SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This paper is an attempt to present a survey of the sociologist’s concerns in economic development. It had to be short in terms of the time available for both its preparation and its presentation. A general overview of the theory of social change is followed by somewhat more detailed discussions of the labour force and the bureaucracy as two major factors in economic development and the family as an area of particular interest in terms of the consequences of economic development.

Ample references are intended to allow the reader to follow up any particular issue that has aroused his interest. A few particularly recommended titles have been singled out with asterisks.
The theory of social change

"For the moment, partial theories appear to be the best that can be expected, whether in terms of the sources of changes or the directions of their course through time."
(Moore 1963:44)

No human society has ever been static. No society is in a complete state of equilibrium within itself, nor is there a permanent equilibrium between a society and its natural environment, nor is any society ever completely cut off from any contact with other societies. We are nevertheless justified in characterising the present world in terms of change, because the transition from a poor to a developing economy involves major changes over a short span of time:

"... modernization is a "total" transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the type of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced", economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World."
(Moore 1963:89)

The most important characteristic of industrial societies is that in major areas of social life change has become organized and institutionalized (Moore 1963:110). It is in this sense that they can be called developed. I would therefore argue, against Moore (1963:41, 106), that we might use a transition model of change: carrying on one axis the cumulative incidence of changes in a given society and time on the other.

That societies welcome such major changes sooner or later is no longer in doubt. Levy (1952) discusses some sources of the vulnerability of the structures of relatively nonindustrialized societies to those of highly industrialized societies. Parsons (1956:109) states categorically:

"In value terms, the striking fact is that virtually the whole world has, within our time, come to assign to economic productivity a very high value indeed."

In fact economic development is not always seen as an end in itself. It is quite universal for people to prefer food to hunger, health to sickness, physical comfort to suffering, and life to death. However, the acceptance of Western medicine and the consequent reduction in - primarily infant - mortality is a major agent directing societies towards the necessity of economic development because of the strain it creates on existing economic resources. Similarly it can be argued that the ultimate aim is not economic development per se, but more often something else that may be called social development. The major difficulty has been how to make attempts at measurement and other methods of economic development less subject to political constraints on economic planning: only certain levels of child mortality, illiteracy, unemployment, urbanisation, inequality in income distribution, etc are considered acceptable.

The interdependence between different parts of society is of considerable interest to sociologists: it is the basis of the functional approach and of crucial importance in a discussion of social change. Changes in one sector, eg the introduction of industrialization in the economic sector, can be seen to effect changes in another sector, eg the breakup of an extended kinship system in the family sector. A change in religion, the protestant reform, has probably contributed to a change in economics, the advent of the Industrial Revolution. At the same time a change in one sector does usually not affect all other sectors of society: though all parts of society are interdependent, there is a certain "looseness" in the system.
Are certain parts of the system more independent than others? Moore (1963:75) suggests that aesthetic canons and forms and strictly super-empirical components of religious belief are relatively autonomous. This would have two implications: relatively high and long insulation from the effects of other systemic changes, but, correlatively, fairly "easy" autonomous changes, including those of external origin, owing to the mgser links to the balance of the system.

Here we meet with a further issue: given interdependence between sectors, how long does it take for changes in one sector to affect other sectors? In 1962 Ogden emphasized that changes in material conditions (especially in the physical environment) and in things (including houses, factories, raw materials, and other objects) often outdistance the ways of using those things and of adapting to these conditions. The ways of adjustment may be called the adaptive culture, which includes wholly adaptive elements, such as technical values, and partly adaptive elements, such as the folklore and mores. Ogden called the period of delay the culture lag. An example of such a lag is the population explosion: the fact that after the drop of the mortality rate the birth rate continues high for some time. Davis (1922) gave an excellent discussion of the institutional patterns supporting high fertility in present societies.

In a discussion of social change in economic development it is tempting to distinguish between factors conducive to economic development and consequences of economic development. While we follow this distinction here it should not be interpreted rigidly. Changes in the family structure usually interpreted as a consequence of economic development may also be seen as an agent facilitating it (Goode 1963:247ff).

Following Moore (1963:53ff) we may enumerate a number of what he calls conditions of economic development in terms of values, institutions, organization, and activation. The prime value, the commitment to economic development, is no longer an idealistic value in the instrumental steps that touch on other, inconsistent value premises, it is both cognitive, the necessity of change is not appreciated, and normative, the sacrifice of such values is resisted (Feldman & Moore 1960:6). Sproul (1936) gives a number of instructive case studies of the experiences made with the introduction of specific changes to different societies: from the introduction of the wagon to the Papago Indians of Southern Arizona to the development of democratic leadership in the Micronesian Islands.

