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The Political Economy of Self-Help: Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology.

By

E. M. Godfrey and G. C. M. Mutiso


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Since mid-1971 local self-help committees throughout Kenya have been raising large sums of money for the establishment of harambee institutes of technology. By April 1973 such institutes had been proposed for Kiambu, Kirinyaga, Murang'a, Nyeri, Emu, Meru, Yatta, Mombasa, Kajiado, Kariyo, Nakuru, Kienyche, Kilifi, Kisumu, Kaimosi, Kakamega, and Sarg'alo. The plans of the proposed institutes vary a great deal, but most of them are aiming to provide some kind of technical training to those who have finished secondary school form IV. In this paper we try to place this fascinating fund-raising campaign in its political and economic background and to look forward at the possible effects that the establishment of such institutes might have on Kenya's economy and society.
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF SELF-HELP: KENYA'S HARAMBEE INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY

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Since 1963-1971 local self-help committees throughout Kenya have been raising large sums of money for the establishment of harambee institutes of technology. By April 1973 such institutes had been proposed for Kiambu, Kirinyaga, Murang'a, Nyeri, Embu, Tetu, Un了我的, Kajiado, Kericho, Nakuru, Kienacha, Kisii, Kisumu, Kaimosi, Kakamega and Samburu. The plans of the proposed institutes vary a great deal, but most of them are aiming to provide some kind of technical training to those who have finished secondary school form IV. In this paper we try to place this fascinating fund-raising campaign in its political and economic background and to look forward at the possible effects that the establishment of such institutes might have on Kenya's economy and society.

A. The Background

The background to the emergence of the campaign for the institutes of technology is one that inextricably combines politics and economics. If we separate them here it is only for purposes of clearer exposition and not because we regard them as separable processes. The political forces emanate from what has been happening, or rather not happening, within the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). For various reasons KANU has failed to establish itself as a strong political party with a systematic ideology. Thus the period from 1962 to date can be regarded as one of increasing depoliticisation, with the government relying more and more on the legitimising role of the President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, and on control via the provincial administration and law and less on politics. As a result political processes have devolved from the national centre to the periphery and local harambee activity has become an important arena within which political leadership at the local level is determined.

We can illustrate this view by dividing the period since 1962 into three: (1) 1962 - May 1966; (2) June 1966 - April 1969; and (3) May 1969 to the present day. (1) 1962 - May 1966 could be regarded as the period during which KANU suppressed regionalism by absorbing the leaders of Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Akamba Peoples Party (APP). This was effective at the national level but it created problems, which persist today, in the former KADU and APP areas, of conflict between local...
factions, with KANU 'A' groups consisting of those who had been associated with the party since its beginning and KANU 'B' of those who had not. A second branch of the government's policy to suppress regionalism in this period was the strengthening of the provincial administration. The provincial commissioners became confirmed in their role as the agents of the centre, a role which became increasingly important with the abolition of the regions in 1964 and the reintroduction of licences for political meetings.

(2) June 1966 - April 1969 is the period during which the "party-line" leaders consolidated their position within KANU. This group consisted of former KADU members and those who had always been identified with Mboya within KANU. Their rigid enforcement of a more conservative party line displaced several national leaders who moved into competition at the district level, where they quickly took advantage of the platforms offered by sponsorship of local harambee. Indeed some of the bitterest political in-fighting between 1966 and 1969 was in the harambee groups. The provincial administration reacted to this threat to existing (and correctly "party-line") local leaders by attempting to control harambee groups and banning those which they regarded as blatant covers for politicians. At the same time the new Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU) was characterised by its opponents as strictly a Luo affair and the use of tribalism as a way of competing for national leadership became part of the political currency.

(3) May 1969 to the present day saw the final withering away of KANU as a national party and a hardening of tribal attitudes. The Gem by-election of May 1969, in which the KANU candidate was crushingly defeated, sparked off a critical eight months during which Mboya was assassinated, the KPU was banned and Odinga arrested. In Mboya's absence the task of organising the primaries for the 1969 general elections passed to the provincial administration. In the ensuing elections, partly as a result of the primary selection procedure, 5 ministers, 14 assistant ministers and 77 members of parliament lost their seats and a significant body of 'new men', having more in common with civil servants and academics than with the pre-1969 political leaders, entered parliament. The hardening of tribal attitudes, which was an obvious result of the events of 1969, was intensified by the announcement of two planned coups. For obvious reasons the details of who were involved and towards what end are not available to researchers but the net effect seems to have been to retrench the Luo and the Kamba back into the tribe. At the time of writing
in spite of desultory efforts to revive it, KANU is at its lowest ebb, with branch elections, postponed since 1971 because voter registration is so low, still not having been held. President Kenyatta’s announcement that there will be parliamentary elections in 1974 makes it likely that the reorganisation of KANU will be further postponed. MPs are concentrating on ensuring re-election rather than reorganizing the party.

While politics was moving from the centre to the periphery and becoming increasingly tribal and the provincial administration was consolidating its position of strength, important changes in the system of access to rewards were taking place. At independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a system of extreme inequality, with four-fifths of the high-potential land in the hands of less than 6,000 Europeans, and a racially-determined wage and salary structure, such that in 1961 22,000 Europeans earned an average wage of over K£1,300, 38,000 Asians just over K£500 and 530,000 Africans about K£75. Since then the preoccupation has been not so much to charge this structure as to remove its racial basis. So during the sixties Kenyanisation was extended from the public to the private sector, particularly the larger foreign firms, and, through loan, credit, training and extension programmes and control over trade licensing, the growth of a class of African entrepreneurs was encouraged. At the same time large areas of land were transferred from Europeans to Africans in the form of settlement schemes or individually-owned large farms. But the basically unequal structure of income distribution remained.

Meanwhile, although the economy was growing fast, at a rate of about 7 per cent per year at constant prices, wage employment in the formal sector was growing much more slowly, at a rate of less than 2 per cent annually. Moreover, educational enrolment was expanding, with a particularly fast rate of increase at secondary level, so that the number of formal-sector jobs available was being progressively outstripped by the number of those who had been led to expect that they would obtain such jobs. Paradoxically enough it was this growing excess supply of educated job-seekers, combined with the use of educational criteria in hiring, which ensured that the political force that was gathering behind the harambee groups, in the way described above, would be directed towards specifically educational projects. As primary-school leavers found it more and more difficult to obtain formal-sector jobs it became increasingly necessary for them to equip themselves for selection for such jobs by attending secondary school. If sufficient secondary school places were not available locally, and the government

* The obvious debt of these two paragraphs to the ILO report [*], particularly chapter 6, is acknowledged.
showed no signs of providing them, then an ideal harambee project, combining a large expected private benefit for its contributors (or their children) with a handsome political pay-off for its main sponsors, was born. Anderson has shown in recent paper /15/ the amazing rate at which such harambee secondary schools were created, to the extent that by 1970 they accounted for 62 per cent of secondary schools and 41 per cent of their enrolment.

