

**CASH TRANSFERS AND RESILIENCE IN CHAD:
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES AND
CASE STUDY OF CARE'S INTERVENTIONS**



Photo: IDS/BERDES field research team

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACF	Action against Hunger (<i>Action Contre la Faim</i>)
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (<i>Agence de Coopération Technique et de Développement</i>)
AFD	French Development Agency (<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>)
AGIR	Global Alliance for Resilience (<i>Alliance Globale pour la Résilience</i>)
APRODIF	Association for the Promotion of Integrated Development and Training (<i>Action pour la Promotion et le Développement Intégral de la Femme et de l'Enfant</i>)
BAPE	Bureau of Support for Agriculture and Environmental Protection
BeG	Bahr el Gazal
BERDES	Bureau for Economic and Social Research and Study (<i>Bureau d'Etude et de Recherche pour le Développement Economique et Social</i>)
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CASAGC	Action Committee for Food Security and Management of Crises (<i>Comité d'Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Gestion des Crises alimentaires</i>)
CEAO	Economic Community of West African States (<i>Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>)
CERF	UN Central Emergency Response Fund
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee against Drought (<i>Comité Permanent Inter-États de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse</i>)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
ECOSIT	National Household Consumption and Informal Sector Survey (<i>Enquête sur la Consommation et le Secteur Informel au Tchad</i>)
EDF	European Development Fund
ENSA	National Food Security Survey (<i>Enquête Nationale sur la Sécurité Alimentaire</i>)
EU	European Union
FACER	Women, Adaptation to Climate Change, Water and Resilience (<i>Femmes, Adaptation au Changement Climatique, Eau et Résilience</i>)
FAO	UN Food and Agricultural Organisation
FCFA	Central African Franc of the African Financial Community (<i>Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine de l'Afrique Centrale</i>)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
IDI	In-depth Individual Interview
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
ITRAD	Chadian Institute for Agricultural Research and Development (<i>Institut Tchadien de Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement</i>)
KII	Key Informant Interview
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEPCI	Ministry of the Economy, Planning and International Cooperation (<i>Ministère de l'Economie, du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale</i>)
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONDR	National Rural Development Office (<i>Office National de Développement Rural</i>)
PADL/GR	Support Programme for Local Development and Natural Resource Management (<i>Programme d'Appui au Développement Local et à la Gestion des Ressources</i>)
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PNAAL	National Nutrition and Food Policy (<i>Politique Nationale de Nutrition et d'Alimentation</i>)
PND	National Development Plan (<i>Plan Nationale de Développement</i>)
PNISR	National Programme for Investment in the Rural Sector (<i>Programme National d'Investissement dans le Secteur Rural</i>)
PNSA	National Food Security Programme (<i>Programme National de Sécurité Alimentaire</i>)
PRP	Country Resilience Priorities (<i>Priorités Résilience Pays</i>)
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
RGPH	General Population and Housing Census (<i>Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat</i>)
SISAAP	National Food Security Information and Early Warning System (<i>Système d'Information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et d'Alerte Précoce</i>)
SNPS	National Social Protection Strategy (<i>Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale</i>)
UE	European Union (<i>Union Européen</i>)
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union (<i>Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine</i>)
UNICEF	United Nations Fund for Children
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International

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1. Introduction and context

1.1 Poverty reduction and the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS)

Over the past ten years, Chad has experienced a period of sustained political stability, economic growth, infrastructural development and poverty reduction, with heightened attention to the reinforcement of basic social services and growing investment in productive sectors. Between 2003 and 2011, the poverty rate dropped by 8 percentage points, from 55% to 47%. Nevertheless, as the National Development Plan (NDP) for the period 2013-2015 underlines, economic growth has not been inclusive: certain groups and regions have benefitted more than others, and significant disparities remain in most indicators of socioeconomic well-being.

Multi-dimensional poverty remains widespread in both urban and rural zones and the inter-generational transmission of poverty continues to threaten both individual and societal progress. Formal employment opportunities are limited, overall productivity is low, and coverage rates for basic social services such as quality education and health care remain uneven. The multiple and complex challenges to social development in Chad from both internal factors linked to issues of governance and institutional instability, and external factors including climatic fluctuations and extremes, armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, and global economic forces.

Poverty reduction, with its corollary, the protection and promotion of vulnerable groups, is a central feature of the country's 2030 Vision and the NDP. It is in this sense that the Government adopted the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) in July 2015, identified in the NDP as both a cross-cutting strategy and an integral part of its strategic axis 2 aimed at *'the mobilisation and promotion of human capital and the reduction of inequalities, poverty and social exclusion.'* Social protection is considered a central pillar in the fight against poverty and vulnerability. It plays an important role in reinforcing the resilience of individuals and households in the face of various risks and shocks. It is also a right whose provision manifests the social pact between the state and its citizens, thus reinforcing national cohesion through different measures aimed at equity and inclusion.

The global objective of the SNPS is to establish a complete system of social protection in Chad that will i) furnish social assistance and promote the social inclusion of vulnerable groups; ii) ensure a minimum revenue and decent work for the working age population through the promotion of employment and the expansion of social security; iii) promote food security and nutrition; and iv) facilitate access to basic social services, notably education and health, particularly for the most vulnerable individuals and groups.

1.2 Identification of effective mechanisms for the implementation of the SNPS

UNICEF, working with teams from the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and the local Bureau of Economic and Social Research and Studies (BERDES) has provided technical support to the Government in the development of its national social protection strategy. It now continues to support the Government in identifying and developing appropriate measures and mechanisms for the implementation of the strategy. Among the different types of social protection mechanisms that are available and in use in Chad, the focus for the current body of analytical work is on cash transfers linked to resilience and the reinforcement of livelihoods, and labour intensive public works that aim to provide employment while creating needed infrastructure or services.

Global experience highlights the potential of such mechanisms to strengthen both individual and household resilience in the face of various risks and shocks, to help smooth consumption, and to support investment in human capital development including through the increased use of social services. But it

also identifies certain challenges in the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of such mechanisms, with significant lessons learned on how to make such tools effective mechanisms for social protection.

Technical assistance supported by UNICEF and offered by the IDS/BERDES team aims, therefore, to bring international experience to bear on the analysis, assessment, and operational recommendations for the use of these two mechanisms in Chad. The overall work combines a synthesis of global experiences and lessons learned, a review of the use of such approaches in Chad, and case studies of two selected projects underway at the time of the study.

For labour intensive public works, the focus has been on the urban sanitation programme known as ‘N’Djamena Nadif’ initiated and implemented by the mayor’s office of N’Djamena, which has recruited a cadre of women to work as ‘surface technicians’ in charge of sweeping and cleaning the capitals’ streets and market areas. Full details of the analysis and recommendations can be found in a separate report.¹ For cash transfers linked to resilience, analysis has focused on the approach pursued by CARE International in the east of the country in rural communities in the region of Wadi Fira where, through a variety of interventions ranging from direct cash transfers to support the immediate seasonal food security and survival needs of households during the lean season, to emerging ‘cash-for-work’ initiatives for selected households to enable them to secure their livelihoods in the longer-term, the difficult link between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ is being broached. The current report focuses on this latter thematic and the mechanism of cash transfers linked to resilience.

1.3 Study processes and methodology

This study combined an extensive literature review on cash transfers in Chad and globally, with qualitative field investigations in Wadi Fira, in the east of the country. Discussions in N’Djamena took place between 25 September and 2 October 2015, while field work in Wadi Fira was conducted over the period 24 October to 2 November 2015. The methodology for the study was developed in advance and combined key informant interviews, focus group discussions and in-depth individual interviews with beneficiaries, as well as observations.

Information on experiences with cash transfers in Chad as a whole benefitted greatly from a recent social safety net mapping exercise conducted by the World Bank as part of its analytical work in Chad (World Bank 2016). Additional information was drawn from interviews with 16 key informants in N’Djamena from different ministerial departments as well as development partner organisations, complemented with a review of available documentation on policies, programmes and plans. A report of these discussions was compiled and submitted to UNICEF in October 2015 (Watson et al. 2015).

Case study field investigations of CARE’s cash transfer interventions in Wadi Fira included 14 key informant interviews (with government officials, NGO partners, representatives of the community and private sector and CARE Chad field staff); focus group discussions with 30 women beneficiaries and in-depth interviews with one female and one male beneficiary. Field work covered three rural cantons of Wadi Fira where project activities are being implemented. Preliminary notes from field research were compiled and submitted to UNICEF in November (Abdoulaye 2015) and the full report completed in early 2016.

Annexes 1 and 2 provide a list of key informants encountered over the course of this study, while Annex 3 presents the field study research agenda.

1.4 Aims and organisation of the report

This report first reviews the state of the art – knowledge and lessons learned from global experience with cash transfers as a mechanism for social protection, with a particular focus on cash transfers linked

¹ See Watson, Devereux and Nan-guer (2016) for the parallel paper on labour-intensive public works and the case study of ‘N’Djamena Nadif’.

to resilience that aim to bridge the divide between emergency responses and longer-term support (*Chapter 2*). It next analyses the national policy context and provides an overview of experiences in the use of cash transfers in Chad (*Chapter 3*). It then focuses on the case study of programme interventions of CARE International, presenting the key findings from field research in Wadi Fira undertaken with the support of UNICEF and CARE International (*Chapter 4*). It concludes with a presentation of operational recommendations for the overall use of cash transfers in Chad, and for the reinforcement of approaches seeking to support livelihoods and household resilience. (*Chapter 5*). The overall aim is to provide policy makers and programme planners with pertinent information and analysis that will contribute to their efforts around implementation of the SNPS.

2. Global state of the art: knowledge and lessons learned from cash transfers

Cash transfers have been introduced as part of social protection or social security systems in almost every country in the world. A recent review found that 119 developing countries have implemented at least one unconditional cash transfer programme and 52 countries have conditional cash transfer programmes for poor households (Gentilini et al., 2014). This section reviews international evidence on the impacts of cash transfers, as well as lessons learned on how to design and deliver cash transfer programmes effectively.

2.1. Impacts of cash transfers

There is now an international consensus, supported by a solid evidence base, of the effectiveness of cash transfers in achieving a wide range of positive outcomes for poor households. Positive impacts that have been recorded in evaluations of cash transfer programmes across the world include:

- **Poverty reduction:** cash transfers make poor people less poor, in some cases lifting them out of poverty altogether (especially if they are close to the poverty line and transfers are generous) but at least reducing the poverty gap (e.g. lifting them from extreme poverty to moderate poverty). For example, the *Oportunidades* conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico reduced the poverty gap for beneficiaries by 30% after two years, and the Child Support Grant in South Africa reduced the poverty gap by 47% (DFID 2011, pp 15 & 17).
- **Inter-generational poverty:** Although the evidence base for long run impacts is still being built, cash transfers can contribute to breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty. Poor people cannot afford to invest optimally in the human capital (health and education) of themselves or their children, resulting in low productivity and low earnings for themselves, and limited opportunities for their children to access lucrative employment and earn higher incomes in adulthood. Cash transfers that alleviate income constraints and encourage investments in human capital can raise productivity and earnings, immediately and for the next generation (ILO 2010, p. 5).
- **Resilience:** Cash transfers give vulnerable people options to strengthen their resilience against a range of shocks, for instance by acquiring assets that can be disposed of during a crisis, or by diversifying their livelihoods to spread risk. An example comes from the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, which provides partial protection against shocks such as drought: PSNP participants do adopt damaging ‘coping strategies’ including selling assets for food to survive, but they lose less of their productive assets and are able to recover faster than non-PSNP households (Béné et al. 2012).
- **Cyclical food insecurity:** In farming communities with one rainy season, the risk of seasonal hunger or *soudure* is high, and social protection interventions should be designed to provide support at times of year when food supplies are low and food prices are high. The PSNP in Ethiopia operates during the annual ‘hungry season’ providing income at the most difficult time of year and offering protection against seasonality. One impact evaluation found that the PSNP reduced the annual ‘hunger gap’ in rural households from 3.6 months in 2006 to 2.3 months in 2010 (Hoddinott et al. 2011, p. 30). In Malawi and Swaziland, cash transfers have been used as an emergency response during seasonal food crises, but in Swaziland a package of food plus cash transfers was delivered, while in Malawi the amount of cash given to drought-affected households was increased every month in line with rising food prices until the next harvest (Devereux 2010b).
- **Nutrition:** Positive impacts of cash transfers on nutrition status (wasting in the short-term and stunting in the long-term) have only been found in a few evaluations, but this is increasingly recognised as a fundamental outcome that should be an objective of all social protection. Cash transfers can improve nutrition status by increasing access to food through direct purchases, food production for home consumption, or higher incomes through investment in livelihood activities

that generate profits for food purchases. Children on Mexico's *Oportunidades* gained one centimetre in height for age compared to a control group, after two years of the programme. Boys who receive the Child Support Grant in South Africa have an increase in height-for-age which will make them 3.5 cm taller as adults (ILO 2010, p.6).

- **Education:** Conditional cash transfers increase access to education directly, because parents only receive the cash if they send their children to school. Conditional cash transfers have resulted in large increases in primary secondary school enrolment in several countries in Latin America (e.g. Mexico and Nicaragua) and in Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia and Turkey) (DFID 2011, p. 25). However, unconditional cash transfers are also invested in children's education. A study that compared conditional and unconditional cash transfers in Malawi found that both types of cash transfer increased school attendance and reduced dropout rates, and there was no significant difference in these impacts between conditional and unconditional transfers (Baird et al. 2010).
- **Health care:** The 'income effect' of cash transfers also increases access to health services, because people with higher incomes tend to spend more on health care and health insurance. However, for both health and education services, improved access does not necessarily lead to improved outcomes – healthier and better educated populations. Cash transfers increase the demand for these services, but complementary investments are needed in the supply-side – more clinics and doctors, more schools and teachers, better quality of services – especially in countries like Chad, where the quality of basic social services is weak and uneven (DFID 2011, p. ii).
- **Local economy:** Cash transfers are spent partly on buying goods and services from local farmers and traders, which creates income multipliers – injecting cash into poor rural communities generates income for other people as well as the cash recipients. Assessments in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho and Zambia have found income multipliers ranging from 1.34 to 2.50 (Daidone et al. 2015, p. 97).

2.2. Lessons learned

Cash transfer programmes can be designed in ways that maximise the impacts of cash transfers. Factors that generally increase impacts include:

1. **Transfer value:** Bigger transfers lead to bigger impacts. Small transfers tend to be spent mostly on food and other basic needs, but larger transfers provide additional cash that can be invested in assets, education and health, farming and non-farm livelihoods. Transfers should also be adjusted for household size and they must be index-linked to inflation, otherwise their real value and their impact will erode over time (Devereux et al. 2005, p. 46).
2. **Transfer predictability:** Cash transfers must be delivered “in a frequent, regular and predictable manner” (Daidone et al. 2015, p. 99). This allows poor households to plan and budget better, to make savings and invest in asset accumulation, and to take moderate risks. Conversely, late or irregular and unpredictable delivery of cash transfers can be disruptive and undermine the confidence of cash recipients.
3. **Targeting by labour capacity:** Households that have working adults and low dependency ratios (e.g. a newly married couple with no children) can make more productive use of cash transfers than households with no working adults and high dependency ratios (e.g. an elderly widow looking after her orphaned grandchildren). Widows and orphans do need social assistance, but they are likely to consume most of any resources they are given, whereas young working adults are more likely to invest some of these additional resources in building sustainable and resilient livelihoods. In other words, cash transfer programmes need to be designed to meet different needs, and there should not be unrealistic expectations about what they can achieve.
4. **Linking relief and development:** Humanitarian emergencies require a rapid response while social protection programmes imply long-term regular programming. Although food aid was the standard response to food crises in the past, cash transfers are increasingly used for both emergency relief and permanent social protection, and often there are large overlaps between the people who need

both forms of public assistance. For this reason, contingency funds have been built into the PSNP in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya, allowing both programmes to scale-up rapidly in bad years, either by increasing the number of beneficiaries registered or by increasing the amount of cash delivered to existing beneficiaries (e.g. from 6 months to 9 months of the year). Sometimes called ‘surge capacity’, the advantage is that emergency relief can be delivered through established targeting, registration, payments and monitoring systems, which is cost-effective and enables a prompt response to crises (IFRC 2014).

