Wellbeing and Protracted Urban Displacement: Refugees and Hosts in Jordan and Lebanon

Dolf te Lintelo, Rajith Lakshman, Wissam Mansour, Emma Soye, Teo Ficcarelli and Will Woodward

April 2018
This project was supported by NWO-WOTRO, through the Security and Rule of Law in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings research programme. Additional funding was leveraged from Save the Children UK to support the literature review.

Acknowledgements: the authors gratefully acknowledge the important inputs provided by various colleagues as part of this project. Expert review was provided by Professor Charles Watters at the University of Sussex during various stages of the project to guide and refine the report. Clive Robertson, creative director, and colleagues at RealTime went beyond the call of duty to create and produce the Participatory Video, which itself could not have been done without the wholehearted support from Naba’a community members, notably Hayat Fakherldine, Iman Atama, Saada Dadash, Rabab Iskouralam, Rene Braiteh, and Manaal Ghalaf. Samuel Brett at Impact Initiatives and Hart Ford at Acted expertly led the project activities undertaken in Amman and Beirut.
Contents

Executive summary v

1 Introduction 1

2 Refugee flows in Jordan and Lebanon: A background 5

3 Conceptual framework 9

4 Methodology 11
   4.1 Inception and end of project ‘research to policy’ workshops 12
   4.2 Systematic review of academic literature 12
   4.3 Re-examination of existing primary data on Syrian refugees in urban Jordan 14
   4.4 Grey literature 16
   4.5 Policy analysis 16
   4.6 Participatory Video 16
   4.7 Reflection on impact pathway 16

5 Modalities of reception 18
   5.1 Governance context – Lebanon 19
   5.2 National policy and law in Lebanon 19
      5.2.1 Border regimes 20
      5.2.2 Registration 21
      5.2.3 Legal status: residence permits, sponsorship and birth certificates 22
      5.2.4 Economic participation 26
      5.2.5 Housing 29
   5.3 Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors 32

6 Jordan 39
   6.1 Governance context – Jordan 39
   6.2 National policy and law in Jordan 39
      6.2.1 Border regimes 39
      6.2.2 Legal status: residence permits, bail outs and birth certificates 41
      6.2.3 Economic participation 47
      6.2.4 Housing 52
   6.3 Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors 53

7 Wellbeing of urban refugees and their hosts in Jordan and Lebanon: A systematic review of the academic literature 57
   7.1 Registration 57
      7.1.1 Registration and status determination: material wellbeing 58
      7.1.2 Registration and status determination: subjective wellbeing 60
      7.1.3 Registration and status determination: Relational wellbeing 61
      7.1.4 Conclusion 62
   7.2 Housing 63
      7.2.1 Housing: material wellbeing 63
      7.2.2 Housing: subjective wellbeing 65
      7.2.3 Housing: relational wellbeing 68
      7.2.4 Conclusion 71
7.3 Economic participation
7.3.1 Economic participation: material wellbeing
7.3.2 Economic participation: subjective wellbeing
7.3.3 Economic participation: relational wellbeing
7.3.4 Conclusion

8 Conclusions and recommendations

References

Appendix A Legal distinctions in Lebanon and Jordan: Syrians, Palestinian Refugees from Syria and Iraqis

Appendix B Systematic search strategy for academic literature

Appendix C Stakeholder maps

Appendix D Statistical comparison across five cities in Jordan

Appendix E Shortlist of Impact initiative’s primary datasets

Figures
Figure 2.1 Registered Syrian refugees in the region. 5
Figure 2.2 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon 7
Figure 3.1 The triangle of wellbeing 9
Figure 4.1 Research process and methodology 11
Figure 4.2 Systematic review of academic studies 13
Figure 4.3 Night light based urban map of Jordan (2013) 15
Figure 5.1 Changing residency policy in Lebanon 25
Figure 5.2 Households that have completed each step in birth registration for children born in Lebanon 25
Figure 5.3 Interlocking policy – Lebanon 26
Figure 5.4 The policy environment regarding economic participation for Syrians and Palestinians in Lebanon over time 29
Figure 6.1 Changing border regimes in Jordan 40
Figure 6.2 Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member holding a valid MoI card (2015–16) 44
Figure 6.3 Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member without valid MoI card (2015–16) 45
Figure 6.4 Policy change regarding legal residency status in Jordan 46
Figure 6.5 Interlocking policies – Jordan 46
Figure 6.6 Accommodation in tented settlements or tents 53
Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with municipal services 55
Figure 7.1 Households that reported having all household members with legal residency 58
Figure 7.2 Feeling part of a community 66
Figure 7.3 Accessing shelter causes tension in the community 69
Figure 7.4 Eviction of Syrian refugees in Jordan 71
Figure 7.5 Reasons why accessing employment causes tension in the community 77

Tables
Table 2.1 Syrian refugee numbers in various host countries 5
Table 2.2 Major forced migration movements to Jordan 6
Table 8.1 Policy trends Lebanon and Jordan 2011–2017 84
Executive summary

This research project was conducted between April 2017 and February 2018, aiming to answer the following research questions:

1. What modalities of reception drive what kind of gendered wellbeing outcomes for refugee and host communities in cities across Jordan and Lebanon? What explains for these outcomes?
2. In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and donors support modalities of reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing outcomes for urban refugees and host communities?

The project used the Bath Wellbeing in Development framework to analyse material, relational and subjective wellbeing outcomes for hosts and refugee groups. It conducted a systematic review of secondary materials, and combined this novel analysis of existing datasets for Syrian refugees in Jordan, a synthesis of policy analyses and a limited set of semi-structured interviews with key policy and practice stakeholders. The project also developed a Participatory Video together with host and refugee communities in Lebanon. Here we present some of the synthesis findings from the research, capturing the connections between modalities of reception and gendered wellbeing outcomes.

Urban modalities of reception

The war in Syria, now in its eighth year, has led to the mass exodus of the Syrian people. Lebanon and Jordan have achieved a remarkable feat by hosting millions of refugees, with many having located to urban areas, where the great majority of local populations are already situated. The war has slowed down the Lebanese and Jordanian economies. Simultaneously, the refugee influx has put tremendous pressure on urban systems providing housing and basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, electricity and waste collection) that were already strained prior to the crisis. The mass arrival has seen accelerated house rent inflation, severely diminished water supplies, daily power outages, higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of health-care and education providers to cope with demand. Charged regional politics are severely challenging delicate societal and inter-communal harmony. There are large discrepancies in perceptions of inequality and threats between Syrian refugees and host groups. Many refugees complain about their discriminatory treatment by local business and state institutions, whereas hosts consider Syrian refugees as disproportionately benefiting from international aid and an economic threat.

We broadly conceptualised ‘modalities of reception’ comprising of those (formal and informal) arrangements, policies, programmes and implementation practices that constitute more or less enabling environments for refugee and host communities to enjoy safe, dignified and worthwhile lives and to achieve wellbeing, as people themselves define this.

The relations that Syrian refugees have with governments in Jordan and Lebanon often involve national level authorities, as both countries have highly centralised policymaking processes. Frequent changes in national policies and complex bureaucratic processes (e.g. regarding registration, residency, work) make it hard for refugees to both stay updated on their obligations regarding temporary stay, and entitlements and protections that may be enjoyed. Moreover, government officials have a significant level of discretion in applying policies, creating further uncertainty, arbitrariness and unevenness in their application.

Yet, relations with local urban/municipal authorities are important too, as the latter bear the brunt of dealing with the everyday challenges that the refugee influx poses. Local responses are, however, largely ad hoc, and little evidence is discerned of self-initiated strategic plans.
or policies to manage the influx. In Lebanon but not in Jordan, mayoral initiatives were noted, apparently generating both positive (e.g. hosting social events for hosts and refugees) and negative (e.g. curfews; closure of informal businesses) wellbeing outcomes. However, while likely to be significant, these occasions are poorly documented and their wellbeing effects under-analysed.

In the early years of the crisis, humanitarian actors largely sidestepped municipalities, facing both low capacity and centralisation of policy. However, it is increasingly recognised that this is not sustainable and while many new initiatives have emerged that do better, there are opportunities to take better stock of lessons learnt from these efforts.

Informal settlements attract the poorest Syrian refugees and other migrants, but also poor Jordanians and Lebanese, precisely because they offer the most affordable housing (and sometimes a place of anonymous refuge). However, neither Jordan nor Lebanon has a national urban policy and both consider informal settlements undesirable. Urban planning is weak in both countries, but whereas Jordan has undertaken efforts in promoting social housing and upgrading informal settlements, in Lebanon the state has been highly ambivalent towards the latter. Thus, whereas Palestinian camps are not provided with services such as electricity, water and sanitation, etc., informal settlements raised by Lebanese internal migrants who are able to politically organise vis-à-vis the state have achieved some provisioning over time.

In urban and peri-urban informal settlements of various forms, assemblages of actors (private, aid, government, non-government, faith based organisations, NGOs) are involved in a wide range of service provision to poor hosts and Syrian refugees – from security, to housing, education, etc. The terms under which these occur diverge by location and by population, and their wellbeing effects are generally not very well understood.

Evidence synthesised in this study suggests that urban modalities of reception are based on who one is but also where one is. Reception differs spatially between and within cities, especially in Lebanon. Thus, for instance in Beirut, Palestinian unofficial ‘gatherings’, Palestinian camps and informal settlements all are governed by different actors, whose territorial dominance generates different ways of rule, and distinct relations to city governments, utilities, and other formal actors to result in a patchwork of negotiated, and highly localised provisioning of services. Similarly, peri-urban informal tented settlements on private land are idiosyncratically governed by their owners.

Urban informal institutions have historically emerged to provide critical services and forms of political representation for refugees and internally displaced groups and migrants. They generate ‘solutions’ that seek to work around the constraints posed by formal policy positions that have historically emerged. For instance, mediators and municipalities find ways to allow for housing maintenance in unofficial Palestinian gatherings. While these urban informal institutions perform important functions for their constituencies, their treatment of Syrian and minority host populations are not necessarily equitable, and greater understanding is needed of their wellbeing effects on the most vulnerable groups.

**Border regimes, registration and residency: effects on wellbeing**

The current (and possible future) modalities of reception for Syrians can be understood with reference to historical ways in which influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees were politically and administratively managed. Whereas Jordan has extended citizenship rights to most Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has steadfastly resisted this. Consequently, the enduringly temporary status of Palestinian refugees in urban Lebanon, spanning multiple generations (since 1948), is characterised by severe and multiple overlapping vulnerabilities, including limited entitlements to work, health care, higher education and lacking social and political rights and structural discrimination.
Nationality, wealth and religious affiliation emerge as factors in modalities of reception for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. In the absence of refugee or asylum law, Jordan and Lebanon consider refugees and asylum seekers foremost as ‘foreigners’, where nationality serves as a primary source from which civil rights and entitlements are derived. Consequently, within the same host country, people fleeing from Syria are not all treated equally. Palestinian refugees from Syria have been received on less generous terms than people bearing the Syrian nationality. From early on in the conflict, borders have been shut for Palestinian refugees from Syria in both Jordan and Lebanon. Moreover, we find some evidence that distinct modalities of reception were based on wealth and religious affiliation, for Syrians, and historically with Palestinian and Iraqi refugees.

Interlocking public policies regarding border crossings, processes of registration, status determination and legal residency determine Syrians’ access to housing, economic participation and legal identity. For instance, policy sets out that the nature of a person’s entry into the host country, via an official or unofficial border crossing, interacts with policy that shapes the processes and options for gaining access to housing (in host communities vs obligatory encampment in Jordan), or towards obtaining temporary legal residency status (Lebanon, Jordan). Residency policy in turn determines the possibility for parents to find legal work and to register child births.

Public policy and diffuse implementation practices have made it difficult for a significant share of Syrian refugees to obtain and retain legal residency status, through imposition of regular fees and sponsorship requirements for those not registered with UNHCR (Lebanon), and officials retaining and misplacing identity documents (Jordan). Irregular residency status is a key factor in producing material and subjective wellbeing failures: it reduces people’s mobility – in particular affecting the menfolk – access to basic services, formal work, and exposing people to arrest, detention and deportation; labour exploitation and sexual abuse (particularly women and girls); an inability to turn to the authorities for protection or redress; and psychological anxieties. It also inhibits registrations of marriages and births, to risk thousands of newborns becoming stateless, and structural vulnerability in the future.

Recent policy efforts, following multi-year compacts with the EU and the international donor community, seem to enable more Syrians to gain legal residency, though data on this are not yet available (Lebanon), and some groups are excluded from this arrangement and remain highly vulnerable.

In the absence of legal protections, cultural notions of hospitality have had important symbolic and practical significance for dealing with the Syrian influx by buffeting relational wellbeing. Enduring displacement and financial and social pressures faced by host groups has, however, put significant strain on hospitality, with host communities struggling to live up to cultural ideals of hosting, and a gradual social re-categorisation is taking place that considers Syrians less “guests” and more “refugees”, and less worthy of support. The terminology of “guests” connotes hospitality, but also the temporary nature of refugees’ presence in the country, and does not imply the granting of legal rights.

**Housing and wellbeing**

While Jordan has made a significant effort at encampment and Lebanon adopted a ‘no-camp policy’, in both countries a significant majority of people have ended up living in urban and peri-urban areas. For Syrian refugees, living conditions vary widely. The main housing options available are: (1) rental housing; (2) squatting in and further overcrowding one of UNRWA’s camps for Palestinian refugees and in unofficial ‘Palestinian gatherings’; (3) forming or joining informal tented settlements (ITS) on rented private or public land (often in conjunction with providing low-wage labour; (4) living with local hosts; or (5) camps (Jordan only). Each of the options presents its own wellbeing challenges, and they collectively fail to meet the need for housing.
In Jordan, refugees face trade-offs between modalities of reception that offer provision of shelter and subsistence but little mobility or opportunity to exercise agency (camps), and living in cities which offers greater autonomy and opportunity for improvement, but that also entails the risk of a more precarious existence.

The extra population influx of Syrians has placed substantial additional pressure on already inadequate urban basic infrastructure servicing the host populations, while the unavailability of affordable housing has meant that property rents have rapidly increased, and are a key cause of worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities. The psychological pressures that high and rising housing rents generate leads to frequent relocation, potentially making it harder for social networks, important to everyday relational wellbeing, to take root and inhibiting social cohesion. Moreover, this housing deficit further underpins the disproportionately powerful position of landlords versus refugee tenants, enabling abuse, violence and arbitrary treatment.

The pressures of housing rents have made the relatively low-rent conditions of official and unofficial Palestinian camps and gatherings in cities attractive to the poorest host, Syrian and other migrant groups, diversifying its populations. This also involves a growing densification of poor urban neighbourhoods and a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of living conditions. Subject to historic policy neglect, in Lebanon, urban Palestinian camps have weak physical infrastructures, substandard housing and are overcrowded, yet offer low rents, and relative anonymity and security for those unable to acquire or maintain legal residence status.

Overcrowded, unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, affect subjective wellbeing in various ways. Worries and anxiety about one’s ability to pay the rent now and in future are common. Overcrowded housing limits privacy, dignity and affects people’s peace of mind, while the lack of safety outside, and the risk of arrest by security forces and the police due to one’s irregular legal status immobilises and keeps women and girls in particular confined to their homes, with many living in extreme social isolation. Refugees linked cramped living conditions to their psychological health, the occurrence of family conflict, domestic violence (to which women are particularly subjected), and rebellious and badly behaved children.

Outside the home too, lack of safety and threats to personal and bodily integrity are key wellbeing concerns of both hosts and Syrian refugees, and particularly to girls and women. Displaced populations are often affected by a heightened risk of violence within the displaced community, between host and displaced communities and with the authorities. The risk of violence is associated with family separation, overcrowded living spaces, poor social cohesion, unsafe shelter, gender-based discrimination, limited rights and protection services, and changes in traditional gender roles that accompany displacement. Competition for economic resources have played a role in violent clashes in urban camps in Lebanon.

Legal safeguards are largely absent and judicial systems weakly equipped to offer protection to refugees.

**Economic participation and wellbeing**

Economic participation is critical for the wellbeing of refugee and host communities. Humanitarian assistance is neither designed nor sufficient to provide for the full scope of refugee needs. Work is critical for catering to basic needs and material wellbeing, but also potentially offers the perspective for longer term improvement, provided the terms under which work is engaged in are conducive.

Public policies in Lebanon and Jordan are geared to protect the formal sector economic interests of the host communities, in the shape of work permits and professions restricted to these populations. In Jordan, since the end of 2015 access to formal jobs has been facilitated by the Government as part of the Jordan Compact with donors. Nevertheless,
refugees have had to primarily rely on the informal sector for work. This meant that poorer Jordanians, Lebanese and other migrants who were already working in the informal sector had to bear the costs of growing labour supplies, through falling wages and loss of jobs.

The relational wellbeing of refugees with regard to interaction with the host populations are defined by the tensions, real or perceived, that have been created not only by the increased competition for jobs, but also by competition for other resources. Labour markets are a key point of friction and these frictions have increased with time, generating increasing levels of negative relational wellbeing.

Economic participation in the informal sector was possible only if the refugees were prepared to bear significant risks of exploitation. In addition to lower pay, which the poorer locals also had to endure, other forms of exploitation such as longer hours of work, poor labour conditions, rights violations and use of child labour, are common. Under the *kefala* system, in operation in various forms in Lebanon and Jordan, migrant workers require a domestic sponsor for obtaining a work visa. The relationship between these workers and their employers is characterised by structural power inequalities. As legal status is dependent on continued employer support, the conditions are fertile for abuse, particularly in the absence of effective policing and judicial protection.

The lack of economic opportunity and the inability to fulfil the traditional role of breadwinner of a household has negatively affected men’s subjective wellbeing. Their anxieties and frustrations have perversely spilled over to other members of the households in the form of domestic violence. The use of child labour as a negative coping mechanism to secure some form of economic participation achieved the desired effect only at a substantial psychosocial cost. This type of trade-off between material and subjective elements of household wellbeing was common. Syrian boys were the most exploited in the labour market but girls, because of the gendered nature of economic opportunities available for them, were more at risk of child marriages.

Since late 2015, in Jordan, the compact with donors has led to a concerted effort to issue 200,000 work permits, formalising existing jobs and aiming to generate new jobs for Jordanians and Syrians. Its roll out is progressing, albeit not as fast as planned, and its effects are as yet unclear. Comparable efforts in Lebanon have focused on job creation and livelihoods, but have not led to policy change simplifying access to the formal labour market for Syrians. Portraying refugees as a resource that can be harnessed for the benefit of the host country is a strategy that is likely to improve relational wellbeing of refugees as well as the hosts. Both countries have specific example projects that have begun to look at refugees as a resource.
1 Introduction

Cities, towns and urban areas play a central role in the dynamics of global refugee flows. They absorb more than two thirds of the refugee population across the world (IOM 2015: 78) and the volume of urban refugees is estimated to increase at a rate of 8 percent per annum (United Nations 2015). Cities have been critical too in the case of the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis (Mercy Corps 2014). Now in its eight year, the civil war has led to over 5 million Syrians fleeing the country, with another 6.5 million being internally displaced (http://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html, accessed 30 November 2017). Besides the refugee influx, the war has significantly affected neighbouring countries by impeding cross border trade, slowing down economic growth in Lebanon and Jordan (EIU 2017a; 2017b). The World Bank (World Bank 2013: 1) estimated that during the 2012–14 period, the Syrian conflict could cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year in Lebanon. It would further push approximately 170,000 Lebanese into poverty, while deepening the poverty of those already poor. The Syrian conflict has also led to the infiltration of extremist groups leading to regular, highly violent incidents, attacks and battles in Lebanon, and the fear of further spill-overs casts a significant shadow over refugee politics and social relations in host countries.

Estimates suggest that over 85 per cent of Syrian refugees have settled in and around urban centres (Achilli 2015a), and their displacement has become protracted in most instances. By September 2017, Lebanon and Jordan had absorbed and given commendable hospitality to an extraordinary number of registered Syrians: respectively 1.001 million and 0.65 million (http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html). Substantial additional numbers of displaced people remain unregistered. Their numbers are subject to much uncertainty and significant contestation (Lenner 2016; UNHCR et al. 2016). In addition, both countries have historically absorbed significant Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations. The influx of Syrian refugees has added to already highly urbanised populations in Lebanon (83.7 per cent) and in Jordan (87.8 per cent) (United Nations 2014). For instance, Amman, the capital of Jordan, harbours more than 400,000 Syrians (EIU 2017a). However, the impact of mass displacement (driven by conflict or disasters) on host cities, and in particular on the resilience of the urban system, is not well understood (Kirbyshire et al. 2017).

Significant proportions of Syrian refugees experience poor wellbeing (Scales et al. 2015). The refugee population influx combined with assistance gaps have affected a dramatic deterioration of living conditions for refugees and vulnerable host populations because of an exhaustion of the affordable housing market, stretched public services (water, electricity, education, health, solid waste collection, etc.), price inflation (Jordan) and wage depression. The World Cities report 2016 sets out that in 2014/15, 12.9 per cent of the urban population in Jordan was estimated to be living in slums, amounting to 808,000 people (UN-HABITAT 2016). The urban poverty headcount rates amounted to 13.9 per cent in 2010, based on national poverty lines, which typically underestimate urban poverty incidence. In Lebanon, in 2014/15, 53.1 per cent of the urban population was estimated to be living in slum areas, amounting to 4.4 million people (ibid.).

The Government of Lebanon’s (2016: 63) submission to the United Nations’ Habitat III conference notes that it has not recognised slums until today, and officially maintains the need for their dismantling. It further identified four types of slums in Lebanon. First, small pop-up gatherings of substandard housing near industrial and agricultural sites, found present in nearly all urban and rural areas of Lebanon. Second, large informal settlements are present as neighbourhoods in central and suburban areas of major cities. For instance, in Beirut, there are 24 informal neighbourhoods housing nearly 300,000 inhabitants (an estimated 20 per cent of the agglomeration’s population). Third, Palestinian refugee camps. Fourth, informal tented settlements, especially in rural areas and in urban peripheries.
While 15 per cent and 23 per cent of the working age populations in Jordan and Lebanon are unemployed, and 70 per cent of Syrian refugees live under the poverty line and 35 per cent are moderately/severely food insecure, competition over income-generating opportunities has grown sharply, challenging community relations (UNHCR et al. 2016). In Lebanon, for example, nearly 71 per cent of the surveyed host communities in cities perceived that public service conditions had worsened in their municipalities (Mercy Corps 2014). More than a one out of four million Lebanese nationals live below the poverty line, and it is estimated that a further 170,000 have been pushed into poverty by the unfolding Syrian crisis (World Bank 2013).

Cities may offer economic and social opportunities – however, they can also be places of rising inequalities, deprivation, poverty, isolation and exploitation. In conditions of scarcity and growing urban inequalities, greater understanding is needed of the ways in which people succeed or fail to make urban areas into places of belonging, participation and wellbeing. The limited understandings we have about how local urban dimensions shape wellbeing outcomes in conditions of protracted crises hinder a more effective humanitarian and developmental response. A key opportunity may be lost:

Urban refugees could be highly beneficial to cities if they were allowed to pursue productive lives, absent legal restrictions, harassment, and insecurity ... Host governments and UNHCR could do much to bring about positive outcomes without expending significant resources, and without placing the host society at a disadvantage. ( Jacobsen 2006: 273)

International recognition of the importance of urban areas in the protection of forced migrants and refugees is rapidly rising. The New Urban Agenda of UN-Habitat (2016) explicitly calls for inclusion of urban refugees within existing city structures, to help achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11: inclusive, sustainable and secure cities. But as cities and towns are now key settings for protracted displacement, humanitarianism faces a double challenge. Firstly, as the average period of displacement is now about two decades, responses need to turn from humanitarian relief to development. This requires taking a long term perspective that looks beyond immediate survival and protection needs, towards livelihoods, security and prosperity, underpinned by new sets of competences, mandates, and analytical and programmatic approaches. Humanitarian policy is beginning to recognise that forced displacement is primarily a ‘development issue with humanitarian elements – and not the other way around’ (Harild 2016: 5). One key aspect, highlighted by the World Humanitarian Summit (2016) concerns the ‘localisation agenda’: the need for a much richer appreciation of local context in responses. Arguably, the humanitarian system and its operating principle of human universality is poorly geared up to appreciate difference in people and their values, cultures and needs, and the ways in which people’s relations to others and to diverse holders of authority shape their lives. Secondly, humanitarianism is at the start of a process of coming to terms with ‘the urban’, as its bodies of knowledge, instruments and tools for intervention have historically been grounded in temporary rural (camp) conditions. This challenge to better understand the urban is, however, also faced by the development studies discipline (Parnell 2016).

In this respect, urban studies and related disciplines have significant insights to offer. Urbanists highlight the complexities of urban systems, referring to, amongst others, the dynamics between high population fluxes, mobilities and densities; congested and contested use of public and private spaces; the significance and fluid relations between formality-informality and the struggles for public authority by multiple actors. National and city

1 The UNDP, for example, have taken a ‘resilience-based development approach’. This involves adopting a longer-term perspective from the outset, focusing on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with the crisis through immediate emergency interventions and sustaining this recovery toward development (UNDP 2014).
governments, donors and non-state actors put in place policies, programmes and implementation practices, and various informal arrangements that establish environments within which refugees and host communities pursue wellbeing.

We broadly conceptualised 'modalities of reception' comprising of those (formal and informal) arrangements, policies, programmes and implementation practices that constitute more or less enabling environments for refugee and host communities to enjoy safe, dignified and worthwhile lives and to achieve wellbeing, as people themselves define this. Modalities of reception need to be understood historically, and can vary by country, by city, by population groups and along gendered lines in terms of services (e.g. access to shelter, health, education and social protection), control over labour activities, and people’s mobility and freedom of movement.

Globally, refugee studies show that ‘modalities of reception’ have significant impact on wellbeing for both refugee and host communities (Wallin and Ahlström 2005; Watters 2008, 2001; Wimelius et al. 2017), often in a highly gendered way (Ellis et al. 2010; Rousseau et al. 2004). The ‘refugee policies of the host government – or in cases where the central government’s remit is weak, the local authorities – is a key determinant of refugees’ vulnerability and their ability to pursue livelihoods’ (Jacobsen 2002: 101). Where the state fails to provide protection, a variety of other actors can be expected to fulfil such welfare functions (Davis 2004). For instance, non-state actors such as faith based organisations have been shown able to provide effective modes of reception (Ager, 2015). In urban contexts, the density and concentration of people may particularly facilitate a rich tapestry of organisations and rich variety of collective action responses. Formal and informal support modalities co-exist, but their interrelations and effects on wellbeing are poorly understood. Moreover, gendered institutional practices (e.g. by support agencies or FBOs) can have significant impacts on gendered outcomes (Kabeer 2013), while needs for support may differ by gender (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2013). In Jordan and Lebanon, significant heterogeneity exists in terms of institutional service delivery and governance between urban, peri-urban and rural areas (World Bank 2015), while some reports also note that local municipalities increasingly devise policies aiming to address the Syrian refugee crisis (Mercy Corps 2014). However, there is currently little comprehensive evidence that tells us how and why modalities of reception shape wellbeing outcomes for Syrians and host communities, and how to improve reception environments in cities.

Accordingly, in this report, we aim to review, synthesise and strengthen the evidence base on dynamics and consequences of urban modalities of reception (including those supported by donors) for gendered wellbeing outcomes of refugee and host communities. We do so with the aim to support evidence informed decision-making by key actors managing the Syrian refugee crisis across cities in Jordan and Lebanon. As such, the report seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. What modalities of reception drive what kind of gendered wellbeing outcomes for refugee and host communities in cities across Jordan and Lebanon? What explains these outcomes?
2. In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and donors support modalities of reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing outcomes for urban refugees and host communities?

Accordingly, this report investigates the possible ways in which the wellbeing outcomes of refugees and their hosts in Jordanian and Lebanese cities are shaped by modalities of refugee reception. The remainder of this report is structures as follows. This introductory section will be followed by section 2, which explains the background of refugee flows into Jordan and Lebanon. Section 3 explains the conceptual framework and this is followed by section 4, which outlines the methodological approaches used in this report to produce a nuanced analysis. Sections 5 (Lebanon) and 6 (Jordan) offer a detailed analysis of the
modalities of reception for Syrians living with hosts in urban areas. We briefly discuss general governance issues in the host countries to set the scene, then discuss national policies on three focal themes: borders/registration/legal status; housing; and economic participation. Finally, we will review local responses to the Syrian influx, including those of municipalities and non-state actors involved in governing urban spaces, to directly and/or indirectly affect the wellbeing of refugees. Next, section 7 provides a systematic analysis of the academic literature on wellbeing of refugees that had fled to Jordan and Lebanon over the last 20 years and presents findings across the three focal themes. Section 8 concludes the study and offers a set of recommendations for policy and research agendas.
2 Refugee flows in Jordan and Lebanon: A background

Several years into the crisis, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt were hosting 95 per cent of the overall Syrian refugee flow (Achilli 2015).

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of registered Syrian refugees in the region (Sullivan and Simpson 2017).

Figure 2.1 Registered Syrian refugees in the region.

![Figure 2.1](image)


Consequently, Lebanon and Jordan are now amongst the countries with the highest ratios of registered refugees to overall population in the world (Kirbyshire et al. 2017). Table 2.1 shows the total and relative shares Syrian refugees make up in (groups of) host countries.

Table 2.1 Syrian refugee numbers in various host countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Refugees</td>
<td>1,322,825</td>
<td>16,218</td>
<td>476,510</td>
<td>1,265,000</td>
<td>1,017,433</td>
<td>2,764,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>508,000,000</td>
<td>318,900,000</td>
<td>80,620,000</td>
<td>9,523,000</td>
<td>4,467,000</td>
<td>74,930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>0.005%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>3.6%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are approximations based on UNHCR, Eurostat, and national census data. With any hidden and mobile population, especially politically controversial groups like refugees, estimations are based on the best available data. Source: Sullivan and Simpson (2017).
The Syrian influx has added to significant existing numbers of refugees and displaced people hosted in these countries. Jordan has hosted significant population influxes of Palestinian refugees, with estimates of 1.1 million arriving over time from Palestine (in 1948 and 1967) and Palestinian-origin Jordanians who had lived in the Gulf for decades (fleeing the Gulf war in 1991). In addition, Jordan has hosted thousands of Iraqis (following the first Gulf War as well as after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Table 2.1). 29,191 Iraqi refugees were registered with UNHCR in Jordan, and 8,751 in Lebanon by 2012 (UNOCHA 2012). Some estimates suggest that around half of the population of Jordan is of Palestinian descent (Lenner 2016). 1.9 million Palestinians are registered with UNRWA (these include Palestinians born in Jordan). Unlike any other host country, Jordan granted most Palestinian refugees citizenship rights. Yet this has not quite resulted in citizenship on the basis of equality with Jordanian nationals (IRIN 2010).

The Syrian civil war has doubly displaced Iraqis or Palestinians who had found refuge in Syria (Lenner 2016). Just ahead of the Syrian civil war, 427,000 Palestinian refugees were registered with UNRWA in Syria, many holding most of the same rights as the Syrian population, barring citizenship rights. Other UNHCR registered refugee groups in Jordan also increased from 28,070 in December 2013 (Bidinger et al. 2015) to 57,140 in December 2015 (Saliba 2016). These include, in Jordan, 1,700 African refugees, including Sudanese, Egyptians and Somalis (Bidinger et al. 2015) and a growing number of Yemeni people that are in the country but have not necessarily applied for asylum. UNHCR’s April 2016 Jordan country update indicated that there are 3,852 Yemenis registered in the Kingdom (ARDD-Legal Aid 2016a).

Over 90 per cent of Syrians entering Jordan (and Lebanon) are families, and over half the population are children below 18 years of age (Bidinger et al. 2015). The large influxes to Jordan have been facilitated by several factors, such as its political stability, historical social, economic and cultural relationships between inhabitants of the two countries and refugees’ kinship and friendship ties in Jordan (Achilli 2015a). As Table 2.2 shows, estimates of the number of refugees from Iraq and Syria in Jordan vary widely. The number of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees stands over 650,000 as of October 2017 (http://www.unhcr.org/uk/jordan.html, last accessed 3 November 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of forced migrants</th>
<th>Estimated numbers Jordan*</th>
<th>Estimated numbers Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Palestinians from Palestine</td>
<td>ca. 450,000</td>
<td>300,000–450,000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Palestinians from West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
<td>ca. 350,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–92</td>
<td>Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin from Kuwait and other Gulf states</td>
<td>ca. 300,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–07</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>160,000–700,000</td>
<td>50,000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>660,000–1,300,000</td>
<td>1,100,000–1,500,000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In contrast, the number issued by the Syrian Refugee Assistance Department and publicly used by the Jordanian government estimates that there are roughly 1.26 million Syrians in the country. As the King of Jordan Abdullah II used a similar figure of 1.2 million in a 2013 speech, this number has become an important reference point for policy, population surveys and in public discourse (Lenner 2016). The government estimates are based on a census analysis carried out in late 2015 and combine registered plus unregistered Syrians. However,

---

2 The exception are 120,000 Palestinians who arrived without identity documentation from the Gaza Strip.
details about the methodology applied and data have not been released, incurring widespread concern about the census’ veracity (Lenner 2016). On the other hand, the Government has pointed out that the significant mobility of Syrian refugees, and their failure to notify UNHCR or the Ministry of Interior makes it difficult to maintain accurate official data on refugee population distribution (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 16).

In the case of the Iraqi influx in 2003, counting methodologies inflated estimates of the number of Iraqi displaced people in Jordan, substantially increasing donor aid (Lenner 2016: 14–15). While this enabled a strengthening of the protection space, it also created serious problems for humanitarian agencies, who were unable to plan activities for ‘missing Iraqis’. As a consequence, UNHCR and its partners now rely exclusively on their own figures and do not openly contest the government numbers (Lenner 2016: 14–15).

In Lebanon, immediately prior to the start of the Syrian conflict, Iraqi refugees made up close to 90 per cent of the population of concern to UNHCR in Lebanon (not counting the Palestinian groups) (UNOCHA 2012). The Syrian influx has occurred at a rather different scale. The highly paced influx of Syrians is shown in Figure 2.2 (using data from https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-residing-lbn).

