5 Urban community profiles
Safe relocation and resettlement in post-war Sri Lanka

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Introduction

For a quarter of a century, from 1983 to 2009, Sri Lanka suffered from a civil war waged by government military forces against the insurgents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (colloquially, the Tamil Tigers). Certain areas of the country, particularly in the north and east, were torn apart by armed conflict, and thousands of people were displaced. Such disasters are nothing new, of course: for millennia, civil conflicts—as well as natural disasters and, in more recent times, development projects—have forcibly displaced people from their homes, usually into cities. Now known as Internally Displaced Persons or IDPs (for a formal definition see Deng 1999), these people encounter gross violations of their rights during, and often far beyond, their resettlement or relocation (Davies and Jacobsen 2010; Jacobsen 2011; Jacobsen and Nichols 2011; Zetter and Deikun 2010). This often included violation of what Lefebvre (1996) described as “the right to the city”. The rights violations of urban IDPs can be identified as urban violence, as defined by Moser (2004).

We also now know that post-war conditions add further layers of complexity—both to urban violence itself (Moser and McIlwaine 2001), and also to the resilience of the affected persons or communities. This resilience is defined by Hallegatte (2014) as “the ability of an economy or society to minimise welfare losses for a disaster of a given magnitude.” Another definition, provided by Adger (2000), is “the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change.” Resilience, in the form of capabilities, is useful in the recovery process in terms of resettlement. Building this factor into existing assessment models can help to highlight the capabilities of IDPs, rather than just their vulnerabilities and their risk of impoverishment (Muggah 2000).

In this chapter, we offer some theories about how to create safer cities in post-war countries. We do this by presenting our research on the losses and gains of two relocated urban IDP communities in post-war Sri Lanka: Colombo, the national capital, and Jaffna, the capital of the country’s
northern province. Our community profiling approach looks at how these two communities responded with resilience to the violence and displacement that residents experienced in a post-conflict situation.

Common definitions of violence—including that proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2002—present it as the use of physical force to cause bodily hurt in order to impose one’s wishes (Moser 2004). However, broader definitions of violence also include psychological hurt, material deprivation, and symbolic disadvantage (Fox 2015; Schröder and Schmidt 2001). These expanded definitions can be particularly useful in cities that have low-intensity violence, such as that documented in South Asia. Muggah (2012: 46) points out that, unlike in Latin America and the Caribbean, “South Asian cities and slums are not characterised by large-scale urban violence or criminal gangs.”

For this reason, we favour Fox’s broader definition of violence, which includes coercion or psychological manipulation used in a harmful or destructive way. Further, violence may not be a static factor. It can also be a dynamic process that is “constructed, negotiated, reshaped and resolved, as perpetrators and victims try to define and control the world they find themselves in” (Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 8). Violence can even be analysed into typologies, such as political, institutional, economic, social, and structural (Moser 2004).

Urban IDPs face a wide range of losses, such as chronic impoverishment, even long after they have been (often forcibly) resettled. The government may lead the recovery efforts, sometimes with the support of emergency organisations and development agencies. These perform various interventions as the victims go through the different phases of immediate relief, and intermediate and long-term development (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2013; Brun and Lund 2008; Cornwall 2010; Gunasekara, Najab, and Munas 2015; Jaspars 2009; Romeshun, Gunasekara, and Munas 2014). A useful tool for this kind of analysis is the Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction (IRLR) model, developed by Cernea (1997). It identifies eight variables that increase the risk of impoverishment among IDPs:

- landlessness
- joblessness
- homelessness
- economic marginalisation
- increased morbidity
- food insecurity
- loss of access to common property
- social disintegration.

The model was originally proposed to analyse the vulnerabilities of affected communities in situations of Development-Forced Displacement and Relocation (DFDR). It was later extended to cases of Conflict-Induced
Displacement (CID) by Muggah (2000, 2003). At that time, Muggah added three other variables associated with war-related humanitarian situations:

- loss of education
- loss of political participation
- violence (since the type of violence experienced in conflict situations is different from that of development situations).

This model broadly fits the literature on the cultural and social losses incurred by displaced persons. These include loss of access to

- infrastructure services (such as public transport, water, and electricity)
- social services such as schooling, education, etc.
- common property resources and political participation
- social capital such as networks and relationships, etc. (Cernea 1999).