Institutional conditions of economic development are obvious in the economic sphere: the factors of production must be mobile. This necessitates clearly recognized claims to scarce resources and an effective market where these can be exchanged. It further requires a labor force with a high degree of occupational and geographical mobility and a certain degree of social mobility. We will discuss this at greater length later. In the political sphere political stability is frequently seen as another institutional prerequisite.

Specialization and the mass production and mass servicing that make it possible necessitate elaborate organizational structures. Specialized and Hierarchically governed bureaucracies become predominant. We will return to these.

The most difficult issue concerns individual motivation. Weber's "The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism" is only mentioned here to stress that he established the links between the change in religion and the advent of capitalism through a number of separate variables. Lerner (1955:495) stresses the
importance of empathy, the capacity to see oneself in the other follow's situation, as the mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world. But know among economists is Hagen's (1962) use of the concept of the innovative personality. McClelland (1951) and associates have conducted extensive studies dealing with the unconscious need for achievement. Kahl (1965) discusses a number of studies that measure achievement orientation at the level of conscious belief systems. Recently a new approach was made by Levine (1966) who analyzed dreams in different ethnic groups in Nigeria. While this is undoubtedly an extremely important area it needs perhaps reminding that different demands are made on different members of society and that consequently different motivation as between personnel holding different positions in society may be highly functional. This may be one reason while immigrant labour can so well contribute to economic expansion in developed countries.

Given the required profound changes in major spheres of society and individual, important consequences of economic development are to be expected. I can do no more than mention a few. A major area of change is in kinship relations and I will deal with these in some detail later. Except for early child rearing, that by some authors is seen to be so crucial for later motivation, education takes largely place outside the family. At the same time its share in manpower, both teachers and students, is greatly increased: formal education becomes the norm not only for children but also for adolescents, and we expect to see the present the emergence of further training and retraining for adults as a general feature.

Another sphere of considerable change, and an area of considerable political sensitivity is in social stratification. The old upper class may have its offspring trained in the promising new careers. But usually elements of low class origin gain also access to these educational opportunities. While both old and new criteria of stratification are accepted in a society, but individuals rank differently according to the criteria used, existing systems of social stratification may be said to exist.

Mobility of labour does mean rural-urban migration, even though there is no necessary link between industrialization and urbanization (Kuczynski 1965). In fact much of the development in the poor countries of today will have to be rural to start with. Etherington (1965) has shown for Kenya that for some time to come the rural areas will even have to absorb part of the natural population increase. For sociological study urban areas are attractive in two respects: they may be seen as problem areas (housing, urban planning, unemployment, prostitution, crime), but they may also be the first to indicate the trend of change in the different spheres of a given society (Eugler 1956:12ff). I have recently initiated a survey among blue-and white-collar in Kampala.

But don't we know already the end result? Does not economic development necessarily lead to a specific type of society? Lerner (1958:VIII) puts it succinctly:

"The "Western model" is only historically Western; sociologically it is global."

Korr et al (1960:288ff) think that the future belongs to pluralistic industrialism, a society that appears to resemble closely contemporary American society.

There is no argument about the fact that the existence of an industrial system affects the way in which poor countries attempt to reach economic development:

"... the presence of an industrial economy in some parts of the world presents a central set of conditions under which
any nation which is a participant in the world community must exist and develop and... it presents a model which others can follow and a resource on which, in varying ways, they can draw." (Parsons 1958:123)

However, the goal that these countries aim for is clearly not Westernization, nor "Russification" or "Japonization" for that matter. As far as the Western model is concerned, Parsons (1958) argues convincingly that economic development in the 20th century will not take the same way as the original development of industrialism in the West, in particular with reference to the role of political authority. Furthermore, our age may have alternatives available: ideologies may play the role we attribute to the Protestant ethic in the development of the West. Finally, we may assume that, just as economic development has been achieved under optimal conditions, in all instances certain aspects of a culture's past must have acted as obstacles; e.g., the heritage of feudalism in much of the West. Similarly, any country's past, as well as ideologies imported from outside, will influence her attempts at implementing a policy of economic growth.

References: The theory of social change


Guglar, Josef 1966 Measuring urbanization. Paper read at the 6th World Congress of Sociology, Vienna.


Levine, Robert 1966 Dreams and deeds.
Levy, Marion J. 1952 Some sources of the vulnerability of the structures of relatively nonindustrialized societies to those of highly industrialized societies. Pages 113-125 in Roselitz, Bert P. (editor), The progress of underdeveloped areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Committed Labour

It is on labour questions that the relevance of sociological research is most easily perceived. In colonial days numerous studies were commissioned by the authorities. They had two main concerns: the supply of labour to employers, the effects of labour migration on traditional societies. Schapera’s (1947) study, commissioned 1943 in what was then Bechuanaland Protectorate, provides the classic in this field.

