THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT SPACE:
THE STATE AND NGOs IN THE DELIVERY OF
BASIC SERVICES IN KENYA

BY-
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WORKING PAPER NO. 456

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P.O. BOX 30192-
NAIROBI, KENYA
1 JULY 1992

JUNE 1992

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ABSTRACT

The centrality of the state in the development space of many Less Developed Countries (LDCs) has come under critical scrutiny because of its limited success in fostering adequate social, economic and political changes in the last three decades. Many blame the deepening development crisis and attendant decline in basic services on the inadequacies of the bloated state. The search for other institutional actors to supplement and/or complement the preceding state services has focussed attention on private non-governmental voluntary agencies (NGOs).

This paper discusses both state and NGOs’ roles and experiences in providing basic services. It concludes that the worldwide recession, domestic economic, and political problems, and general effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have reduced the state’s capacity to deliver services. The result has been the intervention of NGOs. This intervention has been received with unease by the state, especially in recent years, due to what can be regarded as competition for legitimacy between the state and the sub-state actors. The paper concludes that the state is likely to continue to be the senior partner in this competition.
1.0 Introduction

At a time when demand for development is rising up rapidly, many developing countries, including Kenya, are experiencing development crises of varying types and proportions. This is manifested by, inter alia, declining per capita incomes coupled with rising impoverishment and marginalisation of the citizens; increased cost of living and unemployment; disintegrating infrastructure; general decline in human development and shrinking productivity. Added to these is also civil strife and widespread discontent with the state as a motor of social change. Amidst these problems is the constrained access of citizens to basic needs and services and subsequent decline in the standards of living.

The explanations for the gloom now sweeping less developing countries (LDCs) are many. Some are placed in the broad international economic environment, others in the colonial situation and still others in current domestic policies. In the International system, the general unequal relations that characterise the system in the form of dependence of poor countries on the industrialised states, is usually singled out for blame. Such unequal relations, it has been argued, are the cause of high indebtedness that LDCs face which, in turn, contribute to the reduced capacity of these countries to manage development affairs due to resource flight through debt service obligations.

Colonialism laid the basic framework for development in LDCs in such a way as to suit the colonial needs. Perhaps the framework should have been changed at independence but instead it was adopted by most post-colonial states. A central feature of the colonial framework was that it was one of
the founding cornerstones of the present unequal international system. Current domestic policies, in particular political conditions, exemplified as they are by poor governance and little or no pursuance of democratic principle, have a share of the blame: the effect of poor leadership being mostly manifested in economic mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency in public institutions, all culminating in poor provision of basic services by the state.

The limited success of the state in fostering social economic changes, despite the central position it has assumed in the post-colonial era, has caused concern among development practitioners and scholars. Some indeed view the centrality of the state as a major development mistake of the past, (Bratton, 1987; Hyden, 1983; Clark, 1991; Kinyanjui, 1985). The concern has prompted the desire and indeed the need to re-examine conventional models of development with a view to designing and pursuing alternative strategies to promote economic recovery, if not recovery in other areas of societal endeavours.

No wonder then that development agencies, donor institutions included, are now almost frantically searching for a new paradigm whose basic thrust would underline the importance of not the state but human development, through promoting specifically, people's access to basic services, and thereby supplementing and complimenting the activities of the state (IDS 1989). On their part, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have strongly urged, some would say demanded, a comprehensive reduction of state activities. Through the now well known Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) one condition for further lending to indebted countries is that economic
distortions and other imbalances in the economies of "adjusting" countries, be corrected (Nsouli, 1989). At the micro-development level, the overall logic of SAPs seems to be that state cede its role in micro-development activities to other agents and concentrate, instead, on creating an enabling environment for the latter.

The scaling down of state activities, especially in the provision of basic services, might have some negative consequences, especially in the short run. In this respect, it is now generally accepted that the most vulnerable groups are likely to be the already marginalised members of society. Consequently, concern has grown on how to fill the development space vacated by the state and on the viability of agencies that can effectively reduce the adverse effects of SAPs, in particular, and the shrinking performance of the state in general. The private non-profit voluntary sector (NGOs) is viewed as one important sector in this regard. This elevation of the NGO sector to what the state has on occasion viewed as a rival status has the potential to create conflict over control of development space.

2.0 The Perceived Importance of NGOs

NGOs represent non-profit-making organisations, voluntarily formed by people in response to development needs, especially micro-development needs. (Streeten, 1987; Fowler, 1988; Kanyinga, 1990; Ng'ethe, 1989; Muchiru, 1987). Fowler (1988) argues that the emergence and formation of NGOs can be seen as an expression of particular interests or objectives which are not adequately represented in the body politic and Muchiru (1987) observes that NGOs are institutions established to guarantee the survival of the people amidst
critical development constraints. Representation and survival, then, are among the key justifications of NGOs. Both have traditionally been "guaranteed" by the state.

Those broad observations suggest that NGOs comprise simple self-help community-oriented organisations whose formation is motivated by the welfare of members. In addition, NGOs can be formal organisations (in terms of organisational structure) voluntarily and purposely formed to help other people who are not necessarily those constituting the organisations' membership. While this paper is more concerned with the latter category, it has been claimed that nearly all categories of NGOs exhibit certain characteristics which include 'altruism, charity, efficiency, diversity, pluralism, popular participation, and autonomy', (Brodhead, 1989). The degree to which each particular NGO exhibits the presumed characteristics is, of course, a matter of debate. However, it is on account of these presumed characteristics that significant attention worldwide is being attached to NGOs as viable agencies that can not only ensure survival, but also promote sustainable development, at least at the micro level.