All this fits well with a hypothesis recently put forward by Fields /12/ and Rado /13/ under the name of the "explosive model". The model has two simple basic assumptions. The rate of increase in output and thus in opportunities for remunerative employment is determined exogenously (that is, it is not affected in one way or another by changes in educational provision) and is lower than the rate of increase in the potential labour force. (2) Employers, faced with an excess of applicants, select by level of education. These two assumptions give the result, particularly when as in Kenya the distribution of income is extremely unequal, that while the social return (in terms of output) on additional investment in education is zero, private demand for extra education is very high. As Rado puts it, "the more unprofitable a given level becomes as a terminal point, the more demand increases for it as an intermediate stage; a precondition for the next level of education." This imparts an explosive nature to the expansion of private demand for education, which gives rise to pressure on governments to increase educational facilities and such phenomena as the harambee secondary schools.

Within this framework it is predictable that harambee groups should seek further projects within education. What is on first sight less predictable is the change in direction that the proposal for harambee institutes of technology represents. One might have expected more secondary schools and, particularly, since Form IV is now no longer a profitable terminal stage, their extension beyond that point to Form VI. The possibility that some of the more ambitious communities might have gone for their own harambee universities, to increase opportunities for Form VI leavers, would also have fitted in the framework of this model. This latest harambee effort, however, is not in any of these academic areas but in technical training, a field in which there is evidence that, while qualifications exert a powerful influence, employers pay at least some attention to performance criteria in their hiring practices. For instance, it seems...
likely that trainees from the Christian Industrial Training Centres with primary schooling plus two years' CITC training are preferred for the same jobs to those who have spent four years on 'pre-technician' courses at secondary technical schools. This suggests that a concern of the planners and supporters of the harambee institutes has been to identify a section of the labour market in which demand exceeds supply and to meet that excess demand, rather than to continue to participate in the scramble for more and more academic education. In doing so they have made educational history, since technical training in Africa has traditionally been something that was foisted on unwilling recipients by paternalistic colonial governments or foreign advisers. As King /9/ says, Kenya is the "first country voluntarily to espouse technical training on this scale in Africa". This change of heart seems to be mainly related to changes in the labour market. Colonial attempts to 'make education more practical' were premature in the sense that academic education still offered a higher private rate of return. In this respect, as Anderson points out, it is interesting to contrast the public enthusiasm for the idea of the institutes of technology with the relative failure of the village polytechnics to attract mass support. The institutes promise access to wage-earning jobs. The village polytechnics are concerned with 'rural self-employment.' It could almost be characterised as a contrast between indigenously identified private benefit and social benefit as identified by non-participants.

B. Plans and Possibilities

So far we have been concentrating on the background to the emergence of the institutes of technology and have said little about what they intend to do. Rather than treat each institute individually we have summarised their plans and fund-raising progress in Table 1.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this table, apart from the size of the targets, is the lack of progress shown by most institutes towards those targets. Apart from Embu, Mas, Sang’alo and Kaimosi, which are building on existing institutions, only two of the proposed institutes (Kiambu and Murang’a) look to be anywhere near their planned fund-raising targets. It begins to appear, therefore, that the crucial determinants of the institutes' achievement and impact will be the amount of foreign capital aid that they are able to attract. So far (see page 21) only Kiambu, with its 6.7 million shillings from the Netherlands, has been successful in this respect. If we were to take a pessimistic view about aid prospects we might assume that only those institutes which have already
raised at least 40 per cent of their fund-raising target (plus those with special access to foreign funds) will go ahead as planned. This extreme assumption would allow through only Kiambu, Nyeri’s, Sang’ale and Kaimosi. Their combined enrolment by 1977 would total only about 2,000 compared with projected enrolment in existing training institutions in 1977 of over 11,000. We do not intend to predict that only four will go ahead as planned but the assumption serves to illustrate that the immediate impact of the new institutes may be rather smaller than had originally been thought.

Nevertheless even in the fairly immediate future the institutes will be making demands on the economy which may be difficult to meet. Elsewhere \[\] we have calculated, for instance, that existing plans for output of Kenyan technical teachers are likely to be insufficient even for existing institutions. Moreover, foreign teachers are not readily available. As the Wamalwa committee [\(\text{p. 327}\)] has warned, “it would be most unwise to plan these colleges on the assumption that suitable training staff in adequate numbers can be obtained from overseas, since there is a global shortage of technical trainers.” The use of overseas ‘volunteers’ can provide a breathing space but is hardly a long-term proposition. As Table 1 shows, most institutes are planning to take secondary school form IV leavers. There will, of course, be no shortage of such people although the institutes will be competing with existing institutions for those who have had some prior technical education. Preliminary orientation courses will probably be necessary (and are planned by Kiambu and Nyeri’s) before training proper can start. King [\(\text{p. 21}\)] raises an interesting point about possible lack of interest on the part of students, citing the low ratio (1.3) of applications to places on the Kenya Polytechnic’s form-V-level science \[\text{and}\] courses. On the other hand, the Kenya Industrial Training Institute receives over 2,000 applications for 80 places on its one-year skilled-level course. The main determinants of the number of applications for places in a training institution are likely to be the level of fees charged and the extent to which the courses offered improve a trainee’s immediate chances of getting a well-paid job. In both respects KITI probably scores better than the Polytechnic’s A-level Science course. For such and many other reasons, the level of fees and the nature of the courses offered at the institutes will crucially affect their prospects.

The current financing problem is illustrated by the case of Kiambu which has gone further in its detailed planning than most of the other institutes. The most that it will be able to raise towards its unit
cost of 5,000 shillings per student, through coffee sales, sale of students' products-and-services and the donation of volunteer teachers from overseas is 3,000 shillings per student. Other colleges have other schemes for raising current finance, including Ramogi I.A.T's endowment fund and Rift Valley's 2,700-acre cattle farm, but all will be faced with a similar gap between current revenue and expenditure, far too large to be plugged by any reasonable scale of fees. The institutes' planners are aware of this problem and confidently expect help from the government once they are in operation. As we emphasise in pages 21-27 the government is certainly sympathetic towards the institutes. But educational expansion has already brought acute financial problems and the Ministry of Education is under pressure to stabilise its budget. The total current expenditure at initial full capacity of the seven larger institutes shown in Table 1 as planning to open before the end of 1974 is about 33 million shillings annually. If we exclude those which seem too far from their fund-raising target to achieve such an early opening the remaining four (Kiambu, Nyeri, Kaimosi and Sang'alo) represent a total current expenditure of about 12 million shillings annually. The institutes are likely to be under pressure to limit the extent of the government's subsidy by such means as charging high fees, seeking employer sponsorship or participation in the national industrial training scheme, perpetuating the use of 'volunteer' teachers donated from overseas and lowering the level at which training is offered.