Wage labour, usually at a distance from the home area, means a new way of life for peasant societies. It first of all requires an appreciation of the wages to be earned, a commitment to the market in the terms of Feldman & Moore (1950). This however is not sufficient: traditional values will have to be sacrificed and wages must be seen to warrant this. In other words a normative element is involved.

In the early days of Western penetration many traditional societies refused wage labour and forced labour was frequently resorted to. A more indirect way of eliciting labour was the imposition of taxes that had to be paid in cash, that is people were forced into a commitment to the market. In most cases this also meant a commitment to wage labour as no other sources of cash were available.

Quite frequently however, forced labour was used not because labour would not have been available otherwise, but because labour was not forthcoming at the wages rates and under the work conditions offered. A good example is the kagera system that was operated in Uganda from 1908 to 1922 (Feldman 1957). Already at the end of the last century and before the introduction of the Hut Tax with the signing of the Uganda Agreement of 1900, the prestige of European goods in the eyes of the Baganda was such that there was a considerable readiness for voluntary, paid work. However, the Baganda took to cotton-growing within the next few years and a shortage of labour resulted. It was then that the kagera system was introduced mainly to induce their people to work for the usual wages, for at least one month in each year - hardly a way of establishing an experienced labour force.

In later years the problem in Uganda, as in many other underdeveloped countries, became one not of the unavailability of labour but of high rates of turnover and absenteeism. Urban unskilled workers have to leave their families behind in the rural areas because they lack family housing, safety wages and social security. Wives brought to urban areas tend to be consumers only because the earning opportunities for women are limited. Furthermore, virtually the entire labour force continues to have landrights in rural areas. For them the farm income is part of the family income no less than the wages earned in employment. At the same time they can usually not obtain adequate compensation for vacating a farm.

1 Contrast the different situation in West Africa where no much of urban - as well as rural - trade is in the hands of women. Temple (1964: 173) reports that among the traders in Kano market, Katsala, the Jalo constitute the second largest female group after the local Baganda. In contrast to the Baganda though Jalo women are invariably married. This is significant in that Jalo men are known to constitute the most permanent group of immigrant workers.
"Men in Uganda are likely to continue to move to and fro between work on their farms and work for an employer as long as they cannot compound the expected future yield of their farms by selling them. Increases in wages designed to make it possible for men to support families and likely to be of little avail. The increase in wages is much more likely regarded as a welcome addition to real wages than as an inducement to give up the family farms, and is therefore not likely to have any marked influence on mobility between employment and "peasant" farming." (Elkan & Fellars 1965:245)

However, by the time this article was published rates of labour turnover had dropped drastically among the major urban farms, well below the level current in industrial countries. This remarkable change was not due to improved housing conditions, increased wages, new urban opportunities for women or social security measures. Nor had there been any major changes in land tenure. Rather it was the pressure of a growing "reserve army" of unemployed that made itself felt. These unemployed do not yet constitute a rootless urban proletariat, nor do they keep urban wages near the subsistence level. They are peasants who are "queuing" for urban jobs precisely because urban minimum wages are high compared to the earning opportunities in the rural areas they come from.2

If labour turnover has dropped because of an increasing pressure of unemployed on the jobs available and not because of a sudden severance of urban-rural ties, then this implies that what used to be an economic cost to employers has become a social cost to employees: labour turnover was replaced by a strain put on the relationship between the local wage worker and his home area. Primarily the urban worker has now greater difficulties in fulfilling his obligations to his family and his home community as well as in keeping his land productive. While the Industrial Revolution quite generally lead to a separation of work place from home, this separation is magnified in Uganda, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, for the low income groups to a separation between the urban residence of the wage earner and the - often far distant - rural residence of his dependents, extended family, local community. Hence one major argument for the decentralization of industry.

2 For a summary of the causes of rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa see Hutton (1966) who stresses the importance of the economic incentive. This incentive continues to exist for the individual even in times of general unemployment because after all there is still the chance of getting a job. The majority of urban unemployed who continue to have a rural basis are "playing the pools", for wage earning.