**Figure 2.2 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon**

![Figure 2.2 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/refugees-residing-lbn)

By 2017, there were 1.1 million UNHCR registered refugees, with up to an additional 500,000 unregistered Syrians in Lebanon (GoL and United Nations 2017), up from 200,000 in 2013 (ACAPS 2013: 4). Moreover, around 450,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA in Lebanon (https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon, last accessed 1 November 2017). In addition, Lebanon has an estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers (HRW 2017a), hailing primarily from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Nepal (HRW 2012a; ILO 2016).

In Lebanon, sectarian politics and the fragile demographic balance between confessional communities (including Sunni and Shia Muslims, Maronite, Greek-Orthodox Christians, Druze, Alawite and other groups) has affected reception responses. The demographics are so sensitive that the last official census was conducted in 1932, which showed that the largest community within Lebanon was the Maronite Christian sect, followed by Sunni Muslims and Shi’a Muslims. This count formed the basis of a fragile political settlement in which key positions in the polity were allocated by confession. So, the Presidency of the Republic is always fulfilled by Maronites while the offices of Prime Minister and Speaker of
Parliament have been given to Sunnis and Shi’ites respectively. Thus, Halabi (2004: 40) argues that Palestinian refugees would, if naturalised and granted full citizenship, shift the demographic balance in favour of the (Sunni) Muslims, implying a change in power distribution in favour of a new Muslim majority. Similarly, Martin (2015: 10) notes that for this reason, historically, not all Palestinians were treated the same way. The Palestinian middle and upper classes have never known life in the camps, as they, especially the Christians, were allowed to settle in the cities and integrate into Lebanese society. Between the 1950s and 1970s some 28,000 Christian Palestinians were encouraged to obtain Lebanese citizenship in the government’s attempt to counterbalance the growth of the Muslim population (El-Natour 1993: 42; in Martin 2015).
3 Conceptual framework

There are many ways of assessing wellbeing. One influential analytical framework with particular promise for application in displacement contexts concerns the Wellbeing in Development approach developed at Bath University. It uses a three dimensional framework that takes account of the dynamic interplay of the material and relational dimensions of a person’s wellbeing with their assessment of their subjective wellbeing (Figure 3.1). By considering material wellbeing (what one has and could do with this), relational wellbeing (living well together with others) and subjective wellbeing (taking account of how people feel about their achievements and failures) it enables a rounded understanding of how people are faring.

Figure 3.1 The triangle of wellbeing

As such, it considers vulnerability, marginality and deprivation by considering not only income and asset poverty (the material dimension of wellbeing). It also involves aspects of exclusion, as well as social and political connectivity (the relational dimension of wellbeing), as wellbeing “does not “belong” to individuals at all, but is produced through interaction with others and the context in which wellbeing is experienced” (White 2016: xii). Wellbeing hence is not simply about living well, but about living well together (Deneulin and McGregor 2010). Finally, the framework recognises the lived experiences of impoverishment and indignity (the subjective dimension of wellbeing) as another key dimension that is fundamental to understanding what people ‘in poverty’ are able to do and why (see for example Gough and McGregor 2007; McGregor et al. 2009, 2007; Rojas 2008; White 2010).

Also important here are insights from Sen’s capability approach, that highlights the critical role of agency and freedom in the constitution of eudaimonic wellbeing (human flourishing), rather than more hedonic versions of wellbeing that stress material needs. Wellbeing then is viewed as both a process and an outcome, with individuals requiring capabilities to achieve meaningful goals (McGregor et al. 2007; Sen 1999). Cities’ ‘bright lights’ offer the prospect of modernisation, of opportunity and freedom from various forms of restriction. Thus, urban contexts in Lebanon offer women ‘more opportunities of gender equality with increased participation in education, economic and social activism’ (Government of Lebanon 2016: 20). They also offer anonymity for those seeking it. Cities are thus places in which people aspire and strive for new forms of wellbeing. The salience of these cognitive aspects makes it particularly apparent why a wellbeing framing for an analysis of urban displacement is appropriate (te Linteło et al. 2017).
The Bath Wellbeing in Development framework underlines that achievements and failures can be experienced in relation to material, relational and subjective dimensions of wellbeing. One starting point for analysis involves ‘knowing what people think about what they conceive as wellbeing and how they are trying to achieve this’ (McGregor 2007: 347). This observation is important, as it implores external analysts and programming staff not to make a priori assumptions about what wellbeing constitutes for displaced groups and host communities. Wellbeing can be derived in many domains of life (e.g. housing, education, environmental conditions) that are typically overlapping and interdependent (Psychosocial Working Group 2003; Sumner and Mallett 2011; White 2008; Williamson and Robinson 2006). In this respect, it has also been noted that perceptions of what constitutes being or subjectively feeling ‘vulnerable’ can vary enormously between people (Sumner and Mallett 2011: 22). The experience of displacement-related trauma, for example, may be closely related to those things that a person uses to define himself or herself (Berman 2016). We cannot ‘claim to know, from the mere fact of refugeeness, the actual sources of a person’s suffering’ (Malkki 1995: 510).

Subjective wellbeing is founded in sets of values and relates to aspects that make up people’s (cultural, religious, national, local, youth, class, ethnic, gender) complex identities. Hence, while wellbeing goals may be individually prioritised, as humans are social creatures, individual goals often reference wider socio-cultural values. The link between individual and collective wellbeing is consistently highlighted across the development literature (Watters 2001; White 2016). For instance, religious beliefs and praxis can be central to how people conceive and experience wellbeing. It informs individuals’ social and political identity, but also provides community, a source of social welfare and grounds values (White 2012). Accordingly, we need to pay attention to individual wellbeing goals, but also to how these are produced relationally, through interaction with others and the context in which wellbeing is experienced (White 2016: xii).

It is now widely recognised that cultural values are closely linked to how people understand and respond to traumatic events such as protracted displacement. Western models of psychiatric support have been criticised for undermining traditional ways of dealing with trauma and failing to engage with refugee priorities (Watters 2008: 129). It is now widely recognised that cultural values are closely linked to how people understand and respond to traumatic events: the expression of trauma may be closely related to those things that a person uses to define himself (Berman 2016). Summerfield also notes that ‘every culture has its own constructions of traumatic events and recipes for recovery’ (Summerfield 1995: 354). Understanding values held by refugee as well as host groups may also equip programmes to help build connections between host and refugee communities and improve social cohesion (Guay 2015). However, it should be remembered that culture is not fixed and that displacement may cause cultural values to change over time (Hall 1993; Watters 2001). Cities inhabited by heterogeneous groups of people practising a wider range of cultural values and practices may be particularly accommodative of cultural change.
4 Methodology

All urban inhabitants aspire to wellbeing and act in efforts to achieve it, however they define it. While a wellbeing inquiry is thus pertinent in respect of city populations generally, we analyse displaced Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese and Jordanian host populations, and recognise that understanding their experiences may need sensitivity to intersectionalities of, for example, gender, class, religion, ethnicity and nationality. We consider that comparative attention to historic (Palestinian and Iraqi) and other contemporary refugee populations (Somalis, Sudanese, Eritreans, etc.) can provide valuable insights into the diverse modalities of reception that are in place in Lebanon and Jordan and the political and ideological underpinnings of policies. Comparisons are also made, where possible, between cities and between areas within cities located in Jordan and Lebanon.

Following the recommendations from the International Advisory Committee on the research proposal, the research design and methodology have been further specified from the outset of the project. The methodology has several integral elements as illustrated in Figure 4.1. These are examined in detail below under separate subsections.

Figure 4.1 Research process and methodology
4.1 Inception and end of project ‘research to policy’ workshops

Organised and hosted by the Impact Initiatives, a project inception workshop was held in Amman, Jordan on 15 May 2017. This provided a valuable opportunity for all project partners – from Jordan, Lebanon and the UK – to meet in person and together finalise the project methodology. This included finalising important methodological decisions on retrieval and analysis of secondary data/literature; on the identification and analysis of primary datasets; on the national level and city level policy analysis; and on the communications plan. One key decision taken by the participants was to focus the research on three themes: housing and shelter, economic participation, and refugee registration and legal status. These themes were deemed critical by the practitioner partners, Impact Initiatives and Acted, and particularly opportune areas for review. The workshop also crafted stakeholder maps for Jordan and Lebanon (0) as part of a communications plan that further outlined communications products and suitable channels targeting the mobilisation of research findings towards strategic academic and non-academic audiences.

Finally, two end of project workshops were conducted in January 2018 in Amman and Beirut to share and debate research findings and their implications for policy and programming. Participants included donors, UN bodies, researchers, INGOs and local NGOs, and invitations were extended to a wide range of participants recommended by the NWO-WOTRO Security and Rule of Law Programme’s Knowledge Platform.

Prior to these workshops, Acted, Impact Initiatives and the urban advisor (Dr Mansour) elaborately commented on a draft version of this report, and on a set of key findings that were shared with participants at the workshops. This entailed joint analysis and devising of a set of key findings, to ensure also that these were framed in a locally appropriate manner.

In Beirut, Syrian and Lebanese representatives from the Naba’a area who had been part of the Participatory Video were invited and actively contributed to the workshop. They particularly used the opportunity to ask critical questions to the representative from the Ministry of Social Affairs about service provisioning in their area, but also shared their highly personal experiences living together in a low cost area that is under tremendous strain.

Finally, detailed inputs were received from Professor Charles Watters, the senior academic advisor to the project based at the University of Sussex. This included regular contact, a review meeting halfway through the project (August 2017) that discussed interim findings, and detailed feedback and comments on the draft final report (February 2018).

4.2 Systematic review of academic literature

Wellbeing can mean different things to different people (White 2009: 3). The Wellbeing in Development conceptual framework thus emphasises a methodological commitment to bottom up enquiry, to open up analytical space to understand individual needs, aspirations and (dis)satisfactions. Within the context of this project, limited space existed to undertake bottom up enquiry beyond the participatory video, as the funders’ directed the review of secondary materials. Yet, the analytical categorisations proposed by the framework were found helpful for organising study findings.

We used a systematic approach to sift through and select all academic studies that looked at possible wellbeing impacts on refugees and hosts in urban areas in Jordan and in Lebanon and on their local hosts. To this end, we used a clearly documented online keyword search strategy. Three online databases were used – Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar – to identify existing studies focussing on: refugee or host populations in Jordan and Lebanon; thematic areas identified for this research (housing; economic participation; registration/legal status) or on urban areas. The details of the keyword search strategy are in 0.
The search strategy involved a sequence of well documented, meticulous and replicable operations before the final set of studies were identified. It was applied to Web of Science and Scopus as described above and with Google Scholar with some modifications.\(^3\)

Figure 4.2 provides a graphical description of these various steps and show how they relate to each other.

---

\(^3\) Google Scholar does not allow complex search strings like Web of Science or Scopus. We modified the search strategy to reflect these limitations and used the modified version on Google Scholar to look at urban-focused work done on Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon in the last year.
4.3 Re-examination of existing primary data on Syrian refugees in urban Jordan

The Impact Initiatives holds a repository of primary data on refugees and/or hosts in Jordan, as part of its assignments conducted for various clients during the last few years. This constituted a significant untapped resource. We accordingly did a fresh analysis of some of the survey datasets in this repository. We were exclusively interested in household/individual level survey data on Syrian refugees’ registration/legal status, economic participation and housing in urban Jordan. Having comparable data across Syrians/Jordanians or across urban/rural was considered an added advantage. Seventeen primary datasets were shortlisted after methodically combing through the metadata (see 0 for an annotated list of these datasets). The relevant datasets were selected from among the shortlisted ones after carefully considering the reports based on the surveys, and the questionnaires used in the surveys. The nationwide Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Social Cohesion Survey 2016 was selected after considering these requirements. Though not collected for this purpose, the studies contain valuable unpublished data on wellbeing indicators relating to our thematic areas of interest, to provide new insight into the still unfolding refugee crisis.

In case the survey data included geo-coordinates of the households, we connected that information with night-time light (NTL) data. Given that there are no widely available classifications or maps showing these areas in Jordan, Impact Initiatives developed an approach using night light data to approximately identify areas as being urban, peri-urban or rural areas. These identifications enabled wellbeing outcomes to differ significantly across urban, peri-urban and rural areas in Jordan.

The DMSP/OLS stable NTL data has been extensively used to provide a unique data set to study/map urban extent (Elvidge et al. 1997; Huang et al. 2016). We used Version 4 of the data captured in 2013 (NCEI 2018) which was the latest available NTL data (Figure 4.3).

The following method was used:

- Processed the imagery and converted it into a georeferenced raster using ArcGIS software, each pixel covering 745,400 square meters (the picture below shows how much this area covers).
- Each pixel’s colour was placed onto a grey colour ramp with values from 0–63.
- Determination of urban/peri-urban/rural categories on the 0–63 colour ramp based on visual comparison of lighting data with satellite imagery, Open Street Map (OSM) landscan of populated areas, OSM land cover data and census 2016 population clusters.
- The best suiting light-categories were found to be: 0–20: Rural, 21–45: Peri-urban, 46–63: Urban.
Figure 4.3 Night light based urban map of Jordan (2013)
4.4 Grey literature
Grey literature, as we have defined it here, includes reports, handbooks, practitioner guidelines and other publications by NGOs and UN agencies. They contain valuable information regarding donor perspectives on the refugee crisis and most are publicly available for online access. Our methodology for accessing these documents had been guided by a (structured) snowballing technique. This process was kicked off by perusing the grey literature already in the possession of Impact Initiatives and Acted, but also available in platforms such as UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal.

4.5 Policy analysis
We reviewed existing summary analyses of the policy and legal environments that shape government reception for Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon, and further screened for examples of city level initiatives in this respect. Sources included academic articles, research reports, online commentaries and English language local newspaper articles. We further conducted informal consultations with selected informants and local contacts, including mayors and municipal and ministerial officials in key ministries. In Jordan, this included stakeholders from Greater Amman Municipality (GAM); Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA); Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVBD); Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD); Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the Department of Urban Planning, Architecture and Build Environment of the German Jordanian University; the Danish Refugee Council; Jesuit Refugee Support; UNHCR; UNRWA; and a local women’s NGO. In Lebanon, such consultations included UNDP, UNHCR, UN-Habitat, United Cities and Local Governments, and World Vision. Academic literature was reviewed to assess the role of non-state actors in contemporary modalities of reception.

4.6 Participatory Video
Participatory video (PV) is a form of participatory media in which a group or community creates their own film. The idea behind this is that making a video is easy and accessible, and brings people together to explore issues, voice concerns or simply to tell their stories. A 3-day workshop in Lebanon targeted 10 participants representing a range of communities, women, men, vulnerable hosts and refugees. The activity also engaged communications and programming staff of Acted, one of the project partners; the lead investigator; and the Lebanese academic advisor, Dr Wissam Mansour, to build their capacity in this technique. The training supported the participants in planning and recording content to support research aims. PV was used in this research to provide displaced persons/refugees and hosts in Naba’a, a highly diverse and deprived inner-city neighbourhood in the Bourj Hamoud municipality within Greater Beirut, with a channel of communications to explore and express their lived reality, and their perspectives on what helps and hinders them.

Following production, the video content was presented to the workshop participants for feedback, and then shown (and receiving plaudits) at the final project workshops. The video is also made available on the IDS website and YouTube channel. The video presents stirring visual materials that speak well about the complexities, insecurities and often humane responses to the challenge of hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees within a dense urban neighbourhood. It conveys such messages to policymakers and general public alike, and makes the case for why participatory dialogue with marginalized groups is important, and how fruitful exchange can happen.

4.7 Reflection on impact pathway
A range of project activities and outputs have delivered the proposed impact pathway and communicated research findings to key stakeholders. These include: policy briefings; blogs; ‘Research- to- Policy’ workshops in Lebanon and Jordan; a participatory video; infographics;
Journal article; social media and media engagement; and academic conference presentations. These have delivered several key research outputs: (a) a strengthened evidence base on the dynamics and consequences of urban modalities of reception, expressed as gendered wellbeing outcomes; (b) increased access to knowledge on enhancing wellbeing outcomes for refugees and host communities; and (c) clear recommendations for improved policy and programming shared with key stakeholders.

In addition to the scheduled project activities, the research team and local partners have opportunistically shared research findings in a range of settings additional to those originally envisaged, to add value and optimise potential impact. The inception workshop in Amman provided researchers with the opportunity to conduct short field visits to ground the research in local realities, and to conduct a selected number of key informant interviews with humanitarian and development specialists. Similarly, during the one week visit to Beirut in July 2017, when the participatory video exercise was conducted, researchers undertook additional key informant interviews. These interviews had not been part of the research design (as the call for proposals highlighted the need for reviewing secondary materials). Nevertheless, these activities proved an important way of building up contextual knowledge. Moreover, the key informants that we engaged all expressed an interest in the final research findings, to constitute opportunities for advancing research uptake and achieving impact. Accordingly, they were then invited to participate in final project workshops and sent the final report and policy briefs. Moreover, interim research findings have also been shared at an invited talk by the project lead at a Symposium on Displacement and Space at the Oslo School of Architecture and Design, on 24 October 2017. A blog (https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinion/urban-wellbeing-mental-health-and-the-syrian-refugee-crisis; 9 October 2017) has been published, while an academic paper looking at the potential of wellbeing approaches for understanding enduring urban displacement in Lebanon and Jordan was submitted to the peer reviewed journal Forced Migration Review (November 2017).

These activities have achieved the following research outcomes:

- Evidence-based lesson learning on key lessons of urban policies, programming, implementation for wellbeing of refugee and host communities in urban Jordan and Lebanon.
- Uptake of new insights by wider audiences with an interest in migration, refugees and humanitarian planning in Lebanon, Jordan, UK, Switzerland and France.
- Uptake of new knowledge by researchers and advancement of academic discourse on the causes, dynamics and consequences of mixed migration flows.

As a result of the end of project workshops, follow up enquiries have been received from various participants as well as donors, expressing an explicit interest in receiving the final research report and policy briefs. We are thus hopeful that further evidence of the targeted research outcomes and their effects informing more effective humanitarian and development responses to migration crises in Jordan and Lebanon will emerge in future.
5 Modalities of reception

In Lebanon and Jordan, even though local government authorities are on the frontline of managing the Syrian refugee crisis, most public policies and laws dealing with refugees are made at the national level. We accordingly give substantial attention to the national policy and legal frameworks governing refugee reception. However, significant inter- and intra-city variations in the modalities of reception for displaced groups in cities of Jordan and Lebanon can be generated by the ways in which national policies are unevenly applied by local level initiatives, for instance by mayors, as well as by the efforts of non-state actors.

The localisation agenda adopted by the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 has underlined the need to be more responsive to local specificity. International humanitarian actors are increasingly recognising the need to better understand urban dynamics for effective programming. The UNHCR has shifted its policy from focusing on refugee containment in refugee camps to an emphasis on pursuing ‘alternatives to camps, whenever possible’ (UNHCR 2014a). Yet, historical neglect and opposition to supporting refugees in urban areas (for a discussion on this within UNHCR, see: Crisp 2017) linger and the ‘implications of protracted urban displacement have not been given due weight by an international aid and governance system that has historically focused its displacement responses on rural camps’ (Haysom 2013: 1).

One important aspect noted in the global literature on urban governance concerns the significant role of non-state actors in cities in low and middle income countries, and in contexts of crisis or weak governance contexts. They have a critical role in shaping people’s relationships with urban built environments and their identities, practices, struggles and opportunities of everyday social life (McCann 2016). Urban governance, rather than just being conducted by governments, is often characterised by ‘fierce competition between different territorialised forms of association and patronage – be they the state, religious organisations, NGOs or international development organisations’ (Alsayyad and Roy 2006: 12) that seek to ‘define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society’ (Lund 2006: 676). Their claims to legitimacy differ widely, from aid organisations enjoying formal legitimacy through their registration with the government to the organisations whose popular legitimacy resides in providing de-facto access to material goods, security and other services in conditions of great need. In this respect, the refugee studies literature notes that globally, non-state actors such as faith based organisations (FBOs) provide effective modes of reception (Ager 2015) that are highly complementary to the international aid responses. Eghdamian (2016: 1,7,9), however, notes that despite the importance of religious identity for refugee reception, responses by the UNHCR seek to ‘avoid or downplay religion’, invoking a ‘neutral’ position ‘under the guise of universality’ that ‘inadvertently favours certain religious groups over others’. In Jordan and Lebanon, initial humanitarian responses to the Syrian crisis also involved the sidestepping of local authorities. As the humanitarian engagement with local government and faith based organisations has proven challenging, engaging other non-state actors is likely to be even more so.

In order to understand the modalities of reception for Syrians living in urban areas in Lebanon, in the following section we will first briefly discuss general governance issues in Lebanon to set the scene, then discuss national policies on the themes of borders/registration/legal status; housing; and economic participation. Finally, we will review local responses to the Syrian influx, including those of municipalities and non-state actors involved in governing urban spaces.
5.1 Governance context – Lebanon

Lebanon is at risk of severe political instability, characterised by weak governance and poor functioning of state institutions. It is also subject to regional power struggles between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as demonstrated by the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri being forced to offer his resignation on a visit to Riyadh in November 2017 (Fisk, 2017). Political and military appointments are routinely negotiated between competing political factions rather than awarded on merit, eroding trust that public figures will carry out their tasks professionally (EIU 2017b).

Political deadlock has resulted in parliament not formally approving a budget since 2005, forcing the authorities to formulate spending plans on an ad hoc basis. In the midst of the Syrian refugee influx, a general election due in June 2013 was postponed twice after political parties could not agree on a new electoral law, to finally take place in May 2017. Following a substantial period of political stalemate, a national unity cabinet began work in January 2017. The coalition government includes bitter rivals, impairing policymaking (EIU 2017b). There is widespread popular cynicism about politics, politicians and voting, as well as a growing reliance on the military to maintain basic domestic security.

The World Bank (2013: 1) estimated that during the 2012–14 period, the Syrian conflict could cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points each year. It would push approximately 170,000 Lebanese into poverty, while deepening the poverty of those already poor, while social safety nets were inadequate, fragmented and poorly targeted. Prior to the Syrian crisis, high unemployment rates coexisted with a high prevalence of low-quality and low-productivity jobs. Unemployment rates are higher among women than men, at a rate of 18 per cent in 2010 due primarily to caring roles within families. Women have been found to occupy very few high positions in the labour force. Likewise, their representation in decision-making positions is low. Women are rarely members of unions and account for just 3.1 per cent of members of parliamentary (Government of Lebanon 2016).

The influx of Syrian refugees hence could increase labour supply by between 30–50 per cent — with the largest impacts on women, youth, and unskilled workers. Hence, the crisis was predicted to double the unemployment rate to above 20 per cent, most of them unskilled youth. Moreover, the crisis would depress government tax collection by US$1.5 billion, whilst simultaneously increasing government spending by US$1.1 billion due to the surge in demand for public services (World Bank 2013). The Government responded by reducing both access to and the quality of public service delivery. It was estimated that an additional spending of US$2.5 billion would be required to reinstate the access to and quality of public services to their pre-Syrian conflict level. Furthermore, Lebanon’s public finances were in poor condition prior to the Syrian shock (World Bank 2013), and by the fiscal deficit in 2016 rose to 9 per cent of GDP, with over one third of public spending going to debt-servicing (EIU 2017b).

5.2 National policy and law in Lebanon

The most significant protection gap for refugees from the Syrian conflict in Lebanon is their uncertain and time-limited legal status. Legal status encompasses: a refugee’s initial classification and the rights it affords (through registration); personal identification and residence status; and the ability to record births, marriages, and other major life events (Bidinger et al. 2015: 41). This legal status commences as it is determined at the border. Indeed, ‘from the first procedure of status determination – who is a refugee? – to the structural determinants of life chances which this identity then engenders, labels infuse the world of refugees’ (Zetter 1991: 39), with myriad implications for material, subjective and relational wellbeing of – directly – the refugees, and indirectly, host communities.

---

*Municipal elections were held during May 2016.*
5.2.1 Border regimes
At the start of the crisis, Lebanon maintained an open-border policy with Syria. A 1993 Bilateral agreement for Social and Economic Cooperation and Coordination between the Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic sought to gradually reach reciprocity between Syria and Lebanon with respect to economic integration. The agreement encourages freedom of movement, stay, work, and practising of economic activity in conformity with the laws of each country (ACAPS 2013). A further 1994 Bilateral Labour Agreement established a joint office on the Syria-Lebanon border and created a department within the Ministry of Labour to handle Syrian workers’ issues. Under the agreements, nationals from each country could enter the other country visa-free, showing a national identification card or a passport (Bidinger et al. 2015). Strong economic and family ties exist between communities on both sides of the border and many Lebanese families found shelter in Syria during the Lebanese civil war, and more recently in 2006 during the Israeli war on Lebanon (ACAPS 2013). And when the Syrian conflict broke out, an estimated 300,000 to 600,000 Syrian migrant workers were active in Lebanese agriculture, construction, commercial establishments and handicrafts (ACAPS 2013). Many of these men called over families and friends to escape the conflict.

Most Syrians arrive in Lebanon with valid personal identity documents (Bidinger et al. 2015) through five official border crossings: at Aarida, El Aabboudiyeh, Qaa Baalbek, Al-Masnaa and Wadi-Kahled. When exiting Syria, Syrians are provided with a Return/Entry Coupon with exit and entry stamps by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities (ACAPS 2013). However, Palestinian refugees from Syria had to obtain a prior departure permit from Damascus in order to legally leave the country (Bidinger et al. 2015: 39–40). There are also several unofficial crossing points along the 365km border, which by May 2013 had been used by about 15 per cent of all Syrians applying for UNHCR registration (ACAPS 2013).

Lebanon’s open border policy has, however, been increasingly eroded to the effect that borders are now effectively closed to some groups. The General Security Office (GSO) in the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Lebanon (GoL) is the agency in charge of foreigners’ entry and residency in the country. It controls all official entry points on the border into Lebanon, and has wide discretion to designate procedures for the treatment of Syrian refugees. Measures put in place include the periodical opening or tightening of the border crossings; changing the document requirements for entry or admission; imposing visa or permit fees or other requirements; and detaining or otherwise penalising refugees for lack of status (Bidinger et al. 2015: 24–25).

Without proclaiming new policy, in August 2013, the Lebanese border authorities started enforcing new and stringent conditions of entry for Palestinian refugees from Syria. These groups could now only enter Lebanon under limited circumstances, such as having a scheduled doctor’s appointment, a scheduled and documented interview at a foreign country’s embassy, or having documentation showing the presence of a Lebanese spouse or a mother residing in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 37). Consequently, Palestinian residents of Syria seeking refuge in Lebanon were turned away, violating the legal principle of non-refoulement: i.e. not to reject at the border anyone whose life or freedom would be threatened in Syria (HRW 2014a).

Furthermore, in October 2014 the Lebanese Cabinet voted to adopt a policy paper which called for halting the influx of Syrian refugees and reducing their existing number in the country (Daily Star 2014). Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil stated: ‘All this aid – be it food, shelter or health care – encourages Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon, while what we want is to encourage their speedy exit’ (Hodeib 2014).

By 31 December 2014, Lebanon introduced new regulations, identifying six categories of persons eligible for entry. Human rights organisations noted that the narrow selection criteria
would violate the principle of non-refoulement by, for instance, denying entry to child orphans and persons with disabilities who do not have relatives in Lebanon. Furthermore, it was noted that the regulations cancelled the displaced person status of anyone that temporarily crossed back into Syria, regardless of reason (e.g. to attend a funeral, to retrieve a stranded relative, to obtain necessary documents) (HRW 2015a).

5.2.2 Registration
Because Lebanon’s law does not incorporate the 1951 Refugee Convention, prospective refugees do not have a pathway to asylum (Bidinger et al. 2015: 40). Instead, a 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the GoL and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sets out the management of refugee issues. The MoU stipulates that Lebanon is not an asylum country and that the term “asylum seeker” means a ‘person seeking asylum to a country other than Lebanon’. The Government of Lebanon thus officially terms the Syrians “displaced” individuals and allows them to enter Lebanon under the conditions of the 1994 Agreement with Syria. However, the MoU for the first time formally recognised the right of refugees to remain in Lebanon if their lives or freedom are in danger in their home countries (Frangieh 2017), with the expectation that refugees will be resettled to a third country within nine months (Bidinger et al. 2015). However, this MoU was not designed to govern large influxes of refugees (ACAPS 2013) and though there was talk of revising the MoU (Akram et al. 2015), agreement does not seem have been achieved.

An individual is not eligible for host country absorption or third country resettlement facilitated by the UNHCR unless (s)he has undergone refugee status determination (Bidinger et al. 2015: 27). In Lebanon and Jordan, the first step towards status determination involves ‘registration’ by UN agencies. Two agencies are of particular importance. UNHCR’s mandate concerns all refugees other than Palestinians, whose protection needs are the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East).

UNHCR began registering Syrian nationals in April 2011 but, significantly, suspended this process from May 2015, at the request of the Lebanese government (Khawaja 2017). Whilst registration was possible, Syrians had to approach the nearest Social Development Centre (SDC) of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), the municipality or the nearby UNHCR offices. UNHCR then arranged an appointment in one of its four registration centres (Tripoli, Zahle, Tyre, and Jnah in Beirut). The registration process is free of charge and confidential. It enquires into basic protection and assistance needs and candidates for temporary and permanent resettlement are identified. All the household members should be present at the registration appointment during which they are interviewed and photographed. All family-related documents should be brought (at least one issued in Syria) such as a national identity card, family registration book, passport, birth certificate, marriage certificate, school/university certificates or any official document issued by Lebanese authorities. While the registration process is also open to Syrians who entered the country through unofficial crossing points, some Syrians refrain from registering with UNHCR out of fear of arrest, lack of documentation, a lack of mobility or the inability to pay transport costs to the registration centres (ACAPS 2013). Some also chose not to register with UNHCR out of fear of disclosing their name and place of residence to authorities associated with the Lebanese government (Thorleifsson 2016). Unregistered individuals are at risk of detention and deportation. However, few such instances are reported (ACAPS 2013). A similar situation characterised the response to Iraqi refugees, a decade prior.

---

5 The 1951 Refugee Convention requires host states to provide administrative assistance, assessment of status, and identity papers for all refugees, implying an obligation to engage in a preliminary refugee status determination procedure (Bidinger et al. 2015).

6 Some Palestinians fall within the mandate of UNHCR, such as a Palestinian woman married to a Syrian.

7 This distinction between groups is mirrored in the Lebanese government structures dealing with Palestinian and other refugee groups. The Department of Political and Refugee Affairs (until 2000 called Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs) was created to engage with the UNRWA with respect to shelter, education, health, and social services.
The police and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) do not systematically arrest Iraqi refugees who do not have valid visas or residence permits, but sufficiently large numbers of Iraqis are arrested and detained to ensure that the risk of arrest is constantly on their minds. (HRW 2007)

Registrees are given a UNHCR certificate of registration, which provides access to basic services such as primary healthcare and public education.\(^8\) The Ministry of Education allows all Syrian students to enrol in public schools and universities (Sadek 2013). For Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS), UNRWA provides free education, non-food items, cash assistance and primary healthcare (ACAPS 2013). However, PRS are recorded as assistance recipients by UNRWA, but not registered, to enable them to retain their registered refugee status in Syria upon return (Bidinger et al. 2015).\(^9\) Assistance is also provided by civil society organisations, host communities and municipalities. The Ministry of Social Affairs, in collaboration with UNHCR and UNICEF, set up Social Development Centres (SDCs) providing health services, including psychosocial support and sexual and gender based violence awareness sessions for the Lebanese community and Syrian refugees. Whereas at the start of the crisis, all assistance extended to all Syrian registrants irrespective of particular vulnerabilities, the enduring nature of the crisis and the limited resources led to a more targeted approach from September 2013 (Bidinger et al. 2015), and a rapidly growing awareness of the need to also support vulnerable groups amongst host communities for social stability.

Accordingly, the registration certificate issued by UNHCR enables access to assistance. Critically however, it is not an official identification card, does not grant Syrians legal residence and – as noted above – does not entail recognition of status as an asylum seeker (Bidinger et al. 2015: 38). Additional procedures exist for these ends.

5.2.3 Legal status: residence permits, sponsorship and birth certificates

Lebanese policies and law determine the legal status of refugees from Syria on various and sometimes overlapping grounds: by nationality (Syrians vs Palestinian refugees from Syria); religious affiliation and class; by the nature of entrance to the country (regular or irregular); by identity documentation (valid/invalid or missing); and by registration status (registered/unregistered).

Like other foreigners, Syrian nationals may attempt to obtain permanent residency permits as per the Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon (1962). However, few are able to meet the criteria.

The 1994 Bilateral Agreement governs the issuance of temporary residence permits for nationals of Syria entering Lebanon through regular border crossings. Upon entering Lebanon, Syrian nationals possessing valid identification receive a free residence permit, in the form of a date stamped Entry Coupon. It is valid for six months and can be renewed free of charge for another six months at any regional office of the General Security Office (ACAPS 2013). Some Syrian nationals (born to a Lebanese mother; married to a Lebanese; born in Lebanon; pursuing their studies; and retired diplomats) are also eligible for a ‘courtesy residence permit’, which is renewable, free of charge and valid for three years (ACAPS 2013).

After a year of stay in the country, Syrian nationals have two options. First, they can return to Syria for a minimum of 24 hours, then re-enter Lebanon, and apply for a new residence permit free of charge. While this was the default option contemplated by the Bilateral

---

\(^8\) UNHCR only covers secondary healthcare intervention in life saving situations.

\(^9\) This ensures that PRS remain registered with UNRWA-Syria, but their assistance needs as displaced persons in Lebanon are covered by UNRWA-Lebanon.
Agreement, security considerations effectively rule this out for most. As a result, the GoL has permitted Syrians to extend their permits for another six months without leaving Lebanon, but for a fee of US$200 (300,000 LL) per person over 15 years of age, which can be renewed free of charge for another six months (Bidinger et al. 2015: 38). When this year is over, the renewal process starts afresh. However, as the crisis continues and people are protractedly displaced, the residency permit fee has become crippling for most, as 70 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon fall below the poverty line and rely on aid to survive (UNHCR et al. 2016).

