Land: An Empowerment Asset for Africa
The Human Factor Perspective

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Chapter Six

The Ethics behind the Fast-track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe

Fainos Mangena

Introduction

A lot has been written about the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe. Since 2000, there have been critical academic contributions from the humanities, social sciences, life-sciences as well as the natural sciences on this highly emotive subject. While most contributors have focused on the socio-economic and political dynamics of the FTLRP, and while most contributors have blamed the government of Zimbabwe for what they have perceived as injustices perpetrated against a remnant of the white commercial farmers who owned the biggest chunk of the land, we look at the ethical dynamics of the FTLRP with a view to show that the government of Zimbabwe was justified in taking land from these white commercial farmers and giving it to the landless blacks.

In our view, the government of Zimbabwe was justified for two reasons: Firstly, we argue that those who have blatantly criticised the government of Zimbabwe for being unjust in its re-distribution of land to the landless blacks have selective memory. Secondly, we argue that those who have blamed the government on this issue have little knowledge of the spirit and ethics that informed this drive. As we defend our argument, we utilise two dialectically opposed perspectives, namely: the human rights perspective which is made up mainly of those people who have criticized the FTLRP for violating or infringing the rights of the few white commercial farmers 'whose' land was taken by the landless blacks as well as the perspective of those who have defended the FTLRP for correcting a historical imbalance with regard to the re-distribution of fertile land to the black majority. We discuss these two perspectives in the context of Zimbabwe's founding values and ethics.
Historical Background to the FTLRP

If there is any subject that arouses emotions in Zimbabwe once it is introduced, it is the subject of land-ownership and control. This is so because notions of identity and belonging cannot be discussed without placing them into the context of land ownership and control. As Simon Mawondo (2008) puts it, in apparent reference to the importance of history in defining identities and belonging, ‘we form ideas of who we are in the light of not only what we think we were in the past, but also in terms of what we want to become’ By this, Mawondo probably meant that people need space or territory to form those ideas about identity and belonging and that the whites had robbed us of this space or territory in the form of land. Joseph Mujere (2011:1125), further explains the notion of belonging when he argues that:

Belonging is a relational concept which entails among other things, attachment to a group, place or other category. Local notions of belonging especially among peasants in Africa tend to revolve around religion, autochthony and ownership of land. It is therefore about being locally embedded.

For Mujere (2011: 1125), belonging raises the question of access to resources such as land. Mujere believes that it is the connection between land, ownership and belonging that has led to the rise of claims to land ownership by the indigenes (2011:1125). Indeed, the issues of land ownership and control in Zimbabwe are inextricably bound together with notions of identity as defined by Mawondo, and belonging as defined by Mujere because we are all vana vevhu (sons and daughters of the soil) because rukuvhute rwedu rwuri muivhu re Zimbabwe (our umbilical codes are buried in the Zimbabwean soil).

Now, as in the past, land-ownership remains the root of political tension within the country and with the former colonial power, Britain (Zimbabwe Embassy, 2014). Someone might ask: Why is there political tension? Why are there emotions when it comes to this subject? As a response to these questions, one will probably be forgiven to argue that there is political tension and emotions because of the cruel manner in which land was taken away from the black population by the white settlers.

In fact, what fuels the emotions even more is the fact that as the takeover of land unfolded, white settlers hemmed in the majority black population on what they called Native Reserves (known today as communal areas) which were infertile and tsetsefly-infested and this marked the beginning of the division of the Africans’ land (Chitsike, 2003: 2). Conquest through
land grab and livestock seizure brought stiff resistance from the indigenous people and the first major uprising (known as the first Chimurenga) soon exploded in 1893 and this led to the death of many black revolutionaries.

