WHEN DOES THE STATE LISTEN?

RESEARCH BRIEFING
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WHY IS IT SO HARD FOR NON–STATE ACTORS TO BE HEARD? INSIDE TANZANIA’S EDUCATION POLICIES

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Why is it so hard for non-state actors to be heard?
Inside Tanzania’s education policies

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Further reading
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Despite acknowledging, of late, the importance of non-state actors in guiding government education policies, the government often thinks of competition instead of cooperation when it interacts with non-state actors.

When does the state listen?

Communication between the state and citizens is an essential element for an equal and just society. Growing social inequalities, lack of proper public services, and denial of basic human rights all act to widen existing communication gaps. Key to bridging these gaps is ensuring not only that citizen voices are heard, but also that states have the capacity and incentive to listen and respond. As much of the literature on accountability focuses on citizen voices, a group of researchers from Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania – in collaboration with the Institute of Development Studies – decided to look at state responsiveness. Trying to find instances of accountable governance, when the state is responsive to citizen voice, this team of researchers interviewed key actors across the state–citizen spectrum who had been involved in landmark social justice policy processes during major junctures of democratisation in these four countries. Calling their research project When Does the State Listen? (Loureiro et al. 2016), they examined when and how the state listened, and to which actors; and why, at times, it chose not to listen.

The researchers identified three types of juncture when the state listened: (1) ‘hearing’ moments, when the state engaged with citizen voices but did not change the way it acted; (2) ‘consultation’ moments, when it engaged with citizen voices through two-way dialogue, resulting in one-sided action; and (3) ‘concertation’ moments, when coalitions between reform-minded officials and politicians and organised citizen voices engaged in two-way dialogue and action for accountable governance. They witnessed concertation moments when state and non-state actors shared a sense of urgency and a common goal, despite different understandings of accountable governance. But they also found that states often reverted to consulting or hearing, as concertation moments are arduous and temporary, and part of larger, ever-changing policy processes.

In this brief, Lucas Katera looks at the barriers Tanzanian citizens and other non-state actors face in trying to make the state listen to their voices. He focused his research on the design and implementation of primary education policies and programmes in Tanzania since the beginning of multiparty democracy in 1995. He analysed the content of various publications on primary education policies, looking for the voices of non-state actors in government publications. He complemented this by interviewing key individuals, including government officials in the education sector, retired government officials who were in office during the design and implementation of post-1995 policies and programmes, as well as researchers and civil society actors working in the education sector. The research concludes that policy-making is a top-down affair in Tanzania, where there is an antagonistic relationship between state and non-state actors. Despite
acknowledging, of late, the importance of non-state actors in guiding government education policies, the government often thinks of competition instead of cooperation when it interacts with non-state actors. Whereas part of this mistrust comes from a sensitive state, non-state actors at times do not help the situation with critical and confrontational advocacy efforts.

**Trends in the development of Tanzania’s education sector**

Universal access to education has been on Tanzania’s development agenda since independence in 1961, when the government of the new state declared war on three social enemies: poverty, ignorance and disease (Nyerere 1968). Universal access to education was one way of addressing ignorance. Investment in education infrastructure was emphasised, alongside teacher training. By the end of the 1970s, Tanzania had almost attained universal primary education (UPE) through an effort that involved allocating a serious proportion of its national budget to education, increasing the number of schools and teachers, and making primary schooling compulsory and free.

But the government could not afford to sustain this effort and, under pressure from international financial institutions, from the early 1980s it decreased the overall percentage of gross domestic product allocated to education, shifted its educational policy towards cost-sharing, and introduced enrolment fees (URT 1993). Against the backdrop of the stagnation of the 1980s and early 1990s, and following the 1995 multiparty elections, the state started once again to invest in primary education. Particularly over the past 15 years, budget allocation to the sector has been high, averaging 18% of total government expenditure.