Article 32 of the 1962 law on Entry and Exit from Lebanon allows the assessment of criminal charges and penalties against individuals entering Lebanon without authorisation, regardless of whether those individuals are asylum seekers (Bidinger et al. 2015: 43). Hence, Syrian nationals over 15 years of age and in possession of valid identification who entered Lebanon irregularly were initially urged to regularise entry by submitting a ‘petition for mercy’ with the authorities, and paying a fee that ranges from 300,000 to 900,000 Lebanese pounds (US$200–600) (ACAPS 2013). A similar policy had been pursued with respect to irregular Iraqi refugees in the 2000s, who were considered illegal and exposed to the risk of arrest, detention and deportation, although they were also granted periodical amnesties (UNOCHA 2012). The success of petitions for mercy are, however, uncertain, as there are no policies or guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the GSO, and applicants cannot be represented by counsel in their proceedings (Bidinger et al. 2015). Furthermore, new procedures regarding residency renewal circulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs on 23 January 2015 note that Syrians who have entered the country illegally must pay the penalty for their illegal entry or be permanently banned from entering Lebanon (HRW 2015a). Moreover, they will no longer be able to regularise their residency status, and instead be given five days to leave the country, or be subject to arrest and deportation (HRW 2015a).

For Palestinian refugees from Syria, distinct rules apply. Having secured a departure permit from Damascus and gained access to Lebanon, in February 2013 a Government of Lebanon circular stated that PRS would receive a transit visa stamp at the border (US$12), valid for two weeks (ACAPS 2013). After its expiry, a short-term residence permit valid for three months could be obtained, initially for a fee of US$33 and subsequently PRS could renew their residence fees at the end of one year of residence, subject to the same renewal fees as Syrian nationals. PRS applying for a visa who could not afford the visa renewal fee received a slip stating that they had made an application for visa renewal (Bidinger et al. 2015: 39–40). Moreover, in early 2014 it was decided that the fee could be waived. This generosity was, however, soon limited to the existing group, as Lebanon closed its border to Palestinian refugees from Syria in May 2014 (Bidinger et al. 2015: 41). PRS who failed to renew their visas, or entered the country irregularly, were at risk of not being able to pass military checkpoints guarding entry to Palestinian camps where many reside (ACAPS 2013) as they lacked valid identity documents. While expired residency permits put Palestinian refugees from Syria at potential risk of deportation to Syria, there does not appear to be widespread evidence of such refoulement, yet the government retains the discretionary powers to do so (Bidinger et al. 2015: 43). However, Palestinian refugees from Syria and Sudanese refugees have been detained and subjected to mistreatment and torture in detention and forcible returns (HRW 2014b, 2013a).

Finally, since January 2015 residency status policy distinguishes between Syrians that have registered with UNHCR and those who have not. Its application has largely affected existing displaced populations, as the GoL instructed UNHCR to no longer register refugees from May 2015. Refugees applying to renew their residency permits were sorted into two categories: those registered with UNHCR and those who are not. Registered Syrians aged 15 and over had to pay an annual US$200 renewal fee per person, present valid identification and an entry coupon obtained at the border, and also submit a housing pledge confirming their place of residence, and provide two photographs stamped by a Lebanese
local official to obtain residency status. In contrast, Syrians without UNHCR registration were directed to find a Lebanese sponsor in order to remain in the country legally. This involved providing a ‘pledge of responsibility’ signed by a Lebanese national or registered entity, to sponsor an individual or family. Some reports noted that in response to the policy change “a rather vivid black market of fake sponsors, brokers, employers, and contracts emerged” that make it very difficult for Syrians to renew residency (Lebanon Support, 2016a, p. 25). Sponsorship hence raised serious concerns about the potential for Lebanese citizens to exploit asylum seekers looking for sponsors, with some Lebanese nationals charging refugees up to US$1,000 for sponsorship (HRW 2015a).

In February 2016, Lebanon committed to a review of existing regulatory frameworks related to residency conditions and work authorisations for Syrians at an international donor conference in London (Republic of Lebanon 2016). Subsequently, in February 2017 the GSO once more changed the residency policy, waiving the annual US$200 residency fee for Syrian refugees, provided that they had registered with the UNHCR before 01 January 2015, or obtained residency status through their UNHCR certificate at least once in 2015 or 2016 (HRW 2017b). For many Syrians, this new fee waiver policy was described as ‘life changing’ (Khawaja 2017). However, large groups are excluded, notably Syrians not registered with UNHCR – almost 400,000–500,000 people by government estimates (GoL and United Nations 2017). In this respect, it should be noted that the UNHCR suspended registration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government on 06 May 2015. Excluded from the waiver are Syrians who were not able to maintain valid UNHCR registration continually since their arrival, or those who turned 15 since they entered the country and who are not able to access residency as they do not have valid personal identification. There are also suggestions that the new General Security policy excludes registered refugees who renewed their residency through sponsorship by a Lebanese national and that the waiver does not apply to Palestinian refugees from Syria (Khawaja 2017).


Moreover, reports have emerged of negotiations between Hezbollah and Syrian opposition forces to return refugees from Lebanon to Syria. Human rights activists and the UNHCR have, however, firmly dismissed these discussions, arguing that the situation inside Syria is too volatile (Khawaja 2017). The evolution of policy regarding residency for Syrian and Palestinian refugees from Syria is shown in Figure 5.1.

Finally, Syrian refugees lacking valid residence permits may not obtain birth, marriage or death certificates in Lebanon. When a baby is born, parents must either register their birth in Syria, or go through a cumbersome registration process in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 52). The diagram below sets out the steps that should be completed within one year: after obtaining a birth notification document from the hospital/midwife a local mokhtar (government representative\textsuperscript{11}) and a registered nofous (local registry) should be visited to acquire a birth certificate. Afterwards, the birth should be registered with the Personal Status Department. Only at this stage is the birth registration complete; a stage completed by just 17 per cent of Syrian households (Figure 5.2). Although the charges are nominal, the procedure is

---

\textsuperscript{10} Similar concerns have been expressed regarding the sponsorship system for Syrian refugees in Jordan (HRW 2015a).

\textsuperscript{11} Mokhtars are state representatives elected at neighbourhood or village level, responsible for some official functions such as registering births, deaths and marriages; ensuring the implementation of circulars; and distributing administrative bulletins on behalf of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (UN-Habitat 2017).
complicated and often requires extensive and costly travel (ACAPS 2013). In September 2017, the Government of Lebanon announced the simplification of birth (and marriage) registration procedures, indicating that valid legal residency of parents, a key obstacle, would no longer be required for birth registration (UNHCR et al. 2017).

Figure 5.1  Changing residency policy in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior to the Syrian crisis</th>
<th>The onset of the Syrian crisis</th>
<th>The crisis intensifies</th>
<th>GoL starts restricting numbers of refugees</th>
<th>London Donor Conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon (1962): theoretically offers permanent residency, but not issued in practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The Bilateral agreements (1994): temporary residence permits given for 12 months to Syrians entering through regular border crossings. Re-entry renews permits for free but a fee of $200 applies for all over 15 years of age to annually renew without re-entry. Special case Syrians (e.g., born to Lebanese mother) eligible for 3 year Courtesy Residence Permit. PRS get 3 month residence visa, then renew like Syrians. |
| Petition for mercy: Syrians having crossed borders irregularly can regularise entry at cost of $200-600 per person but need ID. |
| PRS get residence renewal fee waiver |
| GoL starts restricting numbers of refugees |
| GoL instructs UNHCR to stop registration of Syrians (May 2015) |
| UNHCR-registered Syrians: must submit housing pledge confirming place of residence |
| Sydney without UNHCR registration: must get pledge of responsibility from a sponsor (Jan 2015) |
| GoL waives $200 renewal fee for UNHCR registered Syrians (Feb, 2017) |
| | President and Foreign Minister call for Syrians to return |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law Regulating the Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon (1962): theoretically offers permanent residency, but not issued in practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate issued doctor/midwife</th>
<th>Cert. issued Mukhtars</th>
<th>Cert. registered Nofous</th>
<th>Cert. registered Foreigners’ Registry</th>
<th>Cert. stamped MoFA</th>
<th>Cert. stamped Syrian Embassy</th>
<th>Family booklet, Individual or family civil extract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP (2017: 14)

To conclude, we observe how interlocking public policy addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon accentuates vulnerabilities. Refugees’ mode of border crossing sets them off on distinct routes to obtaining residency status via petitions for mercy, sponsorship and UNHCR registration. Residency status is, however, only of a temporary nature, in need of annual renewal, and as we have outlined, its associated costs have crippled the financial status of Syrians, at least till early 2017 when a fee waiver policy was adopted. Most Syrians hence ended up without valid residency papers, which in turn made it impossible, amongst other things, to register marriages and births, access formal work, and enhanced the risk of municipal curfews leading to arrest, detention and possible deportation (Figure 5.3).
5.2.4 Economic participation

By November 2016, the existing Lebanon Crisis Response Plan — a US$2.5 billion transitional arrangement towards the new strategic framework, backed by the Lebanese government and multilateral partners—had been only half funded. Even if it is forthcoming, however, international aid would not fully compensate for the pressure on public services that the Syrian refugees have created. The government estimates direct budget costs from their presence at US$400 million annually, while the World Bank has calculated Lebanon’s losses as a result of the Syrian conflict at US$13.1 billion since 2012, taking into account wider disruption to trade, investment and tourism.

The Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, unveiled a three-year response plan for the Syrian refugee crisis, calling for US$2.8 billion in aid on 20 January 2017. Some US$571.5 million would go towards providing humanitarian assistance for the 1.2 million most at risk (comprising refugees and host communities), with a further US$507 million to ensure 961,338 receive adequate amounts of food. Investment in the education, healthcare and water sectors will absorb the bulk of the remaining funds (EIU 2017b). With a perception among Lebanese host communities that they are bearing the economic burden of the refugee inflows, a stronger policy response to defuse the issue will need funding, but also more effective government management.

Work permits and restricted professions

Lebanese law restricts foreigners, and therefore refugees, ability to work in many areas, distinguishing groups on the basis of occupation and by worker nationality. We illustrate this through a discussion of Syrians, Palestinians (endurably residing in Lebanon and fleeing from Syria) and the group of migrant domestic workers. Annex A provides further detail.

Any foreigner requires a permit to work legally, which will not be issued to all professions, as a range of professions are reserved by law for Lebanese nationals. Foreigners who work without a permit can be sentenced to at least one month in prison, and are subject to fines.

---

12 Labour laws treat Lebanese women’s [foreign] husbands and their children as foreigners (whether or not the latter are born in Lebanon). They are required to obtain a work permit from the Ministry of Labour as well as a courtesy residency permit from the General Security. Recently, enforcement action by inspectors of the Ministry of Labour have targeted these groups (Ayoub 2017).
By 2010, over 20 high-level professions were off-limits to non-Lebanese workers (HRW 2010a) and in order to practice law, medicine, and engineering, membership of a relevant professional syndicate is required. Foreigners are by law allowed to take membership in these syndicates – however only if Lebanese professionals are allowed reciprocal entitlements in their home country. Moreover, annually the Minister of Labour announces a list of professions in which foreigners are allowed to work. In February 2013, Resolution No. 1/19 opened some professions, such as those involving construction, electricity, and sales, to refugees (Sadek 2013), in effect regularising a common practice (ACAPS 2013). However, over the last two years Syrians have been prohibited from working in all trades and crafts restricted to Lebanese citizens except for agriculture, construction, and ‘environment’ (Ayoub 2017).

Syrians have long had special privileges working in Lebanon, and vice versa. The bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination (1993) abolished movement restrictions on persons and granted freedom of stay, employment and practice of economic activity for nationals of both countries (ACAPS 2013). While Syrians needed a work permit in theory, the Lebanese Government has been hesitant to issue work permits, as Syrians were considered to compete with local workers for scarce jobs even before the crisis. By 2012–13, according to official figures by the Department of Syrian Workers in the Ministry of Labour there were only 650 people issued permits (ACAPS 2013). The Ministry of Labour issued 1,558 work permits to Syrian citizens in 2014, 2,150 permits in 2015 and 1,567 in 2016 (Ayoub 2017). It is thus clear that the great majority of Syrians working in Lebanon have done so without work permits.

The Lebanese government tried to both reassert itself and reduce arrivals in late 2014 by replacing its open door policy with new visa and residence regulations. These regulations, which went into effect on 05 January 2015, delineate two ‘categories’ of Syrian refugees: those registered with UNHCR and those with a Lebanese national ‘sponsor’. The former must sign a pledge not to work in order to receive a residency permit. This pledge serves as an official and binding agreement (Lebanon Support, 2016b). The latter must have their subsistence guaranteed by their sponsor. For both categories, the annual renewal of the residence permit for persons over 15 years of age costs US$200 (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 123). Further down in this section we discuss how the kefala sponsorship system has played out for other migrants in Lebanon, to raise concerns about its potential for abuse.

At the London donor conference in February 2016, Lebanon committed to a review of existing regulatory frameworks related to work authorisations for Syrians, including by simplifying documentary requirements such as waiving the ‘pledge not to work’ requirement for Syrians. However, it also underlined that it would only seek to ease the access of Syrians to the job market in certain sectors where they are not in direct competition with Lebanese, such as agriculture, construction and other labour-intensive sectors (Republic of Lebanon 2016). Nevertheless, some reports note that Syrians are still told to sign a pledge not to work, despite this requirement being dropped (HRW 2017b, 2016a).

At the same time, while Lebanese law prohibits the employment of children under 14, and limits the work that children between 14 and 18 years of age can perform to six hours a day, these laws are rarely enforced. High costs of living combined with lack of work opportunities and lowly paid jobs for adults has meant that many Syrian refugee children work in restaurants, farms and other jobs to help provide for their families (Bidinger et al. 2015: 52).

Palestinian refugees who have lived in Lebanon for decades or were born there are still treated as foreigners with extremely limited rights to work and social security (Bidinger et al. 2015: 36). Halabi (2004, p. 42) sets out that
Under Lebanese labour laws, Palestinians fit the ‘stateless foreigner’ category, and thus were denied work permits and were prohibited from practising 73 professions in Lebanon. Even where exceptions were made, Palestinian workers benefited neither from social security nor from work compensation. The Palestinian refugee workforce was forced to engage exclusively in unregulated informal-sector work such as construction and retail, which provided irregular and scarce sources of income. They are to a significant extent dependent on employment in an UNRWA dominated economy (Allan 2014). Approximately 75,000 Palestinians are part of the Lebanese workforce, but 75 per cent of them earn below the minimum wage, mostly living below the poverty line with no health insurance or social security. Palestinians remain excluded from practicing in over 70 professions, including medicine (except within refugee camps), law, and engineering. Laws regarding professional syndicates frame foreigners’ membership around nationality, to exclude stateless Palestinians (HRW 2010a). Studies have shown that just 15–20 per cent of adult Palestinians that work have employment contracts, and only two per cent of Palestinians in Lebanon have official work permits (Bidinger et al. 2015: 50). While some attempts have been made by the Government of Lebanon to increase the opportunities for Palestinians to work legally, their effects have been limited. For instance, in 2005 Lebanon eliminated a ban on Palestinians holding most clerical and technical positions, provided they obtain a temporary work permit from the Labour Ministry. Yet, few Palestinians benefited from the reform and by 2009, only 261 out of 145,679 work permits issued to non-Lebanese were for Palestinians (HRW 2010a). Other reforms amending Article 59 of the Labour Law were made in August 201013 to revoke work permit fees, the reciprocity requirement and to also allow Palestinians to qualify for many of the previously-banned professions. However, these laws remain essentially unimplemented (Bidinger et al. 2015: 54). Moreover, the law disincentives Palestinians from taking up formal sector jobs by making social security contributions mandatory, while excluding them from benefiting from these (HRW 2010a). These discriminatory laws create ‘a permanent underclass in the Lebanese economy’ (Bidinger et al. 2015: 54). As the majority of Palestinian workers do so informally, without permit and without legal protection, they face severe discrimination in wages and hiring. Many employers pay them less than their Lebanese colleagues, or refuse to hire Palestinians, or are unwilling to support them getting a work permit (HRW 2010a). Figure 5.4 summarises the policy environment regarding economic participation for Syrians and Palestinians in Lebanon over time.

Finally, and not covered in the diagram, are an estimated 250,000 migrant domestic workers who reside in Lebanon, almost all of them women. The relationship between these workers and their employers is characterised by structural and highly gendered power inequalities (ILO 2016), partially because of the design of Lebanese labour laws. These exclude domestic workers from standard labour protections afforded to almost all other categories of workers, such as the right to a weekly day of rest, paid leave, benefits, and worker compensation (HRW 2015b). In order to obtain a work visa, workers require a domestic sponsor. Under this kefala system, migrant domestic workers lose their legal status if their sponsor terminates their contract, or if they decide to leave the employer. Accordingly, a migrant domestic worker who leaves an employer and files a complaint against him or her loses the right to work and faces potential detention and deportation. The kefala system hence enhances the risk of exploitation and abuse. The domestic workers typically have short-term contracts and are expected to live in their employer’s home. Migrant domestic workers in Lebanon commonly report non-payment of wages, forced confinement, employers’ refusal to provide time off, and verbal and physical abuse (HRW 2017a, 2013b).14

---

13 Companion Laws No. 128 and 129.
14 Moreover, under Lebanese residency regulations, low-wage migrants such as domestic workers, are not allowed to sponsor residency for their spouses or children. Lebanon-born children of the migrants could apply for year-long residency up until age four and then could apply for residency if they enrolled in school. In 2014 however, General Security took a decision to deny residency permit renewals for a number of low-wage migrants who have had children in Lebanon and for their children (HRW 2015b), demanding people to leave the country at short notice. This policy violates the right to family life (HRW 2017a), and
A recent ILO study surveying 1200 Lebanese employers showed their low level of knowledge of domestic worker rights and employer responsibilities under national labour laws. Two out of five employers pay the workers’ first three months’ salary to the recruitment agency and not to themselves, violating worker rights. Half the employers do not allow for one day of rest a week, and of those who do, only half allow them to go out alone on their day off. One out of five Lebanese employers lock the worker inside, heavily restricting personal freedoms despite many knowing that this is not permitted. Although Lebanese courts have stated that employers do not have the right to withhold their worker’s passports, 94 per cent of employers surveyed did. Thirty-five per cent pay less than US$200 per month in wages. While contracts govern the labour relationship, more than three quarters of employers indicate that workers do not receive a copy of it (ILO 2016). While unionisation may help domestic workers to stand up for their rights, the Ministry of Labour has actively deterred them from doing so, violating the human right of freedom of association (HRW 2015b).

Domestic workers also face extremely weak protection from abuse by the judiciary and police (HRW 2015b). National courts are frequently found failing to observe human rights treaties relevant to the treatment of refugees, despite the fact that Lebanon’s Constitution requires such treaties to take precedence over domestic legislation (Bidinger et al. 2015: 29). One report in 2010 reviewed 114 judicial decisions involving migrant domestic workers, and found that not a single employer faced charges for locking workers inside homes, confiscating their passports, or denying them food (HRW 2017a, 2010b).

5.2.5 Housing
Unlike Jordan, and despite efforts by the UNHCR (Chatty 2017: 27), the Government of Lebanon has maintained an official ‘no-camp’ policy since the start of the Syrian crisis (Sanyal 2017). Key political actors see the establishment of refugee camps ‘as a security threat, rather than a solution to a security threat, because of the history of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Lebanon’s weak state capacity and the risk that camps could damage al-Asad’s regime and cause instability within Lebanon’ (Turner 2015: 391). This policy was also strongly driven by a fear of replicating its history of Palestinian refugee camps. Becoming a conflicts with Lebanon’s obligations to protect this right as per the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 23) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
permanent fixture in Lebanon’s urban and peri-urban landscapes, Palestinian refugee camps have over decades transformed flimsy tented settlements into multi-story concrete housing. Ineffectively policed by the Lebanese state, over time the camps developed into ‘states within a state’, that weaponised, became active factions in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), and repeatedly drew in Israeli bombings (Fisk 1990). Turner (2015: 399), however, asserts that both Lebanon and Jordan’s distinct no-camp and encampment approaches towards managing the refugee crisis is informed not just by security or humanitarian concerns, but by the state’s interests in maintaining a cheap and docile Syrian labour force.

Lebanon’s ‘urban refugee approach’ allowed refugees the freedom to determine where they wish to live. Granting refugees their right to be mobile and the chance to support themselves and not be dependent on handouts not only allows them to contribute to their host countries, but also promotes their human dignity and the possibility of living normal, productive lives. Yet, all too often, refugees ended up living in urban squalor, undignified on the margins and in desperate need of assistance (Frelick 2013), not least because of the lack of citizenship and employment rights set out in the previous sections. In this respect, Frelick also notes that while camps bring high visibility and an outpouring of international assistance, the no-camp policy may have led the international community to provide inadequate and disproportionally low support to the Government of Lebanon for its efforts to accommodate refugees.15

Another consequence of the no-camp policy is the exacerbation of shortages of low income urban housing, in the absence of active housing construction for the refugees (Bidinger et al. 2015: 29). Indeed, some studies prior to the crisis have depicted the Lebanese housing market as dysfunctional, with a large and unmet demand for affordable housing, and the absence of credit facilities addressing the needs of the urban middle- and low-income groups (Fawaz 2009: 843). One key underlying reason for this failure to provide low cost housing in cities is a fragmented urban planning system. Thus, the capital Beirut ‘offers a masterclass in the over-politicisation of planning, and of what happens in a complex urban environment that continues to develop in an urban policy vacuum and with only the most basic of regulatory controls’ (Carmona 2013: 124). Consequently, the conurbation lacks the delivery of any serious citywide transport planning and an almost total absence of public transport. For Fawaz (2009: 840), as part of a neoliberal development model promoted by the international community, urban planning in Beirut became preoccupied with promoting ‘heavy investments in the tourist and service sectors serving the visions and needs of the wealthiest groups, rapid gentrification of low income areas, and the proliferation of new forms of private policing and security provision’ (Fawaz 2009: 840).

Carmona nevertheless notes that there is no absence of incentives to build houses, but these appear to be rather of the wrong type, and limited to landowners. Accordingly, all landowners in Lebanon have a right to develop at 0.4–0.8 Floor Area Ratio, anywhere. This as-of-right entitlement ‘sets an expectation of development’ (Carmona 2013: 125) and overseas investments through remittances of 15 million people of Lebanese descent drives rapidly rising property prices. The result is ‘a more or less continuous urban sprawl in the zone along the coast between the sea and the Lebanon Mountains, with very little control on the quality of this development’ (ibid.).

Decentralisation and privatisation policies have shifted the responsibility for the provision of social goods in cities to under-capacitated and poorly funded local authorities, while protections for the low income class were abandoned. As rental housing became the dominant mode, in the 2000s, housing rent controls were abandoned. Estate agents now play an important role in brokering access to housing, but are also implicated in being less tolerant of rent arrears and in people’s forced evictions (pers. comm. T. Kamourieh, UN

---

15 While Lebanon hosted more Syrian refugees than any other country in the region, the UN’s $1 billion Syria Regional Response Plan called for $495 million for Jordan and only $267 million for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. If the pledges are fulfilled, per capita, Jordan will receive 75 per cent more per refugee than Lebanon.
Habitat January 2018). Moreover, large private sector employers were allowed to weaken social welfare provisioning for its workforce, and instead commenced hiring flexible (often foreign) daily workers, increasing demand for low cost rental housing. These migrants, like the Syrians now, shared housing, sometimes among up to ten income earners, and sometimes taking shifts to use a bed. While paying lower rents per capita, aggregate rents increased, creating a competition from below for affordable housing (Fawaz 2009: 842).

Furthermore, in the absence of low-cost housing options, the displaced solve their accommodation needs by expanding informal settlements (Martin 2015: 13). Large shares of the urban population of Lebanon live in ‘slums’. According to one estimate, this amounts to over 53% in 2005 (https://unhabitat.org/lebanon/lebanon-urban-issues/, last accessed January 2018)\(^{16}\) and these areas are inhabited by the poorest Lebanese as well as by Palestinians, migrants and Syrians.

There are various types of informal settlements, roughly distinguishable by who governs these, by the density of their built up areas, and who lives in them. Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees live in crowded camps that lack essential housing, road, water and sanitation infrastructure (HRW 2010a). For Carmona (2013: 125), the conditions in these camps, abandoned by urban planners, offer ‘a stark reminder of the sorts of urban conditions that planning was first invented to confront’. There are 12 official camps and a range of unofficial Palestinian ‘gatherings’. These ‘refugee camps, even if they are segregated and marginalized, are part of the urban settings that host them’ (Doraï 2010: 8) because of the integration of economic exchange, social networks and movements in and outside the camps, and the blurring of institutional and geographic boundaries. In a study of a Palestinian camp in Amman, Oesch (2017) comes to a similar conclusion. Estimates suggest that by 2014, 12 over-crowded official UNRWA camps are housing 53 per cent of the Palestinian refugees from Syria (Bidinger et al. 2015: 47).

However, under Lebanese law, people living in informal settlements are not entitled to access to public services. According to Law 7279 issued in 1961, ‘it is forbidden to connect property owners or residents of a lot with a phone, service or electricity if s/he does not provide a residency permit’. As noted, the majority of Syrians lack valid residency permits. While this law was suspended momentarily in 1967, this provision was reinstated by the 1971 Lebanese Building Code and reconfirmed in 1983. It applies to all public agencies providing services, including water and electricity (Yassin et al. 2016: 348–349). Some laws and public policies affect the ability to improve conditions in urban informal settlements. Presidential Decree No. 11614 of 1969, amended by Law No. 296 of 2001, states that:

No real right of any kind may be acquired by a person who does not carry citizenship issued by a recognized state or by a person, if such acquisition contradicts the provisions of the Constitution relating to the prohibition of permanent settlement (tawteen).

(Yassin et al. 2016: 348).

This law effectively revokes a right that many Palestinians had enjoyed for decades (HRW 2010a), and affected all Palestinians outside the official refugee camps (living in unofficial gatherings). These generally do not hold official titles for the land they are living on – even though many have contracts with the former Lebanese owners (El-Natour 2012; NRC 2013, in Yassin et al. 2016). Such informal tenure status also affects people’s ability to improve their housing, such as undertaking simple repairs or building new floors. These require a prior permit from the municipal authorities, but can only be requested by a person holding legal title to the land (NRC 2013, El-Natour, 2012).

\(^{16}\) The underlying method for estimating this figure is not clear, and the estimate is dated.
About 10 per cent of the Syrian refugee population is living in informal tented settlements (ITSs) in Lebanon that are not officially recognised by the government. These appear to be mainly located in rural and peri-urban areas, and are typically situated somewhere on a spectrum between the camp and the city (Sanyal 2017: 118). They constitute ‘an informalized response to the crisis through a system of deregulation’ (i.e. as a consequence of the non-recognition) to enable ‘refugee spaces to emerge that are visible, yet unrecognized, flexible, yet precarious’ (Sanyal 2017: 117). ITSs are often at risk of eviction, but are sometimes tolerated, with the backing of local employers’ organisations such as farmers’ unions who depend on the cheap labour of the refugees – but local authorities regularly dismantle them once they appear too sturdy or threaten to become actual camps. UNHCR and NGOs have been trying to negotiate with municipalities to allow settlements not exceeding 20 tents, and to ensure that such settlements have adequate sanitary conditions, winterisation, and water-proofing. The government has, however, banned creative housing initiatives that could provide a partial and camp-free remedy for some refugees, such as the Danish Refugee Council’s box shelters, IKEA lightweight modular shelters and other temporary solutions, because they appear too sturdy and permanent (Onishi 2013). At the same time, national government authorities have advocated for the creation of ‘safe zone’ camps inside Syria and immediately beside the Syrian-Lebanese border – initiatives which UNHCR has firmly resisted (Bidinger et al. 2015: 47).

Finally, as the response by the Lebanese state to the housing crisis was largely absent, initially (I)NGOs started to give rental assistance to the refugees. However, this approach proved impracticable to maintain due to surging rents, dwindling aid, and growing shelter needs. Some NGOs provide assistance to refugee families to help fix temporary shelters, inadequate living quarters, or shared housing at no expense to the owners in exchange for no or low rent to the refugees, and for agreeing rental contracts. These initiatives are aimed at adding value to property of the local owners or hosts, while arranging housing for refugees, and creating goodwill between Syrians and host communities (Bidinger et al. 2015). However, giving the resources at the disposal of NGOs, these arrangements have had limited coverage.

5.3 Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors

In Lebanon, municipalities ‘have been at the frontline of the refugee crisis in the absence of a coherent national response’ (Mercy Corps 2014; Mourad and Piron 2016: 5). Their tasks include registering new arrivals, maintaining security, ensuring adequate water and sanitation services, and providing shelter, as well as mediating community tensions (Mercy Corps 2014). Municipalities and unions of municipalities have displayed ‘unparalleled generosity and fortitude’ (Republic of Lebanon 2016), for a variety of reasons. These include a moral obligation to support refugees’ pressing needs because of shared heritage and culture; the desire to reciprocate support received from Syrians when Lebanese people fled Israel’s invasion in 2006; as well as by security concerns, prompting them to monitor and channel refugee settlements (Boustani et al. 2016: 7; Mercy Corps 2014).

Moreover, the central government issued a decision generically instructing municipalities to respond to the Syria refugee crisis. In some instances, this has led to efforts that have taken a somewhat participatory approach involving the municipalities, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs putting in place work plans for 251 municipalities, identifying key problems and planning solutions. Yet other ministries, such as those responsible for water and energy, still have a highly top-down approach in engaging municipalities (pers. comm. S. el Ghali, Ministry of Social Affairs). Furthermore, some centrally steered programmes have a significant physical presence in city neighbourhoods and towns. For instance, over 200 Social Development Centres (SDCs) are run by the Ministry of Social Affairs across the country, providing psychosocial counselling services as well as vocational training to both local populations and to refugees, in collaboration with NGOs, and this may be a site for
strengthening community relations. Yet, the central government has generally sought to retain control over local responses. It has provided limited support or guidance to help municipalities cope with the additional pressure on social relations or local services (Mercy Corps 2014: 2), as for instance in the case of a markedly visible decline in the level and quality of solid waste management services (World Bank 2013).

Lebanon’s local governments and municipalities are highly dependent on central government transfers, have a weak local revenue base, and have a backlog of investment needs that far exceed available resources (World Bank 2013). In the early years of the crisis, local responses have been hindered by weak governance, and the absence of a national response strategy that could support the coordination between international actors, the central government, and local authorities (Boustani et al. 2016). International organisations including United Nations (UN) agencies took the initial lead in responding to the rapid refugee influx. This has, in some ways, involved humanitarian organisations sidestepping cumbersome bureaucratic processes in municipalities. Funding constraints and limited programme timeframes also disincentivised the development of enduring relations with municipalities and unions of municipalities (Boustani et al. 2016). However, over time, the role of the Government of Lebanon grew, leading to the development of the 2015 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) jointly with UN agencies. Moreover, as relief interventions are shifting gear towards development, and recognition of the necessity of urban specific responses is growing, area based efforts that seek to meaningfully engage local governments are gaining in popularity. One notable example concerns the detailed city and vulnerable urban neighbourhood profiles that UN-Habitat has been devising to inform strategic interventions by humanitarian and development agencies, in close collaboration with municipalities. These have covered major cities including Beirut (e.g. UN-Habitat 2017), Tripoli and Sour. Humanitarian and development organisations’ engagement with urban municipal authorities is nevertheless hindered by the absence of a national urban policy.

Moreover, definitional clarity on which areas in Lebanon are urban is missing, and clearly defined statistical measures (for instance based on population sizes or densities common measures) for what constitutes the urban have not been adopted by the government. Moreover, municipalities can, but often do not, govern urban areas, as ‘more than 70 per cent of the 1,000 registered municipalities in Lebanon have fewer than 4,000 residents registered in their area’ (Boustani et al. 2016: 7). Associations of cities are not allowed in Lebanon, and there is no ministry focusing of municipalities. Because they are part of the mandate of the Ministry of Interior, security is the priority issue, and municipalities are given less attention (pers. comm. H. Odeimi, UCLG July 2017).

Our review of responses of the Lebanese municipalities regarding the Syrian influx provides limited evidence. Some municipalities have sought to enhance community relations, for instance by encouraging the existing community football teams to recruit Syrian refugee youth so they may participate in regularly organised tournaments; or adjusted or more generously applied permit policies and procedures to promote the building of homes. This has been beneficial to the host community, as well as Syrian refugees by allowing the host community to benefit economically through renting their real estate, while also opening more living spaces for Syrian refugees in need of shelter (Mercy Corps 2014). There is, however, also some evidence that municipalities are involved in activities detrimental to the Syrians, but these have not been systematically recorded. Since 2014, at least 45 Lebanese municipalities have imposed evening and night-time curfews on Syrians (HRW 2014c). In the wake of multiple suicide attacks killing five civilians on a predominantly Christian village, al-Qaa, some 30 kilometres north of Baalbek on 27 June 2016, Syrians faced vigilante reprisal attacks, military raids and a tightening of curfews. The Lebanese army’s official Twitter account reported at least 600 Syrian nationals were arrested in the first three days after
al-Qaa, and the Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk admitted concern noting that ‘lately, there has been a rise in the abuses committed by members of the police in several municipalities concerning Syrian refugees’ (Rollins 2016).

Observers have noted that enforcement of curfew rules happen in bursts, and the picture differs around the country. In response, Syrians are self-policing, and observe the curfew, though in urban areas, there are greater opportunities for ignoring the curfews. Syrians in urban, Sunni neighbourhoods of Baalbek, for example, say they can go outside at night after curfew. But in pro-Hezbollah areas of the city, the situation is quite different (Rollins 2016). While local officials defend restrictions on the freedom of movement for Syrian refugees as necessary security measures, their explanations often rely on stereotypes and contribute to a discriminatory climate (HRW 2014c; Rollins 2016). Curfews seem to carry widespread support amongst the Lebanese. One survey found that about 90 per cent of the participants would support nightly curfews and restricted political freedom (Harb and Saab 2014). Nevertheless, protest marches by Lebanese citizens against the curfews have also taken place, notably in Beirut (Rollins 2016). The curfews are also contested at a high level. Cabinet ministers, representing different sectarian groups, have sent mixed messages. While multiple Ministers of Interior have condemned the curfews and challenged that there is no legal basis for the measure, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been expressing his support (HRW 2014c; Rollins 2016).