Apart from making demands on the economy for resources the institutes will of course be turning out each year large numbers of trainees who will have to find jobs or self-employment. Will this present any problem? On the basis of a comparison of Table 1 with a survey of existing training provision and plans for its expansion and of the government's manpower survey, discussed more fully elsewhere [6], there is no doubt that if all the institutes carried out all their plans excess supply of trained manpower would result, particularly in the case of engineering technicians. However, fund-raising difficulties make it unlikely that more than a few institutes will come into operation in the next year or two and current financing difficulties make it unlikely that many will be able to operate, to start with, at higher than skilled level at least in technical subjects. Thus their immediate impact on the trained-labour market is likely to be smaller than seemed possible in the euphoric early days of the fund-raising campaigns. Nevertheless, particularly if we look further ahead, the question of what would happen if the supply of technically-trained people exceeded
employers' demand for such people has to be faced. One possibility that can probably be rejected straight away is that wages and salaries would fall to allow the absorption of the increased supply, since the Kenyan formal-sector salary structure has so far shown remarkable resilience in the face of enormous changes on the supply side. Excess technicians and craftsmen would, rather, need to look for opportunities in self-employment. The crucial question then becomes whether the Kenyan economy is yet at a stage where it can offer much in the way of opportunities for lucrative self-employment to expensively-trained technicians. Experience in training for self-employment, for example in the village polytechnics and the Kenya Industrial Training Institute, has not so far been encouraging in this respect. Less tangibly and more optimistically, such a significant increase in the numbers of trained technicians may impart a more technical orientation to society and open new areas of innovation. One way or another, an excess supply of technically trained people would have profound social and political as well as economic effects.

So far we have discussed what might be called the direct impact of the institutes via their demand for staff, students and current finance and their output of trained people. They are likely also to have several important side-effects.

First of all, as Mbithi has pointed out \( \text{[10, p.163]} \), harambee of this kind represents a transfer of resources from productive use to consumption, or at least to less immediately productive use (particularly, as is likely in this case, if the time-lag between fund-raising and fruition is long). Analysis of contributions is not yet possible, but it is already clear also (see page 18) that, although conspicuous donations are being exacted from the elite, most local contributors are in lower-income-groups, particularly small farmers. Thus there are likely to be important effects on the distribution of wealth and income. This will be particularly so if the institutes persist in their intention (see table 1) to offer courses mainly for form IV leavers and set their fees at 1,000 shillings per annum or more. It would then be only a slight exaggeration to describe the situation as the raising of money from the poor to provide channels to jobs for

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\** The effect depends on how the lower-income groups finance their contributions. They may reduce consumption, reduce 'investment' in farm inputs etc., or sell assets, particularly land and cattle. These are in ascending order of long-term effect on income distribution.
those sons and daughters of the rich who failed to get into university.

As well as accentuating inequalities between classes within regions there is also a danger of accentuating inequalities between regions. It is no accident that Kiambu and Murang'a, two of the richest districts, have so far been able to raise the largest amounts locally. Moreover, since the richest region is also the most influential politically, it seems likely that foreign aid will reinforce rather than counteract the disqualifying effect. It is no accident that Kiambu has so far been the only institute to attract large-scale foreign aid. Of course, politics is not static and one could make various predictions of 'success rates' for institutes depending on the foreign aid implications of future political scenarios. Most of the feasible ones, however, involve continuing regional inequality.

As well as affecting regional economies the institutes are also likely to influence regional and national politics. We refer in section C (page 14) to the return to their areas of ethnic origin of members of the elite other than professional politicians. This obviously has healthy effects - in particular the breaking of the myth of the omnipotent politician and the opening of new channels through which local political demands can make themselves felt. In this way the institutes are being used as an important means of forcing accountability on politicians. There is, however, a negative side. It is quite possible that the institutes will strengthen majimbic feeling. In some cases this was explicit in the aims of the founders. Spokesmen of at least six institutes, for instance, have spoken of university or university-college status as an eventual possibility, while others, recognising the competitive nature of the situation have argued that their area must have an institute because it "cannot afford to be left behind". Whatever the aims, the process of interaction creates unification. Regular meetings of ethnic elite members are being held leading to contacts which would not otherwise have been made.

From the point of view of their 'Majimboism effect' the institutes could be divided into three groups. (1) Those competing on an inter-ethnic basis include Coast, Rift Valley and Western. In all cases ethnic unity has been threatened by problems of choice of site. Lack of agreement on site at the Coast, which probably includes the largest number of ethnic groups, ultimately allowed the Provincial Commissioner to step in. There is still

* The idea of creating several new universities in this way seems particularly dangerous from the point of view of its effect on national integration. A tribal university is a contradiction in terms. Multiplication of universities also makes little sense in the light of educational priorities.
The planners of the institutes have been careful to ensure that they will be national institutions open to all. Whether or not this will be the case will probably depend primarily on market factors; in a situation of excess local demand for places an 'outside' quota becomes difficult to enforce. Whatever the outcome in this respect, the process of increasing intra-tribal interaction may be both result and cause of greater tribalism - an ironical result of a process of competition for leadership between some of the most educated members of the ethnic groups. The only consolation is that the particular groupings that have emerged, particularly the four-way split in Central Province, are less dangerous than some others that could be thought of.

A final note should be included about some of the possible educational effects of the institutes of technology. Do they, for instance, mark the end of the 'educational explosion' described in section A? This looks unlikely. Although they are a deviation from the explosive model, if they prove successful in placing their trainees in jobs they will

* Although at the time of writing it is showing signs of revival.
probably be faced with an excess of applicants and may react to this by raising entry qualifications. This has already happened to training institutions, such as the National Youth Service, which were originally intended for primary school leavers. Thus the scramble for academic qualifications as means of entry could be encouraged rather than discouraged by the institutes. Moreover, while the enthusiasm for technical training is new and, in a sense, revolutionary from the educational point of view, the curricula and syllabuses are unlikely to be innovative. Pressure from both the Ministry of Education and employers will be for 'recognized' qualifications (i.e. trade tests and City and Guilds), and it would be a brave principal who resisted such pressure in view of his immediate need to demonstrate the employability of his products.

