productive power':

'But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely judicial conception of such power; one identifies power with a law which says no; power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition. Now I believe that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, one which has been curiously widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things; it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse...'(Rabinow 1984:6).

I wish to argue that productive power has held good in this sense, even in the inhospitable terrain of South African racial administration. Two arguments follow from Foucault's claim. First, the state does not merely repress; to the extent that it employs techniques of 'discipline', the State makes certain forms of useful social activity possible:

'The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body - to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilled and increases its forces' (Foucault 1979:136).

One of the techniques of discipline is the demarcation of collectivities. The notion of disciplinary power is intimately bound up with categorization. 'Discipline sometimes requires enclosure... places of confinement, barracks, boarding schools, manufacturing spaces' (Foucault 1979:141). Furthermore, it allocates a place to different categories of individuals:

'...All the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/innocent; normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him...)' (Foucault 1979:199).
Each moral and political order has to decide what the relevant categories into which people must be divided are (in South Africa, for example, the oppositions old/young, religious/secular, educated/literate, formal/formal sector; and black/white have been crucial). Individual identity is created and refined by the categories in which people find themselves, and with which they identify.

The normative notion of 'community' is fundamentally based on these categories. As Foucault noted, the genealogy of power is only one domain of study. There is also a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; and a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (Rabinow 1986:351). It is this normative dimension of 'community' which forms the substance of the rest of the argument of the paper.

In South Africa, the central question regarding the community has remained deeply problematic. The citizenship of the city is even today unresolved, although different political perspectives are providing varied answers. During the 20th century, Foucaultian discipline was gradually being applied to urban 'native administration'. But different perspectives of the community (the paternalist vision, the Verwoerdians, the Joint Management Centres (JMCs), the Regional Service Councils (RSCs), the civic associations and the local authorities of the 1980s) were each to have a different way of applying the disciplinary ethos. The next section will take up this problem.

1.2. A constitutive theory of citizenship and community

A second claim follows from Foucault's assertions about the productive notion of power. For Foucault, the power of the state can only be understood as productive and constitutive if we see it as resting on, already existing, power relations. 'The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology... (1986:64). To put it differently, the way in which people's identity is constituted in shared institutions, the way in which they are recognized, collectively produce a sense of community, entailing specific modes of appropriate behaviour.

But communities, identities and institutions do not merely rest on power. They also entail rights and obligations. It is at this point that we must proceed beyond Foucault. While he admirably describes the pervasiveness of power in and through social institutions, and the resultant ways in which individuality is constituted, he does not take his analysis to
According to Foucault, 'power traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse'. In addition, I maintain that power in institutions produces rights. The rest of this section will argue for the pervasiveness of rights in most (though not all) forms of society, in fact, it is only through social institutions that we can have rights at all (Rabinow 1986:61).

Unlike natural rights theorists such as Locke, who regard individuals as having 'natural rights', this paper argues for the notion of 'having rights' as a distinctly social phenomenon. Individuals are not discrete social entities, holding certain human rights as part of their human nature. Rather, having human rights only makes sense within the context of a specific social relationship, and within specific social institutions (Frost 1986:162-3). A person has rights to the extent that he/she can make claims for a certain kind of recognition from other persons, within certain social arrangements. Rights and institutions imply one another.

'Constitutive theory aims to bring to light the internal connections between being an individual rights holder of a particular kind and being a member of a certain kind of social or political institution, where both the rights and the institution are conceived of as being components of a wider practice' (Frost 1986:165).

Whereas any institution accords rights and obligations, certain rights are more fundamental than others. One's membership of a university can be terminated. In contrast, membership of a community tends to define one's entire social existence, including social relationships, expectations, moral judgments and values. In this paper, the term 'community' refers to the ensemble of social institutions. Since this is necessarily a very abstract notion, it is usually ambiguous when we attempt to apply it in practice. We find it difficult at best of times to determine precisely where the 'community' begins or ends. Yet there are degrees of ambiguity. This paper will argue that the paternalist vision of the city was extremely ambiguous, and that it spawned numerous, more dogmatic, visions which selected some of the elements of paternalism and eliminated the rest.

Almost all notions of communal citizenship allocate rights and obligations to members of that community. These rights would simultaneously imply constraints and obligations on the part of other people. Only in the extreme case of total slavery, where the slave is reduced from a person to an object without will or humanity, can it be said that there are no constraints on the slave-holder. This extreme is not easy to achieve; as Genovese has shown, the mere recognition amongst Southern slave-holders that their
slaves were indeed human, implied the obligation to recognize at least the slaves’ right to life (1976:28-30).

There are many different ways to recognize other people’s humanity. Total rightlessness implies an absolute lack of recognition of another person’s humanity, while full equal rights implies the recognition of that person as free, autonomous and equal citizen. In between these extremes, different relationships (e.g. parent-child, husband-wife, capitalist-worker, ruler-citizen) produce different configurations of rights, depending on the institutions within which they are rooted. It is also possible that an individual may have different rights within different institutional contexts.

"Thus the task for normative theory becomes the one of showing how we as individuals are constituted as such through our participation in a particular set of social, economic and political institutions which in turn are grounded in our adherence to certain norms. What we are called upon to do is to stand back from the multiple institutions in which we live in order to show how each contributes to the kind of individuality we value ..." (Frost 1986:167).

The recognition of rights is extraordinarily pervasive. Rightlessness within a community (e.g. the system of slavery) is fairly rare. Most social ideologies do define certain categories of people as outsiders, and yet will at least recognize their right to exist. Notable exceptions are Nazism, those brands of anti-communism which want to eliminate communism completely, or, ominously, extreme rightwing movements in South Africa. All movements which define social reality as being in a state of war, tend to deny all rights to those outside their community (I will argue later that the JMC system in South Africa approximated this view). Apartheid attempted to restructure the South African community; even the ‘Bantu’ were accorded rights - rights to a homeland existence. To that extent, they were still part of community, albeit one that approximated the international community of nations. Whatever the intentions of the Verwoerdians were, the fact that the ‘Bantu’ did not accept these rights implies that these ‘rights’ were ultimately not viable, since rights must be mutually recognized). The ‘Bantu’ were defined as human, as not intrinsically malevolent, and hence the problem posed by their presence had to be resolved in terms of some notions of human moral decency. It was the moral implications of this humanity which were elaborated differently by different sectors of the state.

Methodologically, the argument has very far-reaching ramifications. Once one asks how government officials and members of the public implicitly, intuitively conceived themselves and others, the issue becomes very abstract. Notions of ‘decency’, ‘fairness’ and
appropriate behaviour patterns imply concepts of 'normality'. In Foucault's words, "...each society has its regime of truth" (Rabinow 1986:73). Certain social structures and behaviours are taken for granted as being part of the nature of things, and studying conceptions of normality is a daunting prospect. It conjures up a minefield of theoretical problems, including the relativity of beliefs, the nature of knowledge and, of course, the role of the researcher herself.

Furthermore, this approach has radical implications for our understanding of the state. Contemporary studies of the state, and especially those within the 'policy analysis' approach, have tended to fetishize the state, in the Marxist sense of the verb. An unwarranted objectivity and existence is attributed to the state as if it is a 'thing', a constant given, with a solid identity. Once this assumption is made, it inevitably leads to a utilitarian conception of the state: What are the state's goals? How does it survey the range of possible strategies to meet them, and then pragmatically pick the most suitable option? The state itself is perceived as remaining ontologically intact, as if it were a (collective) actor operating on a world distinct from itself.

The constitutive theory of community, rights and individuality also demands a reassessment of our view of the state. The state is a relational entity, in the most fundamental sense - it consists purely of relations among government functionaries, and between them and their clients within civil society. These functions form part of the state, only to the extent that they are recognized as legitimate bearers of functionaries. Even when people condemn the excesses, inefficiency, bias or other sins of which government officials may be guilty, the critics still have a notion of what a 'decent' government official is. The state is a fundamentally hermeneutic, socially-constructed whole; it is a short-hand term for the myriad of complex ways in which private citizens and government officials participate in maintaining, evaluating, challenging and changing patterns of authority. In the very process of implementing policies, functionaries make sense of themselves, their role, and the rights of citizens. They are constituting others, and being constituted in turn. The 'state' is a relationship of recognition, a process, a constant activity. The study of the changing conceptions of the 'community' in South Africa will attempt to show how different sectors of the local and central government have 'stated' their relationship with civil society.
PART 2: COMMUNITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 Constitutive citizenship and the community in South Africa

The central moral and philosophical problem for whites in South Africa has arisen with their simultaneous advocacy of sovereignty, rights and citizenship for themselves, while denying these to the indigenous majority. As the quest for sovereignty from Britain was gradually satisfied, the moral problem of according and denying rights to the majority increasingly became the backdrop to politics. At the heart of the issue was the problem of the definition of community. Even though the South African state has had its fair share of scoundrels and Machiavellians, I maintain that it is very important for most members of society, including politicians and officials, to justify their actions to themselves. It has been a moral debate, but such a fundamental one that it entailed all people's intuitive conceptions about what is normal and appropriate. All people strive to consider themselves decent.

