

VOLUME SIX NUMBER FOUR

SPRING 1989

INDICATOR

S O U T H A F R I C A

Centre of Applied
Social Sciences

POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

THE "FW" FACTOR

MDM ON THE MARCH



POLICING THE POLICE

NEGOTIATION ALLIANCES IN THE 1990s




University of Natal

THE BAROMETER OF SOCIAL TRENDS

DONOR

M E M B E R S

AECI Ltd • Africa Inst of SA • African Cables • African Oxygen Ltd • Allied Technologies Ltd • Andrew Levy & Assocs (Pty) Ltd • Anglo American & De Beers Chairman's Fund Education Trust • Anglovaal Ltd • Anikem (Pty) Ltd • Anna Starcke Assocs • Barlow Rand Ltd • Beacon Sweets & Chocolates • BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd • Carlton Paper of SA (Pty) Ltd • Chamber of Mines of SA • Checkers SA Ltd • Colgate-Palmolive (Pty) Ltd • Consolidated Textiles Ltd • Crown Cork SA (Pty) Ltd • Development Bank of Southern Africa • Durban Chamber of Commerce • Durban City Council • Durban City Council - Personnel Services • EMSA • ESCOM • Everite Ltd • Federated Life Assurance Co • First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd • General Mining Corp Ltd • Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd • Gillette SA Ltd • PG Glass Holdings (Pty) Ltd • Gold Fields Foundation • Henred-Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd • IBM SA Projects Fund • Impala Platinum Ltd • Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd • Johnson & Johnson • SC Johnson & Son • Kangra Holdings (Pty) Ltd • Kellogg Co of SA (Pty) Ltd • Kluk Textile Industries • KwaZulu Finance & Investment Corp • Liberty Life • Malbak Ltd • Mercedes-Benz of SA (Pty) Ltd • Metal Box SA Ltd • Metropolitan Life Ltd • Mobil Oil Corp • Mobil Oil Foundation of SA • The Natal Witness (Pty) Ltd • NCR Corporation of SA Ltd • Netherlands Embassy • Old Mutual • Perm Centenary Trust • Premier Group • Rand Merchant Bank • Richards Bay Minerals • Rio Tinto Management Services SA (Pty) Ltd • Robertsons (Pty) Ltd • SA Clothing Industries Ltd • Safcon Investments Ltd • SA Foundation • Sanlam • SAPPI • SA Sugar Ass • SA Tioxide (Pty) Ltd • SEIFSA • Smith Kline & French Laboratories • South African Breweries Ltd • Southern Life • Standard Bank Investment Corp Ltd • Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Ltd • Suterush Limited • Sun International Ltd • TEK Corporation • The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd • The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd • The Urban Foundation • Toyota Marketing Co (Pty) Ltd • Unilever SA (Pty) Ltd • UNISA • USSALEP • Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd • PG Wood Industries • Wooltru Ltd



**”We are committed
to democratic principles,
individual freedom
and a socially
responsible
free enterprise economy.”**

An extract from
AECI "TOWARDS 2002"

Sustained growth through diversification



The INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA Quarterly Report and the INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA Issue Focus series are published by the Centre for Social and Development Studies, based at the University of Natal, Durban. Opinions expressed in these publications are not necessarily those of the Editorial Committee and should not be taken to represent the policies of companies or organisations which are donor members of the Indicator Project South Africa

© Copyright for all material herein is held by INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA or individual authors, except in the case of short extracts for review or comment, which must be fully credited.

© Sole copyright for all data bases rests with INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA. Permission to republish or reproduce any part of this publication must be obtained from the publisher.

Editor/Publication Manager *Graham Howe*

Liaison/IR Research *Myrna Berkowitz*

Production/Design *Robert Evans*

Secretary *Dorothy Smith*

Editorial Committee

Simon Bekker, Myrna Berkowitz, Robert Evans, Graham Howe, Mike McGrath,
Valerie Moller and Lawrence Schlemmer

MONITOR COVER PORTRAITS *Sue Williamson*

MAIN COVER PICTURES *W Parker (MDM March)/E Miller (FW de Klerk) of Afrapix*

• COVER DESIGNS *Graphics* • COVER REPRO *Hirt & Carter (Natal)* • REPRO & PRINTING *Creda (Natal)*

ISSN 0259-188x

We would like to thank Futurewave Technology (Pty) Ltd for donating the Ventura desktop publishing programme used in the design of this publication.

PRESS REVIEWS OF INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA, 1984-1989

'The first comprehensive documentation of the anti-apartheid opposition and the state's responses ... their (Indicator SA) studies indicate invaluable aids towards ending the cycle of violence.' *Sunday Tribune*, December 1988.

'A special ten point strategy, which includes possible selective participation in the system, is spelt out in a special publication of the authoritative Indicator SA.' *The Star*, March 1989.

'Indicator SA has achieved an enviable reputation for skilled, in-depth research ... its impartiality and accuracy are acknowledged. Indicator occupies a unique position in the information supply in our rapidly-changing society.' *The Natal Mercury*, July 1988.

'Indicator SA stands by the quality of editorial analysis and in-depth data it provides of current socio-economic trends ... such independent coverage has become essential for the serious business reader in contemporary South Africa.' *Finance Week*, July 1988.

'The Indicator Project has again confirmed its ability to tackle major problems of the country, presenting the full scope of opinion.' *The Daily News*, October 1987.

'The government cannot argue with facts and Indicator SA has a habit of producing disturbing statistics.' *The Natal Mercury*, May 1987.

'Indicator SA, an authoritative academic journal that attempts to come to terms with the facts behind what are otherwise emotive political issues.' *Business Day*, January 1987.

'Indicator SA, that most valuable barometer of social trends.' *Sunday Times*, September 1986.

'That absolutely indispensable publication ... We need better research, the kind of research published inter alia in Indicator SA.' *Cape Times*, August 1984.

VOL.6

NO 4

S P R I N G

1 9 8 9

POLITICAL MONITOR

POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

De Klerk's Five Options: A Mandate for Change	<i>Lawrence Schlemmer</i>	9
Negotiation Alliances in the New White House	<i>Willie Breytenbach</i>	14
The Swinging Vote: CP Slip on the FW Factor	<i>Richard Humphries</i>	17
Breakdown of votes by party, province and region	<i>Data Base</i>	18/19
Parliament in the Promised Land: The CP and the Ultra-Right	<i>Janis Grobbelaar</i>	21

REGIONAL MONITOR

POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

Divided Delegates in the Hung House	<i>Yusuf Bhamjee</i>	27
House of Delegates Poll 1989	<i>Data Base</i>	28
The House of Hard Labour: Counting the Non-Vote 1984-1989	<i>Robert Cameron</i>	30

ECONOMIC MONITOR

CARNEGIE DEBATE

Sharing the State Pantry	<i>Francis Wilson</i>	35
Comparative government revenue and social expenditure	<i>Data Base</i>	36/37
Can Populism Uproot Poverty?	<i>Charles Simkins</i>	39
Economic Outlook	<i>Mike McGrath & Merle Holden</i>	43

URBAN MONITOR

POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

The Defiance Campaign: Protest Politics on the March	<i>Yunus Carrim</i>	49
The SAP & the State: First Line of Defence	<i>Andrew Prior</i>	53
Policing Popular Protest: Iron Fist vs Velvet Glove	<i>Three Case Studies</i>	55/57
Segregated Schooling: Changing White Attitudes	<i>Monica Bot & Lawrence Schlemmer</i>	58

INDUSTRIAL MONITOR

POLICY REVIEWS

Sharing the Company: Co-determination in the 1990s	<i>Hermann Giliomee</i>	63
White Worker Disaffection with Wiehahn	<i>Attitude Survey</i>	66
Chartering a Course: Cosatu, the MDM & Saccola	<i>Simon Segal</i>	68

NOTE: Copy for the rural (development) monitor has been held over to accommodate regional post-election coverage. The Rural & Regional Monitor will appear in its usual form in the following edition of Indicator SA, Vol7/No1.


