DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND DECENTRALISATION
SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

by

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The paper discusses the meaning of development administration suggesting that it is closer in meaning to political development than to traditional public administration. It then goes on to speculate on the adequacy of decentralisation as a response to specific problem areas of development administration. The underlying argument is that decentralisation is not a panacea. Rather it must be accompanied by a high degree of political commitment from all concerned, and in this sense, it is an issue in underdevelopment.
Administration has frequently been cited as one of the various shortcomings of development policy in Kenya. This shortcoming is by no means peculiar to Kenya. It is now generally recognised that developing countries must respond to underdevelopment with administrative structures that might have to be substantially different from those already established in developed countries if development is to take place. In other words, the fact that one is engaged in administering development projects does not mean that one is thereby engaged in development administration. The administration must must embrace features that make it developmental in its own right, regardless of the intrinsic nature of the activity that is being administered. This, of course is a statement of the problem in an ideal form, for in all likelihood organisational features do have an effect on the nature of the would-be development activity and vice-versa, and especially at the stage of implementation. In other words at a practical level, the independence between administrative features and the nature of the development activity is likely to break down, if it ever existed, due to mutual adaptation between the two. The prospect of mutual adaptation, however, cannot be interpreted as the case against an independent conception of development administration; no more than the latter can be interpreted as the case against an independent conception of a development activity. Failure to conceptually separate the two would likely lead to a situation where one logically follows from the other, whichever one happens to be empirically defined first. Thus, one would be empirically empty.

Our concern here, however, is not with the peculiar relationships between administrative features and a development activity. Rather, we are concerned with the question of the relationship between development administration and decentralisation. More precisely, we would like to speculate around the question: to what extent is decentralisation an adequate response to the salient problems of


2. The Administration of the “Special Rural Development Programme” was in effect an attempt at our independent conception, albeit in a very narrow sense of development administration.
For our present purpose, we would like to discuss four problem areas of development administration. These problem areas are, of course, not exhaustive. Indeed some might not even consider them the most important areas. They are therefore chosen purely as illustrations of the central issue vis. decentralisation as a response to development problems. The four problem areas are: 1. Utilisation of external resources in the context of institution building. 2. Innovation in administering development. 3. Administrative complexity in inducing development. 4. Speedy and decisive implementation of development projects.

First, a few words on development administration as such.

**Development Administration**

Like most other concepts, development administration is surrounded with debate, depending on whether one views it from the point of view of public administration or from the point of view of social-political development. Those who view it from the point of view of traditional public administration tend to put the emphasis on the notion of "public". They therefore argue that development administration is that aspect of public administration which is concerned with development activities, be they social or economic, i.e. so long as the activity concerned is both public and involves independently defined development projects, then the kind of administration involved is, ipso facto, development administration. In other words if one were charged with the responsibility of studying development administration, one would look for public development activities, however defined, and then study the administrative structures around it. Alternatively one would formulate administrative structures to go with the public development activities. In brief this school of thought would argue that public administration is a much broader concept than development administration.

The question therefore becomes: are we to assume that the aspect of public administration which is concerned with other than direct public development activities is itself developed, or are we to assume that even if it is not developed, it does not need development? If the assumption is that it is developed, then the additional question becomes: how come it has developed out of context when the rest of the system is not developed? How about such constant complaints that one hears about as the unwillingness of the public officials from newly independent countries to make decisions? Isn't this an aspect that needs development? How about the tendency to make decisions in the interest of certain classes or even in the interests of external classes? If on the other hand the assumption is that this aspect of
administration does not need development, then this clearly calls for an explanation. The point being made is that administration cannot be taken out of context from the general condition of underdevelopment. i.e. it must be viewed within the systemic context, which in this case is underdevelopment.

Similar questions to the ones asked above have led another school of thought to conceive development administration in a much broader way than public administration as understood in so-called developed countries. Infact some writers have conceived it so broadly as to make it equivalent to nation — building, with all that this involves. Conceived this broadly, development administration subsumes under it such other concepts as integration, political development, economic development, general institution building etc.

