New Light on China's Political Economy

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Introduction

Both redistribution and growth—the chosen themes of this issue of the IDS Bulletin—are subordinate in the Chinese view of economic development to the broader goal of building and consolidating a socialist society. It is not that the Chinese are in any sense 'anti-growth' (despite idealistic interpretations to this effect among some Western admirers of the still predominantly rural Chinese 'way of life'). On the contrary, China's commitment to the construction of a modernized and fully comprehensive economy is explicit though long-term, and recent substantial purchases of advanced technology from abroad, as well as its manufacture on an increasing scale within China, testifies to this aim. It is also obvious that redistribution of income has been a major aim and a partial achievement of the People's Republic of China since its foundation in 1949, along with the related aims of full employment and a more equitable distribution of investment and resources. But the specific features of economic growth in China over the past quarter of a century, and of the redistributive policies which have been adopted, are only partly a reflection of material opportunities and constraints. Limitations on growth and redistribution are also influenced by other considerations. The overall context, which I shall briefly sketch in this paper, is set by the wider vision of Maoist political economy with its particular and explicit attention, at least since the late 1950s, to the task of completing the socialist transformation of Chinese society.

The development of China's socialist economy interests, often fascinates, a great number of people other than the China experts themselves. Yet the impression exists that this is an impene- trable subject once one has got past the stage of making favourable generalizations. The progress made by China since the Liberation of 1949 is evident; so is the degree of social equity in her system, but how much further can one go? Those who want hard statistics will be frustrated by the scarcity of them since the late 1950s; those who want to conduct field studies or help write national plans will certainly not find the Chinese at all anxious to solicit the aid of Western development experts. Details of the plans which the Chinese have themselves written since the Great Leap are also very sparse.

A more fundamental problem, especially for students, is the lack of serious writing in English on Chinese political economy from an even remotely Marxist viewpoint. Thus we have a very imperfect understanding of how the Chinese themselves define their own tasks of socialist development. The dissociation of politics and economics has been carried even further than usual in the China Watching profession. The political scientists have been mainly concerned with 'stability' in China, and the economists with its 'performance'. The one book-length exception in English. (Wheelwright and MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York 1970) and the writings of Charles Bettelheim and his associates in French (e.g. Bettelheim, Charrière, Marchisio, La construction du socialisme en Chine, Maspero, Paris, 1965) rarely appear on reading lists.

Some of the blocks to our understanding are beginning to dissolve as more people visit China and obtain a more detailed grasp of what the Chinese are trying to do, and why. There are difficulties. Chinese officials are often reluctant to discuss processes (e.g. state planning or purchasing) which extend beyond their direct sphere of responsibility, though they are usually very informative about everything which occurs at their own level (e.g. the accounts of a factory, the distribution system in a commune). Another difficulty—often more serious—is the visitor's own lack of prior knowledge which makes his questions appear bizarre if not meaningless, as well as posing additional problems for the Chinese interpreter. Nevertheless a vast amount of information is brought back by visitors and needs to be collated and fully appreciated.

New insights into China's development strategy may also be gleaned from two further important sources in the recent past, and it is these to which I wish to draw attention in this short article. One source of great interest is a previously unpublished collection of speeches and writings by Mao Tse-tung which includes a number of extended discussions on questions of political economy. This is often referred to as the Wan-sui or Long Life (to Chairman Mao) collection (bibliographical details are given below). A second and even more recent source of new insight is the documents of the Fourth National People's Congress which was...
held in January, 1975 and the discussion in the Chinese press which accompanied them. The documents include some rare indications of Chinese long-range planning for at least the next decade, while the post-Congress discussion (which Mao has personally inspired) has revived a whole range of questions about how to advance along the 'socialist road'. These questions, which have been argued about for the last 20 years, are basic to the Chinese view of their economic development—and should be just as basic to our own efforts to understand it.