This does not mean that people are not motivated by interests. All sane and socialized people, however, have to reconcile decency with interests; in fact, it can be argued that interests are only meaningful if they confer on actors, at least as a byproduct, a sense of moral decency. The revisionist school has done important work on analyzing material and other interests within the South African political economy; what is now needed is an analysis of the ways in which interests were shaped by normative justifications and values. It will be argued here that people's sense of their own decency is intrinsically tied up with their notions of what other people are, what treatment is appropriate to those people, and what rights they possess. The state, as an upholder of 'good order' in a country, is a key actor in creating, maintaining, reinforcing and changing people's notions of themselves and others. In a radical sense, therefore, not only is the State involved in defining people's sense of decency, but it is indeed involved in the very definition of people's humanity.

In the South African context, since the middle of this century, the black population's status as subjects has been very unclear. The notion of segregation has always been ambiguous. To some extent, this was politically manipulated by leaders such as General Herzog: 'The elusive quality with which he invested segregation was its very strength, for it drew differing groups into its discourse, always promising, never quite revealing' (Dubow 1989:43). There were at least two strains of thinking: the strident,
racist version of Herzog, and the incorporationist, paternalist and 'protective' elements of liberal segregation (Dubow 1989:44). By the mid-20th century, therefore, the status of Africans in the broader community was still quite unclear, and contained many different elements. Africans were not slaves, and yet they were not part of the political community (except in Cape Town); many blacks were not fully proletarianized, while others had formed a working class in the modern Western sense. Many black people still had a rural base, where traditional institutions, rights and obligations prevailed. In the cities, some blacks have been allowed to live as in families, while others have not; certain blacks have been allowed to own property, and others not. Some Blacks' freedom of movement was more constrained than others. The state's obligations to these people were also unclear - the state regarded education and 'advancement' of blacks as a good thing, even though they did not have a right to it in the strict sense.

What had always been clear to whites, and here I refer especially to government officials, was that blacks were not socially or politically equal to whites. However, there has been little agreement amongst white officials on the way in which blacks were unequal to whites, and what the appropriate relationship between whites and blacks should be. Government policy has been unclear on precisely what sort of racial and social order it wanted to achieve. Furthermore, ambiguous policies had to be put into practice by a wide variety of central, provincial and local government actors who interpreted policy according to their own experiences of social institutions. In terms of the normative theory outlined above, different white official agencies 'recognized' the status of black subjects in different ways.

However, and this is very important, each segment of the state had some vague but indispensable notion of what it meant to rule decently and justly. It is only if we acknowledge the existence of shared notions of rights, obligations and appropriate behaviour, that it makes sense to talk of a 'decent official'. Officials were aware of standards of fairness, decency and appropriateness. They could also, at least some of the time, point to real or imagined black approval of what they were doing, and this reinforced the impression of reciprocal relationships of recognition.

I will argue, in the next section, that a paternalist vision was the key to understanding the conflicting notions of 'community' or 'fraternity' in the years after 1950. The ambiguous and inherently unstable definitions of 'community', 'rights' and 'decent rule', put forward by paternalism, allowed different segments of the state in subsequent years to develop different conceptions of the appropriate normative relationship between
whites and blacks. These conceptions were sustained by certain impressions of ‘normality’. Officials were reassured by overt consent by black residents, or by ambiguous behaviour on the part of black people, which could be interpreted as evidence of the normality of the bureaucratic rule. Intervention in private lives, consultation with selected black leaders, a degree of black co-operation with official policies, and an unquestioned belief in the normality of segregation, insulated white official elites from any radical challenge to their perspectives which might have existed in the townships. The definition of community was sometimes shared with black people with whom they came into contact; other times it was imposed, and sometimes it was a complex mixture of both.

So far, these claims have been made with reference to the entire state. Methodologically, the study of implicit processes of recognition is daunting. Analyzing beliefs, concepts, norms and values is an extraordinarily complex enterprise and a great deal of empirical work still needs to be done. At this stage in our knowledge of the South African state, there is no substitute for detailed research into the minutiae of the state’s various interactions with civil society. There is still very little research available on the actual, day-in-day routine activities of government officials, and the responses they received from white and black members of the public. One way of making this task manageable is to focus on specific arenas of state activity. The next section will consider the city as one platform on which the questions of community and fraternity have constantly been posed.

2.2 Constituting citizens: The role of local government in South Africa

City elites (officials, councillors, businessmen etc.) were never mere instruments of the central government. While it is true that formal decentralization of power to local government has always been tenuous in South Africa, the towns and cities have always represented a political space not quite wiped out by central government intervention. I propose that the way in which individuals were constituted within shared social institutions had a direct effect on the relationship between the central state and the city. The city’s political space was expanded and shrunk during different historical periods, as various sectors of the state have attempted to mould the city to serve alternative conceptions of ‘community’.

This paper will provide a schematic overview of different ways of conceptualizing the city. These different ways are ideal types, and will inevitably do some violence to
historical detail, but I am attempting to outline the essence of certain kinds of relationships.

In this process of constituting a moral order the perceptions and actions of central and local officials (as opposed to public representatives, City Councillors or Members of Parliament) were often crucial. Bureaucracies, especially state bureaucracies, are powerful creators of systems of meaning. In South Africa, officials have always been involved in interpreting the nature, jurisdiction and membership of the city polity. Officials have hands-on information about social conditions, and this invariably translates into influence. They define urban problems, plan towns, implement legislation, and guide the actions of local councillors, businessmen and other organizations. As 'experts', officials have other institutional supports which legitimize and encourage them in their actions. For example, the Institute for the Administration of Non-European Affairs, South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA) and university courses have been sources of ideas, concepts and information. It is important to differentiate between politicians and officials as the source of policy. Under different circumstances, either of these sectors may have the preponderant influence in defining people's rights and in defining the urban political order.

Yet bureaucratic power is no guarantee of bureaucratic uniformity. South African officialdom has never been fully united or integrated. As far as the cities were concerned, even though township managers were responsible to a central government department, this did not prevent them from sustaining their own notions about what was right and proper in 'their' townships. In one sense, the history of the city and of the state in South Africa is the story of the central government's attempt to gradually impose a uniform bureaucratic order. It is well known that there was widespread local resistance to this (Bekker and Humphries 1985:4-5), although it was disorganized and confused. However, the normative implications of this ambiguous resistance have yet to be explored.

Within the South African state, there have been several different conceptions of the constitutive relationship between blacks and whites. As said above, one way of exploring these conceptions is to consider different understandings of the city and the urban order. The following are ideal types which place different perspectives within different institutions. The distinctions between them are not at all quite so clear in the messy world of historical detail, but we can discern the broad outlines of these perspectives.

In this paper, therefore, the theme of the city is used as a means to explore the normative justifications of the social order, which have been generated by different
segments of the state at different times in history. The cities have been one important stage on which the various forms of recognition of individuals as subjects of the state have been played out. This paper will analyze the changing ways in which urban blacks were perceived by various sectors of the state, and how central and local actors differed or agreed on the nature of blacks' citizenship. These differences or agreements in turn produced changing central-local relationships, manifested in changing conceptions of what cities are about. Examples are drawn largely from an East London case study although the potential for generalization to other municipalities does exist (with the notable exception, probably, of National Party dominated ones).
PART 3: GOVERNMENT BY 'CITY FATHERS': PATERNALISM, DISCIPLINE AND COMMUNITY

Generally speaking, the apartheid order began in 1948. Nationalist politicians set out to implement a radically new racial order, which would have profound implications for the cities. In practice, however, it took at least 15 years for the machinery of the state to be sufficiently mobilized. Especially in the realm of 'native affairs', the position of the municipalities was inherently contradictory: they were the agents of the central Department of 'Native Affairs' (DNA), and yet the municipal officials were employed and paid by the local city councils, thus causing an irresolvable tension in their loyalties. As a new breed of native administrators, who could collectively be called the 'Verwoerdians', took hold of the central government, this tension became much more marked.

Not only were their loyalties ambiguous, but local 'native administration' officials were powerful in creating a specific atmosphere and normative and symbiotic urban order. They exercised extensive power over their locations. Although the central state attempted to lay down uniform policies, local conditions and officials varied greatly. Concealed by the haze of bureaucratic red tape, the local officials could follow their own style of management.

The municipal history of East London indicates that certain local authorities during the 1950s and 1960s (notably the non-Nationalist Party-dominated local authorities), clung to an intuitive paternalist understanding of what the nature of the citizenship of black urban residents meant. The very 'natives', who were the object of so much central government concern, were actually in close physical and personal proximity to local whites, and this often affected those whites' understanding of the urban order, for better or worse. It is important for us, therefore, to explore this rich and complex notion of paternalism, as it has formed the foundation of many latter-day visions of the city and of its citizens.

In terms of the paternalism of municipal officials in the 1950s, the urban order was unequal and racist. Why should there then have been resistance to, or sluggish compliance with, the apartheid programme of the DNA after 1948? How did local officials and councillors conceive of the proper role of the city, of blacks, and of the administration of the local community?

The presence of blacks in the cities was not a fundamental political problem for local native administrators, as it later became for the Verwoerdian central government.
officials who wished to remove blacks to an entirely different political order. Local officials and councillors regarded the physical proximity of black 'locations' to the rest of the city as quite normal, although it certainly did not imply access to the local franchise. Local whites also did not conceive blacks as having political rights, hence no fundamental restructuring of political institutions was necessary. For officials, the presence of 'natives' was perceived as a frustrating practical problem, one of providing housing and infrastructure, and preventing crime. The presence of large numbers of natives placed a growing pressure on municipal revenue and planning resources.