BARLOW RAND CIRCUIT BREAKER INDUSTRIES BARLOW RAND BARLOW MOTOR HOLDINGS BARLOW RAND M B BLOW MOLDING
 ADCOCK-INGRAM BARLOW RAND NAMPAK BARLOW RAND BLAIKIE-JOHNSTONE BARLOW RAND DOUGLAS COLLIERY BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND DURBAN ROODEPOORT DEEP BARLOW RAND HARMONY GOLD MINING CO BARLOW RAND PERSEUS
 THE COLD CHAIN BARLOW RAND C G SMITH SUGAR BARLOW RAND PETERS PAPERS BARLOW RAND GOLDEN LAY FARMS BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND RAND MINES BARLOW RAND REUNERT BARLOW RAND C G SMITH FOODS BARLOW RAND PERSEUS COMPUTER SYSTEMS
 TIGER FOODS BARLOW RAND RAND MINES PROPERTIES BARLOW RAND GEC SOUTH AFRICA BARLOW RAND ATC BARLOW RAND
 MEADOW FEEDS BARLOW RAND NATIONAL PANASONIC BARLOW RAND BLUE CONTINENT BARLOW RAND E J ADCOCK
 JUNGLE OATS BARLOW RAND ROTOFLEX BARLOW RAND MONOWELD GALVANISERS BARLOW RAND ERPM BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND HYPACK BARLOW RAND NAMPAK PAPER BARLOW RAND KING FOOD BARLOW RAND TELKOM
 BARAIR BARLOW RAND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS MANUFACTURING BARLOW RAND RCP GROUP BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND DELTA SOFT BARLOW RAND SA OIL MILLS BARLOW RAND RHODIUM REEFS BARLOW RAND POLYCO
 SPICERS BARLOW RAND METAL BOX SA BARLOW RAND NATAL CANE BY-PRODUCTS BARLOW RAND BARLAN FORMS BARLOW RAND
 RAND WITBANK COLLIERY BARLOW RAND REUNERT TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS BARLOW RAND MIDDELBURG STEEL & ALLOYS
 BARLOW RAND FEDERATED TIMBERS BARLOW RAND WELGEDACHT EXPLORATION BARLOW RAND DELMAS MILLING BARLOW RAND
 ROBOR INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS BARLOW RAND IMPERIAL COLD STORAGE BARLOW RAND LEFKO BARLOW RAND BARLOW HANDLING
 BARLOW RAND SAPHAR-MED BARLOW RAND ELECTROCOL BARLOW RAND NASHUA BARLOW RAND RADIM
 BARLOW RAND COMPUTER SERVICES BARLOW RAND PPC LIME BARLOW RAND TIGER BAKERIES BARLOW RAND THOS BEGBIE & CO
 BARLOW RAND BARTONS BARLOW RAND FEDERATED-BLAIKIE BARLOW RAND RADUE WEIR BARLOW RAND UNIPLY BARLOW RAND
 BROLLO AFRICA BARLOW RAND G E HUDSON BARLOW RAND THESEN & CO BARLOW RAND ISM BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND BARLOW'S TRACTOR CO BARLOW RAND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION BARLOW RAND ROBOR BARLOW RAND
 SMITHCHEM BARLOW RAND METAL BOX GLASS BARLOW RAND BARPLATS BARLOW RAND VELDSPUN BARLOW RAND
 RAND BERG RIVER TEXTILES BARLOW RAND HEXTEX BARLOW RAND BARLOW RAND PROPERTIES BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND S WAINSTEIN BARLOW RAND DAIRYMAID BARLOW RAND AEROLAK BARLOW RAND COUNTY FAIR FOODS
 BDM SECURITY CARDS BARLOW RAND PRINTPAK BARLOW RAND SABAX BARLOW RAND RENOWN BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND JIFFY MANUFACTURING BARLOW RAND OCEANA FISHING BARLOW RAND BLYVOORUITZICHT GOLD MINING CO
 LANGEBERG FOODS BARLOW RAND W G BROWN INVESTMENTS BARLOW RAND RAND REGISTRARS BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND FATTI'S AND MONI'S BARLOW RAND PRETORIA PORTLAND CEMENT BARLOW RAND BARLAND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
 MILSELL CHROME MINES BARLOW RAND B & D EDUCATION SYSTEMS BARLOW RAND LIFESTYLE BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND COLLECT-A-CAN BARLOW RAND QUADRISECTION BARLOW RAND BARLOW'S APPLIANCE CO
 SACO SYSTEMS BARLOW RAND BARLOW RAND WRIGHTTECH BARLOW RAND AIROMATIC BARLOW RAND FLORTIME BARLOW RAND
 BARLOW RAND PLASCON-EVANS PAINTS BARLOW RAND MARINE OIL REFINERS BARLOW RAND LOTZABA FORESTS BARLOW RAND
 DAIRYBELLE BARLOW RAND ROMATEX BARLOW RAND ISLAND VIEW STORAGE BARLOW RAND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL
 BARLOW RAND BARCOM ELECTRONICS BARLOW RAND LOGOS PHARMACEUTICALS BARLOW RAND VAN DYCK CARPETS BARLOW RAND

Barlow Rand. The name behind 400 respected S.A. companies.

Ranked 78th in Fortune's directory of the 500 largest companies outside the US. In turnover (R21 billion) and assets (R13 billion), first on the list of South Africa's publicly owned industrial corporations.

Responsible for nearly a quarter-million jobs in a wide diversity of interests. Mining, ferro-alloys, computers, electronics, electrical engineering, textiles, building and construction supplies, consumer durables, packaging, pharmaceuticals and food.

Barlow Rand. A vital part of South Africa's future.



GREY-PHILLIPS BUNTON MUNDEL & BLAKE 85465/78

carlton paper

CARES

- FOR ME • FOR YOU • FOR HEALTH
- FOR MOTHERS • FOR HOUSEWIVES
- FOR BABIES • FOR CHILDREN • FOR SCHOOLS
- FOR GOLFERS • FOR RUNNERS • FOR HYGIENE
- FOR COMMUNICATION • FOR EVERYBODY
- FOR PARENTS • FOR DRIVERS • FOR TAXIS
- FOR WORKERS • FOR STUDENTS
- FOR BUSINESSMEN • FOR BUSINESSWOMEN
- FOR HOSPITALS • FOR NURSES
- FOR PATIENTS • FOR CYCLISTS
- FOR MINERS • FOR PLUMBERS • FOR PEOPLE
- FOR GRANDPARENTS • FOR FARMERS
- FOR THE COUNTRY AND THE FUTURE
- FOR TEACHERS • FOR DOERS
- FOR FRIENDS • FOR JIVERS • FOR SHOPPERS
- FOR HOUSEHOLDERS • FOR RELIGION
- FOR T.V.ADDICTS • FOR COOKS • FOR HOMES
- FOR DOG OWNERS • FOR THE YOUNG
- FOR THE OLD

FOR EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING

Changing the shape of Men's Fashion



Svenline
MAN ABOUT TOWN

the most
natural shape
in shoulders

Editorial Notes

The Spring edition of *Indicator SA* looks at the implications of a shift in the distribution of power in and outside parliament for South Africa in the 1990s. In a special 'state of the nation' review, prominent national contributors focus on the dramatic socio-political events and trends in the third quarter of 1989.

In keeping with the tradition of our unique information service, *Indicator SA* publishes the complete facts as well as a full range of policy interpretations.

ELECTION TRENDS

Election commentaries draw on the expertise of political analysts countrywide, including Lawrie Schlemmer (Wits GSB), Willie Breytenbach (University of Stellenbosch), Richard Humphries (Wits GSB), Janis Grobbelaar (Unisa), Yusef Bhamjee (University of Natal) and Robert Cameron (UCT).

The publication of their reviews will enable those subscribers who missed our stimulating post-election seminar, convened by IPSA liaison officer Myrna Berkowitz in Johannesburg, to catch up with the latest data and debate about the likely shape of parliamentary politics in the 1990s.

To assist our readers, some of the common themes in these post-election scenarios are:

- state and opposition stances in a pre-negotiation phase
- the shape of negotiation alliances and coalitions
- the prospects and timetable for reforms
- a white voter mandate for an inclusive system
- the election ceiling to Conservative Party support
- coloured and Indian rejection of the tricameral system
- the new challenge and form of black opposition
- the political limits to economic growth.

Data trends published in our *Political Monitor* identify a liberal shift in white voting patterns in the late 1980s, contrasting the 1988 municipal polls and the 1987/1989 national polls for the House of Assembly. Other commentaries in the *Regional Monitor* evaluate the specific dynamics of the coloured and Indian voter boycotts in the Western Cape and Natal. Data trends compare the inaugural 1984 and recent 1989 polls for the controversial House of Representatives and the House of Delegates.

PROTEST ISSUES

In the *Urban and Industrial Monitors* we review the dramatic development in the extra-parliamentary sphere, the de facto legalisation of protest activity.

Sociologist Yunis Carrim (an executive member of the Natal Indian Congress) comments on the visible assertion of power by a revitalised and broadened anti-apartheid coalition, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). He explains the defiance campaign as an attempt to open up legal space for leftwing opposition groups, to establish the congress movement as a major actor in the pre-negotiation phase, and to seize the initiative from the state in identifying areas for transformation.

Political scientist, Andrew Prior, explores the crisis of policing and the enforcement of security laws in the suppression of black dissidence between 1976 to the present. Case studies are presented of the harsh crackdown on anti-electioneers in the Western Cape, the contrasting official tolerance of the freedom marches, and the racial/ideological cracks appearing among police ranks.

Labour correspondent, Simon Segal, locates the position and policies of Cosatu within the MDM. Reviewing the major issues at the labour federations' mid-year congress, he discusses the divisive potential of the shift from the Freedom Charter to a Workers' Charter. The linkage of the anti-Labour Relations Act campaign with the defiance campaign and the impact on the Cosatu/Nactu/Saccola talks are also put under the spotlight.

THE NEW LOOK

Indicator SA has taken an automated leap onto the desktop of publishing technology in the 1990s. These topical reports and the other feature articles come hot from the *Indicator Project SA* (IPSA) press. An even quicker turnaround of fresh copy from our national network of contributors is facilitated by the use of desktop publishing (DTP), enabling us to bring in-depth, topical analyses of current events to *Indicator SA* subscribers.


Those readers with an astute typographical eye will no doubt notice the hidden clues to the adoption of DTP production methods. All credit is due to our new graphic designer, Rob Evans. Keep a look-out in this column for notice of further innovations to our information service!

Graham Howe, Editor
October 1989

POLITICAL

M O N I T O R

Albertina Sisulu, a president of the banned United Democratic Front, and lifelong activist in congress movement. Recently reunited with her husband, Walter Sisulu, ex-ANC Secretary-General, who was released with other political prisoners by the State President. (See Schlemmer/Breytenbach on reform initiatives, this monitor: 9-16.)



Subject: Nonsikelelo Albertina Sisulu · Artist: Sue Williamson · Portfolio: Silkscreen Series, *A Few South Africans*

**A NEW INDICATOR SA
ISSUE FOCUS**

**VIR VOLK EN VADERLAND
A Guide to the White Right**

**By Janis Grobbelaar, Simon Bekker
and Robert Evans**

The first comprehensive guide to the white rightwing in South Africa. A special report filled with 55 pages of information, commentary and data which:

- analyses Conservative Party policy and strategy
- identifies the grassroots interest groups in the wider movement, from co-operative to school committee
- shows how different ultra-right white groups adapt a resurgent Afrikaner nationalist ideology
- highlights the potential for rightwing violence

This *Indicator SA* report is essential reading for decision-makers, analysts, investors, and lobby groups.

COST: R20 or \$US 20 (overseas orders), including airmail postage


Make payment out to INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA

Order by direct mail from:
Indicator Project SA, University of Natal,
King George V Avenue, Durban 4001, South Africa



**POLITICAL CONFLICT IN
SOUTH AFRICA**

Data Trends 1984-1988



INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA

This exhaustive special report combines in-depth profiles of South Africa's conflict regions by leading analysts with research data into political violence monitored by the Indicator Project SA between 1984-1988.

An essential source of information for all decision-makers, this *Indicator SA* Issue Focus contains 125 pages of analysis and an additional 100 pages of data on:

- consumer, election, and transport boycotts
- worker, community and school stayaways
- conflict fatalities by region/month
- targets of dissidents between 1976-1988
- ANC guerilla activities and targets
- economic indicators of political conflict
- maps of conflict regions/township 'trouble-spots'.

COST: R50 or US \$50 (overseas orders), including airmail postage

Make payment out to INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA

Order by direct mail from:
Indicator Project SA, University of Natal,
King George V Avenue, Durban 4001, South Africa.