A question can still be asked: Did the landless black Zimbabweans have any right to the ownership of the land before the coming of the white settlers? A good answer to this question would probably require us to revisit the history of colonisation in Zimbabwe. A look at this history will show that when the first whites arrived in 1890, the land between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers was populated by the Shona and the Ndebele people, who claimed sovereignty and it is thought that the Shona had been there for about 1 000 years, while the Ndebele arrived in the 1830s, having migrated north from Natal after falling out with the Zulu King (Ayinde, 2002). We learn that in 1889, the imperialist Cecil John Rhodes, who had made a fortune in diamond mining in the Cape, set up the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to explore north of the Limpopo (Ayinde, 2002). In a short space of time, he had dispatched 200 settlers with each of them being promised a 3 000-acre farm and gold claims in return for carving a path through Mashonaland (Ayinde, 2002).

When these settlers came, the Shona people were too fragmented to resist and the British flag was raised at Fort Salisbury on 13 September 1890 (Ayinde, 2002). The name Rhodesia was adopted in 1895 and in a relatively short period of time up to 1914, the division of land became vastly disproportionate as just three percent of the population controlled 75 percent of the land, while the majority (97 percent) were given a mere 25 percent of the worst land (Ayinde, 2002; Chitsike, 2003). This division of land was a violent process that would make the majority of black Zimbabweans slaves in their own country for more than 100 years.

To put this point into proper perspective:

The Rhodesian state [once established] embarked on a programme of institutional violence in the form of forced migrations. At long last, the implementation of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act... was to be carried through. Africans on 'white' land were to be moved to the reserves, by force if necessary. This policy involved suffering everywhere... the deaths and hardships which resulted from being forcibly dumped in the disease-ridden wilderness were built into the evictees' collective memories (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000: 46).

Based on the contents of the above quotation, one can argue (and justifiably so) that colonialism sowed the seeds of retributive violence in Africa. Below, we discuss the ethical dynamics of the FTIRP with a view...
to defend the claim that the government of Zimbabwe was justified in embarking on the FTLRP.

**Ethical Dynamics of the FTLRP**

With regard to the ethical dynamics of the FTLRP, two perspectives are pre-dominant with the first perspective representing those who blatantly criticised the FTLRP for what they termed a violation of the human rights of the minority groups by violently driving out the few white commercial farmers who owned the biggest chunk of the country's arable land prior to 2000. This perspective, which we shall call the *human rights perspective*, is defended mainly by sympathisers of the white commercial farmers whose land was taken, together with the white community of European and American descent. The second perspective that celebrated the FTLRP for empowering the majority of the landless blacks shall be called the *perspective of the landless blacks* and is defended by advocates of black empowerment and other like-minded citizens.

The former perspective argues that during and after the inception of the FTLRP, issues of right and wrong relating to both human beings and non-human beings abound. It observes that there were human rights abuses as some white commercial farmers who were resisting eviction from the farms were beaten up, maimed or even killed by landless blacks led by war veterans (Research and Advocate Unit, 2014: 24). Animals were also wantonly killed as the war veterans-led mob ran rampage in a bid to claim what, according to them, was rightfully theirs (2014: 24). Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009: 207) puts it aptly when he argues that:

> At the centre of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme there was a 'relentless pursuit of justice' that degenerated into a 'vendetta and ended up in revenge.' Race came into the picture and a few whites were left dead by the so-called “jambanja”/Hondo yeminda/Third Chimurenga.

As shall be seen later, the human rights perspective on the FTLRP provided a one-sided story that rubbished the whole process and blamed the Zimbabwe government for fanning violence in the name of land redistribution. As noted earlier, the rights of the minority groups, such as the white commercial farmers, were violated since even those farms which were not designated for resettlement were taken by the land hungry blacks. Defenders of this perspective would argue that it is the absence of the rule of law that made the government of Zimbabwe culpable and that reduced the whole process into a racial prank.
On the other hand, the perspective of the landless blacks puts it that the FTLRP was long overdue as the black majority had suffered for a long time without land. This perspective defends the position that up until the year 2000, the armed struggle had meant nothing to the majority of black Zimbabweans since they had not been given what they had fought for—land. Below, we discuss these two perspectives, in detail.