Even though the matter was not conceptualised of as a political problem, the presence of the 'natives' did raise intractable philosophical problems. Paternalism was one way of conceptualizing the appropriate relationship between whites and 'natives' in the cities. 'Paternalism' is intrinsically ambiguous, containing within itself impulses to control as well as protect, similar to those found in the ideal-typical model of the parent-child relationship. Yet whereas paternalism in the family is a fairly coherent concept (there is nothing intrinsically contradictory about simultaneously controlling and protecting children), the application of paternalistic notions to social reality was more problematic. In what sense could the 'natives' be seen as 'children'? In what sense was Rev. Mashologu, of the Advisory Board in East London, a 'child' in relation to the Council? Yet surely it was clear that many black residents of Duncan Village were in need of protection, either against themselves, or against selfish white interests?

Were the 'natives' intrinsically racially inferior and in need of protection? Or were they in the process of 'growing up', to become part of the 'civilized' community? Or would 'growing up' entail greater separation and cultural differentiation between black and white? A remarkable statement by a prominent native administrator, Dr. Language of Brakpan, demonstrates this vacillation:

'Must Bantu authorities form an integral part of the white management system in our country? If a location is situated within municipal boundaries, and power is given to the Bantu authority, then such an authority will automatically become an integral part of the City Council, and then you have a system of complete integration. On the other hand, if locations are situated outside municipal boundaries, then they can be developed without affecting the white local council. I am not prepared at this stage to say which one is preferable (IANA 1953; My emphasis).

Furthermore, whereas literal paternalism in the context of the family at least has clear parameters (we all agree on who is part of a family, and who is not), in the social
context of metaphorical paternalism the boundaries of the relevant units are very often
debatable. There is no doubt that local whites did feel a sense of community or fraternity
with black residents, but in conditions of rapid urbanization and social change, the limits of
friendship were very unclear. I wish to argue that at the heart of urban paternalism was an
unanswered question: ‘Who or what is the city’s community?’ The presence of the growing
‘native’ population presented not only practical problems; their presence also posed
philosophical and moral questions, which were never clearly articulated, let alone resolved.
It is useful to imagine a ‘native administration’ official trying to work out urgent practical
policies whilst remaining totally unclear about the philosophical parameters of such
policies. What was the proper place of ‘natives’ in our city? What forms of social
recognition and control are appropriate to them? If they earn such low wages, how can
they afford decent housing and pay sufficient rentals to balance the ‘Native Revenue
Account’? If they are merely here for their labour, who should pay for their housing? Are
they in fact here simply for their labour? Do they have moral claims to other social
facilities? Do they have a right to be here? Whose people are they? The rapidly changing
social patterns of the cities confused the issue still further.

As a City Councillor observed, probably more accurately than even he perceived,
‘We are a small body of Europeans groping, so often at cross purposes with each other, to
solve a problem which is world wide, and of which our country happens to be one of the
foveal points, and of which I am convinced the urban Native is one of the most important
testing grounds’ (IANA 1953:47).

It will be argued that these internal tensions gave rise, from the 1960s till the
present day, to fundamentally different ways of conceiving both the government-citizen
relationship, and the relationship between the central state and the city.

Let us attempt to analyse paternalism, keeping in mind this latent question, ‘What
is the “native’s” place in the urban community?’ There are several uneasily juxtaposed
elements to paternalism in the South African urban context.

a) To start with, paternalism emphasizes inherent differences. For a ‘native
administrator’, a ‘native’ was distinctly different from a white person. They were
less Westernized, less sophisticated, less affluent. Their ‘tribal’ background was
often referred to in municipal documents. For example, municipal officials’
long-standing debate on municipal beer production often produced references to
the important place of beer in ‘tribal custom’ (for example, JLAB:31/3/58). They
can be forgiven for this, for the 'natives' with whom they came into contact also often referred to their own cultural distinctiveness ('Africans are communal'; ‘We know what is good for us’).

This notion of 'difference' was seldom defined, and could therefore have very contradictory results. It could be used to justify, on the one hand, interventionist control (due to 'natives' disorderly tendencies), and on the other hand, permissive freedoms, since traditional customs (such as beer-drinking) presumably had to be respected.

b) Inequality: In the archetypal parent-child relationship, the parent has more knowledge, experience, and stature than the child, regardless of the individual qualities of either parent or child. For municipal officials, the 'native' was having difficulty in coping with modern urban conditions. In the words of Mr. Mathewson of Benoni, '...With the civilization of the country, (the native) has been obliged to radically change his mode of life. As a result we find a complete lack of family cohesion and control; standards of morality and community no longer exist. There is no anchor, while he cannot invest in land...' (IANA 1953:42).

Again, the substance of this inequality was very unclear. While Mr. Mathewson spoke of officials' first-hand information of the 'aspirations of the urban native', and consequently, the right to control, there were also arguments that the native had to be given more freedoms, so that he could graduate into advanced civilization. Just as styles of parenting can be seen to range on a scale from very protective/controlling to very permissive, there were significant differences of approach within paternalism.

c) Protection: Paternalism implies care, and even affection, for the object of paternalism. The essence of paternalism is that control or guidance is exercised for the good of the other person. Native administration often approximated this approach. For example, a municipal beer monopoly would protect Africans against 'illegal concoctions' and exploitation by shebeen queens (TR:6/J/1956). It also accounts for the profound moral uneasiness experienced regarding the idea of deriving profit from such beer sales. Would a decent parent make a profit from encouraging his child's consumption of liquor?
While the relationship between municipal official and township resident was based on unequal power, it did coexist with mutual respect. From the East London Council minutes, there are repeated references by councillors and municipal officials to the appalling conditions in the locations. While these statements may also reflect the impulse to control, it is not unreasonable to claim that white local officials, who spent every day amongst township residents, may have felt distress about such rapidly worsening poverty. Again, however, the appropriate degree or kind of concern or protection was unclear. How much should be ‘done for’ the natives? How much should they be subsidized? What claims do they have on the rest of the community?

In East London, the local authority saw itself as the appropriate body to administer ‘natives’, partly because it had always done so and could not imagine anyone else doing so; and partly because councillors were aware of the need to maintain a suitable work force. There were also, however, the bonds of localistic loyalties, the sense that the local authority knew and understood ‘their natives’. In the building of Mdantsane, the huge dormitory township in the Ciskei, the East London municipal officials produced one argument after another, regarding the financial deprivations which would result from the DNA’s chosen site. Transport costs, travel time, the loss of lodgers’ income and the survival of the aged in a distant township, were used as arguments against the site proposed by the Department. These arguments do indicate a pragmatic concern with municipal efficiency and labour productivity, but it is not unwarranted to interpret them as an expression of concern. This contrasts strongly with the blatant ‘end-justifies-the-means’ attitude of the Verwoerdian officials, who were seldom aware of the suffering caused by official policies, and when informed of it, were not moved.

Paternalism implies power. Just as parents can feel justified to use force or violence to discipline children ‘for their own good’, so paternalistic white local authorities knew they had the power and authority to override black residents’ wishes. In East London, the Location Advisory Board recommendations were summarily rejected from time to time. In the lengthy wrangle over the introduction of municipal beer production, the Council failed to persuade the Board of the merits of its proposal, and eventually simply took a unilateral decision on the matter.
Analyzing municipal control over local black people is a very complex theoretical enterprise. In the past, two kinds of explanation have been advanced. According to one approach, the political exclusion of blacks from the franchise produced, by definition, an authoritarian system of rule. According to materialist explanations, the need for a docile labour force led to certain township regulations being enforced. A third perspective is currently gradually emerging, focusing on the impulse to order, surveillance and discipline, especially in town planning (for example, Robinson 1990).

Foucault's notion of power is important for my argument in two ways. To begin with, it was clear that the floating population in the townships had to be stabilized. Modern society involves discipline: 'Discipline fixes, it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions...' (Rabinow 1984:208)

Controls exerted in the townships by the paternalist officials of the 1950s were not simply a response to black resistance, or the need for an exploitable work force, important though these considerations may have been. They are a normal part of the growth of modernity, a state extending itself to get a grip on its citizens. The 'exit option' does not exist in a modern state: 'Europeans are ... registered in many ways, notably at birth, through taxation records, directories and kindred compilations, parliamentary and municipal voters' rolls and under the Defence Act. They also almost invariably have fixed addresses at which they can be found or information obtained as to their whereabouts, and can usually produce documents or credible witnesses vouching for their identity at the shortest notice. On the other hand, apart from the pass laws, the only more or less general system of registration of native males is through tax records and these do not lend themselves to the ready and efficient tracing of natives' land even in their own districts' (Interdepartmental Committee 1920; Quoted in Robinson 1990).

The extension of disciplinary controls was encompassing the entire population. This implies that the impulse to discipline and control in the history of native administration in South Africa was not unusual. It was a normal part of modernization. In fact, white sectors of society have also been brought into disciplinary structures (at schools, in hospitals, in the planning of towns, and so forth). We must not confuse our critique of such a disciplinary ethos with a
critique of the precise, racist way in which it was applied in South Africa, especially
to the disenfranchised. The disciplinary ethos has come to stay, and will certainly
be with us in a post-apartheid society. Any modern, united society (as opposed to
societies that are traditional, fragmented, inchoate or undergoing civil war) will
experience ‘discipline’.