De Klerk's Five Options A Mandate for Change

*By Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, Director, Centre for Policy Studies,
Wits Graduate School of Business Administration*

Prof Schlemmer argues that the September election marks the end of a phase of restructuring in white politics. It lays the basis for the kind of state power which will in due course take South Africa into a phase of tough and drawn-out negotiation about the inclusion of the black majority in parliamentary politics. It also takes South Africa into a new phase of integration of the major cities, an integration process which will be managed amidst controversy and delay while constituencies acclimatise to existing reforms.

Like most political events, the September 1989 election for the white House of Assembly can be variously interpreted to suit most political tastes. It has been assessed as a second 1948, this time signalling the possible or inevitable defeat of the National Party (NP) in the next election. It has been heralded as a swing to the left; a precursor to the growth of a swing to non-racial democratic sentiment among whites. Even conservatives have had their satisfaction in pointing to the seventeen additional seats won by the Conservative Party (CP).

Most of these assessments are flimsy. The election and its outcome were more complex, and facile conclusions should be qualified. For all four white political parties, and conceivably for extra-parliamentary formations as well, the 1989 election has probably been a strategic lesson. It has emphasised both prospects for change and political constraints equally firmly. As such, it is a platform for the hard work that lies ahead.

Adverse Circumstances

If ever the NP should have lost its overall majority in the House of Assembly it should have been in this election. Under the last years of Mr PW Botha's leadership, white interests had suffered major setbacks in the economic field. There were numerous instances of corruption in the NP and government, international pressure had increased, and the management of internal security had increased in technical sophistication but had become politically sterile.

Furthermore, the House of Representatives, homeland leaders, urban black 'moderates' businessmen, and very many better-informed supporters of the NP, both inside and outside the caucus appeared alienated and frustrated. Above all, the NP government was not solving the problem of involving blacks in negotiation; a challenge it had set itself.

This build-up to the elections was followed by the illness of Mr Botha and the leadership crisis. Mr FW de Klerk won the leadership of the NP with a relatively narrow majority and in a climate of division. He led the party into the election initially hobbled by the manifest strain between himself and the State President, burdened with what the public at large probably saw as second-rank status.

Only in a situation of national crisis, conceivably with a sharp economic downturn, signs of disunity and deep vacillation in government, is the NP likely to perform more poorly at the polls than it did in the invidious circumstances it faced in September. Under most circumstances the NP is likely to be able to win a future white election fairly comfortably. This will be particularly true after a new constituency delimitation, which could cost the CP, and to a lesser extent, the Democratic Party (DP) several seats.

Swing Vote

The combined CP and Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) vote fell back from the percentage share of the vote obtained in the 1988 municipal elections (approximately

For white and black politics, the 1989 has been a strategic lesson about both the prospects for change and political constraints

Data Trends

Pre-Election Predictions

In June and July 1989, research-based predictions showed the election heading for a 'hung parliament', with the National Party losing its overall majority. Schlemmer et al (*Sunday Times*, 23/7/89) forecast around 78 seats for the NP, veteran forecaster Harry Laurie (*Rapport*, 30/7/89) 79, Donald Simpson (*Sunday Times*, 23/7/89), 72-77 seats.

Market and Opinion Surveys (*Rapport*, 23/7/89) saw the NP share of the vote dropping from nearly 53% in 1987 to 46%, and Con Botha, the NP director of publicity, admitted that he had felt the NP was in danger of losing an overall majority (*Rapport*, 27/8/89).

In mid-July, *Indicator SA* published election forecasts by various commentators who focused on the likely fortunes of specific parties. Simon Bekker and Janis Grobbelaar predicted 36-40 seats for the Conservative Party, while David Welsh predicted around 30 seats for the Democratic Party. In a set of forecasts for all three parties, Hennie Kotze predicted 92-98 seats for the National Party, 36-44 seats for the Conservative Party, and 25-30 seats for the Democratic Party (see pre-election focus in *IPSA Political Monitor* Vol6/No3:9-20).

June and July were early days in the campaign but they reflected the malaise in the ruling party. Inevitably, as the NP machine started to roll, its prospects improved, and later forecasts recognised this shift. The new predictions (*Frontline* Vol8/No10, August 1989) for the NP were:

- Mischke of *Rapport*: 90 seats
- Professor Giliomee: 103 seats
- Von Keyserlingk of *Finansies en Tegniek*: 84
- Beckett of *Frontline*: 86
- Patrick Laurence of *The Star*: 97
- Schlemmer: 95.

The State President resigned, giving Mr FW de Klerk the political benefit of full symbolic leadership and the NP pulled out of the trough, emerging with 93 seats and a 20-seat overall majority.

About 12% of NP voters in 1987 voted DP in 1989 versus about 5% of NP voters swinging to the CP

33-35%) to barely one percent more than they had obtained in the 1987 election. The CP seems destined to be pinned at roughly 30 to 32% of white support, unless a crisis emerges as suggested above. In a future election (or referendum) which the NP calls at a politically opportune time, the CP is unlikely to increase substantially its level of support.

From 1987 to 1989, the major swing was leftwards to the DP. (About 12% of NP voters in 1987 voted DP in 1989 versus about 5% swinging to the CP). This has been heralded as a major trend but has to be seen in a longer-run perspective. In 1977 and 1981 parties to the 'left' of the NP gained 30% and 27% of the vote respectively, compared with the approximate 22% obtained by the DP in the September 1989 election (allowing for the large DP support in two unopposed constituencies).

A comparison of results in pre-election polls conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys (comparable national random samples of about 2 000 voters) show that the percentage share of support to the left of the NP was 30 to 33% in 1981, 25% in 1987 and 28% in 1989. Hence it is difficult to argue, in terms of distributions of party support from the centre leftwards, that a major swing has occurred. What in fact happened was that the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) was rather abnormally weak in 1987. This was due to the fact that its leader, van Zyl Slabbert, had resigned and the fact that voters shifted towards the NP in the wake of the insecurity of the 1984 to 1987 protests and township violence.

The swing from the NP to the DP occurred mainly among English-speaking voters. Over two decades of polls by Market and Opinion Surveys suggest that over time, an average of just under 25% of English-speakers support the NP. In 1977 and in 1986, 1987 and 1988, this proportion rose to well above 30% (in June 1986, to 37%). This increase is associated with threats to white security. With the fading memory of black unrest in late 1988 and 1989, the proportion of English-speakers supporting the NP has once again dropped towards its twenty-year average (roughly 23% just before the election).

The English voters are swing voters par excellence; more than two-thirds tending to support more liberal policies than those of the government but swinging back to support the state when threats to the established order are keenly felt. There is nothing in the results of the 1989 election to suggest a break in this pattern. What may be expected, however, is that when the government begins to negotiate seriously about the black franchise, well over one-third and possibly up to one-half of English-speaking voters will swing back to range themselves behind the NP.

Afrikaans voters are still dominantly in the NP camp. Between 1980-81 some 7% of Afrikaners supported parties to the 'left' of government. Just before the 1987 election, this rose to 12% with some 6% supporting the 'Independents'. With the amalgamation of Independents into the new DP the proportion of Afrikaners supporting the DP dropped back to 9%, only slightly more than the 7% of English-speakers supporting the CP or HNP. (Extracts from survey results by Market and Opinion Surveys.

Hence, despite strenuous attempts by both the DP and the CP (the latter has made a

THE THREE-PARTY POLITICAL DYNAMIC

Afrikaans		English/Other	
Afrikaans Strict Conservative	Afrikaans Pragmatic Conservative	English Pragmatic Conservative	English Liberal Reform
Conservative Party Base Support	National Party Base Support		Democratic Party Base Support

point of having English-speaking party personnel), both these parties remain ethnically dominated. In the DP, the presence of Afrikaans-speaking academic and professional supporters creates an impression of greater Afrikaans support, but in fact Afrikaans voting to the left of the NP is about the same or slightly less than it was in the early eighties, seventies and sixties. The powerful phenomenon of a division between Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking political culture remains. The notion of massive Afrikaner 'yuppie' support for liberal politics tends to be a creation of the media.

Restructured Dynamic

The outcome of the 1989 election is probably most appropriately described as a restructuring process brought about by two highly significant developments. These are, firstly, the stabilisation of the relatively recent phenomenon of a strong rightwing Afrikaans opposition, and secondly, the recovery of opposition to the left of government to its appropriate level of strength in terms of basic voter sympathies, made possible by the unification of liberal and pragmatic reform views in the DP.

The difference between the 1981 and 1989 elections lies in the presence of the CP as a party able to project and articulate hyper-conservative views of a more modern, less historical and less traditional kind than the HNP could. In September 1989, the conservative opposition for the first time had an effective national organisation and to some extent had lost some of the stigma of extreme traditionalism and pathological bigotry. In the event, it did not gain much in terms of percentage voter support but it established and stabilised its position as an opposition likely to remain a force for years to come.

In other words, September 1989 fully established the white political dynamic likely to endure into the future: a three-party system reflecting basically the division of both English and Afrikaans political cultures into less-conservative and more conservative wings. This pattern is broadly, if in somewhat oversimplified form, depicted in the accompanying diagram. This differentiation in the electorate is likely to endure as the basis for political responses from whites as the country proceeds in its slow transition away from apartheid.

Finally, under the patterns reflected in the 1989 election, is the fact that, quite aside from party support patterns, the electorate as a whole, and with it the NP in particular, has been slowly but steadily shifting leftwards. Very recent survey results conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys, compared with identical surveys in the past, published in *Rapport* (1/10/89), reflect this shift very clearly (see table). There are numerous similar empirical indications of the steady shift in mainstream white attitudes, but the one cited here will suffice.

Very broadly, then, the results seem to indicate that the NP base is fairly secure within a three-party system and that underlying shifts in opinion favour cautious but conceivably sustained social and political reform. What are the implications for the future?

Reform Implications

Quite clearly, the NP government awaited the outcome of the election before moving on certain reforms. The CP, having demonstrated that its current potential makes it less of a threat than many nationalists imagined, can be disregarded for a period at least.

Two main trends are that a strong rightwing Afrikaans opposition has stabilised, and that liberal opposition has recovered to its former strength

The shifts in voter opinion favour cautious but sustained social and political reform

Negotiation Alliances in the New White House

By Professor Willie Breytenbach

The election suggests that a contract zone offering a negotiated democratic settlement has not yet emerged

Many commentators thought the general election of 6 September irrelevant to the South Africa of the future because it was not an exercise in full democracy; others believed it to be a watershed, having a crucial bearing on the shape of expected negotiations.