NGOs are observed to have comparative advantage over state institutions in undertaking micro development activities. This is mainly on account of their ability to: utilise cost-effective and flexible methods of development operations; undertake small-scale projects, thereby achieving results faster than would be the case with large-scaled projects carried out by the bureaucratic institutions of the state; concentrate the services in the rural areas where the majority of the poor live. (Fowler, 1988:5; Bratton, 1987; 1983: 120; Dracek, 1987; Streeten, 1987:92).
It has been further argued that the kind of micro-development activities that NGOs usually engage in constitute a development priority in that, being grassroots organisations, NGOs are well situated to understand local institutions and values, recognise the people as protagonists of development and therefore enlist their participation in development planning. In other words, NGOs have the potential to create and strengthen local participatory institutions for development, thereby breaking patterns of dependency and promoting greater self-reliance capacity on the part of development beneficiaries, (Ng’ethe, 1991:5; Masoni, 1985:38; Brodhead, 1988:19; Kanyinga, 1990:64). One area in which this capacity is greatly needed is in the provision of basic services amidst declining state capacity to provide the latter. This is certainly true of Kenya.

In Kenya, NGOs have been propelled to importance not only because of their contribution to the provision of basic services, but also due to their efforts in trying to strengthen local capacity for development. The role of NGOs is thus recognised in the major official development policy documents in addition to constant reference in public pronouncements.

Unlike a number of Africa countries where NGOs are still predominantly engaged in relief activities, a good number of NGOs in Kenya appear to have graduated from relief and welfare to activities that are primarily developmental thus invading space previously monopolised by the state. Thus, NGOs in Kenya are now engaged in a wide range of sectoral activities in the fields of energy, education, water, health and sanitation, food and nutrition, environmental conservation, income generation, legal affairs and other sectors. The wide range of NGO activities no doubt reflects the twin
phenomenon of increased demand for "development" and the shrinking role of the state in delivering the same.

Like other LDCs state contribution in the provision of basic services is on decline in Kenya, as a result of worldwide recession and subsequent decline in state productivity, in addition to gradual adoption of structural adjustment measures. This should, however, not be construed to mean that the state has completely vacated the development arena. No state can do that and at the same time continue to justify its existence, least of all in LDCs. Rather the state continues to play an important role, even as all manner of forces, both domestic and international, argue for and advocate further shrinkage of this role. This is the essence of the politics of development space.

3.0 The State and Provision of Basic Services in Kenya

3.1 Economic Performance

The performance of the state in local development in Kenya has been highly influenced by the various economic trends that have manifested themselves in the country since the 60s. The country inherited a highly dependent economy characterised by a large traditional sector. The post-independence government undertook to rectify the historical and sectoral distortions through several state-driven measures. Chief among these was the emphasis given to diversification of the economy which was highly dependent on agriculture. Notable achievements were made as the contribution of the agricultural sector to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has declined while the contribution of other sectors has gradually risen though not significantly.
Thus, agriculture contribution to GDP dropped from 41.8% in 1964 to 28.4% in 1984 and the cumulative contributions of the manufacturing (industrial) sector for the period 1964-72 increased from 10.9% to 12.8% in the 1986-90 period, (Ikiara, 1991:4). The performance of the economy has not been remarkably good however. GDP has varied considerable over the years as shown in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>GDP at Factor Cost</th>
<th>GDP per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-72</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-81</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-84</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-90</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 shows that comparatively good economic performance was achieved in the 50s when the GDP grew at 6.0% and GDP per capita at 3.0%. This is the only period when the economy exhibited a high growth rate of GDP. Growth dropped to 4.3% in the 70s and per capita drastically dropped to 0.3%, and attained a negative growth rate in the early part of 80s.

The reasons for the trend could be many but the behaviour of the international commodity market most certainly made a major contribution. Proceeds from coffee and tea for example, fluctuated wildly during the period and although there were substantial earnings from these crops in the late 70s,
these did not offer sustained relief to the economy. The prices took a nosedive before the end of the decade and the effects led to a negative GDP per capita growth rate.

The oil crisis of the 70s had similar severe effects on the domestic economy just as the 1990 Gulf war did. The escalation in oil prices prompted large budgetary deficits which necessitated both domestic and external borrowing. The dismal economic performance in the late 80s and beginning of 90s could be ensuing from the wave of political events unfolding in the form of multi-party politics, worldwide recession, and decline in foreign investments. Disintegrating infrastructure and general inefficiency in the public sector might also have contributed to the poor performance by dispelling foreign investments on which the economy has greatly relied in the past. All in all, the poor economic performance during late 80s and beginning of 90s is exemplified by declining GDP growth rates. From 5.0% in 1989, GDP growth rate dropped to 4.5% in 1990 and is estimated to have fallen further to 1.0% in 1991 (Economic Survey, 1991).

The economy has been constrained by a burgeoning population which for most of the 1970's and 1980's was growing at around 4% per annum. Though the rate is estimated to have dropped to around 3.34, by 1989, the overall population growth has outstripped the GDP growth rate thereby constraining the states ability to provide services to the citizenry. The public service has similarly grown. Public sector employment grew from 138,688 people in 1970 to 298,358 people in 1980 (Ongile, 1991). Public expenditure, in view of these constraints, has exceeded revenue. For instance, public expenditure on recurrent account and as a percentage of GDP was 32.5% in 1980 compared to
26.9% public revenue for the same year. Similar occurrence is observable throughout the 80s. In 1988, the ratio was 33.0% to 96.5%. The implications of this on state productivity are obvious for large budgetary deficits obviously mean declining capacity of the state to adequately deliver basic services. Within the same period the World Bank and IMF adjustment programs gradually evolved. Introduction of cost-sharing and user-payment levy in the basic health and education institutions and withdrawal of state subsidies on essential commodities were visualised, if not actually instituted. This would eventually mean that the already poor services would become even poorer, especially for members of society who, in any case were already poorly served by the state.

3.2 Delivery of Basic Services

As stated earlier, poor economic performance has, of course, constrained the ability of the state to successfully deliver the services. Table 2 attempts to capture the main trends in the delivery of services by the state.

Table 2: Central Government Spending on Basic Services (% of total Recurrent and Development Accounts on main Services)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ed.</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>15.84</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>17.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, Comm. and Welfare</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. Welf.</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most salient feature over the years is that there has been gradual decline of state expenditure on the main basic services. The figures show that the education sector is the main consumer of both the recurrent and development accounts. In spite of this, the spending in the sector has been on gradual decline save for the 1987/88 financial year when 20.49% of the total state expenditure was channelled to the sector. This is the period associated with drastic changes in the education policy, when a shift was made from the education system of 7:4:2:3 to an 8:4:4 system. The underlying assumption here was that students would acquire appropriate skills for use after school at any of the cycles. The change triggered the expansion of tertiary institutions as one measure of absorbing output for the lower cycles. For political purposes, the state also undertook to popularise the system which was otherwise not uniformly well-understood and received by Kenyans. Thus an artificial demand for more universities was created without an appropriate institutional capacity to strengthen or maintain them.

