Politics in Travail

An Inaugural Lecture
GIVEN IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF RHODESIA

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by
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POLITICS IN TRAVAIL

ONE of the pleasanter aspects of the inaugural lecture is the tradition of paying tribute to pioneers (an emotive word in this part of the world), and I am glad to pay tribute to the work of Professor F. M. G. Willson, the first occupant of the Chair of Government at the University College of Rhodesia, a scholar of note and a peerless administrator.

The Chair of Government did not become, I am glad to say, redundant; it merely faded away, or rather it was whisked away by Academic Board Fiat. The subject underwent a metamorphosis and became political science. Hence, while the Chair is not new, its claims are different and, I would say, more difficult.

The object of this lecture is to justify the activities of the political scientist and, to a lesser extent, those of the politicians. This may not be a simple task, for only recently at the Conservative Political Centre’s national summer school, held at Christchurch, Oxford, Professor Brian Chapman declared, “Political scientists are the only professional men who have killed more people than doctors.” This macabre concept of our function is universally shared (though it is sad to see that even professors of this subject have accepted it). Shakespeare put into the mouth of King Lear hisview of politicians—the object of much of the political scientist’s study:

“Get thee glass eyes:
And, like a scurvy politician seem
To see the things thou dost not.”

(Lear, Act IV, Sc. VI.)

Moreover, Swift speaking of Brobdingnag showed his scorn of anything political when he asserted, “And he gave it for his opinion that whoever could make two ears of corn and two blades of grass grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind and do more essential service to his country than the whole race of politicians together.”
Again, when President Johnson declared himself no longer a candidate for the presidency of the United States of America, satisfaction was discernible from almost all quarters. One commentator declared grandly that the President had taken the presidency out of politics—as if the presidency could be divorced from politics. Moreover, a few years ago in the South African Parliament, one Member accused another Member of “preaching pure politics” and argued that Parliament was no place for politics.

Sometimes the general distaste is couched in terms of quaint romanticism and this will even trickle across the Iron Curtain. Mr. Yevgeni Yevtushenko in a letter to the New York Times said, “I should not like that blunt soldiers’ boots of war and mucky politicians’ shoes should crush the snow-like purity of feelings between our peoples.” Were that international political problems were soluble in this grand way. Of course, General de Gaulle has the last word. With his supreme contempt for politicians he declared, “As usual, I have against me the bourgeoisie, the officers and the diplomatists and for me, only the people who take the Metro.” The French have a word for it—depolitisation which means scepticism of, if not withdrawal from, politics. Hence they take to the streets rather than to the hustings.

We constantly hear pleas from all sides to take sport out of politics, and education out of politics, and religion out of politics . . . and now it appears that they want to take politics out of politics. Some years ago I went on my way to a tutorial in Natal University. I fell in behind two students and one of them asked the other where he was going. A silence descended on the first when he was told that the second student was going to a politics tutorial. “That’s where you learn to make plastic bombs, isn’t it?” eventually retorted the unbeliever. Such is the travail of the political academic. Occasional compensations exist, however, one of which I treasure came from the student who described the Opening of Parliament as the Queen’s Purgative.
The politicians too seem disturbed. Mr. Jo Grimmond said in tones of final desperation. "Apart from gossip and jokes about George Brown, party political argument is dead." Mr. Christopher Mayhew asserted, with unpleasant frankness. "A certain degree of humbug is inevitable in politics, but the amount required of us now to keep the party system going is becoming excessive." Even the Speaker of the House of Commons has been worried about this, for he recently said. "It is not out of order to accuse one side of the House of humbug, but it may be discourteous." President Harry S. Truman said a propos the slings and arrows directed at politicians, "If you can’t stand the heat, you’d better get out of the kitchen."

There is politics everywhere, however. It is embedded in those nursery rhymes which we teach our children:

"Sing a song of sixpence
A pocket full of rye
Four and twenty blackbirds
Baked in a pie.
When the pie was opened.
The birds began to sing.
Wasn’t this a dainty dish
To set before the King?"

The story of the Rye House plot and the twenty-four suspended bishops are happily far away from us now. Revolution in the nursery; here children are taught about the impertinent King James, his counting house, the papist queen in her parlour, the maid in the garden; was it Nell Gwyn whose nose was pecked off by a blackbird bishop?

What of goosey goosey gander wandering upstairs and downstairs, not to mention his lady Queen’s chamber? The old man thrown so violently downstairs who couldn’t say his prayers was, so I understand, that famous Whig dissenter, Earl of Shaftesbury.

Hence, it would appear to most people that the term politics is synonymous with, variously, intrigue, sabotage, unmitigated partisanship and, for all we know, original sin. It
may come as a shock to Rhodesians to learn that there was a political monk by the name of John of Salisbury writing in the twelfth century who preached tyrannicide. Whenever a scapegoat needs to be found for the foibles of men, it is at hand, it is to be found "in politics." Perhaps the cruellest blow of all has been to assert that problems of race confrontation are "political" problems. It must be admitted that Mr. Enoch Powell has not assisted in this regard.

Out of all this babbling and mumbling, political scientists have attempted to construct a quieter language, one which attempts to study an organised body of knowledge about human behaviour, as it relates to public affairs, which scholars have validated, or consider susceptible of validation, by rigorous and systematic examination. Politics is an art, political science is science, but unfortunately the art had not had much help from the science. Most of the vulgar criticisms made by the unthinking man on the Clapham omnibus or the Avondale special can be treated with the contempt they deserve, although it gets a little tedious for the professor of political science to accept all the old-fashioned glances and the frigid looks from all sorts and conditions of men and women when he confesses his profession. The travail which is his lot is yet more difficult to endure when it comes from presumed educated men whom one might expect to know better. Einstein was surely right when he said that politics is much more difficult than physics.

It must nonetheless be admitted that there is a considerable sense of disenchantment with both politicians and the political process. A study of the British Press at the end of 1967 brought forward the revelation that the political process (and with it the constitutional way of doing things) was under severe attack. One newspaper declared in looking forward to 1968, "... there are alarming signs that more and more people—the young and idealistic businessmen and industrialists—are opting out from the political process." One other newspaper spoke of, "The widespread public disillusion with politics and politicians. . . ." One prominent
British public servant in 1967 advocated the running of Britain as a huge business corporation with a few political nuances thrown in to jazz it up a bit.