However, the basic lack of clarity about the limits of the community posed severe
problems for this disciplinary spirit. ‘Discipline’ had to be applied, but to whom,
and where, and how? Should newcomers from the rural areas be allowed to live
on peri-urban small-holdings? Should rent defaulters be evicted, if they cannot
afford their payments? Should they be subsidized by the Native Revenue Account,
which was indirectly being subsidized by the white ratepayers? Should respectable
householders have the right to brew their own beer, or should the general
prohibition on brewing apply to them as well? Is their identity as respectable
people more important than their identity as ‘natives’? Should everyone be
subjected to police raids? Should juvenile delinquents be accommodated in
reformatory hostels to be taught the virtue of labour, or should they be
‘repatriated’ to traditional areas? Is ‘native’ membership of the urban community
conditional on good behaviour, or is it a right based on birth and the sharing of
urban values?

In sum: certain categories of people (the employed, respectable, law-abiding,
church-going permanent residents) were more easily conceptualised as belonging
to the urban community than the delinquents, the criminals, the newcomers and
the single men in the hostels. Yet their identity as ‘natives’ cut across these
distinctions, making the task of imposing order very difficult in practice.
Paternalist officials shared the (normal) modernizing impulse to create order and
predictability. However, the moral and philosophical foundations for this project
were inherently unstable. This meant that a great deal of debate invariably took
place before any decision was taken, any money spent or any facility established,
even though the urgent need for social improvements was seldom lost from sight.
Something had to be done; and this usually resulted in makeshift, overlapping,
contradictory rules and regulations, prohibitions, permissions, permits and
prosecutions. The web of control was not nearly as systematic and confident as in
Foucault’s portrayal, as best, it was an application of a modernizing disciplinary
spirit to a fundamentally ambiguous situation. In the end, it could only deal with
some of the symptoms. It is this inherent confusion that differentiates paternalism
from the totalitarian control of the Verwoerdians, who were as yet still waiting in
the wings and gathering their strength.

e) Finally, paternalism includes rights, albeit in a most complicated and subtle way.
While certain rights may be explicitly spelt out in a document (such as the
'Municipal Location Regulations'), these rights are embedded in more implicit
notions of appropriate behaviour, limits, excesses and even compensation. Not
only is a child's right to decent treatment usually recognized, but most styles of
parenting give children rights to decide on certain things. It is at this point that the
'native - native administrator' dialectic becomes most interesting. In terms of my
argument earlier, political citizens are constituted by their recognition as such by
other citizens or subjects of the state. Native administrators saw the unequal
relationship between black and white as normal, not requiring justification. The
East London documents indicate that municipal officials, while denying political
equality between blacks and whites, did acknowledge other rights: the rights of
(certain) 'natives' to be in the cities; to have families with them in the cities; to
accumulate wealth; to be left alone as long as they obeyed the panoply of laws that
governed mobility and residence. Certain councillors argued that it was morally
incorrect to 'enforce upon residents measures which were not absolutely necessary
in their own interests' (NAC:7/10/57). Evictions for rent arrears was usually done
as a last resort, and the unemployed usually qualified for remission of rent. Some
also took a more permissive view of Africans' rights; for example, Councillor
Stakemire steadfastly defended the right of 'Bantu legally resident in the area ... to
make their own choice of employment', and he opposed the endorsing-out of
Bantu who did not want to do certain kinds of work (NAC:3/3/64).

There was not a clear philosophy of rights. Africans were not full citizens of the
political order of the city, but they were part of the landscape; they had an
unofficial 'right' to be there. For example, during the 1950s, most councillors in
East London felt that Duncan Village should remain, even if Mdantsane were to
be established.

At the very least, municipal officials in East London seemed to believe that black
residents had a right to be treated humanely. During the chaotic first years of the
removal of people from Duncan Village to Mdantsane, the municipal officials
repeatedly expressed disapproval and even anger at the Department's inept
handling of the issue. Even when paternalist officials earnestly attempted to apply
the growing number of regulations and prescriptions imposed by the Nationalist government, they usually found it impossible to resolve the practical contradictions of urban native policy. This attention to detail paradoxically left some space for ‘natives’ to go about their own lives. For it invariably took a great deal of the officials’ time to sort out their own rationales for policies, and then to implement them in a very complex environment.

The ambiguous position of the Advisory Board demonstrated this complex mix of rights and relative powerlessness. The Advisory Boards were part of a reliable, predictable system of city government. Even the ANC Youth League fielded candidates during the 1955 Advisory Board election in East London (Lodge 1987). The officials’ experience of the Advisory Board was crucial. The Board consisted of about ten black members, elected by township residents. It had no executive powers, and its effective role was usually neutralized by the powerful advisory position of the City Council’s Native Affairs Committee. The Board’s influence was also constrained by the presence of a white Councillor as chairman, and the Township Manager at Board meetings.

The Board could not, however, simply be overridden. It had its own informal power resources. The Board constantly called the municipality to account for its application of influx control, and especially with regard to the behaviour of the police. On certain issues, such as the introduction of a municipal beer monopoly, the Board’s approval was greatly desired by the Council and officials. The opposition of the Advisory Board to the Council’s proposal caused many frustrating delays for the officials. What made matters worse for the Council, the Advisory Board members shared many of the same paternalist assumptions as their officials. Yet they could use paternalist discourse to make very telling arguments against Council proposals.

‘Traditional custom’ was invoked in order to argue that blacks know what is best for themselves, or that established rights should be respected, or that blacks need an opportunity to do things for themselves so as to advance towards ‘civilization’. Such arguments often left officials and the Councillors annoyed, disturbed, disoriented and exhausted. Hence the relationship between the Council and the Board could vary between mutual support, apathy and exasperation.
In the long run, though, the behaviour of the Board tended to reinforce white paternalist assumptions. Municipal officials believed that they had the voluntary cooperation of the large majority of black residents. While Advisory Board members often complained about the lack of facilities and about administrative difficulties of their constituents, there was seldom any indication that the Board members fundamentally questioned the urban order. A remarkable example of this was the repeatedly-discussed issue of law and order and the excesses of the police. Yet a meeting of the Board in 1955 complained that the police were, once again, conducting raids as early as 3:30 am, whereas 'everyone knew' that the regulations determined that raids should only take place after 6:30 am.

Even if it is claimed that the main effect of the Advisory Board system was to legitimate white rule in the eyes of the white rulers, this entailed recognizing at least some influence on the part of Board members. No white Councillor or official would have liked to think that the Advisory Board was simply a fraud. This moral need helped to sustain relations of mutual respect.

It is this reciprocity that formed the true social strength of paternalism. The proper rights and roles of 'natives' as well as 'native administrators' were based, to some degree, on the notion of mutual recognition. This leads us to ask some very difficult theoretical questions. If white officials recognized certain combinations of rights and rightlessness in blacks, how were they 'recognized' in return? Did blacks' perceptions of themselves and others contribute to maintaining the institutions, the network of recognition, which sustained the social order? Again, drawing on Genovese (1976:70-4), the answer is bound to be complex. I will hazard a hypothesis that is sufficiently vague to allow us to continue with the argument. It seems that the most viable kinds of unequal social and political order are those entailing a combination of fear, affection and the recognition of at least some human rights with which the 'ruling class' treat the 'dominated class'. Coercion, paternalism and a measure of liberty combine to allow the dominated group to feel some measure of dignity, protection, social stability and freedom. Feelings of anger and resentment indeed exist, but it is difficult for a subordinated class to challenge the entire social order. It is possible that a subordinated group can, for a long time, oscillate between anger at the power of their superiors, and trust that their own interests are protected by at least some members of the 'ruling order'. In addition, there are often important shared experiences such as those in
South Africa, between 'muzum' and domestic worker, between white farmer and black farmworker, between white local official and black township residents. Shared experiences, especially in the 'small things of life' (the birth of a child, the acquisition of a house, shared conversations) produce vague affinities that obstruct the development of a militant consciousness. This does not apply only to unequal race relations - it is also found in other situations of inherent inequality, such as schools, hospitals, and armies.

To put it in different terms, an unequal order is perpetuated by a mixture of rights and rightlessness. Such a paternalistic unequal order (even allowing for a substantial use of violence and coercion) can achieve a surprising measure of fatalistic or even positive legitimacy, especially if the ethos permeates all social institutions. To some extent, the 'dominated class' (in the non-Marxian sense of 'class') recognizes the right of the 'ruling class' to rule in some ways (again, the limits are vague). Such an order may indeed be challenged by articulate leaders within the dominated class, but the state can usually rely on some measure of consent, and consequently appropriate behaviour.

To the extent that rulers and ruled share certain notions of rights, obligations and appropriate behaviour, it can be said that they participate in sustaining a certain notion of community. To put it somewhat drastically, 'natives' and 'native administrators' created one another; they played the same game; they shared notions of proper limits, normal behaviour, and decency. 'Native administration' was an institution that encompassed rulers as well as ruled. This does not imply a full consensus; there certainly were always 'native' grievances; but it is unlikely that either rulers or ruled could have conceptualized a completely different order from the existing one. There are limits to our imagination, our 'horizon of the possible'.