5. **Graduation programmes:** The success of cash transfer programmes led to a belief that this intervention is enough to eradicate poverty on its own, and inspired an influential book called ‘Just Give Money to the Poor’ (Hanlon et al. 2010). However, a category of interventions called ‘graduation model programmes’ has achieved remarkable success in ‘graduating’ people out of extreme poverty by providing a sequenced package of support for a fixed period of approximately two years. Although graduation programmes originated in Bangladesh, pilot projects have since been launched in eight countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, which have all achieved impressive results (Banerjee *et al.* 2015a). The thinking behind graduation programmes is that single interventions such as cash transfers or microfinance are not sufficient to reduce poverty on their own. Instead, providing a package of resources that includes regular cash transfers, asset transfers, access to savings, training and personal coaching can lift poor households towards self-reliant livelihoods. The main disadvantage is that graduation programmes are expensive and require enough staff to deliver community-level trainings and regular home visits to all beneficiaries. For this reason, NGOs working at grassroots level might be better able and more effective than governments at delivering this intensive package of support (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2015).

3. Overview of cash transfers in Chad and emerging priorities for resilience

This chapter examines the place of cash transfers in selected national policies and plans (3.1); reviews available information on experiences with cash transfer programmes in Chad (3.2); and identifies an emerging coalescence of thinking on the links between cash transfers and ‘resilience’ (3.3). Information derives from the review of available documentation as well as interviews with a number of key informants from different ministerial departments as well as development partner organisations. The review of current experiences with cash transfers draws in particular on the comprehensive mapping of social safety nets recently conducted by the World Bank, along with other recent programme evaluations. The chapter concludes (3.4) with an overview of general themes and lessons learned arising from experiences in Chad and identifies issues for consideration in moving forward with such approaches.²

3.1 National policy and planning context

3.1.1 The National Development Plan (PND 2013-15)

The PND (MEPCI 2013) serves as the overarching policy framework for sectoral programmes and investments in Chad. Its vision is to promote – over the medium and long terms – economic growth that will reduce poverty and vulnerability, including through social development processes that will enable all Chadians to have access to healthy and abundant food, high quality social services, decent housing and employment and appropriate training. While the PND does not mention cash transfers specifically in its strategic axes, it does identify social safety nets to facilitate the access of vulnerable groups to food stuffs as one of the strategies foreseen to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing by half the proportion of the population suffering from hunger. Other broad bases for appropriate mechanisms to support vulnerable households facing both food insecurity and other threats include the following:

- **Within strategic axis 1** on productivity and employment: the need to reinforce food crisis management mechanisms is highlighted as a means of enhancing food security.
- **Within strategic axis 2** on the mobilisation and valorisation of human capital and the fight against inequalities, poverty and social exclusion: the need for strengthened social protection for the most vulnerable groups is recognized, including enhanced access of vulnerable groups to social action services. The PND calls overall for the development of a national social protection strategy.
- **Within strategic axis 3** on the protection of the environment and struggle against climate change: the PND identifies the need to strengthen the national food security apparatus and to put into place appropriate mechanisms for both the prevention and response to crises.

3.1.2 The National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS 2014-18)

The SNPS (MEPCI 2014) sets the overall framework within which social protection actions and mechanisms – including cash transfers - are to be developed and implemented. Cash and other social transfers are explicitly identified as appropriate interventions in three of the four strategic axes:

- **In strategic axis 1** on social assistance for the most vulnerable groups: the SNPS recognizes that cash transfers implemented by the Ministry of Social Action to date have been small scale and limited to ad hoc actions supported by partners. Among the priority interventions identified are cash transfers to i) older people (social pension); ii) orphans and vulnerable children; and iii) families as

² Note: Research and discussions for this study took place in 2015 – prior to the initiation of the government’s national social safety net pilot project, supported by the World Bank, which includes cash transfers to poor households.

an incentive for birth registration. It also foresees iv) a pilot project of cash transfers to women with disabilities to facilitate access to income-generation activities.

- ***In strategic axis 3*** on food security and nutrition: direct cash transfers, school feeding and cash for work are all identified as appropriate social assistance mechanisms to address food insecurity in the short term. Food transfers, prices subsidies, transfers of animal feed, and public works programmes are seen as appropriate humanitarian responses to transitory food insecurity. Social protection in the form of food or cash transfers are also identified as appropriate responses in the face of cyclical food insecurity during seasonal lean periods. Social protection in the form of more regular and predictable social transfers are also seen to have a potentially important role in the management of risks and the reinforcement of the resilience of households and communities, in the face of shocks.

This is indeed identified as a priority domain for action in the SNPS. Moreover, since climate change is a growing threat to livelihoods, the SNPS foresees pilot social protection projects aimed at reinforcing resilience to climate change and natural catastrophes in different livelihood zones. Other pilot projects foreseen in the strategy are a transfer of agro-pastoral inputs to poor and vulnerable households; and a cash transfer to poor households with small children, accompanied by a transfer of food supplements and nutritional education.

- ***In strategic axis 4***, on facilitating access to basic social services: the SNPS identifies a number of social transfers that should be considered as a means of supporting school access and retention. These include school lunches, take-home rations for girls, school fee reduction or exoneration for marginalized children, including children with disabilities; free distribution of school materials; and support for mothers' associations and host families of girls studying at secondary level outside of their home communities.

Box 1. Social protection to reinforce resilience: perspectives from the SNPS

Resilience can be defined as the capacity of individuals, households or communities to withstand a shock or a progress deterioration of living conditions and to respond, adapt, or even benefit from these changes. One can speak, for example, of the resilience – or lack of resilience – of communities in the face of repeated droughts. In a certain sense, resilience is the opposite of vulnerability. The more resilient a household is to a certain type of shock, the less likely it is to be negatively affected by this shock. Social protection, in its dimensions of protection and prevention, can greatly contribute to strengthening the resilience of populations and – in particular – the most vulnerable.

Source: SNPS 2014

3.1.3 The National Food Security Programme (PNSA 2014-21)

The PNSA (Phase II) aims to sustainably ensure and preserve the food security of all populations in Chad, particularly in the most disadvantaged urban and rural zones. It focuses on ensuring physical and economic access to food, including for the most vulnerable groups; improving conditions to guarantee stability in the supply of food stuffs; fostering balanced and healthy meals; and reinforcing mechanisms to prevent and manage food crises. It identifies four sub-programmes to i) develop water resources; ii) increase and diversify production; iii) reinforce mechanisms to prevent and manage food crises; and iv) strengthen overall coordination and management (République du Tchad, Coordination Nationale PNSA 2014).

The PNSA does not specifically mention cash transfers as a mechanism to enhance food security. In its review of current initiatives, it does note the importance of food-based interventions of actors such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the in-kind transfers of the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO); mentions humanitarian assistance efforts (although these are not detailed); identifies community cereal banks as a promising initiative; and notes on one occasion the importance of social safety nets, without specifically defining these. The PNSA calls for a close link between poverty reduction efforts and food security strategies and for an articulation within the latter of the different dimensions of prevention, management and mitigation of the impacts of crises. It counts on

supporting a system of microfinance to support income-generating actions for producer groups of women and young people. Its planned programme to reinforce mechanisms to prevent and manage crises includes a ‘support fund to persons in distress’ to allow them to realise economic activities.

3.1.4 The National Nutrition and Food Policy (PNNA 2014-25)

The PNNA is articulated along five strategic programme axes, including 1) nutrition and health; 2) nutrition and food security; 3) community nutrition; 4) nutrition in the educational system; and 5) reinforcement of the institutional framework for nutrition (République du Tchad 2013). Explicit links between social transfers and nutrition are most visible in three of these strategic areas.

- **Within food security:** food aid is identified as an important measure of response to the prevention and management of crises, but more ‘structural’ assistance is highlighted as a priority for vulnerable regions, particularly in the seasonal lean periods. Cash transfers per se are not identified in this policy area; however a number of priority strategies that are identified could lend themselves to either cash and/or food transfers as a modality, including, for example ‘*the protection, rehabilitation and reinforcement of livelihoods and food security of populations*’; ‘*the improvement of access by vulnerable households to essential food stuffs and basic social services*’; and ‘*the improvement and reinforcement of survival mechanisms of vulnerable populations*’.
- **Within community nutrition:** one of the strategies identified is the development and reinforcement of social protection structures and another is specifically the promotion of social safety nets in order to strengthen the purchasing power of the poorest households. The specific types of social safety nets that would be most appropriate, however, are not specified.
- **Within nutrition in education:** school feeding is promoted, but not cash transfers per se.

3.2 Cash transfer programmes, projects and partners

3.2.1 Review of cash transfer programmes and approaches

An extensive mapping by the World Bank of social safety nets in Chad as of 2014 provides the most current and comprehensive available information on cash transfer programmes and approaches in Chad (World Bank 2016).³ The mapping covered the scale and budget, objectives and coverage of safety nets overall (including both cash and in-kind transfers, fee waivers and subsidies) as well as the geographic scope, targeting mechanisms, transfer amounts, implementation and monitoring and evaluation procedures. Information for the mapping was drawn from a variety of sources, including the database of humanitarian projects maintained by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); the database for food security database for projects administered by the FAO as part of the Food Security Cluster; and questionnaires and interviews with key actors. This mapping served as a point of departure for the development of a national pilot social safety net programme, supported by the World Bank.

The overall assessment at the time was that the system of social safety nets in Chad has been primarily orientated towards humanitarian or emergency response, targeting in large part, households suffering from seasonal shocks linked to food insecurity. Interventions are heavily dependent on humanitarian development partner financing and non-governmental organisation (NGO) project implementation, though certain government structures may be involved in the start-up phase or planning/targeting, and some degree of local coordination or exchange may occur through ‘action committees’ that have been established at regional and departmental levels. With a few exceptions, most of the existing programmes are not used as mechanisms for poverty reduction or redistribution of resources, are not designed to promote ‘graduation’ of households out of poverty; and are only weakly integrated into other sectoral

³ The social safety net information for the World Bank study is based on the ‘Cartographie des filets sociaux au Tchad’ written by Elena Celada with the support of Rony Djekombe.

policies of the government (World Bank 2016). Key findings on the direct cash transfer elements of the mapping exercise are shown in the box below in relation to cash transfers linked to food insecurity.⁴

Box 2. Key findings from mapping of cash transfers linked to food insecurity in Chad

A focus on food insecurity during the ‘lean season’

Transfers of cash or near-cash (vouchers) are clustered primarily around food insecurity, and the majority of food insecurity response programmes were indeed cash and near cash transfers (cash: 29%; coupons 34% = 63% of beneficiaries of food insecurity responses). In 2014, for example, the budget for cash and vouchers provided by NGOs (Oxfam, CARE, Acted, World Vision, Action against Hunger, Catholic Relief Services, and Solidarity) as a response to food insecurity came to USD 20,750,743, financed by development partners such as the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO), US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and other humanitarian funds. These projects covered a total of 566,824 beneficiaries. Most of the programmes were short-term ‘emergency transfers provided to vulnerable households during the lean season (3-5 months/year).

A geographic focus on the Sahel

All identified programmes were located in the Sahelian regions of Chad which, according to national food security surveys are the most food insecure. Regions include Kanem, Lac, Bahr el Gazal, Batha, Guera, Sila, Hadjer lamis, Ouaddai, and Wadi Fira. The projects did not seek to address chronic household poverty, which could have justified the inclusion of regions in the South of the country.

A combination of targeting mechanisms

Most cash transfer programmes apply a combination of geographic targeting, based on analysis of agricultural data through the National Food Security Information and Early Warning System (SISAAP) that identifies cereal deficit areas and annual food security surveys conducted post-harvest survey, and the Household Economy Approach (HEA) which uses community rankings to determine household survival and livelihood deficits or some similar community based method (see box for more details on HEA).

Considerable variation in transfer amounts

Amounts are usually calculated according to the degree of survival or livelihood deficits assessed (through HEA) or through a food basket equivalence (common for WFP). The transfers provided in the different NGO-implemented programmes identified above vary between USD24 and US80 per household per month; with a duration ranging from 2 to 6 months (for average duration of 3.5 months), leading to an annual household amount from between USD 70 to USD 288 (for an average amount of USD 169 per household). Thus while monthly amounts may be generous, the short duration of the transfer means that the total amount is usually just enough to support household food consumption in critical times.

Choice between cash transfers or vouchers

This design choice is influenced by market conditions (with vouchers seen by some to minimize risks of inflation or stock shortages); security considerations (vouchers run fewer security risks in delivery); and programme philosophy (a compromise between ideals of consumer choice and programme concerns with food security).

Modality of transfers

Because of limited banking structures in the largely rural areas where cash transfer programmes are implemented, partnerships with the two leading telephone companies – Airtel and Tigo – are often contracted, or other delivery means adopted. In voucher systems, merchants are pre-selected for later exchange of vouchers for food.

Weak registration system for beneficiaries

Because of the short-term nature of most cash transfers, detailed computerized beneficiary records maintained from one year to the next are not normally maintained. It is therefore difficult to track households that may be receiving benefits over time.

Conditional or unconditional transfers

With the exception of the cash-for-work programmes, most cash transfers are unconditional, though they may be accompanied by training and awareness-raising sessions on, for example, family nutrition practices. The CARE FACER (*Femmes, adaptation au changement climatique, eau et resilience*) project which is the focus of our

⁴ Other food security initiatives include price subsidies, food distributions and food/cash for work; for more details on the latter, please see our parallel report on public works programmes in Chad.

review is highlighted as one initiative that offers women beneficiaries transfers conditional on participation in training sessions and functional literacy classes.

Monitoring and evaluation.

Post-distribution monitoring is normally conducted after transfers, to assess in particular whether the process is working and if the programme has been effective. There were no examples of randomized control impact assessments identified, but once again, CARE was singled out for its pre and post-survey evaluation in 2014. The NGO Action against Hunger also conducted a detailed socio-anthropological study of cash transfers in the Kanem; and Oxfam's cash transfer programmes were also subject to an external evaluation (see details below).

Source: World Bank 2016, based on findings from Elena Celada's Cartography

Aside from the food security programmes, the only other examples of direct cash transfers identified in the World Bank's mapping exercise were small initiatives providing support to particularly vulnerable groups (orphans, widows), though information on these is fragmented. Among safety nets in other domains, those designed as direct responses to nutritional needs are most often provided in the form of transfers of nutritional supplements to women and children, sometimes linked to the above-outlined food security programmes. Safety nets designed to support education are mostly in-kind, through school feeding programmes/take-home rations in the Sahel, and fee waivers with free distribution of school supplies in selected zones – each targeting girls. Measures to support access to health care are linked to national policies of free health care in selected situations/target populations. And a variety of labour intensive public works approaches are linked primarily to rural infrastructure development programmes (World Bank 2016).⁵

A number of recent evaluations shed further light on specific cash transfers programmes in Chad, with summaries of key findings in the box below.