The new total of 11 risks and losses are clearly the result of both development and conflict, and hence easily linked with Moser’s (2004) typology of urban violence. However, these variables mostly operate on a macro level, and do not take into account the IDPs’ own capabilities for poverty avoidance (Muggah 2000). In terms of our theoretical and conceptual scaffolding in this chapter, it is useful to conceptualise the way IDPs negotiate the shocks of the medium-term impacts of displacement as a form of community-level resilience (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010; Hallegatte 2014; Schipper and Langston 2015). Measuring resilience as a response to the IRLR variables—especially in terms of outcomes to issues like social cohesion, asset accumulation, livelihood regeneration, and changes in violence experienced—allows us to understand the real potential of the resettled IDPs to avoid poverty.

Urban displacement in Sri Lanka

The 26-year war, which ended less than a decade ago, means that, for some Sri Lankans, almost an entire generation has experienced displacements. Many people have also been forced to move due to urban development projects, such as when the government evacuated a number of shantytowns and slum communities. Some individuals or groups had to move multiple times, experiencing several returns or resettlements (Brun and Lund 2008, 2009; Muggah 2008; Perera-Mubarak 2013, 2014). The development-related relocations were under the purview of the state, while conflict-related resettlements were joint interventions between the state, the United Nations (UN), various NGOs, and other multilateral entities (Godamunne and Kumarasiri 2010; Hyndman 2011; Jayatilaka 2009; Jayatilaka, Amirthalingam, and Gunasekara 2015). The government set up a number of ministries, authorities, and departments to deal with displacement.
But the complexity of the problem was such that many aspects were inappropriately or inadequately addressed: solutions were hard to find for social, psychological, and environmental adjustments (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010; Goodhand 2010; Jayatilaka and Amirthalingam 2015; Lakshman, Ekanayaka, and Lakshman 2016; Vithanagama et al. 2015). The latest UN data suggest that Sri Lanka is among the least urbanised countries in the world, and certainly the least in South Asia. These statistics show that the urban proportion of the population was 19 per cent in 1990, and 18 per cent in 2014; and it is projected to be just 30 per cent in 2050 (United Nations 2014). These low levels are attributed to the process of “hidden urbanisation”, the result of relying on administrative boundaries to define what is (and is not) urban (Ellis and Roberts 2016).

According to the Asian Development Bank (2015), for instance, the city of Colombo was believed to have a population of 555,031 in 2012. Nearly half of these people lived in substandard conditions and lacked basic facilities such as water, sewers, and electricity. By 2014, around 900 acres of government land in and around Colombo was occupied by slum dwellers, mostly unused terrain such as railway land, canal banks, and swampy low-lying areas. Between 2010 and 2014, Sri Lanka’s Urban Development Authority initiated a plan to evacuate some 68,000 families out of these slum communities, and into high-rise buildings in and around Colombo (Razick 2014). The government intended to clear away all the low-income housing units by 2020 under its Megapolis Development Plan. The government’s aim in doing so was threefold:

- to free up the shantytown lands for socioeconomic development
- to help the former occupants obtain secure housing
- to pursue its vision of making Colombo a slum-free “garden city”, and a commercial hub for South Asia.

The end of the war in 2009, and the return to normalcy in the country, added impetus to this plan, which is still ongoing—and is likely to increase urbanisation in the region. For example, Jaffna’s metropolitan population in 2009 was only 134,134, but it is projected to reach a million by 2030 (World Bank 2012). If realised, this would mean a phenomenal 9.6 per cent annual increase in population. Part of this growth was driven by the government’s mega-resettlement project, known in Sinhalese as *Uthuru Wasanthaya and Neganahira Udava* (Northern Spring and Eastern Awakening). By late 2015, the project, which included fully built and semi-built housing, had resettled 800,129 people displaced by conflict in the north and east of the country.

Methodology and locations

As indicated earlier, we took a community profiling approach with our research, drawing on existing data and using a number of methods to
construct community profiles. Our goal was to make these extremely broad, in order to analyse all the resources, needs, and other issues that affect communities. Christakopoulou, Dawson, and Gari (2001), for instance, noted that neighbourhoods should be profiled in six ways:

- as part of the city
- as a place to live
- as a social community
- as an economic community
- as a political community
- as personal space.