C. The Institutes and Previous Harambee

In section A we tried to show the way in which the campaign for the institutes of technology emerged from a conjunction of political and economic trends. In the course of this attempt we made some references to previous harambee, particularly the secondary schools. It seems worthwhile now to take this a bit further and to look more carefully at the specifically harambee aspects of the institutes. What are the similarities and differences between these and previous self-help projects?

Holmquist has characterized self-help as "preemptive development". "Groups try to pre-empt the field of contest by convincing the government that it is politically and economically unwise to deny support to a superior local effort." In the process any central plan that may exist is ignored. "Even if a coherent plan exists, the strategy of self-help groups is to purposely go beyond the plan because they probably would not receive aid without preemptive local effort.... Rather than helping to shift the burden of development from government, self-help activity may serve to generate even more demands upon government from below." Thus in choosing a project the primary consideration for a harambee group will be the likelihood of its being taken over by the government. The bid for government resources, as Colebatch points out, may consist, as in the case of health centres, merely of erecting a building or may extend, as in the case of secondary schools, to starting to run the institution with local resources, but the attraction of government help is the main point.
The institutes of technology seem to fit into this general pattern. Indeed, the way in which they were chosen as projects suggests that their initiators were looking for something not only likely to be taken over by the government and to attract overseas aid but also unlikely to be independently initiated by the government. Thus the project committee of the Coast Institute of Technology was at one time considering raising money for extensions to Mombasa Technical Institute (now Mombasa Polytechnic) but dropped this on hearing that the government was already planning to develop M.T.I. with overseas aid. The possibility of a technical school in Taita was also dropped in favour of the Coast Institute of Technology which was thought more likely to attract sympathy from the government and from overseas. Similarly Kiambu rejected further academic secondary schools because there were already several in the area and an institute of technology looked potentially more attractive to government; Kirinyaga chose technical training because government development programmes in water, agriculture, health and academic education seemed adequate; the Ukamba Agricultural Institute was preferred to an irrigation scheme because it was felt that the government would ultimately deal with water; and Murang’a dropped the idea of extending a hospital when it became clear that this was already included in government plans. Thus King’s tentative characterisation of the institutes as bids for projects that were already planned by the government, as well as getting the time sequence wrong, seems to be a mis-reading of the way in which harambee works. The point is not to choose something which you know is already in the government’s plan but, rather more subtly, to force the government to go in a direction which, although not in the plan, you know will be difficult for it to resist. Otherwise, why would Mombasa and Kisumu, which have already successfully attracted to themselves government projects in technical and vocational training (within the plan), nevertheless be persisting with fund-raising for their own harambee institutes of technology?

Another aspect of harambee, stressed in section A, is its role as a vehicle for personal political ambitions. This is also emphasised by Holquist. “Leaders, by promoting development activities, are able to enhance their own standing in their areas and they compete with each other over who will be able to initiate the largest, most successful, and most numerous development projects” (Holquist, p. 222). It also, as Colebatch points out, works in the other direction. “If a man cannot establish his political effectiveness, it will be difficult to maintain support for the self-help projects he has promoted.” He cites the example of a harambee secondary school which collapsed
for want of pupils when the MP who promoted it was defeated in the election. The institutes of technology are very much within this tradition. As Mr. Omonu, defending himself in a letter to the Daily Nation (24 November, 1972) against charges of using Kaimosi college for political purposes, asked, "which of the colleges of technology have not got the leadership or support of politicians?" Unlike most previous harambee projects, however, each of the institutes is too large and covers too wide an area to become the personal property of a single leader. Thus quarrels over leadership partly explain the multiplication of institutes in some areas, particularly Western Province, and the deadlock within institutes in others, particularly Ukambani and Meru.

Moreover, in an important respect the institutes-of-technology campaign represents something entirely new in Kenyan politics - the return to their areas of ethnic origin of members of the elite other than professional politicians. We will use the term 'non-politicians' to describe this group, consisting of those who are not and never have been Members of Parliament or KANU party officers at national, provincial or district level. Our use of this term should not be taken to imply that we think these non-politicians are non-political; indeed, part of our argument is that they are playing a highly political role. The point is that this group has not tended to get much involved in harambee before. Previous projects have tended to be on a smaller scale, covering an area no bigger than a division, and dominated by MPs who used them as a scene of interacting with their constituents. We argued in section A that, as the process of depoliticization continued and public meetings were regulated more tightly by the provincial administration, harambee was about the only chance for such interaction that was open to MPs. Such non-politicians as did frequent their home areas were regarded by MPs as a threat. MPs' anxiety about this group has intensified since 1969 when many members lost their seats to non-politicians who argued that their education and/or bureaucratic experience fitted them for political leadership. Scarcely a week goes by without an MP complaining about the political activities of non-politicians, particularly civil servants, and parliament likes to reassure itself occasionally that civil servants who involve themselves in politics must resign their posts.

The importance of non-politicians in the institutes-of-technology campaign can be illustrated in various ways. Table 2, for instance, shows the composition of the institutes' critical committees by category of membership. We established whether or not committees were 'critical' by checking the sequence of decision-making on (a) whether to establish a college, (b) size, (c) entry levels, (d) membership of all committees and (e) fund-raising.
Table 2: Executive Committees by Category of Membership

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Excludes Embu, Men (Kajiado), Kakanji, and Ankunda for whom data are incomplete.
\* The four are Nairobi city councillors and the mayor of Nairobi.
\* Project committee and trustees.
\* Combined trustees and executive committee.
\* Combined fund-raising committee in Meru and initial Nairobi-based curriculum Committee.
\* Governing Council.
\* Six representatives of women's organisations and one representative of special interests (the Asian Community).
\* Project committee and finance tactics committee.
\* All Coast Province county councillors.
\* Interim executive, planning and appeals/publicity committees.
All Kisii chiefs.

Project committee.

Executive officer, child welfare society.

Women's representative on main committee - a professional social worker.

Fund-raising committee.

From this we can see that 'politicians' (categories 1-3) represent less than a third of those involved in the critical committees and are significantly outnumbered by those in the 'non-politician' categories, mainly civil servants (categories 4 and 5), managers in the private sector (category 9) and university staff and students (category 6).

The fact that members of parliament are the largest single category shows that they are aware of the institutes as a significant political issue.