Box 3. Results of recent evaluations of cash transfers in the Chadian Sahel

An evaluation of the *socio-anthropological impacts of unconditional emergency cash transfers implemented by ACF in the Kanem region* in 2014 found that the project had limited impact on social relations in the community – primarily because of the limited value of the transfers, although it did seem to have stimulated community solidarity mechanisms through partial redistribution of benefits through clan structures. The project also had very limited impact on the local economy, since the majority of funds were spent in markets outside of the region. While the transfer was effective in 50% of monthly food needs of 8,000 households, it was found to have a negative impact on community resilience, as households developed a certain passivity as they waited for the regular benefits to be provided. Among the conclusions of the study: *'The utilisation of unconditional cash transfers – an emergency instrument adapted to economically productive zones – is not, in the context of chronic crisis in a geographic zone with a 'bloodless' and non-productive economy –appropriate in the medium to long term... It is a palliative strategy but in no way an approach that permits the reinforcement of productive capacities and food security.'* (Meunier 2014)

An external evaluation was conducted in 2014 of *ACF's food security initiatives for vulnerable pastoral populations in the Bahr-el-Gazal region*, a multi-faceted programme that aims to sustainably reinforce the livelihoods of beneficiary households (protecting purchasing power and animal capital during successive lean seasons). Among its broader development activities (support for construction of cereal banks and animal feed banks, rehabilitation of wells, chicken vaccination campaigns, distribution of small ruminants and income-generation activities) it distributes small ruminants to a subset of 100 vulnerable women (though targeting criteria are not clear) who are members of the income-generation groups or engaged in private activities and provides unconditional cash transfers (15,000 FCFA per month over three months = 45,000 FCFA per woman) in order to permit them to obtain food during the lean season and maintain the animal capital provided by the project. According to ACF's post-distribution monitoring, the beneficiaries used the money exclusively for the wellbeing of their families and in particular for the food needs of their children; the small ruminant distribution was, however, less successful as there was high mortality among the animals (Zlatan 2014).

An evaluation of the *socio-economic impact of Oxfam's cash transfer programmes in 3 regions of Chad* (Guéra, Bahr el Gazal; and Sila) looked at projects implemented between 2012 and 2014. The programmes were designed,

⁵ See also our parallel report (Watson, Devereux and Nan-guer 2016) for a more complete review of cash-for-work public works programmes.

for the most part, to combine seasonal cash transfers (as well as ‘blanket feeding’ at certain points) provided as a ‘emergency’ intervention to support survival during the lean season with longer term development support for livelihoods in villages of concentration (gardening, cereal banks, veterinary stores, aviculture, distribution of small ruminants...) as well as some attempt to link training and awareness-raising around nutrition. However, the interventions were not always in the same communities and not all the households benefited from each. Moreover, the annual nature of the ‘emergency’ cash transfers (in some areas since 2011) was seen to militate against the build-up of resilience and to promote, instead, the development of what some authorities saw as a dependency syndrome. The situation was complicated at times by the presence of multiple humanitarian actors operating in some of the same zones. Targeting of beneficiary households on the basis of HEA was seen to have effectively identified the poor and the very poor; nevertheless, there was a considerable redistribution to the better off households who did not always agree with such selectivity.

Overall, the cash transfers in Oxfam’s programmes were seen to have positive effects on beneficiary households, enabling them to i) cover their food needs and improve the quality of meals during critical periods; ii) continue their agricultural work; and iii) avoid negative coping strategies such as destocking and contraction of usurious debts. However, they also had many limitations: i) the amounts were judged to be insufficient to enable vulnerable households to go beyond survival to strengthen or diversify livelihoods; ii) transfers sometimes arrived too late for maximum effectiveness; iii) a lack of follow-up of accompanying activities (for example nutritional training and information sessions) meant that important positive synergies were missed; and vi) in some areas (for example in BeG) interventions were too dispersed to produce visible effects. While an Oxfam study in Guéra suggested that a quarter of the households supported were effectively able to move out of the ranks of the poorest; the evaluators found less evidence of this, particularly among households who only received emergency cash assistance, without other project support and a tendency for even those who had managed to move up within their wealth categories had a tendency to fall back the next year. A key finding is that *‘Investigations have not found a situation where emergency assistance alone has permitted households to protect or reinforce their livelihoods.’* One of the overall recommendations is therefore that stronger linkages between cash transfers and support for household investment strategies be established (Belemvire 2015).

3.2.2 Partnership initiatives and tools

Within the wider global network of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) which was established to promote and strengthen the use of cash transfers, a Cash and Voucher Working Group was initiated in Chad in 2013 as a sub-group of the Food Security Cluster. It is chaired by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Oxfam. Its overall aim is to serve as a forum for exchange between humanitarian and development actors around the use and implementation of cash transfer programmes in order to improve their effectiveness. Its TORs explain that key areas of interest include not only food security, but livelihoods more broadly as well as social safety nets. Specific objectives include promoting the use of cash transfers; coordinating approaches; synthesizing and sharing information on tools developed for, and lessons learned from, cash transfer initiatives, and identifying areas for collaboration, whilst promoting synergies between humanitarian and development actors in order to optimize interventions in favour of vulnerable groups, touching in particular, on multi-sectoral reinforcement of the resilience of such groups.⁶

Among the common tools used by many of the NGO partners implementing cash transfers in Chad, the Household Economy Approach (HEA) has been developed and promoted as a tool for targeting (see box) with a number of training exercises conducted to reinforce expertise. While this, for the moment, has been mostly the domain of NGO implementers, the Cash and Voucher working group is making significant efforts to engage government technicians in these training exercises. The government focal point for HEA sits within the national SISAAP apparatus and is a strong proponent of the method which he notes is currently used primarily for emergency situations but is actually *‘an effective tool for development’* particularly as it allows a diagnostic of potential livelihood diversification opportunities. Representatives from ECHO who provide significant support for the use of this methodology in the NGO-implemented relief efforts they fund recognize the importance of the HEA targeting apparatus, but also point out that communities in any case often share the benefits out among themselves, so it is

⁶ ‘Termes de référence du groupe de travail Cash et voucher Tchad’, <http://www.cashlearning.org/groupe-de-coordination-et-de-travail-techniques-en-afrique-de-l-ouest/tchad>

important to understand community attitudes. Other key actors suggest that the HEA is a relatively complex tool for use in targeting (Watson et al. 2015b).

Box 4. Targeting based on the Household Economy Approach (HEA) in Chad

The Household Economy Approach (HEA) is based on an analysis of the means of existence of households. It helps determine the food needs and other non-food needs of the population, understand the repercussions to economic or environmental changes on livelihoods and establish which are the most appropriate ways to deliver assistance be it short-term emergency assistance or development programs or policy changes for the long term. Efforts are organized around two main steps:

- A reference base updated every 5-6 years that analyses household livelihoods over an “average/normal year” (no major crises). This first phase allows to identify the geographic coverage of a “livelihood zone” or zone where populations share overall livelihood characteristics, ii) classify households by socioeconomic category (VP, P, M, A). Determinant characteristics of a given socioeconomic group are established during discussions with key local informants. This exercise is conducted randomly across several villages (10-12) in the livelihood zone; iii) identify each socioeconomic category’s household subsistence strategies or create an overview of “typical” household economies.
- Result analysis that is updated every six months (according to need and/or available funds). This analysis leads to a better understanding of how external factors (negative shocks or positive factors) affect household economy, and their capacity to: (i) Meet their basic survival needs (survival threshold) and (ii) Protect their basic livelihoods (livelihood protection threshold). The analysis takes into consideration the coping strategies mentioned in the reference survey. Households facing survival and/or livelihood deficits are counted, their depth of deficit is established and the appropriate responses are then planned. The analysis is based on secondary data usually collected by actors who are in the field as part of the follow-up measures on the agriculture campaign (production, local market prices, etc.).

Currently 13 profiles have been conducted in Chad, in seven livelihood zones. For the most part, these zones are in the Sahelian band, with 10 profiles conducted in pastoral, agro-pastoral or fishing zones in proximity to lakes. The Southern zone is covered by three profiles that include livelihood based on rainy-season cereal crops, market gardens crops, subsistence crops and income-generating crops (Southern Guéra, Ouaddai and Mandoul/Logon Occidental). Two profiles are also being conducted in refugee camps: one in Maro (South) and another in Goz Amir (East).

Source: Table 16 in World Bank (2015)

3.2.3 Reservations about cash transfers in some zones

Cash transfers to date have not been a feature of relief and development initiatives in the southern part of Chad except in and around refugee camps where social safety nets may target both refugees and host populations. In other parts of the south, the modality of assistance is more commonly through classic community development –type interventions (see World Bank 2016 and Watson et al. 2015a). There seems to be, in addition, a certain reticence on the part of local development actors in the south to the use of cash transfers as a response to chronic poverty (as opposed to a temporary relief mechanism). These were revealed through recent field investigations around poverty, vulnerability and social protection mechanisms in the southern region of Logone Occidental:⁷ *‘If it is used as an emergency measure’* said a key informant there, *‘there’s no problem, but over the long term, it will not help’* (Watson et al. 2015a).

Some local development actors in the region feel that cash could be a complementary measure, but the main thrust of development efforts should be on *‘changing mentalities’* and *‘human capital development’*, through training programmes – otherwise *‘Cash will never succeed.’* Others suggest that cash transfers could be used, but caution that strong organizational, management and follow-up mechanisms would first need to be established and put in place by credible NGOs: *‘Otherwise, peasants will squander it.’* Some actors would be in favour of cash transfers if they targeted the most vulnerable groups or individuals, mentioning, among others, categories such as orphans and vulnerable children, people with disabilities, older persons, and women – particularly widows. Still others mention more

⁷ Field work was conducted as part of the World Bank’s analytical work on social protection.

broadly ‘*people with limited livelihood capacity*’ and those who are ‘*marginalized.*’ For such efforts to succeed, development actors agree on the importance of correct and transparent targeting in association with communities. Other actors in the region voiced stronger misgivings about cash transfers as a mechanism for assistance. The following table captures some of their views.

Table 1. Reticence towards cash transfers in Logone Occidental (southern Chad)

Principal fears	Perceptions of local governmental and non-governmental development actors
Creation of dependency and welfare mentality	<p><i>‘This would create a situation of total dependence, which would multiply problems that will be difficult to manage if the actions are short-term.’</i></p> <p><i>‘We must stop giving out for free – such a policy leads nowhere. We must also be on guard against handouts.’</i></p> <p><i>‘We must avoid falling into the errors of the NGOs...Such models of have buried efforts by the population.’</i></p> <p><i>‘Cash would create an eternal dependency, stifle initiative, cause people to no longer help themselves. It would also create jealousy and division. Already, microfinance initiatives are experiencing difficulties – cash transfers would be even more difficult.’</i></p>
Destruction of community spirit/social cohesion	<p><i>‘A programme should stimulate a collective consciousness. Cash transfers would be very bad in this region because they would de-structure the whole system.’</i></p> <p><i>‘The risk is that there would be conflict in the community – people would kill each other.’</i></p> <p><i>‘Risks are high for this kind of transfer – jealousy, lack of understanding, and social division in the community.’</i></p> <p><i>‘That is likely to foster social division and individualism would take over.’</i></p>
Poor use by beneficiaries	<p><i>‘Peasants are not prepared for these kinds of instruments. They are going to spend it on alcohol and buy additional wives... In short, cash transfers would delay development.’</i></p> <p><i>‘The problem of management arises – beneficiaries will spend it quickly. It would be better to give it to them in the form of credit. We should always strive to avoid giving for free – if not, things just won’t work.’</i></p> <p><i>‘Cash transfers are a bad thing – they make people lazy and will not succeed here in Logone Occidental. Give me all at once a million and you will see that between now and this evening I will have spent it all because I have made no effort to earn it, while what I have earned from my own effort I guard preciously at the bottom of my pocket.’</i></p>
Unsustainability	<p><i>‘This type of assistance has a high risk – if actions are not supported over the longer term, these people dependent on the cash transfers would plunge into an even more acute poverty.’</i></p> <p><i>‘Cash transfers pose first of all a problem of sustainability – we are going to give cash until when?’</i></p>
Negative effects on market prices	<p><i>‘It risks creating massive speculation around food stuffs which are by nature limited.’</i></p>
Worsening effects of poverty	<p><i>‘Cash transfers would be a catastrophe in this zone – they would make the situation even worse.’</i></p> <p><i>‘Cash transfers as an instrument would rather create problems than solve the problem of poverty in this zone.’</i></p>

Source: Watson et al. (2015a)

While some of these views may suggest stereotyped preconceptions of the ‘dangers’ of ‘cash handouts’ and in particular fears of ‘dependency’ that have not been borne out in a multitude of global experiences with such programmes, it is important to bear these in mind in any future efforts to promote a cash transfers more generally within Chad as part of the overall system of social protection.

3.3 Emerging coalescence of thinking around cash transfers and resilience

3.3.1 National stakeholder perspectives

Interviews with a variety of development actors in N’Djamena (Watson et al. 2015b) reveal a rising focus on the concept of ‘resilience’; a strong concern for making the links between ‘emergency’ and ‘development’ interventions; and a growing interest in the design of cash transfers that can respond to both the immediate ‘survival’ and longer term ‘development’ needs of households – what is couched in HEA terms as ‘survival’ and ‘livelihood’ thresholds’.

An official in the Ministry of Planning, for example, spoke of the need for interventions in the SNPS to achieve a balance between humanitarian and development actions: *‘Yes for saving lives with immediate actions – but these must be integrated into longer-term interventions, with a suggested 15% for humanitarian assistance and 75% for development’*. The technical advisor to the Ministry of Social Action⁸ notes that cash transfers linked to food security and nutrition are already identified as appropriate mechanisms within the SNPS and adds that the link with resilience is also important. The HEA focal point and nutritional expert within the Food Security and Early Warning Information System (SISAAP) stresses as well that in relation to cash transfers, *‘Long-term support is needed. Saving lives is urgent, but if it is simply a matter of giving something and leaving, that is not logical. We must follow up with something sustainable – if not, we create more problems. We must always go beyond the two thresholds of HEA: survival and protection of the means of existence.’*

Some government actors, including an official within the Ministry of Agriculture most closely associated with the food security apparatus – Action Committee for Food Security and Management of Crises (CASAGC) fully embrace the resilience agenda and assert that *‘Those who are engaged in short-term emergency actions should integrate concern for resilience with longer-term actions. They should respond to immediate needs while at the same time proposing longer-term actions so that a more effective impact is achieved.’* All forms of transfers (cash, food, agricultural and pastoral inputs) may be effective responses, but according to our interlocutor, conditional cash transfers of the type ‘cash-for-work’ which can contribute to the resilience of an agricultural system may be preferable to unconditional cash transfers which risk creating dependence.

Some development actors locate the main constraints in moving towards a ‘resilience’ agenda, in the different funding streams available for humanitarian assistance, on the one hand, and development support on the other. The World Food Programme, for example, is attempting to move towards a resilience approach in their country programme, through cash or vouchers for assets and have developed a participatory methodology through which appropriate seasonal livelihood support activities can be identified for such programmes; funding, however, is not fully available for such programmes, as donors prioritise humanitarian relief efforts. As one WFP technician put it, *‘The problem with resilience is that it takes at least three years to obtain results, but the funding we receive is for short term activities.’*

NGO development actors directly involved in the implementation of cash transfers also evoke the problem of funding. In Oxfam, for example, *‘Reflections around the question of resilience are underway. We want to evolve through our cash transfer programmes towards more sustainable interventions and we are seeking to elaborate projects in this manner and to reflect on our geographic zones of concentration. A principal worry however is around funding, as donors prioritise emergencies to the detriment of development.’* In targeting – through HEA – the most vulnerable (very poor or poor) for immediate support in times of crisis, organisations like Oxfam realize that, *‘We are not reaching those households at level two which are a bit better off but still very fragile and who often therefore fall (into poverty) through lack of support.’*

Some donors contend that humanitarian NGOs themselves find it difficult to *‘move out of emergency approaches’* due to the instability of staff or lack of experience. Other development partners affirm that it is the context in Chad itself that paves the way towards a focus on (and greater availability of funding

⁸ Recently renamed the Ministry of Women, Early Childhood and National Solidarity.

for) emergency responses over longer-term development, as the country finds itself prey to continual crises of all sorts – climatic, socio-political or other.

