Inclusive Urbanisation and Cities in the Twenty-First Century

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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>City Prosperity Index</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>information and communications technologies</td>
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<td>IUC</td>
<td>inclusive urbanisation and cities</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<td>UN-Habitat</td>
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1 Introduction

In academic and policy discourse, urbanisation and cities are currently receiving a great deal of attention, and rightly so. Both have been central to the enormous transformation the world has been going through during the past few centuries. Many parts of the world have experienced and are experiencing an urban transformation. While these processes have taken distinct regional forms across Latin America, East and South Asia, and Africa, it is clear that, globally, the urban transformation has coincided with major societal and ecological changes. Some of these developments have been heralded as progress – notably millions of people being lifted out of poverty – while others, such as entrenching inequalities and accelerating climate change, are alarming. In recent years the pro-urban voices have been louder, but accounts of the wonders of cities (for recent examples see Barber 2013; Glaeser 2011) need to be balanced with a recognition of the violence, inequity and environmentally destructive forces that cities can embody and reproduce. Equally important is to explore how cities and urbanisation can be made to contribute more to human wellbeing and to international and local development goals. This report is particularly concerned with whether and under what conditions more inclusive urbanisation and cities (IUC) can support these development goals.

Inclusion has only recently become a popular aspirational term in development discourse. There were only two references to inclusive/inclusion in the Millennium Declaration (United Nations General Assembly 2000), and none in the titles of the Millennium Development Goals. Fifteen years later the (roughly five times longer) text of the 2030 Agenda has 45 such references, including six in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) titles (United Nations 2015), while the draft of the New Urban Agenda that was agreed on at the Habitat III conference (17–20 October 2016) has 45 (United Nations 2016). Moreover, what has often been referred to as the cities goal among the SDGs is that by 2030 cities and human settlements become ‘inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’. In effect, the term ‘inclusive’ bears most of the weight of the social aspirations for future cities, despite it being relatively recently coined and poorly defined.

This report follows on from another in this series (McGranahan 2016) that focused explicitly on the role of cities and urbanisation in achieving development goals. In that report, it was argued that cities and rapid urbanisation have contributed more to achieving economic than social and environmental development goals, but that this imbalance can and should be rectified. It also argued that more IUC could become an important means of reducing the trade-offs and contradictions amongst these goals. This, however, requires a more critical understanding and synthesis of how inclusion in the context of cities and urbanisation is currently understood.

Section 2 briefly examines the concepts of urbanisation, cities and inclusion, what IUC denotes, and some of the different registers through which the inclusion of urbanisation and cities needs to be interpreted. Section 3 gives a brief analysis of inclusion (and exclusion) as a process and an outcome within various key framings of cities and urbanisation. In Section 4, we apply a conceptualisation of IUC to demonstrate its potential to illuminate a small selection of key urban issues (i.e. violence, informality, and migration).

A question underlying much of this report is whether a focus on IUC is a useful perspective through which to advocate for the pledge made by nations signing up to the 2030 Agenda that ‘no one will be left behind’. In other words, how should we conceptualise IUC to guide the actions needed to counter the rising in-country inequalities that so often accompany urbanisation, and arise from social and environmental goals frequently being sacrificed to short-term economic ends.
2 Key concepts: urbanisation, cities, inclusion and exclusion

2.1 Urbanisation

Over half the global population is now urban, and though there are conditions under which a country’s population share in urban areas may decline (Potts 2012a, 2012b), the trend to greater concentration of people in towns and cities is likely to continue for the rest of the twenty-first century. The United Nations estimates that by 2050 two-thirds of the world’s inhabitants will be urban, with the vast bulk of future population growth occurring in the urban areas of low- and middle-income Africa and Asia (United Nations Population Division 2015).

Urbanisation is widely viewed as key to achieving economic growth (Spence, Annez and Buckley 2009) and in recent decades there have been rapid theoretical, methodological and applied advancements concerning the forces of agglomeration, including the nature of neighbourhoods and human capital externalities, the foundations of systems of cities, the development of local political institutions, agglomeration and regional growth (Duranton, Henderson and Strange 2015; Henderson and Thisse 2004; Krugman 2011). Rapidly urbanising countries whose governments are generally keen on economic growth are concerned with their populations becoming spatially imbalanced, and many are making an effort to curb rural–urban migration (United Nations 2013). This may be in part because economic growth does not always flow from urbanisation, while it can be politically difficult to accommodate large numbers of migrants in cities and towns already growing rapidly due to natural population growth (Brueckner and Lall 2015; Liddle and Messinis 2014). Equally important, the failure to plan proactively for urban population growth can yield symptoms of over-urbanisation, including the growing unplanned settlements, creating more resistance to accommodating the new population, and further planning failures.

Policy debate and research on urbanisation is often made confusing by differing interpretations of what urbanisation is. In common parlance, urbanisation is the process of becoming more urban, but that meaning is unsatisfactory. Demographers define urbanisation as the increasing urban population share of a country or region, and this is widely accepted as the official definition: the share of a population that is urban is the level of urbanisation and the annual percentage increase in the share is the rate of urbanisation. These represent crude measures of the shift in population from smaller and more dispersed rural settlements towards larger and denser urban settlements. Most of this shift is the result of a net migration from rural to urban areas and the (often associated) expansion of urban areas.

An urban population is the people living in urban areas, but the criteria for being an urban area can seem rather arbitrary. The ‘urban’ label is typically applied to settlements that are larger (with cut-offs, when they are explicit, between 5,000 and 15,000) and denser (with cut-offs harder to compare) than rural ones. However, the definition of urban areas varies country by country and often includes administrative and other criteria such as the share of the population engaged in agriculture (McGranahan 2015; United Nations Population Division 2015).

The rural–urban dichotomy once helped to distinguish settlements where people were engaged principally in agriculture, from larger settlements where other economic or political activities predominated, but even in less urbanised countries the overlap between spatial form and livelihoods is increasingly blurred. It was also believed to capture other critical differences in
culture (e.g. *gemeinschaft* versus *gesellschaft*) and polity (e.g. lower versus higher administrative functions) but such distinctions are also no longer so closely associated with any rural—urban divide or continuum. Just as the globalisation of economic production and financial flows has tended to diminish the significance of national borders, they also diminish the significance of the rural—urban divide.

Nevertheless, the shift in the spatial distribution of population towards larger and denser settlements, and the migration this involves, remains one of the most important and challenging developmental transitions the world is going through. It is particularly significant in low-income countries where natural population growth rates are also high, contributing to what are often extremely high urban growth rates. The rural—urban distinction and estimates of urbanisation may be crude, but still provide revealing indicators of this critically important demographic transition.

Among non-demographers, including many urbanists, ‘urbanisation’ is often used more loosely. At various times it may be used to refer to: (a) urban population growth rather than the growth in the urban population share; (b) a growing share or quantity of a country or region’s land or economic activity that is becoming urban; (c) complex and multidimensional processes whereby many things, possibly but not necessarily including people, are becoming more urban; and (d) sometimes the environmental, cultural or even economic impacts that urban activities increasingly have on rural areas – as with the concept of planetary urbanisation summarised in Section 2.5.6.

There are problems with the widespread use of contradictory definitions of urbanisation, particularly when urbanisation is being blamed for the ‘explosive’ growth or expansion of cities. Equating urbanisation and urban population growth means ascribing all that population growth to urbanisation. But most countries experiencing the urban transition, from predominantly rural to predominantly urban populations, are also going through the demographic transition and experiencing rapid overall population growth. Urbanisation, defined conventionally as the growing urban population share, often only accounts for less than half of urban population growth, the rest being the result of natural population growth (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2014). Migration accounts for an even smaller share of urban growth, though it is often blamed for it, a mistake facilitated when the difference between urbanisation and urban growth is ignored.