Stressing the domineering role of economic causes of rural-urban migration should not obscure other factors. Political insecurity has led to a rural mass exodus in certain countries, e.g Indonesia, the Congo (Kinshasa). Urban anonymity provides an easy escape for the man who has got himself into serious trouble in his home community and who in the past would have tried to get himself accepted into another rural community. The town is particularly attractive for underprivileged groups: former slaves, women - these, once they have broken with the rural community, are therefore more fully committed to an urban existence.
Labour turnover and absenteeism are also influenced by work conditions. Two views clash here. Kerr (1966) is an outstanding proponent of those who hold that industrialization is truly revolutionary and that radical transformation may be easier, as well as more rapid and viable, than patchwork compromises between inconsistent systems. The end-product is expected to be very much like what has developed in the most industrialized country, the United States. Another school of thought, strongly influenced if not led by anthropologists, holds that there is structural variability and that since ease of gaining commitment varies inversely with departures from traditional life styles, it is desirable and possible to keep such departures at a minimum (Feldman & Moore 1960:167).

Nash’s (1958) study of the biggest textile industry in Central Africa shows how this factory overcomes its inevitable initial difficulties by accommodating to the local community. Nash (1958:115) concludes his report:

"Chiefly, I should like to say this to those interested in minimizing the human costs of technological advance. First, discard the idea that there are specific answers as yet. At best we are equipped with diagnostic tools, which enable us to point to the situations where most helpful strain may be generated. Second, a program which is highly flexible, permitting members of the society undergoing change to choose freely and discard easily from the alternatives offered them, is most likely to be effective. Third, when the end is technological and economic development, the largest problem in social change is the task of enlisting the energies and sentiments of the people involved, not the communication of expert knowledge to the benighted."

The type of flexibility required is shown by a tobacco factory in Uganda which gives 21 working days’ leave entitlement per completed year of service, allows leave to be cumulative up to a maximum of 3 years’ entitlement, and provides for up to 12 working days’ unpaid leave in any one year on exceptional compassionate grounds. Furthermore it grants pass-outs with pay for taking sick relatives to hospital and attendance at funerals according to tradition. On the other hand it is striking that the rate of turnover on wages estates has only slightly dropped in recent years and is still at around 100% per year even though wages paid are comparable to urban minimum wages and well above what landowners in the same areas pay their labour.

The Report of the Committee on African Wages (1954: 290) has stressed the importance of the stabilisation of labour in order to increase its efficiency. This view has been repeated in the Report of the East African Royal Commission (1955:146). The effect of the stabilisation of labour on its efficiency varies however considerably according to type of employment (Elkan & Follens 1950). Given the low rate of turnover with the major urban employers in Uganda today we have now to deal with the argument in its most extreme form that only a fully urbanised population will provide an efficient labour force. This is still an issue, at least in tropical Africa, because the majority of urban dwellers do not stay on in towns after the end of their working lives. However, I can see no reason that the efficiency of such a labour force should be impaired by the fact that they continue to maintain links with rural areas to which they intend to retire eventually. In Van Valen’s (1963:36) terms: a man need not be a permanent urban dweller in order to make a permanent urban worker. I am further inclined to agree that given the rapid rise of the educational level in the population at large working careers shorter than the open
a man's working life will lead to a more rapid infiltration of
the younger, better qualified into the labour force and avoid
the wholesale dismissal of people whose educational
qualifications are no longer considered adequate for the posts
they are holding.

Bell (1953) gives a detailed analysis of survival rates
in a firm in Salisbury with reference to a number of other
factors: country of origin, tribal origin, age, marital state,
status, skill grade, accommodation and department.

As for absenteeism, its incidence does not appear to be
related to degree of urbanisation. Hauser (1962:163), in
a study of workers in manufacturing industries in the vicinity
of Dakar, reports no connection between absenteeism and the
degree of urbanisation as measured by the age at which workers
exchanged their rural environment for an urban one. In a South
African study which employed a whole series of indicators of
urbanisation: place of birth, present place of residence of wife
and children, land rights in rural area, period of continuous
residence in an urban area, the relationship between urbanisation
and absence was reported as not clearly defined (Glass 1960:21-24).

The ultimate test of what is rather elusive called labour
commitment is labour productivity. Strangely enough there appear
to be no conclusive studies on labour productivity and I can do
no more than refer to two interesting discussions by Kilby (1961)
and Williams (1963).

One major factor in the productivity of the labour force
is clearly its qualification. The widely favoured in-service
training would seem to lead to a rather narrow formation and to
hinder labour mobility. The major issue for most underdeveloped
countries is the transfer of skills from expatriate "experts"
to locals. We expect to get an empirical study in this field
under way this year.
References: Committed labour


Efficient work organization

"Modern man is man in organizations. If the most dramatic fact that sets our age apart from earlier ones is that we live today under the shadow of nuclear destruction, the most pervasive feature that distinguishes contemporary life is that it is dominated by large, complex, and formal organizations. Our ability to organize thousands and even millions of men in order to accomplish large-scale tasks - be they economic, political, or military - is one of our greatest strengths. The possibility that free men become mere cogs in the bureaucratic machineries we act up for this purpose is one of the greatest threats to our liberty." (Blau & Scott 1963:XIII)

Bureaucracy has been a favorite topic of sociological discourse, especially since the classic in this field has become accessible to a wider audience in translations. However, Max Weber is prominent in contemporary discussion not only because of his contribution to sociological theory, but because, as other German social thinkers at the turn of the century, was preoccupied with the emergence of industrial society. Thus the debate that started after the Second World War on the development of the - not to use an euphemism - poor countries of the world soon took up the issues raised half a century earlier.