Key informants at both ECHO and the EU agree that the theme of social transfers linked to resilience is very pertinent, and point out that the 11th European Development Fund Programme (11th EDF) 2016-2020 seeks to link emergency projects with longer-term food security and nutrition projects that aim at reinforcing resilience. Some two thirds of the funds in the 11th EDF are allocated for activities in the domains of food security, health, nutrition and water and sanitation and the EU foresees engaging an expert to work on food security and productive transfers. A key focus will remain on the Sahel which, *'after years of aid and multiple projects and programmes, remains in chronic vulnerability.'* They are hoping in this programme cycle to establish linkages between investments and impacts, particularly on food security and nutrition, through a whole group of activities concentrated in selected regions, including a focus on public works to build and maintain rural infrastructure. They agree that *'we must put in place a regular, predictable, and long-term system'* and suggest that mechanisms such as cash transfers linked to resilience and public works should be situated within local community development structures and approaches, which have already been tested through such EU programmes as PADL (Local development support programme). They also suggest that *'The concept of resilience be inscribed within SISAAP [the food security and early warning statistical system].'*

Within this overall effort, however, interlocutors from ECHO affirm that ECHO's own mandate remains humanitarian assistance – that is 'social assistance', while longer-term 'social protection' is seen to be more the mandate of the EU and World Bank. NGOs should have a long-term guarantee of financing before they launch into development programmes. While ECHO also wants to avoid the *'stop and go'* effect of limited duration funding, it must maintain its mandate and reserve its funds for humanitarian crises, since such funds are limited. They understand that emergency cash transfers cannot normally enable a household to move out of the poverty or survival threshold and recapitalize livelihoods; however, they point out that resilience refers not just to household resilience, but also to the resilience of individuals to withstand shocks and that by accentuating links with nutrition actions (which they are supporting in their programmes) emergency cash transfers can indeed contribute to individual resilience. They also note that food is preferred over cash by some beneficiaries, so programme design should not automatically assume a preferred modality. And a further important point is the need to anchor such assistance mechanisms more firmly within government: *'A donor like ECHO is investing a lot in partner NGOs, but why not also in government structures to reinforce their capacity?'* For this, there is a need to overcome what is perceived as *'mutual suspicion'* between humanitarian actors and the state so that, among other things, they can better work together on the ground to link emergency interventions to development.

Development actors such as FAO are also reflecting on social protection and social transfers linked to resilience, though according to one technician, in their case, the transfer modality is mostly food for work/asset creation (in partnership with WFP) or other transfers in kind (agricultural inputs such as seeds, tools, or sometimes small ruminants), and less frequently (again in collaboration with WFP) in cash or vouchers. They have programmes of two-year duration to support livelihoods through diversification of the sources of food and revenue based on grain cultivation, gardening, and small animal production.

An FAO programme in the Kanem region used the modality of food- and cash-for-work to protect arable lands from encroachment of sands. They are also in the process of developing an integrated programme or approach to *'caisses de resilience au Tchad'* which would consist of i) support for diversification in agricultural production; ii) community capacity development around nutrition and food security; iii) financial assistance in the form of cash transfers to permit households to both meet immediate needs and contribute to local funds to access credit. They advocate strongly for resilience to be integrated into emergency responses/humanitarian interventions, but feel that humanitarian actors themselves remain *'at the level of good intentions'* even though a letter has been circulated to partners in the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) stressing the importance of such integration. They also comment that for the moment, the government's role in critical food security strategies and planning and response remains rather limited: FAO and WFP coordinate the Food Security Cluster, and

OCHA coordinates emergency food security responses: it is primarily through the mechanisms of CAGC and SISAAP that state actors intervene so these should be reinforced.

3.3.2 Country resilience priorities

As part of the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR), participating countries have developed cross-cutting ‘priorities for resilience’ aimed at galvanizing programme actions and investments to address hunger in its guise of food and nutritional insecurity across multiple sectors and multiple partnerships.⁹ The strategic objectives of AGIR are to i) improve social protection for the most vulnerable households & communities in order to secure their livelihoods; ii) strengthen the nutrition of vulnerable households; iii) sustainably improve agricultural and food production, the incomes of vulnerable households and their access to food; and iv) strengthen governance in food and nutritional security.

In Chad, building on the National Investment Plan for the Rural Sector (PNISR) and the National Food Security Programme (PNSA), and taking into account both the SNPS and the national nutrition strategy, the provisional document of the Country Resilience Priorities (PRP) aims to focus resources on the most vulnerable, create a bridge between humanitarian aid and development, and address the structural causes of vulnerability and food and nutritional insecurity (République du Tchad 2015a and 2015b). Priority geographic zones include the Sahelian regions of Kanem, Barh el Gazal, Batha Guéra and Hadjer Lamis, though other regions may also be included and victims of conflicts, floods and other isolated shocks will also be covered.

Social protection is recognized as the first pillar of the country priorities document, with a stated focus on the promotion of proven instruments to address food and nutritional insecurity and the reinforcement of livelihoods. Actions foreseen include support for social safety nets for 753,000 households (4.1 million people) in the priority zones of chronic vulnerability, of whom 430,000 are pupils who will benefit from school meals and 25,000 households in other zones affected by isolated shocks such as flooding or other local disasters (with some 137,500 people) or conflict (750,000 people). In a first set of intervention, 1) different sorts of social transfers are to be promoted for vulnerable households, all with the aim of lifting households out of mere survival to permit them to reinforce and protect their means of livelihood. It is envisioned that such transfers be accompanied by specific interventions to reduce nutritional insecurity (including distribution of supplements to children under 2 and pregnant or lactating women) as well as with more ‘structural’ interventions to sustainably reinforce the functioning of markets. Other measures include reinforcement of cereal banks, animal feed banks and community ‘stocks de proximité’; implementation of a system of strategic reserves; and development of a system of food grain credits (warrantage).

Beyond the above activities, which are described specifically as social safety nets, priorities under the social protection pillar include, 2) those aimed at promoting and protecting the livelihoods of vulnerable groups, including the unconditional distribution of agricultural and pastoral inputs, small ruminants, chickens, and the rehabilitation of agricultural lands and irrigation; support for income-generation activities; development of risk management and response mechanisms such as agricultural or animal insurance. And, in a third set of interventions within the social protection pillar, 3) mechanisms designed to improve access to basic social services, which include school canteens, elimination or derogation of school fees for vulnerable categories; and maintenance of the existing policy of free health provision for designated groups.

Priority target groups for the social protection pillar include poor agricultural, agro-pastoral, pastoral or fishing households; children under five suffering from malnutrition; pregnant and lactating women; older people, people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, household victims of catastrophes or crises,

⁹ AGIR (Global Alliance for Resilience) was initiated in 2012 with the participation of African state members of CEDAO/ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); UEMOA/WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union); and CILSS (Permanent interstate committee for drought control in the Sahel), with support by the Sahel and West African Club of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development).

the vulnerable, the unemployed, and students living in chronically vulnerable zones or within mobile populations.

3.3.3 Examples of cash transfers linked to resilience

While the short-term, seasonal emergency-type response predominates in cash transfer programming in Chad, the World Bank mapping exercise identified some programmes aimed at more ‘structural responses and resilience. These included a number of initiatives launched as part of the Thematic Food Security Plan (*Plan Thématique de Sécurité Alimentaire*), financed by the EU with the common objective of improving household crop yields and reinforcing household resilience to future shocks. Social safety net components were identified in the interventions put forth by three of the programme’s eleven partner NGOs working in the Sahel.

- A project implemented by Solidarité in the western part of the Batha region provides cash transfers to extremely poor households during the lean season and offers support for a number of activities to increase community resilience (financing for its risk management plan, and increasing local production capacities).
- An SOS Sahel project finances agricultural production development activities around oases located in the Kanem region. A 2015 cash-for-work program for women from poor and very poor households is in the planning phase; its objective is to protect the sand dunes surrounding the oases.
- And finally, the project implemented by CARE in the eastern region of Wadi Fira entitled Women Coping with Climate Change, Water and Resilience (*Femmes, Adaptation au Changement Climatique, Eau et Résilience*) aims specifically to offer support to vulnerable agro-pastoral and pastoral communities suffering from chronic food insecurity and malnutrition, so they may become more resilient to short- and mid-term shocks and improve food security and nutrition in a sustainable manner. The project includes cash-for-food and cash-for-training work programmes in aid of poorer households and to help reinforce their capacities (World Bank 2016).

3.4 Lessons learned and conclusions

Cash transfers are being implemented in Chad and are recognised as an important policy instrument, especially as a social safety net, mainly in response to food insecurity, either cyclical (seasonal hunger) or acute (food crises). However, most cash transfer programmes to date have been small-scale, ad hoc, temporary, and are usually implemented by NGOs with financial and technical support from donor agencies. The Government of Chad has played only a marginal role in planning, designing, financing or implementing these programmes.

Much of the discourse around cash transfers in Chad has focused on the complex links between relief and development, and whether cash transfers have a role to play in terms of strengthening household and community resilience against climate shocks and livelihood stresses. As discussed in chapter 2, there are potential lessons to learn from experiences with ‘scalable’ safety net programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya, where cash transfer beneficiaries and payment amounts are scaled up to provide increased support in bad years.

The National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) identifies broader potential roles for cash transfers than a hunger safety net, including the social welfare function: specifically, social assistance for orphans and vulnerable children, people with disabilities, and older people (social pension). This is clearly a crucial emerging role for cash transfers, as Chad starts to develop a comprehensive social protection system. However, there is some resistance to the delivery of regular cash transfers to poor and vulnerable people in non-emergency contexts, such as chronic poverty. These negative perceptions reflect the belief that cash transfers create dependency and passivity among recipients, and undermine social cohesion. These perceptions might be based on prejudice, but some impact evaluations in Chad provide supporting evidence, which suggests that these cash transfer programmes were poorly designed and implemented.

Evidence from other countries confirms that ‘dependency syndrome’ is exaggerated – cash transfers do not cause people to reduce their work effort and become lazy, and cash transfers are not wasted on ‘temptation goods’ such as alcohol and tobacco, except in a minority of cases (Banerjee et al. 2015b). On the contrary, cash transfers can reduce dependency, by alleviating income constraints and enabling investment through income-earning activities or looking for work. At the community level, cash transfers to the poorest alleviate the burden on community members for supporting their poorer dependent neighbours, and this can be positive for social cohesion (Devereux 2010a).

The risk of ‘dependency syndrome’ can be avoided by designing cash transfer programmes carefully, for instance by using community-based targeting so that communities validate the selection of needy beneficiaries, or making cash transfers conditional on work (cash-for-work, or labour-intensive public works) or on behavioural changes (conditional cash transfers).

4. Case study of CARE's interventions in Wadi Fira

The choice of CARE's interventions in the region of Wadi Fira, as examples of a case study ('projet témoin') meriting further exploration, was guided in the first instance by the social safety net mapping exercise which had highlighted the approach as one of the few social transfer programmes that is moving beyond short-term emergency relief, towards a more structural response to strengthening livelihoods and resilience. Key informants among CARE's donors confirmed the aptness of the choice. According to a representative from ECHO, which funds CARE's unconditional seasonal cash transfers as a humanitarian assistance intervention, *'The choice of CARE is good – it is a rather exemplary case of support and follow-up for a certain number of households over time. Among all the NGOs, they have gone the farthest towards integration [of relief and development].'* A representative of the EU, which funds the more development-oriented transfers conditional on work linked to the FACER project notes that *'It is an ensemble of several projects which aims at the transition between relief and development, seeking stronger working ties between ECHO and the EU.'*

It should be noted at the outset, however, that the FACER project is just now getting underway and only some of the planned activities have been initiated. The focus of the analysis is therefore on the challenges involved in linking 'relief' and 'development' initiatives through parallel programmes designed to respond to both survival and livelihoods deficits; the role and design of cash transfers therein; and key issues for consideration in moving forward. The following sections set out the context of Wadi Fira (4.1); provide an overview of CARE's interventions in the region based on a review of available documentation and key informant interviews (4.2); present the main findings from field research conducted around CARE's programmes in Wadi Fira (4.3); and sets out key issues for consideration in moving forward (4.4).

4.1 Context of Wadi Fira


4.1.1 Administrative structure and ecological zones

Wadi Fira is a region located in the far-eastern Sahelian zone of Chad, bordering Darfur in Sudan to the east. It is made up of three departments: Biltine (with the capital city Biltine); Dar Tama (capital city Guereda); and Kobi (capital city Iriba). These departments are further sub-divided into ten administrative sub-prefectures, three sultanats and 53 cantons (Soumana 2012). The population (estimated at 508,383 in 2009, according to RGPH figures of 2009) is sparsely settled (at an average of 5 inhabitants per km² over an area of 51,900 km²) (WFP 2014). Major population groups include the Zaghawa, Arabs, and Goranes, primarily transhumant herders living in the northern part of the region; and Maba, Aboucharab and Mimi, agro-pastoral groups living in the southern part. Historically, the entire zone was a tributary of the Kanem empire (Soumana 2012).

The region is composed of three ecological zones: sand and grassy plains in the west where pastoralism is organized around deep wells (from 80-100 metres); a mountainous area in the centre; and numerous *wadis* (seasonal river courses) flowing from the heights towards Sudan in the east (Guibert and Kakiang 2011). It also spans two livelihood zones, as defined by FEWS NET: transhumance in the north, and agro-pastoralism with cereal production and gardening in the south (WFP 2014).

Pastoralism is by far the economic and social pivot of the livelihood zone as a whole, taking sedentary, semi-sedentary and transhumant forms. In the transhumant form, occasionally only some members of the household migrate to distant dry-season pastures, leaving the rest of the household behind on the homestead with a few milking animals for subsistence (FEWS NET 2011). Agriculture is, for the most part, dependent on the rains (for cultivation primarily of millet, but also sorghum, cowpeas, groundnuts and sesame); gardening activities (tomatoes, gombo, peppers and watermelon) have been introduced more recently around the *wadis* and in low-lying ponds to the south and east. Foraging for wild plants and fruits is also a feature of household food economies. Social infrastructure and services are weakly developed in the region (Guibert and Kakiang 2011; FEWS NET 2011).

Figure 1. Wadi Fira geographic position and livelihood zones



Source : Fewsnet (2011) Tchad - Zone de moyens d'existence. Disponible sur : www.fews.net/fr/west-africa/chad/livelihood-zone-map/tue-2011-08-30

Source: WFP (2014) Reproduced with kind permission from FewsNet

4.1.2 Livelihoods at risk

According to FEWS NET, wealth group breakdowns for the two livelihood zones (which extend beyond the borders of Wadi Fira) categorize households as very poor, poor, middle or better off, according to land and livestock holdings. In the agro-pastoral and rain-fed agriculture/market gardening zone, the poor and very poor make up 32% of the population, while in the transhumant livestock zone, they make up 39%. In both zones, the poor are highly dependent on the market and in-kind payment for labour for their staples (FEWS NET 2011).