**The Human Rights Perspective on the FTLRP**

This section, relies on the FTLRP story as told by Ryan Dale Groves (2006) who is one of the scholars representing the human rights perspective, among others. Groves begins his narrative by noting that beginning in late February 2000, veterans began what has been frequently called *jambanja*, a period of chaos and lawlessness (2006: 66). A series of well-coordinated government-sponsored invasions of white-owned farms left over 30 people dead (mostly MDC supporters) and countless more injured (2006: 66). Lionel Cliffe *et al* (2011: 913) sum it up when they remark, thus:

> Varying from political protest to noisy disruption to violent intimidation, beatings and killings, they often dislodged owners and managers, and sometimes their farm workers... irrespective of the origins of the impetus of the de facto occupations of farms, the ruling ZANU PF did shift to a policy of encouraging invasions...

Known as the *Third Chimurenga*, the invasions represented a desperate attempt to reclaim the revolutionary essence that had defined President Robert Mugabe's early successes (2006: 66). Despite rulings that found the seizures to be illegal, the end of constitutional restrictions on acquisition payments left many without a legal leg to stand on (2006: 66). Groves further argues that, eroding the court's authority was the overt aid of government, which directed war veteran operations and selected specific farms for invasion (2006: 66). Ultimately, land occupations were designed to set the stage for a political campaign that played to ZANU-PF's large constituency of communal farmers and simultaneously punished supporters of the opposition, namely, white farmers and their labour force (2006: 66).

As the parliamentary election of 2000 began, war veterans became the militant wing of ZANU-PF, waging a campaign of intimidation and violence against the MDC and its supporters while Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders vilified white farmers, painting them as imperialist cronies (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2000 quoted by Groves, 2006: 66). Despite its best efforts, the judiciary was openly undermined and the

**The Perspective of the Landless Blacks on the FTLRP**

Most of the scholars who have written in defence of the FTLRP have justified the FTLRP on the basis that the white commercial farmers ‘whose’ land was seized during the FTLRP, as well as their sympathizers, have selective memory. Those who are objective in their analyses of the situation will recall that these same white commercial farmers – who owned 75 percent of the land for over 100 years – had acquired the same land violently and fraudulently. Against this background, we, therefore, argue that the landless black Zimbabweans were justified in using the same force to repossess their land. This point is corroborated by John Locke (1994: 394) who argues that people whose rights are violated by conquest have a right to revolt and regain title to their heritage. Locke maintains, thus:

> The people who are the descendants of, or claim under those, who were forced to submit to the yoke of government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and to free themselves from usurpation of tyranny, which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of government, as they willingly, and of choice consent to (1994: 394).

Here Locke is, no doubt, arguing that people who are suffering under the yoke of oppression have a right to liberate themselves using whatever means. By extension, one can also argue that although Zimbabwe’s FTLRP has been described in some quarters as a violent process, this was necessary as Zimbabweans had suffered for a long time. As Simon Mawondo (2008) argues, politically, the act of conquest and the setting up of the colonial administration deprived Africans – and by extension, Zimbabweans – of the right to set up their own government as the colonial government reduced them to subjects. Economically, Africans were made manual labourers on white-owned farms, firms and mines, especially as they depended on subsistence wages (Mawondo, 2008).

Mawondo (2008) argues that ‘this reality had not changed that much at independence and this is why it is important to question the efficacy of the reconciliation policy in bringing justice and peace to Zimbabwe’. He, asks the question: Is it possible to have genuine reconciliation when the
fundamental injustices of the colonial past have not been addressed? In other words, is it possible to have genuine reconciliation when only three percent of the white population stills own 75 percent of the country’s arable land while 97 percent of the black majority owns a paltry 25 percent?

Probably, it was in a bid to address the above questions that the government of Zimbabwe had to use force to reclaim the land. In any case, peaceful negotiations had collapsed especially as the Tony Blair-led labour government that replaced the Margaret Thatcher-led conservative government that had brokered the Lancaster House agreement, had refused to compensate Zimbabwe for the land these whites had grabbed from the indigenes. For starters, the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 had protected white commercial farmers for the first decade after independence (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

According to the terms of the agreement, the new government would not engage in any compulsory land acquisition and that when the land was acquired, the government would ‘pay promptly adequate compensation’ for the property (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Land distribution would take place in terms of ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Willing-buyer, willing-seller meant that the government was only able to purchase land from white commercial farmers who were willing to sell their land (see Njaya and Mazuru, 2010). But how many of these were willing to part with their land? This is a question that would probably require further investigation in a different research project.