Conventionally defined urbanisation accounts for an even smaller share of the growth of urban land areas, since urban densities are in decline globally (Angel *et al.* 2010). It can be especially confusing when the term ‘urbanisation’, conventionally meaning a shift towards denser settlement patterns, is used to refer to a phenomenon of urban expansion that, at least in more affluent countries, is driven primarily by sprawl.

Alternatively, when urbanisation is treated as a multidimensional but poorly specified urban development phenomenon, it is all too easy to ascribe to it changes that could actually be amplified by attempts to curb urbanisation, more narrowly defined. For example, a rising urban population share is often associated with rising inequality, and this is often treated as part of the urbanisation process but, somewhat perversely, inequalities are often amplified by attempts to make it difficult for poor migrants to gain a foothold in successful cities. Moreover, defining urbanisation as a process of urban change rather misses the point that the shift in population towards urban living is also a process of rural change.
In this report, we keep people central to the meaning of urbanisation, and by and large follow the conventional definition. On the other hand, urbanisation can only be understood within the context of a broader set of transformations, including the demographic transition and the economic shift away from agriculture. Moreover, both the challenges and the consequences of urbanisation depend heavily on what is driving it and how it is situated within the local, national and international contexts, as well as to other ongoing transformations. And when it comes to achieving development goals, how urbanisation is proceeding is a critical focus for action, while the rate at which it is proceeding is less so.

2.2 Cities
Cities are conventionally defined as important and/or populous urban settlements. They typically have their own governance structures, have formally demarcated boundaries, and possess a relatively coherent ‘identity’ as a city. As with conceptualisations of the urban, there is no consensus around what constitutes a city at the international level, or often at the national level. Most empirical research on cities focuses on particular cities or particular types or sizes of cities. Once viewed as typically monocentric and clearly bounded, cities are increasingly understood to be inherently polycentric, and inclined to merge into urban regions (Forman 2008; Hall 2009; Hall and Pain 2006; Jones and Douglass 2008). Even as the settlement form is becoming less distinct, the city is gaining more recognition in international policy discourse, with some claiming that we need to look more to city governments and leaders, what with globalisation and other forces undermining the pre-eminence of the nation state (Barber 2013). While cities are often described as vanguards of economic growth, and various other sources of wellbeing, it is vital to stress that they are also marked by extreme and often mounting inequalities (Chant and McIlwaine 2015: 29). Indeed inequality – as well as exclusion – has become a major emerging issue for cities, as the gap between the rich and the poor in most countries is at its highest level in 30 years (UN-Habitat 2016). How urbanisation takes place not only influences the levels of inequality, but also the extent to which they arise within the urban population, rather than between the rural and the urban populations.

Understanding cities in their diversity requires thinking in multiple ‘registers’ (Amin and Thrift 2007; Parnell and Pieterse 2016). They can be seen as: (a) sites where things happen; (b) hubs in wider networks and systems; and (c) concentrations of people and groups with the potential to effect change. In these terms, an urban spatiality register recognises the importance of concentrations of social, economic, architectural, and physical processes that transform places into entities with social meaning and power; a systems register recognises cities as sub-systems within larger complex systems that support the emergence of cities as entities with character traits that endure over time; and a socio-geographic register recognises the collaborations, conflicts and the emergence of cities as experienced and transformed by those who live in them.

2.3 Inclusion (and exclusion)
The term ‘inclusion’ came into development discourse from France by way of European social reforms of the 1990s (de Haan 1998; de Haan and Maxwell 1998). There has been some resistance to applying the concept of inclusion in very different settings, and particularly to where poverty is being driven by processes that could be termed ‘adverse inclusion’ (Du Toit 2004). In its defence, inclusion became popular as a term to refer to inclusion into social relationships of support. It has been used as a means of calling attention to the need to address multiple deprivations, and to move beyond unidimensional measures such as income poverty, which are often criticised by more socially minded development researchers (Alkire and Foster
Moreover, as pointed out by Amartya Sen (2000), inclusion and exclusion are relational terms, and can be used to broaden the focus of research on deprivation beyond outcomes, to include the relations and mechanisms that create these outcomes. With some care, it has proved possible to adapt the concepts to better fit development politics (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2014) and the challenges of chronic poverty (Nevile 2007).

There are problems that arise, however, when concepts like inclusion become aspirational terms in the development lexicon. First, aspirational terms used in declarations and reports on development tend to lose any precision to their meaning, and come to be good by definition rather than by implication. In the 1990s, it was observed that inclusion had been adapted differently in different settings, and at least three paradigms had been noted (Silver 1994). In France, with its history of Republicanism, inclusion was intended to support the extension of social solidarity and the rejection of liberalism, and inclusion was called for along with the demand that public institutions assume responsibility for necessary social aid (ibid.: 537).

As the concept spread and developed, however, an alternative liberal interpretation emerged, with an emphasis on removing discriminations. Elsewhere, the concept was adapted more to social democratic principles, evoking citizenship rights and the need to address inequalities. However, from a contested concept, inclusion has become a concept that many agree is good, partly because they do not agree on what it is.

In response, this report adopts a definition of inclusion that recognises it as ranging from removing discrimination, to enhancing voice in existing institutions, to securing people’s human rights (McGranahan, Schensul and Singh 2016). These can be roughly interpreted as three levels of inclusion, but it should not be assumed that securing people’s human rights necessarily involves improving the terms of inclusion or eliminating discrimination, or for that matter that improving the terms of inclusion involves elimination of discrimination. As with the different paradigms of inclusion that Hilary Silver (1994) identifies, some may be more radical or set their heights higher than others, but this does not always mean their approach to inclusion accomplishes more. Moreover, inclusion and exclusion can mean very different things in different countries and different places within countries, and the simplified use of the terms within the 2030 Agenda and even in this report should not be allowed to hide this (Silver 2015).

Inclusion and exclusion evoke spatial metaphors, and have special relevance to urban contestation over land, space and place. Tracing the recent popularity of inclusion in international declarations to its French 1960s roots, it is worth noting that Lefebvre first published on the right to the city in the radical France of 1968 (Lefebvre 1968), Castells drew on this French experience in writing his classic on The Urban Question (Castells 1977), and the banlieues housing minority populations on the outskirts of Paris have long been considered emblematic of exclusion in France (Silver 1994: 534). Looking more broadly, exclusion from the city has itself been a key form of exclusion in poorer countries, and especially those attempting to resist mass urbanisation partially driven by rural–urban migration. Moreover, exclusion from and inclusion within the city are often interlinked, with many of those excluded within the city treated, explicitly or implicitly, as belonging to groups that should be excluded from the city – as with the semi-fictional Bombay judge Arundhati Roy describes as justifying the bulldozing of unauthorised settlements on the grounds that ‘people who couldn’t afford to live in cities, shouldn’t live in them’ (Roy 2014: 1).

Apartheid South Africa must be among the most discriminatory and systematic examples of exclusive urbanisation, based as it was on a racial pass system and policies explicitly designed to keep black Africans from moving to live in the cities. In some ways, it was just a follow-on
from a common tendency of European colonialists to try to keep ‘natives’ from gaining a permanent foothold in the cities, or at least the European part of the city. However, exclusionary policies are also linked to resistance to urbanisation in ways that have nothing to do with colonialism. China’s hukou1 system, which acted for many years to restrict rural–urban migration, and still profoundly restricts the life chances of many urban dwellers with rural hukou, is often presented as one of the most egregious forms of social discrimination in contemporary China (Chan and Buckingham 2008), though its effects are diminishing. The favelas of Brazil reflect a more passive but also very exclusionary resistance to urbanisation (Martine and McGranahan 2013). More generally, informal settlements and informal economies can often be seen as a compromised exclusion, not as extreme or oppressive as evictions, but supported by planning and regulations that are only designed to accommodate those who secure acceptable housing or jobs, and in effect exclude a large share of the urban population.