The dramatic shift invited high state inputs in order to legitimise the system and also to garner the tempo of citizens' participation and support for the new education system. This in turn put a high demand on inputs from the people in the form of cost-sharing unlike the case before. The state's increased expenditure therefore appears to have been aimed at averting potential disinterest and disillusionment on the part of the citizenry, and perhaps political embarrassment in case the implementation failed.

A higher rate of decline is evident in the health sector. From 7.5% in 1976/77 period, the highest over the years, spending declined to about 1.88% during the 1990/91 fiscal year. Similar trends are discernible in the housing...
and other sectors save for social welfare or grants made to the Ministry of
Culture and Social Services. In the latter case, one may conclude that lack
of significant changes in the grants to the ministry mean little change in the
improvement of social welfare. The 4.0% noted in 1986/87 may be explained by
the observation that it is within the period that the government was highly
involved in the expansion of sporting facilities across the country an aspect
that does not directly correlate with the provision of basic needs to the
poor.

The observed declines in the provision of basic services by the state
raises the question of “who is the state ceding its micro-development
activities to?” More specifically, “who is filling the gaps emerging from the
gradual phasing-out of the state in the provision of basic services?” NGOs
are playing a critical role in filling these gaps, and we now turn to this
issue.

4.0 NGOs and Basic Services Delivery in Kenya.

4.1 Growth of NGO Sector

As in most peasant societies, NGOs in Kenya are rooted in the indigenous
life styles and values of the people. Rural life in general reverberates with
the spirit of communalism, charity and voluntarism, all of which inform the
establishment of NGOs throughout the world. In Kenya, this is manifested in
the spirit of Harambee that has led to the growth of many self-help activities
and associations that have become recognised as a central feature in the
country’s development process (Nyagah, 1978).

The NGO community in Kenya has been influenced by several fact.
including the noted spirit of communalism. Arguably, this spirit has led to not only the evolution of many indigenous community-based organisations, but also, to the influx of many international NGOs into the country. In addition, the latter category of NGOs has been inspired possibly by the religious tradition and philanthropic movements of Europe and North America especially after the Second World War. These organisations expanded their activities to the Third World countries especially in the 60s after Europe had recovered from the war.

During colonialism, a majority of NGOs in Kenya were charitable organisations, others were religious bodies combining evangelical work with activities like education and social welfare. There were also urban based organisations formed by rural people living in urban areas. These included such organisations as the Kavirondo Tax Payers Welfare Association. In general, however, NGOs were few in the colonial days.

With independence, events changed a great deal as many organisations with social welfare as their principle objective evolved. The floods of the early 1960s, which ravaged many households, became a centre of focus and an entry point for many relief organisations. Some indigenous NGOs like the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and "Maendeleo ya Wanawake" greatly expanded their activities during these hard times.

Secular NGOs emerged in the late 1960s and 70s focussing, this time on development. Some of these organisations like the Co-operation of American Relief Everywhere ("CARE") which came to the country in 1968, had slowly started shifting their focus from relief to development by this time.

A quick look at the NGO sector shows that there are currently many NGOs
in the country and perhaps their number is the largest in the region if not the continent. By late 1970s there were about 120 NGOs in the country. By 1988, the estimated population of NGOs had grown to over 400 (InterAction, 1986; Fowler, 1988; KNCSS, 1988) excluding slightly over 20,000 registered self-help (Harambee) groups most of which are women organisations, (Ng'etie, 1989). There are other indications that by 1991 the total number of NGOs in the country was between 450 and 500 (Development Horizons, 1991).

In general therefore, Kenya has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of NGOs during the last twenty years. This growth has been fairly well documented by, among others, the Kenya National Council of Social Services (KNCSS) which was established by the government in 1964 to co-ordinate NGOs, (KNCSS 1978 and 1988) the Mazingira Institute (1985), InterAction (1986) and the Ford Foundation (1987). The KNCSS data, for example, shows that between 1978 and 1988 the number of NGOs in the country increased by between 113% and 132%. Fowler (1988) gives a similar impression of a rapidly expanding NGO sector. Tables 3 and 4 summarise this growth rate for the last decade or so.

Table 3: The Growth of NGOs Between 1978 and 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Documented</th>
<th>No. of NGO in 1978</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Difference 10 years</th>
<th>Growth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational*</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Operational NGOs with no offices in the country.

Source: Kamunga, N.K. (1990)
Table 4: Total sample of NGOs by type and origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSOs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOs</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoKOs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(PSOs - Private service organisations; KOs - Membership organisations)

Source: Adapted from Fowler, A., (1989)

Tables 3 and 4 show that the NGOs’ growth rate has been steady since late 70s. Calculations based on the conventional figures of between 400 and 450 would give an even higher growth rate than what is computed using the KNCSS and other sources. It is in the light of this that Fowler (1988) estimated a growth of 126% of indigenous and 250% for foreign NGOs. The question that therefore arises is: why this high growth rate and how does it affect the behaviour of the state?

Both foreign and indigenous NGOs have, no doubt, been highly attracted by the rural community setting which is dominated by the Harambee movement. In addition, Kenya has enjoyed a peaceful political climate since independence in 1963. Furthermore, many organisations have established regional offices in Kenya in order to serve other countries where the political setting is not conducive to residence. In this respect, Kenya has a well established communication and transport network and Nairobi itself is a regi...
communication and transport hub for several countries in Eastern Africa region. These factors have no doubt contributed to the growth of the NGO sector.

