The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.

The development of this material has been led by the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies and the Institute of Development Studies who jointly hold the copyright.

The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies.

AG Level 2 Output ID: 747

WHERE IS THE MONEY? DONOR FUNDING FOR CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION IN EASTERN AFRICA

Patrick Mutahi and Mutuma Ruteere

a Research Fellow, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (pmutahi@chrips.or.ke)
b Director, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (mruteere@chrips.or.ke)

January 2017

This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are clearly credited.

First published by the Institute of Development Studies in January 2017
© Institute of Development Studies/Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies 2017

IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
Contents

Acknowledgements 2
Abbreviations 3
Introduction 5

1 Political environment for conflict and violence funding 7
  1.1 Terrorism 7
  1.2 Natural resources-driven conflicts 8
  1.3 Internal political stresses 9
  1.4 South Sudan conflict 9

2 Factors influencing donor funding 11
  2.1 Increased funding by other non-OECD donors 12
  2.2 Alignment behind national government policies 13
  2.3 From development to trade 13
  2.4 Changing and challenging local political contexts 14
  2.5 The ICC effect and push back on donor demands 15
  2.6 Leveraging of natural resources 16

3 Where is the money going? 18
  3.1 State stabilisation 18
  3.2 Security sector reforms 21
  3.3 Addressing long-standing resource/pastoral conflicts 23
  3.4 Building resilience to counter violent extremism 24
  3.5 Increased funding for counter-terrorism efforts 25

4 Conclusion 28

References 29

Tables
Table 2.1 Global figures for ODA in US$bn, at current prices 12
Table 3.1 Bilateral ODA by sector for South Sudan, 2013–14 average 19
Table 3.2 Programme resource by donor 20
Acknowledgements

A number of key informants offered their time to frankly and openly discuss the issues covered in the report. We thank them for their contributions. We are also grateful to Joash Moitui and Brian Kimari, Junior Research Fellows at CHRIPS who assisted in data collection for the report. Dr Jeremy Lind and Dr Caitriona Dowd, Research Fellows at IDS, offered substantial comments on earlier drafts of the report; their comments and suggestions are gratefully acknowledged.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRPRP</td>
<td>African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counter-terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI</td>
<td>Development Alternatives Incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA-IO</td>
<td>Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Improving Community Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument for contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSAT</td>
<td>International Security Sector Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOS</td>
<td>Justice, Law and Order Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALIP</td>
<td>Karamoja Livelihoods Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPSSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASE</td>
<td>Maritime Security Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and State building Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFE</td>
<td>Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>Strengthening Community Resilience Against Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDTP</td>
<td>Security and Defence Transformation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Somali Stability Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRIVE</td>
<td>Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAT</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>Transition Initiatives for Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS-UBRAF</td>
<td>Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>UN Support Office for the AMISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAWG</td>
<td>violence against women and girls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

In 2014, Kenya and Uganda were two of the top three recipients of official development assistance (ODA) in Africa (OECD n.d.). The funding focused on education, health care, infrastructure, entrepreneurship development, HIV/AIDS treatment, conflict prevention and relief from natural crises such as droughts, famines or earthquakes. Such a mixed bag of funding priorities points to the variegated nature of the development agenda of both the funding actors and the recipient countries. This broad scope, however, obscures the recent shifts and developments with regard to the major challenge of violence and conflict facing the region, and the growing importance of this field for donors and national governments. The Eastern Africa region in general currently faces security and violence challenges linked to terrorism, internal armed conflicts and resources-based conflicts, as well as insecurity linked to everyday crime. These forms of insecurity and violence are seen both by the states of the region and by Western donor states as a threat to state stability as well as the region’s development ambitions. Violence reduction is therefore a shared goal both within Eastern Africa and among these Western donor nations. This study seeks to critically examine the shifts and trends in current donor funding in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan aimed at reducing violence and conflict. It analyses key issues being funded as well as trends in donor funding.

It is notable that there is a long tradition of donor support to conflict reduction and prevention in the region, as well as support to security sector and policing reforms. However, recent years have witnessed a shift in this support, with the appearance of new security emergencies in the form of terrorist threats in, for example, Kenya and Somalia, and threats of state disintegration in places such as South Sudan. Of course, the agenda of conflict and violence prevention has not always been without its ambiguities even in earlier years, and the donor priorities and those of the populations in the region have not always converged.

In a sense, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular Goal 16, are meant to ensure that interventions for violence reduction and prevention as well as development are part of a common and shared vision.

Goal 16 aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. It recognises the link between peace and prevention of violence and conflict and the building and strengthening of functioning and inclusive societies. While the SDGs represent a powerful political commitment by the member states of the United Nations to work towards a common development agenda, the recognition of the linkages that Goal 16 makes between peace, security and development is not entirely new. Indeed, the link between security and development was made quite eloquently by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. An examination of the funding trends on violence in the Eastern Africa region demonstrates that most donor projects explicitly recognise this link. Funding for various violence prevention interventions also seeks to promote good governance, better functioning law and order and justice institutions, and to promote cohesion among other institutions. It therefore seems that if the funding interventions have not worked as expected, it is not because the link had not been made.

What is distinct, though, and is in keeping with a more targeted approach, is that funding takes different forms depending on the contexts of violence in various countries. Thus in Somalia, support to reduce violence takes the form of strengthening the capacities of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to effectively combat the threat from Al-Shabaab. In Southern Sudan, support to violence prevention takes the form of
demobilisation of armed militias, and the strengthening of the state military, among other things. In Kenya and Uganda, violence prevention is different as there are no active conflicts. Thus in Kenya, for instance, the focus of the support is on pastoralist conflicts, ethnic conflict and strengthening of justice and law and order institutions.

This study demonstrates that donors have a variety of security and commercial interests in the region, and these are not always neatly separable from conflict and security priorities: for example if they fund initiatives to counter violent extremism, they will still at the same time seek to enhance economic relations with the host country. Choosing to support a range of themes is moreover a smart political choice as it allows the donors to expand their playing field (Scheye 2010). Donors’ decisions are also shaped by assessments and calculations of risks as well as by what benefits them the most.

Geo-political realities and interests also significantly shape the relationship between the states in the region and donors. As this report later analyses, donors have had to confront the changing political realities within the recipient countries, which has forced them to shelve some of the projects they intended to fund or establish. In addition, the number of bilateral and multilateral donors has increased over the years, which has led to more funds, ideas and tools on how development can be achieved (Severino and Ray 2011). This has made the donor market more diversified, posing new challenges to the ‘traditional’ donors in Europe and the US, which have been forced to adopt new ways of relating to countries that they support.

This report shows that violence prevention appears to be integrated in many of the donor support programmes in the Eastern Africa region. In keeping with the understanding that security is linked to most of the development and governance interventions, it is clear that funding cannot be easily segmented into one theme – except possibly for military support. The various funding themes are not mutually exclusive, nor are funding programmes necessarily designed according to a logic that allows for clear boundaries. They intersect and sometimes overlap. Even an examination of the objectives of the funding may not offer much illumination. For instance, funding that seeks to support conflict prevention in the Karamoja (Uganda) or Turkana (Kenya) areas may involve support to community resilience, support to police services, and accountability interventions. Likewise, support to countering violent extremism (CVE) work appears to cut across all these sub-themes or strands. Apart from explicitly designating resources for CVE projects, donors are also funding interventions that touch on the push and pull factors leading youth to extremism. These include youth unemployment, local grievances over land and exclusion from leadership, security accountability and better relations with the community. These patterns have implications for how we think about funding as sectoral, yet in reality the sectors are sometimes so interlinked that their boundaries make little policy sense. It also suggests that in reality violence reduction and prevention is about rebuilding whole and effective communities and societies.