Mao on Political Economy

The Wan-sui collection was compiled in Peking for restricted circulation during the Cultural Revolution in an edition which later (1973) turned up in Taiwan. The main purpose of its anonymous compilers—apart from the obvious one of bringing up to date the officially published Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (which stop at the Liberation of 1949)—was apparently to demonstrate to the Chinese reader the essential continuity of Mao's 'general line' on economic development. The volume contains a miscellany of essays, speeches, summaries and notes ranging from discussions on philosophy, health and education to conversations with foreign visitors and Red Guards, but the bulk of the material, dating from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, is concerned with economic policies (particularly the Great Leap Forward) and above all with the question of China's transition through the socialist stage of development.1

Many of the Wan-sui documents cover ground already familiar, at least in outline, although adding much-needed detail and definition and doing so in Mao's inimitably lively and allusive style. But a broader theme comes through which could only be traced previously with some difficulty from the official record. What the documents reveal, explicitly and with a wealth of stimulating analysis, is Mao's constant preoccupation with charting the course of China's socialist transition in the light of the Soviet (and especially Stalinist) experience. Stalin's failure to grasp the persistent nature of contradictions within socialist society, his oppressive handling of internal dissent and his mistreatment of the Soviet peasantry, are frankly discussed by Mao. Whatever the Chinese may say publicly, Mao makes it clear that the deformation of socialism by Stalin's successors arose from Stalin's own failure to solve the problems of the socialist transition. And it is this object lesson which adds force to Mao's own efforts, from the mid-1950s onwards, to find an alternative Chinese road.

Specifically, how can the level of collective ownership in the countryside be raised until the contradiction between agriculture and state-owned industry and town and country generally has been overcome? What degree of rural production, accumulation and distribution must be reached to enable it to be raised? How can industry be run on more democratic and innovative lines? These and other equally important questions about planning, management, mechanization, prices, commodity production etc. are discussed by Mao with a greater realization, as the lessons of the Great Leap sink in, that there are no easy answers, but always with the conviction that a measure of forward movement in the 'transition' must be maintained. (This continues to be Mao's main preoccupation in 1975.)

For the non-China specialist the most exciting document, and also the longest, is a set of notes written by Mao in 1959-60 as a commentary upon the Soviet textbook Political Economy. This was the famous book on which work had painfully begun during Stalin's final years and which prompted his essay on Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952). It was published after his death, and the third edition (1959) was translated into Chinese and used by Mao. Both the textbook and Mao's Notes were studied throughout China by the Communist Party cadres in the aftermath of the Great Leap. The Notes take up 80 pages of Chinese text and are divided into 75 sections which either provide some sort of resolution to a particular problem or—equally often—point out the unresolved questions which it raises. The mood is confident but enquiring and sometimes tentative. When confronted with economic realities, Mao writes, "the thoughts of Marxism-Leninism are confusing" and he acknowledges that the Chinese still have a lot to learn.

These Notes are the nearest thing we have to a comprehensive Chinese textbook on political economy, and certain principles emerge very clearly. These include insistence on the following points:

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1 There are actually two volumes, both with the same title of Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought) which were published in Peking in 1967 and 1969 respectively. The earlier volume deals mostly with the Great Leap; the 1969 collection covers the years 1955-68 (plus a very few earlier items). Together they offer some 800 pages of unduplicated Chinese texts and there is some overlapping. A fairly full selection, including all the items discussed here, has been translated in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1940-65), pts. 1 & 2, issued in February 1974 by the Joint Publications Research Service (Arlington, Virginia, JPRS-61269-1 & 2). Mao's Notes (see below) on political economy have also been translated by Hu Chih-hsi, Mao Tse-tung et la construction du socialisme (Paris: Seuil, 1975). No-one has seriously challenged the authenticity of the documents and the overwhelming evidence in their favour is discussed in a useful review by Stuart R. Schram in the China Quarterly, No. 57.
(i) First and foremost, the socialist transition cannot mark time too long without running the risk of retrogression. To complete the transition is China's major task.

(ii) The contradiction between the collective sector (mainly agriculture) and the state-owned sector (mainly industry) is the most dangerous and weakest point during the transition. Stalin failed to recognize, far less to solve, this contradiction.

(iii) The law of value and prices still have a definite role under socialism, although not at the expense of planning.

(iv) The purpose of planning itself is not to produce a 'balanced' economy, but to mediate between the 'imbalances' which provide the motive force for further development. Planning should not be at the expense of local initiative and 'self-reliant' development.

(v) Electricity is important, but 'politics in command' is equally so. Thus another failing of Stalin was that he concentrated on the economic base and ignored the super-structure (see below).

(vi) Ownership is not everything. How distribution is handled and how individual producers relate to one another within the collective or state-owned unit are equally important factors in the socialist relations of production.

(vii) Though the relations of production should not go too far beyond what the existing level of productive forces justifies, they should lead the way and certainly never lag behind.