"The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism" is Weber's best known contribution in this context and is as relevant as ever as arguments rage as to the role of ideology in development. Weber's writings on bureaucracy are, similarly an attempt to understand the mechanism that is the necessary correlate of industrialism. Revealingly Weber notes:

"The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production." (Gorth & Mills 1946:214)

What started as a discussion of government administration has since become a more general theory of "Formal organizations" as the title of a recent textbook (Blau & Scott 1963) says, covering public and private administration. There is a further tendency to recognize that no useful line can be drawn between white-collar and blue-collar, that the decisive fact is work in the formal organization, "Men at work" as William F. Whyto (1961) calls his textbook.

Following Blau & Scott (1963:32f) we may list five distinctive characteristics of this type of organization as seen by Weber:

(a) Organization tasks are distributed among the various positions as official duties.
(b) The positions or offices are organized into a hierarchical structure.
(c) A formally established system of rules and regulations governs official decisions and actions.
(d) Officials are expected to assume an impersonal orientation in their contacts with clients and other officials.
(e) Employment by the organization constitutes a career for officials.

Weber states that these characteristics, and, specifically, their combination function to maximize administrative efficiency:

"Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organisation... is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency." (Weber 1947:337)
However, dysfunctions can be shown to exist between these characteristics, in Sjoberg's (1960) terms they constitute contradictory functional requirements. The best known of these conflicts is the one between expertise and discipline. Executives in complex organizations are typically less qualified to make expert technical judgments than their professional subordinates, since they cannot possibly be the leading expert in each of the specialties under their jurisdiction. In many bureaucracies, from Imperial China to contemporary Uganda, they are in fact recruited not because of their professional expertise, but because they have achieved a general level of education that is expected to make them able to respond to varied tasks. In recent years the trend has been, especially in the United States, to train experts in administration as such, a professionalization of administration.

Two further conflicts to which we will want to return later are frequently mentioned (Blau & Scott 1963:34f):

"Thus, even if it is true that the hierarchy of authority promotes discipline and makes possible the coordination of activities, does it not also discourage subordinates from accepting responsibility? Or, granted that promotion should be based on objective criteria rather than on personal consideration or family connections, which of the two major criteria is to be selected - seniority or merit?"

The major criticism of Weber's analysis centers on his preoccupation with the formally instituted aspects of bureaucracies and neglect of the informal relations and unofficial patterns which develop in formal organizations. The study carried out by Roethlisberger and Dekker (1939) in the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company in Chicago during the depression brought one of the major discoveries in Sociology. Experiments on the effects of varying degrees of illumination on worker productivity were followed by increases in productivity that could not be explained in terms of the experiments: even when illumination was decreased again productivity of workers continued to increase. The explanation did not lie with variations in illumination, but in the fact that the experimental groups had been given attention by management and by the researchers: the significance of human relations had been discovered.

As the Hawthorne studies continued the significance of social relations between workers themselves became more obvious. Cohesive work groups were found to establish effective norms of their own, e.g. controlling individual output, against the norms laid down by the formal organization. Informal social processes can thus be seen to characterize relations between peers as well as authority relations.¹

¹ Udy (1959) stresses that many informal behaviour patterns can at least partially be accounted for by problems which seem inherent in the formal structure. From a comparative analysis of 150 formal organizations in 150 non-industrial societies, using data largely from the Human Relations Area Files, he shows that rational variables are negatively associated with bureaucratic variables. Bureaucracy and rationality would thus appear to be mutually inconsistent in the same formal organization. Udy therefore argues that it is because of this inconsistency that accommodative mechanisms arise which result in the continued operation of the organization at some level of efficiency. Informal social processes are thus seen not as deviations from ideal patterns but as a necessary part of formal organizations as stable social systems.
The necessity of establishing efficient formal organizations in poor countries if they are to develop is widely recognized. Because of the prominent role played by government not only in the political but also in the economic sphere the main emphasis is put on public administration. The importance of the government bureaucracy is further enhanced because it is seen as the stable and persisting sector of the political arena (Lofchie 1967:1). It becomes such the major agent in the introduction of social change.