What is of critical and immediate importance in this chapter is that after the lapsing of the decade, the government of Zimbabwe was free to compulsorily acquire land to resettle the landless blacks without any hitches. Although the government acquired large tracts of land and resettled quite a number of blacks from 1990 to 1997, more land was required to resettle the remainder of the landless blacks who were landless but some of the commercial white farmers were now dragging their feet with regard to the idea of ceding more land to the government and this is why the government of Zimbabwe resorted to force, giving rise to the FTLRP.

It is on the basis of the above premises, notwithstanding the method of execution, that the FTLRP was justified. It was important for the indigenous people to retrace their footsteps back to the land of their forefathers. In fact, as Mujere (2011: 1128) put it:

The FTLRP... provided traditional authorities with the opportunity to pursue an agenda akin to land restitution as they have been making a
number of claims...over the new resettlements which they viewed as
their matongo (old homes)...and mapa (ancestral burial sites).

So, when the landless black majority look at the FTLRP, they see it as an
opportunity for them to be more fully human, especially as the process
of repossessing the land which was taken from them by the enemy would
enable them to increase productivity and thereby sustain their livelihoods.
For it is from the land that people get food and water and it is also on the
land that people build their shelters and it is also in the same land that
their bodies are to be laid to rest when they finally pass on. Land sustains
people's livelihoods and this is why it remains an emotive issue in
Zimbabwe.

Some critics have argued that the FTLRP violated the rights of the minority
groups, as in the process of resisting the violent farm invasions or
occupations, the few white commercial farmers, lost their lives and
property. But those who are objective in their analyses would recall that
when these same whites forcibly took the land from the black majority,
no human rights issues were raised. So, the issue of the violent nature of
the FTLRP can be properly understood only when people look back and
see how these blacks lost their land. Selective memory should probably
not have a place when it comes to this emotive subject as that will be
tantamount to saying 'I, the white man, am more human than you, the
black man.' This is not to say that we condone violence, but that issues of
this nature need to be analyzed objectively.

The FTLRP in the Context of Zimbabwe's Founding
Values

In this section, we argue that the FTLRP was anchored on indigenous
values as informed by the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* which is not only
communal but also spiritual. A philosophy is said to be *communal* if it
puts the interests of the group ahead of the interests of the individual
and, likewise, a philosophy is spiritual if it is anchored on the idea of
ancestreology, which is the belief in ancestral spirits. To this end, we
argue that since the spirits of Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi, Chaminuka,
Lobengula and others had inspired the liberation struggle, it was also
important to remember the role that these spirits had played in winning
us this struggle.

Thus, it was befitting to call the FTLRP, the *Third Chimurenga* in order to
invoke the spirits of Nehanda and others that had helped Zimbabwe win
the *Second Chimurenga*. It should be remembered that during times of
crisis, nations go back to their founding values in search of solutions.
Gade (2011: 304) calls these *narratives of return* and for him, there are two observations about these *narratives of return*. The first observation is that *narratives of return* have often been told and discussed in the context of *social transformation* whereby political leaders, academics and others attempt to identify past values that they believe should inspire politics and life in general in the future society (2011: 304).

The second observation is that African post-colonial *narratives of return* have typically contained the idea that in order to create a good future society needs to return to something African which does not stem from the previous period of colonial oppression but which is rather rooted in pre-colonial Africa (2011: 304). While Gade has used the designation *narratives of return* to refer to the cherished values of the past; elsewhere, we have called them *founding values* or *moral anchors* (Mangena, 2013: 6). Such values include: the value of unity and/or togetherness, the value of forgiveness and restorative justice and the value of collective memory and praxis. Below, we explain briefly the efficacy of each of these values and their connection with the FTLRP.

