ARCHIVE COLLECTION
Volume 49 | Number 1A | April 2018

INCLUSIVE PEACE AND SECURITY

Editor Robin Luckham
Contents

From Disarmament and Development to Inclusive Peace and Security: Four Decades of IDS Research
Robin Luckham
Article first published April 2018, IDSB49.1A

Peace and Development
Willy Brandt
Article first published October 1985, IDSB16.4

Editorial: Disarmament and Development – the International Context
Robin Luckham
Article first published October 1985, IDSB16.4

Globalism Versus Villagism: Food Security and Environment at National and International Levels
Susanna Davies and Melissa Leach
Article first published July 1991, IDSB22.3

War and Famine in Africa
Alex de Waal
Article first published October 1993, IDSB24.4

Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder
Susan Willett
Article first published May 2001, IDSB32.2

Peace Through Agrarian Justice
Paul Richards and Khadija Bah
Article first published June 2005, IDSB36.2

‘Security from Below’ in Contexts of Chronic Violence
Alexandra Abello Colak and Jenny Pearce
Article first published March 2009, IDSB40.2

Gendering the New Security Paradigm in Sri Lanka
Neloufer de Mel
Article first published March 2009, IDSB40.2

Researching the Gendered Silences of Violence in El Salvador
Mo Hume
Article first published May 2009, IDSB40.3

Quantitative Methods in Contexts of Everyday Violence
Patricia Justino, Jennifer Leavy and Elsa Valli
Article first published May 2009, IDSB40.3

Naomi Hossain
Article first published September 2009, IDSB40.5

Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical Africa Conflict States: An Overview
David K. Leonard
Article first published January 2013, IDSB44.1
From Disarmament and Development to Inclusive Peace and Security: Four Decades of IDS Research

Robin Luckham

Abstract This introductory article surveys four decades of work on peace, security, and development, centring on articles published in previous issues of the IDS Bulletin. These articles focused initially on disarmament and its actual and potential contributions to development. After the end of the Cold War, development research engaged more and more directly with conflict prevention and peace-building, turning the spotlight upon security. IDS work has been distinctive in three respects. First, in interrogating the multiple meanings of security, delinking it from state and international security. Second, by tracing the complex links between global, national, local, and personal security. Third, in its insistence that security be inclusive, drawing upon the experience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘developed’ and ‘secured’.

Keywords: disarmament and development, militarisation, security, violent conflict, inequality, social inclusion, peace, peace-building, human security, security in the vernacular.

1 Introduction

This article introduces an IDS Bulletin Archive Collection which reviews four decades of analysis and research on peace, security, and development. This work initially concentrated upon disarmament and development. Disarmament, along with reductions in military spending, it was argued, would release resources for development. It would also break the cycles of militarisation which propelled violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. When the Cold War ended, however, the focus shifted to security’s troubled relationship to development, in a global context in which donor agencies engaged more and more directly with security questions. This article and the pieces reprinted in this Archive Collection trace these shifts, before concluding that it may be time to revisit disarmament in the present times of chronic insecurity and increasing violence.
Despite these shifts in focus, certain common threads of analysis have continued throughout. First, security has been treated with circumspection, as a hugely contested, if vital, concept. It takes diverse forms, not all of them military, and connects intricately with development. Violence and insecurity disrupt economic progress and cause massive human suffering. On the other hand, security itself can impose burdens upon development. Uncaring or repressive governments frequently sacrifice their citizens at the altar of national security. Major powers tend to pursue their geopolitical security interests with little regard to the poor and vulnerable people harmed or uprooted by their interventions.

Second, contributors to *IDS Bulletins* have had a shared commitment to rigorous investigation of both (a) the multiple ways global, national, and local institutions and actors interact to determine security and to shape the course of development; and (b) the many forms of security (international, national, military, personal, livelihood, food, environmental, etc.) and how these interconnect, or indeed clash.