Since different profiling methods have their advantages and disadvantages, it is worthwhile to combine methods to gain richer information and a more well-rounded view of the community (Hawtin and Percy-Smith 2007). Our studies, conducted during 2014, relied on primary, secondary, quantitative, and qualitative data to triangulate findings. They also drew on a variety of investigative techniques, including:

- interviews
- focus groups discussions
- key informant interviews
- household discussions
- ranking exercises
- seasonal calendars and timelines
- Google Earth observations
- geographic information systems (GIS) mapping
- physical exploration
- photography.

The two communities we profile here are Passaiyoor in Jaffna (Jayatilaka et al. 2015), and Sinhapura in Colombo (Lakshman et al. 2016). The latter community is in the division of Wanathamulla village, a slum area with an unsavoury reputation for violence and criminal activities. Many of the original houses there were merely small dwellings made of planks, with limited (or no) facilities such as electricity, water, or bathrooms.

The Sinhapura housing project includes Phase 1 (constructed in 2007 to house residents from Wanathamulla) and Phase 2 (constructed in 2011 to house people from Torrington, a few kilometres away). Both phases are five-storey buildings of 60 condominium-style flats each, standing next to each other; and both were constructed under the supervision of a private company, the Real Estate Exchange, and Sri Lanka’s Urban Settlement Development Authority. The two groups living in the buildings, some 120 families in all, form a sharp contrast. Those in the earlier building came from the low-income Wanathamulla area, and were forced out of their own
homes by the military. The Phase 2 families—a mix of blue-collar and white- 
collar types—formerly lived in the more high-income area of Torrington, 
known for its affluent lifestyle. Their displacement was less physically vio-
lent, but involved deliberate deceit on the part of politicians and officials. 
The residents were talked into evacuating their houses with the promise that 
the government would construct a new housing complex for them on the 
same land. In fact, that did not happen.

In Jaffna, the location we selected for the project was the small fishing 
village of Passaiyoor East (hereafter referred to simply as Passaiyoor). The 
locals there were caught in the intense fighting between government secu-
ritiy forces, peacekeeping forces from India and the Tamil Tigers. Although 
no official figures are available for this turbulent time, in remote parts of 
the country, it is generally accepted that hundreds of people migrated out 
of the country; others suffered significant internal displacement and resettlement. The current population is 364 families, totalling 1,149 individuals, 
who live in different types of owned and rented accommodation (Jayatilaka 
et al. 2015). Most families earn their living by fishing, and have relational, 
caste, and religious ties with each other. Many people were able to return 
to their own houses after being displaced, and used their own labour and 
financial resources to repair them. Assistance for resettlement was mostly 
limited to some livelihood assistance provided by the government. However, 
one major benefit was the construction of a new anchorage and harbour by 
the International Organization for Migration (with aid from the Sri Lankan 
and Australian governments).

Colombo: Sinhapura Phases 1 and 2

In Sinhapura, people suffered physical and psychological harm as a result of 
the forcible evictions they experienced. The Phase 1 residents, as indicated 
earlier, were forced from their homes by the military. There were occasions 
where soldiers would physically break down the roof or walls of a house, to 
make it uninhabitable. As one female resident of Phase 1 explained:

The government moved us here before they demolished our house in 
Wanathamulla. They removed our roof, and then we had no choice but 
to move. Of course they did not pull us out with our belongings. But 
how can one live without a roof on top of one’s head?

Phase 1 residents also had to deal with problems such as paying for the new 
flat, coping with overflowing drainage systems in the new housing complexes, 
and the increased cost of living (since they now had to actually pay for their 
legal electricity and water supplies—rather than obtaining them illegally, as 
they had before). There was also the emotional stress resulting from large 
numbers of strangers living together. One female respondent explained the 
financial burden:
We still have to pay money for this flat, which is 500 square feet. They told us that our previous house was 400 square feet, and asked us to pay for the extra 100 square feet. I have to pay 50,000 rupees [roughly US$330] more.