**The Value of Unity and/or Togetherness**

The value of unity and togetherness is a cherished value in Zimbabwe as it is one of the values that delivered Zimbabwe from colonial oppression. It should be remembered that during Zimbabwe’s armed struggle, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU PF and the Zimbabwe’s People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of PF ZAPU, worked together to deliver independence for Zimbabwe. Even after independence, Zimbabwe upheld the value of unity as seen by the signing of the Unity Accord of December 1987 which saw ZANU PF and PF ZAPU forming one government and also the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 which led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU PF and the (MDC) in February 2009.

True to the words of Stanlake Samkange and Tommie Marrie Samkange (1980), Zimbabwe modelled its governance along the lines of the *hunhu/ubuntu* value of unity. Way back in 1980, Samkange and Samkange (quoted in Gade, 2011: 310), had identified the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* as a philosophy about how the new Zimbabwe would be governed. According to Samkange and Samkange (1980), the socio-political implications to be extracted from *hunhu/ubuntu* were five-fold as follows:

(i) That *hunhu/ubuntu* dictates that there should be a government of national unity in new Zimbabwe (1980: 45).
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(ii) That the new Zimbabweans ought to live amicably with their neighboring states (1980: 50).

(iii) That the new Zimbabwe government should use the inhabitants’ fear of ngozi (aggrieved spirits or spirits of restorative justice) to prevent murder (1980: 54).

(iv) That communal land ownership should not be eroded by Western ideas of private ownership (1980: 59), and

(v) That there should be state, communal and individual property (1980: 64).

We argue that most of the five-fold socio-political implications to be extracted from hunhu/ubuntu – as outlined by Samkange and Samkange – have already been realised in the last 34 years of Zimbabwe’s independence. There is no doubt that Zimbabwe, just like any other country in this world, has had moments of political turbulence, starting with the Matabeleleland disturbances of the early 1980s and late 1980s as well as the political and economic crisis of the last decade (1999-2008). In both cases, Zimbabwe has solved its internal problems through a hunhu/ubuntu-inspired dialogue, thereby demonstrating the spirit of unity and togetherness in the country. Zimbabwe has also lived peacefully with its neighbours such as South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana and Malawi and has also sent its army for peace-keeping missions in the region and beyond as a gesture of friendship and the desire to see a peaceful and united region.

Coming to the issue of hunhu/ubuntu and justice, we argue that Zimbabweans, through the fear of ngozi, generally value life and this is why the rate of murder cases compared to neighbouring countries like South Africa is very low. With regard to the issue of land-ownership and control, the FTLRP was carried out with a view to empower the poorest of the poor, thereby preserving the African value of communal land-ownership and at the same time granting freedom to those who believed in the idea of private land-ownership, with a bias towards the former, of course. All this was done in the spirit of unity, inclusivity and togetherness.

One might ask: Why is it important to talk about private land-ownership in a country that is founded on communal wisdom? Why is it important to talk about Zimbabwe’s neighbours in a chapter that should strictly be dealing with the FTLRP?

Beginning with the first question, we would say that it is important to talk about private land-ownership in this chapter for the simple reason that Zimbabwe, being a peaceful and tolerant nation respects the rights of the minority groups who may believe in private land-ownership, despite
having a *hunhu/ubuntu*-inspired type of governance. It is also important to note that Zimbabwe has enjoyed cordial relations with its neighbours even during its trying times to show that it is not in the nature of Zimbabweans to cause trouble unless they are pushed to the wall as happened during and after the FTLRP.

**The Value of Forgiveness and Restorative Justice**

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, inspired by the spirit of *hunhu/ubuntu*, extended reconciliation to his erstwhile enemies as he began the process of rebuilding the country after years of ruin. Reconciliation meant that all the wrongs of the past were to be forgiven and that the white man was going to have the same citizenship rights and privileges as those of the black man. Consequently, the inequalities and the landlessness which had characterised black Zimbabwean existence before independence, were to be forgotten (Mawondo 2008).

On paper, this reconciliatory gesture seemed to be the best way to move the country forward but as Mawondo (2008) puts it, there was something wrong with this kind of reconciliation and forgiveness as it was done before the injustices of the past were redressed”. For Mawondo, the question that must be asked is: What did the ordinary Zimbabweans gain at independence? Being told not to revive the wounds and grievances of the past, to forgive and be reconciled, what exactly was this meant to imply? Whichever way one looks at this issue, the Mugabe-led Zimbabwe government demonstrated that forgiveness was a virtue if the country was to move forward as this was one of the biggest climb-downs one would expect from the leader of a country that had suffered for more than a hundred years under the yoke of British rule.