Enrolment trends have followed changes in government funding, which have been shaped by different policies and programmes. For instance, enrolment in primary education increased slowly from 0.5 million children at independence in 1961 to 1 million children in 1973. Thereafter it increased sharply to a peak of 3.5 million in 1983. These developments could not be sustained following the economic crisis of the mid-1980s, which necessitated cost-sharing and cuts in expenditure, leading to an increasingly uncomfortable learning environment and high dropout rates, especially among low-income families and other vulnerable groups like orphans. Enrolment fell to 3.1 million in 1988 and started to rise slowly until 2000, when it reached 4.4 million. From 2001, enrolment increased sharply to a peak of 8.3 million in 2007, after which it stabilised, before falling again in recent years. Figure 1 (on page 5) summarises primary school total enrolment since independence.

These trends have been shaped by the government’s education policies and programmes. For instance, the sharp increase in enrolments in the mid-1970s occurred during the period when UPE was being vigorously implemented, and when education was generally regarded as a gateway to social mobility (Carnoy and Samoff 1990). Accordingly, enormous effort was made to transform an insignificant educational sector characterised by low enrolment rates and poor infrastructure into a national provider of UPE. The goal was to make free primary education available and compulsory for all members of society.
Similarly, the sharp increase in enrolments from 2001 to 2007 was due to the implementation of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) of 1995 through the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP), which started in 2002. This education policy came about as a response to the declining enrolment of the mid-1980s. Recently, the government has launched a new education and training policy, the 2014 ETP, aimed at addressing the weaknesses of the previous policy but also responding to the current national and global development agenda (URT 2014). The success of these policies and programmes depends heavily on how citizens understand them, but also on their involvement in policy formulation.

### Does the government listen to its citizens in policy formulation?

Citizen involvement in decision-making has been part of Tanzania’s political reforms in recent years. The local government reforms of the late 1990s emphasised the decentralisation of decision-making and policy formulation, especially on issues that affect citizens’ daily lives. To operationalise this, various structures exist at the lower levels of government to enable citizens to engage in decision-making (URT 1998). For sustainability and ownership of a project or programme, it is important to involve key stakeholders from situation analysis, through needs assessment and priority setting, to the drafting of the document (Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008). To what extent has the government involved its citizens in the formulation of policies and programmes in the education sector? To answer this question, we focus on the ETPs of 1995 and 2014, and the 2002 PEDP. The 1995 and 2014 ETPs were important in broadly shaping the education sector, with the 1995 ETP aimed in particular at increasing enrolment of children, particularly those from poor and vulnerable families who had been out of school following the introduction of cost-sharing in the late 1980s. The PEDP was the key tool for operationalising the 1995 ETP. Table 1 summarises the participation of non-state actors in each policy.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Think tanks</strong></td>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Key message</td>
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<tr>
<td>University experts and research institutions</td>
<td>The quality of the education system has suffered; poor children are excluded</td>
<td>Education programmes need to be informed by research</td>
<td>While we have achieved on quantity, more needs to be done about quality</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Participated in drafting the policy</td>
<td>Various studies provided input to the government actors drafting the policy</td>
<td>Invited to comment at later stages, but few sent inputs as the policy had already been launched</td>
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<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Key message</td>
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<tr>
<td>National and international</td>
<td>Children from poor families are excluded from access to education</td>
<td>Children from poor families are excluded from access to education</td>
<td>The quality of education has deteriorated</td>
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<td><strong>Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Did not participate in the policy process, which was under the control of the central government</td>
<td>Some participation in education-sector working groups, but the government was selective on which inputs it chose to take into account</td>
<td>Participated in formulation, but concerns not reflected in the final document</td>
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<td>Research and advocacy on the existing condition of the education sector</td>
<td>Advocacy and activism on the existing condition of the education sector</td>
<td>Roadside poster campaign and sponsorship of radio and television programmes on the state of education</td>
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<td><strong>Donors</strong></td>
<td>Not involved officially</td>
<td>Key message</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cost-sharing did not have a human face</td>
<td>Supported various groups, providing inputs to policy</td>
<td>The quality of education has deteriorated</td>
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<td><strong>Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Participated in various working groups</td>
<td>Provided financial support to government for the preparation of the new policy, and to NGOs to stimulate debate towards improving policy</td>
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<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td>Not involved (at this time, the media consisted of state-owned newspapers and radio, which reported progress without questioning implementation)</td>
<td>Key message</td>
<td>Key message</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio, print, television</td>
<td>Children from poor families are excluded from access to education</td>
<td>The public should be informed on debates about the policy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Various developments and challenges reported</td>
<td>Reporting on the state of education sourced from research publications and meetings</td>
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The 1995 Education and Training Policy
The starting point for establishing this policy was the Education Commission report under Jackson Makweta, popularly known as the Makweta Commission (URT 1993). This report contained a lot of detailed information on the problems of the education sector and what was needed to improve it. The Makweta Commission was formed following well-documented, high levels of citizen dissatisfaction with the direction of the education sector from late 1980s to the early 1990s.