The state development plans and other official policy documents have attached some importance to NGOs in national development and participatory development strategies. An important feature of current IMF/World Bank inspired thinking is that participation is enhanced by cost-sharing as the latter reduces the burden on the state. Whether the people's capacity to cost-share actually exists is another matter altogether. The issue, here, is that participation is directly implied in the concept of cost-sharing and since NGOs claim to use participatory approaches to development, their activities should be in harmony with the state's stated policy. Looked at this way, there ought not to be, at least in theory, conflict over sharing development space. However, as stated earlier, there are other equally important themes in current IMF/World Bank development thinking, all of which provide fertile ground for conflict as the state resists what it views as attempts to marginalise it.

Perhaps another factor which has contributed to the growth of the NGO sector in Kenya is the country's 'philosophy' of establishing a "mixed economy." This 'philosophy' encourages, among others, open door market policy, which, in turn might have encouraged the "private-profit" and "non-profit" sectors to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour, the latter in the development arena in particular.

While domestic factors might have nurtured the growth of the voluntary non-governmental sector, external factors have definitely played a part, and
especially the behaviour of aid agencies. Many of these agencies have recognised the potential of NGOs as development catalysts. It is the view of most of these agencies, that results of their development assistance through the state for certain types of programs and projects, have not been particularly encouraging for a number of reasons, including failure to produce the desired quick returns. Thus NGOs are viewed by some donors as the most appropriate institutions through which quick and tangible results can be achieved compared to state institutions whose returns are neither quick nor guaranteed. Donors, therefore, prefer NGOs over the state for certain types of development programs and projects and herein lies a potential source of conflict over development space previously monopolised by the state.

Substantial resources have, therefore, been channelled through NGOs in recent years. In this connection, Smith (1987) notes that between 1973 and 1985, matching grant contributions channelled through NGOs from official aid sources in Europe, Canada, and United States more than tripled from US$ 331.9 million to US$ 1.1 billion. Fowler (1989a) has also argued that NGOs receive over $1.5 billion from official development aid agencies - ODA. Ng'ethe (1989) further notes that NGOs now receive as much as $3.3 billions from private sources. Bratton (1987) has similarly noted that the European Economic Community (EEC) contributes over $600 million annually through NGOs and another $1 billion is thought to have reached Africa through combined channels. Clark's contribution to these observations is more succinct. He observes that "collectively," NGOs now constitute one of the major channels of finance from North to South, and that in 1989 NGOs shifted $6.4 billion to the South or about 12% of all western aid to the South. This is substantial
resource compared to less than $0.9 billion handled by NGOs in 1970 (Clark, 1991). Moreover, Development Assistance Country (DAC) members give various kinds of grants to NGOs and collaborate with NGOs in implementing projects. For instance, in 1985 over US$ 4.5 billions was granted to NGOs in the developing countries, and in 1986 another $ 5.3 billions was granted to the voluntary sector (OECD; 1988:81).

In Kenya, a similar fund base for NGOs is evident. Actual figures, however, are difficult to obtain because of the lack of records and general lack of systematised knowledge on NGOs activities. However, available estimates show that NGOs have attracted significant amount of resources particularly in the 1980s. Lekyo (1989) estimates that NGOs in the country control between $150 - 200 million annually, while interim survey findings by Fowler (1989) showed that budgetary figures for about 100 NGOs operating in the country were close to $72 million or above $228 million if calculated on the 400 conventional wisdom figure of NGOs in the country. The InterAction directory (1986) shows that of 73 American NGOs operating in Kenya in 1985, 28 undertook projects worth close to $3 million in 1983, a figure that doubled in 1984 for the same organisations, and increased substantially to $9 million in 1985. An Institute for Development Studies survey of 39 NGOs operating in different sectors of the economy in Kenya reveals similar funding trends. Total budgetary figures for these NGOs were US$ 10 million in 1985. This rose to $11 and $12 million for 1990 and 1991 respectively, once again demonstrating increased donor confidence in NGOs, (I.D.S. 1992). United Nations Development Program (UNDP) figures show that of the total external disbursements made in 1986 ($1,171,933,000), 1.18% or $13,928,000 came from
very few international (foreign) NGOs and were channelled mainly to the areas of health, technical training, and education (UNDP, 1989).

It is not contestable that funds available to NGOs have a direct bearing on the expansion of the sector. Kobia captures this phenomenon clearly when he states that "it has become necessary to form NGOs to spend money that must be given out without delay, and certainly any group that registers as an NGO can find funds for its operation somewhere in the North", (1985:33).

Kobia's observation would not only explain the growth rate of NGOs but also the existence of numerous "hawkings" NGOs, that exist only by name or are registered pending donor funding that is readily availed through elaborate project proposals which are fine-tuned to the interest of the donor.

The "hawking" phenomenon has also contributed to NGOs occupying an expanding development space. Thus when the droughts and famine of the early 80s received dramatised attention, numerous NGOs came in handy to offer relief. Having done so, the NGOs lingered on after they had supplied relief by expending sectoral and location operations once the threat was over.

On the same note, poverty problems associated with the short-term effects of structural adjustment in Kenya may explain the rise in the number and activities of NGOs. As stated earlier, adjustments have adversely affected service delivery as state expenditure continues to be outpaced by growing demands for the services. Central to this theme is the widespread distribution of NGOs' activities in all sectors and the massive involvement in provision of basic needs and services particularly to the vulnerable groups which most states in LDCs like to think constitute a special clientele.
doing so, NGOs have to operate through a variety of development frameworks established, not by themselves, but by the state.

4.2 NGOs and the Local Development Framework.

In Kenya, the institutional framework for the provision of basic services and local development has undergone considerable changes since the 60s. Makokha (1985) and Mbithi (1982) capture the changes quite well. The authors argue that the centralised planning approach of the state began a gradual process of decentralisation in the late sixties with the introduction of District Development Committees (DDCs) and the posting to their positions of Provincial Planning Officers (PPOs). This was done with a view to "removing planning phases from the national and central offices of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development", (Makokha, 1985:7).