Apart from the Notes on political economy, the Wan-sui collection has further riches to offer. It includes a speech by Mao and a shorter set of notes, both of which provide a detailed critique of Stalin's 1952 essay on Economic Problems. There is also a talk by Mao, dated June 1964, on the principles behind the Third Five-Year Plan.

In several other documents Mao discusses the connection between China's isolation on the international scene and the need for accelerated economic development. 'Catching up' with the West is necessary not only to improve the material well-being of the Chinese people but to preserve the Chinese state from being continually looked down upon—and threatened—by imperialism. (See chapter 11 of my The World and China 1922-72, Eyre-Methuen, London, 1974, for further analysis of the connection between foreign policy and economic goals in China.) There are also numerous passages where Mao discusses various aspects of economic organization in the countryside from the Agricultural Co-operative movement of 1955 onwards, though here the ground has been covered in other documents already available to us (see the analysis by Jack Gray in Nuti and Nove, eds., Socialist Economics, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972).

Although the Wan-sui collection is dated by now, and new documents addressing themselves to current issues continue to be published for internal circulation only, we do know that the main themes referred to above are still regarded as very relevant. Mao's speech on the Stalin essay, for example, was being studied by cadres all over China in 1973 (private information). A foreign visitor to Peking in 1972 was briefed on Chinese planning policy in terms which reproduced almost verbatim the essentials of Mao's June 1964 speech on the subject (Alberto Jacoviello, L'Hypothèse Chinoise, Seuil, Paris, 1974). The latest popular book on political economy to be published in China reflects the main lines of argument in Mao's Notes on the Soviet textbook (Zhengzhi jinghi xue jichu zhishi, Shanghai, 1974, 2 vols. Incidentally this book was first published in an edition of 450,000 copies in a series intended for readership by high school graduates—another sign of the seriousness with which the Chinese treat the subject). So do recent (Jan.-Feb. 1975) editorials on the future of socialism in China, published in the official Party journals Red Flag and People's Daily.

Two brief extracts from the wealth which Mao offers in the Wan-sui documents may convey some idea of their potential interest. First, in chapter 25 of his Notes, Mao discusses the problem of vested interests appearing under socialism, and pinpoints one particular interest group which could hinder the transition in the countryside:

"The realization of ownership by the basic commune should in general benefit everyone, so we reckon that there will be no conflict with the vast majority of commune members. But when that time comes, the original team cadres will no longer be masters in their own house (run their own villages), and their administrative power must necessarily be reduced. Are they not going to put up some resistance to the change?

Although a socialist society has abolished classes, in the course of its development it will probably have problems with 'vested interests'. They will rest content with an established system and be unwilling to have it changed. For instance they thrive upon the system of 'To each according to his work', under which the more they work the more they receive, and they are going to feel unhappy when this is changed to 'To each according to his need'."

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The second extract comes from Mao's speech in November 1958 discussing Stalin's essay *On Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*:

"Stalin only talked about the relations of production but not about the superstructure, nor about the relationship between the superstructure and the economic base. When cadres in China do labour, and workers take part in management, and cadres go down to the countryside to be tempered, and old codes and conventions are broken, these all belong to the superstructure and the realm of ideology. Stalin only talked about the economy, not about politics, and although there was supposed to be 'selfless labour', in fact no one did an hour's more work, and no one could forget himself."

**The National People's Congress**

The Fourth National People's Congress was held in January 1975, ten years after the Third Congress and nearly five years overdue. It indicated general agreement (which seemed to have been lacking since the Cultural Revolution) on the priorities for Chinese development. It combined a strong emphasis upon the need for economic advance with an equally strong insistence that the socialist system should be strengthened in this process. The Congress—which corresponds to China's supreme parliamentary body—also elected a capable team of a dozen Deputy Premiers of the State Council under Premier Chou En-lai, over half of whom have direct experience as planners or as producers (they include one peasant leader and two workers).

In his Report to the Congress, Premier Chou described a two-stage economic plan which although already in existence, had not previously been discussed in public. He also announced that a new Ten Year Plan is being drawn up for the next decade. The long-range economic plan began in 1965 and is supposed to run up to the year 2000. Its first stage (1965-80) is intended "to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system"; the second stage (1981-2000) will accomplish "the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology". In simpler language the goal seems to be to establish by 1980 (though the first stage may be running behind schedule) an economic platform which will then provide the basis for a concerted drive for modernization. The weak points which have to be filled in selectively during the first stage, before an all-round advance can be made, are still located mainly in agriculture and agriculture-related industries such as fertilizers where efforts are currently being concentrated. The new Ten Year Plan will bridge the end of Stage One and the beginning of Stage Two, according to Premier Chou. (If, as seems likely, Stage One has been delayed as a result of the planning hiatus caused by the Cultural Revolution, then this Ten Year Plan will see it through to completion). Fragmentary as this discussion of China's long-range planning may be, it still adds considerably to our knowledge hitherto and should provide a framework into which further information may be fitted.