Of course one understands the low state of British political morale in 1968. Students of political science, however, are in a situation where they must defend themselves from their friends too, forgetting such comments as those made by Mr. Nigel Birch who, opposing a guillotine motion in the House of Commons, once remarked that the academic study of politics was becoming "one of the growth industries." Indeed, the academic study of politics is not growing all that much. Thus, in 1966, in the whole of the U.S.A., only 2.25% of all doctorates awarded were in political science.1

The idea of political science may startle some people whose notions of what science is are based upon the physical sciences. Can we therefore legitimately speak of a science of politics? Is there a science of politics? The answer to this question is that politics can be highly scientific in a narrow sense, but in the broadest sense it is the most unscientific human activity. In the narrow sense in which many people regard the subject, particularly in the U.S. today, political science is a highly scientific enterprise. These people argue that much, if not the bulk of, political activity is quantifiable, amenable to mathematical manipulation, and, even, at times, predictable. Hence, it can be argued, and it is frequently argued, that political science fulfills all the prerequisites for its establishment as a scientific discipline in its own right. If this is the case, the tests for regarding politics as a science should be the same tests as those which any scientist would enunciate.

Firstly, the science should be concerned with the acquisition of some body of knowledge which the average man cannot produce for himself without guidance. Secondly, the science should consist of a corpus of factual knowledge applied to some given field and distinguishable from guess-work, intuitive art and aesthetics. Thirdly, it should be reasonably consistent in prediction, which means that there is a possibility that
experiments can be repeated. Science, we may conclude, characteristically describes a “sophisticated body of knowledge, or a highly-organised method of obtaining knowledge.”

Political scientists would be more than bold to claim that their activities are wholly scientific in this sense, but most of them would claim that they are involved with scientific method, whose characteristics are reasonable detachment and absence of dogma, continuity, sincerity and systematic treatment and also unfailing devotion to accuracy. In practice, the Achilles heel of political science is prediction. The graveyard of all our attempts to predict is to be seen in the field of history—whether this is to be found in the promised land of More’s Utopia or in the prophecies of Marx. Nevertheless within small areas of study the psephologically-inclined political scientist can expect a quite staggering degree of accuracy.

The most obvious example which can be quoted relates to the public opinion poll. It is quite possible to predict with a high degree of accuracy (to within 1% to 2%) who will win an election. This fact (if it is a fact) depends upon knowledge of a number of other facts, such as knowing that a particular area is liable to be in the pockets of a given political party (the so-called “safe” seat).

We know, for example, the proportion of “safe” seats in Great Britain and on this basis we know fairly accurately that most general elections in Britain are fought over the so-called marginal seats. In some ways the general election is becoming less significant because we know from the polls which are conducted by Dr. Gallup and others the degree of the popularity which the government of the day enjoys.

There is thus growing up a whole new battery of concepts within the orbit of that discipline which we call psephology. We can dissect an election in such a way that our chances of prediction are quite high once we take account of all the variables. These variables include:

1. The candidate, who is himself regarded merely as a party man and is worth a few hundred votes at the most. Hence,
however shining his personality, his value is severely limited except in terms of the party whose label he bears. There are, of course, many honest exceptions to this rule, but it remains true nevertheless that his value is that of a human political tool.

2. The campaign. The psephologist frequently argues that the effort expended in an election may largely be a waste of time. Indeed, it has been shown that only one voter in seven had not finally made up his mind by the start of the campaign.

3. Constituency organisation and local party officials do not have much influence apart from making the campaign easier to document and perhaps from getting postal votes in marginal seats.

4. Few people change their minds as a result of canvassing, and the amount of false information given to potential candidates by electors may only be a measure of the gullibility of the canvassers.

5. The influence of television around politics has been hugely overestimated. Television simply informs us of the imminence of an election and nothing more.

6. The election manifesto appears to be virtually useless, and it has been shown that the information therein contained does not affect the outcome of an election.

We also know that the "image" (to use a Madison Avenue term) is in fact all-important. People see political activity in terms of mental pictures, and "images" are highly significant. Images relate to what a party is supposed to stand for. Hence while nobody reads policy statements, everybody senses images.

It is important in this connection to distinguish between "images" and "issues." We know people will vote for an "image" while they will not necessarily support an "issue." In the South African general election in 1966 (which I followed very carefully) few people understood the Bantustan concept, but they voted nevertheless for the Nationalists. It is a reasonable assumption to make that had they understood
the Bantustan concept they might have voted for the United Party, but the "image" of the Nationalists, strong, stern and unyielding, was a stronger emotion than that of the vaguer United Party. Again, in the London suburb of Greenwich, a survey demonstrated that only three out of ten persons asked could offer any reasonable comment about party politics, and comments, in fact, whether critical or not, tended to be personal or "casually biographical."

In British politics as far as the "issues" are concerned, there is considerable overlap in reality between the parties, so much so that Sir Ivor Jennings once said. "Among the leaders of the three major parties there is so much common ground that if they changed parties the results would be hardly noticeable." Nevertheless, as far as the "images" are concerned, people imagine that they are poles apart and the cloth cap and bowler are still the ultimate in political thinking for the majority of the British voters. In reality, the cloth cap and the bowler have married, producing a bizarre headgear recognisable as a devalued trilby.

All these studies have assisted us in discovering what are the principles which impel the electorate to think as it does. What, however, is most extraordinary and paradoxical is that the science of voting behaviour constitutes an attempt to establish rational laws on the basis of irrational voting habit. Moreover, it is clear that producing political "laws" is a hazardous affair, because one may produce a fact (a "value-impregnated fact," to use a most infelicitous phrase), which contains within it a value judgment. Thus, we all know that one manual worker in three supports the Conservatives, and it has been suggested even that this is the reason for British political stability. The "deferential" vote has been the subject of much discussion and political scientists are hard-pressed to explain its full significance. Moreover, the manipulation of votes is still in the pre-Newtonian era; if there are levers to be pulled which will persuade voters to change their minds, the psephologists are still trying to discover them—but indeed which scientists are not awaiting the dawning of some brave
breakthrough? Money does not seem to be the answer, because although the Conservatives spent about £440,000 on half-page advertisements featuring Sir Alec Douglas-Home between January and April, 1964, in the same period his popularity rating fell from 58 to 48 per cent.