Experimentation with the Special Rural Development Program (SRDP) in six districts was yet another attempt aimed at decentralising the role of the state in planning for local development. The results of the pilot SRDP, though not immediately adopted, constituted an important step in the evolution of development decentralisation in the country. The International Labour Organisation (ILO: 1972) strengthened the case for decentralised development by specifically calling upon the state to examine 'Integrated Development Planning' with a view to accelerating balanced growth and eliminating glaring regional inequalities that had resulted from past centralised planning approaches particularly during the colonial period. Prior to these events, the famous "National Paper No. 10" of 1965, the landmark of independent Kenya's economic and social development policies, had laid a framework for better
distribution of basic services.

In spite of earlier declarations, actual decentralisation of the development process did not take shape until 1983 with the promulgation of the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), which is a more articulate decentralised strategy in comparison with previous attempts. DFRD aimed at giving importance to bottom-up strategies for development and thus providing a springboard for the citizenry to actively participate in planning and implementation of development endeavours. As a result of DFRD, a number of local level development institutions such as District Development Committees (DDCs), Divisional Development Committees and similar grassroots community institutions were, this time, actually set up as channels of development participation. In addition, central government ministries were required to decentralise some of their activities to the district level in order to facilitate better district planning.

The performance of DFRD, however, has not been seriously analysed. All the same, it is worth noting that the strategy appears to be providing not only a focal point for co-ordinating rural development, but also a reference point for political patronage. Thus, DFRD exhibits relatively high political competition between politicians wishing to channel development benefits to their constituencies. Politics of DFRD aside, the strategy appears to have integrated, may be even co-opted, the Harambee (pulling together) movement into the official local institutions. Since independence the Harambee self-help movement has been the main feature of community development participation in Kenya.

In addition to the Harambee movement, DFRD has laid an official
foundation for the operation of other local development agencies. Arguably, NGOs constitute the most important actors in this regard. Not surprisingly, there is an explicit commitment on the part of the state to integrate NGO activities into the local development process. The Development Plan for 1989/93 period, for instance, notes that

since NGOs have become increasingly involved in development activities these efforts will be strengthened by DFRD, through which NGOs, in collaboration with DDCs, community groups and local authorities will enhance the process of local participation in the development projects (Development Plan, 1989-93:260).

NGOs are considered not only important local actors in general, but also particularly important in the provision of basic services. It is in view of this role that some regard it as imperative for the state to keep track of NGOs' activities with a view to coordinating them, some would say controlling them, in order to avoid duplication of efforts and wastage of resources. DFRD, therefore, requires all NGOs to channel their development activities through the local development committees and ultimately through the District Development committees. This requirement is viewed by some NGOs with unease. The most articulate view it as an attempt by the state to reduce the development space occupied by NGOs in the country especially as they try to deliver perhaps the most socially and politically sensitive of all development needs, namely, basic services.
5.0 NGOs and Basic Services Delivery: A Sectoral Analysis

The majority of NGOs operating in Kenya seem to have as one of their objectives, delivery of basic services to their beneficiaries. (Kanyinga, 1990; Ng’ethe 1991). The strategies they adopt towards this end of course differ, depending on local traditions, their own organisational tradition, and availability of resources. All the same, it seems that NGOs do indeed view development by and large in human terms, viz; increasing human potential and capabilities through provision of first and foremost basic needs to the people. In recent years they have increasingly tended to adopt a sectoral approach which perhaps is more compatible with their own view of how to establish a civic development culture characterised by among others group autonomy and group ownership of development endeavours.

NGOs are thus found in virtually all sectors of development in Kenya as documented by among others, the KNCSS (1988), Alan Fowler (1989) and various studies by the Institute for Development Studies, (IDS, Nairobi). Tables 5 and 6 provide a summary of the sectoral distribution of NGOs in Kenya even though the classification by sectors is not watertight as one NGO might be involved in overlapping activities.
### Table 5: Sectoral Distribution of NGOs in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% Occupied in Sector</th>
<th>% Occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief and Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Destitute</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Handicapped</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Charity</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recreation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relief and Development</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Shelter</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Religion</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Community Development</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agriculture</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Food and Nutrition</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Health</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Services</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Technology</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Education and Training</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social Counseling</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Employment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Population and Family Planning</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Transport and Communication</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation and Development</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Women</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Youth</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Children</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Politics of Development Space, IDS 419
Table 5 shows that NGOs attend mostly to issues pertaining to education and health. About 173 NGOs are involved in education and training, and 115 in general community development. Provision of food, nutrition and health services has attracted 137 NGOs while water and sanitation have 30 NGOs. Agricultural development has 50 NGOs and a total of 141 deal with issues pertaining to women, youth and children or the vulnerable groups. Another group of 115 is engaged in integrated sectoral development projects in the form of community development.

Relief and social welfare have a similar focus of attention by NGOs: a total of 242 NGOs are involved with the welfare of the destitute, the disabled and relief services for the poor. This may seem to contradict our earlier observation on the shift of emphasis from relief and welfare to actual community development and the creation of institutions for sustainable development. However, this can be explained by observing that there are many overlaps in the categorisation of NGOs. Ng’etha, for example, has argued at some length that (1989), classification of NGOs by either origins, functions, or source of funding is a difficult task. Still it should be noted that our earlier observations notwithstanding provision of relief and social welfare occupies an honourable third position in terms of the number of NGOs providing this category of Services. However, viewed from our earlier observation, the sector is slowly receding in importance. Table 6 is worth discussing primarily because it endeavours to show the number of NGOs (foreign and local) involved in various sectors during a specific period, viz. the 1978-1988 decade. As in Table 5, it should be noted that information in Table 6 should be carefully handled. Fowler warns that there are a number of overlaps in the
sectoral classification of NGOs and the use of data availed by NGOs through statements on where they are or are operating needs caution in that there was no empirical follow-up to determine whether they were actually involved in the claimed sectors. In other words, there is the possibility of NGOs inflating their activities in order to look more sectoral widespread and therefore more important developmentally than they actually are. (Fowler, 1989:80).