Wadi Fira has been significantly affected by social conflicts along the border with Sudan, which over the years (since 2003) have traumatized the population, causing death and destruction and massive inflows of refugees. To this has been added insecurity and internal displacement due to the rebellion in the region between 2006-9 and conflicts between herders and farmers which have been intensifying - due primarily to population growth, expansion of farmlands, and degradation of pastures. Other recurrent shocks include drought and inadequate, late, or poorly distributed rains; epidemics (such as measles); animal diseases and crop infestations by birds and grasshoppers (WFP 2014 and FEWS NET 2011). Seasonal calendars for the two livelihood zones show that the lean season months are also those with the greatest potential for shocks and hazards.

A more recent HEA profile of the agro-pastoral zone of Biltine (Soumana 2012), constructed specifically as a baseline for CARE's programme interventions, found that 80% of the population was engaged in agriculture – particularly of rain-fed millet and niébé, with sorghum produced in the low-lying areas and gardening in the *wadis* for the production of onions, garlic, tomatoes and gombo. But because of limited and irregular rainfall, frequent destruction of crops by predators, and soil

degradation, there has been massive outmigration (both temporary and permanent) of populations in search of non-farm activities around urban centres. The herding activities of the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups have also been affected by diminishing resources – particularly water and pasturages, with conditions of scarcity provoking frequent conflicts.

Household wealth-ranking analysis shows a higher degree of poverty than in the earlier FEWS NET exercise for the livelihood zone as a whole, with nearly two thirds (63%) of households in Biltine categorized as either ‘very poor’ or ‘poor’, living on an estimated annual income of between 316,170 and 398,860 FCFA, and able to cover only 3-4 months of their food needs, with food accounting for between 32% and 38% of household expenditures.

‘In Biltine as in the region as a whole, successive droughts caused by climatic variations have resulted in scarce pastures leading to the death of many animals and a fall in crop productivity. This situation has provoked a pauperisation of the majority of the population, reinforcing even more their vulnerability to shocks.’ (Soumana 2012)

A participatory community exercise led by World Food Programme found that major shocks were experienced in the region in five out of the past ten years – more than in the previous decade and graphically depicted the effect of shocks on household well-being according to the degree of vulnerability of different household categories (WFP 2014). Coping strategies adopted in the face of recurrent shocks can often contribute to the erosion of livelihoods and diminished well-being, particularly for already vulnerable households, and include such measures as increasing out-migration, contracting loans for purchase of cereals, cutting down on food, and slashing expenditures on communication or transport (Soumana 2012).

4.1.3 Chronic food and nutritional insecurity

As a cumulative result of the above, much of population in the region is affected by chronic food and nutritional insecurity. According to recent assessments (ENSA 2013 and Cadre harmonisé 2014) Wadi Fira has been classified among the regions with the highest level of food insecurity, with nearly two thirds of the population (61%) classified as food insecure. Global acute malnutrition is critical at 14% - higher than the average of 13.6% for the Sahel overall, with 1.8% of that severe, according to UNICEF. Chronic malnutrition is even more widespread, affecting nearly a third (32.3%) of children under five, of whom 8.7% are severe cases (CARE France 2014a and b).

Principal causes of malnutrition in the region include:

- Precariousness of agro-pastoral production systems due to poor rainfall and lack of irrigation for counter-season production;
- Poor purchasing power of the population, with an average monthly revenue of 10,760.8 FCFA per capita (around one US dollar/per day/per person) for an average household of 7;
- Recurrent climatic and environmental shocks which oblige the poorest households to adopt negative coping strategies (destocking, long-term migration, deforestation) thus threatening the sustainability of livelihoods;
- Population growth exerting pressure on resources, particularly land, the environment, and scarce social and economic services (CARE France 2014a and b).

The poorest households are the most vulnerable to food insecurity during the lean period, from June to October, during which the previous season’s harvest has been exhausted and the current crops are not yet in. This is the time during which they depend on the market for both food and non-food needs and are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices. With recurring food crises, it has become practically impossible for the poorest households – who possess only 2-5 animals according to HEA results, to ensure the viability of their herds without considerable assistance (CARE France 2014a and b).

4.1.4 Women particularly vulnerable

Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable due to their limited revenues and control over decision-making within the community; transhumance patterns (men moving with herds to dry season pastures and out-migration in search of jobs) leaving few animals and resources with women and families at the homestead); and lack of pasture and veterinary services for their animals (CARE France 2015b). Women's role in household food security is critical, with income generating activities including petty trade, handicraft production, and casual wage labour for the well-off (Soumana 2012).

A baseline study carried out by CARE found a significant correlation between socio-economic status and gender of the head of household. Average monthly revenue for female-headed households was just 7,414 FCFA; just over a quarter (27.4%) had an average monthly revenue over 30,000 FCFA. Agriculture and livestock rearing were their principal economic activities, with few opportunities for diversification (CARE International in Chad 2015).

4.2 Overview of CARE's interventions

Rather than a focus on a single 'pilot project' per se, the analysis of CARE's interventions in Wadi Fira looks more globally at the cumulative experiences of successive seasonal, unconditional cash transfers provided as humanitarian assistance funded by ECHO, and the newly initiated FACER project discussed above. FACER focuses on resilience through a variety of interventions including in-kind transfers and provision of cash conditional on work in community asset-building. Information is drawn from available project documents, key informant interviews with CARE representatives in N'Djamena, and field research in Wadi Fira. The field research took place from 24-31 October and included key informant interviews with local authorities and decentralised government technicians as well as project implementers from CARE and local NGOs; and both focus group and individual discussions with project beneficiaries and other community members in three cantons (Arada and Mimi, for the ECHO-funded projects; and Kodei for the FACER project).¹⁰

According to CARE's programme officer and deputy director in N'Djamena, CARE's overall strategy is built around three cross-cutting pillars: i) resilience to climate changes and other social shocks; ii) reinforcement of the rights of women and girls; and iii) reinforcement of humanitarian capacities and responses. Under the resilience pillar in particular, interventions focus on sustainable strategies of adaptation to climate change, reinforcement of productive capacities, and social protection for households suffering from chronic or acute vulnerability. The newly introduced FACER project, funded by the EU, with its conditional transfers accompanying other interventions, falls within the resilience pillar, while unconditional seasonal cash transfers accompanied by nutritional supplements fall within humanitarian responses funded by ECHO. Overall, '*CARE understands the importance of complementarity between emergency actions and development for the sustainable reduction of chronic food and nutritional insecurity*' (CARE France 2014a).

CARE has been established in Chad since 1974 and has been present in Wadi Fira for over ten years, starting in 2004 with an emergency programme of assistance to Sudanese refugees and Chadian host populations in the Department of Kobe. In the Department of Biltine, CARE's actions date from its 2012 emergency response to the food crisis in the Sahel, which has been repeated annually since then. Donors for humanitarian and food security assistance projects implemented by CARE in Wadi Fira over the years have included ECHO, OFDA (Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance), FAO, WFP and BMZ (the German Economic Development Ministry). CARE operates in Wadi Fira out of its sub-office in Biltine. It participates in local food security cluster meetings in Abéché, the capital of Ouaddai region, and maintains close working relations with relevant decentralised government service structures and local NGOs (CARE France 2014a). Since 2014, CARE has also been implementing two development projects aimed at sustaining food security and supporting local canton and commune development plans with financial support from the European Union (for its Support Programme for Local

¹⁰ Full results of field research are reported in Abdoulaye (2015)

Development/Natural Resource Management – PADL-GR) and Austria’s Cooperation for Development (ADA) (CARE France 2015c).

4.2.1 Seasonal cash transfers as emergency response

CARE has reached over 33,000 households with ECHO-funded seasonal cash transfers between 2011/12 and 2015, with numbers fluctuating each year according to assessed need (Bwikanye 2015). The following box outlines the key dimensions of the ECO-funded seasonal cash transfer programme implemented by CARE in Wadi Fira. The precise project features, including interventions, transfer amounts, and beneficiaries, have differed from one year to the next over the successive years of programme implementation (in 2014, for example, CARE’s cash transfers covered 15,000 poor and very poor households in the region, with differing amounts of cash transfers for each category) (CARE France 2015c). The box outlines the 2015 food security interventions which were in operation during field work.

Box 5. Outline of CARE’s ECHO-funded seasonal cash transfer programme in Wadi Fira (2015)

Title: Reinforcement of the food and nutritional security of households affected by food insecurity in eastern Chad

Aims: To contribute to the reinforcement of the food and nutritional security of very poor households affected by recurrent food crises through a response to the immediate needs of households whose survival is at risk.

Geographic focus: Wadi Fira region: covering the two cantons at most risk (according to outcome analyses) in the Department of Biltine (Oumol, with 40 villages; and Arada, with 25 villages), and the Department of Megri (20 villages). The villages were selected in collaboration with the National Rural Development Office (ONDR) on the basis of vulnerability criteria, including a poor agricultural campaign and limited access to lands for counter season production. Overall geographic targeting aims at complementarity with the FACER project – with the most vulnerable villages and cantons covered by this programme, and the others covered by FACER.

Beneficiaries: 6,123 ‘very poor’ households (as defined by HEA), characterised by a ‘livelihood protection deficit’ and who risk falling into a ‘survival deficit’ during the hunger gap months between May and September. These households include 3,062 children aged 6-23 months. Total number of individual beneficiaries = 42,861 (with an estimated 7 persons per household). At village level, the project covers 100% of ‘very poor’ households.

Duration: 10 months

Interventions:

- **Food security:** Three distributions of cash (or vouchers depending on local market capacity) of 20,000 FCFA each (total of 60,000 FCFA) per household during the lean period from April to August 2015. The amount has been calculated to meet 100% of the food needs of these households during this period and to enable these households to forego negative coping strategies that would further threaten their livelihoods.
- **Nutritional security:** Distribution – during the cash transfers period – of food supplements (Plumpy-Doz) to children aged 6-23 months from the beneficiary households in order to prevent malnutrition (in collaboration with WFP).
- **Nutritional awareness and screening:** Information and sensitization sessions on nutrition and hygiene and active screening of malnourished children through mid-upper-arm circumference (MUAC) measures and referrals for severe cases (in collaboration with the local NGO BASE and community outreach workers). This activity is also open to non-beneficiary households.

Modality of cash/voucher transfers

- If cash: local economic actors contracted by Airtel Money will distribute.
- If vouchers: redeemable through local merchants

Community participation: Development of additional vulnerability criteria for HEA assessment and targeting; community selection committees (2 men/2 women) and complaints committees (3 men/3 women) in each community; implication of local authorities (village chiefs) in distributions of cash and nutritional supplements.

Monitoring and evaluation: Evaluation of market responses to injection of cash (in coordination with the government’s Department of Agricultural Production and Statistics (DPSA); post-distribution monitoring (PDM) by CARE on a 5-10% sample of beneficiaries; local level follow-up (*suivi de proximité*) by project facilitators in each village; and baseline and endline surveys.

Total budget (ECHO): 978 460 Euros (food security: 763 741 Euro; nutrition: 133 677 Euro; coordination: 17 031 Euro; indirect costs: 64,011)

Source: CARE France (2015c, project proposal)

CARE's targeting approach uses a weighted combination of socio-economic and food economy indicators derived from HEA and additional criteria of vulnerability. HEA indicators are based on household size and number of able workers; source of food and revenue; frequency of meals; agricultural production; and possession of herds and other productive assets. Additional vulnerability criteria pertain to household status (single parent of female-headed); and presence of children and/or other malnourished people in the household (see table 2).

Table 2. Targeting on the basis of vulnerability scores

Vulnerability Criteria	Identification criteria		Score	Vulnerability score
	Household status	Single parent or female-headed	3	0.09
Labour constraints	Presence of orphans, older people, people with disabilities	2	0.06	
Children and nutrition	Presence of children and/or malnourished people with medical proof	5	0.14	
Socio-economic criteria (HEA)	Household size and number of able workers	Size \leq 7, with working members \geq 3	5	0.14
	Source of food and revenue	Households relying exclusively on agriculture and foraging, with no other revenue or food reserves	5	0.14
	Frequency of meals	1 or less meal a day	5	0.14
	Agricultural production	Households having cultivated less than 1 ha and produced less than 50 kg	5	0.14
	Presence of animals and other productive assets	Households having lost all their animals and without other means of production	5	0.14
	Size of herds and other productive assets	Households with more than 2 heads of cattle and/or 10 goats/sheep, with horses and carts	-5	-0.14
			35	1.00

Source: Bwikanye Mass (2015), translated from the French and reproduced with kind permission

In its programme documentation, CARE outlines some of the lessons learned from its experiences in cash transfer programming in Chad leading to the strengths it sees in its approach as well as some of the key results that have been achieved (see table 2). On the basis of this, it foresees the possibility of going to scale with cash transfers as a mechanism for the implementation of the SNPS (Bwikanye 2015).

Table 3. Perceived strengths and measurable results of CARE seasonal transfers

Perceived strengths of the CARE model	Key results achieved
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeting of beneficiaries on the basis of HEA and community participation in the analysis of vulnerability Implication of all key stakeholders (local leaders) in targeting processes and distribution of cash through village committees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Favourable community perceptions of the programme Good use of cash by beneficiaries: +90% used for essential needs for food (70%); purchase of productive assets (16%); and access to essential services (5%) Integration of nutrition interventions contributed to reduction in prevalence of global acute malnutrition in Wadi Fira from 21.3% (2012) to 11.3% (2014) Multiplier effects: +795,820,000 FCFA (close to 1,500,000 Euro) injected into local economy

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership with cell phone operators (Airtel Money) to facilitate direct distribution of cash to beneficiaries • Development of impact assessment tools (baseline, post-distribution monitoring, and local level follow-up) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A beginning of rehabilitation and reinforcement of livelihoods of poor and very poor households (close to 200,000 Euros invested in productive assets for agro-pastoral production and other income-generating activities); this constitutes an entry point for longer-term resilience
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Sources: CARE France (2014a); Bwikanye (2015)

4.2.2 Moving towards resilience

Recommendations arising from the 2012 HEA profile of Biltine had suggested the importance of limiting free food distribution in the region to emergency situations and putting in place instead mechanisms of food- or cash-for-work, with a view to strengthening collaboration in transitioning from emergency assistance to recovery activities. The recommended focus for such interventions was on improving water sources, supporting women’s savings and loans groups and developing a variety of income generation activities to improve household revenue. Cash-for-learning mechanisms coupled with school canteens were also recommended to improve education, along with an intensified focus on prevention of malnutrition (Soumana 2012).

An internal assessment of CARE’s cash transfer programmes based on post-distribution monitoring exercises followed a cohort of beneficiaries who received unconditional seasonal transfers funded by ECHO over successive years between 2011 and 2014 (ECHO 1, 2, 3) and found that 47% had been able to move from a vulnerable situation of ‘survival deficit’ (households which cannot meet their basic food needs) to a situation higher up the ladder of resilience where they were investing more and more in the ‘protection of livelihoods’, as measured by HEA assessments. The successive cash transfers had, in fact, enabled these households – in addition to meeting food needs – to invest in productive assets (a couple of goats, chickens, seeds and tools) which progressively allowed them to strengthen their livelihoods (KII, CARE programme director, N’Djamena).

Post-transfer monitoring in 2014 indicated overall: (i) an improvement in qualitative and quantitative household consumption after the transfer: a majority of households (86%) met their daily calorie intake; (ii) the cash transfer met the survival deficits in all the households of the project intervention zone. However, the livelihood deficit persisted in about 27% of households; (iii) the cash transfer was used to buy food (79%), but it was also transformed into a productive investment or income-generating activity (18%) or used to cover health and education expenses (2%) (World Bank 2016; see also Bwikanye 2015).