Third, and most important, has been an insistence on asking the question ‘whose security, and whose development?’ This question has both analytical and political repercussions. Interrogating security and development ‘from below’ reframes the established agendas of security and development thinking. Activating the experience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘developed’ and ‘secured’ is at the same time a profoundly political process, especially so in a world in which geopolitics and national security are once again on the march.

2 Disarmament and development

The theory and practice of security, and likewise that of development, was shaped within the historical matrix of the post-Second World War international order. The dirty secret of the ‘long peace’ maintained through nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was that the struggles between capitalist West and communist East played out in the warscapes of the South. A series of United Nations (UN) conferences and reports proposed curbs on arms races, reductions in military spending, and the reallocation of the resources released by these reductions to development. But military spending kept rising and the peace dividend never materialised. The Bretton Woods institutions and aid agencies maintained a studied distance from the brute facts of war and political violence which disfigured many parts of the developing South. Violent conflicts, often aggravated by arms sales and international interventions, continued to increase throughout the Cold War period with devastating legacies, many of which persist to this day.

IDS first began to investigate the relationship between disarmament and development in the 1970s (Jolly 1978). Its concern then as now was the safety and wellbeing of poor and vulnerable people jeopardised by global as well as local insecurities. The initial focus was upon the savings that could be achieved by deep cuts in military spending and arms sales,
and upon the reallocation of these savings to development and poverty reduction. But it soon became clear that it was not realistic to propose cuts without better understanding of the processes which drove military spending, propelled global and national arms races, spread insecurity, and triggered armed violence (Luckham 1976, 1977; Kaldor 1978). The central policy challenge was how to reverse militarisation through peace initiatives, conflict reduction, and the conversion of military industries to peaceful purposes. Whilst the broad thrust of this analysis was global, the optic was also ‘from below’, in that the goal was to reduce the burdens of security on poor and vulnerable people.

These were the principal themes of a 1985 *IDS Bulletin* on ‘Disarmament and World Development: Is There a Way Forward’, articles from which begin this Archive Collection (Brandt 1985 and Luckham 1985, both this *IDS Bulletin*). The 1985 issue contained impassioned pieces by Willy Brandt, Shridath Ramphal and Inga Thorsson, all three prominent international proponents of disarmament and development. It was published at a fraught juncture of the Cold War, when the United States was ramping up its military spending and embarking on the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) proposals, and when the global economy was in a precarious state. Not long afterwards, the Reagan administration pulled the United States out of the forthcoming United Nations Special Conference on Disarmament and Development, planned for 1986, and thus ensured its cancellation.

**3 End of the Cold War: new world order, or plus ça change?**

Within four years the Cold War came to a rapid end, and this appeared to change almost everything. The end of the stand-off between the two superpowers ushered in a period of apparent unipolar Western and especially American hegemony. At last, it seemed, the elusive peace dividend might be achievable. To be sure, new security challenges soon emerged from the breakup of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe; the destabilisation of client regimes in the developing world, which had previously been propped up by the communist East or the capitalist West; and the proliferation of multiple forms of ‘non-state’ violence, including terrorism. The ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War period saw an unravelling of political authority, hastened by globalisation and aggravated by the rise of identity-based conflicts in many regions of the developing world (Kaldor and Luckham 2001). Nevertheless, the number of wars and other forms of violence soon began to decline, according to most published measures, as did the numbers of people killed and wounded, fleeing their homes, and suffering war-related human misery.

The policy environment was transformed even more dramatically. Starting from the UN Secretary-General’s *Agenda for Peace* in 1992 (UN 1992), the international community played an ever more assertive role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. The development community became increasingly oriented to humanitarian action and emergency assistance in conflict zones (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). International
donors and non-governmental organisations cast off their previous reluctance to address security issues, arguing that it was sometimes necessary to invest in security to protect weak states from the violence that threatened to engulf them, as well as to rebuild peace after conflicts.