Again, Wilson's rating fell from 71 to 63 per cent, between May, 1963, and May, 1964, a period during which Labour devoted the largest part of its advertising campaign to boosting its leader. It seems just possible that voters are more influenced by what political leaders do rather than how they are presented. The conclusion of all these studies appears to be that, as yet, political science has some way to go before the day when we can advise politicians what levers they should pull in order to obtain which votes, in order to obtain a victory. Clearly the nagging fear is that image-makers may in fact take over from politicians. This fear is as yet unjustified, but the day may very well come when elections will be superfluous because the computers can do it much better than the electors. When this happens we will be able to speak of "government of the computer, by the computer, for the computer." In fact, politicians are just as frightened of computers as the public because they see here a threat to their own position. They want to believe that they know better than the machine; they want to believe that they understand the mystic processes of communing with the voters, and they tend to resent the intrusion of the professionals; the technologists of political and public opinion are consequently underutilised. Here is a case where political science is too scientific for the politicians.

Psephology, as one writer said, produces dyspepsia, but it is at least as scientific as one might hope for, and it can account at the moment for only a small area of political interest. Psephological phenomena and the language of quantitative empiricism represent only a small area of political interest. There are large areas of political activity not amenable to this sort of analysis. In this case, noumena.
which is the qualitative aspect of political science, and therefore not amenable to measurement, take over.

Political science falls short of being a formal empirical science, for to use the language of Kant, it does not succeed in constructing a system of synthetic a priori propositions. Even the acolytes of political science agree to ask the question of Bertrand de Jouvenal: “Political science stands alone in its lack of agreed elements.” There are no basic concepts simple enough to allow of only one meaning, therefore conveying exactly the same significance to all and confidently handled by everyone; there are no simple relations, acknowledged by all to form the smallest components of complex systems, and commonly used in the building of models devised to simulate the intricacies of real situations. Does such a deficiency pertain to the nature of this discipline?” The answer to the question must be in the affirmative.

Perhaps we might consider the famous political proposition of Lord Acton, “power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This proposition has all the appearance of being empirically verifiable, but what is interesting about it is, why ask the proposition to be forwarded? It was not to be forwarded for verification, but rather for the noumenal purpose of advancing an ideal derived from a normative conviction—the liberal view that “he governs best who governs least.” Hence it is not possible to posit and verify the wider laws of politics as one can verify the laws of the other purer sciences. To try might be to invite travail.

The constructor of a science of politics is therefore faced with a number of superhuman obstacles. He must firstly try to construct political laws and face the prospect that they will be disproved or their basis shown to be unverifiable assumptions—though we must accept that the natural scientist also faces these difficulties.

Machiavelli, for example, decided that “man’s nature, while actually good and bad, had to be treated for the purposes of politics as bad.” There is clearly a collision here
between Machiavelli's rationalism and his empiricism. However, the strict scientist might object on the grounds that Machiavelli thought the facts confirmed his a priori postulates, but he neither drew his postulates from the facts nor tested the facts which supposedly tested the postulates.

Hence, it follows, secondly, that the political scientist must forge new propositions and yet always assume as did Hobbes or Machiavelli something fundamental about human nature, or remember the assumptions of, say, Adam Smith, that there was a harmonious balance of nature which gave rise to economic man, or bear in mind, as did St. Thomas Aquinas, the rational and moral nature of man.

The core of our travail lies in the fact that the quantitative and qualitative elements of the subject form an imperfect mix. One can understand the scorn with which the notion of a political science is greeted by people both outside and inside the profession. Ignoring the external pressures, there are difficulties at home. Within the profession the behaviouralists, logical positivists and their fellow travellers have attempted to "reform" those of us they regard as woolly-minded, but still imagine that there can be a science without political laboratories.

The late Sir Ernest Barker once said that political science was a trilogy. "It is the theory of the State: but it is also a theory of morals and a theory of law. It contains two subjects which have since been removed from its scope and treated as separate spheres." Such generalisations would be unpopular today because Barker grew up, taught and died under the shadow of Victorian liberal values—as these were understood in the University of Cambridge, and not in the age of computerised politics.

What Barker called "political science" would no longer appeal to the tough, rigorous technicians in the camp of the behaviouralists and others. One of the fashions to which some of the political scientists have attached themselves is that of behaviouralism (to be distinguished from its American
counterpart, without the "u"—or not, according to taste). In origin, as associated with J. B. Watson, it is a psychological concept which was adopted "to help exorcise from scientific research all reference to such subjective data as purposes, intentions, desires or ideas."

Only those observations obtained through the use of the sense organs or mechanical equipment were to be admitted as data. Observable behaviour generated by external stimuli rather than information about the subjective state of mind of the person being observed, were to constitute the subject matter of research.

The original behaviouristic paradigm, S-R (stimulus-response), has yielded to the more intelligible one of S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) in which feelings, motivations and all the other aspects of the subjective awareness and reaction of the organism are taken into account as potentially useful data." One may ask what crimes are committed in the name of science—we hear talk about test instruments, survey methods, statistical analysis, experiments with small groups in social science laboratories, mathematical models."

I have heard that behaviour therapy has proved very useful in preventing enuresis (bed-wetting). We might, therefore, describe the behaviourist approach as political bed-wetting: when the voter hears the bell, he reacts appropriately, reaching for his Chamber of Deputies. The behaviourists constitute an impressive force in many North American universities and in one of these, to my certain knowledge, they almost brought a university to a standstill. It has not always been easy to understand them, though one may wish to sympathise with their objectives, but the extremists amongst them might be described as politically illiterate numerates.

We should not, however, write off the valuable contributions of sensible psychologists like Professor Eysenck whose work has been of considerable value. He has assisted us in jettisoning the old, tired, hackneyed clichés Left and Right, which, as a metaphor of political structure, obscures at least as much as it explains. The straight linear implications of
Left. Centre, Right are nonsense for a start, as everyone recognises, because the two extremes meet somewhere between the thoughts of Chairman Mao and those of Balthazar Johannes Vorster.

But there is another division which cuts horizontally through the whole spectrum of social and political attitudes. It was first pointed out, I understand, by the American philosopher, William James, who called the two ranges of attitude "tough-minded" and "tender-minded." and the terms were taken up in the fifties by Professor Eysenck. The very expressive Afrikaans words verkrampte and verligte express the notion very well. "Tender" left-wing attitudes are ones concerned primarily with increasing the power and the rewards of those with less; "tough" left-wing attitudes are chiefly interested in dispossessing those with more. Since the Second Vatican Council even the Vatican has its verkramptes and verligtes.