Table 6: Development activity of local and foreign NGOs in Kenya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Wel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Wel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dev. Serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prod. &amp; Eco. Serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev. Serv.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Computation by Fowler shows that environment and development services comprise the sectors with the highest NGOs growth during the period of 1978 to 1988 (500%). This has to do with what he perceives as increased donor funding for environmental issues as the core for sustainable development and the need to improve development management systems for NGOs (Fowler, 1989:10). It is clear that social development comprises the highest NGO involvement between 1978 and 1988. Social development, comprising labor aspects of food and
nutrition, health, education, population, water and shelter appear to have received major recognition from NGOs partly due to NGOs shift of emphasis from relief to institution building and partly due to structural adjustments forced on the state by major lending institutions. This is in addition to the economic crisis that started in the late 1970's and gradually worsened in the 1980's.

Analysis of the same data also provides a comparative picture of the involvement of local and foreign NGOs in the same period. It is evident that social development has been of high concern to both foreign and local NGOs. The local NGOs apparently have not been quite active in relief matters. Fowler gives a tentative reason for this to the effect that local NGOs perceive this sector as a "government sector". However, the discrepancies might not be all that significant given the inadequacy of data used.

A very important observation in this regard is that while government expenditures on basic services has been on the decline, NGOs involvement in delivering similar services has risen. This is the case if we consider the mere number of NGOs involved in basic services.

Nonetheless, it is obviously unjust to compare the state and NGOs' contributions in providing basic services using dissimilar variables of analysis, namely, state expenditure and growth in number of NGOs. A more valid basis of comparison should be magnitude of expenditure by the two agents of development. Even then, the obvious point that the state has the moral, political social and economic obligation to deliver services to her citizen's should be emphasised before reaching any firm conclusions.

A second caveat is that data on NGOs expenditure is hard to come by.
NGOs rarely give such information and when they do, it is either not up to date or has excluded the actual operational costs which in some instances are suspected to be higher than project costs. In many cases, the projects are located in places far away from the head offices and are manned by junior staff. This means that there are extra costs incurred in monitoring projects' progress by the 'touring' senior staff. Some NGOs are indeed a secretive "Pajero Community" on account of high expenditure on luxuriant secretariat staff as opposed to general organisational development and field development expenditures in particular. (Ng'ethe, 1989). Budgetary reticence in addition to reticence on matters regarding organisation structure thus make it difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of their contribution. However NGO "beneficiaries" do indeed readily agree that they have indeed benefited from NGO services even though, in most cases they, have no clue at all on their benefactors' organisational structure, let alone the magnitude of the benefactors' budget and the sources of the benefactors' resources.

Perhaps the best approach then to assess NGOs contribution to service delivery would be to proceed by way of examples in an attempt to augment the general observations made in respect of the overall contributions of NGOs to the national development.

There is some agreement among scholars and the state that NGOs have made and continue to make significant contributions to national development. In 1990 for example, the state observed that NGOs were able to mobilise foreign exchange worth Ksh. 6.9 billion (Hansard; December, 1990). This is a significant contribution irrespective of how one looks at it.

In some specific sectors, NGOs contribution is truly remarkable. In
1989 the Ministry of Health estimated that NGOs in the health sector provided up to 40% of Kenya's health facilities and it was suspected that the state's share may come down to 50% with increased assistance from NGOs. (Daily Nation, 9th Sept. 1989). Data, from the Ministry of Health further indicates that between 40% and 50% of total family planning services in Kenya are provided by NGOs. Ng'ethe et al. (1988) reckon that indeed this is one area where the role of NGOs has been explicitly recognised by appointing 10 NGOs to the membership of the National Council for Population and Development.

Examples of NGOs contribution in specific rural areas give perhaps an even better picture of the expanding role of NGOs. In Meru district, for instance, an NGO operating in two divisions with a population of over 240,000 people is responsible for over 80% of the total health services. It has operated there for over 8 years. The NGO provides primary health care (curative and preventive), training of beneficiaries on general primary health aspects such as hygiene and birth attendance, immunisation programs, construction and equipment of health facilities among other services. The organisation has equipped and renovated existing government health posts in the area. The state seems to be confined to the single responsibility of deploying qualified staff, which in any case is often done rather late (Kanyinga, 1991).

The overall results of the NGO contribution in the two divisions is a decline in infant and maternal mortality rates from 75:1000 live births in 1987 to 70:1000 live births by 1991. By 1991 about 80% of the population as compared to 70% in 1987 immunised against communicable diseases. One important benefit accruing from the operation of the NGO in the area is that
health services have been brought closer to the people and the latter have developed some skills relevant to their health needs. It is possible that some of the above initiatives will, in the long run, be sustained by the local beneficiaries.

The same organisation has achieved remarkable results in providing surface and ground water to the local communities. Prior to 1984, there was only one state surface water project, aimed at supplying water to a population of about 5,000 people within a radius of less than five square kilometres: an urban centre and its environs. The treatment of the water was highly intermittent hence exposing the area residents to amoebic attacks. The organisation has implemented 19 surface water projects and drilled about 61 boreholes, catering for about 25% of the total population. While the 'sustainability' of some of the projects is doubtful because of the overall approach in technical designing and implementation, the organisation has at least been able to provide, for now, a terribly essential service in this area. One side benefit of this is that the area residents now spend less time in search of water and correspondingly more time on other household needs. This is particularly so in the arid and semi-arid parts of the area where the residents hitherto had to travel for over 10 kilometres (Kms) to fetch water. With the intervention of the NGO the distance has been reduced to about 5 Kms, in some parts of the area.

It should be noted that in this area the state had not managed to provide similar services since independence. Several water projects had been planned by the state but as noted earlier, none had ever been implemented. The reasons for this include lack of funds, poor planning, little
involvement of the beneficiaries at the initiation phases, rivalry over projects leadership and political competition among local leaders.

NGOs have made remarkable contributions in the education sector. In the arid and semi-arid areas (ASAL), which comprise about 80% of Kenya's land surface, NGOs maintain school feeding programs as a basic component of their activities. Though this may be viewed by some as a relief and welfare activity, it is more than that, being as it is an absolutely necessary component of the educational system in these areas. Without it, children from these areas would never be able to compete favourably with others from high potential areas of the country. In these areas NGOs also assist in construction of schools and provision of basic equipment, in addition to offering "child sponsorship schemes" to the less fortunate families. Some NGOs even attach volunteer teaching staff to some of the schools because of the reluctance of public teachers to accept posting to the areas. This reluctance on the part of public teachers is somewhat understandable in that the prevailing attitude of the state bureaucracy is that the posting of public servants to the areas is essentially a disciplinary measure for errant public servants. In order to correct this impression, incentives in the form of compensational 'hardship allowances' were introduced soon after independence, in the salary and wage packages of civil servants deployed in the 'hardship areas'. However, this has not repaired the dented image of the ASALS.