Research data for this study was collected using primary and secondary methods. Interviews for the primary research were held with diplomats and donor representatives, non-governmental organisation (NGO) officers and experts closely working with donors in the region. Secondary data entailed collection and analysis of data from relevant research reports and databases, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, donor and NGO reports and other sources. The report begins with a contextual discussion of conflict and violence in the region, before mapping out the key funders, themes/issues supported and the actors involved. It then discusses the shifts in funding and what these portend for violence reduction policy and programming.
1 Political environment for conflict and violence funding

The political environment in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia is challenging and is constantly changing. There is also considerable variation across countries within the region. Some countries, like South Sudan, are still confronting a civil war; as indeed is Somalia which is combating the challenge of Al-Shabaab and still does not have a government with effective control of the country. Uganda has made significant strides in dealing with armed conflict particularly in the north of the country but is still grappling with questions of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction as well as threats from terrorism. Similarly, Ethiopia and Kenya are also facing terrorist threats, particularly from the Al-Shabaab movement. All of these countries are also at different stages in democratisation and strengthening of the rule of law. Across these countries, several layers of conflict and violence can be discerned:

1.1 Terrorism

Instability in Somalia continues to pose a serious threat to regional stability. Beset by civil war for over two decades, Somalia’s troubled past has been characterised by armed warfare, failed peace agreements and recurring humanitarian crises (Menkhaus 2014). Although the disintegration of the central government and destruction of its security sector is traced to the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia’s degeneration began soon after its independence in 1960 (Dagne 2009; Bryden and Brickhill 2010). Progressively, an informal security sector began to swell and Somalia’s collapse led to the proliferation of various militia groups, most of whom had been unhappy with Siad Barre’s leadership. With accumulated arms and weapons, many in the former Somalia Army retreated to their clans. This set the stage for the current state of affairs in Somalia (Bryden and Brickhill 2010).

Since the 2000s, Somalia has been the regional epicentre of violent extremism, particularly with the rise in 2006 of the Al-Shabaab terror group, which currently controls some sections of the country, particularly in the southern and central regions. Al-Shabaab has recruited many Somalis and fighters of other nationalities, including women, into its ranks and also conducted numerous attacks within Somalia. The group is fighting the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu as well as the 22,000-strong foreign troops deployed by AMISOM to support the federal government and secure the country.

Due to the success of AMISOM, the frequency of Al-Shabaab attacks has significantly reduced and the group has been forced to switch to indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Somalia (ACLED Report No. 34, 2015). However, Al-Shabaab has proved difficult to defeat, as it is reported to have sufficient funding from its control over activities such as charcoal exports at Kismayo, taxation of local businesses and piracy (Journalists for Justice 2015). In addition, Al-Shabaab still retains control over large territories of Somalia and key transport routes (Human Rights Watch 2016). Of late, a section of the terror group has declared allegiance to the militant group, the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS).

The Al-Shabaab terror group is, however, transnational in nature, with its members carrying out attacks in Kenya and Uganda as well as increasing recruitment in these countries. Since Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the country from Al-Shabaab attacks, attacks on Kenyan soil have actually multiplied, ranging from the September 2013 siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall, to the 2015 attack on Garissa University, and to village massacres, and the targeted killings of police and religious
figures (Dowd 2015; Bogorad 2016). Further, deep-seated grievances, including a sense of marginalisation among Kenya’s ethnic and religious minorities, have provided fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to localise its war in Kenya (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015). Lately it has emerged that Kenyan women are also being recruited to join Al-Shabaab or ISIS in Syria (Agutu 2016).

On 11 July 2010 two separate suicide bombings took place in Kampala, Uganda, as fans watched the FIFA World Cup Finals. The attacks left 79 people dead and 70 others injured. Al-Shabaab immediately claimed responsibility as retaliation for Ugandan support for AMISOM (BBC News 2010). In March 2015, seven Kenyans, five Ugandans and one Tanzanian were each charged with terrorism, murder, attempted murder and of being accessories to terrorism, and all except one were accused of being Al-Shabaab members. Fourteen months later, five of the suspects were sentenced to life imprisonment and two others to 50 years in jail for masterminding the twin blasts. Five others were released for lack of evidence while one other was sentenced to one year of community service (Europe News Week 2016).

These incidents demonstrate the capacity of Al-Shabaab to inflict serious harm and tragic loss of life, in a conflict that has become increasingly regionalised in East Africa. Countering the threat of Al-Shabaab has therefore become a major priority for both donors and countries in the region. Currently, about 22,000 troops seconded from the military forces of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are deployed in the country under the mandate of AMISOM, to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Most of the funding, as we shall later see, is from various multilateral donors.

1.2 Natural resources-driven conflicts

Competition for natural resources and access to land is a major driver of conflict in the pastoral frontier areas. The focus here is not only on the oil, gas and minerals found on the ground, but also on access to land as the primary resource. This adds to the perennial conflicts in the Horn of Africa within and across borders and has direct implications for political stability in the region, especially in the arid north-eastern region of Karamoja in Uganda and northern Kenya. Perennial conflicts between the Karamojong, Turkana, Samburu and Pokot have continued to present some of the most significant threats to security in the region. This has been exacerbated by unresolved boundary disputes that have found new significance in part as a result of the new system of devolved governance in Kenya and also contention over access to water and grazing resources. In places where there have been new resource discoveries, such as oil in Turkana, new conflicts have emerged over access to jobs in oil exploration companies. Adding to the lethal nature of these resource conflicts is the ready availability of small arms and light weapons originating from border areas of Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia (Manatuk 2016).

Governments across East Africa are pursuing multi-million dollar infrastructure programmes, mainly in the marginal frontier areas of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, adding another layer of resource conflict. These investments include the US$29bn Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor project (LAPSSET) (The Presidency 2016a; Lapsset Corridor Development Authority 2016), Turkana wind power project (Lake Turkana Wind Power 2016), Djibouti–Addis railway line (Ethiopian News Agency 2016), Ethiopia’s US$4.8bn Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and power station (Impregilo 2016). These developments are taking place in and crossing remote regions and pastoral frontiers (Korf, Hagmann and Emmenegger 2015), where the governments were previously absent or weak, and that have been neglected throughout the years due to their harsh terrain and weather as well as low agricultural potential. Nevertheless, they are now resource frontiers, where the relevant state is planning and developing them with an aim of absorbing its inhabitants as part of the nation-state. For example, since independence, northern Kenya has remained
marginalised, with little or no education and public services. Other problems include poor infrastructure, lack of proper housing and health facilities, food and water shortages. The Kenyan government has, however, in recent years put in resources to tap into the recently discovered oil and gas in Turkana. In Ethiopia, most projects are established outside the core ‘highland’ area of central and northern Ethiopia, which includes areas associated historically with the ethnic base of the Amhara and Tigrayan populations, as well as parts of the Shewan highland plateau. These areas have remained marginalised and attempts by successive Ethiopian governments to integrate them have largely ended in failure (Mosley 2012).

These large-scale investments have generated tensions and provoked incidents of violence in places like Turkana, where there has been contestation over ownership of the land where the oil blocks are situated. Similar tensions have emerged in Lamu where a port is being constructed as part of the LAPSET project (Anyadike 2014). Similarly, in the Ethiopia–Somalia border area there has been a rush for land acquisition triggered by an economic boom in response to demand for range lands, charcoal and irrigated farms (Mosley 2012). This area remains contested, however, with armed groups – for example, the Oromo Liberation Front, Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Tigray, Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front, among others – posing a national security threat.