Development analysis and policy began focusing on fragile states, including their failure to protect their citizens and deliver basic security and justice. Poorly resourced, non-accountable, and undisciplined military and security institutions were considered security threats in their own right. They subverted democratic transitions and engaged in cycles of violence, interacting with the non-state armed groups they were supposed to keep in check (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). Donors began by investing in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes to discourage ex-combatants from returning to violence. They promoted security sector reforms, to improve the effectiveness and democratic accountability of military, police, and justice institutions. Later on, they embarked on ambitious stabilisation and state-building programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan.

These policies were reinforced by significant discursive shifts. First, peace-building was realigned around the preservation of security, and disarmament almost vanished from the picture. Second, the concept of security was broadened to comprise human and citizen security, alongside but not replacing more traditional conceptions of state and international security. The World Bank became an enthusiastic convert and its path-breaking *World Development Report 2011* (World Bank 2011) made citizen security the starting point for its policy engagement with state fragility and peace-building.

4 Securitisation, violence, and geopolitics

Nevertheless, the brute realities of inequality and global violence did not vanish with the end of the Cold War; far from it. Violent conflicts declined from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, but have been on the upturn ever since. The cuts in global military spending of the post-Cold War era have largely been reversed. Major powers increased their military interventions in the developing world, especially after 9/11. The number of people uprooted from their homes and displaced across and within national boundaries is higher than at any time since the Second World War. The framework of international cooperation continues to stutter in the face of these and other global challenges, including that of climate change. And although real progress has been made in reducing poverty, the gains are unevenly spread, globally and in each national context.

Moreover, as critical analysts have observed, the liberal or democratic peace was never all it seemed. It was underpinned by an ideological vision in which political freedoms marched hand in hand with free market economics. Behind its façade lurked many of the same forces which had propelled militarisation in the North and violence and underdevelopment...
in the South during the Cold War. It seemed that security had taken development hostage step by step. Simultaneously, development was being rewritten according to a neoliberal, free-market script.

Duffield (1994) argued in an *IDS Bulletin* published not long after the end of the Cold War that international interventions in complex political emergencies had begun to transform the development industry and to realign North–South relations; what he was later to term the ‘securitisation’ of development (Duffield 2001). Humanitarian interventions to fulfil the international community’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (ICISS 2001) vulnerable people exposed to genocide and extreme violence were increasingly intertwined with international security concerns. Even human security became compromised, when used to put a human face on these interventions or to justify donor support for state-building and market-based development. These critiques gained added traction after 9/11, when the ‘war on terror’ was initiated and a spate of international military interventions were launched, some under humanitarian or peace-building cover, others supposed to preserve international security, but almost all shaped around the geopolitical concerns of the major world and regional powers.

Willett (2001, this *IDS Bulletin*) spelled out the dangers of such ‘security first’ approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building. She argued that they can at best patch over violent conflicts driven by impoverishment, inequality, and social exclusion. Rather it is globalisation, along with market deregulation imposed by donors on weak governments and their poorly performing economies, which has sown the seeds of discontent, fuelling the violence. It follows that tackling globalisation and inequality may be the best peace-building strategy. The major international players and development institutions must put their own houses in order, and tackle the inequities generated by global capitalism, before imposing their liberalisation and peace-building agendas on others.

5 Tackling insecurities in an unequal world

Fundamental asymmetries characterise how global shocks are perceived and acted upon. According to the world view of many Northern decision makers, human insecurities, including violent conflicts, are largely confined to the South. Yet they intrude upon the North as well. First, through terrorism and transnational crime, seen in the media age as symbolic disturbances in the established order of things. Second, through the increasing flow of people displaced by violence and poverty across the borders of Europe and North America, generating increasingly hostile public perceptions. Third, through the political and social ruptures brought about by economic liberalisation, rapid technological change, and inequality in Northern countries themselves.

International security policy, humanitarian action and, increasingly, development policy are being reframed in an increasingly divisive political context which shifts the blame and the responsibility for dealing with spreading insecurity to the South. These largely Northern
perceptions disregard the brutal reality that it is countries, communities, and people in the South which suffer most from global shocks; which bear the traumas of most of the violence; and which shelter and feed the vast majority of refugees.