Further to curfews, since the beginning of 2017, municipalities in Lebanon have taken increasing action against Syrian workers. Municipalities have been involved in forced closure of shops run by Syrians, and have forced other establishments to dismiss Syrian workers for replacement by Lebanese workers, with support from the local police. Such reports have been made for various municipalities, including Dahieh in Beirut, al-Hadath area of Baabda district (Mount Lebanon), Aley in Mount Lebanon, Baysarieh in Saida, Dekwaneh in Metn, Ashqout in Keserwan, and Naameh in Chouf district (Ayoub 2017). Some municipalities have justified their interventions by asserting its duty to implement Decision 1/41 issued by the Minister of Labour (2017), identifying professions restricted to Lebanese citizens. Civil society groups have, however, challenged this argument, noting that these interventions exceed the mandate set out in the Municipalities Law, and that it infringes the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour (Ayoub 2017).

**Case: Shop closures**

Before closing his vegetables shop located in Beirut’s southern suburb [Dahieh], Syrian refugee Mahmoud, 33 years of age and father of two, depended on his income to secure a living for himself and his family. The municipality sent Mahmoud two warnings to close down his shop, but he ignored them since there is no other way for him to support his family. Finally, a police patrol sealed off the shop with red wax. Since then, Mahmoud has been unemployed and living off of some assistance he receives from his family. Mahmoud knows very little about the Lebanese Labour Law. He does not know the main reason why his shop was closed. Now, six months later, Mahmoud is trying to find a Lebanese sponsor, hoping to secure legal work in Lebanon. He says that, “a sponsor costs at least US$500, not to mention residency fees of LL300,000 [US$198]”.

**Source:** Ayoub (2017)

Overall, local responses to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon are that:

In each country, some governorates and municipalities have adopted relatively more inclusive or restrictive policies towards Syrian refugees. The main sets of factors that appear to mediate this relate to identity and interests, but also to the personalities of individual heads of municipal authorities.

(Betts *et al.* 2017: 2)
Religious affiliation appears to play an important role in particular. It is clearly important to Syrian refugees, 55–63 per cent of whom in our analysis of survey data for urban areas across 5 districts in Jordan noted that religion is ‘most important’ for them, trumping other identity markers such as nationality (16–21 per cent); or tribal allegiance (0–8 per cent).

In Lebanon, the Sunni municipalities we spoke with have been the most welcoming. Elsewhere, Hezbollah-run Shia areas have become the least welcoming, with Christian areas ranging across the spectrum. Confessionalism has mattered because of the predominantly Sunni identity of Syrian refugees – assumed rightly or wrongly to be supportive of the Syrian Revolution – by Hezbollah which is allied to the Assad regime.

(Betts et al. 2017: 2)

Eghdaman (2016: 1, 7) also finds that Syrian Christian and Syrian Druze refugees living in urban centres in Jordan ‘experience isolation, insecurity and discrimination because of their religious identity’. However, besides religious affiliation, reception 'has also been shaped by class dynamics and importantly, the personalities of particular mayors' (Betts et al. 2017: 2).

In terms of social cohesion, the influx of multiple communities has added another layer of complexity in a fragile system, where urban neighbourhoods are fragmented along sectarian lines; a legacy of the Lebanese civil war. Moreover, the absence of legal and institutional mechanisms for metropolitan governance also limits the possibilities of ensuring cohesion between social groups in such urban areas (Government of Lebanon 2016: 20). Non-Lebanese nationals such as Syrians have no official representation in the political system (Fawaz 2009: 835) and cannot participate in local governance (Government of Lebanon 2016: 20). However, this is also the case for many Lebanese residents, albeit for different reasons. One peculiarity of the Lebanese polity is that though municipal councils are directly elected, the Lebanese typically hold voting rights that are maintained in one’s area of origin rather than residence. Most rural migrants continue to vote in their areas of origin, despite having lived in the city for several generations, and this creates serious accountability deficits for urban residents; they do not vote for local political representatives. While the transfer of voter registration is legally-speaking an easy step, in practice it is very complicated because it requires strong political support, as local political blocks resist any change in the balance of power (Fawaz 2009: 835).

Fawaz (2009: 839) notes that in essence, Lebanon’s development model has emphasised the provision of healthcare, housing subsidies, schooling and other basic needs by non-state actors – ‘predominantly religious authorities and institutions that respond to their own constituencies’ needs’. Hence, assemblages of municipal, humanitarian, NGO, faith based, private (e.g. landlord), gangs and community organisations are involved in providing idiosyncratic and locally specific modalities of reception, to affect refugee access to security, jobs and housing, and more generally govern the places in which they live. Informal tented settlements thus emerge ‘through a collusion of private interests, state acquiescence and humanitarian aid’ (Sanyal 2017: 119). In urban Lebanon, the provisioning of housing, work, living, and social support for refugee populations is to a considerable extent informal. There are significant areas within the country (EIU 2017b), as well as within specific cities such as Beirut or Sour, where the state has limited authority, and other actors have a greater say over public life, and are (potential) interlocutors for aid and humanitarian efforts from Western or Gulf based donors. Two cases stand out: Palestinian camps (official and unofficial) and Lebanese dominated informal settlements.

In Lebanon, local authorities’ position towards informal settlements varies from one municipality to the other. Some, such as Ghobeiri municipality (Beirut), have sought to improve their condition, even though the position of the central government remains not to recognise and service these areas (Government of Lebanon 2016).
Throughout the Arab world, religious socio-political organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Harmsen 2008) or Hezbollah, while sometimes outlawed or declared extremist by foreign states, are an important force in social development and actively engaging refugees and internally displaced groups (Carmona 2013; Roy 2009). Yet, religious organisations in host societies can also have conflicting agendas and interests to refugees. For instance in Lebanon, Hezbollah has been politically and militarily aligned with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and thus has a rather ambiguous position vis-a-vis Syrian refugees. Furthermore, Fawaz points out that Hezbollah

...represents only sections of the community, meaning the majority of the Shiite dwellers who abide by its politics. Others, such as migrant workers, but also Christians and (Shiite or not) Muslims who oppose its policies, have not only lost representation but also leverage and position in any negotiations with the state and have no venues to challenge the consolidated authority of the party. (Fawaz 2009: 846)

The rapid urbanisation of Beirut in the 1950s and 1960s involved the formation of many informal settlements that were deemed illegal by the state and thus not provided with basic services. Populations of informal settlements are often considered ‘undesirable’ on a religious and class basis by local urban authorities who do not view their dwellers as partners in the making of the city, not least because they lack voting powers. As mayors work on shoestring budgets while facing substantial challenges, many are frustrated. Neglect by urban authorities prompted newcomers to establish new forms of organising in order to influence local decision makers (Fawaz 2009). Accordingly, neighbourhood committees were set up that constructed sewerage systems and road pavements, lobbied for inclusion in public networks and organised the construction of the local mosque. These all-male committees represented and sought recognition for the neighbourhood from municipal authorities and service agencies, and lobbied elected representatives in their areas of origin. Women were never included in formal processes of decision-making, were not allowed in the land development or building construction businesses, and property records show that the percentage of women acquiring home ownership was far lower than for men (Fawaz 2009: 837–839).

Over time, population increases and changing populations made it harder for neighbourhood committees to represent neighbourhood dwellers, and their role has fallen back on public authorities and the political parties (Fawaz 2009: 844). The Shiite community had historically been underrepresented, but its political parties Amal and especially Hezbollah have emerged to play a central role in the country in post-war Lebanon (Fawaz 2009: 839–840). Hezbollah provides security and assistance, bridges communities and state, and resists and reshapes policy efforts by state or international institutions (Roy 2009). Following Israeli bombardments in southern parts of Beirut in 2006, that totally destroyed 1,300 buildings and made 13,000 people homeless, the organisation provided highly effective reconstruction. The rapid restoration of neighbourhoods cemented its power-base and offered a sharp contrast to the stasis and neglect suffered by Palestinian camps (Carmona 2013).

Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, arriving in several waves starting from 1948, were housed in camps, which over time have become part of the Lebanese urban fabric. The Palestinian camps increasingly accommodate the poorest Lebanese, Syrians and other migrants.

In the first twenty years of their residency in Lebanon, offices of police and intelligence services were placed in the Palestinian camps to monitor the refugees’ activities. However, the 1969 Cairo Agreements between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) granted administrative autonomy to the Palestinian refugee camps, lifted the ban on employment, and allowed the use of Lebanese territories as a base for attacking Israel (Halabi 2004: 40). It permitted the Palestinians to self-administer their spaces, and allowed them to expand their camps and build multi-story houses and other buildings that
would have created a sense of permanency. While the Lebanese government abrogated the Cairo Agreements in 1987, Lebanese authorities are still not controlling the camps from within (Martin 2015: 14). Rather, these settings are characterised by hybrid sovereignties (Ramadan and Fregonese 2017), with the Lebanese state and other partially sovereign actors competing for authority to create ‘spaces of exception’ beyond the control and surveillance of the state (Ramadan 2013, 2009) and the de facto suspension of laws (Hanafi and Long 2010).

In the 12 official camps, the UNRWA provides basic health, social and education services, and does not extend to the physical environment. In unofficial camps, also known as ‘gatherings’, which are neither serviced by the Lebanese state nor by UNRWA, dwellers have ‘resorted to alternate self-help mechanisms and strategies so as to secure and maintain their basic urban services – in the process creating informal institutions that govern access to electricity, water, solid waste disposal and shelter repair’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356).

Political parties, local committees, and NGOs are the main actors responsible for provision of urban services in camps, such as the provision of water from wells, the implementation and maintenance of local electricity networks and generators, and local sewage networks. In many of the camps, Palestinian Popular Committees (PCs) play an important governance role. For instance, in the Maashouk gathering in the city of Sour, popular committees collect a monthly service fee from its inhabitants in exchange for organising some services, such as digging community wells for water provision, organising waste collection, and redistributing pirated electricity. Popular committees undertake some coordination with the municipality, often based on the development of personal relations with the mayor and the deputy mayor. The municipality does not collect taxes from the settlement, and ‘does not take a consistent position on servicing the settlement across service such as electricity, water, waste’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Whilst it engages in a waste collection service, it does not allow residents to obtain permits necessary for building repairs or construction. Such permits are only granted to inhabitants who are able to show residency documents, but this is not possible for Palestinians living in informal settlements. Because of the 2001 law that forbids Palestinians to own land or real estate, the ‘link between Palestinian nationality, lack of residency papers and absence of building permissions has indeed become a direct and institutionalized one’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Consequently, the majority of construction repairs in Maashouk are done without formal permission or do not abide by any sort of regulation.

The treatment of Palestinians contrasts with treatment of Lebanese citizens living in informal settlements in Sour. For the latter, an inability to show proof of legal ownership, which is often hard, is not decisive in the quest for building permits. Indeed, in order to deal with such instances, the municipality of Sour has adopted an institutionalised informal practice called ‘knowledge of ownership’, where officials have some discretion to issue the permits, even though this overrides the law (Yassin et al. 2016: 356). Informality thus results from the coping mechanisms of marginalised communities, but also because of the practices of the Lebanese state. Its national law declaring that no services will be provided to informal settlements enables their ‘deregulation’, while the 2001 law institutionalised the informal residency status of the Palestinians living outside the official camps. Moreover, there are highly localised, institutionalised (‘knowledge of ownership’), as well as idiosyncratic informal practices adopted by the local municipalities. These practices enable the Lebanese

---

17 Whereas legitimacy is drawn from such facilitation of access to services, the PCs ‘lack the de jure legitimacy of representatives elected by citizens as well as the de facto authority of representatives operating under the Cairo Agreement in the camps’ (Yassin et al. 2016: 358).
18 If they do have residency papers it usually states their (fictitious or previous) residence in one of the official camps (Yassin et al. 2016: 356).
19 Proof of ownership is especially difficult with respect to inherited lands or lost deeds and other complications partly stemming from the administrative absence of the state during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) (Yassin et al. 2016: 356).
authorities to deal with significant numbers of urban dwellers, marginalised on the grounds of lacking citizenship, legal residency status or official refugee status.

As such, modalities of reception differ and take account not only for who one is, and what one’s legal status is, but also where one is. Different municipalities engage vulnerable groups such as the poorest Lebanese, Palestinians or Syrians in significantly different ways. Moreover, we have shown that within cities there are areas that receive distinct treatment (compare Palestinian camps with informal settlements inhabited mainly by poor Lebanese). Juxtaposing Palestinian gathering dwellers, Palestinian camp dwellers and Lebanese urban poor can be expected to yield important insights in how vulnerable communities relate with both formal and informal institutions, and how being a refugee mediates these dynamics (Yassin et al. 2016: 357). A final axis across which these groups are governed concerns the nature of the services. Thus, in the case of Maashouk, whereas waste services were provided, building construction services were denied point blank. Here, the popular committees complemented, replaced, reshaped and contested services denied or provided by the municipality and the electricity board.

Even though many observers consider it highly unlikely that Palestinians in Lebanon will gain full citizenship status (and by implication, Syrians if they were to stay for many more years), their wellbeing may be dramatically improved through other means. Yassin et al. thus propose, given that residents also associate formality with certainty, formalising the urban spaces in which they live, and advancing the official representative status of popular committees in dealing with the municipalities (Yassin et al. 2016).
Jordan

6.1 Governance context – Jordan

Jordan, when compared to Lebanon, enjoys more political stability, and a highly centralised and more effective governance system. King Abdullah remains at the heart of all key decisions in the country, although recent reforms include widespread electoral and budgetary changes and devolution of powers to the municipal and governorate levels. Press freedoms are weaker and civil society less vibrant when comparing Jordan to Lebanon. However, Ababsa (2011) notes that municipalities are gradually being held to account by their residents. Islamic charity NGOs are very active and based in the poorest neighbourhoods along with ‘Royal NGOs’ (such as the Jordan River Foundation and the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development).

Sluggish economic growth, structural adjustments, high unemployment (15.8 per cent of the labour force in the third quarter of 2016) and weakening remittance inflows from the Gulf Arab states have affected living conditions (EIU 2017a). There have been protests from disaffected young people struggling with poor job prospects.

The government estimates that absorbing the Syrian influx amounts to US$8.6 billion for education, health, subsidies on electricity, water, healthcare, infrastructure and municipal services, plus indirect costs of US$3.1–3.6 billion a year since the beginning of the refugee crisis (ibid.). The government has successfully sought support from Western governments and multilateral agencies, and the International Monetary Fund agreed a US$723 million extended fund facility (EFF) for 2016–19. As part of this deal, the government will seek to improve the business environment for the private sector, and strengthen employment prospects for Jordanians and Syrians. The government tries to meet budget deficit targets (to 0.3 per cent of GDP by 2018) and debt reduction targets, but the risk is that this further squeezes living standards of low and middle income earners. Political pressure and high unemployment will also make it more difficult to reduce jobs in a bloated public-sector. The government’s efforts to address the country’s socioeconomic challenges will be hindered by concerns over political stability, with competing views held between tribal and other groups loyal to the king versus urban constituents and Palestinians who form the main support base for various Islamist political groups (EIU 2017a).

6.2 National policy and law in Jordan

6.2.1 Border regimes

Jordan is not a party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (1951 Convention) or its 1967 Protocol. Jordan’s non-signatory status is often explained by reference to the politically and socially complex Palestinian refugee issue, popular sentiment against refugee integration, lack of resources and capacity to provide for refugees, and misinformation about the perceived social and economic burden of refugees and related questions of national security (Saliba 2016).

And while Article 21(1) of the Jordanian Constitution provides that ‘[p]olitical refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defense of liberty’, Jordan has not enacted specific legislation that regulates the status of refugees. Jordan is, however, party to several other human rights treaties, many of which establish similar obligations as the 1951 Refugee Convention (Bidinger et al. 2015). It is party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) in 1991, which Article 3 prohibits refoulement (ACAPS 2013). It is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the rights of
freedom of movement within the country, due process and to refrain from arbitrary detention. Being party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jordan is obliged to ensure freedom from discrimination and equality before the law. Jordan also is party to the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights, which establishes many principles protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention, including access to courts; freedom of movement; and freedom from arbitrary detention (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59–60).

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) of the Government of Jordan is the key actor governing refugees. Significantly, it views its obligations towards refugees primarily through a national security lens (Bidinger et al. 2015: 56). In the absence of special legislation addressing the conditions under which refugees can be admitted into the country, refugees and asylum seekers are subject to Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs (Saliba 2016). This law applies to all foreigners without distinction between refugees and non-refugees. It does not identify conditions under which individuals will be eligible for asylum – however, the law requires that those entering the country as political asylum seekers present themselves to a police station within 48 hours of arrival (Sadek 2013). Article 10 gives the Minister of Interior the authority to regulate documentation and status for entry. Moreover, while this law does not impose any sanctions against asylum seekers who entered the country illegally, the Minister may issue regulations concerning the travel documentation refugees require within its borders, based on the recommendation of the Director of General Security. Moreover, Law 24 grants the Minister the power to determine on a case-by-case basis whether persons that entered illegally will be deported (Sadek 2013).

In the absence of national legislation for refugees, the legal framework for their treatment is a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan (Ministry of Interior) and the UNHCR. Under this MoU, refugees can receive temporary protection from UNHCR, which is responsible for processing asylum claims and refugee status determination. However, since the Syrian crisis erupted, border policies have changed significantly (Figure 6.1).

**Figure 6.1  Changing border regimes in Jordan**
Jordan’s initial response to the Syrian crisis entailed an open-border policy, exempting Syrian refugees from visa requirements to enter and residence permits to stay (Bidinger et al. 2015). Syrians mainly came from Dara’a, Aleppo and Homs, and most arrived through the eastern border crossing, having travelled a long and dangerous road, often across lines of fighting (Achilli 2015). In some instances, Syrian refugees are closely linked to the Jordanian population. In border areas, tribal ties are pronounced and original refuge was granted with host families related either by blood or marriage (Chatty 2017: 31). However, as the influx of Syrian refugees swelled to unmanageable numbers (3,000 per day), the government started imposing controls (Bidinger et al. 2015). By 2012, just one border crossing between Syria and Jordan remained open: Naseeb-Jaber, near the Jordanian town of Ramtha. Moreover, as Syrian border guards turned people back in large numbers, many crossed the border at night with the help of the Free Syrian Army (HRW 2012b), via approximately 25 unofficial crossing points (Bidinger et al. 2015). Since April 2012, Palestinian refugees from Syria crossing into Jordan via such routes were, however, automatically detained by the Jordanian authorities, without the possibility of release (HRW 2012b).

From January to April 2013, Jordan permitted only about 300 border crossings per day, prioritising children, particularly unaccompanied minors, the injured or sick, and the elderly. From amongst the adults, former members of the military were separated out, in order to maintain the ‘civilian nature’ of the general camps (Bidinger et al. 2015). While the Government of Jordan denied a change in the open border policy, access to the country was drastically limited (Achilli 2015a). Human rights groups reported that Jordan denied entry to four highly vulnerable groups: all Palestinians living in Syria (a similar policy of Palestinian non-admission was implemented during the Iraqi refugee crisis); all single men of military age, regardless of whether they are combatants; Iraqi refugees living in Syria, and anyone who is undocumented (Amnesty International 2013; Frelick 2013). This is likely to have occurred not only in response to the massive refugee influx, but also as Jordan fears infiltration by militants, in response to its participation in US led campaigns against Islamic State and affiliated groups (Achilli 2015a). Following an attack on Jordanian soldiers, Jordan fully closed the border with Syria in June 2016. The various and growing restrictions on entry and the potential of being forcibly returned to Syria poses a substantial risk to life and liberty of the refugees (Bidinger et al. 2015).

6.2.2 Legal status: residence permits, bail outs and birth certificates

Foreigners cannot live in Jordan without acquiring a residency permit, which in most cases are valid for one year only. Applications are submitted to the Ministry of Interior, which can reject an application for residence or revoke a residence permit without specifying the reasons for that decision (Bidinger et al. 2015). These permits are typically granted in small numbers to refugees. Syrians entering the country as asylum seekers or who are registered as refugees with UNHCR are rarely given a residency permit (ILO 2015a). As part of the MoU with UNHCR, the Government of Jordan has agreed to ensure refugees are free from overstay fines and departure fees (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59).

Similarly, prior to the Syrian crisis, just 30 per cent of UNHCR registered Iraqi refugees in Jordan were granted residency permits (Sadek 2013). Without a residency permit, access to legal work is limited. However, the Government of Jordan has generously extended the right to education and access to health care to Iraqi refugees, similar to the services available to Syrians with the MOI Service Card (Bidinger et al. 2015). Besides Syrians, Iraqis and Palestinians, and a growing number of Yemenis, there are Sudanese and Somali refugees. This group is particularly affected by discrimination, deprivation and poverty (pers. comm. Director Urban Programmes, Jesuit Refugee Services May 2017), and suffered from a redirection of financial aid to the Syrians by UNHCR. More than half of the Sudanese and Somali refugees have had their monthly allowance withdrawn since the Syrian crisis (Bidinger et al. 2015: 72).
According to the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Jordan, UNHCR is responsible for processing asylum claims and refugee status determination. Refugees fleeing Syria who enter through the official border are typically brought to the Khalda centre for registration. Upon first contact with UNHCR, an Asylum Seeker Certificate is issued, as well as a Verification Appointment Card, which documents the appointment for a subsequent interview for verification of refugee status. All refugees then undergo an interview for UNHCR registration purposes, which results in a registration card. In parallel, a separate security clearance interview with government officials is undertaken, when biometric scans are also taken (Bidinger et al. 2015). Successful applicants for status determination are legally considered ‘asylum-seekers’ in Jordan and become ‘refugees’ only upon securing a resettlement space to a third country. However, in practice, UNHCR uses the term ‘refugee’ as a term of convenience. In turn, the Government of Jordan prefers to refer to Syrian refugees as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, ‘Arab brothers’ or simply ‘guests’, which has no legal meaning under domestic laws. This was also the approach to Iraqi refugees arriving a decade or so earlier (Saliba 2016).

Asylum seekers can remain in Jordan for six months after registration, during which time the UNHCR has to find a resettlement country for them or voluntary repatriation has to take place (ACAPS 2013). This provision has not been enforced in practice, and rather acts to establish that the residence is temporary (Bidinger et al. 2015: 59). However, in the absence of safe repatriation as the civil war in Syria continues, and limited resettlement slots in third countries, there is little realistic prospective for the refugees from Syria to be relocated. Durable solutions are even more limited for Palestinians from Syria, as resettlement is not negotiated by UNRWA in order to preserve the right of return; and integration into the population is deemed undesirable by the Jordanian government. Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jordan has stated that individual Palestinian refugees have the right to choose resettlement on an individual basis – however, they also maintain that collective resettlement undermines the demand for Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland (Bidinger et al. 2015: 69).

Following the status determination process, refugees go to live in camps (such as Za’atari; the Emirati Jordanian Camp; King Hussein Park; Azraq and – previously – Cyber City), or leave for other, often urban, areas. Those refugees that move to a camp are issued a ration card. It grants access to camp services, which are all provided by non-government agencies: these include a World Food Programme (WFP) food voucher; health services; core relief items provided by Norwegian Refugee Council; and psychosocial services provided by several NGOs.

Refugees entering from unofficial border crossings are gathered at various collection sites by the International Organization for Migration and then brought to Raba’al-Sarhan, or one of the other 11 reception centres in Jordan. A report by ILO (ILO 2015b: 15) describes how many Syrians who enter through unofficial border crossings are met by the Jordanian authorities. The military provides these refugees with shelter or takes them to one of the camps, however their identity documents are taken away on arrival, in order to limit their freedom to move inside the host country. Refugees can have their documents returned to them when they are ‘bailed out’ of the camps, however, UNHCR’s re-verification process in 2015 found that 35 per cent of refugees’ documents had been lost or displaced by the government after arriving in the host country (ILO 2015b: 15). Moreover, as these Syrians do not have proof of legal entry into Jordan, they cannot get security clearance from Ministry of Interior and in turn cannot obtain legal residency status, MOL cards, work permits and access to healthcare, etc. (Rummery 2016). This is particularly problematic as the UNHCR’s Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) Baseline Survey (UNHCR Jordan 2015) found that 20 per cent of low vulnerability cases arrived via informal border crossings, compared with 77 per cent of severely vulnerable cases. So the most vulnerable face the most difficult reception.
Since Za’atari camp was raised in 2012, those refugees wanting to leave the camps for urban areas were required to find a Jordanian national willing to step forward to act as a guarantor, enabling them to ‘bail out’ from a camp or holding facility. Formal bail out applications must be submitted to the Syrian Refugee Assistance Department (SRAD). The guarantor (or sponsor, or kafeel) must be someone over 35 years of age, married, with a stable job, no police record, and in a direct family relation with the applicant. The guarantor undertakes to look after them and to cooperate with the authorities if any issues arise relating to the person in their care. Initially, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers were able to comply with the requirements within days, to then set off for their new place of living. However, those unable to find a guarantor were transferred to one of two holding centres – Cyber City or Ramtha Stadium – where they waited for weeks or months to find a guarantor. This was the case for about 750 people in 2012 (HRW 2012b).

Those Syrians moving on to urban areas do not obtain a ration card but a Ministry of Interior ‘service card’, entitling them to education and health services in urban locations.20 Commendably, these refugees are given equal access to these services to that of Jordanian nationals in many respects (Bidinger et al. 2015), though entitlements have reduced as the crisis endured and the government was less able to provide support. The service card acts as official identification documents, listing basic information about cardholders and their families, as well as the place of residence (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 21).

The Government of Jordan estimates that there are over 500,000 unregistered Syrians in Jordan. If one accepts that these figures are correct, the question arises as to why this is the case, given the benefits that registration incurs in terms of assistance for education, healthcare and formal employment (work permits).

From late 2013, all Syrians in the country were expected to report to the police and go through a biometric iris scan to obtain a new MoI service card, required to access government provided health and education services. This approach started in December 2013 with the establishment of a new registration centre near the border; it was then applied to the camps in 2014, and rolled out in urban areas in the rest of the country from February 2015 (Lenner 2016). High fees and bureaucratic obstacles delayed the roll out of the re-registration programme, but intense negotiations between the Government and UNHCR reduced these hindrances, after which roll out accelerated.21

By the end of 2014, the Jordanian government was taking increasing control of humanitarian assistance, with negative implications for protection and service provision to urban refugees. The Government was reported as having instructed humanitarian organisations to serve only refugees with complete documentation, undermining trust in these organisations (Achilli 2015a) – however, a number of organisations continue to work explicitly targeting undocumented Syrians (Swan 2017). Simultaneously, a growing number of evictions of informal tented settlements have been witnessed. In one instance, around 1,300 Syrian refugees living in an ITS in the proximities of Amman were forcibly evicted and sent to Azraq camp (REACH 2014a).

At the start of 2016, 250,000 Syrians were estimated to be without updated government registration and 152,000 of 515,000 registered Syrian refugees living outside of camps had not yet received a new MoI card. Moreover, since April 2014, close to 14,000 Syrian refugees had been involuntarily relocated to Za’atari and Azraq Camps as a result of not having the required documentation or for working without a permit (NRC 2016a). In 2015, 62 per cent of families of Syrian refugees in urban areas transited through Za’atari camp upon

---

20 For those refugees who will live in a camp, the cards chiefly serve as documentation of government registration (Bidinger et al. 2015). Syrian refugees had access to free services until late 2014, when the costs were considered prohibitive, although vaccination and treatment for communicable diseases is still free of charge (EIU 2017a).

21 By May 2016, re-registered non-camp residents amounted to 366,134, while the population in camps totalled 137,068; totalling less than 40 per cent of the government’s census figure (Lenner 2016).
arrival in Jordan (and a further 3 per cent through Azraq). This compares with 67 per cent entering straight into host communities the previous year, indicating a change in border regime towards encampment (CARE 2015). Achilli (2015) also argues that the Jordanian government has made increasing attempts to curtail the urban refugee population. Government officials’ previous flexible attitude towards refugees meeting all the requirements for ‘bail out’ has hardened. Since July 2014 the Jordanian authorities have instructed UNHCR to stop issuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) to Syrian refugees that had left the camps without proper ‘bail out’ documentation. Without an ASC, obtaining access to UNHCR as well as government basic services is not possible. Moreover, since the opening of Azraq camp in April 2014, the overwhelming majority of bailout applications have been denied by SRAD, which appears to have discretionary power in determining the number and type of applications to approve (Achilli 2015).

Prior to the Urban Verification Exercise (UVE) already significant shares of urban refugees lacked the MoI card. CARE (2015, p. 23) surveyed 1300 Syrians in urban Jordan to find that 26 per cent of families who arrived between January and June 2014 did not have a valid MoI card, as compared to 21 per cent of those who arrived after 2014 (up until the time of the study). Eight per cent of those who arrived in the first half of the year were not registered with UNHCR, and 18 per cent of those who arrived in the second half of the year. Of those without MoI card, half failed to access health care, and 61 per cent of families without MoI card, and 74 per cent without UNHCR registration, did not have children in school.

Our analysis of primary data finds that between 2015 and 2016, the share of urban households (identified using night light analysis) surveyed in three Jordanian cities with at least one member having a valid MoI card has improved in Amman, but reduced in Mafraq and Irbid (Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2** Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member holding a valid MoI card (2015–16)

At the same time, the UVE was successful in bringing more Syrian refugee households into the fold of the MoI card regime. Figure 6.3 shows that the share of households having at least one member without an MoI card has come down dramatically in Mafraq and Irbid. This is an important advancement as these households will have gained access to key services for which the MoI card is a prerequisite, while it also indicates that the Government is better able to monitor the influx, to possibly generate a greater sense of security. Nevertheless,
many Syrian refugee households (a share of 9 per cent in Irbid to 16 per cent in Amman) still have one or more members that do not yet have the MoI card, and are thus deprived of its benefits.

Figure 6.3  Syrian families in urban Jordan having at least one member without valid MoI card (2015–16)

The Urban Verification Exercise (UVE) thus seemed to improve the relative coverage of families holding at least one card amongst its members, but reduced the number of people within these families carrying valid MOI cards. The UVE also led to a compounding of documentation challenges: in order to be re-registered for a MoI card, Syrians needed a UNHCR asylum-seeker certificate, rent agreement and birth certificates of children. However, if unable to complete the UVE because of missing documentation, the refugee is now also lacking a new MoI card in addition to these other documents. The UVE hence also raised the issue of children for whom no birth certificate had been obtained. At the beginning of the Syrian Refugee crisis, marriage and birth registration among Syrian refugees in Jordan was very low. One study noted that refugees stated that among the barriers to obtaining this documentation were a lack of understanding of their importance and how to proceed to register. They also were unable to provide the documents required to register marriages and births, such as identity papers and marriage certificates. Furthermore, many gave birth at home without an authorised midwife, or were refused notification from the hospital if they were unable to pay the full cost of the delivery (ARDD-Legal Aid undated). In response, ARDD-Legal Aid, UNHCR and the Jordanian Government launched two national campaigns to raise awareness among refugee population about the importance of the issue, and to mobilise families to correct the status of the children, in late 2014 and May-July 2015. Importantly, registration fees were waived and personal status offices were opened in Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, as well as sharia’a courts to document marriages. Validation (affixing) of marriages is key in order to affix the kinship of the children, and thus, to facilitate the registration of children according to Jordanian law. Additionally, the Government of Jordan decided to allow for documents indicating proof of marriage or birth to be copies and not the original documentation (ARDD-Legal Aid undated). Despite these various measures, the UVE estimates for January 2016 suggest that 30 per cent of Syrian refugee children in Jordan did not have birth certificates and could therefore not receive new MOI cards (NRC 2016b).
Figure 6.4 shows the ways in which residency policy for Syrian refugees has changed over time in Jordan.

Furthermore, Figure 6.5 summarises the interlocking of border regimes, encampment and urban pathways, legal status and other policy related outcomes for Syrians in Jordan. It draws on data for February 2018 regarding 657,628 UNHCR registered Syrians, sourced from UNHCR data portal.

Figure 6.4  Policy change regarding legal residency status in Jordan

Figure 6.5  Interlocking policies – Jordan
Historically, Jordan has granted full citizenship rights to Palestinian refugees, with the exception of approximately 140,000 refugees who originated from Gaza (Bidinger et al. 2015: 72). Article 2 of the country’s nationality law, Law No. 6 of 1954, grants Jordanian nationality to all Palestinians that lived in Jordan between 20 December 1949, and 16 February 1954 (Sadek 2013). Citizenship was granted as part of Jordan’s territorial claims over the West Bank, which it controlled from 1950–1988. Yet, Palestinians have not been treated as equal citizens, facing many forms of discrimination and exclusion (Lenner 2016). Some Jordanian citizenship laws are gender discriminatory, with significant social implications. Unlike men, Jordanian women cannot pass their citizenship to spouses or children. A child born to a non-Jordanian man is thus not considered a citizen. It has been estimated that these laws directly affect more than 65,000 Jordanian women and as many as 500,000 children. In instances where children are born to Jordanian mothers and a stateless Palestinian man, the offspring becomes statelessness too (Emanuel 2012).

A different situation pertained to the Palestinian Refugees from Syria. Many, having relatives in Jordan, were entitled to find a guarantor until April 2012. Since then, authorities began excluding all Palestinians which had not crossed into Jordan through an official border post, taking them to ‘Cyber City’, a camp closed recently. Here, they lived in crowded conditions, and were guarded by police posted 30 metres from the front door, not allowing them to leave the immediate area. The way Palestinians were held at Cyber City, with no possibility of release, allegedly met UNHCR’s definition of detention (HRW 2012b). Yet, while UNHCR intervenes and advocates for refugees in detention and those subject to deportation, this mandate does not extend to the Palestinians.

As in Lebanon, UNRWA is responsible for Palestinian refugees in Jordan. UNRWA registers rather than registers Palestinian refugees in order to maintain their right to return to Syria when the conflict ends. This has become even more important as President Assad has declared that Palestinians who leave Syria will not be welcomed back (Bidinger et al. 2015). There are only 12,500 Palestinian Syrian refugees recorded with UNRWA in Jordan and estimates suggest that there may be 5,000–20,000 unregistered compatriots. The willingness of Palestinian refugees from Syria to come forward to record their presence and obtain services is limited by their fear of the Jordanian authorities. As a result of the non-admission policy, since January 2013 all Palestinians who have entered have technically committed an immigration offence, and are therefore at risk of detention and deportation. Human rights observers assert that Palestinians from Syria have been deported for entering Jordan since the non-admission policy was put in place (Bidinger et al. 2015: 61). Deportation is usually carried out within 24 hours. Intelligence services often come at night and execute the return without any option for intervention or judicial review (Bidinger et al. 2015: 64–65). In October 2017, Human Rights Watch issued a report that noted that the Jordanian authorities deported about 400 registered Syrian refugees each month in the first 5 months of the year (HRW 2017c). The Government retorted by rejecting the claims as ‘groundless’ (Ghazal 2017).