Neither of these assessments are entirely accurate. On the future of the system, the outcome of the election is clear: no less than 68,5% of the white voters, and presumably most of the coloured and Indian voters opted for an **inclusive** system, presumably a democracy. Unfortunately, the crystal ball is not clear on this outcome. The National Party's commitment to 'democracy' remains suspect. However, there may be confusion between the concepts of 'democracy' and 'full participation'.

A clear commitment to democracy and negotiations by all relevant parties may be ascertained only once a 'contract zone' offering the real possibility of a desirable, negotiated, democratic settlement may be assumed to have emerged. But this election, and the wider politics that went with it, suggest that such an assumption cannot be made now.

On future constitutional arrangements, all three major contending parties in the 'White House' (the House of Assembly) were guilty of waging election campaigns based on half-truths. The NP professed to have a fully participative system in mind, yet may actually think along the lines of 'top-down' co-optation rather than 'bottom-up' representation. The CP claimed that territorial separation will save all, but may actually have severe reservations about the practicability of their own partition policies. Finally, many in the DP may actually think a black government in South Africa is unavoidable, and even desirable, but their spokesmen do not concede this possibility.

As it turned out, the election produced quite extraordinary outcomes. The results were

characterised as much by what did **not** happen, however, as by what actually occurred:

- The anticipated 'hung' parliament did **not** happen (there is a 'hung' House, however, in the form of the House of Delegates where no single party gained a clear majority).
- The NP did **not** lose a winning margin (in terms of votes, not seats) in any of the provinces despite being severely challenged in the Transvaal and Free State.
- The CP did **not** do as well as they expected, e.g. it did **not** capture seats in Natal and won only two seats (though for the first time) in the Cape - it also made very little inroads in any of the larger urban areas in the country.
- The DP's lack of perceived clarity on group rights and economic policy apparently did **not** count against it.
- With the exception of the Natal platteland, the DP fared rather badly in all rural constituencies. It is therefore **not** a party of farmers and rural interests, not even in Natal where the DP fared so well.

The personalities (and not all of them enjoyed television coverage) sometimes fared better than their party's general performance, e.g. on the NP side, prominent persons such as Sam de Beer, Leon Wessels, Louis le Grange, Gerrit Viljoen, Adriaan Vlok and Rina Venter did much better than was expected of the ruling party in their respective constituencies. The same may be said about DP personalities such as Wynand Malan, Dene Smuts, Carole Charlewood, Jannie Momberg, Kobus Jordaan and Denis Worrall.

The common thread here is good campaigning and charisma. It probably serves to underline the urban-orientated and more 'modern' image of the NP and the DP, as opposed to the CP's dour campaign which did not emulate their charismatic razzmatazz. In this sense the CP's campaign was a replica of yesteryear's NP approaches.

The NP's fully participative system may consist of top-down co-optation rather than bottom-up representation

Real Outcomes

The other obvious thing that happened was a clear demarcation of party support on rural/urban and urban/urban lines. With the exception of the Cape and Natal, the CP emerged as the strongest party in the rural areas of the OFS and Transvaal. The urban support patterns for the CP suggests a lower to middle income orientation (notably OFS Goldfields, East Rand, West Rand, Pretoria North and Pretoria West).

The CP vote contrasts with a clear-cut urban/urban dichotomy in the case of the NP and DP. The NP support is middle to higher income Afrikaans-speaking, and the DP support is middle to higher income English-speaking. Further, the NP fared well in 'salary' cities as opposed to the DP that fared well in 'trade' cities. In a sense, it is a return to the pre-1981 patterns, but with one very big proviso: Afrikaners are now prominent in all three parties.

And we all know what has happened since 1981. The rightwing was born, certain re-alignments took place, and the NP became a typical 'centre' party with more creative 'city' forces to the left of it than to the 'rural' right of it. The irony is that English-speakers are gravitating towards the 'non-racial' (DP) left, but in doing so are actually mobilising on an 'ethnic' basis. Is this the resurgence of an incipient kind of English language, or even more far-reaching, of white group consciousness?

Many issues that characterised this election were new. Take the ruling party, for example. The NP won, but unlike in previous elections, it lacked central campaign themes. The only coherence really was the 'FW Factor', no redherring this time. For the first time the NP asked the electorate for a mandate to relinquish full domination. It did not even ask for a mandate to clobber the left. There is a paradox here. The NP expended the same, if not more, energy to appease the left, instead of castigating it.

The NP finally said 'goodbye' to rightwingers. However, it did not turn its back on own affairs, groups, group rights, and group areas. But then who said these issues - once devoid of discrimination - were an essentially *verkrampte* outlook on life? Pity the Nats gave 'group politics' such a bad, apartheid name!

Even the CP's election issues were illuminating. Not because they were so new, but because they shed **new** light on the

political debate. The total CP share of the white vote (31,4%) illustrates that a significant proportion of whites (and, maybe of coloureds and Indians, plus some conservative Africans) are not sold on the idea of negotiating an inclusive dispensation. They represent the exclusivists **and** conservatives but are far too weak to govern under any dispensation. At the same time, they are strong enough to prevent a quick resolution of the negotiating process.

With the white right obstructing the negotiating process, and the black left (e.g. the PAC and Black Consciousness groupings) doing the same from their perspective, the outcome is bound to be protracted rather than prolific. But the prognosis remains problematic because a whole range of other possibilities still abound.

These issues become clearer when an assessment of other implications of the election are made.

Obstructing Talks

All the repositories of orthodox nationalism, the Africanist tradition in the case of blacks (i.e. PAC black exclusivism) and Afrikaner nationalism in the case of whites (i.e. CP/HNP/AWB white exclusivism), are, through their own decisions, firmly excluded from the negotiation contract zone. Their policies do not entitle them to a place in this 'inclusive' sphere.

This implies one of two outcomes. Firstly, without nationalists on either side of the 'contract divide', no lasting settlement can be negotiated because it would lack historical authenticity. Secondly, exclusivist forces are now side-lined at last, so that those (the majority?) who share the vision of an undivided future (e.g. within the anti-nationalist posture of non-racialism) can get on with the job of state cum nationbuilding. If this is indeed the case, however, nationalists on either side may obstruct negotiations for a very long time to come.

History will judge the outcome of this struggle. On the one hand, ethnicity seems to increase with the intensification of competition for scarce resources such as wealth and power, implying a resurgence of black nationalism as opposed to non-racialism, and white consciousness as opposed to inclusivity. On the other hand,

Does the election reflect the resurgence of an incipient kind of white group consciousness to left and right?

Africanists (black exclusivists) and Afrikaner nationalists (white exclusivists) remove themselves from the negotiation contract zone

Committed white and black nationalists may obstruct negotiations for a very long time to come

the quest for togetherness (or mutual accommodation) will probably predominate, if only for economic reasons and for the right to retain a share in the wealth of greater South Africa.

Is a liberal type of democracy at all achievable under such conditions of polarisation, and ultimately, political instability?

In the shorter term, two very important issues, conspicuous by their absence from the election debates, were the questions about Nelson Mandela's release and Namibian independence. Perhaps these omissions were signs of the times - people no longer quarrel about unstoppable, inevitable events. This may be a sign of political maturity.

These signs may also be watersheds of sorts. They may indicate movement away from petty politics and sectarian obstructionism.

Negotiation Alliances

Other short-term implications of the past election are that although none of the parties in the White House were whitewashed, all of them are in for overhauls.

The CP is in for a shake-up, not so much in respect of policies, but perhaps in terms of leadership. The 1982 old guard, or **bitterbekke**, smarting from defeats sustained in bruising encounters with PW Botha and Chris Heunis over the tricameral constitution, may now be vulnerable to the younger generation of nationalist, separatist ideologies. The CP's new MPs are neither as ambitious as the old guard nor as grievance-driven as these 'oldies'. Watch out for those young lawyer/academics from the Transvaal!

Moreover, it was the old guard of the CP which boasted about a victory of 60 seats plus. The younger leadership (17 freshmen in the House) may well scale down grand demands (as Dr Carel Boshoff's more realistic partition proposals already are) and try to heal some of the wounds within the rightwing establishment. Because for them, the calling is great, and the threat severe.

The NP, on the other hand, is now a redesigned outfit. Watch out for the new faces from the business sector, Afrikaner academics, English-speakers and women.

Mr FW de Klerk may want to do what Mr PW Botha neglected to do, and that is to reward followers for their political support. Alas, Mr de Klerk does not have a big choice right now, but it is still big enough to reflect more accurately on the forces that made the NP victory possible.

Another short-term implication is that the emergence of 'negotiation alliances' has never been more probable than now. This will be the biggest overhaul of them all. The NP is strong enough in parliament to rule their own way, but far too weak outside to negotiate alone. So, watch out too for the DP, Inkatha, the Labour Party (69 out of 80 seats in the House of Representatives), Solidarity and the National Peoples Party (together 24 out of 40 seats in the House of Delegates), homeland parties and urban black local authority associations. Will they get involved on the side of 'the system' (under Mr de Klerk's NP initiative) in the government's efforts to negotiate a constitutional settlement?

Even the newcomer is in for an overhaul, if not immediately, certainly during the early lifespan of the new parliament. The DP troika cannot rule forever. Worrall's power base includes half of the seats in Natal, which will place him in a strong leadership position in the caucus. The DP will also have to reach clarity on a number of policy issues. Protesting outside parliament is rather different to positioning from within. Policy-formulation in parliament calls for preciseness.

It is probably not mere coincidence that the discernible parliamentary and extra-parliamentary shifts towards inclusivity in South Africa are taking place at the same time as the peace processes are unfolding in the region.

With all the conflicts in the region potentially resolved - in no small way due to American, British and Soviet pressures - the South African issue remains the last anachronism. For those who are in a position to exert pressure, it remains the most cherished conflict to be settled.