One of the major problems of formal organizations is that they themselves should be able to adjust to changes. An extreme case of non-adjustment occurs where the organizational goal is lost sight of and instrumental values become terminal values (Merton 1940). What is required is a pattern of self-adjustment within the organization:

"Official procedures provide precise 'performance programs', which prescribe the appropriate reactions to recurrent situations and furnish established guides for decision-making. But uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated. Change, whether due to new external development impinging on the organization or to internal modifications, produces situations without established precedents. Besides, some exigencies that may arise cannot be anticipated, and the more complex the tasks, the more attempts to make behavior too rigidly interfere with the ability to make expert judgments in terms of abstract professional standards." (Blau & Scott 1963:240f)

Adaptability to change may be presumed to be even more of a problem in developing countries. The rapid changes that accompany the development effort place on the flexibility of organizations in these countries an even higher demand than is the case in industrial countries. At the same time the severe shortage of qualified manpower circumscribes more narrowly the discretion that can be left to lower echelons.

A second aspect of formal organizations has to be considered when transferring our analysis from the West to other cultures. Gouldner (1959:410ff) discusses how some informal patterns are derived from the culture of the society in which a given formal organization happens to be located. Thus the norm that one should not "squeal" can in the United States be expected to interfere with the free flow of communication required by the organization.

Similarly cultural norms will influence the relationships between members of the organization whatever the rules it attempts to lie down. This is particularly obvious in hierarchical relationships. Whyte (1961:63-66) discusses the difference in behavior between North American and Latin American workers when it comes to communication from subordinates to superiors. Presthus (1961:16) reports from Turkey that motivation may be positively correlated with strong leadership and a minimum of participation, in the Western sense of the term.

Furthermore all people in organizations have a variety of "latent social identities", that is, identities which are not culturally prescribed as relevant to or within rational organization. The sex of the holder of an office does influence his/her relationship with other members of the organization. Elderly workers are given more deference than their position in the organization warrants by American supervisors. The definition of the "latent social identity" will differ between cultures. In many non-Western societies the importance of age will intrude even more forcibly into the formal organization. In Africa the importance of race and ethnic identity is unsurpassable.

We are presently trying to obtain funds for a study of communication in industrial firms in Uganda. It is surmised that
communication is affected by differentiation according to race, ethnic identity, language and - to a much greater extent than in rich countries - education. It is hypothesized that the flow of communication is diminished and its content distorted where it encounters these differentiations. This would in particular affect communication down and up the line as racial, ethnic, linguistic and educational groups continue to coincide to a considerable extent with particular levels of the organization hierarchy. Even for Nigeria Yesufu (1962:100) reported a few years ago:

"... what is of outstanding importance is that most of the largest employers today, in commerce, manufacturing, commerce, construction, etc., have in the past and remain at the present time, foreign firms, mainly European. Accordingly, labour-management relations in Nigeria have for long partly assumed the character of race relations."

A final argument in cultural relativity. The discussions of Weber's theory of bureaucracy are based on empirical research in North America. Weber used historical data - and had the Prussian bureaucracy right before his eyes. I suggest that the conflict between the hierarchy of authority and the responsibility to be taken by subordinates did hardly exist in Prussia: discipline was a dominant feature in that society. Similarly I wonder whether there was any conflict as to the criteria for promotion, whether seniority wasn't quite clearly overriding merit. There are no more than guesses and are meant to suggest that formal organizations in Europe have been different from those evolved in the United States and that similarly non-Western cultures must be expected to develop their own structures.

In the transitional phase while such structures are instituted or existing structures are adapted to the demands of a development economy severe conflicts are to be expected. Pallers (1956:196ff) discusses the predicament of the chief in Buganda who is faced with conflicting demands being placed upon him: the newly introduced civil service norm of disinterestedness conflicts with the traditional obligation between kinsmen. Berger (1957:149) in a study of the Egyptian Higher Civil Service stresses the persistence of personal, familial, and communal loyalties in the population being governed and from which the administrators are drawn. Such conflicts are not unknown in the West but the priority of the norm of the impersonal orientation of the official has been clearly established. In our discussion of the family we will see that it is the very fact that rewards go to individuals and not to corporate groups that strengthens the trend towards the nuclear family.

Norm conflicts give individuals frequently a chance of manipulation: to act as an opportunist who in a given situation refers to the norm most advantageous to him personally. Southall, as we shall see, argues that this is the case in marital relationships in Buganda. The chief in Buganda who thinks it legitimate to utilise his kinship connections to secure promotion, but feels outraged if another chief does the same thing, is trying to do precisely this. His position appears however more difficult when it comes to reconciling the conflicting demands made upon him: both the corporate kin group and the civil service hierarchy can back their demands with strong sanctions and the chief finds himself walking on a tightrope attempting to keep both sides satisfied with his services (Pallers 1956:202ff).