Accordingly, exclusive urbanisation often leaves a socio-spatial legacy, and the townships of South Africa and favelas of Brazil remain sites of social deprivation and political discontent, emerging out of how they were created as much as how they are now treated (Perlman 2010; Turok 2014). Urban exclusion is not the monopoly of cities and towns experiencing or having recently experienced rapid urbanisation, however. Nor is it the monopoly of low- and middle-income countries.

In the United States, the mechanisms and destructive outcomes of urban exclusion can be linked to a number of the social injustices that have received attention in recent years, even if they are not always described in terms of exclusion and inclusion. In some way the closest parallel to the resistance to urbanisation in lower-income countries is the resistance to international migrants coming into higher-income countries from those of lower income. Illegal migrants form an important part of the urban underclass in the United States, as in many high-income countries. Their lack of rights and restriction to the informal economy have direct parallels with rural–urban migrants in the global South, living in informal settlements and working in the informal economy. But many of the more pervasive forms and mechanisms of urban exclusion in the United States have little to do with foreign migrants.

Urban policing and eviction have been receiving considerable attention, and both are linked to racial discrimination and mechanisms of exclusion that affect already deprived groups. Alice Goffman’s widely heralded and controversial book On the Run (2014) documents how and why policing has become what amounts to a mechanism of social and economic exclusion in a deprived African American neighbourhood in Philadelphia, affecting young black men most directly. Alternatively, Matthew Desmond’s equally heralded if less controversial book Evicted (2016) shows how and why evictions have become a mechanism of exclusion in the more deprived parts of Milwaukee. His research had previously shown that ‘[i]n poor black neighbourhoods, eviction is to women what incarceration is to men: a typical but severely consequential occurrence contributing to the reproduction of urban poverty’ (Desmond 2012: 88).

Spatial segregation by income and race is an entrenched reality in American cities. There has been a great deal of detailed research on the nature, dynamics and consequences of such segregation (Sampson 2012). Recent research has demonstrated how important segregation and other neighbourhood characteristics are to intergenerational socioeconomic mobility (Chetty and Hendren 2015; Chetty et al. 2014a; Chetty et al. 2014b).

1 The hukou is a household registration system linking household members to a particular location. It was originally used to restrict unauthorised movement, especially between rural and urban locations. It still restricts people’s access to benefits (such as children’s education) when they live somewhere without a local hukou.
2.4 Situating inclusion within academic and donor discourses on urbanisation and cities

Inclusion is rapidly becoming a staple concept in donor discourses on cities and urbanisation (exemplified by the New Urban Agenda); however, only a handful of research publications have explicitly used the concept of ‘inclusive urbanisation’ (see e.g. Choy and Li 2016; Etherington 2013; Guo, Xiao and Yuan 2016; McGranahan et al. 2016; Shrestha et al. 2014).

Drawing to some extent on the World Bank’s definition of inclusion as ‘the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society’ (2013: 3), as well as ‘improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society’ (ibid.), McGranahan et al. (2016: 17) accept the part of the definition that describes inclusion as improvements to the terms on which people gain access to the means of securing wellbeing, including most notably markets, services and spaces. However, they see inclusion as a process which extends ‘from eliminating discriminatory exclusion (a), to actively intervening in creating more equitable markets, services and spaces (b), as well as to guaranteeing human rights (c)’ (ibid.). This definition could cover overt and covert structural forms of discrimination, with IUC involving both process and outcome: inclusiveness in the processes of urban change (urbanisation and urban growth), including in social, economic and political processes, as well as an aspiration for equitable cities that enable wellbeing and a good quality of life for all as outcomes of those change processes. More equitable and just urban societies enable disadvantaged groups to politically voice and articulate their concerns, pointing to the critical role of urban governance.

How do ideas on inclusion play out within key thinking on, and framings of, cities and urbanisation? In Section 2.5, we conduct a rapid overview of eight framings of the city and urbanisation that have recently advanced urban thinking, and discuss these in the light of the above. We look at: (i) world/global cities; (ii) charter cities; (iii) prosperous cities; (iv) inclusive cities; (v) smart cities; (vi) planetary urbanisation; (vii) sustainable urbanisation; and (viii) rural–urban linkages. We point out that each of these conceptual framings is associated with particular intellectual and political agendas, and we consider the extent to which those agendas and their associated insights overlap with IUC.

2.5 Concepts of the city

The first five concepts have an exclusive focus on cities: world/global cities; charter cities; prosperous cities; inclusive cities and smart cities.

2.5.1 World/global cities

The concept of world cities represents the network of interlinked world cities that are central to our global economy (Friedmann and Wolff 1982). It emphasises the interconnectivity of these cities and stresses their importance for the world economy as hubs for financial capital flow, and imbued with tremendous economic power within nation states (McFarlane 2008; Robinson 2002). While world cities are on the one hand the outcome of urbanisation, on the other hand they are the sites where the process of urbanisation (and globalisation) takes place. Yet, this concept has been critiqued for being Western-centric and privileging the economic aspects of contemporary urbanisation. As a result, Saskia Sassen (1991, 2010, 2013) proposed the terminology of ‘global cities’. Here too the global city is characterised by the presence of

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2 The Globalization and World Cities Research Network (www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/) developed the inventory of Alpha, Beta and Gamma cities based on cities’ connectivity through advanced producer services.
services that are essential to the international flow of financial capital (banking, accounting, insurance); however, these global cities also present sites of conflict, where the ‘disadvantaged and excluded can gain presence’ (Sassen 2013: 67). Global cities hence can serve as a venue where multiple struggles for inclusion, equity and social justice can come together and reinforce each other.

The importance of world or global cities from the perspective of inclusion/exclusion comes in at least two forms. Firstly, the world city (or world class city) has become an aspirational term – something that mayors of successfully developing cities are meant to aspire to, and the leaders of successfully developing countries are meant to help their best cities to achieve. The world city is not just wealthy and cosmopolitan; it can afford to flaunt that wealth and has few visible signs of poverty. This reinforces a strong bias against making space for the country’s poorer and more marginalised populations (e.g. Ananya Roy 2011). Secondly, the economic dynamics driven by global cities are themselves often exclusionary. Indeed, Sassen’s (2014) book is entitled Expulsions, and she emphasises that exclusion has become too weak a word to capture what is happening as the result of some of urban-centred economic transformations.

2.5.2 Charter cities

Charter cities is a concept developed by economist Paul Romer (the current chief economist of the World Bank) to serve as an ideal city type built on ultra-efficient governance for streamlined economic performance and growth. Charter cities have not been well received in either academic or policy circles due to some of the extreme assumptions and aspirations of the model. It has been controversial from the point of view of inclusion, since it appears to have no room for contestation or broad democratic participation in governance processes, which would be driven by a single-minded search for innovation and growth.

Modelled after cities such as Hong Kong and Shenzhen, charter cities are, ideally, meant to reduce poverty and enhance economic growth in cities in the global South. The concept centres on the underlying assumption that corrupt and incapable governments are one of the main reasons for poverty and inequality in cities. The idea is for charter cities to be allowed special economic zones – with exceptional economic, legal, and political regulations within their national contexts – which would create prosperity and pro-poor growth by providing ‘well governed’ opportunities for foreign investment. While it is clearly framed as seeing urbanisation as an outcome in that charter cities ‘will allow relatively poor countries to catch up with or surpass the rest of the world’ (Romer 2010: 10), the concept, however, does not seem to propose a more inclusive approach to urbanisation. For example, it focuses on creating economic hubs similar to Hong Kong, but it is unclear how, and in what capacity, existing urban residents would participate in the process, much less new residents drawn to the city by the prospect of such dramatic economic opportunity.