These findings served as the basis for the elaboration of the FACER resilience project in 2015, which aims to enable those households who had achieved the ‘livelihood protection threshold’ – some 46% of the overall beneficiary households (Bwikanye 2015) – to further secure and protect their livelihoods through a number of different interventions that are planned (provision of drought-resistant seeds; introduction of counter season cultivation; income generating activities; restocking, community granaries, ‘warrantage’ (KII, CARE Programme officer, N’Djamena).

‘Discussion with ECHO, and afterwards with the EU allowed us to orient our actions around the reinforcement of household means of production and also around climate change. We explained to our funders that we have been working in this region for two or three years in succession and that people are starting to lift themselves up. But they remain fragile because in the face of any shock, they risk falling back down into precariousness. So what if we were to accompany these households with activities of more durable reinforcement? We subsequently submitted our project to the EU who agreed to finance it. A link was thus established in the funds received from the two donors [ECHO and European Union] with emergency and development thrusts’ (KII, CARE Programme officer, N’Djamena).

Targeting both agro-pastoral and pastoral households, financed by the EU, and implemented in partnership with local NGOs APRODIF (the Association for the promotion of integrated development and training) and BAPE (Bureau of support for agriculture and environmental protection), the overall aim of the FACER programme is to sustainably reinforce the food and nutritional security of vulnerable

households in the Department of Biltine in Wadi Fira. Overall results expected are as follows (CARE International in Chad 2015):

- Chronic malnutrition among children under 5 is reduced by at least 10% in the targeted cantons (from 43% to 33%)
- The percentage of target groups classified as ‘very poor’ is reduced by at least 5% (from 63% to 58%)
- The percentage of households able to retain food stocks for their own consumption for 5-6 months is increased from 32% to 80%, with a 2-month increase in average time covered (from 3.9 months to 5.9 months)
- Average monthly income is doubled for at least half of the beneficiary households, and the proportion of households with a revenue over 90,000 FCFA (USD 150) increases from 1.5% to 50%.

Gender-differentiated specific objectives are formulated around increased revenues, improved physical, social, and financial access to food (including access to land); improved hygiene practices; improved utilisation of water and food; and improved livelihood stability and resilience. A key focus is on women, with the aim of providing them with the means to diversify and increase their economic production. Planned activities include negotiation of contracts for access to land; distribution of improved seed varieties; outreach on improved farming and livestock methods; development of pilot collective fields; construction of 5 community stores; and development of village savings and loans groups. The project also envisions modalities of both cash-for-work and cash for learning.

FACER plans to work with selected households previously benefiting from the unconditional cash transfers, with the aim of reinforcing resilience in the medium and long term. This action is complementary to continued response as necessary to humanitarian needs in the region and in case of food or nutritional crises in households facing a ‘survival deficit.’ The underlying rationale of the project is that:

‘...malnutrition and food insecurity have both structural and immediate causes and cannot be sustainably reduced except by reinforcing resilience to shocks in the short and medium terms, notably poor and very poor households, and more specifically for women, in order to make secure in sustainable fashion the livelihoods of this fringe of population which has attained the [livelihood] protection threshold, thus enabling them to avoid falling back into survival deficits during the next round of shocks.’(CARE International in Chad 2015)

CARE’s concept and definition of ‘resilience’ is outlined in the box below.

Box 6. CARE’s definition of resilience

A higher level of resilience is defined by an improvement in all dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilisation, stability) which will allow faster recuperation after exposure to stress thanks to an appreciative increase in revenue; the acquisition of durable goods and productive assets (for example, land or animals), enhanced participation in decision processes concerning food security and household management but also the reinforcement of knowledge and access to information on key factors that can contribute to livelihoods. Resilience is a concept that brings together three domains of intervention, namely: i) disaster risk reduction; ii) climate change adaptation; and iii) poverty reduction. It is defined as the capacity of a system to adapt by either resisting or evolving so as to attain and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure.

Source: CARE International in Chad (2015)

The box below summarizes the basic features of the FACER programme, which is foreseen to be complementary to CARE’s ongoing humanitarian assistance.

Box 7. Outline of CARE’s FACER programme

Title: Women, Climate Change Adaptation, Water and Resilience in the Sahelian region of Wadi Fira (34 months)

Aims: To contribute to sustainable food & nutritional security in rural Chad through reinforcement of the resilience of poor/very poor agro-pastoral and pastoral households and the reversal of trends in the feminisation of poverty through enhanced access to/ control over land, increased revenue, and the improved status of women.

Geographic focus: Wadi Fira Region, Departments of Rural Biltine (Cantons of Mimi Goz and Ouladjama); Amzoer (Cantons of Gourmaka, Oumol and Kodei); and Rural Arada (Arada Canton).

Beneficiaries: 7,000 poor and very poor pastoral and agro-pastoral households covered by humanitarian assistance projects led by CARE with ECHO funds in response to the food deficits of 2013/14 who have been able to reach the threshold of protection of livelihoods but remain fragile as a result of the external environment. 76 villages will be selected on the basis of the proportion of households having achieved this level; geographic situation in zones of high risk of recurrent food and climate shocks; and specific livelihood profiles.

Interventions

- Multiple interventions to **enhance food availability through the increase and diversification of agricultural and pastoral production** including: distribution of improved seed varieties, agricultural tools, water pumps and training for improved cultivation techniques, natural resource management and water exploitation on demonstration community fields and in *wadis*, with contracts negotiated for land use; support to animal vaccination campaigns through the training and equipment of auxiliary vaccinators; and training on improved techniques for production, collection and conservation of animal fodder.
- Multiple interventions to **increase revenue to enhance physical, financial and social access to food** including: cash-for-work (including for activities foreseen in bullet 1); cash-for-learning for women's functional literacy; creation and support for village savings and loans associations; community dialogues on gender and women's empowerment.
- Multiple interventions to **improve hygiene practices and the use of water and food**, including: training on good hygiene and sanitation practices; training on community nutritional surveillance and promotion of nutritional rehabilitation.
- Multiple interventions **to sustain access to food and improve resilience in the face of food shocks**, including: participatory food and nutrition security monitoring and improved market price surveillance; self-managed community grain stores; a pilot animal health mutual; and support for the reconstitution of herds through distribution of small ruminants.

Monitoring and evaluation: Performance indicators to be developed; baseline studies to include vulnerability analysis, analysis of gender relations, and a socio-economic evaluation of households; regular monitoring will be conducted; along with an endline evaluation.

Programme participation: CARE (management and coordination); BAPE (technical and operational support for natural resource management, agro-pastoral production, and social mobilisation); APRODIF (cash-for-work activities, community mobilisation, and construction of community assets); local authorities (consultation and initiation of activities); decentralised government structures (agriculture and livestock production)

Total budget: 1,713,726.96 Euro

Source: Administration contractante Union Européenne, Délégation UE en République du Tchad (2014)

4.3 Main findings from field research

4.3.1 Conditions of extreme poverty and vulnerability in the zone

Key informants from local government delegations paint a picture of serious deficiencies in social service infrastructure and delivery. Education is challenged by a lack of infrastructure, school materials, teachers (80% of the teachers are untrained community teachers) and supervision structures (no car for the regional delegation); school canteens are seen as a key factor in maintaining children in school. Only 68 of 94 health centres are actually functional. There is a social centre in the urban centre of each of the 3 departments, but a lack of human and financial resources to implement social action and assistance services. There is only one agricultural outreach officer for 56 villages, with an overall coverage of just 15%; livestock production services are also hampered by a lack of personnel (only 50% of required posts are filled) and there is no veterinary pharmacy in the region (KIIs, government services, Biltine).

Community members highlight the hardships created by the lack of sufficient socio-economic services in the region. In Mounkil, for example (45 km from Biltine) women project beneficiaries explain that their children are deprived of education because there is no teacher for the one school that exists in the village; lacking a village health centre, they must travel 5 hours by donkey to the nearest small town

where in any case the doctors are mediocre; lacking a market, they must travel a three-day round trip by donkey to Biltine for sale of produce and purchase of necessities. Other women describe similar conditions in other localities (FGDs, women beneficiaries of CARE's programmes, Wadi Fira).

Problems are compounded for women in the region due to the absence of menfolk who are often away – sometimes for years. As a woman project beneficiary in Mounkil explains: *'There are many amongst us whose husbands are away. My husband, for example, has been away for 7 years. Some leave to search for gold [in the neighbouring region] others have travelled as far as Algeria where some have been detained in prisons for over three years/ They send us nothing back – how can they, as they themselves are suffering out there?'*

Lack of water is one of the highest priority constraints identified by both key informants and community members – this includes both water for drinking and for agro-pastoral production. As CARE project officers put it: *'We are in the Sahel where access to water is a fundamental problem. We have projects with multiple dimensions in the region, but without water, they are not effective. Women travel dozens of kilometres in search of water – leaving at 5 in the morning to return only at 7 in the evening and are frequently exposed to dangers along the way (gender-based violence, wild animals, hold-ups).'* The chief of the Arab canton agrees that the problem of water is crucial: there is a lack of boreholes and secure pastoral wells... *'People are obliged to cluster around the larger villages where there is water, or else leave...'* In formally pastoral nomadic areas, many people have lost their animals following successive droughts and have been forced to sedentarise, trying to eke out a living through other activities. An NGO representative states starkly that *'The lack of water may well cause the population to flee the area someday.'*

The chief of the Mimi community in Mimi Goz explains that for agro-pastoral households, the situation is just as extreme – the rains have failed this year so millet crops have been destroyed; the 4-5 animals most households possess have no pasture. *'The granaries are empty so we are obliged to do some small income generating activity and with that go to the market... For the past two years our harvests last us only one or two months.'* Food insecurity is thus extreme, adding to other hardships, as testified by a group of women beneficiaries in Ban Djadid (20 km from Arada):

'We have tremendous problems of food security – there is not enough to eat in our village. We have had a very bad rainy season and the few crops that survived were later ravaged by locusts, thus we have harvested nothing. It is a very hard year. We have always had rather limited rains, but this year is the worst – there is not even any water to drink. We have no health centre, so we have to take people who are ill to Arada, which is 20 km away. There is no market nearby, so we again have to travel to Arada – it takes us 8 hours round trip – and prices are very high in Arada for us villagers. But our fundamental problem is drinking water. Sometimes when our nearby wells run dry we have to walk for a full day to collect water. The situation is very difficult and if it continues like this we will be forced to leave the region.'

4.3.2 Details on CARE's programme interventions from field personnel

CARE, as we have seen above, is implementing a number of different projects in the region (some twelve in all, according to our field research). The local heads of programme, of our two case-study projects outline the main lines as follows (note that the FACER project is just being initiated, so most of the activities are still in the planning stage).

ECHO funded relief projects

The programme, concentrated in Biltine, consists primarily of cash distributions (currently 19,000 FCFA per household in 3 distributions = 57,000 FCFA) and nutritional supplements for children aged 0-59 months. Each year they start by working with the local and traditional authorities to map out the zones, cantons and villages to be included in the project. They then identify poor and very poor households through HEA. Cash transfers are provided during the lean period which lasts from March to August, with a peak in July/August when food stocks are totally depleted. A light follow-up of selected households is conducted after each distribution, to determine how the transfers are being used;

and a post-distribution monitoring is conducted afterwards (3-5 weeks after distribution) to determine impacts in terms of food consumption score; adaptation strategies, survival indices and the like. The cash covers largely the household's immediate consumption needs (from 80% to 90% of the transfer) but also allows for some investment in productive assets and activities (purchase of small ruminants, gardening, and other income-generating activities).

EU-funded FACER programme

This project takes on former beneficiaries of the ECHO cash transfer programme who – because of the transfer – have been able to overcome their immediate 'survival deficits' and who are now given support to reinforce their livelihoods so as to ensure they do not fall back into survival deficits. [It is thus a kind of 'graduation' model that is being applied.] While still working with households classified – through HEA – as 'very poor', the focus in FACER is on the transition from relief to development. Among the activities and interventions:

- Small ruminants are distributed to beneficiary households through small ruminant fairs, with beneficiaries given 40,000 FCFA to enable them to buy two animals each, with government livestock officers providing veterinary services;
- Cash-for-work activities are organized around pilot community fields (planted with short-cycle, drought-adapted seed varieties with the objective of furnishing better crop seeds for the entire community) and tree and plant nurseries (to produce acacia trees to be used as fences to protect gardening activities around the spreading thresholds (*seuils d'epandage*) that have been created to rehabilitate degraded lowlands). This year, 552 beneficiaries worked 20 days at 1,500 FCFA/day (a total of 30,000 FCFA per beneficiary) cultivating 24 ha of community fields producing millet and niébé seeds while 30 beneficiaries worked in the tree nurseries which produced 20,000 acacia plants. According to the CARE project officer, there is a clear difference between the community fields using improved and individual fields.
- An important activity that is foreseen is the construction of 6 community cereal banks (25-30 tons per bank), with the cereals stored to be sold at initial purchase price during harvest time.
- Accompanying measures for pastoral production activities that are foreseen include the training of 30 auxiliary veterinarians who will be equipped with veterinary kits and an animal vaccination campaign in 6 cantons for 18,000 small ruminants (6 heads per household)
- The creation of 12 women's literacy centres is foreseen, with 240 learners who will be provided with cash-for-learning at 1,500 FCFA/day over 20 days of training by month for 4 months, through a coupon of FCFA 30,000 per month (Total per beneficiary = 120,000 FCFA). (According to the local implementing partners, the creation of village savings and loans associations (VSLA) is also part of the project.

The CARE project officers explain that while seasonal, unconditional cash transfers are still necessary for some households, the positive impacts of successive cash transfers funded by ECHO have allowed for a transition in programming towards the more resilience-oriented interventions of FACER:

'The results of ECHO projects are visible on the ground – beneficiary households have reflected in order to acquire what they need to fortify themselves against future shocks. Today our beneficiaries are coming together to create groups and associations, to undertake income-generating activities such as gardening and chicken-raising. They have become more resilient – their level of vulnerability has reduced. And from there FACER kicks in with development projects.'

There are, of course, key challenges, which the CARE representatives identify as follows:

- ***Targeting issues***, due to lack of understanding – with questions raised within villages or from chiefs on why this household or individual was selected and not another
- ***Security problems*** with the delivery of cash
- ***Transition issues*** arising from the difficulties beneficiaries have in changing over from unconditional cash transfers under ECHO to cash transfers conditional on work under FACER. *'When they see CARE coming into the village, they expect an unconditional transfer and not one*

that requires an effort on their part. We have had entire villages that have categorically rejected cash for work. We have had to sensitize communities and explain to them that their situation was complex – that is why the ECHO projects provided relief whereas now that things are better FACER wants to move towards development so that they do not fall back into the same situation. We explain clearly that CARE will leave one day so they need to learn to manage on their own.'

- **Programme design issues**, particularly a perceived need to focus more on improving access to water, without which other projects will not be effective: *'A good project in Wadi Fira must necessarily have a dimension of accessibility to water... In the course of our current cash distributions, women tell us: "In the future, bring us water instead of cash."'* Women beneficiaries are also often absent on the day that cash/coupons are distributed as they are off fetching water.

Solid partnerships have been established with state structures such as the National Rural Development Office (ONDR) with whom contractual arrangements provide for collaboration on the pilot collective fields; the Agriculture and Environment's plant and crop protection service for protection of the collective fields; and the Chadian Institute for Agricultural Research and Development (ITRAD) for the provision of adaptive seeds. There is also collaboration with the health district in Biltine around the nutritional aspects of the ECHO projects.

4.3.3 Government and local authorities' perceptions of CARE's cash transfer programmes

Key informants from the decentralized government services and community leaders encountered in Wadi Fira expressed both appreciation for the social transfer projects implemented by CARE in their region and some concerns.