1.3 Internal political stresses
Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have been facing various forms of violence internally. Crime and insecurity persist as major problems in both urban and rural areas of Kenya and Uganda. For many Kenyans, ordinary crime in the form of assaults, robbery, car-jacking and burglary constitute the main causes of insecurity. In recent years, Kenya has also seen the proliferation of criminal cartels engaged in the trafficking in drugs, guns, humans and animal trophies that now threaten to undermine the governance and security systems (Gastrow 2011).

Devolution has added new layers and forms of political tensions between the national and county governments with regard to roles and powers and has precipitated power struggles as well as conflicts related to resource allocation from national to county governments, between county governments and within counties (ACLED Report No. 24, 2014). Devolved governments have seemingly also contributed to an increase in inter-ethnic conflicts, owing to emerging competition between communities for power at the county level (ACLED Report No. 28, 2014).

In Ethiopia, members of the Oromo ethnic group have been engaging in widespread protests against plans to expand the territory of Addis Ababa municipality into land that belongs to the Oromia national state. They have also been protesting about what they perceive as continued marginalisation and persecution by the government. These protests were violently put down by security forces: hundreds were arrested and over 50 people reportedly killed (Awol 2016).

1.4 South Sudan conflict
Regional efforts to broker an end to the conflict in South Sudan have faltered while fighting has continued in many areas, including targeted killings based on ethnicity, rape, the recruitment of child soldiers and other crimes. On 15 December 2013, fighting in the barracks of the presidential guards marked the onset of the violence that eventually resulted in civil war in South Sudan. Though the conflict later subsided, it was to later escalate in July 2016, forcing former vice-president Riek Machar to flee the capital Juba and leading to his replacement by General Taban Deng.
The conflict has strained South Sudan’s foreign relations with many donors, who have shifted funds from support of the government’s efforts in developing the country towards direct humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2016). It has also led to increased refugee flows in the region. During the height of the violence in July 2016, more than 8,300 South Sudanese refugees were said to have fled into neighbouring Uganda in a single day. In a week, more than 26,000 South Sudanese had travelled south to Uganda (Standard Media 2016). About 1.61 million people are displaced internally in South Sudan while 818,950 others have sought refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, making the situation a regional security concern (OCHA 2016). The resurgence of conflict in Juba in early July 2016 is likely to worsen already precarious food insecurity for many, and to disrupt livelihoods, access to humanitarian assistance and markets (UN Mission South Sudan 2016).

Apart from the conflicts, the Eastern Africa region has also in the last ten years seen the emergence of assertive leaders like President Uhuru Kenyatta (The Presidency 2016b), President Paul Kagame (Kagame 2016) and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe who succeeded the late Meles Zenawi in 2012. These leaders have been championing the strengthening of cooperation between African countries. They have also been insisting that the international community should partner with African countries as equal partners and they have not shied away from using their natural resources as leverage in pushing their countries’ interests. This, as we shall see later, has led to redefined donor relations and affected the flow of aid into Kenya and Rwanda. Before discussing these shifts, Section 2 looks at the key issues influencing donors’ funding in the region.
2 Factors influencing donor funding

Globally, ODA funding for conflict prevention, peace and security has increased by 67 per cent since 2005. It peaked at US$3.9bn in 2009 after an increase of US$1.1bn (47 per cent) from 2007 to 2008 alone, but then declined to US$3bn in 2012, and has stabilised since then. Increased funding in response to the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan explains the significant rise in ODA funding between 2007 and 2009 (Development Initiatives 2016). The rise in refugee costs did not significantly eat into development programmes, with around half of donor countries using money from outside their aid budgets to cover refugee costs (Eurostat 2016).

The long-term trajectory of aid, however, remains uncertain, and characterised by countervailing trends. On the one hand, it is feared in the long run, funds will start reducing and there are already indications of this; for example, Sweden, which currently spends a higher percentage of overall gross national income on development aid than any other country in the world, has indicated it might cut its ODA by as much as 60 per cent so that it can refocus on the refugee and immigration flows (The Guardian 2016a, 2016b).

The Norwegian government is considering diverting 21 per cent of its US$4.8bn ODA budget into supporting domestic refugees for their first year in Norway. In 2015, Finland cut its aid budget by 43 per cent (The Guardian 2016c, 2016d) while Denmark will cut more than US$600m from its ODA to make room for domestic refugee expenses in 2016 (CPH Post 2015). The trend suggests an end to what some have termed 'Nordic exceptionalism' (Morten and Torbjørn 2015) in providing support to sub-Saharan Africa. This could create a trend across Europe, resulting in drastic cuts to development projects and creating uncertainty at a time when there is need for long-term consistency and commitment from donor countries in supporting the SDGs. Ultimately, people facing extreme poverty will see any chance of improving their lives sharply diminished.

Alongside the increased refugee and immigration flows, however, Europe is increasingly facing carefully planned attacks from both unsophisticated lone-actors and well-coordinated terrorists, a situation which has elevated the threat of terrorist attacks in Europe, and may have indirect implications for funding in the East African region. In 2015, 211 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks were recorded in six European Union (EU) member states, which led to 151 deaths and over 360 people injured. A total of 1,077 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences, of whom 424 were in France alone (Europol 2016).

In an indirect way, these attacks might in the long run lead to increased funding for counter-terrorism initiatives being channelled to East Africa. The EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Council has already urged for counter-terrorism efforts to be reinforced both at national and at EU levels, and that terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist financing are among the main threats to the internal security of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs Ministers 2016). This message was later reaffirmed by the European Parliament and EU heads of government who have highlighted the importance of counter-terrorism efforts. The European Agenda on Security has provided member states with a clear framework for working better together on security and it was the basis for the European Council’s endorsement of a renewed internal security strategy with terrorism as one of its three priorities, alongside organised crime and cyber-crime (European Commission 2016a).
2.1 Increased funding by other non-OECD donors

There are more than 30 donor countries that operate outside the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee; the most prominent of those that currently channel funds to Africa are China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Kuwait and Thailand. The growing influence of these countries is not only leading to more choices and more finance for the developing world, it has forced traditional donors to rethink how and where they channel their funds.

A conservative estimate by the OECD indicates that globally, total gross concessional development finance provided by Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa amounted to US$7.5bn in 2014 (OECD 2016a).

Table 2.1 Global figures for ODA in US$bn, at current prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2014 (% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA from current 28 DAC member countries</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>150.1</td>
<td>140.1</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>150.8</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA from 19 reporting countries outside the DAC</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated development cooperation flows from 10 non-reporting countries outside the DAC</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total flows from non-DAC providers</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated global total</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>164.8</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>175.6</td>
<td>183.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China now has a larger programme than Australia, spending US$6.4bn in 2013, and is on an upward trajectory, with an estimated average annual increase of almost 10 per cent over the last five years. The United Arab Emirates is another example of a non-traditional donor scaling up its aid programme. In 2013, it provided US$5.2bn of ODA, a 375 per cent increase on its 2012 ODA levels (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016). Turkey, as discussed in Section 3.1 below, has invested a lot in Somalia in maintaining peace and security.

Due to lack of detailed comprehensive data and information, it is not possible to accurately establish the extent to which these non-DAC reporting countries are providing funds to mitigate violence and conflict. However, it is clear that over time, they have increased their political influence, through which they have managed to negotiate quick access to markets in Africa, to the disadvantage of traditional donors. This is mainly because their development cooperation is often rooted in the tradition of South–South cooperation, and is less bureaucratic or tied to conditions that are unfavourable to developing countries (Kilama 2016). China’s security engagement with Africa has been largely in supporting peacekeeping in places like South Sudan and in helping combat piracy off the coast of Somalia (Kamerling 2011).