This concept of charter cities puts all the emphasis on one dimension of inclusion – workers in the country where the charter city is embedded are in principle free to come and go, and the charter city will only succeed to the extent that it can provide more than other parts of the country. This is conceived of more as a freedom than a form of inclusion, but it does represent an important mechanism through which urban inclusion/exclusion can be secured, and not just in charter cities. On the other side, however, the charter city provides no inclusion into politics – no right to the city – and presumably no social security for new migrants and hence little in the way of rights-based policies.
2.5.3 Prosperous cities

Prosperous cities are proposed by UN-Habitat as an urban policy and planning framework in their State of the World’s Cities Report 2012/2013 – and used in more than 400 cities as a monitoring framework. While urbanisation and cities are often associated with environmental degradation, poverty and social exclusion, they can also become sites of prosperity, where people find satisfaction of basic human needs and have access to public services. A prosperous city, as conceptualised by UN-Habitat, is the outcome of sustainable urbanisation. Equality and social inclusion are put forward as one of the five ‘spokes’ in the ‘Wheel of Urban Prosperity’ along with productivity, infrastructure, quality of life and environmental sustainability (UN-Habitat 2012: 11–12). It highlights the importance of functioning institutions and legal frameworks for urban planning, and emphasises the importance of sound data enabling cities to become venues of innovative solutions supporting regional and national development.

Prosperous cities are assessed using a City Prosperity Index (CPI), which includes economic growth as well as physical, social, political and environmental aspects. In addition, a ‘Wheel of Urban Prosperity’ identifies five key interrelated dimensions that underpin a city’s prosperity, namely: productivity, infrastructure, quality of life, equity and social inclusion, and environmental sustainability. The hub at the centre of the wheel represents government institutions, laws and urban planning.

While inclusiveness is a key aspirational feature of prosperous cities, the concept fails to adequately address the issue of people who would migrate into the city. The steady arrival and integration of these people would need to be accommodated in an inclusive way in order to seriously adhere to the stated goals. Urbanisation, almost however defined, is a process that extends beyond cities and involves people and places becoming more urban. Central to the conventional definition is the shift in population from rural to urban, primarily through net migration from less to more urban locations. However, urban growth is also significantly caused by natural growth and the debate about migrants often overshadows this. Arguably, the concept of inclusive cities tends to privilege existing residents and citizens. But is such a city, acting in the interests of its citizens, inclusive? Its urbanisation is unlikely to be, particularly if these citizens perceive themselves to have an interest in limiting the ‘floods’ of rural–urban migrants. In practice, the exclusion of poor unskilled migrants, from or within the city, is also likely to amplify the exclusion of other poor groups within the city.

2.5.4 Inclusive cities

The inclusive cities concept is a response to the growing disparities in income and wealth experienced in urban areas since the mid-1980s (Espino 2015; Serageldin 2016). This has contributed to the erosion of social, economic, and political cohesion. Not all those who live in urban areas experience the same levels of access to urban services, and thus experience varying degrees of social exclusion (McGranahan et al. 2016; Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2013). The inclusive cities concept views urban areas as needing to be more inclusive to marginalised groups, such as migrants, children, women, minority groups, and the urban poor, by guaranteeing some degree of equality to its citizens. This could be pursued through a variety of economic, social, and political measures. These include: increasing and promoting the political participation of marginalised groups; allowing marginalised groups to use urban space to voice their concerns; promoting universal access to basic services, such as affordable housing, water, sanitation, education, basic income security, and rule of law; universal access to social protection mechanisms such as social transfers and health insurance; increased urban accessibility; increased local and national government accountability; and basic land tenure.

2.5.5 Smart cities
The concept of the smart city calls for innovative investment opportunities in physical and human urban capital and development (Caraglu et al. 2011; Graham 2002; Hollands 2008; Komninos 2002, 2008; Komninos, Pallet and Schaffers 2013; Leydesdorff and Deakin 2011). A smart city would pair investment in human and social capital with transport, modern information and communications technologies (ICTs) across urban areas to increase quality of life, business collaboration and innovation, increased urban service provision, and citizen empowerment. This would be achieved through improved administrative and economic efficiency, an increased emphasis on urban business development, universal inclusion of urban residents in public services, promoting high-tech and creative industries, and understanding the importance of social and environmental sustainability.

While the concept of a smart city is fundamentally about the use of technology, it has come to represent another aspirational vision of an ideal city type – a shorthand for everything desirable. In this way, the concept has been used in a functionally exclusive way. For example, urban areas in India that were already developing in exclusive ways have been selected to become smart cities, further entrenching the exclusionary dynamics (Datta 2015a, 2015b; Luque, McFarlane and Marvin 2014; Gupte 2016a).

2.5.6 Planetary urbanisation
Planetary urbanisation refers to urbanisation as it is actually taking place rather than as it should be happening, and takes a very critical stance towards this tendency. Inclusion is central to the concerns of many writing under the umbrella of planetary urbanisation. This is not obvious from the term planetary urbanisation, which is more evocative of concepts such as ecological footprints (Rees 1992) or nature’s metropolis (Cronon 1991) that emphasise how urban activities should be seen as driving rural transformations increasingly across the whole globe. However, in the readings that Brenner (2014) pulled together in a book entitled Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization, those closely related to radical forms of urban inclusion are central. Indeed, Brenner has put a great deal of emphasis on the right to the city, and the work of Lefebvre – though when Lefebvre referred to the planetarisation of the urban it was to signal a concern for the third millennium, but was by no means the only concern (Lefebvre 2014).

As a critique to Brenner and Schmid (2011, 2015), Caterall (2013) asks for ‘bringing back the planet’ to planetary urbanisation theory and calls for developing a multidimensional, transdisciplinary, rather than interdisciplinary approach, while Buckley and Strauss (2016) consider that planetary urbanisation scholars often fail to pay attention to the gendered ways and implications of dismantling the urban–rural dichotomy. Planetary urbanisation may also have a blind spot towards the political dynamics of urbanisation more traditionally defined, and the challenges of inclusive urbanisation in particular. On the other hand, given its Marxist roots, one would expect those researching planetary urbanisation to take a critical stance towards inclusion as a progressive concept, as it suggests that marginalised people can become part of the prosperous classes through a non-disruptive process. Indeed, inclusion defined or pursued in a technocratic way is unlikely to achieve much relevance. Making cities and their urbanisation processes more inclusive will inevitably involve resistance and contestation at every turn.

2.5.7 Sustainable urbanisation
The idea of sustainable urbanisation draws heavily from the effects of urbanisation on the environment (see e.g. Cohen 2006; Girardet 1999; Rees 1995). It points to the world’s growing urban population, and its associated resource consumption and waste production, as examples
of increasing strains on the world’s environment. Scholars writing around this concept are concerned with how cities and urbanisation could contribute to development that is more environmentally sustainable and more equitable. McGranahan and Satterthwaite (2003), for example, highlight the important potential of urban centres as having potential to support a more sustainable development through the advantages of urban density in reducing waste, increasing recycling, and reducing per capita resource use.

Sustainable urbanisation implies urbanisation that is environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable – with social sustainability, in turn, implying some forms of inclusion. But those using the term provide less detail on how inclusion is to be achieved. Sustainability, and sustainable development in particular, actually came into development discourse as a means of highlighting the importance to the world of maintaining sufficient resources and environmental quality for future generations – recognising in effect that they were a vulnerable group in a world of (economic) growth maximisation. When applied to urbanisation, this is, to a degree, the same concern as that suggested by the term planetary urbanisation, but turned into a more positive aspiration. The term is also more suggestive of debate within the development community than within the academic community. In the development community, sustainability rapidly evolved from a concept signalling the green agenda to a broader concept that also encompasses social and economic goals (the social, economic, and environmental that constitute the three pillars of sustainability). As a social aspiration, inclusion itself is relatively attractive to development discourse as it seems to call for non-disruptive change. For much the same reason, it is unlikely to appeal to radical academics. Thus, at least in principle, sustainable urbanisation would seem to be a concept that is very supportive of inclusive urbanisation. However, the use of a classic definition of urbanisation also imposes a rather clunky meaning to the concept of sustainable urbanisation. Why would one want urbanisation (the growing relative share of urbanites in a country’s total population) to be sustainable? Some urbanisation surely doesn’t deserve to be sustained. In practice, however, in the urban context, the emphasis has been on sustainable cities rather than sustainable urbanisation, with the relevant SDG target being to ‘make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ (United Nations 2015).