However, as far as active participation in decision-making is concerned, the important categories have been the national civil servants and statutory board managers and university staff and students (categories 4 and 6).

Category 5, composed mainly of people who are not from the area in question, is important for controlling funds (see pages 16-21).

Another indication of the importance of non-politicians in the institutes is the fact that they form the majority of the holders of national office. Table 3 shows the three main national officers of each institute by category.

Table 3: Chairmen, Secretaries and Treasurers by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Treasurer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirinyaga</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murang'a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukambu</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gusii</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amboseli</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaimosi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sengi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Excludes Kalenjin and Abakuria for which data are not yet complete.

For the Coast I.T., the P.C., as chief administrator and coordinator, is constitutionally and functionally above the chairman.

Formerly with the university.

Of the forty-five office-bearers in the table only 26 per cent are politicians. There is an interesting specialisation by function with the politicians concentrating on the 'figurehead' role of chairman, non-politicians on those of secretary and treasurer. A large proportion of the secretaries consists of university staff, while civil servants form the majority of treasurers. Significantly, in view of past experience with harambee funds, only one of the treasurers is a member of parliament.

More telling than any statistical analysis, however, is an analysis of the way in which the institutes were initiated and the major decisions made. In at least eleven cases the initiating role of non-politicians seems to have been crucial. In Kiambu, as early as 1968 a local teacher and later a provincial education officer, a city council education officer and senior civil servant provided the initial impetus. In Nyeri the initiative came from the district commissioner, and Mr. Kibaki, the Minister of Finance, and not one of the district factional leaders, was elected chairman of the trust board. The executive committee was later to talk of the need "to commit our MPs towards the goal of collecting funds towards our K.I.T." The impetus for Kirinyaga came from the permanent secretary and his deputy in the President's Office; the latter sent the initial letters and the former steered the first caucus meetings before the wider district leadership was involved. The idea for a Murang'a district development fund, not tied to any particular project, came from a group of Murang'a businessmen in Nairobi; the major initiators of the idea of using this fund for a college of technology were Mr. Geaga of B.A.T., the university registrar and the chairman of the Kenya Commercial Bank. In Meru, with its three hostile political factions, the district commissioner had to play an initiating role, backed by 'non-politician' members of the elite mainly working outside the district. In the case of Ukambu A.I., an interim committee of academics, civil servants and businessmen took the important structural decisions before bringing the politicians in. In Kisii the idea was put forward by Abagusii university students who then called a meeting of Kisii leaders. Rongo I.A.T. can also be traced back to pressure from university students, who since 1958 had argued for a university in Luo land; throughout the planning stage it appeared that non-politicians were dominant, with neither Mr. Odinga
... other prominent Luo politicians being brought into the discussions, with the exception of Mr. Oguda, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who played an important role, perhaps because of his position as Chairman of the Luo MPs and a representative of South Nyanza. Sangale seems to have been pushed mainly by Bungoma civil servants in Nairobi. Koinos which has the longest history of detailed preparation, traceable back to 1958, was regarded all along as a Quaker church project with no active involvement of politicians until very recently. The idea of the Coast Institute of Technology was conceived by Mr. Shako, Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, but it has become very much the creature of the Coast provincial commissioner.

Thus it appears that, unlike previous harambee, the organisers and initiators of the institutes of technology have been primarily 'non-politicians' and in many cases conscious efforts have been made to exclude professional politicians or to allot them a subordinate or symbolic role. To call them non-politicians does not, as we have emphasised, imply that they are playing a non-political role. Just how political the role of some of them has been may become clearer when the candidates for the 1974 elections declare themselves.

But perhaps the most obvious contrast between the institutes of technology and previous harambee is one of sheer size. As Table 1 shows, initial fund-raising targets for the larger institutes vary from 10 to 30 million shillings; and the combined target of, for instance, the three institutes planned in Eastern province is 40 million shillings, compared with the total of the province's harambee contributions for all purposes in 1971 of about 7 million shillings.

The size of the amounts to be raised has been one of the reasons for the involvement of the provincial administration in fund-raising for most institutes. The prototype fund-raising organisations are those of Kiambu and Murang'a. The district commissioner sets targets for each of his district officers, who pass similar instructions on to chiefs and sub-chiefs. In each area minimum scales of contribution are laid down. In Murang'a, for instance, every male is expected to pay at least 10 shs, every female 5 shs. In addition all employed persons are expected to pay according to salary on a sliding-scale ranging from 40% for those earning 200 shs per month to 1,000% for those earning 5,000 shs. There are also specific contributions expected from special categories, e.g. tea growers, coffee growers, milk cooperatives, harambee groups, secondary, primary and nursery
schools, bus-owners, lorry-owners, wholesalers, retailers, hotel, restaurant and bar owners, petrol station-owners, matatu-operators, etc.

Those who have several roles make a contribution relating to each of them. Similar forms of organisation are operated by other institutes, particularly Coast, Kimathi, Kuru and (after initial hesitation on the part of the provincial administration) Riat. Indeed Kuru's D.C. made a careful study of fund-raising methods in Kiambu and Muranga before designing a similar system for his district.

The extent of compulsion that is applied in order to raise contributions varies from area to area. In parts of central province proof that institute-of-technology contributions have been paid is demanded before any dealings with officialdom (e.g. payment of school fees, purchase of a licence) are allowed. At the coast workers and teachers were dismayed to find that their unions had agreed to a 25 per cent deduction from their salaries, while in Nairobi deductions were actually made from teachers' salaries without their consent. In both cases protests brought immediate assurances that contributions were to be strictly voluntary and refunds of any money that had been deducted. There have also been complaints, mainly from Central Province, of forced deductions from agricultural produce. In some areas there has been trouble with bogus collectors, although probably less than if the provincial administration was not being used. In general, the dilemma of fund-raising is that the amounts needed are so large that even in the most enthusiastic areas a measure of compulsion becomes necessary. Compulsion has not, of course, been unknown in previous harambees but its extent, within a formalised system of collection, marks a new stage on the slope from harambee to a form of regressive taxation.*

Common to virtually all institutes, also, is the attempt to raise funds by designating as "founder-members" or "life-members" those who make specified, large contributions, usually in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 shs. Such pressure on elite members who want to retain local in influence is irresistible. Even in those areas where fund-raising is more loosely organised than in the Kitaw/Kuria model, approaches are usually made to particular groups. In Kisii, for instance, there is heavy reliance on contributions promised from teachers (2½ million shs), pyrethrum farmers (5 million shs), coffee farmers (5 million shs) and tea growers (2 million shs); while UKAI has had the interesting idea of setting up sub-committees of eminent people to approach those in their own area of specialisation - e.g. tourism and hotels, general business, construction and estate agencies,

* See Mutiso [11 and 12] for further discussion of this point.
printers and booksellers, large-scale farmers, etc. etc. It is usual, also, to have committees of dispersed kinmen in the larger towns; indeed, some towns with a large population of 'strangers' may be sending more money out to other areas than they are raising for their own institutes. Then, of course, there are the well-tried techniques of harambee fund-raising such as huge meetings chaired by top politicians at which names and contributions are named, dances, raffles, sponsored walks and badges. Such methods have, in the case of the institutes of technology, broken all previous harambee records. At Wawenye's initial fund-raising meeting 1.3 million shs was raised, while on a similar occasion Kambu was able to announce the amazing total of 6.9 million shs. Even though some of the cheques were not immediately honoured these represent new levels of achievement in harambee.