"Tender" right-wing attitudes express a genuine concern for the freedom of the individual to make what arrangements he can for himself in this world; the "tough" aspect of the Right is the acceptance of the elites which this creates, and of their right to preserve and prosper themselves at other people's expense. In Rhodesia attitudes on race may be divided into these categories, tough and tender.

There are thus two axes along which men's political position can be plotted--Right-Left and tough-tender. Professor Eysenck expressed this by locating them on a two-dimensional graph:

- tough-Left
- tender-Left
- tough-Right
- tender-Right

I can't remember whether Eysenck suggested it, but if we now bend the two-dimensional graph round to make a three-dimensional cylinder, we make a model which allows for the circularity of the political world noted above. Round the
back. Mao and Vorster will be found at the top of the cylinder, where tough-Left and tough-Right meet. Below them, where the extremes of tender-Left and tender-Right meet, is the point where unrestricted laissez-faire shades into anarchism. Here Mr. Enoch Powell meets his London dockers.

Now all we have to do is rebuild the House of Commons on this cylindrical pattern—a sort of Globe Theatre minus the stage, with the Speaker sitting in the middle of the pit and have candidates stand for election with a latitude and longitude after their names instead of a party label. But is this sensible or have we become a laughing stock?

It is not without some significance that the newer psychopolitical techniques have been developed in the United States of America, where institutional norms are much weaker than they are, say, in the case of Great Britain. The struggle to conceive of politics as a behaviourist and non-institutional study has been carried on with immense vigour in the U.S.A. They see politics consisting of a network of psychological actions and reactions, not to mention group analysis upon which de Tocqueville commented over a century ago.

In Britain, however, the case is different. The British have always struggled to fit and adapt themselves to their constitution—to harmonise and overcome all political malaise in an accommodation to the living constitution; in the U.S.A. political scientists try to solve their problems by a critical, sometimes hypercritical examination of themselves. Hence American political scientists seek new structures and/or functions as they try to explain political behaviour. When Americans study African politics the results bear out this contention.

In Britain, on the other hand, one will always have to consider that quaint amorphous utilitarian entity called the British Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong for the structural-functionalists to condemn traditional institutions per se, for, in the case of Britain, traditional institutions are still clearly of paramount importance. This may be the result of the
English "club" mentality (wherever three Englishmen meet they will form a club). Moreover, the English love institutions. They have, for example, the Boat Race, Promenade Concerts, the B.B.C., Harrods, Foyles, Crufts, the British Museum, the Old-Boy network, Tottenham Hotspur and the Elephant and Castle—not that it rests here, for there are institutions within institutions such as the State Opening of Parliament, and even institutions within institutions within institutions; the late Richard Dimbleby (himself an institution) once spoke of "loyal Big Ben." It is clear that the politics of mere behaviour has no chance in this context. Politics can never be in final travail in Britain as long as there is a Carlton Club, an Atheneum and a Transport House. In any case, the future of the House of Lords is assured as long as there are people willing to buy and to read and to believe in the Duke of Bedford's "Book of Snobs."

We have not yet exhausted the devices of the quantitative modernists. Let us therefore turn to international politics, where you will previously have heard about the intrigues of international diplomacy and the mysteries of the international underworld from Sir Neville Henderson to J. Bond, Esq., and all those brilliant diplomatic gatherings with beautiful, champagne-drinking women and unimaginably lavish Viennese-type glitter.

International politics is not like that today. Today we talk about Games Theory and Conflict Resolution, and we assess things like the probability of a World Order, using the most advanced mathematical techniques (it has been calculated, for example, that in the year 3750 A.D. the probability of a settled world is .99935).11 Hence we have removed the romantic officer of the Foreign Legion, armed only with a small revolver and untrammelled courage, just as we have removed Tommy Atkins and Jack Tarr. Our ships are no longer Hearts of Oak and our Flying Officers do not even have to fly an aircraft. Instead, we talk about a meteorology of War and Peace—a singularly un-Tolstoyian concept. We can plot the steps in a war build-up sequence to a large extent
because of the work of Dr. Louis Fry Richardson, an English physicist, psychologist and mathematician and Quaker, who constructed mathematical models of arms races.

The simplest model of Richardson's is described in Arms and Insecurity. In this model Richardson assumes that in a two nation arms race the change in defences of each nation depends upon three factors. The first factor concerns the "defences" of the other nation which, Richardson argues, do not appear as defences to the first nation. The greater the "defences" of the other nation, the greater the increase in defences of the first nation. Similarly, the greater the "defences" of the first nation, the greater the increase in defences of the other nation. For the other nation does not view the "defences" of the first nation as defences.

To summarise the mathematical argument verbally: if the arms race is viewed as being a closed system with an open component, where the closed system is the exponential system produced by a damping force and an elastic force, and the open system component is represented by a series of inputs to the closed system, as the intervals between consecutive external inputs to the closed system vary, the behaviour of the total system can be influenced out of proportion to the external force. Are you groping? I am.

Games Theory focused on diplomacy and war have been developed at MIT, Harvard, Columbia, North Western, Oklahoma, San Francisco State College and at the Army War College at Stanford. Games theorists therefore create states, call them actors and then play out the grisly preliminaries to international conflict--the Berlin Air Crisis of 1948-49 being a favourite. The simulation of war build-up to assess the points of potential conflict and their possible defusing has now reached a state of high development. In a series of control runs at North Western in the summer of 1960, an attempt was made to discover what happens when nuclear weapons are used freely and loosely by all and sundry. In short, can the bomb go off by accident?
It is easy to criticise these developments on the frontier fringes of political science. Thus, for example, we might say these are only games and not the duplication of reality, but only its simulation. for simulators are only copy-cats and not participants. Moreover, a copy-cat calculus cannot tell us why the actors are not rational. The modern political strategists can, however, argue back when told that the armchair strategist is equally useless as the laboratory strategist. It has indeed been proved in a laboratory that the less-trustworthy, one-nation team is in the eyes of the others in a given system, the more likely negotiation is bilateral rather than multilateral. Would the armchair strategists know this fact? Thus proceeds apace the study of conflict process, credibility measurements, sum-zero games and conflict resolution.