---

1 Brazil and Mexico have not published data for all the years included in this table. To complete the table, Brazil’s development cooperation in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2010 and Mexico’s development cooperation in 2014 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2013; OECD (2016a).
2.2 Alignment behind national government policies

Within the Eastern Africa region, all donors are aligning their support to national government plans such as Kenya’s Vision 2030, Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 2010a, 2010b), and Uganda’s Vision 2040 (National Planning Authority 2013). Most of the donors in Somalia channel a large part of their aid through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), set up under the New Deal to encourage aid delivery through consolidated multi-donor funds. This approach emphasises strengthening national capacities, improving transparency and accountability, and making development more responsive to the needs and concerns of Somali citizens.

Alignment of projects behind national development policies is an attempt at aid effectiveness and creation of ownership of the processes and outcomes, promoted after the signing in 2005 of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD 2016b). The impetus behind the Declaration was the realisation that when donors’ aid programmes are built around a series of stand-alone projects they do not result in sustainable developments and are ‘in parallel’ with the country’s own institutions (OECD 2016c).

While some progress had been made in harmonising donors’ work with countries’ own priorities, much more needed to be done. The aid process is still too strongly led by donor priorities and administered through donor channels, sometimes with the developing countries having little say in the matter. Donor interests are sometimes still prioritised over those of the host country. Donors’ alignment of priorities with those of host governments is a politically informed decision since it has the potential to enhance or undermine relations with the state; for example, in Ethiopia, donors complain that the tight state control of society has the potential to undermine donor efforts. Support given to Ethiopian civil society organisations (CSOs) is restricted by national laws. The challenge of government support and complementarity is also alluded to in Kenya, where Western donors have found it difficult to work with the state because of their respective governments’ support of Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Nevertheless, ownership of the process and outcome is crucial for development to be sustainable over the long term. Governments in the developing world must exercise effective ownership over the development process, including over aid. It is fundamental that they do this in full consultation with, and with full accountability to, their citizens, including the poor and marginalised in society.

2.3 From development to trade

The other important shift that may have an overall impact on funding aimed at supporting violence and conflict reduction is the growing emphasis by many Western donors on prioritising business and trade interests with countries in the Eastern Africa region. Increasingly, the business agenda is being prioritised by all the donors, for various reasons.

A major reason is that donors are facing huge pressures from their home countries to ensure that their companies win business locally. Effects of the 2008 economic crisis are still being felt in most of the Western countries, especially in the US and Europe, which are the leading ODA contributors. This is forcing governments to push their missions, especially in Africa, to look for opportunities for home companies to set up businesses and build markets for their

---

2 www.vision2030.go.ke/
3 The ‘New Deal’ is a new approach to support fragile states that are trying to recover from conflict and rebuild their societies, their institutions, and their government. The New Deal for Somalia was endorsed at the Brussels Conference on 16 September 2013. At the heart of Somalia’s New Deal is the Compact, which lays the foundation for building reliable, transparent, accountable and functioning state institutions, respectful of the fundamental rights, freedoms and equality of its citizens. It revolves around five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) designed to deliver inclusive politics, improved security, greater justice, strong foundations for economic recovery, and long-term systems to generate Somali revenue and services.
4 Email interview with a donor operating in Somalia, 9 August 2016; see also Ellison (2016).
5 Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016; see also Kaufmann (2009).
6 See analysis below on ‘changing and challenging political interests’.
goods and services. The feeling is that once a business is set up in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda or Ethiopia the benefits will one way or another lead to increased resource flows from the home country.\(^7\) For example, the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kenya plans to reorient its focus towards trade by 2021. It has thus been steadily reducing its development cooperation budget from €25.4m in 2014 to €14.7m in 2017 and is projected to have a zero budget in 2021. The embassy’s development cooperation staff will be phased out gradually as well. At the same time, the regional role that the embassy already plays, with several attachés accredited for the region, will become more prominent. This strategy aims at increasing the involvement of the Dutch private sector in the embassy’s development programmes and in other sectors, in order to prepare for a transition from aid to trade.\(^8\) The development cooperation programme will be expected to focus on investing public funds with the aim of leveraging private investments (or investments from international financial institutions). Relations between Kenya and the Netherlands beyond 2020 will thus be characterised ‘by a vibrant mutually beneficial economic relationship, facilitated by strong government to government relations and selective use of business support instruments’.\(^9\)

Changed priorities as dictated by the foreign affairs strategies of donor countries are another factor in this shift in foreign aid to focusing on trade. Soon after taking office in September 2013, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the integration of AusAID, Australia’s stand-alone aid agency, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – to enable the closer alignment of the aid and diplomatic arms of Australia’s international policy agenda. The merger was effected in November 2013 and fully implemented by June 2014, when a new paradigm for the Australian foreign aid programme was unveiled which underlined opportunities for people, businesses and communities as the key to both promoting economic growth and reducing poverty (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016). The aid programme thus was expected to provide a sharper focus on investing in drivers of economic growth, including trade; infrastructure; education and health; and empowering women and girls to create new jobs and opportunities that lift people out of poverty. However, funding conflict and trade issues need not necessarily be competing donor priorities. This is because elevating peace and security would be in the interest of trade, by creating a conducive environment for conducting business. In addition, donors’ vision of sustainable, long-term ‘national security’ relies in part on genuine development contributing to a more stable order.

### 2.4 Changing and challenging local political contexts

The operating political environment for donors in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia is changing and mostly becoming difficult for the international community. For different reasons, Kenya and Uganda have a sometimes tense relationship with Western diplomats while Ethiopia has historically been hostile to the democratisation agenda that Western donors have promoted in Africa since the end of the cold war. Somalia and South Sudan are managing large-scale internal conflict, which has affected the kind of political investment that donors can make there. This has forced some of the donors to scale down some of the projects deemed to be too politically sensitive or those without political buy-in.

USAID/Kenya in its current strategy is not directly funding programmes on judicial reform, security sector reform, human rights, public sector reform, or anti-corruption. It only focuses on devolution, recognising the key role that this will play as a driver of other reforms, and other issues will be addressed only as they relate to devolution. This shift is due to the US government’s restrictions and waiver requirements for engaging with security personnel as well as the feeling that other agencies, including the US Department of State, the UK’s DFID, and those of Sweden and other Scandinavian countries are active in this sector.

---

\(^7\) Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016.

\(^8\) Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kenya, Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014–2017, p.2.

\(^9\) Ibid.
meaning that USAID funds could be utilised in another manner (USAID 2014: 25). The agency notes in its strategic plan: ‘This is where USAID/Kenya’s comparative advantage can be found and will be a critical component as it affects how government relates to its citizens, how resources will be allocated for social and economic development, and how the elements of the 2010 Constitution involving equity, justice, transparency, and accountability will be realized’ (ibid.).

Lack of policy space to engage has led to significant re-thinking by USAID-Ethiopia of its democracy, governance and conflict mitigation work. In addition, it has been faced with a complex operating environment for its democracy and governance programmes, with clear constraints and disruptive interventions being applied without warning when the government feels hostile to ‘foreign intervention in politics’, and sees its interests threatened (USAID 2012). Likewise, faced with a low level of commitment to civil and political rights, and continuing concerns about practices and behaviours within the security and justice sector, including incidents of unlawful or arbitrary arrest or detention, mistreatment in custody, and unfair trials, DFID-Ethiopia says it has decreased its support to the security and justice sector, opting instead to concentrate efforts to improve access to justice for girls and women.¹

Due to the conflict in South Sudan and political uncertainty there, donors have opted to support South Sudan’s security reforms at arm’s length, working through contractors, for example the US-funded Technical Advisory Team (TAT) and the UK- and Danish-funded Security and Defence Transformation Programme (SDTP), both of which were implemented by commercial contractors. This weakened the link between the technical and political dimensions of the interventions (Copeland 2015). Further, donors insisted on the country undertaking disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), without taking into account that the soldiers represented different political constituencies and hence the project became a failure despite donors having spent US$117m by the time South Sudan became independent (ibid.)