According to this school, the emphasis is not so much on the notion of "public" as on the more ideologically committal idea of "development". Thus, everything including the management of public institutions that are far removed from development projects as such, falls under the category of development administration. In other words, it is assumed that development should be predicated on the whole system and not simply on an aspect of the system that is arbitrarily designated as developmental. As can be seen this amounts to a virtual abolition of the notion of public administration replacing it with the more comprehensive idea of development administration. One of the advantages of this conception of development administration is that it makes it easier to introduce radical changes in the whole system, and to do so in a comprehensive integrating manner. In other words, once we have done away with the assumption that one sector of the system is already functioning the way it should, then it becomes logically possible to plan comprehensively taking into account systemic adjustments and anticipated systemic consequences. Thus if the ideological commitment is to decentralise in order to facilitate participation by the non-official public, then the necessary institutional re-organisation would include public administration if the latter was a hindrance by virtue of the fact that it embodies a non-developmental


2. Tanzania has already done this.
ideology. We can now see why, development administration, conceived this way is closer to political development than to traditional public administration that is supposed to be politically non committed.

Whatever conception of development administration one chooses to employ there seems to be agreement that the goal of development administration is economic and social development and that this involves planning. The latter is supposed to make the whole process rational. How much planning, for what sector and at what level of government is part of the debate. This debate notwithstanding, there seems to be agreement that change must be induced in all sectors of the society including change in peoples attitudes and behaviour. In other words, social development as an intermediate goal of development administration should not be considered separately from economic development. It must be considered paripassu with economic development. Further, and perhaps more important, a condition of scarcity must be a built in premise of the process of planning. That is to say the scope of the activity is not enough to distinguish development administration from traditional public administration. The environment of scarcity is in many ways an important distinguishing criterion.

Given the premise of scarcity, the necessity for both economic and social development and the broad conception of development administration we shall briefly look at the four problem areas of development administration mentioned above.

It is generally agreed that economic growth could take place without engineered social change, but not self-sustaining and integrated development. The latter requires planning that conceives of development as a complex whole comprising economic elements, sensu stricto, but also quantifiable and most important, not so easily quantifiable elements such as illiteracy, social inequalities etc. What is the place of imported resources in this process?

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It might be argued that if the choice is simple economic growth, then there is a clear and positive place for imported resources. It might even be further argued that importation of development resources constitutes a bold recognition of scarcity in the particular administrative system and is therefore justifiable given the central role of scarcity. However, a number of counter arguments can also be made. The first argument is a straightforward empirical fact viz. that the choice is rarely simple economic growth, if one uses as the criterion the quantity of resources that is usually allocated to social development in planning. The problem therefore is one of quality. The second argument is really a question for consideration in planning viz. on what system should scarcity be predicated, the local system, the national system, or the international system? The answer seems to depend on the anticipated consequences. In most cases, the practice has been to predicate scarcity on both the local and the national systems, while assuming expanding resources in the international system. Hence the constant search for external assistance in its various forms. Given that the choice at least in practice, is rarely simple economic growth, what then are some of the likely consequences of external resources on integrated and self-sustaining development?

Integrated and self-sustaining development requires, among others two major elements, viz. stable resources and stable institutions. Imported resources are always subject to stochastic influences be they political or economic. They are non-guaranteed and therefore by nature unstable. Even when they are quantitatively guaranteed, they are subject to qualitative change. Given this nature of external resources, it becomes possible to argue that the consequences of their utilisation on self-sustaining development are not necessarily favourable, since the function which these resources are best at performing viz. economic growth, is