The psychological harm experienced by the displaced Phase 2 residents takes the form of bitterness and disappointment at the deception they experienced. During interviews, they alleged that several politicians and government officials—including the president of Sri Lanka at that time—convinced the community leaders in Torrington that the resettlement would be a beneficial outcome for the inhabitants. Now, living in Phase 2, they are essentially landless: the deeds to the new condominiums have not been given to them.

The families relocated to Sinhapura continue to face different types of issues. Phase 2 residents, for instance, are now much further from their workplaces, so they must either quit their jobs or cope with longer travel times and higher transportation costs. One man from Phase 2 said his expenses had gone up: “I have to go to Narahenpita for work. This is too far for my son to travel to work every day.” The impact can be worse for women than for men. Many males have been able to secure new blue-collar casual work close by. The women, on the other hand, mostly worked as domestic helpers in houses in and around Torrington; and once they were moved away, many gave up their jobs. (Although the distance between the two communities is only a few kilometres, the distance can be an overwhelming obstacle in a place with difficult public transportation.) The impacts vary further for government employees, or people with private businesses. One woman from Phase 1 spoke wistfully of the fruit shop her daughter had in their previous house: “My daughter had a shop in our previous house. We earned about 1000 rupees per day as profit. It was a fruit shop: pawpaw, bananas, pineapple; we had all the fruits.” But like many small-scale businesses, it has been shut down since the relocation. (Then again, another female resident of Phase 2 opined that things have actually improved, in terms of family income. Before, she said, “the earlier place my father worked used to give him work on one day and then no work the next. But now he goes to work every day.”)

The new condominium lifestyle at Sinhapura also encouraged competition and solitude among residents. With a non-leaking roof over their heads to protect their possessions, they now felt able to buy furniture, goods, and household appliances. This created the usual effect of consumerism: everyone wanted to buy something better than their neighbour. As well as becoming competitive, they also became increasingly isolated. With private spaces came weakened interactions between families, compared to earlier times. Instead of the common public water-tap—where a lot of the neighbourhood socialisation took place—now they have water piped into their own flats.

The absence of a strong community network seemed to make residents more vulnerable to that isolation, and highlighted their lack of a sense of belonging. For Phase 2 people, the unfamiliarity of the Wanathamulla
location also made fitting in very difficult. Few of them, fortunately, had first-hand experience of violence. But their perceptions of their new neighbours were clouded by Wanathamulla’s notorious reputation. This promoted an “us and them” division between the Phase 1 and 2 residents, and contributed to their sense of homelessness. These “before and after” feelings are captured in comments from both sides. A woman from Phase 1 said of the old days in Wanathamulla:

We used to be free those days. When we leave the house and meet people we know who they are. But now there are more people that we do not know. Our parents were born and raised there. So we used to know each other.

Contrast this nostalgic attitude with the former president of a community association from Torrington, a man now living in Phase 2: “[The Phase 1 residents] call us ‘parachutes’—we have been dropped from above. We cannot talk about anything here; we must stay quiet. It’s their rule.”

The strongest grievances are about drug dealing, drug abuse, petty theft, and antisocial behaviour such as noise, shouting, and fighting. It is worth noting, however, that the perpetrators of most of these acts are not in fact residents; they are trespassers from an adjoining shanty community, who enter the Sinhapura complex to make use of its public spaces. These are the people who play loud music, use obscene language, get into fights, and steal things to meet their need for fast cash to buy drugs or alcohol. The police are reluctant to intervene, especially since the closest police post (in the adjoining Sahaspura area) is staffed by only two officers. One result of this dangerous situation is that Sinhapura residents avoid public spaces, and parents discourage their children from engaging in community activities, or even playing with their peers in the neighbourhood.

Regarding children, Sinhapura parents experience a number of difficulties. They claim that schools are reluctant to admit their children because of the negative social connotations of living in Wanathamulla. Even when children are enrolled, teachers and peers sometimes discriminate against them and stigmatise them due to their low socioeconomic standing. That said, some residents—like this Phase 2 man—also report a better social environment for their children:

I think it is good we came to this flat. Children also like this house. We couldn’t invite outsiders to our houses in the previous place. The houses were very densely located. We did not have much space in our previous house but here we have sufficient space.

In terms of aggression against women, this particular problem was not reported at Sinhapura. Most respondents agreed that it was a safe place for females, where they could move about freely in public spaces—even
late in the evening. The most common issue was boys and men teasing and mocking girls.