So if, indeed, the elections of 1981, 1984 and 1987 were 'securocrat' mandates dominated by security perceptions of onslaught; then the 1989 election marks the era of the diplomats and politicians - the 'diploticians' who will no doubt take charge of the 1990s. **DDA**

The biggest overhaul of the elections will be the emergence of negotiation alliances between the NP and the centre-left

The Swinging Vote CP Slip on the FW Factor

By Richard Humphries, Centre for Policy Studies,
Wits Graduate School of Business Administration

The most important outcome of the September general election was the extent to which the rightwing Conservative Party under-performed. Whether this performance presages the limit of CP electoral support is not clear. In reviewing voter trends, an Indicator SA correspondent examines those factors which had a detrimental impact on the CP during the election campaign.

The outlines of the election results are by now well-known (see data bases). Briefly, the National Party (NP) was returned to power, albeit with a greatly reduced majority. It obtained slightly more than one million votes, or just more than 48% of the vote. With the results in three seats still uncertain (being subject to court ordered recounts and to a by-election in Fauresmith) the NP has 93 seats in the House, without including its nominated MPs.

As for the opposition parties, the Conservative Party (CP) received some 680 000 votes (31.4% of the vote and 39 seats) while the Democratic Party (DP) received some 434 000 votes (20% of the vote and 32 seats). The long suffering Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) could only poll some 5 500 votes. (See table 1 for breakdown of votes by party.)

Clearly, the most important outcome of the election was the relative failure of the CP to mount a serious challenge to the ruling party. Such a challenge had not only been expected by the CP, but had been indicated in a number of opinion polls of voter opinion done before nomination day. (See Sunday Times and Rapport of 23/07/89). The CP's prospects had been bolstered by its good showing in parliamentary by-elections in the Transvaal since 1987, while it had performed very well in the municipal elections in the Transvaal in late 1988.

Shortly after nomination day, the CP national secretary predicted a strong election performance for the party. Early canvassing figures were similar to those experienced in the run-up to the Randfontein by-election in early 1988 where the party had performed extremely well. On the eve of the election, too, the

CP's media spokesman predicted a minimum of 43 seats, a maximum of 72 and an average 55 to 60 seats. The party came close to its minimum figure, especially if a few split vote defeats and its narrow losses in some other seats are taken into account.

Thus it was the failure of the CP to capture between 50 and 60 seats which ensured that a hung parliament did not materialise.

Faulty Predictions

How do we explain the poor performance of the CP - which effectively gained little additional support other than those voters who had voted for the HNP in 1987 - in a period of economic hardship? Numerous factors can be presented to explain the CP's poor performance.

CP confidence and expectations were to a large extent based on their assessment of their performance in the October 1988 municipal elections. While the party did do well in these elections, the CP's internal assessment of their likely performance was wildly optimistic and devoid of caution.

CP spokesmen ignored crucial difficulties such as:

- the problems of extrapolating from municipal election results to general election results;
- the role of local issues (as opposed to national issues) as voter determinants in the municipal elections; and
- the difficulties of assessing the political loyalties of voters who voted for independent candidates not directly attached to one of the major parties.

Thus Clive Derby-Lewis, in motivating his election predictions of 75 seats to the CP as opposed to 59 for the NP, claimed a 17%

Contradicting a number of opinion polls and the CP's own expectations, the official opposition party met with relative failure at the polls

Data Base

TABLE 1
Breakdown of Votes by Party, 1981-1989

	1989 ¹ Votes (% Share)	1987 Votes (% Share)	1981 Votes (% Share)
NP	1 044 719 (48,2)	1 075 642 (52,7)	777 558 (57)
CP/HNP ²	685 559 (31,6)	610 390 (29,9)	211 453 (15,5)
DP ³	434 868 (20,1)	356 222 (14,4)	370 956 (27,5)

Footnotes:

1 The figures for 1989 are provisional - they were taken from newspapers and thus could be incorrect.

2 The HNP share of the vote is only for 1981, included with assorted rightwing independents.

3 The PFP and NRP votes are added together for 1987 when they had an election alliance. Also for 1981, when they were in opposition with one another against the NP.

CP success at the 1988 municipal elections proved a double-edged sword, stirring controversy about petty apartheid and partition policies

A CPS opinion poll shows that rank-and-file CP supporters are divided on the necessity for petty apartheid measures

swing to the CP in the municipal elections. He further claimed that this calculation excluded the swing to the party in rural areas not affected by the municipal elections. (*Frontline*, August 1989). It is indeed very difficult to calculate voter swings with reference to municipal elections; an issue glossed over by the CP.

Although these high expectations were not shared by all senior CP officials, they were given very generous publicity in an official party publication, thereby helping to create expectations of CP success. CP spokesmen thus built expectations about the general election on the basis of faulty assessments of their municipal election performance.

This is perhaps partially illustrated by the inability of the CP to win numerous constituencies in areas where it had gained control of municipalities. Seats such as Krugersdorp, Potchefstroom, Springs and Boksburg (all CP town councils) were retained by the NP. Again, seats such as Gezina and Innesdal in Pretoria were retained by the NP in an area of Pretoria where the CP had triumphed in October 1988.

Policy Publicity

The CP's success in the municipal elections proved to be something akin to a double-edged sword in that it stimulated debate about partition policies in a way that would not have been possible had the CP not gained control of important municipalities. Having gained such control, especially on the Reef, the party was in a position to put aspects of CP policy, especially petty apartheid, into effect.

However, the adverse publicity which this aroused, especially in Boksburg and Carletonville where black consumer boycotts were launched in response, allowed critics to forcefully argue that CP policy of partition and petty apartheid was unrealistic and outdated.

The NP and its supportive media seized on the difficulties the CP had landed itself in to launch a concerted attack on the feasibility and practicality of CP policy. It is probably fair to say that this was the main issue on which the NP attacked the CP throughout the election campaign. Fortuitous or not, the Supreme Court judgement setting aside the Carletonville town council's decision to enforce petty apartheid came only a week before the election, thereby adding to the prominence of the debate over CP policy.

There is some evidence to suggest that this issue, and the media campaign around it, cost the CP support at the polls. Furthermore, that there were differing approaches within higher echelons in the party towards the need for petty apartheid measures and, indeed, towards aspects of broader partition policies.

Some CP councils did not go as far as Boksburg and Carletonville in applying petty apartheid restrictions. In addition, debate at the CP's recent Cape congress has revealed rather fundamental differences of opinion within the party over the partition policy, especially towards a coloured homeland. A delegate and candidate in the general election - with highly respected rightwing credentials - pointed out that party policy on this issue had detrimentally affected his campaign. He urged a rethink on the issue (*Volksblad*, 9/10/89).

Rank-and-file CP supporters also appear to have divided opinions towards the necessity for petty apartheid measures. A Centre for Policy Studies opinion poll conducted in June and July found that a substantial core of CP supporters in the constituencies of Gezina and Springs were in favour of a more flexible approach towards petty apartheid issues.

In Gezina, 39% of CP supporters argued that the party should apply more flexible policies in Boksburg and Carletonville; in Springs, geographically closer to Boksburg, the figure rose to 45%. These figures suggest that, given the severity of the NP attack on the CP on this issue, it probably succeeded in drawing away some supporters. At the very least it served to prevent further loss of NP support to the CP.

Another factor which probably had a detrimental impact on the CP was the amount of negative publicity given to various incidents involving CP candidates during the election. These included:

- the attempts by a CP MP to evict a Chinese couple from his property in Pretoria;
- a decision by a magistrate that the CP's candidate in Krugersdorp was racist (he has appealed against the decision);
- the conviction of the CP candidate in Vanderbijlpark on charges of fraud on the eve of the election; and
- the use by CP supporters of religion (including a racist parody of Psalm 23 which was subsequently banned) to bolster their cause. This use of religion in their campaign was condemned by the head of the Dutch Reformed Church.

The importance of these issues, in tandem with the other factors discussed, is that they probably offended middle-class sensitivities. The CP, although not a working-class party in any real sense, has its largest support base amongst working-class and lower middle-class Afrikaners. If the party had succeeded in picking up substantial new support in the election then it would probably have been the result of increasing acceptance from middle-class voters. That it did not is more than likely due to resistance from middle-class voters to these issues.

The FW Factor

The CP, especially in the crucial last two weeks of the campaign, was also disadvantaged by the emergence of Mr FW de Klerk as acting State President. Until then, de Klerk's leadership of the NP and its campaign had been constrained by the unresolved formalities of the relationship between the NP and President PW Botha.

FW's 'presidentialisation' and the promise of a new approach to the political stalemate of the last years of the Botha government gave the NP's campaign a decisive lift just when it appeared that a hung parliament was indeed more likely than most observers conceded.

The role which personality plays in politics is often underestimated; de Klerk's personality brought numerous advantages to the NP, especially when compared with his predecessor. His Transvaal origins (important given the provincialism inherent in NP politics), his role as informal leader of the rightwing faction within the NP, and

Data Base

TABLE 2
Breakdown of Votes by Province (1989)

	NP	DP	CP	HNP	Ind
Cape	315 943	167 546	101 702	1 257	0
%	(53,9)	(28,6)	(17,3)	(0,2)	
Tvl	528 140	159 393	461 038	3 308	657
%	(45,8)	(13,8)	(40,0)	(0,3)	(0,1)
Ntl	107 527	103 547	32 809	256	241
%	(44,0)	(42,4)	(13,4)	(0,1)	(0,1)
OFS	93 109	4 328	84 687	622	0
%	(51)	(2,3)	(46,4)	(0,3)	

TABLE 3
Breakdown of Vote by Selected Region (1989)
Percentage Share by Party

	NP	DP	CP	HNP
Cape Peninsula	30,3	69,7	0,0	0,0
Greater Cape Town	64,0	27,6	7,6	0,8
Boland	64,8	15,2	20,0	0,0
Port Elizabeth	54,5	33,2	12,1	0,2
Northern Cape	55,5	0,0	44,5	0,0
Natal Midlands	40,9	50,7	8,3	0,0
Northern Natal	48,2	15,3	36,0	0,6
Bloemfontein	58,2	4,5	37,3	0,0
East Rand	48,0	11,2	40,6	0,2
West Rand	48,7	7,2	44,1	0,1
Vaal Triangle	49,2	4,3	46,5	0,0
Northern JHB	30,1	68,8	1,1	0,0
Southern JHB	54,0	15,1	30,8	0,0
Eastern Pretoria	52,9	25,6	21,4	0,0
Pretoria (rest)	48,9	4,1	46,3	0,6

TABLE 4
Marginal Seats with Majority under 1 000

NP marginal to CP	17
NP marginal to DP	4
DP marginal to NP	6
CP marginal to NP	17

his personal style (which is one of an aloof yet soft populism) almost certainly served to undercut any drift towards the CP by disillusioned NP supporters. It might even have served to draw back former NP supporters who had temporarily gravitated to the CP.