Two other themes which were discussed at the time of the Congress are also of considerable interest, for the light which they throw upon those aspects of the socialist relations of production which the Chinese regard as particularly critical at the present time. They also vividly illustrate the integration of political and economic goals by the Chinese in a way which makes the familiar China Watching distinction between supposed 'moderates' and 'radicals' in Peking one of very limited value. The problems in question are those of (i) industrial democracy, and (ii) socialism in the countryside.

(i) Industrial relations: The new Chinese Constitution which was approved by the National People's Congress, includes the 'right to strike' among the basic liberties which the Chinese people enjoy. This provision, which was inserted in the draft of the Constitution at Mao Tse-tung's personal request, reflects a long-standing pre-occupation with the content more than the form of industrial relations on Mao's part. In terms of ownership the industrial sector is naturally more advanced than the agricultural sector, since most industry is state-owned. But Mao has long been wary of the too-easily-drawn equation between ownership 'by the state' and 'by the people'.

In his *Notes on Political Economy* written in 1960, Mao described the question of management as the most important problem after that of ownership had been solved. There must be a limit, he wrote, to the progressive change of ownership within a given period, but "in the same time it is possible for the relationship between individuals in the midst of production or labour to reform without interruption". He drew attention to the following measures which had been adopted in state enterprises in order to surmount the divide between worker and management:

- combining centralized leadership with mass movements;
- leadership by the Party;
- integration of workers and technicians;
- participation of cadres in manual labour;
- participation of workers in management;
- continuous change of unreasonable codes and conventions.

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“If the cadres do not discard their haughty airs”, he commented elsewhere in the Notes, “and identify themselves with the workers, then the workers will frequently look upon the factory not as their own but as the cadres”. One should not assume that, under the socialist system, workers and cadres would develop a co-operative relationship “without any political work being done”.

Fifteen years after Mao wrote his Notes, this problem still causes acute concern to the Chinese. The Cultural Revolution encouraged more grassroots assertiveness by the organized workers, and after a lull this revived in 1974 during the Anti-Confucius campaign, when a number of strikes (especially on the railways and in the coal industry) caused some worrying losses of production. Significantly the reaction of the National People’s Congress has been not to condemn this form of activity but to acknowledge the defects in the system which help to provoke it. In his report on the new Constitution to the National People’s Congress, Vice-Premier Chang Chun-chiao had this to say (echoing as he did so Mao’s original argument):

“Like the morning sun, our socialist system is still very young. It was born in struggle and can only grow in struggle. Take the State sector of the economy for example. In some enterprises, the form is that of socialist ownership, but the reality is that their leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers.”

Workers are naturally not supposed to resort to strike action without seeking to remedy their grievances in other ways (e.g. by putting up posters or by complaint to higher authorities, both actions being provided for in the new Constitution). It is also explained that one is entitled to “strike for socialism and not for capitalism”—that is, strikes for greater financial rewards will be criticized. Nevertheless the formal provision in the Constitution of the right to strike is unusual among the socialist countries and unusual too in the frankness with which the underlying problem is acknowledged.

(ii) Socialism in the countryside: The new state Constitution also provides several important definitions of the existing state of social ownership in China. Generally speaking there are two kinds of ownership of the means of production at the present stage. These consist of socialist ownership by the whole people, and socialist collective ownership by working people (Article 5). The first of these corresponds to the State sector of industry, although quite a large number of smaller enterprises are still collectively owned.

The second category, apart from such enterprises, is entirely located in the countryside where collectivization is the rule except for a small number of State farms (occupying probably not more than 4 per cent of China’s cultivated land).

Article 7 of the Constitution proceeds to define the critical area of ownership in the countryside in more detail: this should “generally take the form of three-level ownership, that is, ownership by the commune, the production brigade and the production team, with the last as the basic accounting unit”. This formula confirms the current situation, where some resources (e.g. rural industry, hydroelectric works, etc.) are owned collectively by the commune, others by the brigade, while in the majority of cases the ownership and control of land and the basic means of production, and the disposition of the proceeds of production is in the hands of the ‘production team’—the lowest level of organization which usually corresponds to a simple village. The same article of the constitution also sanctions the ‘private plot’ where commune members may farm or keep livestock for their personal needs.