6.2.3 Economic participation
The Syrian crisis has affected the Jordanian economy in multiple ways. Economic growth has been lower (1.8 per cent per year in 2015–16) than government projections (2.4 per cent), dragged down by weak industrial and tourism performance. Conflicts in Iraq and Syria have hampered access to traditional markets, with agricultural exports particularly heavily affected by the closure of trade routes. About 9 per cent of the budget comes from ODA and development funding (EIU 2017a: 3, 7).
There are about 1.4 million Jordanians currently working, plus an estimated 210,000 unemployed (Razzaz 2017). Forecasts note that job creation will struggle to keep pace with job demand from both nationals and refugees, and unemployment will stay high (EIU 2017a: 3, 7). Living conditions are affected by weakening remittance inflows from the Gulf Arab states and structural adjustment policies.

In the last few years, policies directed at access to work for the Syrian refugees have changed significantly. Before looking at the changes initiated since late 2015 that have sought to enable absorption of Syrians in formal labour markets, we first review a set of policy measures that highly constrained such access. As in Lebanon, key policy instruments include a list of restricted professions, as well as a work permit regime determining access to jobs in the formal sector of the economy. Partially as a consequence of these measures, many Syrians work in the informal economy, and this work is deemed illegal by the government.

The 1998 MoU with UNHCR states that the Government of Jordan should allow refugees a right to work, i.e. have access to employment to support themselves to the extent that ‘the laws and regulation permit’. The latter clause is key, as Jordan has ‘significantly limited the occupations available to refugees’ (Bidinger et al. 2015: 69–70). Firstly, encampment of a significant share of the Syrian refugees has entailed restrictions on working outside the camps. This has particularly affected people in camps that were not located near to urban labour markets, such as in Azraq. Secondly, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour publishes a list of restricted professions and industries in which only Jordanian citizens are allowed to work. These include medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions; telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; decorating; fuel sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction workers (Sadek 2013). The list of restricted professions has prevented most white-collar professionals from officially working in their professions (ILO 2015a). Thirdly, there is the issue of work permits. Even prior to the start of the crisis, all foreigners in Jordan required a work permit from the Ministry of Labour to legally work (in the formal sector). These permits were employer and job specific, and thus limited labour mobility. Non-Jordanians with legal residency and valid passports could obtain work permits only in the unrestricted professions if the prospective employer paid a fee and showed that the job requires experience or skills not to be found among the Jordanian population (Achilli 2015a: 2). Fees could range from 170 to 800 JOD (248 and 1,128 USD) depending on the sector, and because work permits also imposed the costs of paying social security premiums, it thus doubly disincentivised employers to hire workers formally (ILO 2015a).

Consequently, very few work permits were granted to Syrian refugees in the early years of the crisis. People without residency status (itself a possible consequence of missing or expired identity papers, or of irregular entry into the country) were unable to obtain a work permit. Consequently, public policy made it effectively impossible for Syrians to conduct any low or medium skilled work in a legal manner (ACAPS 2013). The Government was found reluctant to allow for any humanitarian programming that could train refugees for (self-) employment, and its response was characterised by Lenner (2016: 16) as ‘an unofficial yet clear reluctance to grant Syrians formal access to any means to gain a living’. Moreover, in many ways, the constrained options to access (formal) employment to Syrian refugees reflected the experience of Iraqi refugees a decade before (Lenner 2016).

---

22 One UNHCR study showed that only 1 per cent of surveyed refugee households had a member with a work permit (UNHCR 2014b).

23 Stevens (2013) explains the policy emphasis on temporariness and a reluctance to support socio-economic integration of the Syrians including in formal labour markets as being informed by the historic experience of integration of a large influx of Palestinian refugees. While relatively successful, the influx affected the demographic and ethnic composition of political groupings in Jordan.
Nevertheless, Jordan’s informal labour market has commonly accommodated Syrians. Well-established prior to the Syrian conflict, informal work made up 44 per cent of all employment (UNDP et al. 2013: 32). By 2013, the Ministry of Labour estimated that about 160,000 Syrians were working illegally in Jordan (ACAPS 2013). Besides informal private businesses, government agencies were also noted as hiring Syrian workers, mediated by contractors (Lenner 2016).

Typically, work in the informal sector is subject to higher levels of hazards and exploitation, lower labour protections and very low or absent levels of social protection. In their desperation to make a living, many families resort to child labour. Estimates suggest that 32,000 refugee children are working in Jordan (Bidinger et al. 2015). An ILO study (ILO 2014a) reports, for example, that close to half of the families have one working child, while one study (UN Women 2013) estimated that 47 per cent of households’ paid employment came from children. An unrecorded number of women are forced into prostitution (Bidinger et al. 2015). Informal workers are at risk of arrest and detention, and in some cases have been deported back to Syria. Peculiarly, such deportations did not prevent immediate re-entry. This possibility for re-entry is not applicable to other refugee populations – for example, Iraqis who are returned get a stamp on their documents are denied entry for five years, and Palestinians who leave or are refouled cannot return (Bidinger et al. 2015: 64).

From late 2015, the Government’s stated policy position has shifted significantly. In November 2015 the Minister of Labour announced a cabinet decision that effectively allowed Syrian refugees to work in the sectors open to foreign workers, and to waive some restrictions for providing work permits. Then, in February 2016, the ‘Jordan Compact’ between donors and the Jordanian government24 set out Jordan’s intention to create hundreds of thousands of job opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians by 2021, reframing the Syrian refugee crisis into a development and economic opportunity (Government of Jordan 2016a). Jordan is now trying to align refugee interventions with its long-term development planning, as set out in the Vision 2025 development strategy and the Governorates Development Programme for 2016–18. Government and foreign donors are also coordinating their efforts towards achieving the Response Plan targets (EIU 2017a).

The Jordan Compact sets out that the Government of Jordan is now officially committed to providing formal access to the labour market, in return for donor support to its economy and infrastructure (Lenner 2016). The Compact envisaged issuing 200,000 work permits for Syrians (Government of Jordan 2016a), effectively seeking to formalise existing jobs and create new ones. King Abdullah envisaged that for every job created for a Syrian, five jobs would be created for Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). The Compact is a ten-year deal that utilises Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a way to attract foreign direct investment. It gives Jordan access to the EU’s market free of tariffs or quotas, as long as the products being exported are produced within the SEZs by a labour force that is at least 15 per cent Syrian (with the goal of being 25 per cent Syrian by 2019). In addition to attracting foreign capital, SEZs are minimally taxed and face few bureaucratic hurdles. The Compact reflects a growing donor pressure, who, faced with rising numbers of refugees in Europe, seek to improve the living and working conditions that may entice Syrians to stay in the region (Lenner 2016). However, the demands of formulating and carrying out such comprehensive planning requires a major upgrading of the capacities of Jordan’s national, regional and local authorities (EIU 2017a).

---

24 The Jordan Response Plan has a budget of US$7.6 billion over 2016-19, but the Government does not believe that even that fully reflects the costs that the country is bearing in hosting the refugees. The government estimates that it has been forced to find an extra US$8.6 billion for education, health, subsidies on electricity, water, healthcare, infrastructure and municipal services, plus indirect costs of US$3.1-3.6 billion a year to absorb its new Syrian population since the beginning of the refugee crisis (EIU 2017a).
The Compact has been accompanied by a range of policy changes and project initiatives. These include a pilot project seeking to provide 2,000 work permits for Syrians in the garment sector in industrial zones, and efforts to formalise the status of Syrians working informally in the construction, agriculture, and food and beverages sectors (Lenner 2016). The Ministry of Labour removed the need for a passport from the work permit application process, recognising that many refugees had fled Syria without one (Howden et al. 2017) and instead accepting Ministry of Interior service cards and UNHCR-issued asylum-seeker cards (Dunmore 2016). Moreover, between April 2016 and April 2017, the Government of Jordan declared multiple ‘grace periods’ (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/55936), in which employers of informally employed Syrians pay neither application fees for their permits (>US$500), nor fines (US$280-US$2,100) for not having applied for them before. Critically, however, the 200,000 work permits are not to be issued for jobs restricted to Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). This is a key red line for the Government, as high levels of unemployment amongst young host populations makes this politically incendiary.

The policy change had a fair start: by January 2017, 35,000 Syrians had been granted work permits (EIU 2017a). Nevertheless, the goal of issuing 50,000 permits by the end of 2016 was missed. In response, the government made it easier for agricultural workers to get permits (Howden et al. 2017).25 Other measures were taken in the construction sector. The Ministry of Labour, with support from the ILO, has issued a new programme together with a federation of unions to issue 10,000 work permits to Syrian refugees in the construction sector, that are neither job nor employer specific (Jordan Times 2017). This arrangement allows day labourers to work legally without being tied to a single employer. Here too, requirements were relaxed. Initially, Syrians were required to present a Certificate of Prior Learning, but this was later scrapped, and instead of having to register for social security, Syrians had to pay roughly US$70 for annual private health insurance. In all sectors, the labour ministry removed the need to present proof of social security registration to apply for a work permit and scrapped the requirement for a health certificate for those refugees who had a valid Ministry of Interior ID card (Howden et al. 2017).

Other explanations for the slow uptake of the work permit schemes consider the incentives for employers and Syrian workers. Employers may not have adequate incentives to formalise employment of Syrians for various reasons. Jordan has strict ratios of Jordanian nationals to foreign employees in some sectors. Hiring more Syrians in formal positions would require adding more Jordanians to the payroll to maintain the ratio. In many cases, employers were already struggling to meet their quota for national staff in industries not traditionally attractive to Jordanians (Howden et al. 2017). There may also be strong disincentives to formalising informal Syrian workers. Those small businesses such as shops and restaurants that employ Syrians often do not have any formal registration (ARDD-Legal Aid 2016b; UNDP et al. 2012). Formalising the status of their Syrian employees – some being children – might get them into trouble with the authorities. Employers may also not be keen to start paying social security contributions for these workers. Moreover, work may be casual in nature and not amenable to formal contracts. Indeed, it may be precisely their precarious status that makes it attractive for employers to hire and fire these workers, and there may be little interest in formalising them (ARDD-Legal Aid 2016b).

Others point out that the new schemes may not account for some incentives built into the structure of the labour market. For instance, in agriculture, hiring is reportedly organised through middlemen, who are mostly Egyptian and who are paid generous sums by Egyptians willing to work, but may not be incentivised similarly to hire Syrians (Lenner 2016: 20).

25 Farm labourers working seasonally typically did not have a permanent employer who could apply for their permits, so the ministry allowed refugees to apply through agricultural cooperatives. Syrians could use these permits to move between farms, working for any of the farmers in the cooperative (Howden et al. 2017).
Syrians themselves also have various motives for not taking up the work permits. One recent large-scale survey commissioned by CARE (2017: 4, 5) found that just over one-fifth of Syrian refugees of working age had a work permit. Respondents noted that this was because: there was no work available (66 per cent), costs too high (10 per cent), employers refused to pay associated costs (10 per cent), fear of losing assistance (8 per cent) and other reasons (16 per cent). The study also highlighted that refugees were hesitant to obtain work permits due to confusion about the application procedures.

Prior to the Compact, Syrians caught working without permits could be sent to refugee camps, as part of a clear monitoring and securitisation strategy. The World Bank successfully asked Jordan to stop this practice (Howden et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the memory of such policy measures may well last and trust in the new schemes may need time to grow. Moreover, people may be distrustful that with the new work permit policy in place, there may be greater justification for cracking down on informal work. Moreover, the new work permits may not be accessible for encamped Syrians, as current regulations only allow residents to leave the camp for a period of up to 15 days (Lenner 2016).

Moreover, as work permits are issued annually, and policy can be easily changed and have done so in the past years, there is uncertainty amongst Syrians if benefits may last. Additionally, Ministry of Labour (MoL) directorates responsible for issuing work permits are reportedly engaging in working practices that conflict with the new rules. Lenner (2016) suggests that such ambiguity and the partially overlapping nature of rules and regulations in Jordan may function to give a semblance of policy coherence between fragmented institutions while allowing for some wiggle room. However, for vulnerable refugees it creates greater insecurity, as rules and regulations cannot be relied on.

Furthermore, the emphasis on job creation in Special Economic Zones has been criticised. Its current workforce are typically single female South Asian workers living on-site at the factories; it is unlikely that Jordanians are willing to do this, at minimum wage levels and in sweatshop-like conditions. There are concerns that Jordanian industry’s production costs are simply too high, and productivity levels too low for new jobs to be generated at the level needed (Lenner 2016). Moreover, Syrians have declined this kind of work because wage levels are insufficient to cover urban rents; women workers are unable to find childcare facilities; long transport times; and, critically, the perceived risk that taking up poorly paid formal work may in future lead to loss of humanitarian assistance packages. For Jordan’s urban refugees, working in the SEZs would require a long commute for a minimum wage that probably would not cover rent or transport, while they may also have earned better money in other sectors like construction or in restaurants, which required less commitment and offered more freedom (Howden et al. 2017).

Discrimination may be another factor that determines access to formal jobs for refugees. It is noteworthy that despite enjoying full citizenship, Jordanian Palestinians are reported to suffer discrimination in employment opportunities, and are not allowed the same opportunities to work within the government, police, security or social services (Bidinger et al. 2015). Moreover, policy and media discourses regarding the Syrian refugees, as previously for the Iraqi refugees, have often been negative, stirring up resentment amongst Jordanians. These discourses emphasised that Syrians would take the jobs of Jordanians, even though there is little credible evidence that this is the case. Arguably, this discourse of blaming the refugees has redirected attention away from public spending cuts by the government, a part of structural adjustment packages agreed with the International Monetary Fund, that have affected the living conditions of ordinary Jordanians (Lenner 2016). King Abdullah’s public support for the permit policy is, however, providing an important means to overcome such legacies.
6.2.4 Housing

The majority of Syrians entering Jordan live in the governorates in the north, along the Syrian border: Al Mafraq hosts over 12 per cent of the Syrians, not including those in Za’atari camp; Irbid hosts nearly 30 per cent as does Amman; and over 10 per cent live in Zarqa (Bidinger et al. 2015). Za’atari camp provides perhaps the best known image of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. As one of the largest camps in the world, it has housed fluctuation populations. While there were over 200,000 Syrians in April 2013, numbers have hovered around the 80,000 mark since August 2015 (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=176). Other camps include the Emirati Jordanian Camp, King Hussein Park, Azraq, and Cyber City (Bidinger et al. 2015). The camps are managed by UNHCR and supported by the Government of Jordan, which also made the land available (Saliba 2016).

Globally, countries requiring displaced people to live in camps typically do so because of concerns about public order, control over movement, tension between displaced and local communities, competition over limited economic opportunities, or for fears that displaced people will be less likely to return home if they establish a life in an urban centre (UNHCR 2014a). While leaving the camp is discouraged, one reason to stay is that access to services within the camps is generally better than outside, with Governments and NGOs providing access to health care, education and food aid. At the same time, it is clear that over time the camps are becoming more and more like a town or city, or a ‘city-camp’ (Agier 2002).

Nevertheless, over 80 per cent of Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside of camps (Achilli 2015a). Most find housing in urban areas, where over 520,000 refugees are estimated to live. Their influx has heavily increased the demand on schools, sanitation, housing, food, energy and water in Jordanian cities. Housing rent has tripled or even quadrupled in border zones and other areas of high refugee density. While these affect both Jordanians and Syrians, the latter tend to pay higher rents for the same housing unit, by cramming in more people (Achilli 2015a).

Whilst basic short-term needs were met in Jordan’s camps, after years of living in these conditions a large proportion of refugees began aspiring for a higher standard of living, jobs, permanent shelters, education, and community participation (Sullivan and Simpson 2017: 6). Living conditions for Syrian refugees ‘vary widely: while so-called ‘informal tented settlements’ have grown, and other refugees live in ruins, building shells and garages, more than half rent regular accommodation’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 124). Jordan’s cities also incorporate historic camps for refugees from Palestine that over time have become fully urban in form and outlook and, that increasingly have absorbed Syrian and other refugees. There are ten official refugee camps overseen by UNRWA, and three unofficial refugee camps for Palestinian refugees.26

About one in five Syrians is estimated to live in substandard accommodation, such as garages, chicken coops, and tents (Achilli 2015a). In addition, a smaller number of refugees reside in informal tented settlements (ITS) spread through the country, often lacking access to basic services such as health, education, water and food. Our analysis of the CFSME primary data sets held by Impact Initiatives noted – unsurprisingly – that people living in tents or tented settlements are particularly prevalent in rural areas of Jordan (Figure 6.6). City dwellers predominantly lived in rented accommodation, reporting comparatively higher satisfaction with their standard of accommodation. Moreover, rural dwellers also reported a much higher incidence of exploitative relations with landlords. This suggests that moving to cities, for those who can afford it, may involve paying higher housing costs, but also involves lessoning the risks of exploitation experienced on rural farms, as it unties work from access to housing and thus may allow refugees to achieve greater dignity. Nevertheless, not all is well in urban areas. For instance, while written rental contracts are commonly used, these

---

26 As of 2017, the official camps housed nearly 370,000 Palestine refugees, or 18 per cent of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan.
often provide limited legal protection; in case of dispute, a rental contract will not be accepted by a court unless it is registered with the local municipality, and tends to favour the landlord over the tenant (CARE 2015).

Figure 6.6  Accommodation in tented settlements or tents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Peri-urban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from WFP and REACH (2016, 2015)

6.3  Local urban responses: municipalities and other actors

As for Lebanon, the academic literature on the role of urban local government authorities in managing the refugee influx is limited. Both academic and grey literature on Jordan offers a variety of statistics, figures and analysis, but these are typically not oriented towards specific urban areas, and directed towards the governorate or national level. As such, Betts et al. (2017: 2) detect differences in reception within Jordan at the governorate level: ‘Mafraq was relatively more open, followed by Sahab and Zarqa’. They explain these findings by the influential role of tribal affiliation and the historical relationships between the area and Syrians. But they also note the role of perceptions of economic opportunity by local elites seeking resources from the central government.

Jordan has 93 municipalities spread out over 12 governorates (muhafazat), which are in turn sub-divided into districts (liwa), sub-districts (qada) and municipalities (nahia). The 2007 Municipal Act introduced a considerable element of decentralisation and the direct election of municipal councils, with the exception of the Greater Amman Municipality. According to the [Jordanian] Municipal Act 2007, municipalities are responsible for urban planning, public health, education, culture and sport, public safety, etc. Municipalities are ruled by elected officials, yet are also placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. At the governorate level, there are offices of the main government actors for refugee response – MoMA, MoPIC, CVBD – who oversee the rollout of national level policy. As such,

---

27 Amman’s City Council has 20 of its 40 members, plus the mayor appointed by the Prime Minister, in order to represent public institutions and civil society organizations. The other half is elected through local elections. This allows the central government to exercise political control over the capital. Moreover, the distribution of parliamentary seats favours the rural and tribal areas inhabited by native Jordanians, leaving under-represented the areas where most Palestinian-origin Jordanians live (Pavanello and Haysom 2012).
municipalities ‘are much more considered as semi-public entities providing public services than as autonomous self-governed authorities’ (OECD 2016: 1). The law has enabled a group of municipalities to jointly implement the public services they are responsible for. However, the central government has privatised functions ‘that should be a priori devolved to municipalities, and the range of their responsibilities is now limited to solid waste management, street lighting, storm water drainage, public markets and others’ (ibid.).

While this review found little empirical evidence on the prevalence of urban informal settlements in Jordan, since the 1970s the Jordanian government has taken a range of actions to improve urban slum areas (Government of Jordan 2016b). The Palestinian camps were extra-territorial pockets within Jordanian towns for 50 years, until the launching of Community Infrastructure Programs in 1997 by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) (Ababsa 2011). This Corporation also implemented projects to improve the service infrastructures of squatter areas, e.g. in East Amman. At the same time, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs amended building regulations in order to limit the squatter areas, while it issued instructions to municipalities to monitor construction and irregularities and not allow any type of construction to be built without certified drawings. Moreover, land use plans were adopted by municipalities to enhance urban planning (Government of Jordan 2016b). Focusing on Amman, in recent years government-sponsored urban upgrading projects in informal settlements and camps have virtually stopped, and the focus has shifted largely to the provision of social housing and the beautification of Amman’s tourist areas (Oesch 2010). However, efforts towards social housing have not always been successful. For instance, in 2006 and 2008, the Government embarked on an active policy of social housing, giving homes to the poorest citizens, and creating working class suburbs built on state land outside urban centres (Zarqa and Marka). The settlements were well built, but lacking services and transport, and were deemed to stigmatise the poor (Ababsa 2011).

Most cities in Jordan are affected by poor built environments and low quality of services, as a consequence of ineffective urban management. However, ‘effectiveness differs across municipalities and across cities, based on financial, technological, and human differences’ (Alnsour 2014: 274). In this respect, it is noteworthy that ‘Nearly all of the constraints preventing municipalities from better addressing the impact of the refugee crisis are related to problems that existed prior to the Syria crisis, such as bureaucratic hurdles, lack of capacity among staff, and insufficient means of obtaining financial resources’ (Chatham House 2015: 2).

The Jordan Compact and the Jordan Response Plan include a portfolio of interventions to support areas like municipal services and infrastructure²⁸ (EIU 2017a). Since 2013, the World Bank has been supporting a Jordan- Emergency Services and Social Resilience project, using a trust fund comprising US$53 million with the objective to support Jordanian municipalities affected by the influx of Syrian refugees in delivering services and employment opportunities for Jordanians and Syrians (World Bank 2016a). It seeks to provide annual block grants to municipalities most impacted by the Syrian crisis. Through an innovation fund, municipal grants will also be awarded to projects that demonstrate creativity in offering solutions to challenges facing the community. Moreover, the fund seeks to support the institutional capacity of municipalities, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Cities and Villages Development Bank to strengthen their implementation, oversight, monitoring and reporting capacities.

Some observers have noted that the centralised Jordanian government system prevents more effective municipal service delivery, inhibiting their role in addressing the impact of Syrian refugees on Jordanian host communities. Chatham House (2015) thus argues for a shift in mentality and approach as to how refugee-concentrated areas are governed.

²⁸ The Jordan Compact had secured US$1.7 billion in pledged grants and concessional financing, including US$700 million for 2016 (EIU 2017a).
recommending that local authorities are given a greater role in addressing impacts and providing services to hosts and refugees. Alnsour (2014: 271), in the same vein, recommends that improved urban planning requires a reassessment of the funding allocated to municipalities from the public budget, increasing the participation of people in the decision making process, and the development of public-private partnerships. However, hopes for this to occur is not great, and some authors observe

…absence of political will in the central government to decentralize the allocation of financial and human resources to municipalities or to remove the highly centralized oversight of their operations. This is partly due to central government concerns about municipal capacity, as well as a consequence of the general security environment in the country. (Chatham House 2015: 2)

Meanwhile, our analysis of primary data (see Figure 6.7) of Impact Initiatives for urban respondents in five Jordanian districts finds that between 16 per cent and 46 per cent of Syrian respondents are dissatisfied with the service provision by their municipalities. Pearson Chi-square test rejected the null that this perception of municipal services is equal across the cities ($\chi^2=73.115$, $p$-value<0.001). Further analysis of this result using pair-wise Chi-square test revealed significant differences between six pairs of cities out of the total ten pairs considered (see 0 for details). The data thus underlines the argument that there are significantly different performances in municipal service delivery across major Jordanian cities.

Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with municipal services

![Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with municipal services](image)

Source: Authors’ own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b).

Unlike Lebanon, for Jordan a significantly smaller academic literature investigates the governance of informal settlements and the role of non-state actors in urban governance. In Jordan, ‘citizen groups are able, albeit in minor but remarkable ways, to organize themselves if not to manage at least to change their urban setting’ (Ababsa 2011: 60). In some instances, residents associations have been active in Amman, to oppose developmental interventions such as against the building of a wall around the citadel (Ababsa 2011). Faith-based organisations also play a prominent role. From the 1960s onwards, the Muslim
Brotherhood was able to develop an extensive network of charities in Jordanian towns and cities. By 2010, these included 14 clinics and two hospitals, and the Muslim Brotherhood managed, through the Islamic Centre Society, 50 primary and secondary schools (the Dar al-Aqsa network) for 16,000 middle class students, 56 orphanages (for 12,000 children) and a university in Zarqa. Furthermore, since the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has faced competition from an emerging Salafi movement (Ababsa 2011: 58). Such faith-based organisations played a crucial role supporting Iraqi refugees in Syria (Sassoon 2008) and in Jordan (Libal and Harding 2011). However, the sheer size of the refugee flows has strained the limited capacity of such local groups to provide comprehensive aid (Libal and Harding 2011: 169).

For the Syrian refugees in Jordanian cities, informal institutions have emerged to support everyday life. For instance, as a consequence of displacement, many refugees lack the necessary civic documents such as birth, marriage and divorce certificates. In their absence, alternative, informal adjudication mechanisms involving local religious leaders are adopted that 'meet cultural standards of formality' (Riach and James 2016: 555). Syrian refugees in the largest camp in the country were thus found 'more likely to discuss disputes or legal issues with kinship groups such as family members, community leaders/elders or religious leaders over Jordanian, UNHCR or NGO administrations' (ibid.).

News sources offer stories of mayors speaking out about the refugee crisis. However, these often centre on the impact of refugees on the towns/cities, specifically the strain on public services, and not so much on what strategic or policy interventions are taken. With the exception of Amman, which is part of the 100 Resilient Cities network supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, and an NRC shelter programme specific to Irbid, very few of these articles describe policies or activities that are implemented to manage the refugee crisis. As such, Amman will be launching a resilience strategy plan document in the coming months. Existing strategy documents refer to how the city plans to tackle issues that have arisen from the refugee crisis – although these are high level, rather than giving specifics around the policies and programmes that will be implemented. One aspect includes a centre to be set up in Amman to help refugees integrate into Jordanian society, assisting them to register businesses and look for housing. However, as noted, even such a city-specific response is made under the oversight of the national level government.

Searching through more official sources, such as press releases from government sites, also found very few, if any, announcements of city-specific plans that refer specifically to the refugee response. Subsequent consultations by Impact Initiatives with key stakeholders were thus undertaken as part of this project to affirm that at the local government level, yet again, there is very little in the way of documentation that outlines a specific town’s or city’s policy towards refugees. As policies addressing the refugee influx are set at the national government level and merely enacted by local actors, some contacts suggested that policies on refugees with regard to residency, economic participation, and housing simply do not exist in any form at the municipal level, while others suggested that if such documentation does exist, there are only hard copies available at the local offices. Contacts also indicated that municipal governments rarely stray outside of their mandates and when they do, there is little documentation to support what they are doing. In fact, even for their officially mandated activities, record keeping practices are very poor and finding accurate information about past, present, and planned activities as they relate to specific pieces of policy is very challenging. Finally, consultations suggest that NGOs and UN Agencies in the early years of the crisis sidestepped local governments, though there is now a much stronger engagement with municipalities. Aid agencies have also typically gone through the national-level government departments when planning activities, because it is the national authorities that have sought to offer firm oversight of local responses and who ultimately reserve the right to sanction any activities.
7 Wellbeing of urban refugees and their hosts in Jordan and Lebanon: A systematic review of the academic literature

This section presents the findings of the systematic review of the academic literature that has focused on the wellbeing of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. We embellish these findings with new analysis of primary data collected by Impact Initiatives as part of other research engagements. Though our study has a specific focus on the Syrian refugees and their hosts in Jordan and Lebanon, to better understand their condition it was important to situate their experiences within a broader historical context of how refugees have been received in these two countries. To achieve this, the review focuses on the recent/ongoing flow of Syrian refugees, but also draws on the experiences of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. We also provide some comparison with other migrant worker groups in the countries, where relevant. As pointed out earlier, the review uses three thematic lenses to assess wellbeing outcomes of refugees/hosts: housing, economic participation, and legal status. The rest of this section analyses the relevant literature by separating them under these three thematic areas.

In the following sections we summarise findings from our review regarding the material, subjective and relational dimensions of wellbeing with respect to the modalities of reception that regard registration and legal status; housing; and economic participation.

7.1 Registration

Both Jordan and Lebanon’s historic experience of hosting Palestinian and Iraqi refugees ‘has led to a reluctance to admit a new population of refugees as anything more than temporary guests’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 122). There are no laws that can assign refugee status with accompanying rights. Hence, whereas in liberal democracies civic rights are linked to permanent residency, here nationality serves as a primary source from which civil rights and entitlements are derived (Knudsen 2007: 4). Consequently, in the absence of refugee or asylum law, Jordan and Lebanon consider refugees and asylum seekers foremost as ‘foreigners’.

A sense of cultural identity as a nation significantly shapes the way that concepts such as reception or integration are approached (Ager and Strang 2008). For instance, the Government of Jordan refers to Iraqi and Syrian refugees as ‘visitors’, ‘irregular guests’, ‘Arab brothers’ or simply ‘guests’, which has no legal meaning under domestic laws but express a proud custom of offering generous hospitality (Akash 2015; Saliba 2016). Stevens thus summarises Jordan’s analysis of its obligations to Iraqis as follows:

A visitor or guest to a country is offered hospitality but is not owed protection as such. Protection is associated with asylum; hospitality is a cultural (and religious) tradition. The guest is alien [...], subject to legal rules on residence, and generally to be treated with courtesy; in return, the guest is expected to respect the laws of the hosting state, comply with temporary residence obligations, and leave once these have expired.

(Stevens 2013: 24)

Mason (2011: 354) argues that ‘the figure of the refugee is regarded in the Arab world as synonymous with the Palestinian situation’, with the result that ‘refugee, as a term, is also rejected by many Iraqis themselves’. Hence, in the context of enduring displacement, the terminology of ‘guests’ connotes hospitality, but also the temporary nature of refugees’ presence in the country, and ultimately their lack of rights (Nusair 2013: 21).
7.1.1 Registration and status determination: material wellbeing

In Lebanon, refugees face daily exploitation and are extremely marginalised due to their precarious legal status (Allan 2014; Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 126). The legal mechanisms that create this vulnerability for Syrians are not new; there are important parallels with those used in respect of Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees and migrant workers in the country.

Enduring displacement in a context of limited opportunities to gain income and high costs of living, including significant costs of retaining legal status, has absorbed refugees’ savings and pushed many into poverty. While in 2014, poverty assessments found that less than half of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon were assessed to spend less than a minimum expenditure basket, by 2015 this was the case for more than two-thirds of Syrian refugees (https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9098). Refugees’ average monthly household income was a third of their Lebanese counterparts’ average monthly income (Harb and Saab 2014).

Public policy has made it difficult to renew residency permits, which has caused a drastic increase in the number of Syrian refugees who lack valid legal status in Lebanon (Janmyr 2016). It is very common for Syrian households in Lebanon to have members that lack legal residency status, due to the accumulation of costs involved and the difficulty of finding a sponsor. The Government of Lebanon does not issue residence permits to Syrians without identity papers (Bidinger et al. 2015) and does not publish regular statistics on Syrian refugees who lack legal residence status. However, the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF surveyed a representative sample of 5,000 Syrian refugee households throughout Lebanon during May and June 2017. It found that whereas 58 per cent of surveyed households in 2014 had all members having legal residency, this figure had dropped sharply and by 2017 only 19 per cent did so (Figure 7.1).

**Figure 7.1  Households that reported having all household members with legal residency**

![Graph showing percentage of households with all members having legal residency](https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9098)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP (2017: 13)

The lack of complete and valid legal documentation has serious consequences. Lebanese security services have conducted mass raids, arresting refugees without legal residency (HRW 2016a). Where Syrians have been put in detention, Palestinian refugees from Syria have been forcibly repatriated to Syria (Bidinger et al. 2015: 51). Another key consequence relates to the ability to earn a livelihood; its wellbeing effects are discussed in detail in section 7.3.
The lack of legal status has left refugees vulnerable to a range of abuses, including labour exploitation and sexual abuse, unable to turn to the authorities for protection for fear that police may arrest them for expired residency (HRW 2017b). Reports of sexual harassment, assault and forced sexual exploitation of women and girls, sometimes by other Syrians, but mostly at the hands of local men, have dogged settlements in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. The latent threat of sexual violence, combined with extreme poverty, have caused an upswing in the number of child marriages among Syrian refugees (Anderson 2013). Half of all studies reviewed by Wells et al. (2016) for Jordan noted the fear of abuse outside the home.

In Jordan, thousands of Syrians have been able to use the bail out system successfully, yet it has led to the exploitation of refugees, many of whom have, in their desperation to leave the camps, paid ‘middlemen’ around US$500 to arrange to be ‘bailed out’ by Jordanian citizens unknown to them (UNHCR 2013a). Stave and Hillesund (2015: 32) found that 87 per cent of refugees in Za’atari, and 58 per cent of out-of-camp Syrians, are from rural backgrounds, with the former less likely to have completed secondary or university education than the latter, who in turn are significantly less well-educated than the Jordanian population. The ‘bailout’ system hence contains an important class element. It has often enabled those Syrians with sufficient access to capital and connections to leave refugee camps and move into Jordanian urban host communities, but also consigned the poorest Syrians to the camps, and it is these people who could exert the strongest downward pressure on wages (Turner 2015: 395).

Legal precariousness is now a reality for the majority of Syrian refugees, but is even more strongly affecting Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). In Lebanon, their opportunities for residency renewal ‘existed only within an extremely restricted time frame and, in practice, were virtually impossible for PRS to benefit from’. Even in the few cases that were successful, renewal was granted for only three months (NRC and IRC 2015: 8).

For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, not being able to gain citizenship has translated in not being entitled to work, health care, or higher education, and being barred from social and political rights beyond those secured by UNRWA. Reduced work opportunities both in Lebanon and abroad have contributed to a devaluation of education among many youth — this, in sharp contrast to the past, when education was highly valued (Feldman 2017). The enduringly temporary status of the Palestinians ‘limits the extent to which they can control and improve their lives and surroundings; consequently, their children are deprived on many fronts’ (Makhoul et al. 2003: 259).