There are yet two further groups who have bombarded political science with their own particular contributions, the sociologists and the philosophers. While we have much to thank the sociologists for, in understanding modern political science, they have, in some respects, been an unhappy influence because they have taken the eyes of the student of political science away from 'politics' into 'society.' Of course, any student of elections must inevitably assess factors such as class, education, sex, age, religion, trade union membership, rural and urban living and family traditions. But the election studies today are so undramatic that they have removed the early, bright-eyed innocence, the decisive simplicity, the joy of victory and the sorrow of defeat - the "poetry," "hwyl" - to use the word of the late Aneurin Bevan, from elections.

Moreover, those of us brought up in the tradition of the great political philosophers and the natural law school are sad to see our subject reduced to a number of sociological propositions which we are asked to verify in the field of the insignificant. We have been introduced to Talcott Parsons, but we suspect that he has "written as if society was a play with a definite script." He is the high priest of what Professor Mackenzie calls over-arching theory. This simply
means that he is a systems-builder, but about this there is nothing very new. We may be forgiven if some of us prefer the craftsmanship of Thomas Aquinas to Talcott Parsons in this respect.

Sociology (here used deliberately and not as a solemn rhetorical substitute for "social") was first utilised in the capacity of handmaid of political science by Aristotle, who sketched the growth of the polis from its social beginnings until its final teleological flowering in political life. Zoon politikon - man, said Aristotle, is a political animal. Generations of political philosophers, particularly the contractualists, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were aware that the social state, commonly called the state of nature, was something from which one should remove oneself as quickly as possible. Citizenship was frequently seen as the superior condition to the social state. The category "citizen" was a superior category to the category "man": Zoon politikon. Man, as Leo Strauss interpreting Aristotle tells us, is the only being that can be concerned with self-respect: man can respect himself because he can despise himself; he is "the beast with red cheeks." the only being possessing a sense of shame. There is a dignity of the public order: the political is sui generis and cannot be understood as a derivative from the sub-political. Zoon politikon.

These lesser sociologists who insist on a rigid interpretation of the political life in terms of society are missing the point. Political life is autonomous. The relationship between politics, the individual and society is reciprocal as well as complex. Thus the ex-colonial territories were "given" a political system "from above," in spite of their vast social differences. On the other hand, why has the "Westminster" model not appeared in Germany, which has had a broadly similar pattern of economic development to Britain since the last part of the last century?

A major objective of a sociology of politics lies in the defining of the circumstances and the extent to which politics
of a country is influenced by general social conditions. The
great danger which many of the greatest political sociologists
of the past have avoided (amongst whom Montesquieu and
de Tocqueville may be mentioned) is the over-simple reduction
of politics to social structure. Not “class,” not “religion,”
not “income,” not “family” — none of these can adequately
explain the political life.

Conversely, in rejecting the over-simple reduction of poli­
tics to social structure one should be cautious about the
opposite fallacy — the “aristocratic” belief that general con­
ditions of society do not influence individual behaviour and
that individuals are free to choose freely, rationally and all
the time, without reference to their working class origins or
their bourgeois aspirations.

Without much of a struggle many of our professional col­
leagues have fallen too easily into the traps which the best
of the discerning sociologists have avoided themselves. The
political sociologist’s antiseptic prose, sociologese, has been
borrowed, with all its unfortunate results. We are currently
being constrained to speak of “normativeness,” “political
factionalism” (or perhaps more happily because of its Greek
derivation —stasisology- to refer to political disagreement),
“socialisation,” “interest articulation and aggregation” and
a host of others.

Yet more serious is the insistence on statistical, quantita­
tive answers to admittedly less exact but politically relevant
questions. One wonders whether we can fairly accept this
development, for, as one American writer, Morton Grodzin,
has said, “The scientist who defines his technique first and
his problem second has placed second things first.” Political
sociology has overall been of immense value in helping us
to understand many of the mechanical processes of politics,
and most of these students today are busy gathering facts in
a brave attempt to help or understand how “it all ticks.”

In his analysis of British political parties Professor R. T.
Mackenzie has restricted himself almost entirely to describing
the mechanics of the dominant political parties inside and outside parliament. He concludes that the chief function of the system is to produce two competing political elites between whom there is nothing to choose in the end. Having arrived at this conclusion 700 pages later, he set out to make all subsequent political developments fit his conclusions. On the other hand, Professor Samuel Beer thinks that ideas do count and that there is a specifically Conservative as well as Labour way of doing things. He will not agree that party politics is a soulless mechanical affair and he argues that much remains inexplicable, but in this way he throws us back into travail. We are just fundamentally ignorant about a great deal which we thought we could measure. Thus, Professor Mackenzie's psephotogical colleague, Dr. Butler of Nuffield College, Oxford, indicated, in tones of quiet resignation, that "No one, in the political game or out of it, really understands what moves voters."

One young sociologist has asserted that political sociology has come to be a study of the "ways in which social structures set the limits of political action." I regard this as a dangerous, deterministic heresy, a form of modern predestinarianism, the annihilation of free will. Free will in politics is preferable to gloomy prediction. Political science was never, as economics was reputed to be, a dismal science.

Modern trends in philosophy have not given much comfort to the student of politics, and hence philosophy too has promoted our travail. The pivotal assertion of the logical positivists and their successors was the verification principle. Everything was to be verified, with the possible exception of the principle itself, and every proposition was to be tested for its falsifiability. The aim of the linguistic philosophers, too, is not to see if a hypothesis is true, but to see if it is false. Hence, falsifiability not verifiability is the criterion of the scientific status of a theory.15 "The ideas of the logical positivists, namely, that metaphysical statements were nonsensical and that a priori propositions were tautologies, were
immediately derived from Wittgenstein and Carnap, but they could easily be traced back to Hume."

The sum total of this activity seems to indicate that philosophers in this century have not been averse in trying to destroy philosophy in so far as they will not discuss those things which one might have expected them to discuss. Hence, while we have had the anti-hero in the Theatre of the Absurd, we have also had the anti-philosopher—one who could say, "what can be said at all can be said clearly (which I accept), and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence (which I do not)." Not a word may be heard about "rights," "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," "natural law" or "tyranny." The classical liberal who espouses modern philosophical techniques is in travail indeed.