How is it possible to challenge these perceptions and to reframe the dominant discourse around more inclusive and yet realistic conceptions of security? This *IDS Bulletin* Archive Collection draws attention to a variety of analytical and policy approaches. None fits neatly under a traditional ‘security’ moniker. Most draw upon conceptions of human or citizen security, but go further in requiring deeper, more differentiated understandings of how poor and vulnerable people respond to and negotiate their insecurity (for more detailed discussion see Luckham 2015 and Lind and Luckham 2017). At the same time, they insist upon rigorous investigation of the determinants – local, national, and global – of insecurity, and of how these determinants interconnect.

A path-breaking example is Davies and Leach’s (1991, this *IDS Bulletin*) exploration of the relationships between food security and protection of the natural environment. Their departure point is the livelihood strategies of poor rural producers, who do not in general distinguish sharply between their food security and the multiple ways they draw upon natural resources. In their day-to-day struggles to survive, these rural producers find themselves situated at many removes from the concerns of national and international policymakers.

Significant North–South discrepancies exist, Davies and Leach argue, in how food security and environmental sustainability are thought about and prioritised. The global policy discourse of environmental protection emphasises global interdependence as well as cooperation to tackle shared threats to the natural environment. Yet this fails to address the underlying North–South inequalities in access to technology and resources, and risks privileging environmental concerns over people. Analysis and policy should identify and negotiate the trade-offs and synergies between environmental sustainability and food security. At the same time, they should take full account of the wide gaps between the household, village, national, and global levels – above all by listening to and respecting the day-to-day concerns of those who are most directly affected by environmental change and by food insecurity.

Hossain (2009, this *IDS Bulletin*) reports on a study investigating the impacts of the post-2008 global food, fuel, and financial shocks upon social cohesion and crime in ten local communities in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, and Zambia. None faced threat of large-scale violence; yet in all, economic shocks increased insecurity, including growth of semi-legal and criminal livelihoods, organised crime, and the criminalisation of the police and other public agencies. The social networks on which poor and vulnerable people depended were weakened. And trust in public institutions and in their capacity to protect their citizens was undermined.
Richards and Bah (2005, this *IDS Bulletin*) argue that African civil wars have often arisen out of, deepened, and in turn challenged agrarian exploitation, which has deep historical and social roots in the colonial and pre-colonial past. Much of the analysis and policy emanating from international development bodies has discounted the grievances arising from exploitation and social injustice, and has misinterpreted resistance, including violent resistance, to this exploitation. Durable peace, Richards and Bah argue, can only be assured through comprehensive agrarian reforms which explicitly bring in previously marginalised social groups, including women and youths.

De Waal (1993, this *IDS Bulletin*) offers a powerful critique of the weaponisation of famine in Africa to win wars, to control populations, and to seize control over land and productive assets; an analysis which still rings true more than two decades after it was written – notably in countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria. Then as now famine is not simply an African problem, it is complexly linked both to global shocks and to violent conflicts. Efforts to reduce it tend all too often to be compromised by the securitisation of humanitarian assistance, as well as the bureaucratic politics of the aid industry.

6 Uncovering silenced voices

The difficulties and opportunities of navigating research in dangerous and politically contested conflict zones are explored by contributors to this *IDS Bulletin* (see also Rivas and Browne 2018). During the past two or three decades, research on violence and the different forms of insecurity has increased in both volume and quality. Researchers have adopted a wide spread of methodological prisms, including historical analysis, ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation, action research, and quantitative techniques. Justino, Leavy and Valli (2009, this *IDS Bulletin*) explore the potential of quantitative techniques of inquiry, notably their use in micro-level research on violence, arguing that they complement rather than replace qualitative methods.

Hume’s (2009, this *IDS Bulletin*) account of the gendered silences of violence in El Salvador highlights the disempowerment of women and the challenges this poses for researchers investigating the multiple ways in which they are silenced. She provides a trenchant analysis of how violence and the fear of violence in El Salvador have been normalised by both police and criminals to silence women and stifle dissent.