How can the transition from a traditional society to a society geared to economic development be accelerated? Ultimately a change in people's values is involved. The optimism that expects an ideological conversion and the pessimism that stresses the impact of early childhood training that takes several generations to undergo the necessary modifications both deal with
the problem involved. Until such changes in the individual's motivation have occurred there is only the possibility of institutionalizing bigger incentives and more severe controls: to back up the new norms with sanctions strong enough to make the traditional a romantic past too costly for a realistic man to indulge in. When Berger (1957:65) studied the incidence of Western bureaucratic patterns among Egyptian higher civil servants he found these not to be related to exposure to the West. Instead it were the older officials, in the top grade, more in administrative posts, more upwardly mobile, more satisfied with their jobs who ranked high on his scale measuring Western bureaucratic patterns: they had been longer exposed to the institution of bureaucracy itself.
References: Efficient work organization


The family

"... no theorist has been able to state, let alone prove, any set of systematic propositions about the relations between the family and other institutions..." (Goode 1959:180)

No aspect of economic development has aroused as much interest among sociologists as its implications for the family. By now an overwhelming body of discussion and quite a substantial body of research results are available. We may distinguish three major issues:

(a) the family type,
(b) the relative position of the sexes,
(c) marriage stability.

There appears to be a world trend towards the conjugal family: husband, wife and their dependent children.1 The most important aspect distinguishing this nuclear family, as it is also called, from more extended family units, as are found in many traditional societies, is that it excludes a wide range of affinal and blood relatives from everyday life.

A considerable fit can be shown to exist between conjugal family pattern and industrial system. The high rate of geographical and occupational mobility as well as a measure of social mobility required from the labour force in such a system as long as it continues to be geared to further change, are better met by the conjugal family than by more extended family structures.2 In its logical conclusion this argument would seem to indicate that a further reduction even of the conjugal family, as has been attempted in Israel and China, would be even more functional for industrial society.

Does this fit also apply to commercial enterprise? Is the family firm efficient? The extended family would appear to have two advantages over the conjugal family in this context: the trust that does exist between the family members and the possibility of self-financing through capital accumulation within the family. On the other hand the desire for family control may put a limit to expansion. East Africa is an interesting testing ground for the hypotheses involved. We are looking forward to the publication of a study Desai did of an Asian business community - where the extended family clearly plays an important role. Harris is engaged in a study of African business enterprise and results so far indicate that the successful businessman does not take family members into his firm. These results should not be taken as final though, even if confirmed in this study: this is a new venture for Africans, especially in Kenya where the study is conducted, and it may well be that the next generation, reared in a business household, will be able to cooperate within family enterprise.

1 Even in the West this trend has not been completed though. Firth (1956) and Young and Willmott (1957) report a considerable degree of interaction with kin outside the conjugal family in lower-class English families. Moore (1953:106f) suggests that the trend may be reversed to a certain extent.

2 Litwak (1960) shows from a survey in the United States that modified extended family relations can be maintained in an industrial society because modern means of communication have reduced the socially disruptive forces of geographical distance. He argues that in fact an extended family can provide important aid to nuclear families without interfering with the occupational system.
But it does not provide an explanation. That an institution is functional in a given society does not explain its occurrence. Quite apart from the fact that disharmonies between conjugal family and industrial system can be shown to exist as well. A major role in introducing the conjugal family to non-Western countries today is probably played by ideology. It is part of a Western creed that arrived before the first machines were installed. This political philosophy asserted equality irrespective of sex and age and encouraged decisions making by individuals, they, and not the family, are to choose spouses or to seek divorce.

But how did the conjugal family come to the West? Goode (1962:247f) argues that the Western family system was different from the non-Western already in the Middle Ages and that these differences were further sharpened by the Protestant Reformation (here in particular the insistence on individualism). The conjugal family is thus seen to be anterior and possibly instrumental to the Industrial Revolution. It can also be argued though, that the industrial system developed in the way it did because it met with a protofamilial that had no extended family lineages within it. The industrial system could have accommodated itself to an extended family structure by adopting a different scale of remunerations (Greenfield 1961). In fact attempts in this direction are made where the number of dependent children of an employee are taken into account in his wage package. An industrial system is also conceivable where the individualism implied in the fact that wages are paid to the very individuals who earned them is avoided by paying to heads of extended households instead. This would not necessarily imply lower motivation of workers - as long as they are committed to the common well of the extended family.