An interesting aspect of the fund-raising, again related to the size of the targets, is the way in which sources of funds other than kinmen are being tapped. Local and foreign-owned firms, individual Asian and European citizens and non-citizens and Africans (usually politicians) from other areas usually feature in lists of contributors. Some firms make a point of contributing equally to each institute, but the richer institutes tend to gain more from this process (for instance, Lomto gave the equivalent of 320,000 shs to Kambu). Asian involvement in the institutes is largely confined to contribution of money (particularly important in the case of Riat, although there are a few involved in planning, fund-raising and organisation, e.g. in UKAT and Maru). The extent to which Africans are contributing across ethnic boundaries is difficult to estimate. There have been some spectacular examples: President Kenyatta's 5,000 shs to Riat and 10,000 shs to Rift Valley; Vice-President Arap Moi's 6,500 shs to Kaimosi and 8,000 shs to Kambu; J.M. Kariuki's 5,000 shs to Riat and 4,000 shs to Kisii. And many leading activists have taken out founder membership of a number of institutes. Riat, in particular, seems to have attracted substantial support of this kind from outside Nyensa. Understandably, however, even those who have contributed away from home have tended to reserve their largest contributions for their own areas.
Spectacular though the local harambee effort has been, these projects are so large that the institutes' sponsors are being forced to look outside the country for a large proportion of their funds. Among countries approached for aid by the various institutes are the Netherlands, the USSR, the US, the UK, India, Italy, Denmark, Norway, France and West Germany. So far, apart from token contributions from embassies, two institutes have been successful in attracting large scale foreign support. The Netherlands government is making a grant of some 6.7 million shs towards the total cost of Kiambu's first two phases of 17 million shs, while a large part of the funds for Kaimosi's first phase has come from Quaker organisations in the US. As 'private' projects the institutes are not allowed to receive aid direct from foreign governments, but Kiambu has shown how this can be circumvented. Its aid is nominally from a church organisation but actually from the Dutch government which has a joint-financing arrangement with the church organisation. Aid is being sought not only for capital expenditure but also in the form of technical assistance; this may consist partly of young volunteers to staff the institutes in their early stages. All of which adds up to the fact that, unlike previous harambee projects, foreign support will be crucial to the success of the institutes of technology, at least if they are to go ahead as planned.

D. Towards a Political Economy of the Institutes

The institutes of technology have been legitimised at the highest levels of government, with the President taking an active part in various
ways and many ministers and assistant ministers being involved in their own area’s institute. It is perhaps significant that only one member of the government, an assistant minister for home affairs, has spoken publicly against the institutes (his particular concern was with the role that civil servants were playing). It is in fact clear to most ministers that non-involvement in the movement would be politically suicidal. Moreover the ‘non-politicians’ realise the usefulness of politicians in fund-raising and invariably take steps to involve them. Ministers are therefore ‘forced’ into acquiescing, even when unenthusiastic, and of course they take the opportunity of the fund-raising activities to keep themselves in the public eye. Indeed in the cases of Kiambu, Murang’a, Rift, Ukai, Rift Valley, JCAAS, Embu and the Coast it is possible to identify ministers or assistant ministers who are involved because they have no choice. Moreover they are expected to be active in raising money.

*As can be seen from the following list showing ministers and the institutes for which they are working in one capacity or another, only two ministers are not actively involved, as far as is known:

Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi, Rift Valley;
Minister of State, Office of the President, W. Koinange, Kiambu;
East African Minister, R.W. Gikonyo, Rift;
Minister of Agriculture, J.J. Nyagah, Embu;
Attorney-General, C. Njoroge, Kiambu;
Minister for Commerces and Industry, Dr. J.G. Kieno, Murang’a;
Minister for Cooperatives and Social Services, M. Muliro, JCAAS;
Minister for Defence, J.S. Bishuru, not actively involved;
Minister for Education, Taita Taveta, Rift Valley;
Minister for Defence, J.S. Bishuru, not actively involved;
Minister for Finance and Economic Planning, J.T. Onyango, Kibera;
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Njoroge Njogu, Kiambu;
Minister for Health, Dr. Z.T. Cropyne, Gusii;
Minister for Housing, P. Ngai, Ukai;
Minister for Information and Broadcasting, R. Matano, Coast;
Minister for Labour, E.N. Mwendwa, Ukai;
Minister for Lands and Settlement, J.N. Angaine, not actively involved;
Minister for Local Government, J.C.N. Osongo, JCAAS;
Minister for Natural Resources, W.O. Omamo, Rift;
Minister for Power and Communications, I.E. Osagoe Okocho, Rift;
Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, J.J.N. Shake, Coast;
Minister for Works, J. Nyamweya, Gusii.
A point that has already been made is the intimate involvement of the government (basically the provincial administration) in the process of raising funds. For instance, the P.C., Coast, is the main mover of the Coast Institute. The P.C., Central, has not been personally active but his D.Cs, D.0s and chiefs provide the structure for fund-raising. The P.C., Nyanza and his D.Cs, D.0s and chiefs do not seem to have as great a role as in other provinces but again they provide the fund-raising structure. In Eastern Province, Embu and Meru are dependent on the provincial administration for organisation while Ukai relies on it for local fund-raising. The P.C., Western, has been embroiled in the quarrels between WGAAS and Kaimpsi and between WGAAS and Bang'alo. In Rift Valley Province the P.C., D.Cs, D.0s and chiefs are clearly an important part of the formal structure. This involvement of government at the local level is justified by the planners of the institutes as both a check on the honesty of fund-raising and as an aid to efficiency in raising very large sums.