De Mel (2009, this *IDS Bulletin*) provides a trenchant picture of the militarised masculinity of Sri Lanka’s military and security institutions, supposed to protect all citizens, including women, from violence. Her portrayal of the interactions between Sri Lanka’s ‘military boys’ and its ‘garment girls’ suggests how the militarised masculinity of the former reinforces the gendered insecurity of the latter, which in turn stems from the feminised exploitation of labour in the country’s transnational Free Trade Zones.
How to uncover silenced voices is as much a political as a methodological task, as both Hume and de Mel suggest. Abello Colak and Pearce (2009, this IDS Bulletin) investigate ‘security from below’ through case studies of community-led responses to violence and peace-building in Guatemala and Colombia (see also McGee 2017, who links the silencing of people in the Colombian Pacific to the invisible as well as visible power of elites and violent groups). Action research and community-led peace-building, Abello Colak and Pearce argue, provide better empirical understanding of the insecurities faced by vulnerable people and groups. In addition they offer credible, popularly supported alternatives to the perverse, forcibly imposed forms of order which sometimes pass for security in violent situations.

7 Inclusive citizenship, legitimate public authority, and the social contract
Citizen participation is essential to legitimate public authority as well as inclusive security. However, Kabeer’s (2002) insightful analysis of the multiple dimensions of citizenship points out that certain forms and experiences of citizenship can reinforce exclusion as well as inclusion. Political authority is diminished when particular categories of citizen – marginalised minorities, submerged classes, women, etc. – are deprived of some or all of the entitlements of citizenship, including protection from violence. Diminished citizenship along with the unravelling of authority connect complexly to insecurity and violence, both as frequent causes and as frequent outcomes of violence (Kaldor and Luckham 2001).

Leonard (2013, this IDS Bulletin) focuses upon the making and unmaking of the social contract between states and citizens in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the political turbulence in the region has arisen from the unstable bargains made between and within African political elites, security apparatuses, and regimes, upon which much of the analysis of conflict and insecurity has concentrated (World Bank 2017). Yet equally if not more fundamental has been the failure of elites and governments to fulfil their social contracts with citizens, and in particular their inability or unwillingness to deliver basic physical safety along with other public goods.

In the absence of the state, alternative ‘hybrid’ forms of security provision have emerged, in which an eclectic range of non-state actors (traditional institutions, elders, religious authorities, community groups, and even warlords and criminal mafias) offer protection and various forms of justice (Bagayoko and M’Cormack 2012; Bagayoko, Hutchful and Luckham 2016). Based on research in Côte d’Ivoire, Allouche and Zadi Zadi (2013) suggest that civilian groups interacting with the state can play a vital role in containing violence and maintaining ‘zones of peace’ in situations of acute conflict.

Behind the analysis and practice of security again lurks the fundamental question raised at the beginning of this article and which is implicit in the social contract: exactly whose security and whose development are
we talking about? People whose lives are thrown into turmoil by violence and insecurity almost invariably see their insecurity differently from how it is seen by national governments, international peacekeepers, and others charged with delivering peace and security. They speak security ‘from below’ in many vernaculars, reflecting significant variations in history, culture, and social milieu (see Lind and Luckham 2017, which introduces a special issue of *Peacebuilding* around these themes based on recent IDS research). Their insecurity invariably intertwines with other forms of human suffering and social exclusion; that is, freedom from violence and from the fear of violence necessarily belongs within a wider consideration of other dimensions of human security.