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical, so we are told; philosophy is supposed to be an activity rather than a body of doctrines, and the purpose of philosophy is seen as to ferret out and expose nonsense. A philosopher must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up.

Hence we may not speak of any notion of political philosophy, say the philosophers, but only of political science, in the narrowest sense, by which is presumably meant that we may adduce propositions about the efficiency of the civil service, of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Republic. Wittgenstein wished to take philosophy out of the university (in much the same way in which many people wish to take politics out of things), arguing that academic duties were boring as well as morally bad. The philosopher could never be an effective don. To teach philosophy was not to philosophise. A philosopher who teaches is a teacher, no philosopher.

One can understand, if one cannot approve of, this view, for in the case of politics to teach politics is not to be a politician. It would appear that in spite of the anti-philosophers, people still do act as if the old issues were important.
and they still do have attitudes and political convictions. A. J. Ayer himself once wrote to me explaining why he could not lecture in South Africa, but it was the nineteenth century liberal who spoke, not the twentieth century Oxford philosopher.

We have had little for our comfort from the existentialists either, because they too appear to speak several languages at once. Sartre presents us with a man for whom futility is the object of existence, but whose thinking at times resembles, it has been said, that of a nervous breakdown. The admission that “each one of our acts sets in motion whatever gives meaning to the world and decides the place of man in the universe,” unaccompanied apparently by any sense of the need to combine such acts (or perhaps of the possibility of combining them) in order to give them social as well as individual meaning, surely argued a moral defeatism of which “neutralism” was merely one facet. “Existence,” says Sartre, “is reasonless, causeless and unnecessary. We are born for no reason, go on living because we are weak, and our death is decided by chance.”

On the other hand, Sartre can become immersed in his own version of Marxism, sometimes strangely mixed up with his own version of French revolutionary thought. His political move towards Communism he described as an old-time political conversion. He said that, “En langage d’église, ce fut une conversion. . . . Au nom des principes qu’elle m’avait inculqués, au nom de son humanisme et de ses ‘humanités,’ au nom de la liberté, de l’égalité, de la fraternité, je vouai à la bourgeoisie une haine qui ne finira qu’avec moi.”

Political thought and action is under attack from all sides, and from the “outside” we are subjected to the vulgar clamour of the politically illiterate who see us as a subversive element. From the “outside,” too, we are told that we perpetrate a fraud in advancing ourselves as political scientists. From the “inside” the political scientist is pressurised by fashionable new schools. Yet I would suggest that of all our sister subjects we rely most on economics and on history. In return we
offer economists, (a better term is political economist), contact with the realities of power, and to historians we offer the words of a great historian, Lord Acton, that political science is as “the grains of gold left behind in the river of history.”

There is little obvious one can do to avoid the easy equation of free-ranging thought with danger for authority (linked in this part of the world with subversion), which is unfair and unfortunate. I had better therefore explain what I see political activity to be. Political activity is not intrinsically distinguishable from other types of human activity. What political activity refers to is an arena of activity rather than a type of activity. Thus, an issue may be thrown up—whether about tariffs, education or the price of soap. The issue may be economic, social or a mixture of these and/or others. The mobilisation of opinion, the taking of sides over an issue, will soon compel recourse to weapons which will further the cause of the various protagonists. In short, means will be sought which give effect to power. “to produce a victory for one or other side.” At that moment in the progression it is possible to speak of something being “political,” which means that we are in the sphere of questions of power, of ultimates, of final decisions, which fall short of force or of the military. All issues are thus potentially in politics. Zoon politikon.

Politics is mostly about power. It indicates the last stage in a dialogue which yet precedes the use of force. We are students, therefore, of power, of that area in human life in which it is necessary to take decisions. Politicians and political scientists ask the question who gets what, when.

Political scientists students of political activity try to understand the science, in so far as there is one, of power. Politicians, the practitioners of political activity, try to gain power, such is the nature of their activity. We study, they do. Sometimes we study what they do, but we might very well be studying only one aspect of the arena of power. In this sense perhaps the most perceptive work on political science ever written was Machiavelli’s Prince, which tried to
present the would-be ruler with a formula for the successful acquisition and maintenance of power. Some writers feel that politics is more than being just about power. They may be right, but forget that fact and all other facts are not worth remembering.

In a recent biography of Lloyd George it was stated that what he wanted was power, and after that power, and after that power, and after that power. But one might just as well apply this to a successful business man, financier or even university vice-chancellor. Power is not the alpha and omega of politics, but it is more than half the story. The story of power is the story of politics and nobody can take this away from us—nor the pure scientists, not the lawyers, economists, historians. The story is told of the late R. H. Tawney, who sent a very young and keen research student to produce a bibliography on the idea of power. The list submitted was very comprehensive, but Tawney was horrified to see a section on hydro-electric power.

We alone possess this area for investigation, and we are in travail because some of our number do not realise it and some outsiders do not understand it. We stand apart in this respect from all the other social sciences. But what is this power? Is it ever attainable, tangible or even comprehensible, save in some mystic way? Is it “a windswept plateau attained by only a few men, and then only at the expense of others, a place where community status and power are concentrated?” Some describe the notion that power can be grabbed, as it were, in handfuls, as the “lump of power” fallacy, and have criticised the conception on the ground that power should not be conceived of as a “thing,” limited in amount and located by definition in any particular place in the social structure. I can only reply that most people will act as if the “lump of power” idea were a fact. Hobbes put this very clearly—in Chapter V of the *Leviathan*.

Others, however, are more concerned with “instant” power, such as Mao, who asserted that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Yet whether power is seen as a permanent
or transitory thing, it certainly merits close and prolonged study. Consider, for example, the case of West Africa.  

Professor W. A. Lewis said, "Philosophers like to see politics as a struggle between great principles, such as egalitarianism or nationalism, or religion, or empire, but in most of the world today, and throughout history, politics has been nothing but a personal struggle for power between men who lust for power to use for their own purposes. That there are political bosses in West Africa is no more surprising than that there are political bosses in New York, or Glasgow, or Calcutta, or Bangkok. Neither is it unusual that men who profess such high ideals should at the same time be capable of much cruelty and corruption. It is normal for the power-hungry to hide behind the cloak of some great principle, such as religion, or nationalism, or socialism."