Knutsson (2005) noted that this dissatisfaction was mainly due to three factors. First was the high costs of education under cost-sharing. Second was the low quality of education, the result of a bad learning environment brought about by the lack of funding during the crisis of the mid-1980s. This resulted in no recruitment of new teachers despite increased pupil numbers, and little or no rehabilitation of schools or related infrastructure. Third, although cost-sharing was intended to make more money available in schools for infrastructure rehabilitation and the purchase of school supplies, the money it generated was treated by district administrators like any other tax, and hence spent at the district level rather than at the school level. It was also expected that cost-sharing would increase a sense of ownership in schools, something which never happened, since parents’ contributions were spent at the district level. Because of this widespread citizen dissatisfaction, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) conducted research and advocacy, and lobbied the government and the donor community to reverse cost-sharing and hence the poor quality of education.

The 1995 ETP was established to address these challenges. The various stakeholders interviewed for this research to determine their involvement in formulating the 1995 ETP – including civil servants (both retired and currently in power), researchers, academics, and civil society actors dealing with education – all concurred that the policy was centrally formulated. This may have happened because of the prevailing situation at the time, in which the central government – dominated by a single party – was the key player in determining policies for social service delivery, even though implementation was to be carried out at the local level. This tendency affected the education sector, just as it did other social services. Studies (e.g. Therkildsen 2000) show that despite the reform efforts of the mid-1980s, local government councils remained marginalised in decision-making on primary education, and parents had limited influence on collective decision-making. Although the 1995 ETP was planned at the central level through the Ministry of Education, it intended to increase citizen participation in key decision-making during implementation.

It is also important to recognise that, while the 1995 ETP was centrally planned, it was also a response to international outcry about the exclusion from education of children from poor families because of the economic hardship.1 Academics, particularly from the University of Dar es Salaam, were key actors in the formulation of this policy, but civil society actors and citizens were not participants; neither were they proactive in trying to become involved.

1 Much of the genesis of the ETP was the result of the National Task Force on Developing Education for the 21st Century, which was mainly externally driven as international concerns grew about large numbers of out-of-school children in developing countries (Sumra and Katabaro 2014).
Citizen involvement in decision-making has been part of Tanzania’s political reforms in recent years. To operationalise this, various structures exist at the lower levels of government to enable citizens to engage in decision-making.

Given the nature of the formulation of this policy, there were mixed feelings on its perceived impact on the education system. Government officials, including those who have retired as senior officials in the sector, noted that the policy recognised the importance of local experts from academic institutions, and was a result of a clear understanding of the problems facing the sector, showing where the sector was, where it should be going, and what was needed to take it in the planned direction. According to retired civil servants, the policy was very coherent and clearly reflected the needs of the education sector. The problem, in their view, was one of implementation, because of limited funding.

On the other hand, interviews with civil society organisations\(^2\) (CSOs) revealed different opinions on the utility of the policy for improving the education sector. According to them, the fact that the government did not involve citizens and other education-sector stakeholders resulted in a policy which could not take the education sector forward. One of the ETP’s weaknesses was the assumption that it would result in an education system in which a child would move from a pre-primary school all the way through to a higher-learning institution (HakiElimu 2008).

In other words, the policy tried to orient citizens’ mindsets to an understanding that education meant passing examinations for the purpose of moving on to the higher stages of education (URT 2014), a belief that ignored the fact that children may have talents which could enable them to improve their lives before reaching an institution of higher learning. According to a HakiElimu survey in 2007, less than 20 per cent of Tanzanians associated education with capability or the changes that a child acquires after the learning process.