These arguments are extremely hazardous, because it is very difficult to evaluate or study the extent of people's consciousness of themselves and of inequality, especially in the past. Let us, for the sake of the argument, backtrack one step, and claim that even if the paternalistic order did not give rise in the hearts of the dominated class to any loyalty whatsoever to the regime, the fact that the subordinated class acted as they did was interpreted by state and local officials as a recognition of their right to rule in certain sorts of ways. Such officials ignored certain black activities, repressed others, and regarded the rest as voluntary and sensible co-operation.
In general, the officials and councillors in East London took the paternalistic structures and relationships for granted, as an unquestioned fact of life. The way in which black poverty was perceived by officials, for example, indicated that it was a pressing issue. Black poverty represented a health hazard to whites, but it also indicated black suffering, which meant, therefore, that it should be ameliorated. (After inspecting the township, the East London Town Clerk reported that he had been 'most distressed to observe the pathetic lack of social and recreational amenities for the natives' (NAC:7/10/57).

Local officials and councillors felt, however, that the situation could be improved within the existing institutional context as long as more funding was provided by the central government. Improvements could be effected on a piecemeal basis. The existence of black poverty did not mean that either the political status of blacks, on the one hand, or municipal control on the other, had to be radically changed.

In summary, despite extreme black poverty and obvious black grievances, the Council saw its regime as 'normal' - 'natives' and 'native administrators' were healthy parts of the urban order. The virtual absence of formal political rights for blacks, and the substantial inroads on social rights, were not considered to be fundamental moral problems.

The East London Council wanted, in effect, to be given some autonomy and space from the central government to administer its natives in its own way. It was also comfortable with giving some space to the 'natives' to live their own lives, within the constraints of whites' lifestyle. Local government paternalism was an ambiguous combination of concern, control, self-interest, prescription and rights. The state was not perceived as a blanket to cover all parts of black civil society. The same kinds of unsystematic central government control, leaving pockets of freedom for local authorities, characterized the spirit of paternalist administration of the locations.

Despite many of the bureaucratic regulations that emanated from the Department of Native Affairs, local authorities and their native 'wards' preserved many pockets of freedom. The central government (especially the powerful Department of Native Affairs) tried to change the course of the state by means of legislation,
departmental circulars, and more informal methods within the Department. Persuasion, threats, hectoring and manipulation by DNA officials, were employed in an attempt to bring local authorities and their officials to heel. Partial successes were achieved, but it was a messy process. As an example, the central government's designs for the new Ciskei township of Mdantsane were repeatedly delayed and questioned by East London officials. They insisted on a proper survey of the site and they argued that Mdantsane residence should not deprive homeland residents of their rural land ownership. They constantly nagged the government to improve the transport facilities and also acted as a conduit for Mdantsane residents' grievances. In the sphere of influx control, a Department of Bantu Affairs and Development inquiry revealed that East London officials had been remarkably permissive in their application of influx control procedures.

In an extraordinary passage, Foucault captures this decentralized form of resistance:

"These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellion, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead, there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, converted, rampant or violent; still others that are quick to compromise..." (1978:15-6)

Although local authorities seldom openly resisted or opposed the central government, and usually implemented explicit instructions, by 1971 the central government had not yet succeeded in administering townships through a body of uniformly socialized apartheid officials. The Administration Board period was precisely such an attempt, and brought urban 'Bantu administration' directly under the control of the Department of Bantu Affairs and Development (DBAD)."
PART 4: VISIONS OF THE CITY SINCE 1970: THE SEARCH FOR
THE 'URBAN COMMUNITY'

4.1 The totalitarian view of the cities:
From 'Bantu Administration' to 'Constitutional Development'

It was only with the Administration Boards that the Department of Bantu Administration succeeded in removing the townships totally from municipal jurisdictions, and putting them under the authority of 'properly' trained and oriented officials who were responsible solely to the central government. From the 1950s the DBAD attempted to penetrate many of the pockets of freedom which had survived under the old municipal order. For very different reasons and motives, the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP), after 1983, took over much of this totalitarian style. In this process, local authorities were brought much more closely into the heart and ideological thrust of the state. Foucaultian 'discipline' took on much more consistent and far-reaching dimensions.

'Totalitarianism' refers to the purpose of a government to remake society as a whole, according to an idealistic vision (Coulter 1984:163). A totalitarian government embraces the 'political blanketing of the vast range of human activities, from intimate personal relations to philosophical beliefs' (Sowell 1980:307). It enters into every possible aspect of human life within the nation-state; as little as possible is left to individuals' discretion. Force can characterize this process, especially if resistance is encountered. The state, however, obviously prefers voluntary compliance, if not enthusiasm.

a) The Verwoerdians (circa 1950-1976)

The totalitarianism of the Verwoerdians was a response to the frustratingly ambiguous notions of 'community' espoused by paternalists. It offered a clear-cut definition of community (along ethnic lines), and it linked them to language and geographical ties. In this way, it was a more consistent answer to modernization, and offered, initially, a sense of coherence and direction.

Totalitarian states tend to emphasize a collective societal quest for an all-encompassing political 'solution', which would be based on a thorough and unquestioning application of a single 'key' to society. Tracing the causal origin of this totalitarian view would be a complex theoretical and empirical enterprise.
One useful contribution has been made by Seegers (1989), who outlined various characteristics of predominantly Afrikaans governance institutions: the de-emphasis of institutional autonomy, bureaucratization of small group dynamics, institutionalized co-ordination and submission to bureaucratic group authority. She attributes the strong force of Afrikaner group conformity to several causes, including a reaction to chronic Afrikaner disharmony, and the absence of universalist moral presumptions. Hence the notion of egalitarianism lacked a legitimacy and resonance within the Afrikaner community.

One consequence of this lack of universalist assumptions was the constant tendency to search for appropriate categories in terms of which the society should be divided. This was not merely a practical problem - it was a search for a social metaphysics, for morally appropriate and even theologically sanctioned communal boundaries. Whereas liberalism postulated the individual as the basic unit of society, Afrikaner nationalism responded with the collectivist notion of volkere. Whereas Seegers attributes this to the nature of moral thinking (the historical lack of universalist presumptions) amongst Afrikaners, this paper argues that the Afrikaners' collectivism should also be seen as a response to the social disarray caused by modernization and urbanization. Modern forms of 'discipline' had to be imposed - but the appropriate social categories were unclear.

The Afrikaner Nationalist version of ethnic communities entailed the institutionalizing of a viable conception of black rights and citizenship. It required a total remoulding of the ways in which the state's subjects lived, interacted, thought and felt about themselves. The state set out to create relationships of rights and obligations. For the Department of Native Administration and their creations, the Administration Boards, blacks' ambiguous citizenship and black poverty presented a moral and political problem. The solution had to be fundamental and far-reaching, because it had to reconcile separation with black political and economic progress. For the first time, blacks were conceived of as having political rights. Hence a political solution had to be found.

There was no doubt that the Verwoerdian state did perceive that blacks had rights, but the institutional framework within which these rights were constituted was still in the making. And it was the state's self-appointed task to create these institutions. In this task, opposition could not be tolerated. Coercion was morally
acceptable, because the end justified the means. Foucault quotes a French political reformer, writing in 1772:

‘Discipline must be made national. The state that I depic will have a simple, reliable, easily-controlled administration. It will resemble those huge machines, which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects...’ (Foucault 1979:169).

The Verwoerdian spirit was based on the initial simplicity of this totalitarian vision. The Administration Boards represented a new style of administration in South Africa. They were centrally-designed, large, regional bodies, directed and staffed by white officials committed to the notion of separate development. Their members soon developed an esprit de corps. Departmental loyalties, ministerial appointments, staff recruitment policies and the education of officials ensured that both the spirit and the letter of government policy were implemented effectively (Bekker and Humphries:18). Furthermore, the institutional form of the Boards tended to isolate their functionaries from other viewpoints, and from political criticism. All members of the Boards were appointed by the Minister of Bantu Affairs, and they were forbidden to disclose information concerning the Boards’ activities, except with the Boards’ consent or in accordance with a directive issued by the Minister (Vosloo et al, 1974).

The Administration Boards were totalitarian in the sense that they had to prevent and even reverse urbanization trends. In the process, they exerted stringent controls over the mobility of Africans by using extensive forms of policing, and monitored the population of black townships. Ethnic identities were ascribed to people which affected every detail of their lives, including residence, family life and schooling. For the Boards, ‘natives’ were now ‘Bantu’ - they were part of definite, organic, primordial ethnic units. The policy was not intended merely to be coercive. Even in 1956, Mr. Smuts of the DNA told the East London City Council that his Department favoured development adjacent to native reserves, because

‘it wished to give the native his right place in the sun. The native wished to enjoy the benefits of civilization to the same extent as the Europeans did, and therefore the Department’s opinion was that he be given every opportunity to develop to the fullest extent in these areas of South Africa which had from time immemorial been his homelands’ (NAC 10/56).

For the Boards, the political life of urban Africans also had to be remodeled. Black people had no intrinsic right to be in the urban areas and those, who in fact
lived there, were not considered to be an integral part of the city. DBAD and the Board believed that the central state had the right to remake cities according to official ideologies. The foundation for this view was laid in 1922, with the Stallard Doctrine, but it was only with the advent of the Administration Boards in 1971 that an enthusiastic corps of social engineers found an institutional base from which to implement their views. The apartheid era had begun in earnest, after fifty years of sluggish municipal compliance.