So far, although (or, rather, because) individual members of the government have given the institutes top-level support and the provincial administration has been allowed to involve itself in their organisation, little has emerged in the way of an active government policy towards the institutes. The Ministry of Education has registered those institutes that have applied as unaided educational institutions. In his foreword to the pamphlet produced by Murang'a President stated that, "despite the fact that Murang'a College of Technology was not originally included in the Kenya Development Plan 1971/74, my Government will accord the highest priority in the allocation of any funds at its disposal for the development of technical education in Kenya and in this connection Murang'a College of Technology will feature prominently." This pledge was generalised in parliament in December 1971 by the Minister of Education who said that the government intends to take over the institutes "when they mature." Understandably the Treasury is more cautious, merely offering assistance "at some future date if such assistance is deemed necessary and desirable." The Ministry of Education has offered the advisory services of its technical section in planning procedures and curricula. As far as is known the planners of the institutes have not taken advantage of the offer.

* From letter from the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, to the Secretary, Kiambu Institute of Science and Technology, dated 10 February, 1971.
preferring to use the services of such experts as they have on their own committees or to employ professional consultants. The expected appointment of a full-time advisor to the institutes, financed by UNESCO, may be intended to rectify this situation. Government attempts to coordinate the activities of the institutes have so far come to nothing. A committee for this purpose was set up within the Ministry of Education and a meeting of representatives of the institutes was called. However, as a prerequisite of the meeting the institutes were asked to fill in a detailed questionnaire (including questions on planning, officers, site, proposed development, courses offered, recruitment of students and finance). As must surely have been known, very few institutes are in a position to answer such questions; only three replied and the meeting has never been held. In a situation where not only ministers and assistant ministers are involved but also top civil servants in all ministries provide the main impetus behind their own institutes, government caution on this issue is hardly surprising.

As well as appeal to government a criterion which we suggested (page 13) must have been in the minds of the institutes' founders is appeal to foreign aiders. Here they seemed to be on firm ground. As King [9, p. 185] wrote in early 1972, "as far as overseas inclinations are concerned, there is probably a good basis for Kenya's confidence in attracting substantial foreign aid in this sphere.... Although there may be difficulties in the actual allocation of aid to regional self-help schemes, it would appear that there would be no shortage of foreign assistance for what will be seen as educational realism at last by an African country." This was certainly how the Dutch government saw it in its allocation of aid to Kiambu. As the institutes have multiplied, however, so have the aiders pulled in their horns. There seem to be two interconnected reasons for this. Firstly the uncontrolled mushrooming of projects is seen as a denial of central planning; this argument carries particular weight with the World Bank. Secondly, the whole phenomenon is seen as having become too "political" and thus dangerous for bilateral aiders. With the Dutch having got what might be regarded as the 'safe' project other bilateral aiders are scratching their heads and looking into their crystal balls. This will not prevent them from offering small-scale aid, such as textbooks and volunteers, but is likely to delay the allocation of large-scale capital aid. Foreign companies operating in Kenya, on

* This has put the smaller institutes, without an extensive ethnic elite and without money to pay consultants, at a disadvantage.
the other hand, are enthusiastic. Their donations to the institutes (usually spread over a number) are, of course, partly a political insurance policy, but also a reflection of their preference for a surplus to a shortage of technicians and craftsmen. Moreover, for those who operate in relevant fields there are opportunities to supply equipment and materials to the institutes and, more subtly, to secure longer-term benefits. One such company, for instance, has offered a grant to an institute to put on courses in the use and repair of that company's equipment. The equipment will, of course, be provided free, a small price to pay for the leverage on government and other users offered by the later flooding of the market with craftsmen and technicians trained in the use of that equipment and no other.

As far as the wananchi are concerned it is in the perceived interests of tribesmen to support their institutes, either as a way of diversifying and increasing opportunities for themselves and their children and of forcing accountability on their politicians or as a means to ethnic reunification. During the field studies in July/August 1972 we found very few people who claimed to oppose the idea, although there may have been some vagueness as to what the idea actually was. According to a Murang'a County Councillor, for instance, contributors are told "that they are contributing the money for a school, and they know that one time their children will go to that school." Also in Murang'a, a county councilor announces the imposition of a 10/- "tax" which will help towards "the school which you have heard of for Technology." Yet if the institutes persist in their intention to admit mainly secondary school leavers the majority of the contributors will feel little direct benefit. There are signs that they are becoming aware of this possibility. For instance, in Nyanza, where the ranks of contributors are linked to the historical military hierarchy, those who happen to be non-ranked because of their inability to make large contributions are asking pointedly what chances their children have of getting into the institutes. In other parts of the country similar questions are arising. Moreover the high levies and the fund-raising methods are arousing intense bitterness, particularly in Central Province. In the wards of a Murang'a trader, "we are not going to sit back and sing 'hallelujah' when our children are expelled from schools for non-payment of school fees, and when we cannot take them to hospitals when they fall sick, all in the name of harambee..."

* Information from Hal Colebatch.
Another matter which worries contributors is the need to make sure that the "politicians" do not eat the money as has happened in the case of other local projects. However, some of the wananchi interviewed felt sure that this would not be so since "their educated sons" were there to watch over the money. The issue of disappearing money is extremely important and is probably the main explanation of the incorporation of the provincial administration into local fund-raising.

An interesting intermediate category between the wananchi interviewed in fieldwork and the elites involved in institute activities is that of primary school-leavers, educated enough to know that the institutes are not intended for them and their like. At a meeting of several hundred primary teacher-trainees attended by one of the authors not a single voice sympathetic to the institutes was heard. Usually primary school-leavers, they clearly saw themselves as a relatively deprived group. Their criticism concentrated on: admission of secondary-school leavers rather than primary-school leavers or those with no education at all; lack of government planning and coordination; intensification of class and regional inequalities; encouragement of tribalism; staff shortages; increased expatriate presence; possible employment problems; misdirection of investment; and use of the institutes to further personal political ambitions. These views have been echoed in letters to the press, presumably from the same 'subelite' category. Neither the institutes nor the government have felt the need to answer these views systematically as they carry little political weight.

The most coherent opposition to the institutes has come from the professional central planners — which, since most of the senior indigenous planners are involved in their own institutes in one capacity or another, means largely the expatriates. The general grounds for their opposition, which was particularly strong in the early days of the campaign, are fairly obvious. These projects were not in the plan and in purely central planning terms they are seen as not making sense. Quite apart from the question of the external efficiency of expanding technical training, the institutes duplicate and may interfere with projects already in the pipeline, such as the upgrading of Mombasa Polytechnic and the building of two more industrial and vocational training centres in Kisumu and Mombasa. They may duplicate each other's facilities. The facilities proposed by the institutes could...