While donors saw DDR as a binding CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] obligation and objectively necessary, to leading figures in the SPLM/A there was nothing objective about a programme that challenged South Sudan’s greatest internal political compromise and threatened to weaken the SPLA vis-à-vis the Sudan Armed Forces. Despite the 2006 Juba Declaration’s political impact on the security sector, DDR was not linked to internal political processes. (ibid.)

Furthermore, donors in South Sudan have continued to rely on technocratic solutions for many essentially political problems – with predictably poor outcomes (ibid.). Understanding the politics of the day and how they affect projects related to reducing violence and conflict, is vital for donors since it helps them to identify instances where, because of political considerations, change is less likely or feasible, and to make decisions about programming accordingly. An astute analysis of the political, economic and social environment offers donors a sound understanding of where power lies and the conditions under which desired change may be possible.

2.5 The ICC effect and push back on donor demands

In the last five years, some of the African leaders, including Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, have driven the pan-African agenda, through both rhetoric and policies, arguing that the continent needs to develop partnership with donors on an equal

¹ In the Operational Plan 2011–16, it provided £3m to UNICEF to improve justice services for women and children in the Somali region of Ethiopia; see DFID (2014a).
basis. Two issues have been appropriated to this end – the Kenyan ICC cases and access to natural resources.

During Kenya’s 2007/08 violence, civil society actors, with the financial support of many donors, had monitored and recorded the violence, identified suspected perpetrators and those who allegedly facilitated it. In addition, they had identified both victims and witnesses whose names they forwarded to the ICC when the Prosecutor started investigating the cases. Throughout the process, many donors and civil society organisations continued to publicly call for accountability for those responsible for the post-election violence. Their support for the ICC process continued after Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, both indicted by the ICC, won the 2013 elections as president and deputy president respectively. Kenyatta used the ICC cases as part of a broader narrative that recast the ICC and donors as tools of Western oppression, with statements that were supported by other African leaders. The African Union took the debate to a higher level when it passed a resolution calling for the non-prosecution of African leaders and threatened that its member states would leave the International Court (Daily Nation 2016a). Further, allegations of bias against Africans were levelled by the continent’s leaders who questioned why Western leaders were not being taken before the Court.11 This push by Kenya, which was strongly backed by Ethiopia and Rwanda, has informed the changing of relations between donors and, in particular, the Kenyan government. The Jubilee Government has since 2013 never quite mended relations with most of the country’s donors and has at times refused to approve requests for development aid or to have joint programmes, especially those touching on governance.12 Indeed, donors note these frosty relations in their strategic plans, saying they are a point of concern and can affect their activities in Kenya.13

Hence, while the genocide framed Rwanda’s relations with Western donors, Kenya has appropriated the ICC process as the main defining factor. Despite this, Kenya remains a key partner with the West because of its role in promoting security in the Horn of Africa, and the ICC effect does not seem to have soured relations with its donors in cases where they are funding counter-terrorism activities – largely due to the fact that Kenyan and donor state interests coincide on this matter. Hence, there is still scope for a large role for donors, but only if it is calibrated to what the states see as priorities.

2.6 Leveraging of natural resources

Largely borrowing from the pan-African agenda, Presidents Kenyatta and Kagame have persistently argued that their countries’ national interest is anchored in regional and continental integration and not linked to the international community whose role is seen as one of ‘extraction’ rather than that of empowering the local people. Notably, President Kenyatta announced as follows: ‘We should not allow non-Africans to take advantage of the continent’s inability to sustain itself for their selfish interests’ (The Star News 2016). This thinking has found traction with other continental leaders. A key informant said:

In order to access natural resources, we have seen some leaders asking donors what they are giving in return and leaving in the country in terms of skill-sharing and finances. We now have to show something tangible especially on the business side, and [the] issue of governance is not attractive…14

---

11 Set up in 2002 as the last resort to try war criminals and perpetrators of genocide never tried at home, the ICC has opened inquiries involving nine nations, all but one of them African: Kenya, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (twice), Uganda, Mali and Georgia.
12 Interview with a donor based in Nairobi, 5 August 2016.
13 Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kenya, Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014–2017, p.6; interviews with a donor from a European country.
14 Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016.
According to the Africa Natural Resources Centre, natural resources have been the bedrock of the continent’s economy and continue to represent a significant development opportunity for its people. In 2012, natural resources accounted for 77 per cent of total exports and 42 per cent of government revenues (African Development Bank Group 2016). Whether Africa will ever fully benefit from its natural resources is a question that is more relevant now than ever, as new discoveries of coal, oil and gas across East Africa look set to transform global energy markets and the economies of the countries in that region.

Few African countries process their own raw materials – rather, the value is added elsewhere, to the benefit of others. Much of the profits from resource extraction flow out of the continent entirely in the hands of foreign-owned companies which pay low rates of tax. Foreign-owned resource extraction companies are also often criticised for providing little in the way of local employment and contribution to local economies (Patrick 2014; Kabemba 2014). Natural resources and the behaviour of countries carrying out the extraction thus are being used to redefine donor relations with East African countries. These structural changes have consequences for donor support to conflict-reduction programming, as discussed below.

The factors discussed above have affected how donors fund different conflict and violence programmes in Eastern Africa. The themes and priorities that are emerging are discussed Section 3.
3 Where is the money going?

3.1 State stabilisation

Funding support aimed at state building, particularly in Somalia, is one of the key priority areas. This funding supports a combination of military, humanitarian, political and economic activities as part of efforts to strengthen the state’s capacity to control, contain and manage areas affected by armed conflict and complex emergencies (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah 2010).

A number of donors have pledged resources for these state-building interventions. For instance, on 17 June 2015 the EU, UK-DFID, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy pledged more than US$106m over three years towards joint programmes under the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs) of the Somali Compact, and the key deliverables of the government’s Vision 2016, with a specific focus on achieving results in the state formation process, constitutional review, electoral support, rule of law, youth employment, and institutional capacity development (UN Mission Somalia 2015). By putting funds through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), donors thus seek to support and bolster the fledgling Mogadishu-based administration against Al-Shabaab and to move away from project-based interventions to a more comprehensive engagement that seeks to boost the search for a more durable political settlement in Somalia (Hagmann 2016: 16). Another example of basket funding is the Somali Stability Fund (SSF), a multi-donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and the UK. It funds grass-roots conflict resolution, institution-building and governance projects in line with the government’s stabilisation policy and priorities agreed through the New Deal.

For its part, USAID is currently running the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) programme, which aims at increasing Somalia’s stability through fostering good governance, promoting economic recovery and reducing conflict (USAID 2016). Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) implements the programme in close partnership with the local and federal government, civil society and community members. It is currently implementing over 450 small grant activities and has supported a total of over 650 projects valued at US$38m. Further, the State Department, in the fiscal year (FY) 2016 requested US$87.7m to support stabilisation and reconciliation efforts; nascent political party development; civil society efforts to promote peace, good governance, and consensus-building; and programmes in education, livelihoods and economic growth (Department of State, USA 2015: 84).