NGOs' contribution in education is even more remarkable in the field of technical education. It is estimated that NGOs support about 45% of the total village polytechnics in the country. They assist by giving material, technical and financial support, among others (Daily Nation, 24th Sept. 1991). Moreover,
The idea of village polytechnics in the country is an off-shoot of NGOs' activities in the early 60s, specifically the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) (Chepkwony, 1987).

The village Polytechnic movement represents perhaps one of the best partnerships between NGOs and local communities. A typical situation would be that local communities, through Harambee self-help initiatives and collaboration with NGOs would establish a village polytechnic often with minimal support from the state. This often entails constructing the physical facilities, payment of supportive staff, instructors and other bills. Usually the community is able to meet its part of the bargain by undertaking several income generating activities and individual monthly contributions, usually of less than Ksh.50. (IDS: 1992).

Provision of credit for income generating activities, usually to self-help woman groups, is another important contribution of NGOs in Kenya. Indeed a number of NGOs including the NCCK and the Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (KREP) are engaged in highly creative lending schemes to micro-enterprises, especially women micro-enterprises. In this regard, the NGOs are right in arguing that assisting women's development activities essentially means improving the capacity or the standards of living of the entire household. (Kanyinga, 1990:158). One may argue, however, that NGOs have chosen women groups' organisations for other reasons. Women organisations are well-established in the country and their existence as participatory institutions enable NGOs, to cut costs of founding new institutions. The existence of such organisations, therefore, provides appropriate entry point for NGOs into on-going grassroots development activities.
On general capacity building, recent studies suggest that NGOs do indeed make fairly good contribution towards the creation of local capacity for sustainable development. Thus, NGOs in particular, do train local people on aspects of project maintenance in addition to sensitising local populations to development education in general. (Kanyinga, 1990).

In summary, NGOs contribution to the provision of basic services is not contestable. What might be contestable is the magnitude of resources involved and how these resources compare with state resources. Table 7 based on a sample of 39 NGOs gives an idea of the resources involved and how they are distributed across sectors.

Table 7: NGOs Spending on Main Basic Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>10,568,518</td>
<td>12,119,296</td>
<td>15,859,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N:6)</td>
<td>(H:7)</td>
<td>(N:9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>29,965,979</td>
<td>32,061,280</td>
<td>30,319,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N:6)</td>
<td>(N:3)</td>
<td>(N:8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>28,336,500</td>
<td>15,924,300</td>
<td>33,153,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(H:8)</td>
<td>(N:8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>16,717,375</td>
<td>7,064,540</td>
<td>13,353,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N:6)</td>
<td>(N:5)</td>
<td>(N:7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>8,452,980</td>
<td>11,490,000</td>
<td>17,107,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N:2)</td>
<td>(N:2)</td>
<td>(N:2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational costs</td>
<td>23,459,000</td>
<td>29,145,000</td>
<td>35,507,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N:9)</td>
<td>(N:9)</td>
<td>(N:10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDS Study, 1991/92

Table 7 shows that the NGOs have been improving their allocations to the
basic services. Water development, which in some cases is accompanied by programs related to food and nutrition, appears to have been given high budgetary allocations by the NGOs. Overall however, the figures are small compared to state contribution in the same sectors. In 1967 for example, the state development account for education stood at Ksh. 513 million and Ksh. 21 million in the health sector. It is therefore, perhaps a false analysis to compare NGOs and the state on the sole basis of their relative contribution to any one sector. Though this is often done, we need to remind ourselves that NGOs, no matter how large their budgetary outlays might appear to be, are essentially micro actors compared to the state. While their local contribution is undoubtedly extremely important this might be on account of relatively efficient utilisation of compared to state. In this respect we wish to point out the obvious fact that state resources go beyond monetary resources including as they do, the power to determine and direct the behaviour of others, including NGOs. Viewed this way, and in light of NGOs relatively small budgetary outlays compared to the state, one should not, in theory, expect relations between the two to manifest themselves negatively. Why then the sometimes negative relations?

5.0 A Question of Legitimacy: NGO-State Relations.

Retention of political legitimacy is a requisite for many states in Africa faced with mal-development, resulting from poor economic and political management. States are challenged by citizens over poor records in development, and in cases where the challenges reach critical levels, states have responded with repression and stifling of dissent. This may explain the
rise of political pluralism in many countries previously reigned by monolithic party institutions.

Repression, manifested by control and co-optation into the mainstream of state bureaucracy, has not been confined to political institutions. It is also evident in development organisations. Some states have shown open distaste for NGOs by banning their operations, or refusing them licence to operate. Malawi, for instance, is a country where NGOs in the 70s, were given a cold reception by the state. The reasons for this are many. Most important NGOs demonstrate relative efficiency in providing services where the state has failed to do so, an accomplishment that would lead to citizens discrediting the legitimacy of the state and questioning its domineering and centralised position in the development space. The point here, however, is that relations between NGOs and states are characterized by suspicion, mutual suspicion, and mistrust. (Bratton, 1987; Baldwin, 1990).

In Kenya, NGO-State relations in the first two decades of independence were generally cordial, but a cooling in relations developed by the late 80s with the state demonstrating an appetite to 'cont...ion' the NGO sector. Reasons for the complex relations are not difficult to trace. One, in the 60s and 70s NGOs were generally relief and welfare organisations. Some were also religious affiliated. During the same period, actual community development such as creating the infrastructure (schools, health facilities, transport and others) was mainly the prerogative of the State. In this period the State's major concern was to meet citizen's expectations and state promises made during and immediately after decolonisation. Not surprisingly therefore, the state viewed NGOs, not as competitors but as agencies supplementing and
The emergence of secular forms of NGOs in late 70s and beginning of 80s, focussing mainly on integrated community development, however, appeared to cause some concern on the part of the state. This is perhaps because NGOs started venturing into an area already occupied by the state and perhaps because, in some cases, NGOs happened to be relatively more efficient in delivering services. Moreover, the state did not have the means to monitor NGO activities and this naturally became a cause for alarm within official corridors where the dominant ideology was essentially centralist in character, public statements notwithstanding.