Jordan initiated a policy of obligatory renewal of MoI service cards for all Syrians since 2014. The Government noted that one factor of why refugees lack valid documentation relates to the renewal of expired UNHCR documentation (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014, p. 17). Achilli (2015a: 7) observes that the government has instructed humanitarian organisations to serve only refugees with complete documentation. In its own right, it is not unreasonable for the Government to insist that Syrians must have the right documents, and the GoJ works with UNHCR to try to achieve that. Yet, applications for residence permits based on UNHCR registration are routinely rejected in contravention of official regulations (UNHCR et al. 2016). This has led to refugees in host communities not being able to access basic humanitarian services, and exposing them to arrest and exploitation (Achilli 2015: 7). In response to this concern, various humanitarian agencies specifically target groups lacking full documentation.

One significant finding emerging from the review is the difficulties, frustrations and fears of refugees in navigating complex bureaucratic procedures. Prohibitive paperwork requirements and fees, combined with arbitrary application of rules, have hindered Syrians from renewal of

---

29 More broadly, reports have noted the gender inequity embedded in personal status laws governing aspects such as divorce within Christian, Shia, Druze, Sunni communities (HRW 2015c).
their residency status. A study in the city of Mafraq, Jordan, finds that while there are no
gender differences in people lacking valid paperwork, a disproportionate number of
undocumented Syrian refugees are children. While awareness about legal documentation is
equal among males and females, the women were found to be the driving forces in resolving
documentation problems – for instance by seeking legal advice, going to the police station
and the courts. Men, however, sought to avoid engaging with the authorities, often due to
fear and past trauma experiences involving the police (Swan 2017).

A systematic review by Wells et al. (2016: 3) finds that for Syrian refugees in Jordan,
‘Difficulties associated with complicated registration processes were reported to limit access
to healthcare, education, and services’. In Lebanon too, bureaucratic processes of
registration and residency permission create ‘hierarchies of eligibility and deservingness’ that
pitch ‘Lebanese versus Syrian, registered versus unregistered’ (Parkinson and Behrouzan
2015: 329). These authors argue that Lebanese public hospitals and healthcare providers
seemed to be ‘actively working against refugees’ interests’, using bureaucratic strategies to
disincentivise Syrians staying in Lebanon by depriving their access to healthcare. The
slowness of administrative and legal services is of particular concern for refugees,
considering the temporal nature of residency status and high levels of mobility. Uncertainty
about one’s future plans and about one’s ability to complete legal administrative processes
leads many to prefer quick fix alternatives including non-registration (Riach and James
2016). Refugees experience the renewal process as abusive and arbitrary (HRW, 2016a;
Lebanon Support, 2016a).

Lack of valid documentation has also hindered Syrians’ ability to register marriages and
births in Jordan and Lebanon. ‘For refugees from Syria in Lebanon, the simple matter of
registering a child under these circumstances becomes a fraught bureaucratic endeavour
involving multiple Lebanese government officials’ (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 328). An
estimated 10,000 Syrian babies born in Lebanon were estimated to require birth certificates
in 2013 and a growing number of children are undocumented (Bidinger et al. 2015). A 2014
UNHCR survey of 5,779 new-borns found that 72 per cent do not possess an official birth
certificate (UNHCR 2015a, in Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 328). Without at least a birth
notification document from the hospital or an authorised midwife, a child will face difficulties
registering with UNHCR and accessing assistance such as food, education and healthcare.
In addition, without an official birth certificate a child may have difficulties obtaining Syrian
identity papers and may therefore not be able to cross the border to Syria (Bidinger et al.
2015: 52). Statelessness consigns these children to significant structural vulnerability in
future.

7.1.2 Registration and status determination: subjective wellbeing

Historically, mental health issues among refugees have been viewed as the result of
exposure to traumatic events in war, and refugees are at higher risk of psychiatric morbidity,
including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Kazour et al. 2017). A significant body of
literature, however, also points to the sizable contribution of chronic stressful conditions in
the post-migration context (Farhood et al. 1993; Harrell-Bond 1997; Miller and Rasmussen
2017, 2010; Rasmussen and Annan 2010; Watters 2001). Chronic daily stressors such as
poverty, social isolation, and family violence ‘erode people’s coping resources and tax their
mental health’ (Miller and Rasmussen 2010: 12).

Protracted displacement typically generates amongst displaced groups a sense of ‘being in
limbo’, characterised by deep uncertainty about the future (Horst and Grabska 2015). Illegal
residency status in Lebanon is also creating various forms of psychological pressure (Janmyr
2016). Fear of arrest and possible refoulement restricts refugees’ movement, affecting the
ability to work, get health care or send children to school (Achilli 2015a; Bidinger et al. 2015;
HRW 2016a). Such fears are deemed a factor implicated in half of the nearly 500,000 Syrian
school-age children registered with UNHCR in Lebanon not getting a formal education (HRW 2016a). And while refugees highlight the benefits of volunteering and active engagement in community life, their offers to volunteer are all too often ignored by humanitarian organisations (Wells et al. 2016).

7.1.3 Registration and status determination: Relational wellbeing
Historical relations of social and economic proximity means that ‘the raw material to unite Syrians and Jordanians in common causes exists in the form of shared identity markers such as family ties, qabilah/ashira [tribal, ed] networks and pan-Arab nationalism’ (Stevens 2016: 61). Such relations were important in Lebanon too, and enshrined in cultural principles, practices and politics of hospitality.

Undoubtedly, the cultural and normative obligations on hosts to offer hospitality to the Syrians and other refugees have enabled the tremendous number of refugees being hosted in the region. Such norms of hospitality can facilitate relational wellbeing between host and refugees, however it is not necessarily extended in an even manner. Mason (2011: 357) notes that ‘cross-border mobility has been experienced unevenly across the Arab world’, with its limits saliently demonstrated by the Palestinian case. Thus in Lebanon, progressively greater restrictions and legal discrimination underlies the social, economic and political marginalisation of Palestinian refugees (Allan 2014; Knudsen 2007). Moreover, ‘The power structures within hospitality also mean that the “guest” is compelled to demonstrate “gratefulness” for the hospitality, and there is always a debt to be repaid in return for the hospitality’ (Gibson 2007: 159, in Mason 2011). Moreover, an inability to live up to hospitality norms may be burdensome, both to hosts and refugees. For instance, the material deprivation suffered by the Syrian refugees leads them unable to afford hospitality while also fearful of being a burden on others if they visited them (Wells et al. 2016).

In Jordan, ‘the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and its negative, real or perceived, impact on the living conditions of Jordanians has meant that Jordanians, who at first welcomed refugees, have become hostile: those who were originally dyuf (guests) are now laji‘in (refugees)’ (Achilli 2015a: 2). This change in the social terms of reception, is likely to deteriorate the relational wellbeing of Syrians, and likely to interact with the policy terms of reception. In this respect, Mourad and Piron (2016: 35) darkly note that one consequence of the regulations faced by Syrian refugees in Lebanon is that these create ‘yet another source of social cleavage within the country, with potentially dangerous effects for social cohesion’.

In urban Jordan, the size and enduring nature of the crisis has meant that social networks among Syrian refugees have collapsed, to impede economic betterment, emotional wellbeing and opportunities for communities to support themselves (Stevens 2016). In the Palestinian camps of urban Lebanon, deepening legal and economic precarity has driven shifts in the nature of social support networks, from traditional village, kinship and family ties to more opportunistic, neighbourly and friendship ties (Allan 2014). In the absence of adequate resources, humanitarian agencies such as UNRWA have to decide who is most deserving of support, and have rationed healthcare for people over 60 years of age. Communities not only find this deeply offensive as it devalues and disrespects the elderly – it also underlines its material inability to maintain desired social practices of elder care, and rationing is viewed as a systematic attempt to harm the community (Feldman 2017). Substantial levels of distrust towards the humanitarian organisations have been reported amongst Syrian refugees and hosts (e.g. Harb and Saab 2014) and between Palestinian refugees and multilateral aid agencies (Allan 2014).

In this respect, our analysis of primary data from a survey spanning urban areas in five districts of Jordan noted that while the majority of people considered that aid supported communities, people were also unhappy about the equity of aid distribution. Only 8 to 19 per cent of respondents across the districts agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that
support had been evenly distributed amongst Syrians and Jordanians. Moreover, when asked whether support was distributed to those most in need, between just 16 and 35 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case.

7.1.4 Conclusion
For those people who have been able to cross the boundary into Jordan and Lebanon, policies determining who has legal status (residence permits, bail outs, sponsorship, UNHCR registration), and their temporary validity lie at the heart of many material, relational and subjective wellbeing challenges for Syrian (and other) refugees in both Jordan and Lebanon. These policies and laws generally treat women and men equally, although their effects may be distinct by gender.

People fleeing from Syria are not all treated equally; it clearly matters who one is. Palestinian refugees from Syria have been received on less generous terms than people bearing the Syrian nationality. From early on in the conflict, borders have been shut for Palestinian refugees from Syria in both Jordan and Lebanon. Historically, Jordan has extended citizenship rights to most Palestinian refugees, whereas Lebanon has resisted this and actively marginalised this group. Nationality is a key factor, but there is also some evidence that modalities of reception discriminate on the basis of class and religious affiliation.

There is evidence that as the crisis endures and negatively affects the wellbeing of the lower income groups amongst host communities in particular, through pressures on affordable housing, availability of work, and security in economies that are slowing down (and in case of Jordan, subject to fiscal austerity), hosts’ attitudes towards extending hospitality have changed for the worse. This appears to have led to a social re-categorisation, with Syrians less considered ‘guests’ and more ‘refugees’, denoting a group less worthy of support, and at risk of scapegoating. At the same time, host communities also struggle to reconcile socio-cultural norms obliging extending generous hospitality in contexts of growing scarcity and pressured services.

Frequent changes in public policies and complex bureaucratic processes make it hard for refugees to both stay updated on their obligations regarding temporary stay, and entitlements and protections that may be enjoyed. Moreover, government officials appear to have a significant level of discretion in applying these policies, creating further uncertainty and unevenness in the application of policy.

As the crisis and resulting displacement endures, large numbers of displaced people from Syria have consumed their savings and becoming impoverished. The costs of staying legal, both through government levied fees and the costs involved in navigating complex bureaucracies, have contributed to this impoverishment, making legality unaffordable. Affecting a significant majority of Syrian households in Lebanon, but also a large share of those in Jordan, illegal status creates multiple vulnerabilities, distinct regimes of care for those who are legal vs those who are deemed illegal, and generates significant wellbeing failures for the refugees. For those who become illegal residents, host states withdraw provision of essential services (e.g. health, education, birth registrations); offer uncertain judicial or police protections; and threaten arrests, locking up and deportation. The fear and anxieties of detection physically immobilise refugees, and there is evidence that these are associated with individual and social harms such as depression and mental health disorders; child labour; early marriages as a way of protecting vulnerable young girls and women from abuse; and statelessness for newborns. The latter is a particularly serious concern, given that its highly detrimental effects are likely to endure beyond the end of the Syrian conflict. The deplorable condition of stateless Palestinians in the region offers a strong cautionary tale.
7.2 Housing
In this section, we will first set out the material wellbeing aspects that are pertinent to housing in urban and peri-urban areas, including camp spaces. We will then consider associated subjective and relational wellbeing outcomes.

7.2.1 Housing: material wellbeing
Globally, the overwhelming majority of displaced people in urban areas live in individual accommodation, rather than planned or managed camps (Kirbyshire et al. 2017; UNHCR 2016).

The population influx of Syrians has placed substantial additional pressure on already inadequate basic infrastructure servicing urban populations. In Jordan, demand for water, an acutely scarce resource, has risen by as much as 40 per cent in some areas of the country, an estimated 19 per cent of solid waste not sent to landfills because of a lack of capacity, and demand for electricity grown. In Amman, the influx of 400,000 Syrian refugees has been associated with a 25 per cent increase in levels of waste generation, to necessitate strengthening of the solid waste management infrastructure (EIU 2017a). With the majority of newcomers ending up in deprived areas with poor water and sanitation provision, the influx is likely to have a negative impact on the wellbeing of all residents in these areas. Moreover, Jordan’s courts are overloaded owing to higher levels of crime concomitant with higher population levels, and an increased workload as refugees seek to regularise their status (EIU 2017a).

Because of the rapid population influx and the inability of the supply of affordable housing, property rents have rapidly increased since 2011 (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46; EIU 2017a, 2017b; Goyes et al. 2017). While increased rents have affected host communities too, in Lebanon it is common for Syrians to pay higher rents for the same housing unit (UN-Habitat 2017). A chronic shortage of affordable housing is listed among the key problems experienced in urban areas in Jordan and Lebanon (Alnsour 2014; Stevens 2016). As such, in case of urban informal settlements in Beirut, conditions prior to the Syrian influx were noted for: the precarity of rental options, regular evictions (households had typically moved four or five times in a period of 10–12 years), deteriorating living conditions, growing population densities, increased pressure on water and electricity services, loss of privacy, the hostility towards (foreign) migrants, as well as the tensions between religious communities (Fawaz 2009).

For Syrian refugees, ‘living conditions vary widely’ (Lenner and Schmelter 2016: 124) but often are substandard. Open sewers, polluted drinking water and faulty electrical wiring represent clear health hazards, while housing conditions including leaking roofs, plastic sheets for windows, mould and moisture contribute to health complications (Goyes et al. 2017: 7). The main housing options available are: (1) rental housing; (2) squatting in and further overcrowding one of UNRWA’s camps for Palestinian refugees and in unofficial ‘Palestinian gatherings’; (3) forming or joining informal tented settlements (ITS) on rented private or public land (often in conjunction with providing low-wage labour; (4) living with local hosts; and (5) encampment (in Jordan only). ‘Each of the options presents its own problems, and they collectively fail to meet the need for housing’ (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46). In Lebanon, 24 per cent of refugee households live in substandard buildings (UNHCR et al. 2016). Limited access to housing has led to Syrian refugees squatting on public property, living in unsafe and unsanitary conditions, with hundreds of thousands living in garages and occupying the nooks and crannies of buildings under construction (Onishi 2013). For instance, in the small town of Bebnine, near Tripoli in northern Lebanon, refugees had ‘turned shops, garages, store rooms, hallways and even a slaughterhouse into provisional housing, while others lived in simple plastic tents’ (Thorleifsson 2016: 1076). Syrians named
Throughout Lebanon and Jordan, refugees have gathered in informal tented settlements. By 2015 there were over 1,000 informal settlements of displaced Syrians, generally on the margins of towns and villages, and in unused or fallow agricultural fields (Chatty 2017). In Lebanon, 10 per cent of refugee households were estimated to live in informal settlements (UNHCR et al. 2016). Other studies estimate that 50 per cent of Syrian refugees live in rented properties, 26 per cent in nomadic camps, and 24 per cent hosted by families or in community shelters (Kazour et al. 2017). A national opinion poll of 900 Lebanese citizens aged 18 and older conducted by Favo shows that 8 per cent of all Lebanese households consisted of at least one member who was a Syrian refugee (Christophersen et al. 2013). Another study reports that one in five Lebanese households provide accommodation to the Syrian refugees; about a quarter of these were doing so for free, the rest for rent (Thorleifsson 2016: 1075). While extending commendable hospitality, it also stands to reason that parts of the middle and upper class have materially benefited from mass displacement through renting out properties at inflated rates.

In both Jordan and Lebanon, Palestinian camps have become important areas within which Syrian refugees have started living, both in tents or makeshift apartments (Jabbar and Zaza 2016). The pressures of housing rents have made the relatively low-rent conditions of the camp attractive. Thus, by August 2013, the South Beirut districts of Chiyah and Burj al-Barajna, which house the Mar Elias, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajna Palestinian refugee camps (as well as the heavily Palestinian neighborhoods of Tariq al-Jadida, al-Da‘uq, and Sabra) hosted the two largest populations of Syrian refugees in the Beirut region, at 18,143 and 10,312 people respectively (UNHCR 2013b). By April 2014, there were 40,538 registered Syrian refugees in Chiyah and 20,658 living in Burj al-Barajna (UNHCR 2014c). (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 325).

Besides Syrians, other poor groups – whether hosts or other migrants – have also moved into the camps, which are thus having increasingly diverse populations. Martin (2015) estimated that 30 per cent of Shatila camp in Beirut comprises of non-Palestinians, which includes Lebanese, Syrians, Turks, Egyptians, and Bangladeshis. Another study of the unofficial Gaza camp found similar figures: 70 per cent of households in the settlement were Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, but other minorities living here included Lebanese (12 per cent) and Syrian citizens (12 per cent) (Zabaneh et al. 2008). The camps offer a level of anonymity and safety:

Besides offering cheap housing and proximity to work opportunities, the Palestinian camps also offer a specific form of security; many Syrian refugees and PRS [ed. Palestinian Refugees from Syria] who have not acquired or cannot maintain legal status choose to live in these communities because Lebanese security forces do not patrol them. (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015: 325).

After the Lebanese civil war (1975–1992), Syrian influence over Lebanese decision-making led to the transfer of unemployed Syrian labourers to Lebanon, in a move to re-invigorate the Syrian economy (Halabi 2004: 42). Palestinians benefited from neither the construction boom nor the economic recovery: ‘ruined camps were not rebuilt, repairing or enlarging existing houses was banned’ and the camps ‘slowly amalgamated into low-income neighbourhoods and slums’ (Knudsen 2007: 8, 10). As the land allocated to the 12 official Palestinian camps has remained largely unchanged since 1948, the fourfold increase in population has resulted in chronic overcrowding (Ramadan 2009: 154) and tremendous pressures on fragile
conditions. In Jordan, density levels in some of the ten official Palestinian camps have also kept on rising. For instance, in Baqa’a, 115,000 people live within an area of one square kilometre (Alnsour and Meaton 2014). Palestinian refugees also live in informal settlements outside of UNRWA camps, known as Palestinian ‘gatherings’, ‘occupying a grey space between the official camp and the city as neither the host state nor the camp officials provides assistance to them’ (Sanyal 2017: 119). In general, while the Palestinian camps and gathering are under-protected, vilified, and at risk of attack and erasure (Ramadan 2009), they also constitute safe and secure spaces of hospitality, identity formation and maintenance, and refuge (Knudsen 2007; Ramadan 2009, 2008).  

These dynamics are, however, nothing new. In Lebanon, a study of three urban informal settlements in Beirut prior to the Syrian influx noted the precarity of rental options, regular evictions (households had typically moved four or five times in a period of 10–12 years), deteriorating living conditions, growing population densities, increased pressure on water and electricity services, loss of privacy, the hostility towards (foreign) migrants, as well as the tensions between religious communities (Fawaz 2009).  

Several authors note that the Lebanese State has withheld support for strengthening the infrastructure and basic public services of informal settlements, and of unofficial (Allan 2014) and official camps (Ramadan 2013; Sibai et al. 2017). There is strong political antipathy to develop these camps as they signal the acceptance of Palestinians’ permanent stay in Lebanon; a political anathema. Knudsen (2007: 8) notes that in early 1998, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri made an official televised statement that acknowledged that the refugees’ situation was ‘extremely bad’ but that improving their living conditions would facilitate their permanent integration into Lebanon. ‘Lebanon was not prepared to foot the bill for their integration, nor were the refugees themselves in favour of permanent settlement’ (Knudsen 2007: 8).  

7.2.2 Housing: subjective wellbeing  
‘The effect that housing has on refugees’ overall physical and emotional wellbeing, as well as on their ability to feel “at home”, is well established’ (Ager and Strang 2008: 171). Their fieldwork in refugee impacted communities in the UK found that, instead of concern over housing conditions, respondents were more preoccupied with the social and cultural impacts of housing. And according to Eastmond (2006: 153), ‘home is where “normal life” can be lived, providing economic security, a social context, and a sense of belonging’. Home may have multiple locations simultaneously. Thus, for forced migrants, the place of origin and the place of refuge together represent home. Similarly, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon consider their camps as ‘temporary cities... where we stay until we can return to Palestine’ (Ramadan 2013: 73). Indeed, the wellbeing of the Palestinian community in Lebanese camps partially depends on pursuing a politics of restoration and return (Feldman 2017).  

In this respect, our analysis of Impact Initiative primary data for Syrians living in urban areas of five districts in Jordan showed that between 53 and 61 per cent of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement that they feel part of communities in which they live, with a significant share of the populations not indicating such a sense of belonging (Figure 7.2). Statistical testing revealed that these city differences were not significant (see the overall chi-square test results in 0).  

---  

30 This is a density similar to the most densely built up cities such as Dhaka, Bangladesh.  
31 Keeping Palestinians in refugee camps, separate from the rest of the Lebanese body, is part of a strategy of maintaining the transient nature of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Palestinian refugees, according to this logic, are temporary visitors to Lebanon, awaiting their return to Palestine (Ramadan 2009: 158).  
32 However, Allan (2014) notes that the public discourses insisting on the right and moral necessity to return as the only option are often in private interjected with the strong pragmatic desire to make a better life here and now, in Lebanon.
Wells et al.’s (2016: 3) systematic review of psychosocial concerns among Syrian refugees in Jordan found that:

Rent costs were reported to be excessive and increasing, with some households selling food rations to pay rent. The conditions in which many forced and voluntary migrants travel, live and work make them particularly vulnerable to physical and mental health risks (IOM 2015). Many Syrian refugees reported that landlords were exploiting the increased demand for housing by raising the rent. CARE found that in urban areas, Syrian refugees, Jordanian citizens, and other minority refugees each identified cash and cash for rent as key primary concerns (CARE 2017). They lived in constant fear that their inability to pay the rent would result in their summary eviction (Thorleifsson 2016), also due to the lack of legal safeguards that could preserve their rights (Musa 2017: 19). In the words of a father of 6 children: ‘Rent is the most important thing for us, if we don’t have a roof over our heads we will have to go back to Syria... If you are going to give us anything give us rent first and then blankets!’ (Wells et al. 2016: 10)

Those refugees living in informal tented settlements are also facing an ever imminent threat of eviction by local municipal authorities. Cash transfers, a popular instrument adopted in humanitarian programming, were reported as enhancing psychosocial wellbeing amongst recipients in income poverty, as it alleviated anxiety and stress in the household relating to their inability to pay their rent (Ulrichs et al. 2017: 5).

The review by Wells et al. also notes that overcrowding and cramped living conditions affect refugees’ psychological health, and is related to the occurrence of domestic violence, ‘bad behaviours’ and family conflict. ‘There is no privacy any more, with the large number of people in every room. We no longer feel comfortable or at peace’ (Wells et al. 2016: 10). Moreover, in Jordan it was reported that frequent relocations in search of affordable accommodation has crucially impacted Syrian refugee families’ ability to maintain legal status, as they are required to update their place of residence on government-issued service cards (Goyes et al. 2017: 7).
Within the context of protracted displacement, one underexplored area of enquiry concerns the placemaking processes through which people spatially organise, build, make, attach meaning, and derive wellbeing (or not) from and in their urban living and working environments. These processes, within the home or through economic exchange in the streets, can contribute to innovation and reconfigure cities (Hall 2015). White (2016: 2, 3) argues that ‘space and place constitute critical dimensions of wellbeing that deserve much greater attention’ because constructions of wellbeing are intrinsically connected to the places in which they are generated. The auto-construction, architecture and design of urban spaces by displaced communities entail important socio-cultural processes that gives shape to and expresses feelings of belonging, identity and placemaking. Housing is one amongst many sites of enquiry in this respect, yet an important one. As noted by Brun and Fábos (2015: 14), “making home” in the displacement context ‘represents the process through which people try to gain control over their lives’. In a study of the daily lives of Syrian women in Amman, such home-making efforts were found to both maintain valued traditions, but also enable the expression of new and multiple belongings (Fakhry 2017). What is less well known is how placemaking processes can advance social cohesion, in terms of both the maintenance of fragmented extended familial and caring relations, as well as the ability to live well together with host communities in the context of Jordan and Lebanon. Brun and Fábos (2015: 9) in this respect note that informal housing for refugees is often associated with low-standard housing, lack of tenure security as well as social security, and accompanied by fewer possibilities for modifying the domestic spaces and making homes.

In the literature on refugees, housing and shelter are often related to aspects of safety and security (Ager and Strang 2008; Brun 2015). Ager and Strang (2008: 172) found that in the UK, safety and security issues associated with particular housing environments for refugees, such as their proximity to host populations with multiple social problems, were common. In Jordan and Lebanon safety is a key concern of Syrian refugees, particularly to girls and women (Sanyal 2017: 122). Safety relates to the fear of other inhabitants’ threats to personal and bodily integrity. In one study of the Syrian refugees living outside the camps in Jordan, conducted by UN Women in 2013, ‘it was found that over 20% of girls under the age of 16 and nearly 19% of women never leave their homes and nearly 50% of both women and girls very rarely left the home’ (Akash and Boswall 2016: 3). Syrian girls and women in urban Jordan often live in extreme social isolation and ‘referred to their homes as a prison’ (Akash and Boswall 2016: 3). Jamila, an Iraqi university professor living in Jordan, told Nusair (2013: 25) that ‘I do not leave the house much because going out costs me financially and psychologically. I am in pain. Sometimes I wonder whether it is better to go back to Iraq and die there’.33

Insecurity and safety are hence also significant concerns to host communities. In Lebanon, vulnerable host communities strongly complained about unequal and unfair treatment by international aid agencies, to heighten perceptions of threat from the Syrians (Harb and Saad 2014). The fear of single male migrant labourers living in dense urban neighbourhoods has been a longstanding issue, and is interwoven with fear of economic competition. For instance, well before the current crisis, Syrian migrants in the Palestinian camps, former enemies in the civil war, were seen as a source of moral corruption, but also as hoarding economic opportunities and taking over control of local markets (see e.g. Halabi 2004).

Our analysis of primary data provided some additional insight. When asked why people felt unsafe, it was noted that in urban areas in Ajloun, Al Mafraq, Az Zarqa and Jerash districts in Jordan, around half of all respondents noted that youth roaming around in the cities made

33 In other displacement contexts too, feeling ‘safe’ is linked to mental health. In a study of daily stressors among Darfurian refugees in Chad, for example, a lack of basic needs and a lack of safety were found to be better predictors of post-traumatic stress disorder than war exposure (Rasmussen and Annan 2010).
them feel unsafe. This is potentially an interesting finding, as much of the debate regarding safety in public space is framed in terms of Syrians vs Jordanians and these findings suggest that greater attention may need to be focused on youth.

There is also increasing recognition that camps for displaced people have significant negative long-term impacts for both displaced and host communities (Kirbyshire et al. 2017). For example, camps limit the ability of displaced people to make choices about their lives and may lead to unwanted dependencies. Camps incur significant infrastructural investments that risk being lost once refugees return, and with displacement now typically lasting for a decade or more, there is a growing sense that humanitarian investment ought to be made taking a longer term developmental lens. Living outside of camps is also considered as providing displaced people with the possibility of living with greater dignity and independence within a host community (UNHCR 2014a). Put otherwise, ‘Camp and non-camp spaces...induce different experiences of exile’ (Fakhry 2016: 10). This review, however, found inconclusive evidence on the wellbeing effects of being located in camps or cities. One study noted that Syrians in a small town highlighted how they preferred living in Lebanon to being encamped in Jordan, even if it meant struggling harder to make ends meet. They had heard discouraging testimonies about the intolerable living conditions and lack of work opportunities in the fenced refugee camps. One Syrian who had lived in Za’atari camp in Jordan for a few months before escaping testified ‘It was just like a prison’ (Thorleifsson 2016: 1076). Other studies come to different conclusions. Shammout (2016), for instance, finds that Syrian refugee students living in Jordanian cities felt a greater sense of alienation than those living in camps.

This may be attributed to the fact that the residents in the city feel more alienation, because they mix with citizens who enjoy stability and security without alienation feelings. So, the Syrian refugee students feel that they are a burden and strangers. (Shammout 2016: 146)

Overall, few studies comparing camp vs city conditions and their effects on wellbeing have been carried out in Jordan. One key consideration is that some forms of shelter offer security at the price of constrained agency, while others offer the latter but at the expense of a more precarious existence. We surmise that people with different socio-economic profiles (having dependents, being educated, being young, etc.) may face and are willing to accept different trade-offs – however, studies have not explored this in any detail.

### 7.2.3 Housing: relational wellbeing

As a result of the deep historic bonds between Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians, many Syrians moved to Jordan and Lebanon to stay with relatives and friends at the start of the conflict. However, the enduring nature of displacement means that providing on-going hospitality is becoming a challenge. In cities like Irbid, Jordan, the relentless financial and social pressures faced by host groups mean that traditional social networks are no longer as effectively contributing to the financial and emotional support of Syrian refugee households (Akash and Boswall 2016: 2). At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Jordanian host communities, expecting the crisis to be short-lived, welcomed Syrians into their homes or supported their accommodation financially (Stevens 2016: 59). It was common for people to follow Arabic and Islamic norms that inspire them to offer support and assistance (Musa 2017: 15). However, ‘It can be argued that a ‘compassion fatigue’, similar to that of ‘donor fatigue’ (UN 2014), has taken place since the initial displacements of 2011’ (Al Akash and Boswall 2016: 2).

---

34 Consequently, humanitarian agencies like UNHCR have adopted a Policy on Alternatives to Camps (UNHCR 2014a) and policy on protection in urban areas (UNHCR 2009).
In Lebanon, the combination of house rent inflation and severely diminished water supplies, daily power outages, higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of healthcare providers and educational institutions to cope with demand under the Syrian influx, have challenged already delicate societal and inter-communal balance (World Bank 2013). In Jordan too, an elevated level of social and economic anxiety across both refugee and host communities in the context of inadequate affordable housing and regional turmoil threatens to further weaken community resilience, to induce violent unrest across these fragile communities (Musa 2017: 19).

Our analysis of primary data held by Impact Initiatives for Syrians living in urban areas of five Jordanian districts also indicated that in each, a large majority considers that obtaining access to housing is a cause for tension in their communities. Moreover, a Pearson Chi-Square test rejected the null that this perception is uniform across the cities (Chi²=11.76, p-value=0.019). Further analysis of this result using pair-wise Chi-square test revealed significant difference between two pairs of cities: Al-Mafraq/Irbid and Al-Mafraq/Jerash (see Appendix E), underlining that local differences occur in matters such as the role of housing as a cause of tension amongst Syrian refugees (Figure 7.3). Yet, the primary data also indicated that such tension is chiefly caused by the cost of housing, and 82 to 90 per cent of these respondents felt positive or very positive about their neighbours.

**Figure 7.3  Accessing shelter causes tension in the community**

![Accessing shelter causes tension in the community](image)

Source: Authors own, based on analysis of primary data from REACH (2014b).

Prior to the Syrian crisis, despite or possibly because of the impoverished conditions and economic and political exclusion, youth in Palestinian camps were found showing high levels of civic engagement, relatively higher rates of trust, feelings of safety and community control prior to the crisis (Khawaja et al. 2006). The influx of Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria has exacerbated already fragile relationships between opposing factions within the Palestinian camps in Lebanon: violent clashes with multiple killings occurred in April 2017, August-September 2016 and August 2015 in Ain al-Hilweh (EIU 2017b).
Research on intercommunity relations and perceptions by Harb and Saab (2014) is also showing large discrepancies in perceptions of inequality and threats between Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals. Many refugees complained about their treatment by local businesses (such as being charged higher prices than locals), health care services (for instance, restricted access to emergency hospital services), property owners (such as inflated rental costs), municipal officials and the police. One in three refugees deemed international NGOs to be corrupt and biased in their treatment of refugees. Conversely, Lebanese nationals saw Syrian refugees as disproportionately benefiting from international aid and attention, including housing subsidies, cash stipends, employment opportunities and basic health care services, while disadvantaged local communities did not receive such treatment. These experiences of inequality heighten perceptions of threat (Harb 2016).

Generally, gender based violence is associated with reception, for example in Lebanon (Yasmine and Moughalian 2016) and Europe (Freedman 2016), and interacts with experiences of loss to negatively affect psychosocial wellbeing (Carswell et al. 2011; Fazel et al. 2012). Displaced populations, particularly women and youth, are often affected by violence in relations within the displaced community, between host and displaced communities and with the authorities. Yasmine and Moughalian argue that Syrian refugee women in Lebanon face institutionalised violence rooted in sexism, classism and racism by the hosting community, governmental institutions, and within interpersonal circles. They are disproportionately affected by elevated levels of gender based violence (particularly intimate partner violence), transactional sex and sexual assaults, while early marriage is seen as a means of keeping daughters safe and protecting them from poverty. Some of the factors associated with the risk of violence are associated with housing aspects, such as overcrowded living spaces and unsafe shelter. Other factors include poor social cohesion, gender-based discrimination, limited rights and protection services, while changes in traditional gender roles that accompany displacement can cause intra-household conflicts (Pavanello et al. 2012). Thus, fathers in Jordanian camps noted that ‘the teens are now disrespectful, defiant, and rudely talking like I’m a sibling, not parent. This is no way to raise a kid in a camp. They don’t respect or listen to us anymore- only listen if we beat them’ (Wells et al. 2016: 12).

Within informal tented settlements, refugees and hosts engage on the basis of patron-client relationships with agricultural ‘gang-master’ hierarchies. ‘In some cases the relationships were cordial, but in others, they were exploitative and descended into significant acts of bullying, violence and harassment’ (Chatty 2017: 27).

In Jordanian camps, women perceived more cases of domestic violence occurring in the camp than while living in Syria but were fearful of negative consequences if they reported experiencing violence (Krause et al. 2015: 5). In Za’atari, women expressed concerns about the lack of lighting and their fears of using the toilets at night, while in Irbid City, women reported feeling unsafe sending their daughters to school on public buses (Krause et al. 2015: 5).