It was during this period that certain white local authorities seemed to reach the nadir of their moral existence as far as their relationship with black residents of their cities was concerned. East London municipal documents of the 1970s tell a tale of repeated municipal withdrawal from the burning issues facing the township. Part of the reason was that the language of paternalism, which they intuitively understood, was being used in new and disconcerting ways by the Department of Native Affairs. A traditional, intimate paternalism, based on face-to-face contact, was being harnessed to justify an abstract, distant control. Yet without a clear vision of their own, paternalist local officials found it difficult to evaluate the merits of the Department’s claims. Who could resist the Department’s claims when they were based on assumptions of ethnic progress and welfare? Because the rights which ‘natives’ had enjoyed under the paternalist rule of the local authorities had not been formalized, it was very difficult to defend them coherently. It was impossible for a Township Manager or a City Council to argue publicly that certain influx control transgressions, for example, had always been overlooked as a matter of right, according to some unstated mutual understandings between Council and township residents. Since these rights could not be defended (either because of their vague, informal nature, or because of their technical illegality), they did not survive for long against the totalitarian designs of the Verwoerdsians.

As a result, in East London, the removal of Duncan Village to distant Mdantsane was accepted by the Council as a fait accompli. After a few years, so much subsequent town planning was based on this assumption that the Council became one of the most fervent advocates of a very discredited and unpopular policy. It is this extraordinary interpretation of the needs of local blacks that makes the revival of local white interest in a collective city identity (outlined below) all the more remarkable.
b) Totalitarian consociationalism: The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning

When it became clear to the government after 1976, that urbanization could not be reversed, it became necessary to provide 'appropriate' political institutions within the townships. In 1977, Community Councils were introduced. They lacked significant powers, and the Administration Boards and the Minister retained full control over jurisdiction, size, and finances. The Minister could disband a Council if he believed that the need for it no longer existed. Demographic engineering was largely replaced by political restructuring, and the Department of Co-operation and Development set about creating entirely new forms of urban citizenship.

The difficulties faced by these new Black Local Authorities have been well documented. Financial weaknesses, lack of popular interest or legitimacy, overbearing white officials, and the lack of any economic base in the townships, created new demands on the government planners at central level. The totalitarian style of politics remained the same: social reality had to be moulded to fit into predetermined categories. There was very little space for civil society to develop its own principles and dynamics. Even those local authorities who wished to become non-racial were not allowed to do so. 'It does not matter how thoroughly the motivation is done' (Interview, DCDP official, 1986).

South Africa was to be replanned by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. Racial categories would be defined within all levels of government and social activity, in terms of the concept of 'own affairs'. The racial segments would come together as groups, and co-ordination of policies ('general affairs') would be done by the leaders or elites of these groups while leaving their followers largely untouched by multi-racial contact.

This system was a brave attempt to reconcile contradictory demands emanating from a recalcitrant white electorate and the increasingly assertive black disenfranchised. It is not clear whether many of the DCDP planners envisaged that the 'own/general affairs' system would last for a significant time. Extensive interviews did indicate that many senior planners saw the system as a transition phase to engineer institutionalized contact between whites and blacks, on the basis of some sort of equality for the first time since the 1950s. In this sense, the progressive nature of the Department's innovations must not be underestimated.
The Regional Services Councils were the paradigmatic cases of the DCDP's approach. They combined coercion, manipulation and persuasion. Rightwing local white authorities had no option but to participate, and RSC meetings were designed to maximize consensus and create an ethos of co-operation and mutual respect. In addition, the RSCs were the first institutions to formally break through the old Stallardist principle of financial self-sufficiency for black townships. In this way, the DCDP attempted to bring into being some of a new multi-racial community ethos.

In keeping this delicate show on the road, central constitutional planning was vital. The planners felt that they could not wait for multi-racial institutions to grow spontaneously out of people's social interactions. Important new bodies, such as the appointed provincial authorities, the Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs, and the Local Government Training Board, were established to integrate and orchestrate local government developments. In this era there was again room for black political rights, but instead of the homelands, the Black Local Authorities were to be the appropriate locus of political citizenship for blacks. There was also another dimension: the system was presented as one that would enhance efficiency in decision-making, financing and service delivery. The technicism of the planners was pitted against the ethnic metaphysics of the rightwing and the non-racial mobilization of the black opposition.

The approach of both the Verwoerdians and the DCDP to social restructuring can be regarded as centrally-designed attempts to come to terms with the thorough dislocations of modernization and urbanization. Both were attempts to impose on society a 'discipline', a form of social control which diminishes autonomous power of individuals and groups and establishes new productive categories (Foucault 1979:138). In the history of South Africa, it was the successive Afrikaner Nationalist governments that saw South African society through the first real wave of urbanization. In any modernizing society, the need for 'disciplinary' categories is paramount, and the Verwoerdians duly offered their ethnic solution. Their scheme came closest to Bentham's 'Panopticon', as described by Foucault:

"The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities" (1979:201).
The theme of the Panopticon - at once surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization, isolation and transparency... (1979:249).

This disciplinary process facilitates permanent surveillance and evaluation by central controlling bodies, according to a pre-determined 'norm' which in South Africa would have great implications for the autonomy of the cities.

Foucault's model also explains why the National Party government invariably found black people who were prepared to co-operate with their designs. In addition to those corrupt individuals who simply wanted to promote their own material benefits, there were people who wanted to empower their own communities, even though they were aware of the defects of the system. As Foucault notes, "...The inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers." This is the true 'empowerment' of modern society: we are given power to the extent that we allow ourselves to be defined by disciplinary institutions. The problem with the Nationalist use of discipline was that these promises of empowerment were not really credible. They offered a disciplinary grid for society which paradoxically ran counter to the very processes of urbanization and modernization which they set out to control. True 'discipline' radically restructures people's identity and individuality, and thereby elicits enthusiastic support from the members of the community ("In prisons, the criminal loves his warder; and he loves him because he is gentle and sympathetic" (Foucault 1979:239). This claim can be extended to schools, universities and hospitals). The totalitarianism of the DBAD and the DCDP merely remained an elaborate mechanism of coercion.

c) Totalitarianism, cities and constitutive theory

The totalitarian approach to government has implications for the nature of subjects and for the nature of cities. From the Verwoerd to the Heunis eras, the state attempted to remould the nature of citizenship. For Verwoerd and the DBAD, recognition of a political subject required the prior recognition of ethnic organic entities. Bantu administration implied the existence of the 'Bantu'. The former was there to help the latter develop its own identity. 'Bantu administration', in essence, was not only more coercive than 'native administration'; it was also philosophically more intrusive into civil society. It had to remake the 'native', a subordinate in a colonial society, into a 'Bantu' who would
belong to an ethnic, organic social order. In this way, the Bantu could be recognized as equal, although separate from, the white social order. The ambiguities (domination/affection; rights/rightlessness; neglect/provision of facilities) of paternalism would be removed.

The DCDP planners had a consociational vision of citizenship. Whereas the Verwoerd era postulated several societies in South Africa, the DCDP believed in one society with several internally cohesive groups. Formal citizenship would be derived from membership of one country, but real ties of loyalty would bind people into their groups. The DCDP had stepped back from the goal of creating 'Bantu'. As the brief period of 'plural relations' in the late 1970s became the consociational era of the 1980s, the DCDP became reconciled to the notion of blacks' identity qua blacks. The black pillar joined the white, 'coloured' and Indian pillars as the four main constituent parts of society. Institutions would be arranged accordingly, in order to provide for the political 'aspirations' of each group. Each town would have three or four local authorities; each RSC would consist of racially-defined urban committees; there would be four organizations representing local authorities, who together would constitute the consociational Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs.

The urge to resolve the political identity of blacks meant that the city could not be recognized as a political order in its own right. Since the cities were populated by people of all race groups, the need to establish the 'correct' racial order had to take precedence over the city's sense of corporate identity. From 1971 onwards, the cities were also politically redesigned. The Boards destroyed the notion that the black 'locations' had any interests or characteristics in common with the rest of the urban areas. Each town or city experienced an institutional 'Berlin Wall', with the black township administered by regional, white-staffed institutions while the white portion of the cities proceeded with a western form of democratic city government. The notion of a city-wide corporate identity was systematically broken down. For the DBAD and their agents the Boards, cities as such did not have an integrity which should be respected. Strictly speaking, the totalitarian view offers no scope for a 'local state' at all, since it would constitute a power base from which the central state could be threatened.

A totalitarian state also has a specific attitude to knowledge and information. It localizes wisdom within the state, in order to explain and justify its detailed
interventions in society (Sowell 1980:308). Opponents are characterized as subversive or as ignorant. Even in the 1950s, the beginnings of this attitude could be seen in the DNA's dealings with the East London City Council on the issue of the planning of Mdantsane. Whereas the Council wanted to research the topographical, social and economic factors before launching the Mdantsane project, the DNA officials thought that these precautions were unnecessary, for they had a formula to calculate housing needs ('One location plot for each plot in a residential township and three acres in the location for every one acre used in industry' (NAC 11/5/55)). In Foucault's terms, the DNA could impose its 'norm' - the power of apparent scientific expertise to impose standards on communities too confused to present a coherent opposition. 'It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish' (1979:184).

In the era of the DCDP, centralized scientific research by well qualified social scientists and planners provided the perspectives which justified the new order. The Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs studied municipal voters’ qualifications, criteria for viable local authorities, municipal finance and personnel issues and the National Training Board assumed responsibility for the dissemination of knowledge to the fledgling black local authorities. The spontaneous suggestions of local authorities such as Port Alfred (1985), East London (1986), Pietermaritzburg (1987) and Cape Town (since 1972) were ignored or forbidden.