Turkey has provided US$8.84m for the restructuring of the Somali army and police force, and trains Somalis in military academies in Turkey. It also offered to mediate between the

---

16 The SDRF is an umbrella architecture that streamlines funding instruments. It is supposed to make sure that all the funds and programmes are in line with the Somali priorities outlined in the Compact, to improve coordination and alignment of development assistance, and to encourage increased use of country systems over time. The SDRF incorporates several funds (UN, AIDB, World Bank) in a phased approach. See http://new-deal.so/somali-development-reconstruction-facility-sdrf/
17 http://stabilityfund.so/background/
18 The New Deal is supposed to be a fresh way of approaching a country’s transition out of fragility. Recognising that a shift was needed in how international assistance is provided, the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ was developed to better manage risks, increase the use of country systems, and increase the predictability of aid. Donors committed to helping fragile and conflict-affected states improve their ability to govern and to make development more responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens, by strengthening national capacities and improving transparency and accountability. The President of Somalia in late 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal process and principles in Somalia with the aim of establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement with the country. See www.newdeal.so/content.php?id=2
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the militant Al-Shabaab organisation, but the latter rejected this proposal. While most Somalis have praised Turkey’s role in their country, Al-Shabaab has been strongly critical (Shinn 2015: 9). During President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Uganda on 2 June 2016 he signed an Agreement on defence industry cooperation and a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation (Africa Defense 2016). Though the finer details were not made public, it showed the intent of the two countries in collaborating on defence matters for conflict prevention.

State building is also a key priority in South Sudan. In December 2013, as the South Sudan conflict escalated, donors decided to refocus their assistance, along three lines: they increased their humanitarian relief funds, while scaling down those supporting the security sector (Hemmer and Grinstead 2015); they also started exploring conflict-mitigation strategies through dialogue; and they stepped up their support for human rights organisations, civil society groups and media professionals in order to further justice and accountability (ibid.). Indeed, 58 per cent of the ODA (2013–14) funding to South Sudan (Table 3.1) was focused on humanitarian activities in order to enhance food security and promote ‘resilience’.

### Table 3.1 Bilateral ODA by sector for South Sudan, 2013–14 average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and population</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social infrastructure</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic infrastructure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme assistance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The State Department in 2016 also requested US$30m in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds, which would most probably go to support efforts to resolve conflict or enforce stability in South Sudan, including through support for a regional conflict monitoring mechanism. PKO funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the UN. Funds also address key gaps in capabilities to enable countries and regional organisations to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and counter-terrorism (CT) operations, and to reform security forces in the aftermath of conflict.

Apart from the humanitarian support, the DDR programme in South Sudan received a total contribution of nearly US$50.7m from donors during 2009–11 for the Individual Reintegration Component, of which US$2.3m was withdrawn in 2012. The donors include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS), and the governments of the UK, Canada, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Japan, as shown in Table 3.2 (Ghebremedhin and Tiberious 2013).

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MDTF</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,264,801</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>767,099</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>465,731</td>
<td>-6,063</td>
<td>2,491,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,807,755</td>
<td>139,763</td>
<td>37,330</td>
<td>4,094,535</td>
<td>780,730</td>
<td>343,474</td>
<td>305,010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,508,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16,339,409</td>
<td>92,469</td>
<td>765,170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,628,909</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18,825,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13,306,484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,310,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure (2009–2012)</td>
<td>36,453,648</td>
<td>1,497,033</td>
<td>802,500</td>
<td>4,865,339</td>
<td>2,409,639</td>
<td>343,474</td>
<td>770,741</td>
<td>-6,063</td>
<td>47,136,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation (2009–2012)</td>
<td>36,491,144</td>
<td>1,497,033</td>
<td>802,500</td>
<td>4,865,525</td>
<td>2,409,639</td>
<td>343,474</td>
<td>770,741</td>
<td>-6,063</td>
<td>47,173,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>37,496</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37,683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghebremedhin and Tiberious (2013).
3.2 Security sector reforms

Donors’ interest and focus on security sector reforms in the developing world is said to have accelerated after the end of cold war when they were faced with demands for an effective donor role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and anti-terrorism (Brzoska 2003). Globally, the number of externally supported programmes that aim to improve security and justice outcomes, especially in fragile environments, has increased significantly in the last 15 years. In part this is because it has proved difficult to stimulate sustainable development without ensuring basic, inclusive safety and access to justice (van Veen 2016). Through these programmes, donors aim to assist in strengthening security sector reforms, enhancing accountability of the police and the building of relations between communities and societies and between state and society. The thinking is that an accountable and professional security sector will lead to an improved business climate linked to aid and trade, and other thematic priorities. Supporting security and the rule of law is therefore not only crucial for stability, but also vital for achieving donors’ economic objectives and those of the host country.

In Kenya, programmes supporting security and the rule of law are wide and far-ranging but there is a stronger focus across the board on inclusive access to justice through judiciary and security sector reforms. For example, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) in Kenya contributed US$3.1m in 2015 to support police reforms and civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (OpenAid 2016). The Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, UN Development Fund (UNDP), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework (UNAIDS-UBRAF) contributed a total of US$2.6m (2013–16) to the UNDP basket funds supporting the Judiciary Transformation Framework (UNDP 2013). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been supporting the Police Reforms Programme (2011–13), which seeks to transform the National Police Service (NPS) into an effective, efficient, accountable and trusted institution for Kenyans (ibid.). The main donors contributing to this basket are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the EU, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the USA, and One UN Funds.

In order to address high levels of violence in the country, DFID Kenya established the Jamii Thabiti Programme, also known as the Kenya Improving Community Security programme (ICS) (Coffey 2016). Jamii Thabiti is a £13.5m, 3.5-year programme that aims to increase security and safety for men, women and children in Kenya through increasing the capacity of key institutions (such as the police and county government) to prevent and respond to violence. In doing so, the programme will address three types of violence: criminal violence, intercommunal violence and violence against women and girls (VAWG), initially in eight counties: Kisumu, Bungoma, Wajir, Mandera, Nakuru, Baringo, Kwale and Kilifi (Coffey 2016: 1). This will be achieved through partnership agreements with at least 20 partners at the national and county level.

USAID Kenya is the only donor in Kenya that is not directly or at the national level supporting security sector reforms. In its 2014–18 Country Development Cooperation Strategy it has made a strategic decision to focus on devolution, recognising the key role that this will play as a driver of other reforms. Its rationale is that if the devolution process is effectively implemented, then Kenya’s governance and economy will be sustainably transformed, propelling other reforms and also addressing other governance issues such as corruption, inequity and conflict. If devolution fails, then stability and rule of law will be compromised (USAID 2014: 25). As a result, judicial and security sector reforms (SSRs) are funded and supported only as they relate to devolution rather than as a stand-alone
programme. However, it is notable that funding to support SSRs is also channelled through other agencies, including the State Department.

In Uganda, 14 donors, including Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, International Committee of the Red Cross, UNWOMEN, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and USAID are supporting the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), a sector-wide approach adopted by the Government of Uganda to bring together institutions with closely linked mandates of administering justice and maintaining law and order and human rights. The UK and the EU Delegation participate as non-contributing members of this basket (JLos 2016). The formation of this mechanism shows the intention of the donors to have a holistic SSR programme, which in the long run is hoped to have more impact than the funding of individual sectors. The programme is currently supporting the implementation of the five-year JLOS Sector Investment Plan III (2012/13–2016/17) which aims at strengthening the policy, legislative and regulatory framework, including the regulatory business environment, enhancing confidence in and access to JLOS services – particularly for vulnerable persons. This is intended ultimately to improve the safety of the person, security of property, observance of human rights and access to justice, with the aim of accelerating growth and increasing employment and prosperity (ibid.).