But please note that Restorative Justice became necessary when the government of Zimbabwe realised that forgiveness without justice was empty and this necessitated the FTLRP. It should be borne in mind that during the time Mawondo was writing, the FTLRP was already in full swing but the process had not yet been completed and this is why he kept on harping on the issue of reconciliation without justice. But it was always going to be a step-by-step *hunhu/ubuntu* process and the idea of extending the hand of reconciliation to the whites before the injustices were addressed, was meant to ease racial tensions but in the long run, Restorative Justice was always going to complete the process. Below, we look at the value of collective memory which enabled Zimbabwe to repossess its land from the coloniser and thereby fulfilling Mawondo’s dream of forgiveness and reconciliation based on Restorative Justice.
The Value of Collective Memory and Praxis

In this section, we begin by defining the words *collective memory* and *praxis*. By definition, *memory* is a cognitive process whereby the mind reflects on past events either with a view to get inspiration from past events in order to move forward or with a view to correct some anomaly of the past that has the potential to worsen the human condition. Thus, *collective memory* is when a group or community of people, in its collective wisdom, sits down and reflects on past events with the aim of correcting certain historical injustices in order to improve the human condition. In the case of Zimbabwe, for instance, there are certain episodes in history where Zimbabweans have had to reflect on the past with a view to improve their condition.

One such episode is when the *Second Chimurenga* was fought to tame the injustices that had resulted in Zimbabwe’s defeat by the British colonisers during the *First Chimurenga*. Although Zimbabwe got its political independence in 1980, the *Third Chimurenga* (often termed *Hondo Yeminda*) was meant to address the issue of land, which would, in turn, bring about total independence, thereby improving the human condition.

We now turn to the word *praxis*. While the word *praxis* may mean different things to different people, we regard it as a human act of bravery that is meant to improve the human condition or to alleviate suffering. Please note that there cannot be *praxis* where there is no *memory*. The fact that the then Prime Minister, Mugabe, extended the hand of reconciliation to his erstwhile enemies at independence, should not be underestimated to mean that he and the rest of the Zimbabwean black population had no memory of what had happened in the past. He and the rest of the Zimbabweans had recollected the memories but were prepared to live peacefully with their white counterparts for as long as the latter cooperated on issues of nation-building.

Land-ownership and control were some of the issues where these parties were supposed to cooperate but when the few commercial white farmers refused to share the large tracts of land they owned with the landless blacks who are in the majority, the government of Zimbabwe had to remind them that while Zimbabweans were peaceful, they also had bad memories of the historical imbalances of the past and this necessitated the FTLRP. Thus, any balanced discussion on the FTLRP cannot afford to ignore the issue of collective memory and praxis.

It is unfortunate that those who have chosen to rubbish the FTLRP on the basis that it violated the rights of the few commercial farmers, ‘whose’ land was invaded, have not really been objective in their assessment of
the factors leading to the FTLRP. It would appear to us that these critics have selective memory given that they start to talk about human rights when the white man is at the receiving end but when our forefathers were defrauded of this same land more than a 100 years ago, no human rights issues were raised. It is against this background that Zimbabwe used the value of collective memory and praxis to reclaim its land through the FTLRP.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, we made an attempt to outline and discuss the ethics that underpinned the FTRLP of 2000. We argued that two diametrically opposed perspectives undergirded critical discussions on the FTLRP and these were the human rights perspective which criticised the Zimbabwe government for violating the rights of the minority whites by allowing landless blacks to repossess their land and the perspective of the indigenous people which defended the FTLRP based on the fact that it was done in the spirit of hunhu/ubuntu. These perspectives are each discussed in the context of some of Zimbabwe’s founding values which are outlined as: the value of unity and togetherness, the value of forgiveness and restorative justice as well as the value of memory and praxis.

**References**


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