As this description illustrates, people had mixed feelings about their new homes. In a focus group, one woman gave her opinion that: “Everything is good here, but caged. No freedom.” That attitude—of seeing positive features in the physical environment, but being generally critical of the social setting—was echoed by a female resident from Phase 1 who said: “These houses are much better than where we lived earlier. But the issue is the [social] environment.” Still, for them the possibility of owning a proper home—rather than a temporary or illegal house—added a dimension of social recognition and importance to their lives. That satisfaction was strongest among those Wanathamulla people who had formerly lived in plank shanties with no running water. For the sake of a better home, they were willing to adjust to the shortcomings of relocation.

Jaffna: Passaiyoor

During the war, nearly all the residents of Passaiyoor suffered high-intensity violence, including deaths, injuries, trauma, and hardships of various kinds. As IDPs, they were forced to flee their villages, land, homes, and jobs, and they encountered risk, uncertainty, and multiple and long-term displacements. Some were able to find security and shelter among friends and family; others only in various scattered welfare camps. Their survival, to a large extent, depended on relief rations; and it was hard for them to gain access to services.

With the cessation of fighting and security issues, many changes occurred in Jaffna’s society:

- the restoration of freedom of movement
- the liberalisation of the economy
- the general opening up of the region
- modern changes in attitudes, and in how people behave and relate to one another.

At the time of our research, however, the residents were still experiencing different kinds of challenges. New types of social issues had begun to disrupt people’s traditional culture. The older Sri Lankan population is quite conservative, and many felt that even standard modern tools, such as mobile phones and internet access, tend to corrupt the young generation. Other unwelcome elements included easy access to alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, and online pornography. Drugs (mostly marijuana) were apparently widely available: one fisherman we spoke to said that his neighbour’s son was a drug addict: “they get the drug in the form of toffees while away in school.”

Alcoholism, in particular, was known to have increased among IDPs. (One religious leader commented: “The consumption of alcohol is continually
on the rise, and the north is known for alcoholism.”) Among young males, who experienced high unemployment and disincentives to work, youth violence and gang formations emerged. In nearby parts of the region, there were also increasing concerns about various kinds of aggressive and violent behaviours, such as the sexual harassment and abuse of women, rape, and even murder. (The IDPs were not directly involved or affected by such incidents, but were naturally disturbed by them.) Property crimes such as robberies, though, seemed not to be prevalent. This was due partly to the cohesion of close-knit communities, and partly to police vigilance.

When people displaced from Passaiyoor finally returned to their own small houses, they found many of them damaged. For their process of resettlement, they relied on three main financial sources: personal savings or loans, their incomes, and support from their extended families. (This was especially the case for residents with friends and relatives who had moved away to France and Germany—as many Sri Lankans had—forming a small diaspora. One fisherman told us: “We are not struggling, thanks to [them]. The monetary assistance we received from abroad was of great use during the war.”)

Many people resumed their former occupation of fishing; but even here there were anxieties and tensions. The once-rich fish stocks in the sea had been much reduced, partly due to over-fishing but also (some said) due to poaching by Indian fishers. This situation was a real concern for a community that essentially had only one source of income, and many fishermen we spoke to were troubled. One member of the Passaiyoor Fishermen’s Society said: “In the future … we may have to leave the industry. We are in a real fix.” Another man explained that this had a follow-on effect. “When some fishermen leave the industry, others are also forced to leave because they do not have enough people to undertake fishing.”

Other community issues that challenged resettlement included high unemployment, debt, land shortage in the village, and increasing land prices. One woman told us:

We educate our children with the income we earn from fishing. Since the income from fishing is low, we want them to study and join other employment. Some of them like to stay on, but we want them to do better. Although the fishing industry has been good to us, it is now in decline.