In South Sudan, continued civil conflict and the alleged role of security forces in human rights violations during the violence led to donors laying more emphasis on SSRs. UK and US funding is supporting reforms in the defence sector, while UNDP support has concentrated on rule of law and crisis prevention (ISSAT 2016). For its part, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has trained diverse security sector actors (uniformed and non-uniformed) especially with a view to enhancing South Sudan’s capacity in national security policy/strategy-making, and in monitoring, oversight and accountability matters. DFID’s 2009–12 Peace-building Programme for South Sudan had a total budget of £5.5m, supporting civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution, reintegration, the control of small and light weapons, security systems management and reform, and the demobilisation of child soldiers. This support rose to nearly £16.8m in the DFID (2009–13) Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation project. The stated purpose of this project is to transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a professional, disciplined army operating under and accountable to democratic civil control, and to support the Government of South Sudan to develop broader civilian security decision-making architecture. In addition, the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, a project involving 13 donor states and the World Bank, provided US$37m towards efforts aimed at SSR in 2012. State- and peace-building activities received an additional US$12m from this facility.

The US State Department in FY 2016 requested US$10m to develop South Sudan’s capacity to provide civilian security and basic criminal justice services. In addition, technical assistance and training for South Sudan’s criminal justice sector officials would be undertaken, both through bilateral programmes and through support to the UN Mission in South Sudan. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programmes funded through the State Department were to assist in enhancing short- and long-term stability as South Sudan transitions domestic security responsibility away from the military to the South Sudan National Police Service and develops its justice and correctional institutions (Department of State, USA 2015: 104). Further, US$30m was budgeted for supporting the SPLA to overcome the legacy of conflict and transform itself into an appropriately sized professional military that respects human rights, represents its

---

20 http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200321
21 http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200329
22 These are the latest figures available: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/MDTF-SS_factsheet.pdf
population, is accountable to elected leadership, protects the people of South Sudan, and encourages stability in the Horn of Africa (ibid.: 115).

In Ethiopia, the UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa 2009–15 programme, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa’, has been carrying out activities supporting criminal justice initiatives in the region. For example, from 18 March 2013 to 31 December 2016, UNODC has been running the National Integrated Programme for Ethiopia, which aims at providing technical support to the Government of Ethiopia to develop an effective and responsible National Crime Prevention Strategy and Action Plan and to build the capacity of the country’s criminal justice systems to operate more effectively within the framework of the rule of law, while promoting human rights and protecting vulnerable groups. Criminal justice institutions supported under this programme include: Ministry of Justice, Justice Organs Professional Training Center, Ethiopia Justice and Legal System Research Institute, Federal Prison Administration, Federal and Regional State Courts, Child Justice Project Office, State Judicial Administrative Council, and Public Defender’s Office (UNODC 2016).

In Somaliland, on 16 June 2016 the EU committed €48m for state-building and peace-building actions to strengthen core state functions, rule of law, security (including support to police salaries) and the public finance management system (European Commission 2016b). UNODC, from 30 September 2010 to 31 March 2015, supported the Criminal Justice Programme, which aimed at providing technical support to the Government of Somaliland in implementing institutional reforms in its criminal justice sector at both central and regional levels, in accordance with UN conventions and international standards and norms.

3.3 Addressing long-standing resource/pastoral conflicts

Supporting efforts aimed at the improvement of livelihoods as an approach to conflict prevention is crucial in a region that faces major problems of regional and transboundary conflicts over natural resources, and pastoral and ethnic conflicts over pasture and water, in addition to many other issues. To this end, donors have invested in long-term programmes that seek to prevent recurrence of resource-based conflicts and to address some of their root causes.

Chronically insecure in terms of food, under-provided in terms of government services, and vulnerable to cross-border incursions by livestock raiders, the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda is also wracked by conflicts that pose a security risk for the country as a whole and for neighbouring Kenya. In order to mitigate the effects of conflict, donors are supporting efforts to improve the livelihoods of the local people. The USAID/Uganda Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2011–15) seeks to provide infrastructure and improved livelihoods, as well as to strengthen structures for peace and security necessary for development (USAID 2010: 6). To do this, it seeks to jointly work with the US Embassy and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), especially the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, ‘to implement carefully targeted interventions designed to promote improved livelihood options, reductions in cross-border tensions, and development of key institutions designed to improve the overall stability and peace in the region’ (ibid.: 20).

The Karamoja Livelihoods Programme (KALIP), for which the EU provided €15m between 2009 and 2015, aimed at promoting peace by supporting livelihoods, including agro-pastoral production and alternative income-generation opportunities for the people of Karamoja in north-eastern Uganda. The focus of KALIP is on improving livestock health, improving crop production to address immediate food security and basic incomes, and enhancing general peace and security in areas that are being resettled and re-establishing their production capacity (ReliefWeb 2015). Likewise, DFID provided nearly £538m to assist in enhancing resilience through Karamoja Uganda, a project that will run until 2017 and is being
implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF and the World Food Programme.

USAID, through its Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace (SAFE) Programme (2012–17), aims at strengthening the capacity of the Government of Uganda with respect to peace-building and mitigation of conflicts over land, oil and ethnic diversity.\footnote{www.usaidlandtenure.net/project/supporting-access-justice-fostering-peace-and-equity-uganda} With funding of approximately US$15m, SAFE focuses on the oil-rich Albertine area, Northern Region, and Central Region as primary entry points.

On 16 June 2016, the EU announced new funding for Somalia totalling €25m, for building resilience and enhancing youth employment for rural communities and urban households. The project is expected to focus on the most vulnerable population of Somalia, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) (European Commission 2016b). Almost a year earlier, on 9 September 2015, the EU had launched an Emergency Trust Fund of about €1.8bn to address the root causes of instability in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad region, and North Africa, and to tackle illegal migration and displacement. From this fund, around €30m was earmarked for providing socioeconomic opportunities in coastal Kenya with the aim of providing and enhancing social and economic opportunities for young people, strengthening security in communities and promoting dialogue and trust between authorities and vulnerable groups of Kenyan society (ReliefWeb 2015). The 11th European Development Fund National Indicative Programme (NIP) which was launched by the EU and Kenya on 19 June 2014 includes a total indicative allocation of €435m. The programme concentrates on food security and agriculture as a key area for reducing poverty and improving governance and infrastructure (ibid.).

3.4 Building resilience to counter violent extremism

Addressing the root causes of violent extremism successfully starts by addressing factors that push and pull people to join extremist groups. While each country’s situation is different, it is largely the case that at the root of extremism is a combination of social and economic marginalisation, unaccountable governance, and inadequate institutions, among other push factors. Most of the countering violent extremism (CVE) funding seems to be concentrated in Kenya and the rolling out of similar initiatives in Uganda has been hindered ‘by the lack of a clearly defined programmatic response and an unorganized methodology for assigning Ugandan government offices and personnel to address CVE issues’ (USDOS 2016). In Ethiopia, the main focus is on counter-terrorism.

UNDP Kenya is supporting a counter-terrorism project aimed at helping vulnerable local communities build resilience against negative and radical narratives that lead to violent extremism. The project will focus on facilitating the psychosocial rehabilitation of returnees who have disengaged from violent extremism and on assisting in their reintegration into society, with the goal of transforming them into a voice for countering radicalisation within their communities. It will also support the creation of cutting-edge and context-based knowledge products relating to radicalisation and violent extremism, in order to inform responsive CVE programming and policy options in Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, Lamu, Mombasa and parts of Nairobi County (UNDP 2016).