The Nationalist Government's totalitarianism did not only have implications for the autonomy of the cities. It also affected the very identity of the state. As I said earlier, the state is not an object, with an autonomous identity. Rather it is the relationship created by its component parts, the way in which officials recognize themselves and others, and how they are recognized in turn. The transition from Verwoerdianism to Constitutional Planning was not simply a question of strategy. The transition involved a fundamental redefinition of what the state was about. For the Verwoerdians, it could still play the role of a 'father', albeit in a much more coercive way than erstwhile paternalism. The state would, from on high, define a new metaphysic: it would create people's identities and produce ethnic communities, and would then lead these communities to advancement. The assumption was that this new order, this constellation of tribes, was an internally consistent and practical goal.
The planners of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning employed totalitarian methods, but with a very different self-understanding. The failure of the Verwoerdians' policies was all too apparent, and black mobilization was making demands for equality and liberty at a time when the white electorate was still insisting on racial segregation. The planners were faced with the dilemma of recognizing equality, liberty and segregation simultaneously.

The only way they could do this was to restructure the notion of 'community'. Whereas the Verwoerdians believed that different ethnic groups' interests were quite distinct, the DCDP built an entire local system (including a new tier of government, the RSCs), on the notion of shared material interests. The different racially-defined 'groups' would come together not because of any intrinsic metaphysical bonds, but because they all needed cheap water, electricity and sewerage. Only through bulk service provision, and hence through co-operation, could this goal be achieved. Furthermore, it was now considered to be in the interests of local whites that township residents shared the same infrastructural facilities which all Westerners desire. Hence whites could be taxed to provide these amenities to their black neighbours. This was an important step in acknowledging the interdependent nature of South African society.

The planners were still totalitarian in that they felt called upon to restructure society for its own good. Yet their self-definition was, nonetheless, very different. They were not wise patriarchs dispensing metaphysical wisdoms; they saw themselves as modern, qualified, progressive people, and wanted to be recognized as such. They were the midwives of the new community, with new forms of solidarity based on equality and liberty. They were not defining 'tribal societies' to which they would never belong; instead, they were creating modern, inclusive urban communities (albeit on the basis of race) in which they themselves would live. Their intellectual roots in systems theory encouraged this sense of being part of the new order. As they saw it, the state was not a distant despotic patriarch forcing divisions amongst people; rather, it was a facilitator, moving amongst the people and promoting new interactions. Although these designs never gained credibility in the townships, for this totalitarian approach inevitably undermined liberty, the DCDP era was crucial because fraternity mattered to government officials in a new way. They may also have contributed to preparing white urban communities for a new vision of the city.
It was precisely the totalitarian impulse that provoked widespread black opposition to white domination. The ambiguities of paternalism had tended to disguise and humanize relations of inequality. The Verwoerdian dream, in contrast, had very little credibility amongst black people. Whatever positive rights it would confer, it first required the taking away of existing rights. This, not only caused physical suffering, but it also destroyed communities and offended people's dignity and humanity.

One response to resistance was the DCDP's version of totalitarianism. The garrison state was another response, and entailed a different notion of rights, of subjects, and of the state. The National Security Management System (NSMS) brought city government within the ambit of a new sector of the state, with its own complex garrison state mentality which combined coercion with social and economic improvements.

On the one hand, the garrison state has important coercive features. According to Lasswell, the elites in a garrison state value power enough to resort to large-scale coercion when they regard such a strategy to be useful to the maintenance of their ascendancy or survival (Lasswell 1962). Garrison state elites usually feel under threat, and this has important implications for their view of what measures are appropriate. In South Africa during the 1980's, the threat was largely seen as an external, communist one, although fed by legitimate black socio-economic grievances. I will outline a few characteristics of the garrison state perspective as they have been applied to South Africa.

First, the NSMS emphasized the co-ordination of governmental functions to the extent that it was difficult to tell them apart. Economic, political, constitutional, ideological and welfare issues all formed part of the definition of 'security' (Swilling and Phillips 1989:137). The traditional tasks of civilian city government became an intrinsic part of the central government's task of maintaining national security. The provision of infrastructure and housing was seen to be important for countering the influence of 'subversive' groups. The institutional boundaries of local authorities became amenable to security intervention.

Second, the NSMS actually helped to create and sustain city governments, especially black local authorities. This usually entailed removing popular leaders and sowing discord by diversionary tactics.
Third, the gathering of intelligence and information is a key characteristic of a garrison state. Joint Management Centre personnel met regularly with municipal officials and had access to municipal information. Local authorities did not respond uniformly. Cape Town City Council simply refused to assist the local JMC; other councillors and officials were unimpressed by the JMC’s vaunted purposes; while a third group participated enthusiastically (Interviews, Eastern Cape, 1986).

Finally, the discourse of security penetrated the thinking of local authorities. Discussions on ‘civil defence’ were prominent in the two leading local government journals, Local Government and Munisipale en Openbare Dienste.

The importance of the NSMS, however, did not only concern its coercive role, although that was very extensive. The JMC system was extremely important in the history of South Africa because it was the first institution that recognized that black ‘unrest’ stemmed, in part, from genuine grievances; that these grievances had to be remedied as a matter of urgency; and that the money of the white taxpayer should be applied liberally to black townships. For the first time since 1970, a central government agency acknowledged that blacks were entitled to white resources, and that redistribution was urgently required. This was indeed a new approach to urban black policy. While money was clearly applied in an attempt to legitimize white rule, it did imply a new thinking about the legitimate claims of blacks. It was a new definition of ‘community’: reasonable blacks and whites formed one community; outsiders were not defined ethnically or racially, but ideologically. Since the situation was defined as a war, these outsiders were the enemy, and should be eliminated or suppressed. The same paternalist dialectic of protection and control informed the JMC’s, but in the most stark form possible.

Yet while the JMCs acknowledged blacks’ rights to be in the cities and to have decent living standards, it was not a recognition of fundamental moral problems with the South African political order. Blacks’ grievances could be bought off, because blacks were seen essentially as consumers: their rights to material things had to be recognized, but their rights to full and equal political participation were ignored. And the JMCs certainly did not recognize blacks’ rights to decide for themselves what kinds of political institutions they wanted.

For politicized black township residents who were mobilized to resist both the Verwoerdian and the DCDP political solutions, the JMC’s position did not have much credibility. Although improved township conditions were important, that was not what the
struggle was about. The people who had rejected a 'Bantu' political identity were no longer
willing to be grateful for material improvements (which might well have been the case in
the paternalistic era of 'native administration'). The successive states of emergency, and
the growing presence of soldiers in the townships produced a de facto situation of war. The
NSMS had faced, and also sustained, its mirror image: the 'liberated zones' and the street
committee system. Henceforth, the militarized state and the comrades would define and
sustain one another, for each provided the material with which the other made sense of
what was happening.

In this process, the whites in the cities increasingly became helpless onlookers.
Ignorant of conditions in the townships, out of touch with black perceptions, thoroughly
intimidated by the two decades of totalitarian central government rule, they watched the
growing civil war with alarm. Especially in the Eastern Cape, the school boycotts, township
violence, army presence, and finally the consumer boycotts, made white leaders worried
and eager to do something constructive. The following section will outline the implications
of this revival of civic assertiveness.

4.3. The emergence of a corporate city identity: Liberal
democratic, corporatist and populist perspectives

By 1987, several white local authorities had expressed the desire for greater
autonomy from government supervision. Not only did they want to be allowed to
participate in the upgrading of black townships, but they wanted the local community to be
given the right to define its own political structures and boundaries. In the context of
government-instituted racism, the demand of various municipalities such as Port Alfred
(1985-6), East London (since 1986), Pietermaritzburg (since 1986), Cape Town (since 1972) and
Swellendam (1987) for a non-racial city government appeared strangely radical (Atkinson
1989). This is not surprising, because it was a fundamental challenge to the totalitarian and
militaristic perspectives outlined above. These initiatives also all move some way towards
superseding the paternalist ethos, although none of them succeed in providing a fully
satisfying alternative. In summary, while all these initiatives do propose (different
versions of) 'liberty' and 'equality', the problem of 'fraternity' has not yet been seriously
addressed.

These local initiatives took on very different forms. I will outline three kinds,
which were, in some towns, closely interrelated. First, in certain towns, the councils
adopted a very straightforward liberal democratic position. In Cape Town, for example,
the Bloomberg Committee (1981) advocated a local government without discrimination on the basis of race. It was the right of any person who contributed to the finances and development of the city through ownership or occupation of property to have full say in its government. On 29 May 1986, the Pietermaritzburg Council adopted a motion rejecting the notion of a divided city and accepting the ideal of a multi-racial council. Port Alfred and East London (1985-6) expressed interest in a single municipality, but did not address the question of a local franchise. These initiatives can be described as ‘liberal’ because they conceptualize freedom in fairly individualist terms, viz. the recognition of people’s rights. Proponents of this position are very aware of socio-economic inequalities, but have not made economic justice the main moral priority.

Another emerging perspective can be termed both ‘corporatist’ and ‘technicist’ because it involves the business sector and municipal officialdom very prominently. In terms of the political principle of ‘corporatism’, prominent functional elites in society (industry, commerce, organized labour and other special interest groups) engage with the state on an on-going basis, and government policies become negotiated programmes of action to which all these sectors share a commitment. In several towns, there has been a new meeting of minds between local commercial, industrial and political elites. For example, in the case of the ‘Pietermaritzburg 2 000 Initiative’, and in Port Alfred in 1985, business leaders expressed great interest in local government and municipal planning. The Pietermaritzburg 2 000 Initiative, especially, was predicated on the idea that all local interest groups should be involved in municipal planning processes. Through a complex set of Action Groups, the space has been created for the public to participate in the strategic planning of housing, employment, municipal finance and the provision of social amenities. Out of this initiative has grown a renewed enthusiasm for a single non-racial local authority, because it would greatly facilitate the planning process. This initiative has also tapped the frustration of local officials towards fragmented institutions, a frustration which has been expressed in many cities.