* East African Standard, 8 February, 1973. The speaker is referring to the practice of demanding to see harambee receipts before allowing payment of, e.g., school and hospital fees. (See above page 12).
be provided at lower capital and current cost in existing institutions. They will present the government with a difficult problem of financing current expenditure when it takes them over. Indeed they are seen as representing a pre-emptive bid for government resources which will be of disproportionate benefit to the already richer areas, etc.

The trouble with this kind of criticism is that it was based on a misunderstanding of the situation in which the critics were operating. The planners were able to hold up Kiamisi college for several years when it was a single church-backed project in a periphery without a unified voice in the centre. To prevent the whole institutes-of-technology bandwagon from rolling is quite another matter. At this point the institutes apparently have a unique capacity to serve the interests (political and otherwise) of the elites who are sponsoring them and to catch the imagination of the wananchi who are contributing to them. In a situation where members of the government and top civil servants are, with their "private" hats on, actively planning each their own institute, and where the government, through the provincial administration, is intimately involved in the fund-raising process, central planners would surely not be acting realistically if they urged "the government" (as if it were an abstraction) to take a hostile attitude towards these institutes. Such criticisms may have had some effect on the attitudes of potential donors, particularly the World Bank, but they carry little weight within the government. The institutes of technology are definitely going to happen; all that remains to be decided is the precise form that they will take.

To do them justice, the planners have now realised this and have inserted into the technical education section of the draft 1974-70 Development Plan a few paragraphs on the harambee institutes of technology. This carefully refrains from committing "the government" to direct help with development or recurrent costs, but promises assistance with coordination in the particular hope of evading duplication of expensive equipment; provision for teacher training needs; and support services such as the Inspectorate, the curriculum development unit and mass media centres. A few words of advice are also included which seem to suggest that the planners will try to nudge the institutes towards craft rather than technical-level courses. Since this is also the direction in which the logic of cost and staffing will be pressing, they may well be successful.
E. Conclusions

We have tried to show the way in which the institutes of technology emerged from a conjunction of political and economic trends. During the first ten years of independence, in the absence of a strong political party with a systematic ideology, politics in Kenya moved from the centre to the periphery and became increasingly tribal, while the provincial administration consolidated its position of strength. At the same time the educational explosion, generated by the unequal and education-related structure of rewards, flooded the market with the merely academically qualified and made institutes of technology an attractive alternative to secondary schools for harambee organisers. Thus the institutes presented themselves as ideal vehicles for determining local leadership at a time when non-politician members of the elite were beginning to challenge the generation of politicians which inherited leadership on independence.

Although relative lack of progress in fund-raising is likely to limit their immediate impact sooner or later the institutes will be making demands on the economy, particularly for staff and current finance, which may be difficult to meet. The prospect of taking over responsibility for their current expenditure must be particularly worrying for the Treasury. At the same time they will be turning out large numbers of technically trained people, of whom, unable to find wage-earning jobs, will have to look for opportunities in self-employment. The eventual possibility of an excess supply of technically trained people, with its unpredictable social and political as well as economic effects, needs to be faced.

In so far as the institutes transfer resources from immediate to less immediate productive use they will slow down the rate of economic growth in their early years. Perhaps more important is their possible disqualifying effect on income distribution both between classes and between regions. Moreover the return to their areas of origin of the non-politician elite, while having the obvious healthy effect of forcing accountability on politicians, raises the danger of strengthening mafiosoistic feeling. Educationally, they are unlikely to mark the end of the scramble for academic qualifications since these will be needed as a means of entry. And while the enthusiasm for technical training is new and exciting, it is going to be difficult for the institutes to escape from the traditional 'recognised' and imported system of qualifications. This, plus the likelihood that the priorities of foreign capital-intensive companies will shape...
their programmes, is the main threat to the institutes' innovative potential and to the evolution of locally-oriented technical training.

The institutes seem to fit in well with the characterization of self-help as 'pre-emptive development' - a bid for rather than a substitute for government resources. To judge from the way in which they were chosen, the ideal herero project seems to be one which is likely to be taken over by the government and to attract overseas aid but unlikely to be independently initiated by the government. Like previous herero projects the institutes are vehicles for personal political ambitions although on a much larger scale. Unlike previous herero projects, they have involved 'non-political' members of the elite in their areas of ethnic origin. Their importance in the institutes' campaign can be illustrated by reference to the composition of critical committees and of the holders of national office but, most convincingly, by an analysis of their initiating role. To call them 'non-politicians' does not, of course, imply that they are playing a non-political role. The most obvious contrast with previous herero projects, however, is that of size. The size of the amounts to be raised has been one of the reasons for the involvement of the provincial administration in fund-raising, the compulsion exerted on contributors, the tapping of sources other than kinsmen and the need to look outside the country for a large proportion of funds. In particular, the transformation of herero into a regressive taxation system is a subject into which more detailed research is needed.

The way in which the institutes have attracted support at the highest level, with the President taking an active part and many ministers and assistant ministers being involved in their own area's institute, is impressive. The government, through the provincial administration, is also intimately involved in the process of raising funds. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that little has emerged in the way of an active government policy towards the institutes, beyond a vague promise of eventual government takeover. They have turned out to be less appealing to foreign donors than had been expected, partly because their mushrooming is seen as a denial of central planning and partly because they have become too "political." Foreign companies, as hirers of skilled labour and suppliers of materials and equipment, are more enthusiastic. The lower-income-group who form the majority of contributors have supported the idea, although they are beginning to ask questions about who will benefit, and collecting methods are arousing intense bitterness. Primary school-leavers, who know
that the institutes are not for them. take a jaundiced view, but are not politically influential. The most coherent opposition has come from the professional central planners, largely the expatriates who are the only ones uninvolved in the institutes. Their criticisms, particularly strong in the early days of the campaign, made sense in central planning terms but ignored the political economy of the situation, as they appear now to be realising.

The institutes of technology represent what might be called the 'last stage of harambee', whereby the full weight of individual members of the government and of the provincial administration has been thrown behind the raising of funds to build institutions the current financing of which will eventually become the responsibility of the government. We have hoped to show that they are not an amusing side-show but an important new development in Kenyan politics with important implications in the future for the educational system and the economy.
REFERENCES


7. Frank Holmquist, Implementing Rural Development Projects, ch.10 in Goran Hyden; Robert Jackson and John Oumblr (eds.), Development Administration, the Kenyan Experience, Nairobi, 1979.