Table 1 The complex landscapes of risk and (in)security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The multiple layers of (in)security</th>
<th>Violence and threats of violence</th>
<th>Economic dislocations</th>
<th>Sustainability risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local, community, and individual</td>
<td>Gender, identity-based, criminal, and vigilante violences</td>
<td>Inequality, poverty, and fragile livelihoods</td>
<td>Famine, epidemics, child mortality, and displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proliferation of non-state armed groups</td>
<td>Uneven impacts of development</td>
<td>Unequal distribution of risks between rich and poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Localised or subcontracted state violence</td>
<td>Spatialised inequalities at the margins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Violent ungoverned borderlands</td>
<td>Weak states unable to manage ‘adjusted’, dependent economies</td>
<td>State failure to deliver public goods, respond to emergencies, or maintain safety nets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unravelling political authority</td>
<td>Widening vertical and horizontal inequalities</td>
<td>Government disinterest or hostility towards environmental protections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary, oppressive governance structures and practices</td>
<td>States as capitalist enforcers</td>
<td>Neglect of infrastructures supporting health, wellbeing, and safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hollowing or capture of democracy by violent elites</td>
<td>Corruption cartels and bandit states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North–South, South–South, and regional</td>
<td>Rising powers and new forms of hegemony</td>
<td>Varying regional capacities to weather economic shocks</td>
<td>Regional competition over water, land, and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regionally interconnected violence and insecurity</td>
<td>Brunt of adjustments imposed on poorest countries and people</td>
<td>Mass population displacements, refugees, and migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insecurity ‘blowback’ towards the North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Networked violence: terrorism, drugs, and crime</td>
<td>Footloose, non-accountable big capital</td>
<td>Unchecked climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New technologies of war and surveillance</td>
<td>Global financial and economic shocks</td>
<td>Health pandemics (HIV, Ebola, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muscular geopolitics and military interventions</td>
<td>Widening global inequalities</td>
<td>Spreading food and water insecurities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Author’s own, adapted from Luckham (2015).
8 Mapping (in)security from below

How can ‘security from below’, and ‘security in the vernacular’ both activate vulnerable and insecure people and groups themselves, and make a tangible difference to analysis, research, and policy? Even if one’s starting point is an appraisal of the risks which press most heavily upon the day-to-day lives of vulnerable people, these risks must be appraised in their national, regional, and global context. Table 1 presents a schematic landscape of insecurities and risks, along with the different levels, from local to global, at which they tend to be most pressing.

The forms of violence and insecurity which most directly affect poor and vulnerable people are summarised at the head of Table 1. Placing them in a wider context and tracing the determinants, direct and indirect, of their (in)security is of course enormously challenging. Local and community insecurities are deeply shaped by remote national, regional, and global dynamics, which local people scarcely understand and have very little ability to control. Global risks such as climate change, economic shocks, and transnational violence cascade through to regional, national and local levels, but how they do so is poorly understood, as well as difficult for those most affected to grasp.

Conversely, seemingly local or national insecurities too have major global reverberations: for instance, the networking across international boundaries of localised Islamist insurgencies in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel; or the political and military upheavals propelling large numbers of people fleeing repression and violence in Africa and the Middle East to seek refuge across the Mediterranean; and the worldwide panics set off by pandemics, such as the Ebola epidemic.

Researchers struggle as best they can to map these interconnections, to expose them to empirical scrutiny, and to draw informed conclusions for policy and political action. It is an undertaking simultaneously of deepening and of broadening (see Luckham 2015 for a panoptic view). It demands rigorous analysis rather than speculative conjecture about the drivers of global change and their attendant risks.

How, for instance, do the diverse insecurities (violence, famine, disease, displacement, etc.) faced by people and groups at the margins (top of Table 1) interconnect and reinforce each other? How do they link vertically to impoverishment and global capital accumulation? How can those most directly at risk mobilise locally and globally, in order to confront the massive inequalities that determine their fate? How do geopolitics, rampant capitalism, fossil fuel extraction and climate change interconnect, and where are the entry points to break these interconnections? Where are global market dislocations, shifts between old and rising powers, and deepening inequalities now taking us; are they now beyond regulation; and what forms of subaltern protest or resistance do they encourage?
These are enormous questions, and asking them has dangers. Mixing a smorgasbord of global, national, and local problems on the same analytical dish can reduce focus and clarity. It can foster the securitisation of all forms of risk, by opening the door to the reframing of global poverty, pandemics, climate change and so forth through the lenses of national and international security policy – potentially harnessing them to the interests of powerful governments and corporations. However, such dangers are best averted by spelling out, rather than obscuring, the interconnections and by opening them to empirical analysis.