The technicist perspective is significant because it emphasizes the city’s economic and productive role. Furthermore, it envisages a closer relationship between local government and local economic sectors. Like the European mercantile cities before the advent of the nation-state, business elites in South Africa are envisaging our cities as places where the business class can imprint their own political and economic principles onto the city-concept. The Port Alfred Chamber of Commerce, for example, urgently wanted to establish an industrial park to stimulate businesses and create much-needed jobs. While it advocated an economic strategy to increase tourism and provide jobs, it also had a
definitive political vision: 'No real progress in stabilizing and normalizing relations between the different peoples can be made unless discrimination, both politically and in other fields, is removed...' (Memorandum, October 1986).

Ironically, this perspective, which is decidedly non-populist and technicist, offers the most effective reasoning for re-establishing fraternity, since the entire community's participation in official decision-making would make planning more reliable and effective. Unfortunately, few of the 'technicist' initiatives has yet succeeded in bringing progressive black organizations into their structures. A notable exception is the negotiation process between the Soweto People's Delegation (SPD) and various government bodies and official service organizations. The Soweto negotiations grew out of the protest politics after 1986, with the Soweto Civic Association using the rent boycott as its most effective weapon. In demands, however, never aroused the sympathies of its powerful white neighbour, the Johannesburg City Council, which was controlled by the National Party. After 1988 the Soweto People's Delegation (SPD) first turned to the Soweto City Council's officials, then to the Soweto Council itself, and finally involved a wide array of government and private organizations. These include Escom, NAFCOC, the Urban Foundation, and the Development Bank (Planact 1979:7). The Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) has also been a key bargaining partner.

Unlike the demands of civic associations in the Eastern Cape, which focused on local government reunification, the SPD's demands were primarily economic. Rent arrears had to be written off, the housing stock handed over to the residents, the services had to be upgraded, service charges had to be affordable, and a single tax base instituted for Johannesburg and Soweto. The SPD's methods and demands created a double bind for the local and provincial authorities: at a time when the rent boycott was biting deeply into municipal revenues, the SPD demanded vast expenditure on township upgrading. Unlike Eastern Cape towns, the rent boycott in such a large city compelled reluctant white institutions to negotiate. The Soweto negotiations can be regarded as a primitive form of corporatist government, for it promises to be an ongoing process of bargaining amongst the leaders of functional interest groups. As one reporter wrote, 'The TPA conceded that the SPD is going to have a say in the running of Soweto' (Weekly Mail, 6/10/89).

Finally, UDF-oriented black mobilization has produced a populist perspective of South African cities. For most of this century, black protest has been focused on the national level. During the 1980s, however, several civic associations have begun to emphasize the reunification of the cities. Their approach, however, has a much more
The populist notion of democracy than that envisaged by most local white elites: it is a perspective that emphasizes the 'people', the community, and the masses as a real and objective unity, representing solidarity and sharing of interests. Mobilizational action, such as stayaways, demonstrations and consumer boycotts have been appropriate modes of political activity. It may, however, under certain circumstances entail the coercion of reluctant individuals. The right to disagree has not been a prominent part of this approach.

It is remarkable that even these modern initiatives have echoes of paternalism. The Eastern Cape initiatives of 1985-6 show this most clearly. The UDF-affiliated civic associations set the goal of reincorporation into the white municipalities. Very little was said about the franchise or about democracy. The most urgent goal was the takeover of the townships by white local officials, as opposed to the Administration Boards. In the smaller towns of Cape Province, especially, it appears that the white local authorities represent in some ways a gentler, more benign urban order which existed before the Administration Boards took over in 1970. In other communities, however, these echoes of paternalism will be short-lived, for the empowerment of communities, through their organizations, will henceforth challenge any benign condescension from the white community. The Mass Democratic Movement has also taken a strong position in favour of full political and economic equality.

The populist vision of the cities has, to some extent, addressed the matter of 'fraternity'. The initiatives re-awakened vague notions of affinity and belonging in local communities. In certain communities, the issue was put clearly in terms of an economic need to co-operate, or technicist planning imperatives, but it seems that the reintegration of the cities has taken on a symbolic role, involving a recognition of blacks by whites as equal citizens. Progressive community organizations seem very aware that the social fabric of the urban community must be knitted together again. Yet the populist approach has not seriously defined the 'urban community' of the future. To what extent will wealthy white communities be responsible for the material welfare of black neighbourhoods? Can it seriously be expected that working class whites and blacks will establish a sense of belonging to the same community? Will the sense of belonging not be limited to the middle class, who share the same life style? Is the establishment of 'community' at odds with individual liberty and ethnic pluralism? In the surge towards liberty and equality, these questions have not been addressed.

In addition to these moral issues there will also be the practical demographic one: Where should the physical boundaries of the cities be drawn? Should the growing,
impoverished squatter settlements on Durban's periphery be considered to be part of 'Durban'? An interesting case of different definitions of 'the city' is taking place in East London right now. A business-oriented initiative defines 'East London' as the white sector, including Duncan Village which is situated right next to the white areas. In contrast, an ANC-oriented initiative not only includes the small towns north and south of East London, but also the huge Ciskeian city of Mdantsane, as well as various rural areas.

Significantly, all these initiatives postulate a new central-local relationship involving much greater local autonomy. If the city has a natural coherent solidarity, it is the appropriate locus for government. This sentiment also harks back to paternalism. Local communities make the claim, 'We know ourselves', but now it has transcended the inequalities of paternalism. The future urban order will have to be built on a very different distribution of power.
CONCLUSION

In South African race relations, different eras have been characterized by different forms of dominant-subordinate relationships. Different white sectors had different perceptions of the nature of blacks as subjects in the political order. The notion of 'community' has been a very unstable one in South African cities. It is this fundamentally unresolved problem which has produced the contradictory nature of the South African state: on the one hand it is internally fragmented, with different sectors at different times pursuing divergent ideals of 'community'; while on the other it is extensively intervening in civil society to construct some form of communal order.

South Africa is now stumbling towards a set of political institutions where all individuals will have formally recognized full human rights. Liberty and equality are the key questions being addressed right now. Yet the very complex issue of fraternity has not been clearly addressed. The cities seem one forum where new forms of community, based on new modes of reciprocal recognition, can be played out, against a backdrop of shared interests in the prosperity of the city. In the process, it seems, as our dismembered cities move towards a new sense of fraternity they may provide a suitable forum where full citizenship is finally defined and achieved.

NOTES:

1 This cannot be reduced to the theoretical notions of capitalism or class. Modern socialist countries also have to go through this phase of reconstituting of society on 'disciplining' foundations, including surveillance, utility, individualism, ranking, and meritocracies.

2 It is at this point that the unexpected intersection between Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt takes place. Both theorists want to move away from the individualist notion of power, in which A exercises power over B to the extent that A gets B to do what B would not otherwise do. In contrast, both Foucault and Arendt look on power as intrinsically communal, collectivist, or as an aspect of social solidarity. Both see the power of solidarity as inherently positive, productive and creative, being the essential precondition for any social action at all. This contrasts with the individualist notion of power which sees it as a limitation on individual freedom. But whereas Foucault associates solidarity with control, Arendt associates it with voluntary and normative cooperation. This paper, in effect, utilizes both perspectives. 'Race relations' in South Africa have played an important role in the construction of people's self-definition; this has been simultaneously a coercive and a co-operative endeavour.

3 One way of doing this is to study semiotics and discourse. According to M. Gottdiener (1986), the socio-semiotic approach analyses cultural phenomena as if they are systems of signs or symbols. Phenomena have, in addition to their literal, denotative meanings, also connotative codes, i.e. socially constructed values or ideologies. These are constructed around a system of differences: concepts only have meaning to the extent that they differentiate one thing from another. For example, certain kinds of housing indicate to people that the residents are high or low status, politically conservative or progressive, socially conformist or 'alternative'. The city can be described as a text, containing messages produced by
builders, architects, businessmen, squatters and planners. Objects can also encapsulate several discourses simultaneously. Various groups in the city can 'read' different messages from urban artifacts. The recognition of the appropriate 'place' of a person will draw on aesthetic, political and rational discourses.

It is preferable not to use the term 'ideology' here. Not only is ideology a very complex concept, but it also has an in-built pejorative sense. To describe someone's ideas as 'ideological' often implies that those ideas are false, mystifying, or concealing power struggles. The holder of such ideas is implicitly being accused of bad faith. There is surely a role for 'ideologie-kritik' in political analysis, but for the moment, we will put it aside.

Harry Bloom's Transvaal Episode (1956) portrays an black township's resentment of an official whose enthusiastic adherence to rules and regulations was unbearable after the more tolerant and benign neglect of his predecessor. Mr. du Toit did not know that he had transgressed certain implicit rights and understandings. In this, he can be regarded as representing the bureaucratic and totalitarian Verwoerodian spirit of the 1960s.

I am indebted to John Mason for this useful term.

I am indebted to Bill Potapchuk for this reference.
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