"No politician will admit that he suppresses his political opponents primarily because he wants to stay in power; he will more usually say that their policies or their tactics endanger the country. Yet throughout history a personal love of power has been the prime motive of politicians, but not only them; interest in policy has been so minor that it is quite common to suppress an opponent today and adopt his policy tomorrow. Modern democracy, with mass parties tolerating each other's opposition, is a very recent phenomenon in the world's history, so recent that it would perhaps be more surprising if West African politicians had decided to work this system than that they should have decided against it."

How then do we study power, the substance of politics? We must firstly study theory. The oldest study with which we are concerned is the history of political thought. Twenty-five centuries ago Plato and Aristotle sketched the outline of the subject, introduced us to the seminal questions of politics and told us how to think politically.

Today, however, the subject falls into three main sections. The oldest, as an academic discipline, is the history of political thought. Generations of students have studied what Plato.
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham and Marx had to say about the State. Sometimes this course is jocularly called the study of political ideas from Plato to NATO. There are occasions at the higher levels, i.e., honours and post-graduate levels, where students are asked what is their political philosophy, and they might be asked questions like, "Why must I obey the government?" rather than, "What did Rousseau say about government?" Broadly speaking, there are two main methods of classification. One can study the philosophers in chronological sequence or one can study concepts like political obligation, seeing what each particular philosopher added to the concept. Both of these approaches has its own validity, but for me the most fascinating and, frequently, frustrating problem lies in the mapping out of the boundaries of a concept, for example, "Where does liberty end and equality begin?"

A second topic is the study of the machinery of government, either in a single country or comparatively. Most people would expect a political scientist to know how the United States Constitution works or of the politics of developing countries in Africa and Asia as well as more obvious understandings of the machinery of government in, say, France or Germany. Comparative government is perhaps the most interesting of all forms of political science because methods of approach in one country frequently throw a light on the methods in another. Many of our number become befogged in questions of method, trying to understand the grand framework into which all species of political life can be fitted. Thus we have recently been asked to approach political systems with an input/output analysis which is of limited value, but even to make this remark is an approach to methodology.

What is certain, however, is that political scientists are moving away from the idea that political science is only very recent history—what some people call "instant history." In fact, many British departments of Political Science contain people who are really historians and nothing else. (We
must remember Joyce’s cry, “History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.”) In fact, our techniques of measurement are becoming sharper as time goes by.

These points also apply to the study of international relations, which is itself becoming a minor industry both inside and outside the Foreign Office, the State Department and the Quai d’Orsay. It must be remembered, in fact, that Rhodesia is somebody’s “international relation.”

The third, and newest, section of the subject is political behaviour, which suggests the conduct of the electorate, the effect of social structures on politics and, more narrowly, elections. I have already indicated that some modern writers concentrate exclusively on political behaviour, many of them because they see this as a way to make politics a science and hence to exclude the subjective elements.

Political science contains two elements in its very name. The first one, “politics,” might be described as a “boo” word—that is to say, many unthinking people regard it as something unpleasant. On the other hand, the second element, “science,” may be seen as a “hurrah” word—that is to say, when we hear it we may feel obliged to cheer, particularly because science is “respectable” and politics is not. To anyone involved in the teaching of politics, one fact should be sacrosanct. He must not use his platform as a means of putting over one point of view. Hence one ought to have no fear that a lecturer would give a pernicious twist to his lectures, using Mill or Marx, simply because he was a Conservative or a Socialist respectively. He may very well come to the conclusion that either Mill or Marx (but hardly conceivably both) had discovered the secret of life, but he would be betraying his calling were he to be an instrument of indoctrination of any point of view.

Of course, a political scientist may decide that a particular point of view is unacceptable to him personally, but it is his duty to conceal his party loyalties. Clearly there are dangers in this, and political science could go the way of economics too frequently concerned with respectable abstractions. What
this means is that any economist has licence to begin every lecture by saying, "I leave all this to the government to decide: I simply give the advice without concerning myself as to the ethical implications." Of course, the professor of political science should be alive to events, and it would be inconceivable to imagine one who was totally uninterested to discover who had won the general election. The whole object of his activities is to train students to analyse and to think, to be concerned with his subject.

Each person concerned with our subject will find himself torn, as was Plato, between the desire to embrace the world of action as well as the world of thought. We are often tempted to apply our thoughts to the present situation to see whether or not our researches could be of value. Sometimes a research problem will thrust itself in front of one. Thus, for example, I discovered the most fascinating thing about South African politics was the influence of certain pressure groups upon government policy and I felt obliged, for I was a political philosopher by inclination, to become an amateur political sociologist in order to understand the functions of these groups, like the Dutch Reformed Church, upon South African political structure. Again, about 15 years previously I found myself forced to enquire as to the actual conceptual meaning of the famous trilogy, "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité." This involved me in a seven-year search into the pamphlets circulating at the time of the French Revolution, on which are 47,000 books of tracts available for reading in the British Museum alone, not to mention the Bibliotheque Nationale. The research fields are limitless.

Further to this justification one is obliged to set out what one thinks the raw material of political science actually is. It contains three basic elements—men, words and ideas—and in order to rescue political science both from its enemies and from its so-called friends—in other words, to remove it from its present state of travail, we recall these three basic themes.
Considering the first element, men, we might remember what was said by Lord Melbourne, a consummate, political animal. “Politics meant to me first of all personalities, and secondly, general principles.” We know all the chatter about charismatic politics, but this concept is no substitute for the painstaking evaluation of personalities. After all, it was the cult of personality which inspired the vituperative utterances of Khrushchev against Stalin in the famous secret speech of 1956.