The ideology that is instrumental in spreading conjugal family patterns in the world today is a major force in the onslaught on the dominant position of men in traditional societies. It has been argued that the relative position of the sexes in peasant societies can not be evaluated in terms of higher and lower because of the strict division of labour established between the sexes. Such a division is in fact widespread and may go so far as to create a considerable dependence on the other sex. Perry-Butler (1966:285) describes vividly the condition of a bachelor he met among the Bororo of central Brazil: only married permits the man to benefit from the fruits of women's work, including delousing, body painting, and hair-plucking as well as vegetable food and cooked food.

However, when we apply the usual criteria used in stratification analysis, power, income and wealth, and status or prestige, women in the majority of traditional societies do enjoy less of these than men. Hence the success of the Western creed of the equality of the sexes with women. Significantly, in the West the equality of the sexes has been largely seen to be linked with equal access of women to economic opportunities. It spread to other areas of the world thus constitutes an attack not only on the inequality of women but on the division of labour between the sexes as well.

That women be part of the labour force is an economic necessity in many peasant societies in order to ensure their survival. There may be a - usually tiny - upper strata that can exist without, but most members of such societies are dependent on the work of all able-bodied adults. This is not so in rich societies where large strata can afford to withdraw their women from productive work. This was done by the upper and middle classes in Victorian Britain. The US, where women had gained

Finnebeck (1930:312) argues that in England marriage for many women was just a sort of business partnership in agriculture, trade or domestic industry until the Industrial Revolution when the majority of married women lost their economic independence.
a considerable measure of access to economic opportunity, known as the "reversal movement", back to the home, after the last war, with the baby boom. Recently the tremendous recession given Betty Friedan's "The Feminine mystique" seemed to indicate a reversal of this trend.

For the individual family deciding about the activity of the wife, or the grown-up daughter, three issues are involved: the economic income to be derived from outside employment, an evaluation of the woman spending her time at a place if employment outside her home, on evaluation of the woman active for a third party rather than immediately for her family. The first two issues are linked to dominant trends of Western industrial society: though extremely rich by world standards further economic growth is a major goal; the industrial system of work has separated work place from residence. Not that during the early days of the industrial Revolution it was quite common for mothers to bring their children to work.

The position of women who do not take up the opportunity of employment is at first sight weakened. However, they do wield increased power in the household economy and the education of the children because of the separation of work-place and home which necessitates the absence of the husband for most of the daytime. Mississandri had noticed the change of the phrase of the past, the father who is not seen by his children. Shorter working hours will to a certain extent reverse this trend. A whole series can be established from the father who comes home for lunch, to the one who sees his children before they go to bed, to the one they know only during weekends, to the salaried who returns every several weeks, to the unskilled Labourer in African towns who is forced to leave his family on the land and returns every year or so, to the prisoner of war who is severed from his family for a number of years. The considerable difficulty of transferring power taken by the wife during the husband's absence back to him on his return in the latter case is well known.

Changes in the relative position of the sexes can be seen to be linked with changes in the rate of divorce. There is first of all a change in the attitude towards the acceptability of formal divorce as such. Furthermore, during the transitional phase when these changes in the position of the sexes take place, clashes between spouses about this very change in values may be frequent. In a study of a slum area in Kampala Southall remarks:

"The relations between the sexes show every indication of tension. Neither men nor women are consistent in maintaining the attitudes appropriate to their usual behaviour. When it suits them to do so, they tend to invoke the values of the past, or of more traditional and stable rural conditions, in opposition to the conditions which at other times they accept and exploit." (Southall & Gutkind 1955:72)

Once the transition is affected, a new consensus of values, attitudes and behaviour established, the rate of divorce can be expected to fit the conjugal family patterns. A number of characteristics of the conjugal family can be shown to contribute to a divorce rate higher than the one found in the majority of peasant societies. However, quite a number of traditional societies had very high divorce rates, as some patrilocal societies in Central Africa, so that for these the establishment of the conjugal family and the corresponding rate of divorce will mean an actual decrease in the divorce rate.

In poor countries that experience rapid urbanization further factors are conducive to a high incidence of urban marital instability. There is usually a considerable sex imbalance because on the one hand the mass of urban wages are not designed
to support families while on the other there are only limited earning opportunities for women. The adult African population of Nairobi in 1948 included 84,000 men, but only 21,000 women, and while the situation had considerably improved by 1962 there was still a serious imbalance with 176,000 men and 83,000 women. Furthermore, the control traditionally exerted by the extended family and the village community is continued only to a lesser extent by the urban neighbourhood (Powdermaker 1962).
References: The family

Firth, Raymond (editor) 1956 *Two studies of kinship in London.* London: Athlone Press.


Young, Michael; and Willmott, Peter 1957 *Family and kinship in East London.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