1. Ibid
is subjected to fluctuations beyond the control of the planner.

As far as institutional stability is concerned, there seems to be two interrelated aspects to the problem. The first aspect concerns what is to be institutionalised. This is logically prior to institutional stability for in most cases challenges or non-challenges to institutions depend very much on what has been institutionalised. Self-evidently, almost anything can be institutionalised depending on course on other factors in the system. Thus, depending on the availability of coercive forces fear can be institutionalised as in the Leviathan state. In order to reduce the likelihood of challenges to the institutions, the latter must embrace broadly accepted and easily understandable procedures. In other words, local participation is of central importance. Participation in both planning and implementation gives the people who are supposed to be beneficiaries of development an avenue for articulation. This increases the likelihood of response from the upper echelons of administration since governments "tend to respond only if there is a clear evidence of demand". Further, when there is an avenue for local participation, it becomes no longer necessary to try and discover the so-called indigenous institutions. Instead, development administration becomes a process of creating the institutions as the people articulate the values that need to be institutionalised. These values cannot be assured to be unchanging and hence the futility of looking for indigenous institutions, and correspondingly, the importance of administrative innovation.

The implications as far as utilisation of external resources is concerned are obvious. In addition to the obvious danger of superimposition, there is the prior danger of institutionalisation not taking place at all in the first place, especially when the would-be models become too identified with and dependent on non-indigenous persons or groups. Thus the answer to our original question is at best ambiguous. In order to avoid the unfavourable consequences of utilising external resources, the latter must be integrated in national development. This is easier said than done, for it involves deciding which internal non-economic prerequisites are substitutable by external financial/economic resources and which are not, and the pertinent substitution functions and methods; a difficult task to say the least.¹

¹ International Social Development Review op cit p. 6.
2. Innovative behaviour can be seen in contrast to incremental reforms designed to improve, for example operational efficiency or simply horizontal coordination. In other words, it is not simply modernizing the bureaucracy. It is this, plus the ability to create new institutions designed to further development objectives. In the specific context of planning, the conflict over innovation is usually between the planning units and the finance units representing innovative tendencies and conservative tendencies respectively. Now it might be argued that the conservative tendencies of the finance divisions represent a clear recognition of scarce resources and are therefore justifiable. This argument is true, but only partly so. In this particular context it is necessary to raise the question: scarce for whom? In other words we cannot legitimately assume that the budgetary process is a cost/benefit approach resulting in an overall rational action in the distribution of resources. In most cases, the budgetary process "reflects influence and power struggles rather than deliberate cost/benefit approach". Hence the relevance of the question. Planning on the other hand involves choosing from alternative courses of action "on the basis of a preliminary diagnosis covering relevant factors". It is true that one of the major planning problems in developing countries is the so-called "planning without facts" but in all likelihood the planning process is a much more rational activity than the budgetary process. Given the previous discussion on the need for development administration to keep pace with rapidly changing societal attitudes as a prerequisite for stable institutions, then the policy question is whether the general tendency of finance divisions to dominate planning divisions should not be reversed giving more priority to innovation as opposed to financial security. The latter, in any case cannot apply to all, given the scarcity of resources and the struggle for influence that this scarcity necessitates.

3. Administrative complexity can be viewed in the contexts of scarce resources and the need for local participation. Few people would deny the need for expertise especially where programmes of economic development


3. Ibid
are involved. However, as we have seen, economic development should only be one aspect of development. The broad question, therefore, as far as manpower planning is concerned is; to what extent should development administration be manned by experts either indigenous or external? Again the answer depends on the anticipated consequences. It can be argued that specialisation is likely to improve staff performance. True. However, this argument is premised on a sectoral conception of development be it economic or social. Within the concept of integrated and self-sustaining development, the utilisation of experts could have two major consequences both of which are undesirable.

First, the administration is likely to become financially burdened. The more institutional expertise is required, the higher the cost. For example at the project level highly sophisticated evaluation procedures are totally unsuitable for individual small projects if for no other reason than because their high level manpower and financial costs rival or exceed those of the projects themselves.

Second, and perhaps more important, specialisation has a tendency to lead to complexity and herein lies the other problem. Given the conditions in the least developed countries it is unlikely that specialised administrators would be uniformly distributed throughout the system. The likely result is that the centre would be characterised by complexity and the periphery would be composed of a few highly specialised administrators charged with the responsibility of explaining and overseeing the implementation. In this situation communication between the experts is possible but not between the experts and the people, unless a host of intermediate staff is available for the purpose of simplifying and explaining the policy. This host of staff is usually not available.