Evidence from the opinion poll referred to above can be cited on this point. Bearing in mind that the poll was conducted long before de Klerk's nomination as acting State President, it reveals the extent to which a reasonably large rump of CP supporters had a favourable image of him.

De Klerk's Transvaal base, his informal leadership of the NP rightwing, and his soft populism undercut any NP drift to the CP

DP tactical voting for the NP in marginal seats to keep the CP out may well have inflated actual NP support

In both Gezina and Springs some 17% of CP supporters interviewed thought that he would have a 'positive' impact on NP policy.

The positive expectations of de Klerk by these supporters is probably the result of his generally conservative image. In other words, the CP probably also had to contend with a 'give FW a chance' lobby!

NP canvassing returns in the final two weeks of the campaign when FW de Klerk had emerged as the unhindered leader of the NP reflected a surge in NP support.

On the crucial East Rand, where the CP had performed well in the municipal elections, NP spokesmen in various constituencies were reflecting a clear optimism for the first time in the campaign. In Springs, Mr Piet Coetzer said the NP's 'problem phase' was now behind it; in Gedult, an organiser said they now had the CP on the defensive for the first time during the campaign. In Germiston District, the NP candidate admitted that the circumstances surrounding the resignation of PW Botha had caused disquiet amongst NP supporters but that the actions and personality of FW de Klerk had tipped the campaign in the NP's favour (*Beeld*, 30/8/89).

After the election the Cape leader of the NP, Dawie de Villiers, frankly admitted that the NP's performance was all the more remarkable since a hung parliament had not looked all that impossible some three weeks before election day. He attributed the turnaround in support largely to the NP leader (*Volksblad*, 8/08/89).

Tactical Voting

To what extent did tactical voting by either DP sympathisers or even DP supporters in marginal constituencies (see table 2) bolster NP support at the expense of the CP? Available evidence suggests this was extensive in certain areas. For example, on the East Rand, DP support, although up on 1987 PFP levels, did not, with few exceptions, reach the levels of support which parties to the left of the NP (the PFP and NRP) obtained in the 1981 election.

On the West Rand, too, DP support was half what the PFP and NRP had obtained in 1981. In Pretoria's upper-middle class constituencies DP support was also down on 1981 figures. Compared with the impressive DP showing in its established heartland, these figures suggest that tactical

voting in constituencies whose political culture stresses the threat of the CP to the NP must have scared off large numbers of potential DP voters. If this is indeed so, the effect was to artificially inflate genuine NP support in these areas at the expense of the CP. This trend also then reflects on the limited electoral prospects for the DP in these areas. (See tables 2 and 3).

The general quelling of black opposition politics since the 1984-86 period might also have detrimentally affected the CP. The September election, unlike the 1987 election, took place without the general backdrop of a prolonged period of unrest and violence. To the extent that such events were indeed happening in 1989 they were not, or could not be, reported in ways which created a general perception of large-scale insurrection.

CP support probably owes a lot to just such perceptions. The CP's national congress in Bloemfontein, held after the municipal elections last year, revealed the extent to which delegates had a view of South African politics which was rooted in the conditions which prevailed between 1984 and 1986. That being so, the effects of the state of emergency did not allow the CP to capitalise on the state of black politics as a specific electoral issue. (Of course the corollary of this is that it helps to explain why former PFP supporters who voted for the NP in 1987 could feel free to again adopt an anti-NP posture in 1989.)

Lastly, the CP also had to contend with a much better organised NP in the September elections than it had faced in 1987. Constituency profiles often tended to quote NP spokesmen as pointing to an improved organisational capacity; at least this was so in the Transvaal. A partial explanation for the CP's success in 1987 probably lies in the extent to which they capitalised on an over-confident NP which under-estimated the CP threat. In the wake of the CP's good performance in the OFS in September, however, NP spokesmen do admit that they lost a number of constituencies in this province on account of organisational deficiencies.

This is perhaps a rather long list of possible reasons for the poor showing of the CP. Of course, the assumption which underlies the analysis is that the CP is capable of further growth. Whether or not this occurs is slightly beside the point at this stage; instead, we need to take comfort in the CP's failure to have grown substantially in the prevailing economic conditions. *IPA*

Parliament in the Promised Land The CP & the Ultra-Right

By Professor Janis Grobbelaar,
Department of Sociology, UNISA

Measured against its own ambitious predictions, the CP's performance at the elections does not suggest that party support has grown since its successful municipal election campaign of October 1989. With a static level of support, will the ultra-rightwing be able to mount a challenge to the state in a period of reform? Will the torchbearers of white conservatism play a significant role in national politics or concentrate on local anti-integration activity?

In reflecting on the CP's role within the broader social movement, the white ultra-rightwing, Grobbelaar focuses on the likely influence of the election results both on party strategy and on the latent potential for rightwing violence in South Africa.

There has been a relatively subdued and seemingly unsure reception by the white ultra-rightwing to the performance of the Conservative Party (CP) at the polls. It is reflected in the rather bland headline of the party's official mouthpiece, *Patriot - KP MIK NA 40* (CP aims for 40) - in its post-election edition of 8 September 1989.

In subsequent editions too, the CP weekly newspaper has appeared to reflect, albeit implicitly, disappointment with the party's showing in the election. No fanfares were sounded, no accolades given to the new CP MPs and less than 50% of the post-election edition covered the expected analysis of election successes. The full election results were not even published.

Other commentators on the CP election performance have been neither more active nor more expansive. But they have generally tended to suggest that support for the CP and the consequent support given to the wider and more complex social movement of which it is a part (i.e. the white ultra-rightwing) has peaked (see Grobbelaar, Bekker & Evans, 1989).

Consolidated Support

The CP won 39 out of a possible 166 parliamentary seats. Although this number represents close to double the 22 seats held

by the CP before 6 September, it does not indicate significant growth in ultra-rightwing support. In fact, three out of ten white voters supported the ultra-rightwing on 6 September 1989 - exactly the same number of supporters as in the May 1987 elections (see data base in this monitor:18/19).

The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) share of the total vote, on the other hand, dropped from approximately 3% in May 1987 to below 1% in September 1989. As a consequence, the CP vote rose slightly, from approximately 27% in May 1987 to approximately 30% in September 1989. The death knell of the HNP has surely and finally been sounded.

One may argue that the 30% of white support for the CP/HNP should ideally translate into approximately 50 parliamentary seats. The CP's apparent under-representation in parliament obviously stems from the system of 'unfavourable' delimitation. Further, the National Party (NP) managed to win eight seats on a split vote. In eight constituencies votes for the combined CP/HNP exceeded those for the NP (see table 4:19).

The distribution of seats after 6 September does reflect a more realistic sense of the CP's standing in the white South African parliament. More significantly, it better

The new distribution of seats accurately reflects the ideological consolidation of the ultra-rightwing within a regional base

Can the CP deliver the psychological and material rewards to keep white Afrikaners committed to its policies?

Historically, Afrikaner nationalist politics have been characterised by important regional and material cleavages

underlines the ideological and infrastructural consolidation of the ultra-rightwing within a regional base. What kind of evidence exists to support this statement?

In the first place, no sitting CP MPs lost their seats. In fact, all but one, (S Jacobs, MP for Losberg) increased their absolute majorities. This points to the CP's ideological resilience in the day-to-day political interface of 'delivering the goods' to constituencies, and to the soundness of its organisational base in the face of particularly harsh media onslaughts. The CP had minimum access to positive newspaper or television coverage.

In other words, CP promises of ensuring white Afrikaner survival in the face of massive socio-economic and political dislocation made enough sense and held enough promise to maintain real grassroots support. Thus the results answer one of the key questions of the last two years: is the CP able to deliver sufficient psychological and material reward and patronage (particularly in the light of the Boksburg and Carltonville episodes) to keep an upwardly mobile group (white Afrikaners) secure and committed to its policies?

The regional voting patterns (see tables 2 and 3:19) also demonstrate that white Afrikanerdom is no longer the monolith it once was:

- The CP won 9 'new' seats in the Transvaal and 6 seats in the Orange Free State, with Fauresmith still formally outstanding - the CP and the NP each obtained 4 619 votes in this OFS constituency.
- The CP presently holds 31 seats to the NP's 34 in the Transvaal and 6 to the NP's 7 in the OFS.
- In other words, 40% of all white voters in the Transvaal voted for the CP and 46% voted for the NP; whereas 46% of all white voters in the Orange Free State voted for the CP and 51% voted for the NP.

When one considers the limited support that white English-speakers gave the ultra-rightwing (compared to their support for the Democratic Party), it appears probable that as many as 50% of Afrikaners in the northern provinces now support the CP. Evidence indeed to underpin Bekker and Grobbelaar's (1987) contention that the white rightwing was well-organised and established in the two northern provinces, and that Afrikaner Nationalism had found a reinvigorated home.

Two Nationalisms

The white ultra-rightwing should not only be assessed in terms of political victory at the polls. The rise and consolidation of the CP represents not only the 'breaking up' of Afrikaner hegemony, but also the realignment of traditional Afrikaner sentiment and voting power in the north under the banner of a renewed Afrikaner Nationalism. This, in itself, is a significant gain.


While the CP's regional strength and rural support base are reflected in the election results one should not underestimate their significant holdings in the PWV region. This support attests to the overarching importance of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, and its mobilising role in the struggle for South Africa.

It should not be forgotten that white Afrikaner politics have been characterised by important regional issues and consequent cleavages throughout the twentieth century. The Nationalist ideology of the south has traditionally been (or at least been seen to be) more *vertig* (open) than its sister variant in the *verkrampte* (closed) northern provinces.

This split may be viewed not only as one between the descendants of those who trekked north (as from 1835), fought the two Boer Wars and suffered or died in concentration camps at the turn of the century, but also as one historically underpinned by different material conditions. Simply put, white Afrikaner wealth has historically been rooted in and controlled from the Cape Province. The headquarters of many of South Africa's established Afrikaner-dominated conglomerates are still to be found in the Cape, e.g. Rembrandt and Sanlam.

In the light of this argument, the two CP wins in the Cape Province are not likely to herald significant future growth for the rightwing there. In short they, and the few Cape seats with relatively strong CP showings clustered around them need to be explained from a qualitatively different point of departure.