This article of the Constitution also allows for ‘non-agricultural individual labourers’. These would include the producers of cottage handicrafts, a few pedlars, handymen, barbers, etc., who are licensed to operate independently by the urban street committee or by the rural production team.

It might appear that the Constitution has ‘fixed’ the status quo in rural collective ownership (and some China Watchers have described this as a ‘victory for the moderates’). In fact this is not the Chinese way of looking at the problem, and it is directly contradicted by accompanying statements in the official press. It is true that the overall framework has been fixed. This has been done partly in reaction against what have been described as ‘ultra-Leftist’ attempts to leapfrog the socialist stage by, for example, abolishing private plots indiscriminately. Such efforts to arouse the ‘wind of communism’ before the season is ripe for it, date back to the Great Leap Forward, and re-appeared towards the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969-70.

But if ‘leaping forward’ is disapproved of, so is ‘marking time’. Coinciding with the National People’s Congress, a massive campaign for agricultural capital improvement has been launched both to raise rural productivity and—equally important—to prepare the ground for raising the level of collective ownership. In this way, forward movement within the framework provided for by the Constitution is encouraged, although it is
still expected to cover a considerable length of time.

The strategy has been explained in, for example, an editorial from the daily newspaper of Hunan province (23 December 1974):

"To actively develop the commune and brigade enterprises, expand the accumulation of the commune and brigade, purchase large farm machinery which the production teams have no means to purchase themselves, build farmland and water conservancy projects which they also cannot manage by themselves, and help the poorer production teams to develop production—these are currently the urgent requirements for the development of production. Speaking in the long term, ownership in the people's communes always advances from ownership by the small collective to ownership by the big collective and then to ownership by the whole people . . . . How can anyone say that it does not matter much?"

Thus the political goal of continuing China's forward motion along the transitional road of socialism (raising the level of ownership) is explicitly linked with one of the economic priorities of the current national plan (the campaign for 'agricultural construction'). 'Cheap' labour is employed by the larger collective unit—the commune or brigade—in the slack farming season to improve land, build roads, new irrigation works, small-scale industries etc. The labour is 'cheap' because the peasants are only paid at rates equivalent to the value of labour points in their own production teams, and therefore the poorer teams contribute their labour—of which in any case they are likely to have a larger surplus than the better-off teams—at lower rates. This will lead in time to the enlargement of the commune- or brigade-owned collective sector as well as to new assets which, shared generally by the production teams, will also tend to increase their own productivity and income. In the course of this process a stronger material base is created which will eventually allow the level of ownership to be raised. Of course all sorts of difficulties can occur along the way, and the Chinese press and radio provide examples in plenty—particularly of the reluctance of the better-off small collective to invest its labour in the larger collective. But the overall strategy and objectives are clear enough.

On a much broader theoretical front, the National People's Congress has been followed by what turns out to be the most comprehensive definition of the 'socialist transition', and of the problems which attend it, to be made publicly in China since the Great Leap Forward. The equivocal nature of a society whose economic forces and socialist institutions are still relatively undeveloped has been stressed, with supporting quotations from Mao—some of which echo the still unpublished (in China) Wan-sui documents. Specific areas of contradiction have been identified, including the following:

(i) The system of unequal remuneration, especially in Chinese industry, where the pursuit of material incentives could lead in time to the birth of a new proletarian bourgeoisie. "Even now China practises an eight-grade wage system", Mao has said "... distribution to each according to his work and exchange by means of money, which are scarcely different from those in the old society." (The argument applies as much to the work-point system in the countryside, but it is made with particular force in relation to urban wage earners—which include technicians and cadres, each with their separate wage scale, as well as workers on the eight-grade system).

(ii) The continuing danger of 'capitalist' attitudes and relations in the countryside being revived as long as production and collective ownership are on a relatively small scale. The People's Daily (9 February 1975) has argued (quoting Lenin) that "... until socialist collective ownership is changed into ownership by the whole people and until the remnants of private economy are eliminated, peasants will inevitably maintain some small-producer characteristics. There inevitably exist spontaneous capitalist tendencies among some well-to-do peasants".