2. Ibid.

3. Reginald Harbold Green, "The Role of the state as an Agent of Economic and Social Development in the least Developed Countries" Journal of Development Planning, No. 6, U.N. N.Y. 1974, p. 17
The point here is that local participation, which is a prerequisite for stable institutions could easily be negated by administrative complexity. Lack of participation could in turn mean lack of enthusiasm and in some cases outright non-cooperation in development efforts. The policy choice here seems to be between sectoral efficiency utilising specialised administrators and a simple administrative system that puts a premium on local input and motivating people, and at the same time utilising local resources and thus coming into terms with the constraint of scarce resources. The latter choice might require no more than simple administrative guidelines that may be applied by semi-skilled manpower rapidly and with a fair probability of a correct decision. (This approach) might be a much more hopeful way of making the right allocations in the short run and of building broadly based institutional and decision-making capacity in the medium and long run.¹

4. Given the atmosphere of "rising expectations", decisive and speedy implementation becomes a vital factor in development administration. Any one of a number of factors could account for slow or for that matter non-implementation. Some of these factors, for example instability of resources and instability of institutions have already been mentioned. In addition to these factors, implementation could be affected by a "lack of authentic national development policies, incorporating images of future society towards which the striving for development is directed." In other words a development ideology. In some extreme cases, the plan might be intended solely to get aid, without any intention of ever implementing it.² Also often mentioned is the fact that the relevant data might be non-available. This last factor is not very convincing, for it follows that if there is no data for implementation, there ought not to have been data for the plan in the first place. Whatever, the relevant factors are at any one time and place, the problem of speedy implementation should be considered in the context of quality decisions.² More often than not, this constitutes a dilemma, which cannot be resolved by changes in administrative structures without opting for either speed or quality. More on this will be said in the context of decentralisation.

¹ Reginald Herbold Greene. Op cit P. 7
² Marshall Wolfe op.cit pp. 32-34. 
³ See Guy Hunter op.cit. p. 7.
Decentralisation:

Decentralisation is not intrinsic to any type of administration be it developing or developed. It is a conscious choice that has to be justified either on the basis of faith or on the rational grounds of it being the best alternative given particular goals. In general terms decentralisation has been justified mainly in the name of "grass-roots democracy". The argument usually put forward is that institutional and political decentralisation would facilitate local participation in planning and this would in turn enhance distribution, access to national resources and the general feeling of democratic participation. Thus decentralisation is viewed as both an administrative and a political concept. This, however, does not mean that the administrative and the political elements must always operate jointly and in equal strength. It is possible to have bureaucratic decentralisation with more or less political decentralisation and vice versa. In some cases it is possible for one form of decentralisation to be effected without the other. The special Rural Development Programme is a good example of some form of bureaucratic decentralisation, without political decentralisation, through the mechanism of centralising financial powers.

Within the context of development administration, decentralisation has been justified in the name of giving power to the people, complexity of local conditions, speedy implementation and in some cases on the basis of the particular administrative history. Our present concern, however, is not the justification of decentralisation as such. Rather we are concerned with decentralisation as a response to the major issues of development administration discussed above. We shall look at 1. scarce resources. 2. Institutional stability 3. Innovation and complexity 4. Decisive implementation.

1. The relationship between decentralisation and scarce resources is by no means obvious. The major argument is that decentralisation would facilitate a more effective utilisation of local resources since local conditions would be taken into account during planning and consequently during implementation. This argument is based on a
recognition of scarcity at the national level and says little or nothing about the international system. This seems to have been the logic behind SRDP where the necessity for small-scale prototype testing was recognised, utilising "existing Kenyan resources both for development purposes and research purposes, and" without a vast infusion of external aid."^ The ambiguity about the international level notwithstanding, several comments can be made in relation to the national level.