The agriculture and environment delegate, for example, said that the distribution of cash for seeds, tools and spreading thresholds (*seuils d'épandage*) were very beneficial for communities. Community leaders agreed that CARE's programmes were of real assistance. According to the Chief of the Arab canton, for example, *'CARE helps our populations, particularly the very poor and vulnerable, by giving them cash and goats, which really help them. The cash is particularly useful as it allows them to solve many problems at once.'* The Mimi community leader noted that the cash transfers enable beneficiaries to invest in productive assets (purchase of chickens, goats, agricultural tools) as well as to respond to their immediate needs.

Some regional government representatives feel that NGOs such as CARE need to implicate government more closely as partners in cash transfer programmes. The regional social action delegate, for example, decried the fact that they have never been associated with these programmes even though, they point out, *'We are best placed to know and understand vulnerable people.'* The regional delegate for agriculture and the environment also felt that government structures should be closely implicated in such programmes, and in particular entrust the Social Action Delegation with the targeting of vulnerable groups. The delegate for livestock noted that his service was routinely implicated in the distribution of small ruminants for the medical control, screening and quarantine periods, but were not associated with follow-up; moreover, they were not well informed about the cash transfers, per se. The regional delegate for agriculture and the environment noted that they were associated with the work of NGOs and in particular cash transfers – pointing to a signed convention on market and food price surveillance, but added that *'there are elements of the programmes that escape us (overall budget, number of beneficiaries) because we are not implemented in the conceptualization and planning phases.'* Some pointed to the need for the CRA (Regional Action Committee) to be reinforced and revitalized to be able to follow-up more closely and coordinate NGO activities in the region.

Community leaders seemed more directly implicated in programme initiation and particularly targeting – the Mimi community leader, for example, noted that he and other leaders are regularly informed of and participate in the targeting process, helping to identify the very vulnerable households within the community.

Some government representatives had general reservations about cash transfers as a modality of assistance. *'It's all well and good to give cash,'* according to the social action delegate, *'but we need more sustainable actions.'* *'CARE should go beyond assistance to the most vulnerable, and establish a broader and effective system of aid'* according to the agriculture and environment delegate. The Chief of Arada canton worried that beneficiaries would not always spend the money wisely. The Chief of the Mimi community stated a preference for food transfers over cash, since the tendency was to spend cash very quickly: *'If food is there at home, the household is happy and calm. Let them therefore give us food and we can manage for the sauce!'*

A few key concerns were expressed about the effects of targeting on social cohesion. The Chief of the Mimi community, for example, said that the distribution of cash sometimes caused social discord and jealousy between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' and the selection was usually seen as a matter of 'chance'; he noted, however, that beneficiaries did usually come to the assistance of non-beneficiaries out of 'social solidarity'.

Others expressed concern for weaknesses in programme design and delivery. The health delegate, for example, suggested that the timing of the transfers needed to be reconsidered and the amounts raised. The livestock delegate reported hearing from communities that cash was not always distributed objectively but was subject to favouritism, and also noted that pastoralists were not taken into consideration in the interventions in spite of their high vulnerability. The social action delegate urged a greater focus on women so that they could become more self-sufficient. Community leaders, for example the Chief of the Arab canton, re-stated the importance of integrating issues to do with water (wells and pastoral wells) in programme interventions and of expanding assistance programmes overall.

4.3.4 Experiences and perspectives of implementing partners

The research team was able to meet with representatives of the two NGOs participating in implementation of the FACER project: APRODIF (the Association for the promotion of integrated development and training), a national NGO created in 2011 to support local development around strategies of adaptation to climate change; and BAPE (Bureau of support for agriculture and environmental protection), a national NGO based in Biltine which focuses on natural resource management, water and food security. Both NGOs work on implementation of different resilience components of CARE's FACER project, and while not linked directly to cash transfer activities, had a number of useful perspectives to share on both FACER and cash transfers.

According to the ***APRODIF programme officer***, direct cash transfers are most suitable in emergency situations. Here in Wadi Fira, where the population is in permanent distress, and the situation is both critical and alarming, cash has significantly helped impoverished households confront crises and has brought great comfort. Cash-for-work is more suitable for resilience, since resilience implies development activities that will help over the long term (such as spreading thresholds (*seuils d'épandage*), water retention basins). The region has also used food-for-work for such purposes through WFP. It is sometimes difficult, however, to make the transition from emergency cash transfers to cash-for-work because beneficiaries of direct cash transfers build up attitudes of passivity (*attentism*) and you have to work with them to change behaviours. While project implementers do work with the deconcentrated government departments, who are said to be implicated in most of the activities, it is not clear that they would be able to sustain these activities on their own. There is often a problem of coordination, and while there are certain partnership conventions that exist, they are often not fully activated.

According to the BAPE programme officer, BAPE, as an implementing partner for the FACER project, helps with overall project facilitation, anchoring of the project within the milieu, contacts with local authorities, targeting, and mobilisation of field personnel (community mobilisers, outreach workers). The focus particularly on the cash-for-work activities around the tree nurseries for the production of hedges for fencing. Participants in this programme are identified from amongst the previous beneficiaries of the direct cash transfer: *'In FACER, we try to pull from the statistical base on beneficiaries, assessing those for whom the level of vulnerability has significantly improved, and*

targeting those who still need support'. But they do encounter some difficulties in the recruitment of participants, as the BAPE representative explains below:

'The passage from relief to development in FACER is not easy. There is some reticence towards cash-for-work, and some villages are more engaged than others. In one village we had 200 people mobilized initially, but when we explained that it was a development project with conditional cash transfers, almost everyone withdrew and we found ourselves with only 30 people with whom we subsequently worked and established a management committee. On our next visit, however, even this management committee had evaporated and we were obliged to relocate project activities to another village that was more motivated... Many people tell us: "We are already occupied in our own fields, so why should we work on 'yours'?"'

The BAPE programme officer feels that the direct cash transfers have been valuable and households – after proper 'sensitization' by project organizers – have used the transfers well, including for small investments in productive activities. But the direct cash transfers sometimes lead to a certain dependency on 'hand-outs' (*'l'assistanat'*): *'The development projects that follow on from relief projects, encounter implementation difficulties because unconditional cash transfers have consequences.'* A related challenge in project implementation is the reliance on village management committees whose members are expected to work on a voluntary basis, with no incentives. The BAPE representative also admits that, at present, there is insufficient engagement of local government actors in project activities, as already their capacities are limited. But they hope to engage them more fully down the line through the initiation of joint action plans and signed conventions with local government education, agriculture and livestock services.

Key recommendations suggested by BAPE for moving forward include i) more efforts to sensitize communities about the temporary nature of assistance – *'We cannot eternally give a fish to someone'*; ii) orientation of unconditional direct transfers towards labour constrained households – including older persons – and cash-for-work activities towards the others; and iii) reinforcement of more carefully planned and appropriate activities aimed at resilience (construction of spreading thresholds (*seuils d'épandage*) and stone anti-erosion works (*cordon pierreux*), counter season production); and iv) further consideration of the trade-offs involved between work on collective fields and on individual fields.

The research team also met with an **operator of the cell phone company Airtel Money**, which is in charge of delivering cash transfers in the region. The operator explains some of the challenges this entails in the box below.

Box 8. The challenges faced by an Airtel Money cash distributor

I distribute the cash through Airtel – we have a contract that links us with CARE and there are five of us in all. I manage the region from Batha to Wadi Fira.

The key challenge in this job is the security – particularly when the region is very difficult. First of all, to deal with this, we establish a dialogue with the traditional authorities about our security, and all canton chiefs except one have understood and collaborate.

In this one canton, I arrived with the money to distribute but the chief seized it and deposited it at the sub-prefecture. The sub-prefect demanded a 10% cut of the total (the total envelope was around 20 million FCFA), There ensued some heated discussion, and I tried to make them understand that this money was meant for the poor and all of it had to be accounted for. Where could I find, therefore, a budget line for the 10% demanded?

I threatened to abandon the work and bring the matter to a higher level. The sub-prefect reflected a bit, then assigned a constable to guard me, saying he had a right to demand a fee for the constable's services. In the end I had to pay 20,000 FCFA from my own pocket to give to the constable so that he would leave us alone. A second time we had the same problem with the constable of this sub-prefect.

But this is the only canton where we've had problems. In the other cantons, many traditional authorities help us and even give us security guards (*goumiers*) to help us organize the rows of women.

Source: KII with Airtel distributor (Abdoulaye 2015)

4.3.5 Beneficiary experience and perceptions of CARE’s cash transfer programmes

Focus group and individual discussions with women beneficiaries of ECHO-funded cash transfers were conducted in two communities (one near Arada and one in Mimi Goz). In both localities, beneficiaries were on their second year of seasonal transfers. Amounts and number of distributions seemed to differ from one year to the other. In Arada, for example, the women report receiving 5 distributions of 19,000 FCFA per household; in Mimi Goz, reported amounts varied from 30,000 FCFA over 4 months of the lean season during the first year to 20,000 FCFA over 3 months of the lean season during the second. The table below synthesizes their perceptions and experiences of these cash transfers.

Table 4. Perceptions and experiences of women cash transfer beneficiaries

Issues	Perceptions and experiences of women beneficiaries
targeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘CARE agents come to register us – especially the neediest – and after that, the lists come out. Those who are lucky are retained for assistance. They target particularly the poor, older people, widows, and people with disabilities, which is good.’ (Arada)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘For the first phase they took older women... For the second phase they took both older women and women with young children... This year they have not yet come... They take the poorest amongst us and often older women, but many other poor people do not receive anything.’ (Mimi Goz)
cash vs food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘Food aid is good, but cash helps us with many things. But, you know, for someone who is poor, we have many needs so we accept anything that is given to us.’ ‘Çash is very practical as it allows us to purchase necessities and diversify our expenses – that is its positive side.’ ‘Fundamentally, we would prefer food.’ (Arada)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘If they give us food, that would be good, but since we are poor we will take anything that we get.’ ‘We are takers of all aid, whether food or cash, but food is more fundamental’ (Mimi Goz)
uses of cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to basic food stuffs, purchase of other necessities (soap); health care; provisions for orphans in their care; home and garden improvements (fencing of garden); investment in productive assets (purchase of 2 chickens for the sale of eggs; 2 goats which have since had kids; a donkey for transport); contribution to a collective ‘caisse’ (500 FCFA per person per month) for use by individuals when they encounter problems (Arada)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food stuffs first (cereals, oil, flour...); then small productive investments (purchase of chickens, goats, a donkey, agricultural tools); debt reimbursement; schooling costs; children’s clothes; child health care.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One woman reported: ‘I bought a goat and use its milk for the orphans I am caring for’ (Mimi Goz)
effects on household	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘The cash has really helped us with a lot of things, Most, of us are married but our husbands have left (for the gold mines, N’Djamena, even Libya) so it’s up to us to raise our children, pay the school master, etc. The cash allows us to cover our basic needs – this year especially if we hadn’t received anything, we would have suffered.’ (Mimi Goz)
effects on community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘Çash distributions sometimes cause jealousy, even though we often try to help others who have not received anything.’ (Arada)
recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘We pray to God to give CARE the means to continue their assistance to the poor and to increase the number of beneficiaries because it is the only support we have.’ ‘We also need assistance with water, health, a market, and plant protection’ (Arada)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ‘We have a serious problem of water in the zone and poverty is practically universal. We would like to have a well, a school/madrassa, a health centre and a mosque.’ (Mimi Goz)

Source: FGDs with women beneficiaries in Arada and Mimi Goz (Abdoulaye 2015)

Box 9. A 70-year old woman cash transfer beneficiary, Mimi Goz

They selected me for the programme from the very first year where I was one of 20 poor older women. They gave us coupons for 30,000 FCFA and we had to go to Biltine to receive the cash. With the cash in hand I would make my purchases, particularly for food (cereals for 7,500 FCFA, condiments, oil) as well as soap and clothes for my orphan children. All these are fundamental expenses.

After the second transfer, I bought a goat for 15,000 FCFA, a chicken for 2,500 FCFA and other small purchases (soap, cream, etc.) in addition to food. The goat had two successive sets of kids, and these kids have also produced. Some of the kids died because of the climate, but I still have 4 as well as 4 chickens now.

For the third transfer, they gave us two coupons at once for 40,000 FCFA with which I bought a sack of wheat flour, oil, other food stuffs and some agricultural tools.

The targeting CARE does is very good; in any case it is God who gives to some and not to others. So for us it is a question of fate. There were many poor people whose names were not retained. In fact, we don't really understand much about the targeting.

We count on this aid – when we see the CARE vehicles coming by, we are happy. My wish is that the assistance can continue and increase. Since we are poor, we will take anything that is given to us – whether cash or food. We would prefer food over cash, but would like to receive a diversified food ration.

Source: IDI with woman cash transfer beneficiary, Mimi Goz (Abdoulaye 2015)

4.3.6 Beneficiary experience and perceptions of FACER and cash for work

Women in the village of Mounkil (45 km from Biltine) described the recent initiation of cash-for-work activities around a collective field in the FACER project in their village, which is just starting up and is planned to run for 3 years. They indicated that targeting is of the 'labour-capacitated poor' (*pauvres valides*) who are willing to work, with project organisers going 'house-to-house' during the identification phase. Women with at least 2 or 3 children were selected for participation in the project because, project organisers explained, that meant that the woman could work in the pilot collective field while her children could continue working the family plots. In all, there are 26 participants (24 women and 2 men).

A village field of 2 ha was identified for the pilot and a village work-management committee was established among the project participants. After a short training, the women began the work of weeding and preparing the land on the collective field as well as planting the seeds provided by CARE. These are seeds for a rapid-growing variety of millet (40 days compared to the normal cycle of 90 days) as well as niébé, which the women said they appreciate. They took turns guarding the crops which – once harvested – will be stored in the community granary.

So far the women have each gone to work on the collective field 11 times and have been given 30,000 FCFA each. They feel they have done good work. They have by now cut the stalks and stacked them but have not yet begun to separate the grains. They note that the rainy season was not good this year, so the harvest does not look promising – they estimate not more than two sacks of millet and perhaps one sack of niébé.

Nevertheless, they feel the project is a good one and with the money earned they have been able to buy their necessities – food, condiments, soap as well as making some investments (purchase of goats, chickens). They said that while the cash was very useful, they would prefer to receive food, but '*We are poor, and the poor does not have too much choice – we take what we are given.*' Aside from the support they receive from CARE, they have been involved in no other project.

The women participating in this activity had not been involved in CARE's earlier cash transfer programmes, thus raising some questions regarding the intended linkages.

4.4 Conclusions and key issues for consideration in looking forward

4.4.1 Elements of an emerging model

The case study of CARE's, cash transfer and resilience interventions in Wadi Fira revealed both the potential opportunities and the significant challenges involved in attempting to move beyond the emergency assistance modality towards support for longer term development activities, in a Sahelian context where livelihoods are severely constrained and households remain highly vulnerable to cyclical and recurrent shocks. In both programme thrusts, cash transfers are used as a critical mechanism of social protection but in different forms and for different purposes.