(iii) The tendency, not wholly eliminated by the Cultural Revolution, for Party and State officials to dispense with democratic management in the running of offices or enterprises, and to seek privileges for themselves or for their units. There were frequent complaints in 1973-74 of, for example, the children of cadres entering college 'by the back door' with parental assistance. Various forms of bonus incentives had also been re-introduced in a number of Chinese industries. After the National People's Congress, attention upon these sorts of shortcomings became still more sharply focused with the publication of two strongly worded articles, in the Communist Party journal Red Flag, by the two most prominent radical members of the Party Politburo, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao (see bibliography below).

Conclusion

The Chinese view of political economy which has been discussed here provides a frame of reference within which it is fair to assume that most Chinese leaders have approached the tasks of
development over the past two decades. The links between political and economic change are explicit and generally recognized; it is unlikely that by now anything resembling what used to be called the ‘purely economic viewpoint’ still survives. Just because these links have, to a large extent, been ignored in most Western literature on the subject, it is all the more important to stress them and to take a unified view of Chinese advances on both political and economic fronts. At the same time it would be foolish to ignore the very sharp arguments which have arisen at intervals over the past two decades since the Chinese (and Mao in particular) first began to query the more limited definition of the building of socialism—heavy industry plus common ownership—which they had acquired from the Soviet Union.

It is the various controversies between the groups in the Chinese leadership described by outside observers as ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ which usually attract attention in the West, rather than the common assumptions that underlie the debate in China. The Chinese themselves have developed a tendency to emphasize—perhaps over-emphasize—the element of conflict (class struggle) in an argument which has at times clearly become tangled with issues of factional politics. What should not be in doubt is the shared commitment to completing the task of the ‘transition to socialism’, in spite of these controversies over the means and the place of implementation, nor should this be blotted out by the echoes of factional struggle too often magnified beyond their proper volume by Western China Watching techniques. Neither can there be any doubt about the essential realism of the Chinese approach: the attainment of the socialist goal has been seen by all concerned, ever since the Great Leap Forward offered an illusory short-cut, as a complex and long-term process for which many of the answers are still lacking.

NEW WORK ON CHINA OF INTEREST TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

John Gittings

A. CHINESE DOCUMENTS

   'Reading notes on the Soviet textbook Political Economy'.
   'Talk on the Third Five-year Plan'.
   These and other 'unofficial' writings of Mao Zedong, covering the years 1955-68 were compiled during the Cultural Revolution in two volumes under the title Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought). Mao's notes on the Soviet textbook, written in the years 1959-60, provide us with an authoritative account of Chinese political economy which is still the basis for present-day policies. Other documents deal with the Great Leap Forward, the Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolution. The Soviet experience under Stalin's leadership is frankly criticized by Mao in a number of passages, particularly in three separate commentaries on Stalin's essay Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.

This collection has been translated by the Joint Publications Research Service as Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung's Thought Arlington, Virginia, 1974, 2 vols., JPRS nos. 61269, 1 and 2.

The first two items listed above have been translated into French, with an introduction, by Hu Chi-hsi, as Mao Tse-toung et la construction du socialisme Seuil, Paris, 1975. There is a review article on the collection by Stuart Schram in China Quarterly, no. 57; separate aspects of it are discussed in articles by John Gittings and Richard Levy in nos. 60 and 61 of the same journal.

2. Chang Chun-chiao, 'On exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie', Hongqi, Red Flag, April 1975. Yao Wen-yuan, 'On the social basis of the Lin Piao anti-party clique', Hongqi, March 1975. These important essays on the new campaign to study socialist theory, both written by Politburo members who are close colleagues of Mao, can be found in Peking Review, 7 March and 4 April 1975. They discuss questions of industrial democracy, rural collectivization, wage differentials, and the general struggle between bourgeois and socialist ideology during the socialist transition.


N.B. Articles 5-10, 27-8, on economic principles and democratic rights.

4. Zhengzhi jingji xue jichu zhishi (Basic Knowledge in Political Economy) Shanghai, 1974, 2 vols. A general textbook for high school graduates and college students, providing an

1 This is a select listing of recent work which opens up new perspectives beyond those of established China scholarship. For general bibliographies, see those by Dean and Ganière. See in addition the special number of World Development, III: 7-8, 1975, on the theme of 'China's Road to Development', edited by Neville Maxwell.

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authoritative post-Cultural Revolution view of the subject.


6. Chu Li and Tien Chieh-yun, Inside a People’s Commune, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1974. The story of one of China’s first communes, presented as a model of “how the spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle . . . shows itself in the communes”.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES


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C. BIBLIOGRAPHIES