At the same time, most risks tend to be politically and socially constructed and be mediated by states and other political authorities. These risks reflect and reproduce current distributions of power, bureaucratic authority and knowledge, none more so than security threats. The discourse of threats evokes a narrow narrative of violent contestation, in which the bodies of citizens become as one with the body politic of the state. This allows powerful actors and institutions to close analysis and policy around particular framings of risk, especially those which emphasise stability and control. Current analyses of ‘fragile states’ tend to focus upon challenges to the state’s monopoly of violence and the unravelling of political authority, especially in ‘ungoverned’ peripheries. But equally if not more problematic has been the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism, often dressed up in democratic drag, which crowd out or obliterate democratic challenges, such as those which extinguished the Arab Springs.

This makes it even more vital to rethink security ‘from below’, keeping the people and groups at grass roots whose burdens of risk are the greatest firmly in view (see Abello Colak and Pearce 2009, this IDS Bulletin; Luckham 2009; Lind and Luckham 2017). It is their silenced voices which must be attended to. It is their resilience and agency that coping strategies depend upon. It is they who have most reason to challenge the dominant framings of security. It is they who can benefit most by mobilising around demands for change. And it is their experiences and perceptions of risk which should be the starting point for analysis and action.

9 Towards inclusive security: what follows from listening to the voices of those who are most excluded and insecure?

What does listening to and giving precedence to the people and groups who are excluded from current framings of security and development imply for development analysis, research, and policy? First it provides a necessary corrective to the tendency of development researchers and practitioners to take for granted that they act on behalf of poor, vulnerable, and excluded people. Sometimes they do, but this cannot be assumed, especially when tackling the problems of people living in insecure and violent places. More reflection is needed upon positionality: where researchers and policymakers sit within the prevailing hierarchies of power and knowledge (Rivas and Browne 2018); precisely who is doing the securing and for whom; and whether the people ‘secured’ or ‘developed’ see policy interventions as...
supporting their concerns rather than being indifferent, or indeed as indistinguishable from the structures of domination and exploitation that trap them in poverty and violence.

Second, uncovering silenced voices requires social inquiry that engages constructively with these voices, at the same time as being methodologically rigorous. This has been a particular strength of participatory and action research at IDS. But for action research to bring tangible improvements in the security of poor and vulnerable people, it must also rise to the challenges posed by the wider national and global structures of power and inequality which reinforce the different forms of human misery and throw up many obstacles to tackling them.

Third, there should be due caution about general conclusions and generic policy prescriptions. Both understanding insecurity and tackling it must be rooted in deep knowledge of regional, national, and local contexts. As Selby and Tadros (2016) argue in relation to the Middle East, analysis of security questions tends to be clouded by unexamined myths and preconceptions, which bias policymaking and may tangibly worsen the safety and welfare of people at the sharp end of violence and insecurity. Collaboration with researchers from countries in the global South is just one way to guard against these biases; even if the difficulties, political and other, of such collaboration should not be underestimated.¹¹

For all these reasons, critical self-reflection upon the development industry’s own policies and programmes must be a priority. First, so as to identify and grapple with the inconsistencies between policy goals and how these bear upon development practice (Davies and Leach’s (1991, this IDS Bulletin) analysis of the tensions between environmental and food security is exemplary). Second, to tease out the potential contradictions arising from the foreign policy and security imperatives of governments and donors, and to address the political dangers they create for development and humanitarian action. Third, to spell out the potentially perverse or negative impacts of both security policies and development programmes, particularly upon those who find themselves vulnerable and excluded. IDS has much to contribute to this process of critical self-reflection, because of its long track record of research on poverty, its commitment to participatory research, and its advocacy for those left behind by development.