First, the effectiveness of decentralisation might very well depend on the degree of decentralisation. What is "local" to the central administrator might not be so to a peasant. For example, the choice of the District as the administrative unit cannot be justified logically. The District might not be local enough for some. Secondly, the effectiveness could depend on what aspects have been decentralised, and to whom. For example planning could be decentralised to the District level, and implementation to the Divisional level. This could be compounded by centralising the financial powers as in SRDP. The result could be disharmony between the plan and implementation, delays in implementation, and frustration on the part of the implementers due to their inability to make any definite commitments in the absence of financial powers. Thirdly, the question needs to be asked; how do the local resources fit in the national context of development? This is the dilemma of decentralisation within the context of disintegrating forces such as (unequal endowment of resources between regions and peoples. In order to avoid institutionalising inequalities through decentralisation, the latter might have to be incomplete, taking the form of bureaucratic decentralisation without political decentralisation. Even this mechanism leaves a host of other questions unanswered such as the level of decentralisation.

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2. There does not seem to be any logical or direct link between decentralisation and institutional stability. There can be an indirect link, however, through participation. A case can be made that decentralisation is likely to lead to increased participation at the local level, which in turn is likely to lead to institutionalisation of broadly accepted principles.

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values, which in turn would lead to institutional stability. One must admit that this argument rests on a rather long inferential chain, and any one of a number of things could happen in between. In recognition of this fact the discussion usually centres on participation and its relation to stability. First it has been argued that participation is more likely to lead to instability because of excessive demands. Hence, in keeping with scarce resources, the argument continues, participants should be just those who are "willing and able to meet production goals". Others should be excluded to avoid having the agencies strategy nullified by popular demands.\(^1\)

The second argument usually put forward is that, at this stage of development, people cannot participate because they do not have the capacity to participate.\(^2\) Thirdly, and with specific reference to decentralisation, it is argued that participation can take place without decentralisation. Hence, the goal of stability can be achieved without decentralisation. This is the "extractionist" view of participation whereby "the central government intervenes in an attempt to promote maximal utilization of scarce local resources." The local people are involved in planning "as potential contributors of money and labour and not as potential members of a strong social/political/economic unit."\(^3\)

The three arguments seem to be premised on the growth concept of development and as such are only true within this narrower concept of development. Outside this narrow concept of development, the arguments have serious loopholes and one can legitimately argue that they are anti-developmental. The first two argument seems to assume that ability and willingness are inmate characteristics. If one utilises the broad conception of development, then it becomes obvious that ability and willingness are issues in underdevelopment. In other words within the broad conception of development, decentralisation as a response should aim precisely at creating among other things ability and willingness to participate once it is clear to the people what they want, as opposed to what is determined for them by the rulers.\(^4\) Furthermore, these arguments assume a benevolent

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\(^2\) N. Ouma Oyugi Op Cit pp. 12-15

\(^3\) Ibid p. 2
participant who will out of sheer good will distribute the fruits of his participation to the so-called unwilling and unable non-participants. This obviously is not the case. Ability and willingness to participate are acquired traits, and what is even more important they are vital determinants of access to the final product. They should however not be regarded as absolute determinants for in a sense they are also the results of access to the scarce resources. Given this circular relationship decentralisation would be meaningless if it does not lead to either one or the other. Hopefully it would lead to better access to resources which would in turn lead to ability and willingness to participate. It is in this sense that decentralisation is an issue in underdevelopment.

With reference to the "extractionist" view of participation, one can either deny that this is participation, or one can argue that the view puts a premium on stability as an end state which is almost self-determining, as opposed to the process of institutionalising broadly accepted values, as a determinant of stability. The process demands much more than simple extraction.

3. The question of innovative behaviour can be discussed together with the related problem of administrative complexity. There seem to be two major views to this question. The first view is pessimistic and looks at the problem of non-innovativeness in terms of "ecological" factors. These factors include culture and relevant historical facts. This view is pessimistic because the conclusion is usually that institutional changes would be fruitless since the administrative practices are the result of social and cultural conditions. In other words, non-innovativeness is the result of inability to become innovative. It follows from this conclusion that structural changes would have little if any effect at all. In fact nothing short of revolutionary changes including major cultural re-orientations would have any effect.