2.5.8 Rural–urban linkages

*Rural–urban linkages* focuses on breaking down and reframing the urban from a range of perspectives. Recent literature suggests that the linkages between rural and urban areas, and the ability to separate them into two distinct categories, are fraught with difficulty (see e.g. Satterthwaite 2006; Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2003; Tacoli 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007; Tacoli et al. 2015). For instance, municipal boundaries tend to be less meaningful in demarcating the transition from urban to rural. Households are often split, with some family members spending time or residing across both rural and urban areas. Seasonal migration makes it difficult to accurately measure populations. Further, urban residents may participate in agriculture and livelihoods based on ecosystem services while rural and peri-urban residents increasingly take on non-agricultural employment.

Such nuanced understandings of the relationships between the urban and the rural also complicate the framing of what IUC is. The most obvious issue concerns the inclusion of rural–urban migrants in the urban areas where they settle. Studies show that rural–urban migration is not a straightforward process of rural people moving to an urban town or city, but the net result of complex movements back and forth between rural and urban areas (e.g. Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2014). Especially at the height of the urbanisation process, many households may be bi-local, rural and urban, and thus temporarily achieve inclusion as well as exclusion in the city, for instance in terms of accessing urban public services and markets. Indeed, as urban
populations grow, those who remain in rural areas may be increasingly deprioritised and excluded from access to infrastructure and investment. Yet, one must be careful not to treat this sort of exclusion as a straightforward ‘urban bias’, in part because this misleadingly implies that the more disadvantaged urban dwellers, often including family members of rural households, are included. In any case, it is clear that to understand IUC it is important to recognise relevant rural–urban linkages.
3 Analysis

Having given a quick overview of various framings of cities and urbanisation, Table 3.1 summarises the ways in which these framings discuss (or fail to discuss) inclusion and exclusion. Foremost, it shows that the process towards inclusion is hung up on quite different aspects, notably stressing the roles of finance capital, technology, governance, urban planning and other public interventions in generating human and spatial interconnections that may be more or less inclusive. Similarly, the eight framings envisage quite distinct kinds of outcomes for urbanisation and cities. Inclusion may be framed in terms of the city rather than its people (incorporation of world/global cities in a select network of cities), overlooking existing exclusions (smart cities), newcomers (prosperous cities) and the political contestation inherently needed to achieve inclusion (charter cities, planetary urbanisation); presenting its intergenerational (sustainable urbanisation) and ‘beyond the urban’ angles (rural–urban linkages; planetary urbanisation; sustainable urbanisation).

Table 3.1 How key framings of cities and urbanisation consider inclusion in terms of processes and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World/global</td>
<td>Inclusion as the interconnectivity of global cities through private finance</td>
<td>Aspirations of achieving global city status are associated with ‘erasure’ of the visible presence of the poor. As an economic dynamic, world/global cities inherently drive expulsions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cities</td>
<td>capital flows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter cities</td>
<td>Ultra-efficient governance for streamlined economic growth and poverty</td>
<td>A promise of inclusive economic participation and growth; poverty reduction. Political participation and rights to the city are restricted to activities that further economic prosperity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reduction. Contrasts with status quo governance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>Government institutions and legal frameworks for urban planning promote</td>
<td>Envisages building socially inclusive, accessible, pro-poor, equitable and gender-sensitive cities for current citizens, but entitlements of newcomers (migrants) are not clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cities</td>
<td>inclusion. Monitoring and data collection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Public interventions (economic, social and political) advance equality</td>
<td>Envisages a minimum level of equality and opportunity for all citizens, including access to services, rule of law, income, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cities</td>
<td>for marginalised groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart cities</td>
<td>Invest in ICTs, physical infrastructure and people’s skills for human</td>
<td>Digitised interactions for efficient governmentality and quality of life. Masks and entrenches existing exclusions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>connectivity and business innovation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planetary</td>
<td>Foregrounds the interconnections between urbanisation and ‘non-urban’</td>
<td>Inclusion as a right to the city; but political processes of achieving this are underdeveloped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urbanisation</td>
<td>change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Little active consideration given to inclusion.</td>
<td>Inclusion as intergenerational preservation of environmental resources and quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urbanisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural–urban</td>
<td>Breaks down the rural–urban dichotomy to highlight mobility and commodity</td>
<td>Posits that inclusion/exclusion outcomes associated with the urbanisation process occur in both urban and rural locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linkages</td>
<td>flows, market access and other interconnections that determine inclusion/exclusion outcomes.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Viewing cities and urbanisation in inclusive terms implies creating places in which people find opportunities and fulfil their human potential. The concepts of charter cities and prosperous cities each point to this, but as discussed above, they do not go far enough. It is not sufficient to recognise potential; it is necessary to explore the conditions under which the inequalities and injustices that persist in cities across the globe can be countered to achieve more equitable and inclusive outcomes. Planetary urbanisation and sustainable urbanisation highlight the importance of recognising that cities have become, with the preponderance of wealth and activity, drivers of global change. In this respect, cities themselves become drivers of change: a living subject making itself new every day. Rural–urban linkages also note how processes that take place in the city actually extend far beyond the city limits. Seeing a city as a network hub can help illuminate how things that may be physically distant are actually nearby in the relational space of networks. These processes – again, of all types, including communication, wealth transfers, economic production, urban metabolism – depend on the physical infrastructure that connects things (like roads and power lines) as well as social infrastructure (policies, rules, regulations, norms) to impede or facilitate processes and skew them towards inclusivity or exclusivity.

Furthermore, these eight framings present cities and urbanisation in terms of geographic locations, network hubs and complex systemic processes of change, nested within larger systems of governance (e.g. the national, global) and environmental systems operating at different scales. Thus, in low-income urban settings the locus of the most severe environmental burdens tend to be relatively local, quick and health threatening, while in highest income settings the burdens tend to be global, slow and threatening to human life support systems. Additionally, the world/global cities concept frames the city as both a geographic location and a hub of networked activity spanning the globe and connecting – through economic activity, supply chains, communication, and more – lives lived in one place to others across the world. In these hubs, processes of consumption as well as protest and struggle can be leveraged and magnified. However, while we speak of cities and their governance as if unitary, in practice we often witness plurality. For instance, spatial inequalities within cities persist, having important economic, political, social, and ultimately urban wellbeing outcomes.

In Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we seek to apply some of these insights to an exploration of three important contemporary urban themes: violence and order; informality; and migration and the city.

3.1 Violence and order in the city
The built environment is a complex social production (Lefebvre 1991), where the ideologies of order not only segregate urban space, for example along ethnic or class distinctions, but such spatial practices also connect with emergent forms of political negotiations (Gooptu 2001). Where these negotiations are not managed through governance institutions, negotiations can ‘tip’ over into violence (Moser and Rodgers 2012). This matters because violence severely debilitates development outcomes, particularly for the most marginalised, and when it becomes endemic to the built environment, it stands at odds with the characterisation of cities as engines of growth. As such, urban violence is invariably connected with political negotiations and mediations over the control of power and space in the city (Brenner 2004). The modalities of such violence can range by virtue of its motivations (e.g. economic, political, or criminal), its pathologies (e.g. armed, physical, sexual, or psychological), by the nature of the victims (e.g. gender-based, or youth) as well as the nature of the perpetrators (e.g. by a gang, a mob, or even at the behest of the state as it forcibly evicts people).
The relative prominence of these characteristics is context-specific, with sociocultural norms and prevailing notions of what it means to live well in a city, playing as important a role as the locations in which violence is perpetrated (e.g. mega-city vs small towns; inner-city vs periphery). For example, widespread public violence, such as rioting, generally takes place in cities that provide the physical, social and demographic infrastructure for significant mobilisation against marginalisation or state neglect (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers 2013). Often, the highest levels of urban unrest occur during periods of political contest, including elections and other periods of national instability (Raleigh 2015). And yet, the configurations of the built environment can themselves become the central ‘objectives to be “taken over”, marked, destroyed’ (Humphrey 2013). Urban violence can therefore create spatial discontinuities by disrupting not only the city’s reticulate infrastructure, but also its less visible, but continually active, social structures (Pullan 2013). As violence can also be constituted within the infrastructural processes in the city (Bhan 2016), its legacies also linger by redefining the accepted parameters of what is adequate, or acceptable, urban living (e.g. in Beirut in Fawaz 2014; in Mumbai in Hansen 2001; and in Bogota in Moser and Mcllwaine 2004).