That doubt over the prospects of the fishing industry caused locals to think about the future of their children. In Passaiyoor—as in much of rural Sri Lanka—there are still gendered differences in education, occupation, and income: women are not treated as equals to men, which limits their prospects. While issues such as assault, abuse, and domestic violence were not prevalent (and these were not the primary problems women faced), there were insinuations that domestic violence and assaults were on the rise.
Women, particularly widows, also struggled financially. Roughly a hundred women in this community had lost their husbands during the war, and were forced to depend on their children for income and protection. Some, however, became entrepreneurs, and successfully managed businesses of their own. Self-employed women commonly engage in small-scale commercial activities such as producing sweets or chili powder, selling firewood, preparing food parcels, etc. For instance, one member of the Passaiyoor Women’s Society operates a small business that she started with the aid of loans. “I started … with the initial 10,000 rupee [loan]. I have been functioning for two years now,” she said. “Next, I will get a 50,000 rupee loan from my micro-credit society and will use it to expand the business.”

With the official services functioning again, and roads and buildings in fair condition, it was time to look to the future. Inspired by the new harbour, local residents—with support from the diaspora, who regularly send money home; and potentially also from the Australian government, the German government, and the British Council—were discussing plans to build a sports stadium and a library in the village. The villagers are known for their talent at football, and Passaiyoor has produced a number of Sri Lanka’s best players (including a captain of the national team). They are also well known in the region for their interest in the arts, especially theatre. The village encourages many social events that strengthen engagement among locals and visitors, and it supports a number of clubs and societies for women, men, and youth.

Other features that shaped the community’s socioeconomic status, and played lead roles in its activities, were the market and the church. Spirituality and religious beliefs are important for the locals, who are almost entirely Catholic (except for a few Hindus). Among the latter, caste differences are limited, since most are from the same community. One fisherman told us: “Our area is blessed by God. We have marine resources, arts, education, and music.” Residents regularly expressed a significant sense of attachment and belonging towards their village, and gratitude for what it offers and what makes it unique. Most of the people who were displaced chose to return; and those who migrated away did so mainly due to the lack of other options. Diaspora relatives living in other countries (who are viewed as a type of guardian) generally keep in close touch, and visit often.

To sum up Passaiyoor’s state: overall, there was a general coping attitude in the community, especially as they recollected what they had been through, and how they had adapted to those conditions by various means. The inhabitants had painful memories of witnessing violent warfare, and experiencing displacement and other losses. They tried to move forward with their lives, focusing on their religion, families, community, and work. Yet, like so many other people in the modern world, they also had to face the looming reality of issues with their livelihoods, their children’s future prospects, and their housing space (not to mention the larger changes that affected their culture). They experienced a duality of attachment: to their
traditional way of life on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to looking for something better—of wanting a better standard of living for themselves and their families.

Discussion and conclusions

Residents of both the communities studied here—Sinhapura and Passaiyoor—experienced displacement of different types. They coped with the events in different ways, showing their resilience in how they responded. In terms of our analysis, the 11 variables proposed in the IRLR were useful in our systematic examination of the dissimilar impacts of displacement (and subsequent resettlement) on aspects such as social cohesion, asset accumulation, and livelihood regeneration.

It is important to note those forced from their homes by development in Colombo were relocated elsewhere, while the people affected by conflict-induced displacement in Jaffna were able to return to their original site. This resulted in differences in the scale of losses, the support received, and the sense of recovery and control over life events. In Passaiyoor, the resettled CID community had experienced a greater magnitude of war-related violence, including destruction of property, psychological trauma, physical injuries, and even death. By contrast, the DFDR community in Sinhapura had experienced less harmful types and intensity of violence.

On this basis, we expected to find the Sinhapura community to be more resilient than the Passaiyoor community. However, we were surprised to find that the reverse was true. Though there are still problems in the fishing village, the residents seem to be in greater command of their experience than the inhabitants of Sinhapura. In this discussion, we will explore whether our framework can explain this finding, and whether it is able to help us accurately theorise about the resilience we encountered.

As Cernea (1997: 1575) points out, “Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric: it disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organisation and interpersonal ties, [and] kinship groups become scattered as well.” In order for communities to recover, that social disarticulation needs to be reversed. The evidence suggests that the Passaiyoor community may have achieved this goal relatively well. The residents endured violent conflict and were displaced for extended periods. But, when they were resettled, the community simply came back together again.

This had significant positive implications for their resilience. The ties the locals shared were deep-rooted, and encompassed many aspects of their lives. Their common occupations, interests, networks, religion, and experience of displacement played an important role in shaping their resilience. Another important factor seemed to be that donor aid was provided transparently, at the community level, rather than privately at an individual or family level. This likely reinforced the existing group ties—a fact that seems
to support Moser and McIlwaine’s theory (2001) that combined strategies are essential to integrate social capital.