¹⁰ Back to the future: the question of military spending and disarmament

Finally, it may now be time to revive analysis and debate about global disarmament and its place in building more inclusive and sustainable security. The threat of nuclear escalation did not vanish after the end of the Cold War, and still hangs over the relationships between rising as well as established powers. Military spending underwrites the geopolitical projects and repressive practices of states in all regions of the world. Access to weapons and military assistance with minimal democratic accountability to those who pay for them through taxes
reinforces the power of military and authoritarian elites. The flow of weapons and other strategic goods and services across national boundaries on the one hand sustains repressive states, and on the other hand arms insurgents and terrorist networks. Recent events in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere remind us that international arms transfers still oil the mechanisms of war and military intervention, supplying the weapons systems that visit destruction upon the social infrastructures on which large numbers of poor and vulnerable people depend.

By themselves, of course, neither military cuts nor curbs on arms transfers would halt violent conflicts; although they might help.

Nevertheless, high (and currently increasing) military and arms spending are a matter of great policy as well as political concern. They represent a massive diversion of resources from other public purposes. They are inseparable from the inequalities in power, wealth, and access to the fruits of technological progress which ensure that the targets of armed violence are mostly to be found in the more peripheral regions of the developing South. Disarmament is a tangible policy goal. It pinpoints the nexus between weapons systems, big capital, and military power. And it can open diagnostic windows through which to identify and mobilise against the structures of domination and exclusion that uphold global and national inequalities.

Notes
1 My deep thanks to Melissa Leach, Director of the Institute of Development Studies, for asking me to put together this IDS Bulletin Archive Collection, as well as to Dylan Hendrickson and Jeremy Lind for very insightful comments. My thanks also to Beth Richard for her careful editorial comments and corrections to this article.
2 Along with the other IDS Bulletin articles referred to in this introductory article, but not republished here.
4 The latter was written to be read with a companion piece, not published in this collection (Luckham 1985), which spelled out various scenarios for global change. Three of these arguably have some relevance today. First, a ‘militarist–monetarist scenario’, which
traced the interconnections between monetarist economics, big capital, and military realpolitik. Second, a ‘Brandt–Palme scenario’, summarising the proposals of the Brandt and Palme Commissions (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982) which floated many of the ideas that were to shape the liberal consensus on global governance after the end of the Cold War. Third, a ‘global transformation scenario’, proposing a mix of structural change in the North, delinking from the Cold War, and more self-reliant development in the South.

5 The former Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, chaired the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (1980). Inga Thorsson was a Swedish politician, diplomat and disarmament expert, who coordinated major international reports on disarmament and on the conversion of military to civilian industries. Shridath Ramphal was the current, well-respected Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.


7 I co-authored one of the two main discussion documents for the conference, which was heavily cut and pasted by the UN, but never published by it. The editing process was an instructive lesson in Cold War and UN politics.

8 Such as the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, or the Mobutu regime in Zaire, both of which were highly dependent on their international patrons, and both of which disintegrated soon after the end of the Cold War.

9 See Byrne (1996) for an influential early discussion of the potential of gender analysis in the study of violent conflicts.

10 Recent analysis by the World Bank (2017) focuses largely on the elite bargains and institutional restraints required to end conflict. In this respect, it is a step back from the Bank’s earlier focus (World Bank 2011) on citizen security and ‘inclusive enough’ political settlements.

11 Some of the IDS Bulletins from which contributions to this Archive Collection are drawn were products of collaboration with developing country partners, and most included pieces by Southern contributors. Contributors to the 2009 IDS Bulletin on ‘Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World’ (the majority from the developing South) were members of the Global Consortium on Security Transformation, a South–North network which eventually foundered due to political difficulties faced by its Southern lead organisations.

12 Terrorism is the apparent exception, which proves the rule. The numbers of people killed or maimed by acts of terrorism in the North are miniscule compared with the casualties of terrorist violence, still less state violence, in conflict zones in the developing world.
References