These CP gains probably stem from the successful use of a harsh *swart gevaar* (the black threat) campaign. The CP won Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape and Kuruman in the North-Western Cape - the former is historically the home of black liberation politics and the latter borders on Namibia.



AFRPIX: ERIC MILLER

Another interesting election trend needs to be considered if we are to more fully understand the importance of the split in Afrikanerdom. This concerns the issue of marginality. Approximately thirty constituencies are presently marginal - the majority of these are situated in the northern provinces (i.e. the Transvaal and the OFS). (Marginal here refers to seats held with less than a majority of 1 000 votes by either the NP or CP. The divide between the CP and NP's marginal seats is minimal). The pressures of this new feature of white politics for both the CP and the NP will be great over the next five years.

Marginality Constraint

It is highly probable that the problem of marginality will influence both CP and NP consideration of any major policy decision. For example, one of the major policies which the CP may have to reconsider is the extent to which it can or should 'soften' its Afrikaner Nationalist image in order to make significant inroads into the Cape Province and/or Natal.

The CP is strongly aware that its strength is rooted in the call of Afrikaner Nationalism. Dr Andries Treurnicht's recent statements at the Cape Congress of the CP provide a good illustration of this recognition. He emphasised that most Afrikaners were voting CP, re-emphasised that to share power was to lose power and argued that white and, in particular, Afrikaner autonomy was all that could really ensure white survival in South Africa. In this context, it makes sense to assume that any ideological and policy shift away from Afrikaner nationalist tenets would lead to

the loss for the CP of at least its marginal holdings in the north.

On the other hand, CP policy-makers will be all too well aware of the strain which the problem of marginality must be causing the NP. This post-election dilemma must at the very least be as constraining to the NP as it is to them. CP representatives are sure to be influenced by their perception of NP strategy on the issue of marginality.

Problems within the NP caucus associated with marginality are likely to be further exacerbated by the regional splits in the party. For the first time in many years, the Cape NP caucus now holds a majority over the Transvaal NP in the national caucus (42 to 34 constituencies). Moreover, the combined OFS/Transvaal NP caucus is presently one short of a majority over the Cape (41 to 42 constituencies). Presumably, the impact of these divisions and the influence of approximately 15 NP-held marginal seats in the north, will affect NP in-politicking and President's FW de Klerk's so-called 'Action Plan'.

The CP will almost inevitably have to mould its strategy by considering the extent to which (if at all) the NP regards marginal seats as expendable, and by assessing the possible outcomes of internal battles for control of the NP by the Cape, Transvaal and OFS caucuses.

Given the limitations of its largely regional support base (confirmed by the election results), the CP also will have to consider more seriously the option of geographical secession. Various 'think-tanks' within the body of the broader ultra-rightwing have for some time paid systematic attention to

Treurnicht and the tortoise on the election trail. The CP adopted this mascot after its launch in the Skilpadsaal in Pretoria, 1982.

About 30 constituencies may now be considered marginal seats, mostly located in the Transvaal and the OFS

CP posters in the White River area proclaim 'Grense bring Vrede' (borders bring peace) and 'U kan op hom staatmaak' (You can count on him).



AFRAPHIX: STEVE HILTON-BARBER

Given the limitations of its regional support base, the CP will have to seriously consider the option of geographical secession

the option of a 'white homeland' - some 'form' of a *volkstaat*.

The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), for example, supports a return to the old Boer Republics, the Vereeniging van Oranje Werkers supports the idea of white growth points to be consolidated into a unitary 'white' state, and the Afrikaner Vryheidstigting (Freedom Foundation) supports the idea of a *volkstaat* to be situated in the North-Eastern Cape. Growing importance has been attached to the option of secession - a 'white homeland' - by some factions in the ultra-rightwing.

Potential for Violence

Any concluding comment on the ultra-rightwing's response to the CP's election performance must consider the question of violence. The growing tensions in our society are exhibited inter alia by well-publicised incidents of political violence. Given the ultra-rightwing's disappointment at CP election results, one is almost forced to pose the question: how will the ultra rightwing as a social movement act if its members believe that the 'parliamentary option' - the first line of defence - is inadequate?

In short, while the CP is a party committed to the 'white' democratic process it is also part of a broader social movement which includes elements such as para-military organisations and twenty-four cultural organisations. These elements reflect varying degrees of commitment (and fanaticism) towards the uniting cause. It is within this context that the potential for violence should be evaluated.

There have been a growing number of reports of violence and threats by so-called *Wit Wolwe* against the Mass Democratic Movement in South Africa. These actions should not be simply dismissed as those of fringe lunatics. More seriously, these are desperate acts by people who strongly and at all costs identify with the protection of what they see as the white South African way of life. It is at the point when they believe that the parliamentary road cannot or will not protect the 'promised land', that alternative routes are most likely to be sought. **CPWA**

References:

Grobbelaar J, S Bekker & R Evans. 'Vir Volk en Vaderland: A Guide to the White Fight, An Indicator SA Issue Focus. Durban: Indicator Project South Africa, 1989.

Bekker S & J Grobbelaar. 'The white rightwing movement in South Africa: before and after the May 1987 election', in Van Vuuren, Schlemmer, Marais & Latakomo (eds), *South African Election 1987*. Pinetown: Owen Burgess, 1987.

Patriot, 8 September 1989.

REGIONAL


M O N I T O R

Amina Cachalia, lifelong member of congress movement and participant in defiance campaign of 1950s. Comes from family of political activists. Denounced the tricameral constitution, calling for voter boycott in 1980s. (See reviews of HoD and HoR regional election dynamics in Natal and Western Cape, this monitor: 27-32.)



Subject: Amina Cachalia · Artist: Sue Williamson · Portfolio: Silkscreen Series, *A Few South Africans*

Table 1
House of Delegates Poll 1989
1.1 Expressed as % of total registered voters



1.2 Expressed in distribution of seats

Party	Retained	Gains	Losses	Total
Solidarity	8	8	8	16
National Peoples Party	5	3	15	8
Independents	0	6	3	6
Democratic Party	0	3	0	3
Merit Peoples Party	0	3	0	3
United Party	0	2	0	2
National Federal Party	0	1	0	1
Peoples Party of SA	0	1	0	1
Progressive Independent Party	0	0	1	0

The defiance campaign has drawn the Indian community closer to the congress movement in its search for alternatives

subsidies were forced to go to the polls under duress. Threats relating to loss of grants, houses and pensions were used to intimidate people into accompanying agents to the polls. This reinforced the indignation of the wider community, already angered by the corruption and malpractices exposed by the James Commission.

Practices of this sort have confirmed that corruption within the HoD has its roots in the quality and the integrity of those who come forward as candidates in the first place. To distance themselves, the 1989 'Don't Vote' campaign witnessed a more overt and concerted attempt by religious, cultural, sports, professional, social and welfare organisations to present the community's point of view.

Unlike 1984, popular rejection of the tricameral parliament has not ended with the September 1989 elections. There has been an important shift in the general community's willingness to actively participate in the defiance campaign, worker stayaways, the consumer boycott, the closure of shops, and in particular, the freedom marches of the mass democratic movement. These activities have given added meaning to the rejection of the tricameral system, drawing the community

closer to the congress movement in its search for an alternative political system.

Multi-Party Polls

While there were ten parties contesting the HoD elections, the front-runners were Solidarity, the National People's Party (NPP) and two new parties: the Democratic Party (DP) in Natal and the Merit People's Party (MPP) in the Transvaal. The most striking result of the elections is that while Solidarity polled 8,7% of all votes cast, it is effectively supported by a mere 5,1% of total registered voters. The distribution of votes and seats are shown in the accompanying data base.

Although Solidarity did not lose any seats to the NPP, the NPP lost seven seats to Solidarity. Solidarity won only 16 (40%) of the 40 seats, however. Without an absolute majority, the competing strengths of both parties is likely to remain in a state of constant flux. Indeed, most of the seats in the HoD may be termed 'marginal' as 27 out of the 40 seats changed hands at the polls. At this stage it is difficult to predict whether either of the parties will command a stable majority during the lifespan of the new parliament.

In addition to the 40 elected MPs, five are elected indirectly. Of these, two are nominated by the State President and three are elected by their peers according to the principle of proportional representation (PR), with each party having one transferable vote.

By virtue of winning 16 seats a member of Solidarity became one of the indirectly elected members. According to the PR arrangement, Solidarity ought to have had a surplus of 3,3% of transferable votes. This could have been effectively used to enter into some agreement with the smaller parties or Independents to support either a Solidarity candidate or one who would support the Solidarity in the house. It appears that Solidarity was ignorant of the voting procedure and offered no second candidate. Thus its majority now stands at 19 - 16 elected, 1 indirectly elected and 2 nominated members.

This outcome means that Solidarity is dependent at all times on the support of four other MPs to maintain a simple majority in the HoD. One MP elected on the NPP party ticket has already crossed over and declared himself a member of Solidarity. The State President

subsequently requested Mr JN Reddy, the leader of Solidarity, to name the Ministers Council for the HoD on the basis that Solidarity now has a simple majority.

Musical Chairs

Only 13 of the 40 seats in the HoD were retained by the two established parties - Solidarity and NPP. The NPP won eight seats (retaining five of its existing seats), while Solidarity won 16 seats (retaining eight seats). In 27 (67,5%) of the 40 seats there was a change in preference for candidates or parties.

Solidarity maintained its national profile with seats in all three provinces, while the NPP lost its base in both the Transvaal and Cape, making the NPP a Natal-based party. The NPP's reduced strength may be due to the fact that it did not contest 9 constituencies, including 4 seats where it had sitting MPs. Six of these seats were picked up by the minor parties: Merit People's Party (2), United Party (1), Independents (3), with Solidarity taking the remaining two seats.

It would seem that the NPP reached an agreement with the above candidates that, in return for their support they would not be opposed by the NPP. One could also surmise that while a number of other candidates may have strong links with the NPP, for their sake of their own political interests they did not wish to be linked to the NPP at a public level. This informal affiliation became evident when MPP and Independent MPs supported the NPP during the indirect election of MPs.