The second weakness identified by CSO interviewees was that, as a result of limited involvement of stakeholders in its implementation, the practice of using Kiswahili in primary schools for the majority of children, and English at secondary and higher levels created quality problems at higher levels and affected performance. From the students’ perspective, all the terminologies they learned and used for seven years of primary education in Kiswahili were of no use to them in secondary school, where everything had to be re-learned in English. Roy-Campbell and Qorro (1997) report on a study which found that an essay

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\(^2\) These include HakiElimu, Twaweza, the Child Dignity Forum and the Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) Secretariat. The TEN/MET is a national network of over 170 national NGOs, community-based organisations, international NGOs and district networks that are concerned with the promotion of education.
exam in Kiswahili yielded thoughtful and concise responses, but the same exam in English yielded disjointed and nearly unintelligible responses.

These complaints from CSOs make it clear that the government did not involve them in formulating the 1995 ETP. It is possible that the marginalisation of CSOs, local government and parents happened because discussions and consultations to formulate this policy took place when the country was still under centralised single-party rule, but also because pressure from civil society was not as strong as it subsequently became under multiparty rule.

The 2002 Primary Education Development Plan
The PEDP started in January 2002 and ran for five years, up until the end of 2006. It was perhaps the most ambitious attempt, after the UPE drive in 1977, to influence primary education in Tanzania. The PEDP went beyond the aim of UPE, which was primarily concentrated on expanding access, and was more comprehensive in its scope. In addition to addressing access, it included an emphasis on improving the quality of teaching and learning, increasing the funding available at the school level, and making institutional arrangements more democratic and transparent throughout the system (URT 2001).

Reports indicated that the government decision to abolish school fees and mandatory contributions significantly increased enrolment (Sumra 2003; Davidson 2004). The abolition of these contributions was a result of advocacy and lobbying by both local and international NGOs, directed at both the government and international donors. Through the PEDP, more money from both the government and development partners was directed to the

A sign outside a school in Dar es Salaam.
education sector. Classroom construction was undertaken, and teacher recruitment and deployment took place in all districts of the country. Communities clearly desired education and responded positively by registering children and taking part in construction activities. NGOs were more engaged in the PEDP process than they had been in the 1995 ETP, and donors appeared to be willing to increase levels of support to primary education (Sumra 2003). These aspects provided grounds for optimism, and the government deserves to be commended for its determination to revitalise primary education.

However, other aspects of PEDP implementation – such as devolving power and resources to the community level, the role of school committees, access to necessary information on the lower-level PEDP, and meeting required funding thresholds – appeared to be fraught with difficulties, delays and confusion (Makongo 2003; REPOA 2004). Some of these problems were inevitable start-up difficulties, but others could have been foreseen and avoided through better planning and management, and especially through more meaningful involvement of communities (HakiElimu 2008).

Studies show that objectives of the PEDP were not well understood, especially at the community level. Many people did not know what the PEDP was, or what it was trying to achieve (MOEC 2003). This is because citizens did not take part in its establishment, even though they were some of those most affected by its implementation. The Ministry for Local Government was to play a proactive role in involving citizens, but lagged behind. Stakeholder interviews suggest that the reason for this was a power struggle: the Ministry for Local Government thought that as the implementing ministry, it should have housed the programme, rather than the Ministry of Education, which mainly deals with policy.

This lack of citizen awareness of the PEDP resulted in numerous implementation challenges, because the nature of the plan meant that implementation required a significant involvement by lower-level government, citizens and school committees. The construction of classrooms and other school facilities was a major undertaking of the plan, with the aim of creating more space to accommodate the many pupils who had dropped out. A key component of this construction was that government efforts would be complemented by citizens. A lack of awareness on the side of citizens on how they were supposed to engage in implementing the PEDP created a loophole for politicians to interfere with the operation of the plan for the purpose of gaining political popularity.

Many citizens were often opposed to making contributions of the kind demanded by the PEDP, especially when they were aware that the government had enough money to cover development projects. Tax payment is considered as a contractual agreement between the government and citizens, in which the latter pay tax in return for service delivery from the former. Obviously, tax payment may not necessarily be sufficient for full payment for the required services, in which case citizens may be requested to pay. This requires, however, discussions and agreements between a government and citizens. Since citizens were not well-consulted in the formulation of the PEDP, politicians wrongly informed them that the government had enough funding for the construction of infrastructure, implying that any additional contribution would very likely be misused by
government officials implementing the PEDP. It was easy for politicians to convince citizens not to contribute, because the citizens were implementing agents rather than part of programme planning; had they participated in planning, they would have better understood their roles, and this would have prevented the politicians distorting the initial plan for implementation.