In urban settings, with rapidly rising housing rents, and written lease agreements being rare, landlords are in a very powerful position to conduct significant numbers of arbitrary and forced evictions (Bidinger et al. 2015: 46). However, our primary data suggests a slightly different story. This 2014 survey suggests that, regardless of where Syrian refugees are located in urban, peri-urban and rural areas of Jordan, it appears that the incidence of eviction or forced removal in Jordan is not as frequent as was reported for Lebanon (four or five times in a period of 10–12 years). About 65–70 per cent of Syrians surveyed had not been evicted/removed at all since their arrival in Jordan (Figure 7.4). And in urban and peri-urban areas, about 15 per cent have on one occasion. This leaves 18–21 per cent of participants, of whom the majority were evicted three times.
Many Syrian women report violence and exploitation by the hosting community’s landlords, employers, and the police (Harvey et al. 2013). The situation is particularly dire for female-headed households, as unmarried or recently widowed women are more vulnerable to inappropriate sexual advances from men offering financial and material assistance in exchange for sex. Reporting harassment or rape is particularly difficult due to the severe social stigma attached to this, but it also entails a lack of trust in, and the possible risk of harassment by the police (Yasmine and Moughalian; Wells et al. 2016). These authors further note that the Lebanese media depicts Syrian refugee women as ‘stealing the men’ or being ‘cheap wives’ for accepting lower dowry, leading to further harassment, shaming, and bullying of refugees by the host community (Yasmine and Moughalian 2016: 31). The vulnerability of unmarried Syrian women in Lebanon leads many to marry into abusive relationships or polygamous marriages, a situation similar to that of Iraqi refugees having fled to Jordan.

Finally, the continuous search for more affordable housing that characterise the poorest groups living in urban areas of Lebanon and Jordan also results in frequent relocations that shake up the social networks important to everyday relational wellbeing. This also is likely to make it harder to foster more enduring contacts that could facilitate greater social cohesion with host communities. On the other hand, as significant shares of the Syrian refugees live with Lebanese host families in rented accommodation, and in a quarter of cases for free (Thorleifsson 2016: 1075), these could be sites where stronger community cohesion is fostered.

**7.2.4 Conclusion**

In terms of housing and shelter, the main difference between Jordan and Lebanon is the former’s efforts towards encampment of refugees, with several large scale camps adopting about 20 per cent of the refugees, and some camps likely to become future cities, whereas Lebanon has adopted a ‘no-camp policy’. The Jordanian government uses policy to incentivise or force (in the case of people illegally having crossed the border) encampment,
by offering greater access to essential services in camps than in urban areas. Enhanced material wellbeing, however, comes at a costs of confinement to camp spaces, reduced agency and subjective wellbeing.

Within cities in Jordan and Lebanon, the shortage of affordable housing and rapid inflation of rental costs is a top material wellbeing concern for both host communities and Syrian refugees. Poor host communities, refugees and other migrants are ever-seeking the most affordable options for housing, driving a further densification of low-income neighbourhoods and a race to the bottom in terms of living conditions. For instance, urbanised Palestinian camps, which historically have been neglected by public policy and municipal service delivery, have now become important sites where poor hosts, Palestinian and Syrian refugees and other impecunious migrants are living together. Arguably, the high mobility of refugees impedes the development of enduring and cooperative social relations and thus social cohesion with host communities, and makes it more difficult to retain legal residential status. Where informal tented settlements arise on peri-urban public lands, they are subject to ever-threatening eviction.

With most refugees settling in the poorest areas, there is fierce competition for employment, basic services and provisions. Severely diminished water supplies, daily power outages, higher unemployment rates, rising poverty, and the inability of health-care providers and educational institutions to cope with demand are exacerbating perceived inequalities and inter-group tension (Harb 2016: 126). Overcrowded, unsanitary and unsafe living conditions affect subjective wellbeing in various ways. Worries and anxiety about one’s ability to pay the rent now and in the future are common. Overcrowded housing limits privacy, dignity, and affects people’s peace of mind, while the lack of safety outside, and the risk of arrest by security forces and the police due to one’s irregular legal status, immobilises and keeps women and girls in particular confined to their homes. Within refugee communities, relational wellbeing is strained within families, and people associate inadequate shelter conditions with family conflict, domestic violence against women, and rebellious and badly behaved children.

Host communities feel that they are suffering the consequences of the refugee influx, while being largely overlooked by the humanitarian and aid system, driving resentment towards refugees and distrust of the humanitarian effort. On the other hand, highly unequal power relations between owners and tenants are conducive to exploitation and abuse, while legal safeguards are largely absent and judicial systems weakly equipped to offer protection to refugees. It is not clear whether these function better for poor Jordanian and Lebanese citizens living in cities – however, at least they do not need to fear approaching authorities for lack of legal status. In peri-urban locations, we are also witnessing a growing number of semi-feudal arrangements between private landlords who offer space for tents and improvised housing structures in exchange for refugee labour.

### 7.3 Economic participation

Economic participation can generate positive wellbeing outcomes for refugees, ‘including promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host society, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance’ (Ager and Strang 2008: 170). However, the terms under which economic participation by refugees or hosts occurs are critical, and work that respects rights, grants autonomy and confers dignity is too often in short supply.

The literature on the economics of forced migration, for example as analysed by Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013), considers its impact from the perspective of the forced migrant and/or that of their hosts. They note that for the former, forced displacement often leads to worse labour market outcomes and to less consumption smoothing. The impact on host communities seems to be mixed and there are both winners and losers.
The refugee/host bifurcation in wellbeing generation provides a useful framing and in this subsection the literature is analysed to draw out how refugee influxes have shaped wellbeing outcomes of refugees and their hosts in Jordan and Lebanon. This analysis of the literature, similar to the two previous subsections, is organised around whether the issues discussed in these works primarily fit within the material, subjective and relational dimensions of wellbeing.

7.3.1 Economic participation: material wellbeing

The economically active share of Syrian refugees is estimated to be 28 per cent in Jordan (Stave and Hillesund 2015) and 47 per cent in Lebanon (ILO 2014b: 20). Turner suggests that the labour force participation of Syrians is higher in Lebanon because of the relatively liberal stance by its government (Turner 2015). In Jordan, Syrians face high unemployment rates, estimated at 61 per cent for refugees living outside camps in Jordan, and 80 per cent for those living in the biggest camp of Zaatari (Stave and Hillesund 2015). In Lebanon, such rates amount to a lower, but still high, 33 per cent (Ajluni and Kawar 2015). However, participation rates and employment figures might have substantially decreased as a result of the recently introduced ‘pledge not to work’ for Syrian refugees.

Section 5 of this report illustrated that while in Jordan efforts are now made to enhance access, Syrians in both Jordan and Lebanon continue to face barriers in participating in formal labour markets (Lenner and Schmelter 2016; Turner 2015). Section 5 discussed in detail the legal and practical barriers encountered by Syrians and also by other refugees/migrants. As a result of these barriers the primary livelihood strategy for Syrian refugees in Jordan has been informal work (Akash and Boswall 2016; Bellamy et al. 2017; Lenner and Schmelter 2016). In Lebanon, albeit for different reasons – the non-encampment policy, historical connection with Syrian labour, etc. – the informal sector also plays an important yet precarious role in shoring up material wellbeing for the refugees (Lenner and Schmelter 2016). For example, 92 per cent of jobs held by Syrian refugees in Lebanon have no contracts (ILO 2014b). Turner notes that male as well as female labour force participation is higher among Syrians in Lebanon than those in Jordan (Turner 2015). In contrast, while Syrians are reported as having created employment opportunities for the locals in Jordan, in Lebanon the Syrians are seen as a threat (Chatty 2017). Chatty argues that the unemployment rate in Jordan has dropped by 2 per cent since the start of the Syrian crisis due to the opening of 200 Syrian-owned factories and the employment of an estimated 6,000 Jordanians in these. Yet in Jordan too, a recent survey by Stave and Hillesund (2015) noted that 95 per cent of Jordanians reported believing that Syrians had to some or to a great extent taken jobs that otherwise would have gone to Jordanians. However, in governorates with large numbers of Syrian refugees (Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq), the Jordanian participation rate in the labour market is slightly higher than in those governorates with low levels of Syrian refugees. This suggests that ‘Syrian refugees largely compete against other Syrians for employment’ (ILO and Fafo 2015 in: Kelberer 2017: 6).

One reason why cities are attractive to the Syrians is because they offer employment opportunities. A recent World Bank (World Bank 2016b) report estimates that 69.2 per cent of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan live beneath a poverty line of 50 JOD per capita, per month. These figures vary by governorate, education level, gender, marital status, family size, and place of origin and destination in Jordan. Notably, in Tafilah governorate, with the

---

35 It is estimated that only 51 per cent of working-age Syrian men and 7 per cent of women living in Jordanian host communities are economically active, and of these only 43 per cent and 12 per cent respectively are employed (ILO and Fafo 2015 in: Turner 2015). Contrastingly, in Lebanon, 70 per cent of working-age Syrian men and 19 per cent of women are economically active, and 79 per cent and 32 per cent of these respectively are employed (ILO 2014a in: Turner 2015).
highest rate of poverty among Syrians, 83 per cent live beneath the poverty line; in Amman, with the lowest rate of poverty among Syrian refugees at 59 per cent36, there are more opportunities for Syrians to work (until now, informally) and earn income.

It is evident that in attempting to manage risks to their material wellbeing, the refugee families may be forced to make trade-offs (Bellamy et al. 2017). For example, a majority of Syrians are displaced to cities in Jordan work without permits, which increases the chance of labour exploitation, the risk of being forced back into a camp and even the risk of being deported to Syria (Carrion 2016). Choosing to not do this work would mean increasing their debts, running down on savings or skipping vital services such as education/health, all of which can be detrimental to material wellbeing (Bekkers 2017; Moghaddam et al. 2017; Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015).

A critical fallout of refugees’ competition over jobs in the informal sector has been the fall of wages in the sector, which has affected material wellbeing of refugees as well as the poorer Jordanians and Lebanese who depend on the sector. Many working in these low-wage jobs remain poor and unable to meet their basic household expenses. Lowering of wages in Jordan’s informal sector is often cited as constituting the factor that is having the most negative impact on the Jordanian informal workforce (Francis 2015; Stave and Hillesund 2015). Stave and Hillesund (2015), using a sample of 3,860 households (1,528 Jordanian hosts, 144 other hosts, 1,398 Syrians outside camp and 790 in Zaatari camp) find that ‘A majority of Syrian refugees (57 per cent in Zaatari camp and 56 per cent outside camps) do not agree that Syrians are pushing wages down, but 93 per cent of Jordanians believe that they are’. It must be emphasised that the finding is based on perceptions of the surveyed individuals, and also that nearly all Syrians in this sample were employed in the informal sector while only about half of the Jordanians were working in that sector (ibid.: 68).

According to FAO (2013, p. 36) citing an unspecified source, ‘The recent large influx of refugees has created increasing competition for unskilled work, resulting in wages dropping as low as JD 150 for 30 days of work’.

A similar effect was reported in Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa Valley where casual labour wages have fallen by up to 60 per cent due to the influx of Syrians (FAO, 2013, p. 36). A series of rapid Emergency Market Mapping and Analyses (EMMA) conducted in Lebanon also support these claims (IRC et al. 2013a, 2013b). In the context of rapidly expanding labour force in Lebanon, by as much as 50 per cent in 2011, one-third of young Lebanese labourers are unable to compete in the informal sector, which contributes to more than 56 per cent of total employment in the country (Cherri et al. 2016). There is evidence that Lebanese workers desperate not to be replaced by Syrians and willing to work for low pay under poor working conditions are also expressing a willingness to work for lower pay (ILO 2014b). Therefore, the material wellbeing of Lebanese workers, whether by losing their jobs to Syrians or by bargaining to an income that is inadequate to maintain their pre-crisis standard of living, has worsened (Thorlefsson 2016: 1078).

Historically, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have also depended heavily on the informal sector which, as discussed in Section 5, includes opportunities created by non-state actors such as the PLO and UNRWA. In the 1970s, particularly after the PLO leadership was moved from Jordan to Lebanon, various industries such as textile, leather, iron, and furniture were set up (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997; Hanafi and Long 2010). During this period the PLO may have employed close to two-thirds of the Palestinian labour force in Lebanon (Sayigh 1995). Access to these jobs were strongly determined by one’s party or faction: hospitals and other social services run by PLO-aligned factions usually employed only their own supporters (Hanafi and Long 2010). Palestinians in Lebanon require a work permit for other jobs, but as

---

36 While it was unclear in this case what criteria were used, in case national poverty lines are used to estimate poverty, higher costs of living in urban areas are unlikely to be taken into account, to systematically underestimate the number of the urban poor.
discussed in Section 5, 72 occupations are restricted and not accessible to Palestinian refugees and other foreigners (Habib et al. 2006; Hankir and Sadiq 2013). Moreover, Palestinians earned less for the same work compared to the Lebanese across all educational and occupational categories (Abdulrahim and Khawaja 2011). The cost of work permits (ranging from US$133 to US$1,200) was so high that not many Palestinians applied for them (Knudsen 2007). Similarly to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the Palestinians also competed for casual work primarily with foreign workers and not with the locals (Makhoul et al. 2003).

The current economic participation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is reminiscent of the experience of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, whose jobs were also chiefly confined to the informal sector (Almakhamreh and Hundt 2012; Chatelard 2010). Informality and irregularity of work compelled less wealthy Iraqis to keep a low profile and live in poor or lower middle-class urban neighbourhoods (Chatelard 2010). The ‘guest’ status in Jordan created a situation of legal and social insecurity for the Iraqis, which limited economic opportunities as the authorities sought to reserve these for Jordanians (ibid.).

The lack of access to formal sector jobs is surely one reason why, according to Fakih and Ibrahim (2016), there is no evidence that Syrian influx has had a significant impact on the formal labour market in Jordan. They forward several alternative explanations which basically suggest that Jordanians and Syrians operate in two separate labour markets. The apparent segmentation of the Jordanian labour market in the context of the Syrian influx and a rapidly growing informal sector was observed as a cause for concern by others (Almakhamreh and Hundt 2012; Kattaa 2016).

Restrictions on economic participation by Syrian refugees in the formal sector of the Lebanese economy was primarily the result of their lack of legal status in the country, but also of the restricted entry to listed professions. In addition to poor pay there are other forms of exploitation endured by the refugees that had implications for their material wellbeing. Janmyr (2016) argues that Syrians under the kefala system in Lebanon are forced to endure poor work conditions due to fear of dismissal and even deportation. Securing a sponsor, which could cost US$500–1000 in the black market in Lebanon, and switching employers which can again cost significant amounts, have implications for material wellbeing of Syrians in Lebanon (Janmyr 2016: 76). Moreover, there is a clear connection between residence permits requiring sponsorship (for unregistered Syrians in Lebanon) and the labour exploitation risk:

*My boss makes me work more than 12 hours a day at his shop. Sometimes I complain but then he threatens to cancel my sponsorship. What can I do? I have to do whatever he says. I feel like his slave.*

(Testimony of Syrian refugee sponsored by his employer, in HRW 2016b)

Such exploitation is, however, far worse and more likely to occur in the informal sector. For instance, in Zarqa, Jordan, informal jobs in the service industry, construction, skilled fields and unskilled agricultural work commonly leave refugees with no employment protection, long hours and denial of leave, in addition to low pay (Bellamy et al. 2017). Exposure to additional risks such as increased chemical exposure in farming is common (Doocy et al. 2016). In Jordan this is compounded by the fact that Syrians refugees typically work only at night or weekends to avoid Ministry of Labour patrols (Bellamy et al. 2017; Ulrichs et al. 2017). A Syrian male in Irbid, Jordan, explains the situation in August 2014: ‘*I worked as a cleaning man in a big shopping mall in Irbid and I chose the night shift because there is [sic] no inspection campaigns from the office of labour at night*’ (Akash 2015).
7.3.2 Economic participation: subjective wellbeing

The financial status of refugees, which crucially depends on their ability to earn, has various connections with their mental health and subjective wellbeing. Palestinians from Syria report suffering severe trauma from the psychosocial burden of double displacement and the fact that not only their standard of living, but also previously enjoyed employment and property rights, were degraded in Lebanon (Bidinger et al. 2015: 51). Studies of the enduring displacement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon spanning multiple generations also highlights the burden.

Because of the conditions of pervasive poverty, restricted opportunity, and inadequate health coverage, many younger Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps think about their lives with a shortened horizon, and live with dying in mind…people still relatively young often talk about their lives as being ‘over’. They may have hope for their kids, but imagine little for themselves. Refugees…do not view themselves as failing to thrive, or being allowed to fail to thrive, but as being killed. (Feldman 2017: 58)

In Jordan, ‘Many of the Iraqis are well educated or were economically stable so that the lack of work or only low status work has impacted on their self-esteem (Fafo et al. 2007; ICMC and USCCB 2007)’ (Almakhamreh and Hundt 2012: 381).

Negative psychological wellbeing due to lack of economic participation is evident among Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. For example, there is evidence on how the pressure to provide for their families while working illegally in Jordan put Syrian refugee men at greater risk of mental illness (Aide Médicale Internationale, 2014; Bellamy et al., 2017; Mercy Corps, 2015; Musa, 2017; Wells et al., 2016). Al Smadi et al. (2016: 940), analysing a survey of 765 Syrian refugees in six Jordanian cities, conclude that job status is an important factor that influences post-traumatic stress disorder. Moreover, men’s mental health is known to translate into violence towards their wives or children, putting the subjective wellbeing of the whole household at risk (Achilli 2015b; Shdayfat 2017; Wells et al. 2016). The domestic violence reported by Iraqi women in Jordan was similarly linked to the lack of employment (Chynoweth 2008).
Figure 7.5 Reasons why accessing employment causes tension in the community

Our analysis of primary data from Impact Initiatives underlines some of these findings. A survey amongst Syrians in urban areas of five Jordanian districts shows that 69–79 per cent of all respondents within a district consider that accessing gainful employment is a cause of tension. Respondents also note a clear variation in the reasons why this was the case (Figure 7.5). Security issues at work were deemed the most important concern (ranging from 36–46 per cent of respondents across districts); followed by discrimination in the workplace (11–32 per cent); while lack of documentation was a further consideration (8–18 per cent).

Work, according to some of the studies reviewed by Wells et al. (2006), offers a sense of purpose to the Syrian refugees in Jordan. Even jobs with poor pay and work conditions may be better in subjective wellbeing terms compared to being inactive. Clearly this position depends on the circumstances and can be very subjective, as other studies illustrate. For example, Janmyr’s (2016) study linking job status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their subjective wellbeing suggests that work can be traumatic to some if it signifies downward social mobility compared to the status back home. Janmyr gives the example of a highly skilled female refugee who felt that being sponsored as a ‘helper’ was demeaning.

Since authorities hardly enforce the law against child labour, Syrian children who work illegally have become important breadwinners for refugee families in Jordan (Akash and Boswall 2016; Dhingra 2015; UNICEF and IMC 2014). Historically, Palestinian refugee families routinely took their children out of school to provide extra income as well as to cut down on school expenses (Hejoj 2007). Wells et al.’s (2016: 3) systematic needs assessment of Syrian refugees in Jordan found 13 studies that documented evidence on how child labour has led to an increase in school dropouts. The Government of Lebanon with
the United Nations (2014) reported that 66 per cent of Syrian children registered as refugees with UNHCR have dropped out of school. Doocy et al. (2013) studied Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to estimate that only 10 per cent of refugee teenage boys were in school, and that many were taking part in the informal labour force. UN Women (2013) surveyed 613 individuals in Jordan to find that 47 per cent of households having had paid employment within the previous month reported that most of it was earned by a child. Though child labour was used as a coping mechanism to shore up refugee livelihoods, the practice predates the crisis and was widespread in Syria (UN Women 2013). Syrian adolescents, and even younger children, often shoulder the emotional burden of insecure livelihoods despite their parents’ attempt to shield them from such burdens (UNHCR 2014d). DeJong et al. (2017: 28) quote an adolescent girl (age 15–16) thus:

*When we left the house [Syria] I was 13 I didn’t think it’s a big deal and I continued to play where we went. But now I think about what happened to us. I could have been growing up in my country and I could have been in school grade 10. I was a good student and I wanted to go to college but instead I’m working here in a workshop. Now when I think of this I feel bad and sad we lost everything.*

Al Akash and Boswall (2016: 3) note that some parents have their daughters married at an early age, and UN Women (2013) show that the rate of child marriages among girls (51.3 per cent) was higher than among boys (13 per cent). The practice of child marriage seems easily explained using cultural reasons and predates the crisis. Yet, there are also strong economic participation-related reasons that could be at play (DeJong et al. 2017; UN Women 2013). Overall, for boys the employment rates tend to increase with age, whereas girls are more likely to work when they are very young and the employment rates tend to decrease as they grow older (UN Women 2013). The same study reports that 80 per cent of employed Syrian girls work in either domestic work or in agriculture and argue that both these sectors are both known to be high-risk sectors for physical and sexual exploitation. These economic participation-related compulsions are attributed to the higher rate of child marriages among Syrian girls. Early marriages, depriving children of schooling can cause lasting subjective wellbeing failures (DeJong et al. 2017).

In Lebanon, the great majority of Syrians work without work permits and if caught run the risk of criminal and financial penalties. This is one reason that 10 per cent of displaced Syrian children in Lebanon are forced to work to complement family income. Even though this law is essentially unenforceable in the face of the sheer number of people working without permits, and because of benefits accrued to the Lebanese who employ them (Turner 2015), the possibility of enforcement creates fear and insecurity (Bidinger et al. 2015: 45). Other developments, such as municipal curfews, closure of informal businesses run by Syrians and vigilantism have meant that Syrians in Lebanon are afraid to go out in the evening or work extra hours.

### 7.3.3 Economic participation: relational wellbeing

Host country policies towards refugees, whether at national or local level, are a key factor determining how refugees negotiate economic participation and how they define and enact relations with different actors in the labour markets in the host country. Turner (2015), using a political economy approach, argues that efforts restricting the Syrians to camps, were expected by the Government of Jordan to protect the employment interests of the Jordanians (Musa 2017; Turner 2015). The Lebanese government’s policy of non-encampment has benefited Lebanese entrepreneurs who have traditionally relied on a cheap supply of Syrian labour (Turner 2015: 398).
In Jordan, the effect of restrictive policies are compounded by misperceptions about them (ILO 2017; Ulrichs et al. 2017). Even when employment policies are positive towards refugees (for example, the recent introduction of work permits for Syrian refugees in Jordan) they are often unclear or badly communicated, resulting in confusion and anxiety for refugees. Syrian refugees are sceptical and worry that policies may change again in future, and many fear that UNHCR assistance will be taken away if they enter into formal work (Bellamy et al. 2017: 34).

Historically, Palestinian refugees in Jordan have also linked their poverty and economic difficulties with government policy. Hejoj’s (2007) study, for example, found that about 70 per cent of their respondents thought that policy and legal status were the reason why they are poor. Others, studying Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have identified that the barriers against refugee rights are located within policy but arbitrary barriers also crop up during policy implementation – authorities are known to deny work permits for Palestinians without explanation, which adds to the confusion and frustration (Hanafi et al. 2012; Hanafi and Long 2010). ‘Palestinians in professions, such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, lost the right to practice their professions outside the refugee camps, and Palestinian engineers, of whom there were many, were denied jobs in the lucrative business of postwar reconstruction’ (Hanafi and Long 2010: 12).

Tensions between Syrian refugees and their hosts in both Jordan and Lebanon are a critical determinant of relational wellbeing of refugees. Increased job competition is escalating tensions between Jordan’s refugee and host communities (Achilli 2015b; Akash and Boswall 2016; Chatty 2017; Mercy Corps 2015; Moghaddam et al. 2017; Musa 2017). Musa (2017) surveys 2,500 households, enquiring into personal/work experiences to build up a picture for the cities of Irbid and Mafraq, Jordan. She suggests that in 2015 approximately 59 per cent of Jordanians and 27 per cent of Syrians considered employment as a key issue causing tension among them.

Authors also refer to the dynamic nature of refugee-host relations and how these relations are nudged and shaped by economic compulsions, particularly in the medium term: ‘Many Jordanians told me that at the beginning of the crisis, their families supported Syrians and welcomed them as guests, but they all agreed that exploitation of refugees started later knowing that the crisis will not be ending anytime soon’ (Musa 2017: 16). Yet, despite the perceived concerns of the locals, the Syrians working in the informal sector in Jordan are largely replacing Egyptians, not Jordanians, in the work force (Chatty 2017: 29). In Lebanon, the entry of many Syrians to the informal sector, for instance in agriculture, construction or in small businesses, has had the most severe impact on the poorer segments among the Lebanese.

Guay (2015), using a systematic review covering 66 studies, summarises how social cohesion in Jordan and Lebanon had been shaped by the intensity and the duration of the Syrian influx. He identifies economic competition for the limited number of jobs available as ‘core-issues’ for social cohesion in both countries. Guay’s analysis is helpful in recognising that economic competition, thought attracting much attention, is only part of the story of tensions between refugees and their hosts. Equally important are historical/structural factors that pre-date the Syrian crisis and aggravating factors, like the role of media in stirring up resentment.

Thorleifsson (2016) thus stresses that the Syrian workers, even before the crisis, were able to work at a lower wage than the locals because of the cheaper cost of living in Syria. Furthermore, after the crisis commenced, the registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon have

---

37 Chemali et al. (2017) provides a detailed update of the refugee-host relations. The main focus of their paper is, however, on a training of fieldworkers to operate in local contexts strained by poor refugee-host relations.
become even more wage competitive: ‘Now the Syrian refugees compete with Lebanese for even lower wages, since they can combine work and assistance from UN organisations and local and international NGOs. Refugees accept lower pay for performing identical work, since it is the total household income that matters’ (ibid.: 1077). Consequently, Thorleifsson (2016), using data from a national survey done in May 2016 (by Fafo) illustrates that: ‘98% think [Syrians] are taking jobs from the Lebanese and pushing down wages, while 63% believe that they are supported financially to an unfair degree’. Yet, Mackreath’s (2014) research conducted in Karr, north Lebanon, describes more mutually respectful refugee-host relations at that time. The following quotation from Mackreath is indicative of an enhanced level of relational wellbeing which seem to have opened up opportunities for economic participation:

A system of job swapping is also evident amongst skilled manual workers and teachers. These small-scale bargains between refugees and their hosts are useful for both populations to get by and highlight both the importance of dignified ‘autonomous’ trade for the refugee, and the significance of the role of the host community in providing assistance by accepting the refugees into the informal economic life of the community.
(Mackreath, 2014, p. 20)

Various economists have also argued that an understanding of the economic effects, and by implication of the relational effects of the refugee influx, requires looking beyond labour markets. Betts and Collier (2017) thus note that Special Economic Zones (SEZs) could tap into idle refugee labour pools to benefit both refugees and host countries. Others argue that the arrival of refugees itself boosts the output of host economies: ‘Refugees, even if poor, are additional consumers, boosting demand with immediate effect, in particular for basic necessities’ (Errighi and Griesse 2016: 7).38 Related to this, Chatty writes:

---

38 As a result, the GDP of host countries have grown. But because the populations have grown even faster with the influx of refugees the end result is that per capita GDP in these refugee-hosting countries will fall.
A discrepancy between what is widely written about in the local press (the burden of Syrians on the Jordanian economy) and what policy makers and practitioners feel is actually occurring has emerged. Many policy makers feel that Syrians are contributing to the Jordanian economy in a greater fashion than is widely being written about and circulated in polite society. Some point to a recent United Nations report (cf ILO) suggesting that the unemployment rate had dropped by 2 per cent since the start of the Syrian crisis due to the surge in Syrian-owned factories opening (200) and the heavy employment of Jordanians (estimated at about 6,000).

(Chatty 2017: 29)

Cultural norms from Syria traditionally stipulated clear gender roles for men and women; fathers tended to look after household income and make key household decisions whereas the mothers managed the home. DeJong et al. (2017), using data from focus group discussions conducted in 2014 in two cities in the Bekaa valley, confirm that even adolescent Syrian refugees were clearly aware of these gender roles. Yet in negotiating the difficult terrain of ensuring economic participation, as a refugee household the Syrians refugees have had to reluctantly put these gender norms aside (Jabbar and Zaza 2016). Research on female-headed households conducted in 2014 in Jordan and Lebanon revealed that

Ninety-four per cent of the women interviewed felt their responsibilities had shifted since becoming the head of household, with a small number of the opinion that this was empowering and positive. But most – 95 per cent – indicated that the role change was a negative one

(UNHCR 2014d: 45)

Another study found that none of the unemployed Syrian woman had worked back in Syria, indicating that the crisis has forced them to enter into the labour market for the first time (ILO 2014b).

Research in four cities in Jordan by Ulrichs et al. (2017) also noted that women face gender-specific barriers, such that their involvement in the labour market is considered either inappropriate because of gender-related norms, or incompatible with their care duties at home. (Ulrichs et al. 2017). Conversely, an inability of men to fulfil the role of breadwinner is associated with greater spousal interference with women’s mobility. Shifts in gender roles within the family are apparent, with men’s mobility hampered due to fear of arrest, detention and deportation as a result of illegal residential status. Women find themselves looking for employment while burdened by childcare and unpaid domestic work. As Qabelias, a 15–16-year-old female, notes:

I work at the factory and all the women who work with me also do housework. I am proof. My dad is home…They mostly rely on me. Although I have brothers, one of them works and the other one works sometimes. I go out to work at 7 am and return at 5 or 6. When I come home, my mother asks me to do the housework.

(DeJong et al. 2017: 30)

However, shifts in gender roles are associated with an increase in intimate partner violence (Harvey et al. 2013).
7.3.4 Conclusion

In a context of enduring urban displacement, economic participation is critical for the wellbeing of refugee communities. Humanitarian assistance is neither designed nor sufficient to provide for the full scope of refugee needs. Work is critical for catering to basic needs and material wellbeing, but also potentially offers the perspective for longer term improvement, provided the terms under which work is engaged in are conducive. The systematic analysis of the literature related to economic participation of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon yielded the following conclusions.

Government policies in Jordan and Lebanon are geared to protect the formal sector economic interests of the host communities. This has meant that the Syrian refugees, as well as Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in these two countries, have had to primarily rely on the informal sector for work. However, there is also some evidence that formal sector companies, and the government, flexibly hire labour in an informal manner, without contracts or social security protections.

As the lower skilled jobs in Jordan and Lebanon are typically conducted by migrant workers, and the poor amongst host communities, public policies that have made it difficult to participate in the formal sector have enhanced competition in low-skilled, low pay jobs. A collapse of wages and of loss of jobs for local workers because of the rapid increase in refugee labour have been observed in the informal sector. This meant that poorer Jordanians and poorer Lebanese, as well as other poor migrants in the countries who rely on the informal sector for income, had to bear most of the costs of the various refugee crises. In contrast, there is no evidence that Syrian influx has had a significant impact on the formal labour market in Jordan in terms of employment rate or unemployment rates, as public policy has until late 2015 insulated the sector from absorbing Syrian labour. However, since then, the Government of Jordan has adopted formalisation policies that seek to issue up to 200,000 work permits to Syrians.

Informal jobs entail refugees’ bearing significant risks of exploitation. However, even in the formal economy, some features of public policy and law are associated with poorer wellbeing outcomes. Under the kefala system, in operation in various forms in Lebanon and Jordan, migrant workers require a domestic sponsor for obtaining a work permit. The relationship between these workers and their employers is characterised by structural power inequalities. In Lebanon, legal labour protections for 250,000 female migrant domestic workers are devised to be weaker than afforded to almost all other categories of workers, such as the right to a weekly day of rest, paid leave, benefits, and worker compensation in case of injury. Moreover, as legal status is dependent on continued employer support, the conditions are fertile for abuse, particularly in the absence of effective policing and judicial protection. For instance, in Lebanon, migrant domestic workers lose their legal status if their sponsor terminates their contract, or if they decide to leave the employer. In addition to lower pay, which the poorer locals also had to endure, other forms of exploitation such as longer hours of work, poor labour conditions, rights violations and use of child labour are common. In Jordan, there is considerable momentum towards formalisation of jobs with employers sponsoring Syrians. Jordan, in contrast to Lebanon, is attempting to formalise the migrant domestic labour system to reduce abuse. There is an active anti-trafficking unit within the Jordanian police, and the Ministry of Labour has shut down recruiting agencies for misconduct (Su 2017).

Various coping strategies used by the Syrians in economic participation in exile have resulted in negative subjective wellbeing outcomes. The use of child labour to secure some form of economic participation achieved the desired effect only at a substantial psychosocial cost. This type of trade-off between material and subjective elements of household wellbeing was common. Syrian boys were the most exploited in the labour market but girls, because of the gendered nature of economic opportunities available for them, were more at risk of child
marriages. For both boys and girls, the material wellbeing generated through child labour involves the discounting of their future wellbeing, where education is compromised, or children are exposed to dangerous working conditions. For Syrian men, the lack of economic opportunity closely associated with illegal residency status has impacted their subjective wellbeing by being unable to fulfil traditional bread winner roles within a household. Men’s subjective wellbeing failures have had the perverse effect of spilling over to other members of the households in the form of familial conflict and domestic violence.

The relational wellbeing of refugees with regard to their interaction with the host populations is defined by the tensions, real or perceived, that have been created by the increased competition for jobs and other resources. Labour markets are the points of friction, and these frictions have increased with time, generating increasing levels of negative relational wellbeing.

Since late 2015, in Jordan the compact with donors has led to a concerted effort to issue 200,000 work permits, formalising existing jobs and aiming to generate new jobs for Jordanians and Syrians. Its roll out is progressing, albeit not as fast as planned, and its effects are as yet unclear. Comparable efforts in Lebanon have focused on job creation and livelihoods, but have not led to policy change simplifying access to the formal labour market for Syrians.

The relations that Syrian refugees have with local urban/municipal authorities is largely structured by highly centralised national policymaking systems, though officials’ discretionary behaviour generates differences in their local application. In Lebanon, mayoral initiatives were noted, both positive (e.g. hosting social events for hosts and refugees) and negative (e.g. curfews) for the wellbeing of Syrians. No such reports were found for Jordan.

Portraying refugees as a resource that can be harnessed for the benefit of the host country is a strategy that is likely to improve relational wellbeing of refugees as well as the hosts, provided this can be embedded in mainstream media discourses. Both countries have specific example projects that have begun to look at refugees as a resource. However, the case must be made for hosts, refugees and migrants to have a right to decent work.
8 Conclusions and recommendations

In this section of the report we identify conclusions and recommendations, addressing the second research question set out as "In what ways can policymakers, practitioners and donors support modalities of reception that promote gender equitable, improved wellbeing outcomes for urban refugees and host communities?". We first offer reflections on policy and programming, followed by a section on emerging research implications.

Recommendations – policy and programming

The comparison of Jordan and Lebanon has been fruitful in showing similarities and distinctions between the two countries' approaches regarding the themes of legal status; housing; and economic participation. Table 8.1 provides a sketch of policy trends.