The relative efficiency of NGOs could simply have been on account of the fact that they were engaged in small-scale development which made it easier for greater local participation to take place. While we can still argue about this, it is certain, that the confidence of the citizens in the state was gradually waning. This was on account of many factors as already mentioned. These included general poor state performance due to the economic crisis the country was experiencing, the economic recession worldwide together with the continued utilisation of centralised strategies which did not cater for an evolution of a civic development culture and a more civil society.

Disillusioned with the performance of the state, donor institutions began a gradual process of seeking a better partnership with NGOs in development activities. This saw increased disbursements through NGOs than was the case in the past. Donors also started to get directly involved (in collaboration with the relevant state institutions) in planning state projects which had their funding support. In general, all this meant that the state was...
doing precisely what most Third World states hat most: ceding development space to other agencies. No wonder then that after the initial shock, the states reaction was to seek more coordination of NGO activities which astute observers interpreted as control rather than coordination. That perhaps was to be expected, given that at stake for the NGOs and the state was political legitimacy through delivery of services.

In addition, the period marking the late 80s saw some NGOs taking open stances against the state over human rights and good governance. Church based organisations, for example were vocal in their criticism of the state. The same period was also characterised by the rise of political discontent and informal opposition against the state over the theory and practice of governance, and specifically electoral procedures. In response the state made several attempts to silence the emerging church opposition. One church affiliated organisation, Associated Christian Churches of Kenya (ACCK), was deregistered in public interest in 1988 not necessarily because it was politically partisan but because the state wanted to send signal to other churches - the state argued that the conduct of foreign staff of ACCK was against public interest. It should also be mentioned that prior to this event, an umbrella body for women groups (Maendeleo ya Wanawake) was co-opted into the ruling political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), perhaps as one way of monitoring and gaining access to funds received by the organisation from outside the country and possibly as a means of political mobilisation of women in favour of the ruling party.

The interest to monitor and regulate the activities of NGOs by the state, therefore, was borne out of several factors. There was the fear of
competition in the development space and consequently the fear that the
citizen may shift political loyalty and confidence to NGOs especially the
foreign ones whose countries of origin might have different political agendas
for the country.

The souring State-NGO relations culminated in the State's explicit attempt
to coordinate and control NGOs through the Non-Governmental Organisations Co-
ordination Act of 1990. The Act was, in addition to the State control of
NGOs, implied in the District Focus For Rural Development. As stated earlier
under DFRD the DDC, a main feature of DFRD, has authority to vet NGO project
proposals and budgets. At the same time, influential members of the DDC might
be tempted to divert NGO projects from needy areas to areas of their interests
in order to enhance their own political patronage.

Nevertheless, the Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Act of
1991 was the most articulate and formalised mechanism of restricting, co-
opting and controlling NGOs. The Act was drawn with little consultation with
NGOs. Where consultations were done, the recommendations presented by NGOs
before it was drafted were not sufficiently incorporated.

The main features of the Act include an NGOs Co-ordination Board with a
heavy representation of government officials as opposed to those from NGOs.
The legislation offers no recourse to the courts of law for aggrieved parties
and places enormous powers in the Minister responsible for NGOs. NGOs are also
required to give details of their organisation structure, operating budgets,
source of finance, and annual project audit reports. The initial legislation
also required NGOs to apply for fresh registration, as NGOs, every 60 months,
which means they would have to their development programs to this life.
Not surprisingly the reaction of NGOs to the Act was quite negative to put it mildly. The NGOs, under the leadership of some of the most articulate ones and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi, reacted by organizing themselves into a lobby in order to seek major alterations to the Act. To this end the NGOs produced their own version of a co-ordinating Act, appointed an Ad Hoc Standing Committee to oversee lobbying activities. In addition NGOs generally made their views known through a series of seminars and workshops. All this culminated in some major amendments to the Act, and a later belated promise by the Attorney General to look at the Act more closely with a view to amending it further in order to include the interests of all parties. So far the Act has not come into operation. If the Act came into operation in its original form it would undoubtedly have had extremely negative consequences on the ability of NGOs to deliver services. Current state-NGO relations in Kenya, therefore, seem to reflect competing legitimacy. In this regard, NGO legitimacy is perhaps the more tenuous, interwoven as it is with the related issues of NGO organizational viability and even more important, NGO accountability. In other words, the legitimacy of the state seems to be the better guaranteed of the two.

7.0 Conclusion: No Immediate Withering Away.

This paper has addressed several issues on provision of basic services in Kenya. The paper has tracked both the State's and NGOs' roles and experiences in the provision of basic services. The discussion on the role of
the State has shown that due to the worldwide recession, domestic economic and political problems, and general effects of structural adjustments conditioned by IMF, the State capacity to deliver services has been on the decline. This has created a lacuna in the development space, inviting interventions by other development agencies.

NGOs have been shown to be viable agencies in filling the gaps particularly because of their experience in delivering small-scale development and increased support by the donor institutions. It has been observed that NGOs contribution to specific sectors, has been considerable though in absolute resources one suspects that this contribution remains small compared to the state. However actual comparison is difficult due to lack of sufficient data and the theoretical justification for comparing the NGOs and the state. However, current development momentum seems to be in favour of increased NGO contribution to the delivery of services, a development which is viewed with unease by the state. Therefore NGO-state relations are currently an important factor which will, no doubt, continue to affect the capacity of NGOs to deliver basic services in the future. In this regard, the state is likely to continue to be the senior partner in the management of her relations with NGOs. However, how well these relations are managed will be one important determinant of the nature of the struggle for development space and quite possibly, some political space in Kenya. One would hope that the outcome will be a more civil development culture.
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