Even at the vulgar level (I Hate Harold) the interest in people as people still remains a fundamental element, and without the evaluation of persons politics would be a very dead business. In this case we may consider a leading article in the Times of 30th March, 1968, which set up a four-sided personality comparison in which were featured Wilson and Jenkins as the modern version of Asquith and Lloyd George. “Lloyd George like Mr. Wilson was a wholly political politician. He was devious, he was an intriguer, he was persuasive, he was ruthless. As an orator he was considerably Mr. Wilson’s superior, but, like Mr. Wilson, he rested his support on the radical section of his party while pursuing in office politics which veered steadily to the right. The parallel between Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Asquith is at least equally remarkable. Mr. Jenkins seems to have found a sufficient sympathy with Asquith to have chosen to be his biographer. Like Asquith, he is a politician of judicious temperament; his decisiveness is the result of a strictly controlled intellectual process rather like that of a court of law. He depends on the support of the reformist rather than the radical element of the party. Like Asquith, he enjoys society as a contrast to work. Like Asquith, he is a conspicuous example of the Balliol intellectual in politics.” It was said to me by an old, canny, government official that policy files die quickly, but personality files never. It is not the policy which is pelted with rotten eggs and dead cats on the hustings; it is a rotten and moribund personality.
It was Hobbes who said, "... for words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools." Nevertheless, we must be foolish or wise according to taste and employ words in the ordinary language of political discourse. Words, however, are like empty bottles, but inside the liquid may vary. Thus we still tend to employ words the Greeks used like democracy, aristocracy, but we have discovered the limitations of using these words because they are frequently used as a weapon of war. The word democracy, to give but one example, is very much a word used in the armoury of political warfare. The Americans have spoken of their own system as the "world's leading democracy," but on the other hand the Chinese use the term democracy indicating that they have found the real thing. The term is sometimes offered for sale to bystanders as if it were some form of magic patent medicine which they might but drink in order to see the truth. In the same category is the word republic which, in its original Latin, was res publica (common weal), but today seems to be nothing more or less than a condition where a monarchy is excluded, and in France in particular one could trace the cult of the republic as a national cause.

We are forced to use the chipped and debased currency of language, to employ words like "liberty," "freedom," "rule of law," as if these still had some intrinsic meaning. "Few ideas are correct ones," wrote Disraeli, "and what are correct no man can say; but with words we govern men." We are all perhaps becoming inhibited, because our vocabulary is so threadbare. We observe the growth everywhere of euphemisms; words are used to give the impression that things are other than what they seem. Words become banners behind which march companies of the faithful. In a matter of weeks the word "parity" became either a rallying cry or a term of abuse, according to taste, in Rhodesia. Sartre was aware of the imprecise, incorrect or misleading use of words when he said, "While one speaks in one's own language, one writes in a foreign language."
Words become sacred cows; they become in themselves enemy fortresses to be taken, citadels to be defended and the insignia of venerable tradition. You can “defend a system,” “create a revolution” and “develop a State” as the Communists have very well shown, only if the correct words are used. There pours out from the Communist world a torrent of words which must be used in the correct sequence—“revisionism,” “anti-party line,” “socialist realism,” “mass participation,” “democratic centralism” and a host of others. But the West is not free from this disease either, and any glance at a typical first-year political science textbook on American government will illustrate that many of the claims about liberty, democracy are not always meaningful. The words of Dr. Johnson are always worth recalling. “Clear your minds of cant. You may say to a man, ‘I am your humble, obedient servant.’ You are not his obedient servant. You say, ‘These are dreadful times; it is a melancholy thing to be reserved to such times.’ You don’t really mind the times. When a butcher says that his heart bleeds for his country he has, in fact, no uneasy feeling.”

It is with ideas, however, that we are mainly concerned. Every political system throws up its own ideology (which is itself an interesting example of a word which has been devalued, for it was invented in the 1790’s by Destutt de Tracy and quickly became a “boo” word). This is not to suggest that ideas are the product only of a given system. In fact, ideas had developed something of a life of their own. not perhaps as Plato would have imagined, but rather more a form of existence which at times pulls away from the anchor of reality. Ideas do matter, as any student of the subject will affirm, and any good department of political science must burgeon with ideas otherwise its travail is grave.

In the end, then, two courses of research emerge for the serious student of political science—the study of political phenomena and the study of political claims. Political phenomena here analysed relate to the push-pull of swarms of competing interest groups (farmers, teachers, industrialists.
shopkeepers, divines), all seeking to influence public policy in their direction, and with interlocking party structures above them. They present us with a condition which might be described as the pathology of politics. The very weight of these phenomena form a study in themselves of enormous significance, not only to the student of the social sciences, but also to the active politician.

As for the study of political claims, we are here faced with the problem of philosophical justifications, which is at the heart of the political dilemma. Claims are made in any given political situation for the rightness of any given course of action. A study of slogans, clichés, of political tag-words (in themselves a form of distillation of political discourse of a higher degree) serves to reveal how, so very often, action is justified IN THE NAME OF some superior ethic for actions which are intrinsically sub-ethical.

The political philosophy of claims is an area of study of immense significance to the political scientist as he patiently dissects the words, ideas, truths, half-truths and even lies of the claimant. The moulding of words to fit the situation, to justify the situation, to make a claim, this is the plastic material of the political scientist. Above its worst enemies the banner of liberty may be raised and the justification for an action may be found. The claim may be “no taxation without representation,” or “rugged individualism,” a view that one man in France, or a plea based on the presumed “natural rights” of man, or an assertion that one is protecting “civilisation” or even “Christian civilisation” when one may, in fact, be doing no such thing.

“Reason,” said David Hume, “is and ought to be the slave of passions.” This may not be the entire truth, but reason is clearly clouded by the passions. The justifier attempts to act first and justify second. As we try to peel away the layers of rhetoric, to discover the truth which lies beneath the ideology, we succeed in alienating the grandiose, the “claimants” who misuse political argument. It is a prospect replete
with travail. Responsibly, however, the work will continue breaking down the claims and the justifications. We must therefore apply ourselves to organise our knowledge of and then evaluate such things as legal systems, property arrangements, ancient and irrational tradition, not to mention a whole portmanteau of sacred cows associated with the various constitutions of the modern world. Political science can proceed, in fact, only by way of the “arid monographs which can provide each separate statement with its whole apparatus of proof and ancillary hypotheses—in short, with concrete verifiability.”

Undeterred, we set ourselves to solve our problems. Let us remember Marshal Foch: “Mon centre recule; ma droite est en retraite. Situation excellente. J’attaque!”


6. Psephology is a term reputed to have been invented by Dr. David Butler, Nuffield College, Oxford, and refers to the study of voting habits; it is derived from the Greek word *psepho*, meaning a pebble. Votes were cast by dropping pebbles in a receptable. Some very useful psephological studies are *inter alia* R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, *Straight Fight*, Hansard, 1955, and *Marginal Seat*, Hansard, 1958.


*Some attempt has been made to check the political origins of nursery rhymes, but materials are lacking in sanctions-bound Rhodesia, 1968. It is hoped, however, that the general point will be taken.*