The community dynamics and resilience we observed in Sinhapura were a sharp contrast. Displacement had indeed torn apart the social fabric, but relocation had not quite sewn it back together. We identified three reasons for this:

- The deceit and manipulation of the politicians and relocation agencies had compromised the effectiveness of existing community organisations.
- The community had been fragmented into two sets of residents, who came from different origins and locations.
- The intrusion of “outsiders”, who behaved badly, into the community’s public spaces, upset the community and added an extra level of stress.

Clearly (as in most urban spaces) there were issues related to living in close proximity to strangers (Franck 1980); and this was further complicated by the community’s fragmentation and demoralisation. So, the experiences of past displacement and current social friction seemed to feed into each other in a downward spiral, decreasing resilience. To quote Moser (2004: 6): “Violence is linked to fear and insecurity, which pervades people’s lives … [this has] serious implications for trust, well-being and social capital among communities and individuals.” Perhaps Moser’s terminology can help us to analyse the differences between Sinhapura and Passaiyoor. The former community seemed to have more social violence, with some political violence; whereas the latter seemed to be recovering from political violence, but had replaced it with social violence.

In Passaiyoor, with the end of the war ushering in a democratisation process, it is possible that what we saw was the democratisation of violence itself (Kruijt and Koonings 1999). People there always spoke to us of how life and survival were a struggle in the past, during the war and their displacement. And, in spite of the current economic and social woes, they appreciated their relative good fortune and were thankful to leave that past behind. They drew on various individual, family, and community capabilities for strength, which contributed to their resilience.

In Sinhapura, on the other hand, people struggled to cope, felt that they had lost more than they had gained, and longed for their past: their neighbourhoods, spaces, jobs, homes, and most of all their sense of community. This contrast highlights the difference in what the two groups considered as most meaningful and important. Both communities commonly referred to the past, “home”, and “belonging” with a sense of nostalgia. In Sinhapura, residents of both phases felt that they had had much better social relationships and networks in their previous homes. Although the problems encountered in their new location were not very different from what they had been used to before, people’s ability to deal with these problems had declined as a result of having to live in a neighbourhood crowded with
“strangers”. But in Passaiyoor, resettlement made it possible for people to reunite with the social networks they once had. This fact made it easier for them to be resilient against all kinds of threats.

The current violence encountered by the DFDR group in Sinhapura was at the extreme low end of the continuum, which was also the case for the CID group in Passaiyoor—though they had experienced high levels of violence before and the Sinhapura group had not. Therefore, the reference points with respect to violence are different for the two groups. It is also possible that the CID group, due to years of exposure to war, were already more adaptable and able to cope. After all, they had lived in various places, and engaged in assorted occupations to make ends meet. The DFDR group had not undergone such experiences, and were likely struggling as they tried to manage their situation. Further, the types and degrees of the 11 IRLR variables were different for the two locations. After their resettlement, the CID people did not experience landlessness, and they regained their social networks. For the DFDR group, their experience was the opposite. These differences affected the groups’ lifestyles, well-being, and recovery times.

Hammond (2008) and Kibreab (2003) spoke of “manoeuvering freedom and space” for resettled communities to recover—especially in terms of spontaneous resettlements and planned relocations, where the settlers had different levels of choice and opportunities. The satisfaction of the beneficiaries was also affected by whether the movement was voluntary or involuntary, and by the type of resettlement programmes. These varied according to whether the displaced people were empowered enough to be able to formulate their own income-generating patterns (rather than having only restricted work opportunities), and to have a sense of ownership of the process. In the case of Passaiyoor, the locals returned of their own free will, and took up occupations according to their liking. In Sinhapura, on the other hand, residents were often compelled to change their employment, taking new jobs that were not always to their liking. This sense of mobility (or immobility) and freedom to manoeuvre affected the people’s economic and psychological well-being. It also most likely contributed to reinforcing or diminishing their resilience. For example, the Passaiyoor people mentioned “space” with relish, while some in Sinhapura felt they were “in a cage”.

References


Jayatilaka, Lakshman, and Lakshman


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