**The 2014 Education and Training Policy**
The 2014 ETP was the result of the government’s recognition that some elements of the 1995 ETP had become outdated, but also a response to the cry of education stakeholders that a new policy was needed.

The 1995 ETP was in place before other reform programmes in many sectors, so its implementation had to take place while these were getting off the ground, leading to a number of challenges. Some requirements of other national macro and micro policies were not appropriately addressed in the policy, and neither were some of the commitments Tanzania made as signatory to various international agreements. Furthermore, all the sectoral programmes were running concurrently, each claiming part of the meagre resources available in the country.

Although improving the quality of education was a driving force behind the 1995 ETP, this proved difficult to achieve. Research pointed to the quality of education going down, suggesting to some a need to change the whole education system, including the curriculum, teacher incentives, teaching language and similar issues (HakiElimu 2008). It also showed that while some achievements were recorded following the PEDP initiative, there were still high levels of regional and gender disparity (Missokia and Zombwe 2011). These trends led education stakeholders, especially in civil society, to call for a new policy to replace the 1995 ETP. It was very common in various policy discussions to hear comments from civil society demanding a new direction in education. It was also common to see posters and television programmes showing children at school congested in a classroom or fighting to access a common facility like a toilet. All these were messages to the government from civil society to change direction on education.

Eventually, in 2006, the government initiated a process of establishing a new education policy, but the process halted in 2008. During this period, education stakeholders – especially CSOs – were consulted by the government, and called to meetings to provide inputs to the planned new ETP. As one CSO key informant noted:

> “As members of civil society working in the education sector, we were called [to] Morogoro in 2008 to provide inputs to the planned education and training policy. Although the document was already in place, we included our inputs with the expectation that the final document would reflect our thoughts. To our surprise, we saw the final report in 2014, which had not included most of our earlier concerns.”

After the consultations in 2008, the policy document that appeared in 2014 was presented as final, without returning to stakeholders to see whether their comments were reflected in the final document. Language of teaching, for example, was one key area of concern that was not reflected in the policy. Another was the removal of...
cost-sharing, which was viewed by some CSOs as another attempt by the government to increase its popularity at the expense of quality of education. As one CSO key informant pointed out:

“Imagine that currently we have cost-sharing, but still the financial resources available at school level are very small to meet the actual needs. What will be the case when parents completely stop complimenting such resources?”

For this informant, cost-sharing is necessary to increase the resources available at schools. Also important to consider is how cost-sharing is implemented, so that it does not become a serious burden to the very poor. A form of exception or reduced contribution could be a good option. But most important is that cost-sharing could be used to strengthen parental monitoring of schools, and accountability on the side of school administrations. But suggestions such as these from CSOs were not reflected in the 2014 ETP, as an educational researcher narrates:

“The current education policy is a result of [a] few government officials. Generally, unlike the previous 1995 policy, this was not backed with clear research to determine the problem and establish clear solutions. The education policy of 1995 may have been good, only that it was partly implemented (perhaps only 50 per cent of the policy was implemented). We possibly needed to improve the previous policy instead of establishing a new one. Even the current one may be considered weak if it will have limited funding like the previous one.”

The final draft version of the 2014 ETP was discussed by politicians, mainly members of parliament. A ‘disguised’ consultation happened after the report had been launched by the President, when the Ministry of Education circulated the policy document to education stakeholders, including CSOs, academics and research institutions to provide feedback. It was not clear how the final policy document would incorporate comments from these stakeholders, given that it had already been launched.

Generally, the 2014 ETP was formulated with little or no involvement from key education stakeholders, a fact that the government appeared to admit while campaigning for the 2015 general election. During the campaign, free education from primary to lower secondary was one of the electoral promises of the presidential candidate from the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. But this was already provided for by the 2014 ETP, implying that education would be free regardless of who was elected president. Knowing that citizens were not aware of this provision, the CCM used the provision of free education as a campaign promise. The CCM was re-elected, and many citizens still feel that free education is a result of their voting for the CCM, and that perhaps they would have been paying if they had voted for the opposition.