The second view is less pessimistic. According to this view, specialisation and the resultant administrative complexity might have something to do with non-innovativeness.

"... the essence of bureaucratic administration is to have highly specialised and defined areas of jurisdiction within which the bureaucratic can apply the rules ... appropriate to that area. But the essence of development is the need to secure interrelated changes in a whole range of sectors of life simultaneously; for this the breakdown of the whole problem of development in any area into rigidly separated jurisdictions is an obstacle, not an advantage."¹

It seems to follow from this view that if an effort is made to avoid top heavy administrative systems, through such techniques as devolution and decentralisation, then more innovative behaviour might follow, though it is not quite clear how and why. Of course it is possible to argue that innovativeness will be a result of response to demands and changing attitudes, now that the system is able to monitor them better. Be that as it may, one should point out that the centre relations, say between finance and planning units, could still hold, only now at a different level. Decentralisation is no guarantee that these relations will change.

The two views, I think, fail to address themselves to the question: why should innovation take place?² They tell us why innovation does not take place. They do not tell us in what conditions it might take place. If one looks at the problem from a materialist point of view, then it becomes possible to argue that in this context innovativeness, is a result of access to resources. In this sense, if decentralisation creates access to resources by the people, then this condition will force bureaucratic innovativeness, as a response to the demands.

4. Decisive implementation requires among other things high speed decisions. In the context of scarce resources, however, the choice must be made between quick decisions and high quality decisions. To achieve both


² John Nellis Ibid.
speed and quality requires a high calibre of junior staff and this is hardly to be expected in a situation characterised by scarce resources.¹

Decentralisation should in principle facilitate quick decisions though this should not be taken to mean that the decisions taken in a decentralized structure are therefore automatically poor. The choice between speed and quality need not be absolute in character. In the specific context of project administration, it is possible to make administrative arrangements so that the knowledge of the highly qualified staff at the centre is utilised during implementation and the experience of the field staff is fed back to the policy-makers.

Decentralisation, however, should not be regarded as an automatic guarantee for decisive implementation, certainly no more than it is an absolute choice between the latter and high quality implementation. As we have already seen, a host of other factors might affect implementation in one way or the other. One factor which perhaps needs emphasis is the temperament of the senior decision makers. The effects of a non-quantifiable factor like this are perhaps more difficult to gauge than, say, the effects of resource instability. The most that could be said if decisive implementation is to take place, then the senior policy-makers must be prepared to tolerate the necessary mistakes by the junior, less qualified staff. In other words, a resilient temperament is necessary if decentralisation is to have the desired results with a minimum of disharmony between the overall policy and implementation. Inflexibility and control run counter "to leadership, teamwork and initiative"² which are classical concerns of development administration.

¹ For a fuller discussion see Guy Hunter op cit pp. 7-8.
² Ibid p. 9
Conclusion.

The burden of the paper is a plea to view development in a much more comprehensive way. A non-sectoral view of development would show that decentralisation is no panacea. Choices have to be made, and trade-offs must be carefully considered before making the choices. In an atmosphere of underdevelopment, these choices are economic, political, social and administrative. In other words, they transcend any one sector. The challenge is to avoid making choices that are in effect half-measures and consequently self-defeating in the long run.

Secondly, decentralisation cannot even begin to solve some of the problems of development administration unless it is accompanied by a high degree of political commitment both at the centre and in the periphery. There are perhaps as many reasons to decentralise as there are to centralize. If the former is to achieve the goals in whose name it is normally justified, then it must first and foremost cater for access to resources and the others would probably follow. Given the tendency of the centre classes to jealously guard the resources for utilisation at the centre, one wonders whether decentralisation can be meaningful without a political commitment to the creation of a society without major class differences.