Table 8.1 Policy trends Lebanon and Jordan 2011–2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Centralised, fairly strong, civil society relatively curtailed, stable</td>
<td>Centralised, weak, civil society relatively free, historically unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Borders</td>
<td>Progressive tightening</td>
<td>Progressive tightening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Temporary residency</td>
<td>Relatively accessible, little change</td>
<td>Accessible to the rich, liberalisation in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Housing</td>
<td>Encampment + urban</td>
<td>No camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic participation</td>
<td>Restricted professions, annual update</td>
<td>Restricted professions, annual update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work permits: enhanced access since 2015</td>
<td>Work permits: highly constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal efforts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Curfews</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Widespread, regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integration</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendations – policy and programming

This report has found that modalities of reception in the domains of legal status, housing and economic participation all have distinct, and unequal, gendered wellbeing outcomes. In some instances, public policy and law itself have generated and underwritten these.

The current modalities of reception for Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan can be explained with reference to the historical ways in which influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees were managed. As such, it pays to 'look back in order to look forward'. Lessons may be derived from the humanitarian responses supporting these previous refugee groups that have relevance today – for instance, regarding the needs, opportunities and constraints to support and build capacity amongst local authorities in charge of everyday management of the influx.

The plight of non-Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan is serious and humanitarian and aid agencies and multilateral donors must equitably address their condition, even if the size of the Syrian influx particularly draws their attention.
The evidence outlined in this report strongly suggest that emerging aid responses focusing on the Syrian influx into urban areas would do well to account for differences between cities and within these in Lebanon and Jordan. Particularly in Lebanon, we have outlined the great and significant variety between areas even within the same cities, in terms of build infrastructures, service provisioning and the role of non-state actors in its governance.

Urban informal settlements now comprise key locations where the poorest refugees, foreign migrants, and poor host communities are situated. However, these settlements are deemed illegal by the state in both Jordan and Lebanon, to constrain service provisioning. In response, assemblages of actors (private, aid, government, non-government, faith-based organisations, NGOs) have stepped in, but this has led to fragmentation and geographical patchworks of service and aid provisioning. Consequently, the terms under which some of the most vulnerable groups in urban areas access services (such as sanitation, drinking water, electricity, waste management, etc.) diverge by location and by population (with nationality and legal status key markers). Urban modalities of reception for refugees are hence not just based on who they are, but also where they are.

The localisation agenda adopted by the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 has underlined the need to be more responsive to local specificity in humanitarian crises and in protracted urban displacement contexts. Responses require building on pre-existing support networks and acknowledging that local cultural values can contribute to wellbeing success, but also failure, for different people – sometimes simultaneously. Moreover, they require ascertaining the role and suitable ways for aid agencies to engage important non-state urban actors such as formal and informal real estate and employment brokers, and understanding how their roles are related to the ways in which public policy organises city planning and manages refugee populations.

In the context of Jordan, questions remain over which types of refugee households stay in camps and which move to urban communities. Their demographic, socio-economic and gender profiles may be distinct, as cities offer opportunities for advancement, but also the risk of exposure to greater deprivations than faced in camps. Conversely, host communities often are assumed homogenous in aid responses but may need greater specification. In Lebanon and Jordan, emerging evidence suggests that religious affiliation performs an important role in reception of displaced groups, generating spatially distinct hosting practices, yet humanitarian and developmental agencies may underplay their importance. Religious, tribal, or other local institutions shape hosting practices and approaches, to complement, intersect and mediate government policy.

In Lebanon and Jordan, national urban policies addressing planning and addressing poverty and vulnerability in cities and towns could be promoted and established, to explicitly devise strategies supporting the equitable development of those urban areas in which the most vulnerable groups reside, using participatory approaches. Strengthened definitions of what constitutes the urban, combined with stronger data collection and publication, and greater political appetite to resolve this will be needed. In this respect, humanitarian and development agencies, and the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan could promote networks and communities of practice amongst mayors and urban municipalities to source learning, share best practices and feed into response plans and policies.

Legal status, rule of law and human security
Irregular residency status is a key factor in producing highly gendered material, subjective and relational wellbeing failures for refugees. Lack of legal status leaves refugees vulnerable to a range of abuses, including labour exploitation and sexual abuse, unable to turn to the authorities for protection for fear that police may arrest them for expired residency. While men without valid legal residency status fear arrest, their mobility and livelihood options
become limited. In response, women and children become key income earners and exposed to attendant risks, while traditional gender roles concerning who is the breadwinner are challenged, producing conflict within families. Child labour for boys has become widespread. And as reports of sexual harassment, assault and forced sexual exploitation of women and girls have dogged settlements in Lebanon and Jordan, the latent threat of sexual violence, combined with extreme poverty, is driving child marriages amongst Syrian refugee girls. Accordingly, in both Jordan and Lebanon, efforts to promote displaced individuals’ access to legal documentation remain critical as it is an issue which affects every aspect of refugee life, not least because residency policy interlocks with other policies governing access to work, or ability to register the birth of newborns. Birth registration is a particularly critical issue and should be prioritised for immediate advocacy efforts.

Frequent policy change in the realms of legal status, border regimes, economic participation and housing have had, and will continue to have, significant implications for the material, subjective and relational wellbeing of refugees and hosts, distinctly affecting women and men, girls and boys. Policy reforms, such as Lebanon’s residence fee waiver in 2017, warrant careful monitoring and cannot be assumed to have gender neutral effects.

In Lebanon, UNHCR registration should resume to ensure the GoL has a clear and documented understanding of the number of refugees on its soil – this can contribute to improved assessment and budgeting of needs, as well as ensuring refugees have access to basic legal protection provided through the UNHCR. Recent advocacy efforts have made progress in obtaining a fee waiver for significant but selective groups of Syrian refugees. Further efforts should seek for these waivers to be extended, to encourage regularised status, especially those who were not able to maintain valid UNHCR registration continually since their arrival, or those who turned 15 since they entered the country who are not able to access residency as they do not have valid personal identification.

There is a significant opportunity for humanitarian and development programming in Jordan and Lebanon to mainstream awareness on the wellbeing impacts of limited legal documentation across all types of aid programs engaging with refugees. To date, awareness raising on these legal issues has primarily remained within the mandate of legal protection actors. Humanitarian, development and government actors focusing on sectoral interventions regarding education, shelter, wash, and employment, etc., often do not address legal status, even though its relation to outcomes in sectoral areas is clear. Use of common communication channels sharing demonstrative videos and policy updates could be promoted between these actors.

Refugees have rights to protection and assistance under international humanitarian law. In the absence of effective and equitable policing and legal safeguarding mechanisms for refugees, greater advocacy for and support to deliver this is needed in Jordan and Lebanon. The international community should support local civil society capacity to advocate with governments to take a more rights-based approach to protection and livelihood issues and equitable reforms of the legal and judicial system to work better for marginalised groups. Development agencies may also critically review the potential of locally present non-formal justice mechanisms to deliver justice and protect rights equitably for women and men. Progressive reforms and monitoring of the kefalla system, in operation in various forms in Lebanon and Jordan, could be initiated to reduce its potential for abuse. Here too, new informal justice mechanisms may be considered to help counter structural power inequalities embedded in the kefalla system.

Although a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Syria remains urgently needed, and while some Syrians may choose to return home to newly stable areas, these developments must not be used as a pretext to encourage or mandate the return of Syrian refugees from Jordan or Lebanon to Syria. As neither resettlement nor repatriation are realistic options for the majority of Syrian refugees, more resettlement places in third countries continue to be badly
needed. The international community must continue to seek building up greater domestic support for the temporary or permanent reception of asylum seekers from Syria, who are currently in Lebanon and Jordan.

**Housing**

Humanitarian and development actors should closely involve host communities in identifying and designing shelter responses. Housing solutions could focus on improving the areas where refugees live, rather than seeking options that lead to further displacement, and rupture of current social and economic networks.

With growing numbers of poor host groups living in informal settlements and urban ‘camps’, practitioners and donors could advocate and work with national and local governments to adjust laws that prohibit the provision of services and that inhibit concrete investments in these localities to demonstrably benefit host and refugee communities. In this respect, shared urban public spaces (parks, street markets, etc.) are important sites for fostering social cohesion through everyday interactions. Development investments in the quality and accessibility of these areas may enhance safe spaces to potentially provide important outlets for people confined to highly crowded housing. Moreover, given the wellbeing issues and effects on gender-based violence highlighted in this research, protection considerations can be taken into account in the design and targeting of shelter programs, and may help to raise awareness in the donor community to facilitate fundraising for these critical needs. Simultaneously, policymakers and donors could explore options to jointly provide support for social housing schemes that benefit poor members of hosts communities and temporary residents from Syria while seeking to halt rapidly rising housing rents, which are a key cause of anxiety. Finally, the mixing of populations in urban informal areas also suggests a review of aid agency mandates, and the aid community should agree on an operational framework to address humanitarian needs of all vulnerable populations within these urban settings.

**Economic participation**

Livelihood support programmes for vulnerable groups will remain essential in coming years in both Jordan and Lebanon, irrespective of when safe return to Syria can be ensured for displaced populations. In this respect, Lebanon could seek to learn from the processes put in place as part of the Jordan Compact towards supporting refugees’ access to formal work, and enabling them to make significant economic contributions, including employment generation for host groups.

Advocacy and awareness raising on decent working conditions is important, notably for vulnerable hosts and displaced groups working informally. This may, for instance, be done through supporting associations or unions of informal workers in sectors known to provide many job opportunities for vulnerable populations such as in construction and agriculture.

Aid and governmental support programs typically focus on youth/women. Promoting income generation opportunities for men and involving them in community development, and educating them on protection issues, etc., can have positive wellbeing outcomes not just for them, but indirectly for other members of the household. Similarly, aid donors may incentivise practitioner organisations to develop volunteering programmes that provide meaningful, appropriate and fulfilling opportunities to contribute to local society and the quality of urban life. Such programmes could be designed to correspond to the aspirations and needs of women and men, adolescent girls and boys but generally would seek to combat boredom, harness untapped energies and comprise both host and refugee groups to shore up community relations.

The urban informal economy provides an important source of livelihoods for refugees. It absorbs Syrian workers without legal residency status and without work permits – however, they are often at risk of being harmed by hazardous and exploitative working conditions. As
barriers to accessing formal labour markets remain, developmental efforts should recognise and remediate the ills, but avoid demonising the informal sector. Instead, it could aim to lessen the sharp edges of informality, such as offering alternatives for child labour absorbed by it. Lessons from other countries suggests that worker organisations that can represent the interests of migrant workers with employers and the state can have an important role in improving working conditions, although this is likely to meet resistance.

Efforts to formalise jobs are ongoing in Jordan. Formalisation has developmental potential but cannot be assumed to suffice in its own right. There is a need to adjust such schemes to the aspirations, concerns and protection needs of informal Syrian workers if they are to be successful. This includes creating greater certainty and clarifying the duration for which policies are put in place, and clearly communicating how these interact with aid provisioning in the short and medium term. Formalisation is, however, not necessarily a panacea. In Lebanon, the discussion of migrant domestic workers shows that even for people with a work permit, other labour laws and the kefalla system enshrines discrimination, weak protection, and highly unequal power relations between employers and workers, making female workers subject to high levels of exploitation and abuse, sexual or otherwise.

In Jordan, amnesties have been periodically announced to enable formalisation of work, for instance for employers of informal workers, and workers lacking proper documentation. Such amnesties may also be promoted to support high rates of birth registration completion for newborns in coming years, and retrospectively for children of Syrian descent who were born in host countries, in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and advance their wellbeing now and in future. Other measures may include supporting access to locally based ‘one-stop shops’ to simplify birth registration, reduce transaction and travel costs involved in the process, and enhance awareness amongst communities about the process and its benefits.

As policy and programming efforts increasingly focus on livelihoods and resilience, this should not come at the cost of a significant reduction in humanitarian aid, as Syrian refugees continue to rely upon humanitarian support to supplement incomes gained through formal and informal work.

Social relations
Globally, greater dialogue is needed about the ways in which cities can host displaced groups in equitable and dignified manners, to enable newcomers’ economic participation, social cohesion and finding new ways in which to live well together with host communities. Lessons from Jordan and Lebanon set out in this report may well have relevance to cities beyond the region.

Managing host-refugee community relations is critical for sustaining significantly strained solidarity ties and hospitality cultures that underpin the welcome of refugees, whose erosion risks a deep challenge to human security. Aid agencies should support social relations by deliberately including the Jordanian and Lebanese poor and this is already happening on a significant scale. Practitioners, governments and donors can identify and celebrate champions at the local government level or within civil society that promote dialogue and joint action to support urban neighbourhoods. It is important for such positive case studies to feature in mainstream media to combat powerful entrenched discourses that victimise refugees and undermine community relations.

National policymakers and donors can reward and incentivise local leadership in municipalities that effectively fosters social cohesion between host communities and refugees. In this respect, in Jordan, the decentralisation of powers to municipalities offers a window of opportunity engaging with locally elected councillors, who are now exploring new mandates set out in the municipal law. These actors could be engaged, supported and incentivised to initiate measures that foster community relations between hosts and refugees.
Simultaneously, it will be important to draw and widely share lessons from such engagements to accelerate good practice working with municipalities.

Research agenda
A wellbeing approach offers a fruitful organising framework that allows analysts to take a rounded perspective on the effects of protracted urban displacement, both for displaced groups as well as for host communities. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that displacement management and urban development programmes often tend to focus on improving material conditions (e.g. by cash transfers or through developing economic benefits of refugees through a ‘Compact’) but ignore the subjective and relational dimensions that are important for wellbeing. Wellbeing research can thus be highly relevant to policy and programming in connecting material to subjective and relational outcomes valued by people.

Though local urban authorities in Jordan and Lebanon bear the brunt of dealing with the everyday challenges that the refugee influx poses, their efforts doing so are poorly documented and have not been subject to adequate in-depth analysis. Within the larger cities, intra-city differences in reception are occurring, but these are, with the exception of Palestinian camps, not particularly well documented. This constitutes a missed opportunity for learning about spatial differentiation in reception and its wellbeing effects in large conurbations, where large numbers of Syrians are hosted. This also hinders learning and identification of new routes for support by domestic and international policymakers, practitioners and donor agencies.

In marginalised urban contexts in Lebanon and Jordan, informal institutions have emerged to provide critical services and forms of political representation to marginalised groups. Informal brokers and mediators appear to play an important role in providing access to informal jobs, housing, services and credit. They may be involved in aid distribution and offer protection. Their brokering practices need to be investigated to understand in what ways and why they affect the wellbeing of refugee and host communities, to inform possible policy and practitioner programming responses.

Political and religious organisations such as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Palestinian Committees, can be important actors in marginalised urban contexts in Lebanon and Jordan. They have historically performed important representative and advocacy functions towards local government authorities, and provided and organised access to essential services for their constituents. Their treatment of Syrian refugees of different confessional backgrounds are not necessarily (gender) equitable and there is a need to better understand when this is the case, or not, and how programming responses may seek to sensitively engage such actors.

While municipalities in Lebanon and Jordan directly engage Syrians, activities are often directed by the central governments, and this review found little evidence of self-initiated strategic plans or policies to manage the influx. However, significant idiosyncratic responses by municipalities were found to occur in Lebanon, and measures taken included curfews and closure of informal businesses, as well as social events that seek to unite host and refugee communities. Their modalities and wellbeing effects are poorly documented but worthy of further investigation, as potential intervention points that can better manage strained community relations at the municipal level. One question here concerns: under what kind of conditions can municipal and higher administrative levels interact to generate positive wellbeing outcomes for host, refugee and other migrant communities?

In order to provide an appropriate response in urban contexts, it is important to collect information on all the different segments of the urban population, and their distinct vulnerabilities to highlight how conflicting interests may come into play. Whereas international attention has been largely on the Syrian population and increasingly on host
communities, effects of the Syrian influx on other vulnerable refugee and migrant groups present in Jordan and Lebanon remain underexposed. This includes questions about labour displacement effects and its role in community relations.

Effort should be made to analyse positive factors in relationship building and maintaining peaceful dynamics in urban contexts. Analysis to date has focused on ‘drivers of tension’, but research focused on the rationale and interpersonal practice of acceptance and peaceful co-existence, temporary or otherwise, and including the urban spatial dimensions to this could be advanced to inform aid programmes and mass communication efforts. For instance, in Lebanon, Social Development Centres have delivered important welfare services and aid to both vulnerable host and refugee groups, and its role in promoting wellbeing and fostering community relations could be explored further. Similarly, given that there is some evidence that Syrians have successfully established factories in Jordan to generate employment for both refugees and amongst hosts, there could be scope to investigate whether and how this may be replicated in the context of Lebanon, and what role local authorities have played in enabling this.

Finally, research may also explore the scope for Syrian refugees to self-organise in new forms of collective action, through which they can engage and represent their interests with local and supra-local forms of government as alternatives to informal institutions.
References


ACAPS (2013) Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria, Geneva: ACAPS


ARDD-Legal Aid (undated) *Birth and Marriage Registration in Jordan*, Amman: Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development


Government of Jordan (2016b) Habitat III National Report


HRW (2016b) “I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person”: How Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees, HRW Report, USA: Human Rights Watch (HRW)


ILO (2014b) Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile, Beirut: ILO Regional Office for Arab States


IRC; Save the Children; DRC; Oxfam and DFID (2013a) Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) of the Agricultural Labor Market System in North and Bekaa, Lebanon, International Rescue Committee (IRC)

IRC; Save the Children; DRC; Oxfam and DFID (2013b) Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) of the Construction Labor Market System in North and Bekaa, Lebanon, International Rescue Committee (IRC)


NRC (2016a) *Drivers of Despair: Refugee Protection Failures in Jordon and Lebanon*, Briefing Note, Norwegian Refugee Council


UN-Habitat (2017) Neighbourhood Profile: Bourj Hammoud, Lebanon, Beirut: UN-Habitat


UNHCR (2014c) Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Beirut and Mount Lebanon Governorates – Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level as of 30 April 2014, Map, UNHCR


UNHCR (2013b) Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Beirut and Mount Lebanon Governorates Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level (as of 29 August 2013), Map, UNHCR


UNHCR; UNICEF and WFP (2017) VASYR 2017: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Report, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP)

UNHCR; UNICEF and WFP (2016) Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2016, Report, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP)


Appendix A  Legal distinctions in Lebanon and Jordan: Syrians, Palestinian Refugees from Syria and Iraqis

Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to Work</th>
<th>Law applies to:</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Labour Law (1946)</td>
<td>The law does not exclude non-Lebanese workers, but it adopts the principle of preference of nationals.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral agreement for Social and Economic Cooperation and Coordination between the Lebanese Republic &amp; the Syrian Arab Republic (1993)</td>
<td>The agreement seeks to gradually reach reciprocity between Syria and Lebanon with respect to economic integration. The agreement encourages freedom of movement, stay, work, and practising of economic activity in conformity with the laws of each country.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Labour agreement (1994)</td>
<td>The agreement established a joint office on the Syria-Lebanon border and created a department within the MoL to handle Syrian workers’ issues.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decree no 17561 (1964)</td>
<td>Every foreigner wishing to work in Lebanon needs pre-approval from the MoL before arriving in Lebanon and must obtain a work permit within 10 days of entering Lebanon. The MoL has the prerogative to select jobs and professions that are exclusive to Lebanese. Taking into account the principle of preference of Lebanese, foreigners can be granted a work permit, if they meet certain conditions.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoL Resolution No. 1/19 (Amendments of the Articles No. 8 and 9 of the resolution 17561 related to organising the work of foreigners) (2013)</td>
<td>The resolution specifies the set of professions reserved for Lebanese. Palestinians born in Lebanon and officially registered are excluded from this law. Some professions previously reserved for Lebanese (construction, electricity, sales, carpentry, blacksmiths…) are now accessible to Syrians. The MoL has the authority to exclude some foreigners from the decree based on several criteria.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoL Resolution No.1/1 (2012)</td>
<td>The resolution specifies how a foreigner, married to a Lebanese or born to a Lebanese mother, can obtain a work permit.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decree No. 1658 Article No. 5 regulating the medicine profession (1979)</td>
<td>The permit to practise medicine is granted to Arab non-Lebanese doctors under the same conditions that apply to any Lebanese (a degree from an accredited university, passing the Colloquium exam, etc.) if there is a reciprocity agreement between Lebanon and the country of origin of the doctor.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cont’d.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law applies to:</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 42 Article No. 5 regulating the attorney profession (1991)</td>
<td>To practise in Lebanon a lawyer needs to have held Lebanese citizenship for at least 10 years.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 636 Article No. 4 regulating the engineering profession (1997)</td>
<td>Non-Lebanese Arab engineers may practise if: he/she abides by the conditions for a Lebanese engineer, a reciprocity condition exists with the country of origin, he/she has the right to practise the engineering profession in their country of origin, he/she holds a residence card, a work permit and resides in Lebanon.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to property/rent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 296 Article No. 1 and Article No. 7 (2001)</td>
<td>A non-Lebanese may not acquire any real estate in Lebanon unless he obtains a licence given by decree issued by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Minister of Finance. It is only possible to obtain this license if the requester has citizenship issued by a recognised state. As a result, Palestinian refugees are not allowed to own property. The acquired real estate area should not exceed 3,000 m². The total area of non-Lebanese possessions should not exceed 3% of total Lebanese area (or 3% of every Caza’s area and 10% of Beirut governorate’s area).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 160 (1992)</td>
<td>The law grants any person the right to rent.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ACAPS, 2013)
## Jordan

### Law applies to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Right to Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Law No. 8 (1996) with amendments until Law No. 26 (2010)</td>
<td>The Minister of Labour has the authority to license the establishment of special recruitment offices to regulate the recruitment and employment of non-Jordanian workers in any sector approved by the Council of Ministers and consistent with the objectives of the Ministry and its policy of providing job opportunities to Jordanians (Article No.3). The Minister may issue any necessary instructions to regulate the introduction and employment of non-Jordanian workers (Article No.5). The law requires the employer to meet several criteria before hiring a foreign worker. The hiring request is sent to the recruitment office for approval after it satisfies the conditions. After obtaining the approval of the Minister (or representative), the work permit is issued.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution on list of professions not allowed to non-Jordanians workers (2010)</td>
<td>16 professions are reserved for Jordanians. These are medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions, telephones and warehouses works, sales, education, hairdressing, decorations, fuel sales, electricity and mechanical occupations, guards, drivers and buildings’ workers.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation No. 36 amending the regulation of fees of work permits for non-Jordanian workers (1997)</td>
<td>The employer needs to pay specified fees for issuing or renewing a yearly work permit for every Arabic and non-Arabic worker.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions and conditions of the hiring non-Jordanian workers in the Qualified Industrial Zones (2007)</td>
<td>Every employer who wants to hire a non-Jordanian worker in the qualified industrial zones must submit a written request to the Ministry Commissioner to the investment desk in the promoting investment institution explaining the details of the company and the worker</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 13 of Jordan Doctors’ Syndicate (1972)</td>
<td>Arab doctors can work in Jordan if they are registered in any Syndicate of an Arabic country and with a license to practise provided his/her country abides by the reciprocity principle.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers Syndicate Law No. 11 (1972)</td>
<td>To practise the profession, any lawyer needs to have held Jordanian citizenship for at least 10 years.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cont'd.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to Work</th>
<th>Law applies to:</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Syndicate Law No. 15 (1972)</td>
<td>Any Arabic engineer needs to be registered within the relevant register for foreigners in the Syndicate after fulfilling certain criteria (like his/her country of origin respecting the reciprocity principle; having practised the profession for the last 7 years, etc.).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Law No.68 (2003)</td>
<td>Any non-Jordanian person is entitled to invest in Jordan in accordance with the conditions determined under a system issued for this purpose and that determines the allowed sectors and subsectors of investment, as well as the maximum rate of participation or contribution and the minimum foreign capital.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to property/rent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of rent and sales of immovable property to non-Jordanians No. 47 (2006)</td>
<td>An Arabic person can own immovable property for housing purposes based on the approval of the relevant authorities, and in accordance with the: approval of the General Director of Lands and Areas if the property is not more than two houses and an office, consent of the finance minister upon the recommendation of the Director for more than two houses and an office such that the land area allocated for this purpose does not exceed 10 acres.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of rent and sales of immovable property to non-Jordanians No. 47 (2006)</td>
<td>Non-Jordanian people can rent property for employment or housing. If the land to be rented is larger than 10 acres and for a period of more than three years, the approval of the Minister of Interior or his designee is recommended.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ACAPS, 2013)
Appendix B  Systematic search strategy for academic literature

This review systematically searched and collected academic literature relevant to the topic.

The following steps provide a summary of this process:

1. Download and save bibliographic details including the abstracts of 408 references in Research Information Systems (RIS) format.
2. Import the saved RIS files were into Zotero (https://www.zotero.org/), an open-source reference management software.
3. Use Zotero’s functionality/feature to identify and then remove 50 duplicate references. Because the searches were done in three separate databases it was not possible to avoid the same study being selected from multiple sources.
4. Apply inclusion/exclusion criteria based on titles and abstracts and apply Zotero tags accordingly. Three researchers were involved in this and the inclusion/exclusion decisions for all studies were confirmed by at least two of them. This first screening approved 162 studies for inclusion.
5. In addition to the online/database searches, 72 studies separately identified as relevant (using snowball review method or previous exposure to the literature) were also included at this stage.
6. The included studies were accessed physically or online. Only 11 studies were not accessible.
7. All documents were saved in an online shared platform (Microsoft SharePoint) and were screened after a full document read. At this stage 47 studies were excluded.
8. Remaining studies (176) were all included and analysed/synthesised as part of the academic review.

The use of electronic databases is an important part of this process which can be systematised by carefully documenting the search terms used for that purpose. The choice of search terms used in electronic searches was made bearing in mind two opposite objectives. Firstly, there was the need to capture all relevant studies, or to minimise the probability of excluding relevant studies during electronic searches. Secondly, there was the need to minimise the probability of including irrelevant studies in electronic search results, to keep a tab on the cost of the review. A higher number of irrelevant studies in electronic searches increases the costs because they then need to be excluded at a later round of searches. The preliminary searches revealed that five sets of search terms are relevant for this review.

1. Host countries: “Jordan” and “Lebanon”
2. Populations: “refugees”, “displaced”, “forced migrants” and “hosts”
3. Nationality of refugee/displaced populations: “Syrian”, “Iraqi” and “Palestinian”
4. Urban terms: “Urban”, “City”, “town” and “municipal”

In addition, depending on the search engine, we also restricted the search for papers written in English and in the last 20 years. The above five sets of search terms were combined in a single main search term:

First Set AND Second Set AND Third Set AND (Fourth Set OR Fifth Set)
The following databases were searched: Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar. The final search terms and strategies are described below:

**Scopus**

When using Scopus, we further restricted the search to cover articles, in press articles, books and book chapters only.

( DOCTYPE ( ar OR ip OR bk OR ch ) AND LANGUAGE ( english ) AND PUBYEAR > 1997 AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( leban* OR jordan* ) AND ( refuge* OR displace* OR “forced migrants” OR host* ) AND ( syria* OR iraq* OR palestin* ) AND ( ( urban OR city OR cities OR town* OR municipal* ) OR ( hospitality OR registration OR shelter* OR settlement* OR camp* OR hous* OR “economic participation” OR labour* OR labor* OR work* OR citizen* OR right* OR policy OR policies OR residency OR perm* OR migrant* OR curfew* OR guarantor* OR sponsor* OR screening OR transit OR border* AND regime* OR evict* OR wellbeing OR welfare OR “social cohesion” ) ) ) )

**Web of Science**

The following databases available in Web of Science were included in this search:

- Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED) – 1900–present
- Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) – 1900–present
- Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) – 1975–present
- Book Citation Index – Science (BKCI-S) – 2005–present
- Book Citation Index – Social Sciences & Humanities (BKCI-SSH) – 2005–present
- Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) – 2015–present

The following search term was implemented in the "advanced search" option in Web of Science.

(TS=((leban* OR jordan* ) AND ( refuge* OR displace* OR “forced migrants" OR host*) AND ( syria* OR iraq* OR palestin* ) AND ( ( hospitality OR registration OR shelter* OR settlement* OR camp* OR hous* OR “economic participation” OR labour* OR labor* OR work* OR citizen* OR right* OR policy OR policies OR residency OR perm* OR migrant* OR curfew* OR guarantor* OR sponsor* OR screening OR transit OR border* AND regime* OR evict* OR wellbeing OR welfare OR “social cohesion” ) ) ) )


**Google Scholar**

This engine searches for all the content, including title, journal name, author, etc. As a result, papers authored by "Jordan" as well as all publications published in "Journal of Refugee Studies", "Refugee Quarterly", etc., are selected, irrespective of whether they cover topics relevant for this study. There is, however, an abstract searching facility which covers only the previous year. We decided to use this facility even though it covered only the previous year
as: (1) it eliminates thousands of studies that get selected when alternative methods are used; and (2) we assume that older studies are sufficiently covered in Scopus and Web of Science.

- **with all of the words** “Syrian refugee Jordan”
  **with at least one of the words** “urban urbanisation urbanization city cities town municipal municipality mayor”
  Press “Sort by date” then select “Abstracts”
  39

- **with all of the words** “Syrian refugee Lebanon”
  **with at least one of the words** “urban urbanisation urbanization city cities town municipal municipality mayor”
  Press “Sort by date” then select “Abstracts”
  33

Import the above two sets of results into Zotero, one page at a time. Then 19 duplicates were deleted leaving 39+33–20=52 Google Scholar studies.
# Appendix C  Stakeholder maps

## Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECHO Europaid</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/ FFP/ OPDA</td>
<td>MoPIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID/ FCO</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP/ RCO</td>
<td>BNLWG (Zaatari and Azraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Officials including Mayors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods WG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection WG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Madad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Municipalities of the Southern Suburbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US embassy BPRM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Power and Water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Stability Sector WG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods WG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Brussels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Beirut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Tripoli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (Syrian Displaced)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D  Statistical comparison across five cities in Jordan

Chi-Square test on overall similarity across 5 cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Significance Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel like part of this community</td>
<td>6.886</td>
<td>0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access shelter causes tension in community</td>
<td>11.736</td>
<td>0.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall impression of Neighbours</td>
<td>9.751</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with municipal services</td>
<td>73.115</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 5 per cent level.

Chi-Square test on pair-wise similarity across 5 cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Mafraq</th>
<th>Az Zarqa</th>
<th>Irbid</th>
<th>Jerash</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel like part of this community</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access shelter causes tension in community</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall impression of Neighbours</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with municipal services</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.040*</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.044*</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 5 per cent level.
## Appendix E  Shortlist of Impact initiative’s primary datasets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment date</th>
<th>Assessment name</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec-16</td>
<td>Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) 2016</td>
<td>An annual exercise conducted for WFP to assess: (1) current levels of refugee food security; (2) how these have changed from last year; and (3) review how many and who are the most vulnerable refugees. This then informs WFP targeting, the prioritisation of families and households for urgent assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-16</td>
<td>Youth Assessment: Za’atari and Azraq Camps</td>
<td>Assessment of youth (15–32) to understand access to youth services (both social and professional) and looks at how these impact wellbeing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-16</td>
<td>Women Working: Jordanian and Syrian Refugee Women’s Labour Force Participation and Attitudes Towards Employment</td>
<td>Understand women’s participation in the labour market and women’s perceptions on employment, as well as factors that might be preventing women from employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-16</td>
<td>USAID Community Engagement Project: Baseline Assessment</td>
<td>USAID CEP seeks to contribute to increased community resilience and support social cohesion in host communities. USAID CEP is a five-year activity which aims to achieve this goal by building community cohesion and enhancing the resilience of communities to more effectively address evolving challenges. The assessment sought to understand community members’ perceptions of different aspects of social cohesion and community resilience, in order to provide a baseline for USAID CEP’s implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-16</td>
<td>Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project (JESSRP): Monitoring Study 1</td>
<td>JESSRP aims to strengthen the capacity of municipalities by investing in social infrastructure and supporting visible and tangible improvements at the municipal level. The monitoring study builds upon the baseline assessment and outlines the findings of the first monitoring round of the nine initial treatment municipalities which have received a series of investments through the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-15</td>
<td>Migration Trends and Patterns of Syrian Asylum Seekers travelling to the European Union</td>
<td>Qualitative assessment to understand push and pull factors for migration of Syrian refugees from the Middle East to Europe in 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-15</td>
<td>Mapping of Higher Education Needs and Opportunities for Syrian Refugees</td>
<td>Identify immediate priorities, challenges, needs and mitigation measures related to education access, with a particular focus on capacities and needs of Syrian refugee children aged 6–17, as well as exploring issues facing youth aged 18 to 24.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cont’d.)
### Assessment date | Assessment name | Brief description
--- | --- | ---
Jul-15 | Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) 2015 | An annual exercise conducted for WFP to assess (1) current levels of refugee food security (2) how these have changed from last year and (3) review how many and who are the most vulnerable refugees. This then informs WFP targeting, the prioritisation of families and households for urgent assistance.

May-15 | Social Cohesion in Host Communities in Northern Jordan | REACH implemented an evaluation of support provided to municipalities in northern Jordan. This follow-up builds upon the previous assessment (see: Understanding Social Cohesion in 2014) by analysing the findings from the household baseline component of this evaluation and through exploring potential drivers of tensions in the medium to long term between host communities and the refugee population, and between community residents and local services providers.

May-15 | Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project (JESSRP): Baseline Study | JESSRP aims to strengthen the capacity of municipalities by investing in social infrastructure and supporting visible and tangible improvements at the municipal level. Investments in social infrastructure aim to support community and recreational centres; increase information-sharing between municipalities and citizens; promote town hall meetings and accountability mechanisms for municipalities. Visible and tangible improvements refer to physical improvements such as increased street lighting; road rehabilitation; solid waste issues.

Jun-14 | Livelihoods, Employment and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jun-14 | Access to Healthcare and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jun-14 | Housing and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jun-14 | Perceptions of External Support and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jun-14 | Access to Water and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jun-14 | Education and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees | Thematic assessment report to understand how tensions in host communities have emerged as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Above: Beirut: density and waste in a crowded inner-city area.

Front cover: Syrian refugees and Lebanese hosts undertaking participatory video training to explore urban wellbeing in Beirut.

Photographs by Dolf te Lintelo