Just as was the case with the 1995 ETP and the PEDP, the lack of involvement of key stakeholders in the formulation of the 2014 ETP means that a number of potential problems in its implementation are likely to occur. It should be noted that this policy has allowed the language of primary-level instruction to be both English and Kiswahili, and it is at the discretion of a school’s
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management which language is used. Implementation of this will have a bearing on the National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA). There will be the need to start translating all primary books and exams translated into English, something for which the NECTA has limited capacity, and which is likely to be too much for it.

Why does the government ignore citizens’ views?

Discussions with both the government and CSOs working in the education sector suggest that the reason why the government seldom listens to its stakeholders is that the relationship between the two has been of ‘pointing hands’ at each other, rather than working together as partners, identifying problems, undertaking research and coming up with solutions. Although CSOs follow this path, given their number and that of other researchers in the education sector, this results in a multitude of proposals requiring government attention within a short time period. It is too much for the government to take on board each and every issue proposed by CSOs. While the government may use this as an excuse for not responding to issues raised by education stakeholders, sometimes it may really be a challenge for the government to address everything. To meet this challenge, government officials say, it is important for CSOs to work with the government throughout the processes of situation analysis, needs assessment and priority setting. Once research priorities have been identified jointly between the government and civil society, the former will very likely own the findings and thus be more likely to use them.
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The relationship between government and CSOs has been one of ‘pointing hands’ at each other, rather than working together as partners, identifying problems, undertaking research and coming up with solutions.

In line with this, CSOs have been conducting research and disseminating findings in public before they are discussed with the government. The government as a key stakeholder in implementing findings needs to get results directly and discuss them, rather than seeing findings in the newspapers, some of which may not represent the actual situation in the sector. This only adds to the atmosphere of mutual accusation between the government and civil society.

Finally, there are budgetary issues, which may constrain the government from taking proposals from the citizens. Some interventions require large sums of money that the government may not have at the time that citizens want action. It should also be noted that government processes have channels of approval before an action can be taken. Sometimes, these bureaucratic procedures take time, but this can be perceived as the government not responding to citizens’ views.

Implications for policy and practice
This briefing investigates the extent to which the government has involved, or not involved, citizens and other education stakeholders in establishing policies.

Involving citizens in policy formulation is very important, since they are the final beneficiaries and the key players in implementation of such policies. We found that the government rarely involves citizens in the formulation of education policies. The involvement of other stakeholders, especially CSOs, has also not been very effective. Although CSOs have been involved in the later stages of drafting policies, their comments have not been taken into account in establishing final documents.

The major area of weakness is the existing relationship between the government and CSOs, which is not a partnership. The government views CSOs as institutions which are there to criticise government performance, regardless of how good it is. On the other hand, CSOs have been doing useful work, including studies which potentially could feed into government processes. However, such studies are done without consulting the government and departments, and thus sometimes end up using ambiguous statistics. The lack of government involvement in various stages of study implementation goes up to the level of dissemination. As such, measures to bridge the basic relationship between the government and CSOs may be needed to improve the involvement of education stakeholders in policy formulation in the future.
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References


About Making All Voices Count

Making All Voices Count is a programme working towards a world in which open, effective and participatory governance is the norm and not the exception. This Grand Challenge focuses global attention on creative and cutting-edge solutions to transform the relationship between citizens and their governments. The field of technology for Open Government is relatively young and the consortium partners, Hivos, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and Ushahidi, are a part of this rapidly developing domain. These institutions have extensive and complementary skills and experience in the field of citizen engagement, government accountability, private sector entrepreneurs, (technical) innovation and research.

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Research, Evidence and Learning component

The programme’s research, evidence and learning contributes to improving performance and practice, and builds an evidence base in the field of citizen voice, government responsiveness, transparency and accountability (T&A) and technology for T&A (Tech4T&A). This component is managed by IDS, a leading global organisation for research, teaching and communication with over 30 years’ experience of developing knowledge on governance and citizen participation.

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