USAID Kenya, through the Strengthening Community Resilience Against Extremism (SCORE) programme (October 2014 – September 2019) is providing funding of nearly US$5m to strengthen community resilience against conflict and violent extremism, and to enhance the institutional functionality and technical capability of targeted CSOs to address conflict mitigation and CVE in the context of devolution. It is also seeking to establish a rapid response fund to effectively address emerging incidents of conflict and violent extremism in
Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Taita Taveta and Tana River counties. ACT!, with Danish support totalling DKK30m (US$4.5m), is working with communities until 2020 to undertake activities seeking to achieve ‘improved coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts’. Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa is a programme funded by the EU’s Instrument for contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) for €2m and implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). It aims to understand the drivers of violent extremism through evidence-based analysis, to develop best practices around CVE programming in the Horn of Africa through short pilot activities, and to provide recommendations for achieving increased impact and more focused interventions. Running from January 2014 to January 2017, the programme has three thematic priorities: youth engagement, investing in women, and capacity-building in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

DANIDA is also supporting a DDR project called ‘Serendi’ for Al-Shabaab defectors in Somalia (Brett et al. 2015: 31). USAID’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilization programme in Somaliland supports youth engagement activities in sports and arts, as well as practical job skills training workshops. The programme arose out of a realisation that high levels of unemployment and lack of education among youth make them susceptible to recruitment into violent extremism and sea piracy.

3.5 Increased funding for counter-terrorism efforts

Donors are heavily funding counter-terrorism efforts in the Eastern Africa region. The possible reason for this is the fear that unstable countries like Somalia can become breeding grounds for terrorists who will later be exported to other countries. Indeed, one of the key tactics of groups such as al-Qaeda has been the recruitment of youths from Western countries. It is documented that foreign fighters who have joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia were previously part of groups that have carried out terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda, targeting both national and international interests.

In addition, there is the fear that these foreign fighters will also find their way back to Europe and the US and lead attacks there. Western donors have therefore chosen to increase funding for counter-terrorism efforts even where they have been scaling down their funding for SSRs.

The EU in 2015 pledged US$12m over five years for counter-terrorism training to help Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen to improve cross-border investigations and prosecutions (Reuters 2015). Ethiopia and Uganda are also among six African countries that are part of the US-supported, US$110m per year, African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). This initiative aims to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflicts. It was unveiled during the 2014 US–Africa Leaders’ Summit, and the US has announced an initial package of assistance to Ethiopia for the development of its airlift capabilities (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2015). APRRP complements the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme, and the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support programme.

---

26 Email interview with donor operating in Somalia, 9 August 2016.
27 Kenya, especially since its army went into Somalia in 2011, has faced increased attacks by the Al-Shabaab targeting Lamu, Mombasa, Eastleigh, Mandera and Garissa. Many young Kenyan men have also been recruited into Al-Shabaab. The 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2013 Westgate attacks and the kidnapping of foreign nationals are some of the examples of international interests being targeted. Al-Shabaab was responsible for the 2010 attack on an Ethiopian restaurant in Kampala, whose customers were mostly foreigners.
28 The other countries are Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania.
The EU is providing support to AMISOM, Eastern Africa Standby Forces (EASFCOM), the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for initiatives related to peace and security and regional stability. From April 2014 to 30 June 2015, the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme provided the Maritime Security Programme (MASE) with €2.3m to strengthen the capacity of the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region for implementation of the ESA-IO Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Promoting Maritime Security.

From 2007 to 2015, the EU provided €1.1bn to AMISOM to cover troop allowances, death and disability compensation for military and police personnel, international and local civilian staff salaries, operational costs of AMISOM, maintenance, running costs and equipment for the Al-Jazeera Training camp in Mogadishu, and Quick Impact Projects (Daily Nation 2016b). Likewise, in FY 2016 the Department of State requested US$115m to be used to continue support to AMISOM, including training and advisory services, equipment and logistics support in relation to personnel/goods from current and new force-contributing countries not covered by the UN Support Office for the AMISOM (UNSOA). The funds were also to be used to professionalise, and provide training, advisory, equipment, logistical, operational, and facilities maintenance support to, Somali military forces, ensuring their capability to contribute to national peace and security in support of the international peace process efforts, and as part of a multi-sector approach to post-conflict SSR (Department of State, USA 2015: 114).

In 2014, the State Department’s military assistance programme, International Military Education and Training (IMET), provided support to Ethiopia and Kenya amounting to US$589,000 and US$748,000 respectively. IMET among other things seeks to establish a rapport between the US military and the recipient country’s military in order to: build alliances for the future; enhance inter-operability and capabilities for joint operation; and improve professional military education. Further, in FY 2016 the State Department requested a total of US$390m from the President’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund for Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) Overseas Contingency Operations; of the total, US$90m would be used to prevent the creation of counter-terrorist safe havens in the Horn of Africa.

Ahead of President Barack Obama’s visit to Kenya on 24 July 2015, the State Department announced that the US would provide US$100m in counter-terrorism assistance to Kenya (Morello 2015). This is an estimated 163 per cent increase in such aid compared with the FY 2014 total of US$38m (Security Assistance Monitor 2015). Of the US$100m, US$95m was to support the Kenyan military’s efforts in AMISOM (ibid.).

The funds allocated to the Kenyan military are to enhance efforts for a ‘manoeuvre and border force, counter-IED, intelligence, and logistics’ and help Kenyan soldiers identify and target Al-Shabaab operatives and respond to terrorist attacks. Other funds will be focused on training the Kenyan military on key aspects of combating terrorism. The counter-terrorism funds have been increasing since 2012 (ibid.).

Following the terrorist attack in Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in September 2013, the EU provided a €19m support package in the area of counter-terrorism, under the IcSP (ReliefWeb 2015). The package has three components: €2m for STRIVE; €6m for a project on countering money-laundering and the financing of terrorism; and €11m for a project on strengthening regional counter-terrorism law enforcement (ibid.).

---


30 ibid.
Since 2008, the US has provided support in the form of military advisers and aircraft to Ugandan-led military operations to capture or kill Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commanders. It has also provided humanitarian aid, pursued regional diplomacy, helped to fund early-warning systems, and supported multilateral programmes to demobilise and reintegrate ex-LRA combatants (Arieff, Blanchard and Husted 2015). According to a Congressional Research Service report, between 2009 and 2012 the State Department allocated over US$56m for supplies, equipment and logistics support to the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Congress increased the authorised annual funding level to US$50m for the period FY 2014 to FY 2017. In FY 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) used its ‘Section 1206’ authority to provide US$4.4m in counter-LRA-related training and equipment to the UPDF. DoD has also supported counter-LRA operations with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as authorised by Congress, with over US$41m in FY 2013 and US$54m in FY 2014 (ibid.).

The Department of State continues to support the Somali National Army and AMISOM in their efforts to push Al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. From 2007–14 it contributed more than half a billion dollars in training, equipment and logistical support to AMISOM. It has also invested more than US$170m to recruit and train forces to help protect Somalia’s institutions and citizens (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2014).
4 Conclusion

The inclusion of Goal 16 in the SDGs reflects the growing international consensus that governance and peace and security are important for development. Internationally and in policy circles, there has emerged consensus around the basic elements of an approach to reduce violence. These include: (1) the need to create legitimate institutions, often through efforts to craft political settlements, (2) strengthening access to justice, (3) extending economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people, and (4) fostering societal resilience, both through institutions as well as by considering the sustainability of interventions (Lind, Mitchell and Rohwerder 2016). As this report notes, donors are funding these various elements and are establishing closer links between security and rule of law and with the trade agenda through an improved business climate, for the direct benefit of their home countries that are investing in the region.

It is unfortunate that owing to a challenging political environment, some donors are moving to concentrate on fewer broad-based projects and themes in some of the countries. This is partly due to declining global funds but also to the realisation that there is no political will to engage in some of the issues, for example security sector and judicial reforms. Addressing violence and conflict in Eastern Africa will not be achieved without the commitment of development actors, both traditional and non-traditional. It will be necessary for these actors as well as governments to implement their own action plans, with their own targets and methods of accountability.
References


Lake Turkana Wind Power (2016) http://ltwp.co.ke/


Morten, E.H. and Torbjørn, G. (2015) The End of Nordic Exceptionalism?, Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Church Aid, DanChurchAid and Church of Sweden