As such, there is little doubt that cities themselves have become key loci of violence during the past half-century (Rodgers 2009). Analysis of city fragility at a global level shows that while a growing number of cities are leading the way in generating global gross domestic product (GDP), a vast number of urban areas, both large and small, continue to be left behind (Muggah 2014). This can be seen both in the context of fragile countries, where violence is not restricted to urban areas, as well as in countries that are otherwise considered stable, but where cities are the location where violence is concentrated.

Looking at countries that are affected by the violence of war, political settlements, or the arrangements by which political power is organised and exercised, during or post-conflict also have a distinct connection with the urban space. Eighteen of the 31 most fragile and conflict-affected countries are projected to be at least 50 per cent urban by 2040, a further five will have nearly two-fifths of their populations living in urban areas (Gupte 2016b). When the violence of war does occur in urban areas, it is invariably indicative of changing strength ratios between rebels and government (see e.g. Holtermann 2014). Even if cities and towns are not the actual location of war, control over them can often be the objective (Beall et al. 2013). We also know that violence against civilians during civil wars now occurs predominantly in urban areas (Raleigh 2012, 2015); urban inhabitants can therefore become targets that need to be continually tracked and controlled, during war and even after the onset of peace (Graham 2011). There are several modalities of urban violence in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, ranging from ‘militia activity in Benghazi, Libya; riots and protests in Cairo, Egypt; rebel and militia violence in Kismayo, Somalia; to rebels and militias in Bangui, Central African Republic’ (Raleigh 2015: 91).

In countries that are otherwise considered stable, the dialectic between urban form and violence is continually underpinned by the state’s imposition of ‘order and to constitute [the city] as a site for legitimate control by establishing clear-cut boundaries between the legal and non-legal’ (Chatterji and Mehta 2007: 129). By defining these boundaries, the state distinguishes between urban citizens, who are seen as legitimately possessing rights to which the state is accountable, and the ‘population’ (as characterised by Chatterjee 2004), which is a vague and heterogeneous grouping without legitimate claims on state provision. This may materialise as the recognition of one area as ‘at the margins’ (Shields 1991), and not another, as the recognition of one group of people as ‘slum dwellers’ or illegal residents, and not others, or most poignantly, as the recognition of some individuals as criminal, and not others (Gupte, forthcoming).
Both the 2030 Agenda and the New Urban Agenda implicitly recognise that there is a deepening crisis of trust between civilians and the institutions that govern the provision of essential services like housing, water and security in cities across conflict and non-conflict settings. This crisis reflects the acute realities of everyday life, particularly for those groups that are marginalised because of their gender, their sociopolitical identity or even their economic status, particularly when government actions aim to exert the rule of law through coercive measures. We see that when planning, policy or design interventions misinterpret ‘ordered cities’ as synonymous with ‘planned’, or ‘smart’ cities, they are likely to create insecurity, not reduce it.

A fundamental question in this regard is whether cities protect women from, or expose them to, gender-based violence. The pattern of domestic violence suffered by women in cities is contradictory across countries: the World Health Organization (WHO 2005) notes that women in urban areas are less likely to report intimate partner violence than their rural counterparts in Brazil, Peru, Tanzania and Thailand, but Kishor and Johnson (2004) find the opposite in Bolivia, Haiti and Zambia. To explain such disparities, McIlwaine (2013) notes that while some underlying risk factors of domestic violence are especially acute in cities, others are less prominent. On the one hand, domestic violence is related to stress, and routine violence in urban communities aggravates these stressors (Wirtz et al. 2014; Horn 2010; Annan and Brier 2010). However, cities also provide opportunities for the economic empowerment of women (e.g. in Ghana in Mueller and Tranchant, forthcoming), and stronger norms around gender equality can help prevent violence against women. For example, women in urban areas are consistently less likely to accept wife-beating than women in the countryside (McIlwaine 2013). Women are also less likely to be judged when moving outside of their homes, and more likely to report cases of domestic violence in cities, with more sources of help at their disposal (Jewkes et al. 2002).

A strong case can be made suggesting that well-managed and inclusive governance practices in cities, particularly those that address the risk factors that drive domestic violence, can revitalise urban spaces that had either been lost to violence or suffered from a lack of access to basic services and neglect, and that this can, for example, have a direct impact on how women negotiate the city. Effective and inclusive urban governance improves the ability, opportunity and dignity of people to take part in society and institutions of governance by overcoming disadvantage based on identity or exclusion from markets, services and spaces.

### 3.2 Informality and IUC

Informality is a critical feature to the everyday functioning of cities across the globe. Conceptually slippery, we can understand informality using economic, spatial, governance, social, epistemological and behavioural lenses (McFarlane and Waibel 2012). Here we highlight some key aspects, to argue that approaches towards IUC must work with the grain of informality, while rejecting its worst excesses.

Spatial forms of informality, such as urban informal settlements, now house a quarter of the world’s countries and a third of developing countries, i.e. over 863 million people (UN-Habitat 2012). Work in the informal economy is growing globally, contrary to decades of predictions of its demise. While work is the most important pathway out of poverty (World Bank 2012), the majority of urban jobs in developing countries are informal, i.e. unprotected by labour regulations and without social security (Ghani and Kanbur 2013). Developed countries are also affected by a major trend of job casualisation (Charmes 2012), with formal jobs disappearing and being replaced by new forms of ‘self-employment’ and zero-hours contracts lacking social security, including unemployment pay, health insurance, paid holidays and other protections.
Informality is also typically associated with poverty. As such, where urbanisation and urban population growth are rapid, informality is often taken by the authorities and elites as a symptom of there being too many poor people coming to the city. The problem from this perspective is that existing regulations – including those whose contravention is so evident in informal settlements – are not enforced rigorously enough. The ‘obvious’ solution is to enforce the regulations more vigorously, and certainly not to redesign them to accommodate people flouting them. However, destroying people’s homes and livelihoods is bound to be strongly resisted and often leads to the spatial relocation of the problem, while in the process causing enormous damage to lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable urban groups. Most of those living and working in this type of informality have nowhere else better to live or work. Whether it affects small numbers of households or hundreds of thousands of people, driving anyone out of the city is an extremely violent act that undermines the efforts of people to improve their lives.

Those living and working in informality may well agree that the problem is that they do not have access to acceptable jobs and housing. They may protest evictions. But they are unlikely to fight for the right to live and work in *enduringly* substandard conditions. For those representing informal residents and informal workers politically, the solution is more and better homes and jobs, not lower standards, and an acknowledgement of the right to development, to allow people to save and invest (e.g. in their housing and businesses) without destructive intervention by the state or other powerful actors. Accepting existing living and working conditions would be the worst sort of co-optation.

While certain forms of informality are typically associated with poverty, it is important to recognise that informality also plays a role in the lives of better-off urbanites, as a practice of urban authorities, and as a practice that enables the functioning of formal systems and economies. Scholars increasingly critique notions that the formal and informal economies are distinct entities. A growing number of studies have demonstrated that informality is not ‘outside’ formal systems and regulations, but is instead produced by formal structures adopting informal practices (Porter 2011; Roy 2005). Moreover, notions that the informal is the preserve of the poor are now vigorously challenged (Roy 2009, 2005). For instance, Ghertner (2008) notes that violations of planning or building laws in Delhi are widely prevalent, by both the elite and the poor, and that much of the built city can be viewed as ‘unauthorised’. In Mumbai, floods in 2005 shifted debates to the informal practices of the state and private developers seeking to bypass formal regulations (McFarlane 2012).