- In the first type of programme, they are direct, unconditional, and short-term seasonal transfers to households targeted as suffering from 'survival deficits' based on extreme food and nutritional insecurity. The intent is to allow such households to meet their survival needs and – perhaps – to invest in some productive assets or activities that might enhance their ability to survive and to avoid negative coping strategies. The cash is complemented by distribution of nutritional supplements for children to address more directly the problems associated with malnutrition. In the region of Wadi Fira, as in much of the Chadian Sahel as a whole, these seasonal transfers have become annual events, with 'emergency' projects submitted and funded each year for at least the past 3 or 4 years, albeit sometimes targeting different zones/households.
- In the second type of programme, cash is targeted to households that have achieved a certain threshold of survival and are now in a position to focus more on protecting and advancing their means of livelihood. Transfers are conditional on public work activities designed to develop community assets and are provided for the time it takes to work on these assets. In the emerging model that is developing, cash-for-work is to be accompanied by other sorts of transfers including in-kind (for example improved seeds and tools), and cash based on other types of conditions (cash for learning, potentially cash for income-generation). The whole is to be set within broader community development-type activities such as the construction of village stores, community granaries and the like over a three-year time span.

The emerging model seems to be incorporating some elements of the 'graduation' models discussed in chapter 2, where households are supported with transfers and accompanying measures until the point at which they are evaluated to be 'resilient' enough to 'graduate' from programme assistance. The difference in the CARE model is that 'graduation' is actually from short-term direct cash transfers to cash-for-work activities over the longer term. The model also seems partially akin to the PSNP in Ethiopia, also discussed in Chapter 2, where subsets of vulnerable households receive either unconditional cash transfers or cash-for-work depending on whether they have labour capacity or not.

Both the direct cash transfers and the cash-for-work programme rely on HEA for targeting, though the latter adds additional criteria of labour capacity and willingness to work. And each is accompanied by a number of complementary measures – around nutrition, for the most part, in the direct cash transfer, and around livelihood support measures in the second. For the time being, each is being implemented by NGOs (CARE working in collaboration with local NGOs) and is funded by external donors. The role of government is fairly limited, though technical collaboration on livelihood interventions is a feature of the latter.

4.4.2 Key issues for ongoing consideration

Moving forward, it will be important for programme planners to connect up the two sets of initiatives in some way that makes sense so that they may be viewed and implemented in a holistic manner. Challenges in the transition from 'relief' to 'development' need to be met head on and addressed through appropriate programme design and communication.

For both types of intervention, effective targeting is critical; criteria and thresholds of vulnerability may need to be honed somewhat to take into consideration the differentials that would determine which set

of households would be eligible for which set of interventions (degree of vulnerability; labour constraints; age; gender....).

The development and implementation of complementary activities is already well-advanced and should continue. The linkage of nutrition with food-security interventions is very appropriate in the Sahelian context and this aspect should continue to be strengthened through collaboration with nutrition and health sector service providers. Consideration of the targeting implications of nutrition-oriented activities will also be needed – for example, will the direct (emergency) cash transfer programme target only vulnerable households with children under five, or will all vulnerable households be included, with only some benefiting from the complementary nutrition actions? Design of the most appropriate livelihood interventions in the cash-for-work programme will need to continue to draw on careful analysis of productive potential (as is currently being provided through the baseline studies and HEA profiling); other aspects may also need to be taken into consideration in the focus on community asset creation (for example, potential tensions between community fields and individual fields).

Other critical design issues may need to be addressed, including decisions on an optimal and – as far as possible – standardized amount and duration of transfers (which seemed to fluctuate from one year to the next and, more broadly, from one programme to the next, even within the same zone); on optimal coverage (taking into consideration budgetary constraints and potential trade-offs between breadth and depth).

Monitoring and evaluation will become increasingly critical, particularly if the model is one of household progression from one set of initiatives to another, for which precise tools to measure programme impact will be needed. HEA seems to serve as a well anchored and effective targeting tool, but it may need to be further honed and/or streamlined. A functional management information system will also be crucial, with electronic registration of households within the different programmes that can clearly track their progress and potential passage from one initiative to the other. Clear programme documentation and strong management and accountability structures at all levels (from community upwards) will continue to be important and should be enhanced, with a view to full transparency. Grievance and complaints mechanisms should be fully established and functional throughout the programme's lifespan.

If initiatives such as the ones being examined are to be fully integrated into a national social safety net system as envisaged by the SNPS, the role and leadership of government will need to be highlighted, including in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation as well as the funding for such programmes. This will involve, amongst other things, reinforcement of the capacities of decentralised government structures.

5. Overall conclusions, policy and programme recommendations

This study has, i) offered lessons learned from state-of-the-art knowledge, experiences and impacts of cash transfers; ii) reviewed the national policy environment and general characteristics of cash transfers projects currently underway in Chad; and iii) provided an in-depth, case-study look at cash transfer programme interventions undertaken by CARE International in the Sahelian region of Wadi Fira – identifying elements of an emerging model seeking to bridge the gap between seasonal ‘emergency’ transfers and longer-term support aimed at enhancing household livelihoods and resilience.

This concluding chapter aims to provide national policy-makers, development partners, civil society representatives and other stakeholders with recommendations to support more systematic programming around cash transfers, as a key mechanism for implementation of the *National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS)*, as set within the broader framework to advance social protection that is foreseen within that strategy. The moment is opportune, as the government has now established a national institutional structure and initiated implementation of a national social safety net pilot programme with the support of the World Bank.

5.1. Building a national social protection system

Increasingly, countries across the world are implementing social protection systems, and cash transfers are always a central component of these systems. The following sequence of 10 building blocks are required to build a national social protection system (see Devereux 2015). Several of these building blocks are already in place in Chad, while others still need attention.

1. **Awareness raising:** Introducing social protection requires raising awareness at all levels, from politicians to the general public. For instance, if cash transfers are popularly believed to create dependency among beneficiaries, this should be debated – what is the evidence for this belief? This may need further attention in Chad, linked in particular to emerging priorities around the ‘resilience agenda’ in which cash transfers are seen as an essential element.
2. **Scoping:** What is the national vision for social protection, and how does it support the National Development Plan? Which conceptual framework of social protection will be adopted – will it be welfarist, growth-oriented, or rights-based? The National Strategy for Social Protection (SNPS) adopted by the government in Chad and discussed at a high-level national forum on social protection in 2015 provides such a vision and outlines the key policy priorities for moving forward.
3. **Policy mapping:** What social protection programmes are already being implemented in the country? Who is reached by these programmes and who is left out? Are these programmes effective or should they be reformed or replaced? The recent World Bank mapping of social safety nets in Chad (World Bank 2016) provides an excellent start, and can usefully be built upon for other components of the system.
4. **Needs assessment:** A social protection system must be grounded in local analysis of needs. Who are the poor and food insecure? What are the causes of poverty and vulnerability? What are the most appropriate policy responses – cash transfers? food aid? public works? school feeding? Chad has an established food security monitoring system and conducts regular national statistical surveys to monitor poverty and its evolution; recent analyses have also attempted to capture the qualitative aspects of poverty and vulnerability. Such efforts should be expanded and built into a system to plan and monitor interventions under the SNPS.
5. **Capacity assessment:** What resources already exist to deliver cash transfers and other programmes, and what additional resources are needed? The assessment should cover human resources (staffing numbers and expertise), administrative systems (including management information systems (MIS)), technological capability (e.g. can mobile phones or banks be used to deliver cash transfers?) and fiscal space (how much money can be mobilised from domestic resources plus donor support?). This should be an essential next step in Chad, as the country moves forward with establishment of

an institutional structure for social protection and the planning/implementation of a national social safety net pilot scheme.

6. **Strategising:** After these preliminary steps have been conducted, national governments normally proceed to the drafting of a national social protection policy or strategy that is formally adopted. In Chad, the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) was developed through a participatory process over two years (MEPCI 2014) and adopted by Government in July 2015. The strategy should also be supported by a costed implementation plan.
7. **Piloting:** Introducing or scaling up social protection requires testing new ideas and experimenting with options. This might include comparing different instruments (food aid *versus* cash transfers, or conditional *versus* unconditional transfers), delivery mechanisms (e.g. manual payments and electronic payment systems – using mobile banks or mobile phones) and management systems (e.g. compiling a ‘single registry’ database covering all social protection beneficiaries). Such testing might take place in Chad within the national safety net pilot currently being developed with World Bank support.
8. **Lesson learning:** Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems need to be set up, so that programmes can be monitored (are cash transfers being delivered efficiently and cost-effectively?) and their impacts can be evaluated (are cash transfer programmes achieving their objectives?). Information from the M&E system should feed back into continuous improvement of these programmes. This will require significant work in Chad within the overall context of monitoring strategic development priorities.
9. **Capacity building:** The initial capacity assessment (step 5) will identify deficits in delivery capacity. Capacity can be strengthened through formal training workshops for government officials and ‘training of trainers’ (ToT), or long-term technical assistance (TA) to government ministries, and/or study tours to learn from good practice in other countries. A number of national training workshops have already been conducted in Chad as part of the process of development of the National Social Protection Strategy, and key stakeholders have also participated in study tours. Moreover, the SNPS foresees establishment of a course on social protection for long-term capacity development through the national school for health and social workers.
10. **Institutionalisation:** Moving from fragmented projects towards integrated social protection systems that ensure comprehensive coverage requires building cross-sectoral linkages with other sectors (agriculture, education, health, labour, etc.) and establishing coordination mechanisms (within government, among development partners, and between the government, development partners and civil society), a sustainable financing strategy, and framework legislation. In Chad, this will be one of the key goals of the government, moving forward.

5.2. Choosing social protection models

Cash transfers are one social protection instrument among many, which also include food aid, public works, school feeding, and social insurance or social security. As discussed in chapter 2, there is growing experience with different models of social protection, which often achieve bigger positive impacts by combining cash transfers with other forms of support. Two examples are ‘graduation model programmes’ and ‘productive safety nets’.

- **Graduation model programmes** deliver a sequenced package of resources to poor households that have the potential to achieve self-reliant livelihoods. The standard package, pioneered by BRAC in Bangladesh, includes regular cash transfers for up to two years, a productive asset such as livestock or land for farming, access to micro-finance, training in livelihood activities and coaching in life-skills such as good nutrition and hygienic sanitation practices. To test whether the model works in different country contexts, 10 pilot projects were implemented in eight countries, and randomised control trial impact evaluations were conducted for six of these pilot projects, in Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru. In all cases, household income, assets and food security were

higher not only at the end of the intervention but one or two years later. The benefits exceeded the costs, and positive impacts were sustained after programme support ended (Banerjee *et al.* 2015a).

- **Productive safety net programmes** offer some components of the ‘graduation model’ package, but not all. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, the poorest households in rural communities are targeted (based on whether they received food aid in the previous two years in Ethiopia, and by a community-based wealth ranking in Rwanda), and those that have labour capacity are offered workplaces on local public works projects (building infrastructure and community assets such as roads or classrooms), while those with no labour capacity receive ‘direct support’ (free cash transfers). In addition, Ethiopia’s Food Security Programme includes a ‘Household Asset Building Programme’ that offers a livelihood package on low-interest credit, such as beehives and training in honey production and marketing, while Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme includes ‘Financial Services’ that offer individual or group loans to support micro-enterprises. The theory of change is that cash transfers and public works employment will stabilise income and protect household food security, while the livelihood support, aims to raise incomes and promote households out of poverty.

The ‘graduation model’ and ‘productive safety net’ approaches are worth considering in Chad, because they have proven their ability to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty and food insecurity in many countries, and to strengthen household and community resilience against shocks. As seen in Chapter 4, CARE’s cash transfer and resilience interventions in Wadi Fira are already adopting elements of such an integrated approach, with the ambition of moving beyond emergency relief or seasonal safety nets towards longer-term developmental impacts. However, these programmes are effective only if they target households with productive capacity. They should complement – but never replace – social protection interventions for labour-constrained vulnerable groups, such as children and the elderly.

5.3. Targeting

Targeting – the definition and accurate identification of people who are eligible to receive benefits – is one of the biggest challenges facing social protection programmes. Many targeting mechanisms exist, including geographical, categorical, community-based, self-targeting, and means-testing or proxy means tests. Each is associated with a trade-off between accuracy and cost. For example, geographical and categorical targeting are relatively cheap to implement, but quite inaccurate (high inclusion and exclusion errors), while means-testing is more accurate but more expensive, because it requires detailed and validated information on every household’s income and assets. No targeting strategy is ever 100% accurate, so an ‘acceptable level’ of inclusion and exclusion error needs to be identified by programme administrators. For example, the only way to guarantee zero exclusion error is a universal programme (everybody benefits – e.g. a general price subsidy on certain food items), but this introduces 100% inclusion error (high numbers of non-poor beneficiaries, who often benefit more than the poor because they buy and consume more of subsidised commodities – which is inefficient).

For delivering cash transfers, no single targeting mechanism is better than any other, and often a combination of several mechanisms is used to create a targeting strategy. The selection of targeting mechanism(s) should be determined by the objectives of the programme:

- for emergencies (food crises) and seasonal food insecurity – geographic targeting is a good way of reaching all people living in affected areas quickly, without needing to undertake an expensive and time-consuming assessment of each individual’s needs;
- for social welfare that delivers assistance to the labour-constrained ‘poorest of the poor’ – categorical targeting identifies groups of people who are likely to be vulnerable, based on proxy indicators of poverty and vulnerability (orphans, older people, people with disability, etc.);
- for developmental social protection – interventions that aim to promote poor and food insecure households into self-reliant and resilient livelihoods – these should target the ‘labour-capacitated poor’ (*pauvres valides*), as CARE does using HEA assessments;

- for avoiding social conflict and resentment between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries – community-based targeting, or community validation of households targeted using other approaches, such as a proxy means test, is an important complementary mechanism.

An increasingly popular approach for targeting cash transfer programmes in rural Africa is to start with geographical targeting (poor or marginal districts or provinces), then select vulnerable groups using categorical targeting or apply a proxy means test, validated by the community to improve accuracy and ensure community ownership.

5.4. Government ‘ownership’ and capacity development

As both the mapping of social safety nets in Chad and the case study of CARE’s programme activities in Wadi Fira have illustrated, until recently, cash transfers have been largely carried out by NGOs and funded by international development partners. As Chad moves forward with the establishment of its national social protection system and the ongoing implementation of the national social safety net pilot, it will be important to continuously build up capacity within government, at all levels, for the design and implementation of cash transfer programmes as an integral part of national social welfare and development priorities. Efforts in this sense should focus on strengthening i) institutional capacity, through the establishment of solid institutional structures and management practices at both national and sub-national levels; ii) financial capacity, through specific national budgetary allocations for social safety nets; and iii) technical capacity, through further training, experience exchange, and the establishment and/or expansion of ‘communities of practice’, around cash transfers, such as that which already exists in the Cash Learning Partnership (CALP). It will be of critical importance to build capacity for planning, implementation and oversight of cash transfer programmes at local government level and to include such programmes in local development planning and budgetary allocations.

5.5. Strengthened and expanded partnerships

Further efforts to consolidate partnerships around implementation of the SNPS should foresee mobilization of all key stakeholders (bilateral and multi-lateral institutions – including the UN system, international and national NGOs, parliamentarians, academics, religious leaders and civil society) in a structured manner that should provide for joint planning efforts, information exchange and the pooling of resources under government leadership. Emerging partnerships around the ‘resilience agenda’ could provide one avenue of expansion of partnerships around social protection, in general, and cash transfers in particular. Links with other key working groups around food security, nutrition, and other domains should also be explored.

5.6. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

As cash transfer interventions multiply and the national social safety net programme gets underway, it will be critical to establish rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and systems that can reliably assess both implementation processes and programme impacts. Data collection tools, methods and indicators should be both qualitative and quantitative and the results of programme assessments should be widely shared, discussed, and used to improve programme design and impacts. Strengthened national poverty monitoring efforts and specific operational research should be designed to assess the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and vulnerability and the various effects and impacts that cash transfers have on these different dimensions. In all such efforts, it will be important to include community-level participation so that the voices of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries can be heard and taken into account in the ongoing design and implementation of programmes.

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