Roy (2009) similarly argues that in many cities, wealthy elites are able to renegotiate what is legal and illegal, authorised and unauthorised, for instance in relation to building regulations and planning laws. As such, the argument for addressing urban informality by stricter enforcement of regulations is no longer simply about people’s ability to afford living by the law. It remains important to distinguish between situations of informality where people are flouting regulations that they can afford to abide by and it is in the public interest to enforce, and informality where the regulations are designed for wealthier groups and enforcement would further poverty and, at most, benefit the better-off. This is central to urban inclusion, as regulations presented as a means of pulling everyone up actually often operate as a means of keeping poor groups out.

This also raises the key question of why some forms of informality are criminalised and rendered illegal while others enjoy state sanction or are even practices of the state (Ghertner 2008; Roy 2009). One avenue for addressing this question is to consider the relationship between the formal and informal. While ‘remarkably enduring and under-investigated’
(McFarlane and Waibel 2012: 1), recent studies in the global South (McFarlane 2012; Roy 2005, 2009) and North (Devlin 2011) show how these relations critically shape the politics, economics and the development outcomes of cities, to suggest that managing this relationship is critical for achieving inclusive, safe and secure urbanisation and cities where ‘no one will be left behind’.

In order to better understand and manage informality towards the goal of IUC, one useful starting point is recognising its intrinsic diversity. Chen (2007), for instance, presents a segmentation amongst informal workers, visualised in a pyramidal shape. A relatively small group of predominantly male and better earning informal employers occupies the top of the pyramid. Below this there are segments of informal employees; own account operators; casual wage workers; poorly paid, highly insecure women industrial outworkers; and a mass of unpaid family workers at the base of the pyramid. To illustrate, in Tunisia, informal employers earn four times the minimum wage, their employees earn the minimum wage, while industrial outworkers – mostly women homeworkers – earn 30 per cent of the minimum wage (World Bank 2012).

A second starting point is the recognition that the reasons why diverse worker groups and small firms operate informally may be quite different. Thus, informal employers may deliberately seek exit from formality and its attendant needs to register and pay taxes (Chen 2012). For others, like own account operators such as street traders, the state may have raised barriers to entry into the formal economy. For instance, in Delhi, a severe rationing of licences condemns over 95 per cent of street traders to a life of illegality (te Lintelo 2009). Furthermore, labour legislation can by design exclude informal workers; burdensome entry regulations prevent enterprises from formalising; and firms may not hire workers formally because of excessive taxation and regulatory burdens (Chen 2012).

Moreover, it is not unusual for colonial era bylaws to remain active, and while originally designed to secure and control urban spaces, they now serve to suppress the livelihoods of groups of urban residents.

Unfortunately, while informality may seem like a suitable short-term compromise for all involved, it can bring serious long-term costs. The land opened up informally may include extremely hazardous or environmentally sensitive sites, along with more suitable locations. While often an outcome, informality may also become a justification for discrimination in service provision, or even for harassment and demands for bribes on the part of officials. The threat of eviction may inhibit residents and enterprises from investing in improvements, and enforcement raids may violate property rights and destroy property embodying household savings. Security, and more generally cooperation between police and residents, may be undermined, enticing those involved in illicit commercial or political activities in. None of this is inevitable, but it is easy to see how a pathology of exclusion and conflict can take hold, and how eliminating informality could be even worse, particularly if pursued through existing regulations which over a long period without enforcement are likely to become increasingly inappropriate to local realities.

At its worst, informality becomes part of an urban pathology of exclusion, reproduced despite the harm caused to the city as a whole and to its economic prospects, as well as to those living and working in informality. While informality can arise for many reasons, it becomes exclusionary when an appreciable part of the population cannot afford to abide by the official regulations, and would be collectively worse off if they tried. While collective action is difficult, not least because of limited institutionalised platforms for dialogue, there are examples from across the globe that showcase how informal workers such as street vendors and waste pickers
can successfully organise themselves to cooperate with urban authorities and to change policies and laws at city and national levels (te Lintelo 2010).

In practice, of course, there are many examples of what could be termed ‘informality’ wherein those involved could easily afford to abide by the formal regulations, but choose to circumvent them nevertheless. This informality of the affluent typically gets less attention, both in the literature and from local authorities. Yet it is with this informality that formalisation through more rigorous enforcement is most likely to yield improvements for the city without imposing undue hardship or contributing to exclusive urbanisation.

3.3  Migration and the city
Every year, an additional 3–4 million people make the decision to migrate internationally. Most international migrants end up in cities, and while unauthorised migrants often become part of an underclass, many migrants are very successful. There is a natural tendency for the migration to be from poorer to wealthier parts of the world, and it takes some wealth to make the journey, though crisis and displacement can be important drivers. Despite various benefits, wealthier areas are often not very welcoming. For many European countries, incoming international migration has itself come to be seen as a crisis. The European Union (EU) has scrambled unsuccessfully to reach an agreement on accommodating the migrants in an organised fashion. But anti-migration politics have become increasingly influential in many countries, and have played an important role – not least because poorly managed in-migration and austerity had adverse consequences for certain domestic populations. Brexit – Britain’s exit from the EU – was promoted in part as a means of curbing migration; and the promise to build a wall to keep out Mexicans became part of the US election rhetoric, along with the threat to send millions of unauthorised immigrants home. But migrant politics tend to be hotly contested and conflict-ridden.

Meanwhile, (net) rural–urban migration and urban expansion adds on the order of 30–40 million people to the world’s urban population, mostly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This is a far less visible, but somewhat analogous migratory process. Again, it is largely driven by the movement of people from poorer to wealthier places. Again, crisis and displacement can be important drivers, but wealth makes it easier to migrate. And again, there is resistance in the receiving locations, at least in the passive form of an absence of planning for known population growth (although most of the urban population growth, particularly in Africa, comes from natural growth). While those who work in the informal economies and live in the informal settlements of the cities in the global South are not all recent migrants, at least indirectly the politics of migration loom large and can easily reinforce pathologies of informality or more overt forms of exclusion. And in both cases, a more inclusive approach is needed, including measures to protect not just the migrants but also those who might be adversely affected by the pressures and reactions to migration.

Refugees and internally displaced persons, who have been forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution, are also increasingly drawn to cities. Informal work shores up livelihoods in the face of other challenges they face. Cities host an estimated 60 per cent of refugees globally, setting for many cities the particular challenge of dealing with displacement, which can be triggered very rapidly by conflict and last for unpredictable periods of time. Part of

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4 In fact, the poorest will not, in most cases, even attempt the journey as financial costs for paying smugglers can be prohibitive; see Lakshman, Perera and Sanga sumana (2014).

5 Simultaneously, intra-urban displacements – caused by market forces driving up housing costs (gentrification) or induced by development projects – are examples of what some would consider urban–urban migration (Baviskar 2009).
the challenge is coordinating and supporting inclusive policies so that the cities or countries that agree to become more inclusive do not thereby attract a disproportionate share of migrants and forcibly displaced persons, or subsidise those who migrate to cities over those who, in the case of rural–urban migration, remain in rural areas. This needs to be recognised as a big challenge, but not nearly as big as dealing with the divisions and conflicts that can otherwise result.
4 Conclusion

Cities and rapid urbanisation often receive more attention regarding their potential contribution to economic development goals than to social and environmental goals, but this imbalance can and should be rectified (McGranahan 2016). More inclusive urbanisation and more inclusive cities could become an important means of reducing the trade-offs and contradictions amongst these goals. However, a key question underlying much of this report is whether a focus on IUC is a useful perspective through which to advocate for the pledge that nations signing up to the 2030 Agenda made that ‘no one will be left behind’. How should we conceptualise IUC to guide the actions needed to counter the rising in-country inequalities that so often accompany urbanisation, and arise from social and environmental goals frequently being sacrificed to short-term economic ends?

Accordingly, in this report we have attempted a more critical understanding and synthesis of how inclusion is currently understood in the context of cities and urbanisation. We find that while inclusion is rapidly becoming a staple concept in donor discourses on cities and urbanisation (exemplified by the New Urban Agenda), only a handful of research publications have explicitly used the concept of ‘inclusive urbanisation’ (see e.g. Choy and Li 2016; Etherington 2013; Guo et al. 2016; McGranahan et al. 2016; Shrestha et al. 2014).

Concepts like inclusion tend to become aspirational terms in the development lexicon. This means they lose any precision to their meaning, and come to be good by definition rather than by implication. In response, this report adopts a definition of inclusion that ranges from removing discrimination, to enhancing voice in existing institutions, to securing people’s human rights (McGranahan et al. 2016). We accordingly conceptualise IUC as involving both process and outcome: inclusiveness in the processes of urban change (urbanisation and urban growth) – including in social, economic and political processes – as well as an aspiration for equitable cities that enable wellbeing and a good quality of life for all as outcomes of those change processes. This conceptualisation articulates inclusion and exclusion in relational terms (Sen 2000), directing us towards investigating the relations and mechanisms that create deprivation and exclusionary outcomes in cities and through particular urbanisation processes.

We highlight that exclusion from and exclusion within the city are often interlinked, with many of those excluded within the city treated, explicitly or implicitly, as belonging to groups that should be excluded from the city. Taking a universal approach to development, we also note that urban exclusion is not the monopoly of cities and towns experiencing or having recently experienced rapid urbanisation, nor is it the monopoly of low- and middle-income countries.

The report further presents a rapid review of key framings of urbanisation and cities in the academic literature: world/global, charter, prosperous, inclusive, smart cities; also looking ‘beyond the urban’ angle: planetary urbanisation; sustainable urbanisation; rural–urban linkages. We find that these stress distinct aspects of inclusion as process and outcome, notably the roles of finance capital, technology, governance, urban planning and other public interventions in generating human and spatial interconnections that may be more or less inclusive. Similarly, the framings envisage quite distinct kinds of aspirations and outcomes of urbanisation and cities.

Next we applied our conceptualisation of IUC to demonstrate its potential analytical strength in making sense of key urban issues: in this case violence, informality, and migration.
4.1 Urban violence
When violence becomes endemic to the built environment, it stands at odds with the characterisation of cities as engines of growth. This can be seen both in the context of fragile countries, where violence is not restricted to urban areas, as well as in countries that are otherwise considered stable but where cities are the location that violence is concentrated in. It is therefore important to understand how the drivers of insecurity and violence interact with the sociopolitical arrangements in the city. We find that this must primarily be spatial – that is how power is organised and exercised at the street, city, and national level – and connect with how people define and describe their own sense of security and insecurity. However, to create conditions for channelling local voices into policymaking processes, it is necessary to consider ways of linking up the multiple levels of governance, actors, and institutions that impact urban violence and order. Urban order can be repressive and exclusionary, and these processes can occur over very long periods of time. As such, ‘order for whom?’ is the operative question that allows ‘inclusive planning’ to engage with the politics of (in) cities, rather than obstruct the process of mediation.

Our understanding of how the drivers of insecurity and violence interact with the sociopolitical arrangements must also be systemic – with a focus on municipalities while recognising the multiple systems in which they are embedded. Municipalities will continue to be on the front lines of how urban services are delivered. This includes, for example, the destabilising factors that urban pressure can bring to national politics, as well as the positive element that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. It might also include identifying and analysing instances where citizens have created their own service systems, or hybrid arrangements, which reflect the ways in which governance failures have impacted local communities.

4.2 Urban informality
Informality is critical to the everyday functioning of cities across the globe and a growing phenomenon. As such, approaches towards IUC must start to work with the grain of informality, while showing low tolerance of its worst excesses. At its worst, urban informality becomes part of an urban pathology of exclusion, reproduced despite the harm caused to the city as a whole and to its economic prospects, as well as to those living and working in informality. Informal settlements and informal economies can often be seen as a compromised exclusion, not as extreme or oppressive as evictions, but supported by planning and regulations that are only designed to accommodate those who secure acceptable housing or jobs, and in effect exclude a large share of the urban population.

Understanding and managing the relations between the formal and informal is difficult but critical as it shapes the politics, economics and the development outcomes of cities. This requires recognising the intrinsic diversity of informality, whether it is of housing, of jobs, or other aspects, and also its diverse drivers. For instance, the reasons why diverse worker groups and small firms operate informally may be quite different, ranging from voluntary exit of the formal system, to barriers to its entry, to the existence of exclusionary laws. Finally, the informality of the affluent typically gets less attention, both in the literature and from local authorities. Yet it is with this informality that formalisation through more rigorous enforcement is most likely to yield improvements for the city without imposing undue hardship or contributing to exclusive urbanisation.
4.3 Migration and the city

Refugees and internally displaced persons, who have been forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution, are increasingly drawn to cities. Cities host an estimated 60 per cent of refugees globally, setting for many cities the particular challenge of dealing with displacement, which can be triggered very rapidly by conflict and last for unpredictable periods of time. Part of the challenge is coordinating and supporting inclusive policies so that the cities or countries that agree to become more inclusive do not thereby attract a disproportionate share of migrants and forcibly displaced persons, or subsidise those who migrate to cities over those who, in the case of rural–urban migration, remain in rural areas. This needs to be recognised as a big challenge, but not nearly as big as dealing with the divisions and conflicts that can otherwise result.

Most international migrants also end up in cities, and while unauthorised migrants often become part of an underclass, many are very successful. There is a natural tendency for the migration to be from poorer to wealthier parts of the world, and it takes some wealth to make the journey, though crisis and displacement can be drivers. This process is similar for rural–urban migration.

Whereas the rural–urban dichotomy once helped to distinguish settlements where people were engaged principally in agriculture from larger settlements where other economic or political activities predominated, even in less urbanised countries the overlap between spatial form and livelihoods is increasingly blurred. Circular migration is a key factor in diminishing these distinctions.

Despite having various benefits, wealthier areas are often not very welcoming. While migration often accounts for a smaller share of urban growth than natural population growth, it is often blamed for it, a mistake facilitated when the difference between urbanisation and urban growth is ignored. As such, while those who work in the informal economies and live in the informal settlements of the cities in the global South are not all recent migrants, at least indirectly the politics of migration loom large, and can easily reinforce pathologies of informality or more overt forms of exclusion. In both cases, a more inclusive approach is needed, including measures to protect not just the migrants but also those who might be adversely affected by the pressures and reactions to migration.

4.4 Effecting IUC in the twenty-first century

Inclusion, particularly regarding issues of urban development, has been enshrined in some of the most prominent public statements of the twenty-first century – namely the 2030 Agenda, the New Urban Agenda, and the SDGs. This is a result of and contributor to the blurring of the concept to such an extent that it has become uncontroversial but toothless. This report is an effort to clarify and sharpen inclusion as a concept both for analysis of the urban transformation and for realising the development goals for more sustainable, just, and liveable cities.

We find that to effect inclusion for urbanisation and cities, it is essential to consider not only the inclusiveness of outcomes in cities, but also the inclusiveness in the social, political and economic processes of change as well. We also note the usefulness of deploying the different registers for thinking about urban change processes and outcomes: the spatial, the systemic, and the socio-geographic. In so applying the IUC approach to the issues of urban violence, urban informality, and migration, we find that it has the potential to be usefully applied to further research and advocacy around understanding and realising inclusive development. Finally, we hope that this report inspires more critical thinking on the topic of IUC to support delivery of the New Urban Agenda and the SDGs.
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