Other interesting features of the election were that:

- In several constituencies voters showed preference and loyalty to individuals rather than to parties. In four constituencies the sitting NPP MPs changed to Solidarity colours and were returned to office.
- One NPP MP, Mr Suchie Naidoo crossed over to Solidarity within a week of the elections.
- An indirectly elected NPP MP, Mr Ismail Kathrada has resigned in protest against the malpractices and corruption prevalent in the HoD. His resignation will lead to even more confusion and aggressive jockeying for positions.
- The DP failed to make a significant impact in the HoD elections. It won only three of the 10 seats it contested, with the polls being no higher than the average for the HoD.

- The DP candidate, and former NIC member Mr Peter Govender, lost to the sitting Solidarity MP in the Southern Natal constituency.
- In the Camperdown constituency, Mr John Iyman, a DP candidate, lost his seat. This is obviously a Solidarity stronghold - Iyman had stood for Solidarity in the 1984 election.
- Sitting MP Pat Poovalingam lost his seat in the Reservoir Hills to the NPP.

HoD Instability

For Solidarity to ensure stability within the HoD over the next five years will require much more than a majority of one. Experience has shown that 'carrot dangling' is so effective a tactic that a simple majority party can easily find itself losing sitting MPs to the opposition overnight. It would therefore be in the interests of Solidarity to enter into some kind of long-term pact with the Democratic Party.

However, neither Solidarity nor NPP can rely on the unconditional support of DP MPs in the HoD. The DP has made it clear that it will not enter into any form of coalition and will exercise its autonomy in the house on the merits of each issue being debated. The DP is also concerned with its national image and relations with the extra-parliamentary MDM. If the DP is serious about building bridges with the MDM it is most unlikely to create the impression that it is flirting with Solidarity.

Should the DP ally itself with Solidarity the opportunity exists for a degree of legitimacy and credibility to be foisted onto the Solidarity Party. However, the MDM and the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses in particular have spelt out that they are just as opposed to building links with the DP MPs in the HoD. This means that the wheeling and dealing for support would largely come from the smaller parties and the Independents, as they would hold the balance of power.

It is clear that the election results of 1989 have not provided for any greater stability in the HoD. The HoD is likely to be wracked with the same confusion, instability and lack of direction that has characterised this house for the last five years. It is the weakest link in a vulnerable tricameral parliament. The elections provide one more telling indication of the need to scrap the tricameral system and search for a more acceptable alternative. (DPA)

The MDM and the Indian Congresses have spelt out their opposition to building links with DP MPs in the HoD

The HoD is likely to be wracked by the same confusion instability and lack of direction as the first five tricameral years

The House of Hard Labour

Counting the Non-Vote 1984 - 1989

By Robert Cameron, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

The September elections for the House of Representatives (HoR) received minimal attention in the media, both during the election campaign and in the post-election aftermath. In analysing the extent of support for the tricameral chamber between the inaugural 1984 and recent 1989 polls, Cameron reports on two issues: firstly, the election dynamics and civil violence in the 'coloured' heartland, the Western Cape; and secondly, the age-old participation vs non-participation debate.

The Labour Party caused the elections to be held in 1989 by refusing to co-operate with the NP until the Group Areas Act is repealed

In 1984 elections for the ('coloured') House of Representatives (HoR) were held on a day on which there were no other elections, and the inauguration of the tricameral system received extensive publicity. In 1989 the HoR elections were held on the same day as the other two ethnic Houses of Parliament. This time around, most media coverage was centred on the white elections with a limited amount focused on the machinations in the ('Indian') House of Delegates (HoD).

The sudden invisibility was quite ironic seeing it was the ruling party in the HoR, the Labour Party, that caused parliamentary elections to be held in 1989 in the first place. The erstwhile State President, PW Botha had wanted to postpone elections for all three houses until 1992, but the leader of the Labour Party, the Reverend Alan Hendrickse refused to assent to this move until the government scrapped the Group Areas Act. In response to the stand-off, the National Party chose what it perceived to be the lesser of two evils; viz an election for the white, coloured and Indian houses in 1989.

Election Dynamics

Perhaps one of the reasons why the HoR elections were largely ignored is that the result was a foregone conclusion. It was always certain that the Labour Party, the only party in this house with a nationwide organisational machine, would win comfortably. In 1984 it had won 76 out of the 80 seats. Although two separate breakaways from the party had reduced its strength to 65 seats by the time parliament

dissolved in May this year, the only real issue was how many seats the small opposition parties would win.

At the dissolution of Parliament, the state of the opposition parties in the HoR was: Democratic Reform Party (7), United Democratic Party (3), Democratic Party (who did not contest any seats in the HoR) (1), Freedom Party (1), and Independent (2), with one vacancy.

Displaying its predominance, the Labour Party nominated candidates in all 80 seats, with 17 of its candidates being elected unopposed. Labour predicted it was going to make a clean sweep of the house, being particularly confident of winning back the seats of 'deserters' who won under the party's banner in 1984. The newly formed Democratic Reform Party (DRP), headed by ex-HoR Minister of Education, Carter Ebrahim, contested 47 seats, Jac Rabie's United Democratic Party (UDP), 18 and Mr Abdul Mohammed's Freedom Party (FP), 17. Altogether, there were 158 candidates for the 63 seats contested in the 1989 elections.

As expected, the Labour Party was returned to power in the HoR, winning 69 seats out of 80. The party swept all the seats in its Eastern Cape stronghold, and it failed to secure only 1 seat each in Transvaal and Natal. However, Hendrickse expressed disappointment in Labour's final tally. In the Western Cape where it traditionally has never been particularly strong, Labour shedded seats to the opposition.

The September polls confirmed the overall trend in the 1988 municipal elections when

the Labour Party's performance in the region was patchy and uneven. Besides failing to gain the two seats in which the opposition was victorious in 1984, viz Ottery (lost to the DRP) and Tafelberg (lost to the FP), it shedded Bishop Lavis, Macassar, Grassy Park and Heideveld to the DRP, Matroosfontein to the UDP and Ravensmead to an Independent. Labour also lost mid-Karoo to the UDP. A notable casualty was Peter Marais, the former leader of the People's Congress Party and now Labour Party member, who failed to win Bishop Lavis.

Opposition Gains

The DRP was formed by Labour Party MPs in the Western Cape (including the ex-chairman and ex-secretary of the regional executive) who were expelled from the party after refusing to accede to a national executive request that MPs should not seek re-election at municipal level. The breakaway party's policy position was to the right of Labour as it favoured a more accommodating and less confrontational attitude towards the National Party government. However, personality conflicts undoubtedly also played a part in the split.

The elections did not go as well as the DRP had hoped but perhaps it fared slightly better than certain predictions that the party would be obliterated at the polls. The DRP's major setback was the failure of its leader, Carter Ebrahim, to get re-elected to parliament. Three of the five seats the DRP gained were won by (former Labour Party) incumbents, which indicates a fair level of personal constituency support. In defeating the incumbent Labour MP, Mr B Ebrahim, chairman of the Grassy Park Management Committee, used the same party machinery (built largely on patronage) he had used to trounce his Labour opponent in the 1988 municipal polls.

Jac Rabie's UDP was initially a left-wing off-shoot of the Labour Party. It broke away because of Labour's accommodating attitude towards the government, although as in the case with the DRP split, personality clashes also played a role. The Labour Party's increasingly confrontational stance after the Hendrickse beach swim in protest of separate amenities, and his subsequent resignation from the tricameral cabinet, began to cut the ground from underneath the UDP.

At one stage the UDP was the official opposition in the HoR but it slowly lost

members, including the vociferous MP for Border, Peter Mopp, who returned to the Labour fold. At the time of the election it held three seats and it retained the same number of seats. Rabie retained his Reiger Park seat but perhaps the biggest shock of the election was the UDP gain in Matroosfontein, which was anticipated to be a neck-and-neck tussle between Labour and the UDP.

Lastly, the minuscule Freedom Party retained its only seat. Also, two Independents were elected, one being an ex-Labour Party member, Mr H Christian in Ravensmead.

Participation Polls

The other major reason for the lack of interest in the HoR election is its essential crisis of legitimacy. The 1984 election poll was 30,9% countrywide but only 11,1% in the Cape Peninsula heartland. The HoR was seen to be racially-based, powerless and imposed on the 'coloured' community. The real issue for the September 1989 election was whether the percentage poll would improve on the 1984 poll.

In the build-up to the election the Labour Party exhorted people to vote, claiming that higher levels of voter participation would improve the party's credibility. On the non-participation side, a whole range of forces including the Mass Democratic Movement, Muslim Judicial Council, and the University of the Western Cape again called for an election boycott. Despite the state of emergency, mass anti-election rallies were held in the region.

The election results were a resounding victory for the non-participation coalition. The percentage poll was 17,6%, a drop of 13,3% from the 1984 poll of 30,9%. Approximately the same number of voters who voted in 1984, went to the polls in 1989. The drop in the percentage poll can be partly attributed to the fact that there were 1 775 751 voters on the voters roll in 1989, compared to 881 984 in 1984 (an increase of almost 900 000). This was apparently due to the automatic registration of people issued with new identity documents since the last election.

It must also be pointed out that conditions in 1989 were more propitious for a higher percentage poll than in 1984. The prior vote system, which did not exist in 1984, gave party organisers an extended period to get voters to the polls. However, it is clear that

The HoR percentage poll was a resounding victory for the voter boycott, dropping from 30,9% in 1984 to 17,6% in 1989

The elections were completely overshadowed by the violent conflict between the riot police and coloured communities

Greater voter participation in municipal polls show there is greater scope for the (coloured) management committees

'coloured' voters generally are not interested in participating in the tricameral parliamentary system.

The elections were completely overshadowed by the violence in the Western Cape. There had already been violent conflict between the riot police and coloured citizens in a number of areas in the period leading up to 6 September. This struggle culminated in widespread arrests, police shootings, injuries and over 20 fatalities on election night, with certain commentators claiming that the violence even eclipsed that of the 1985/86 urban rebellion. A local community newspaper, *South* (7-13/9/89) claimed that 'election '89 was not fought in the polling booths, but on the streets'.

Mitchell's Plain was particularly affected by violence with many cases of alleged police brutality towards local citizens (see Rockman case study in *Urban Monitor*:53). This contributed to the lowest poll in the country in this high density suburb. Only 802 voters out of over 40 000 people, or 1.93%, on the voters roll bothered to cast their vote in Mitchell's Plain. Party organisers in the badly affected areas claimed it was almost impossible to get voters to the poll through burning barricades in a highly intimidating atmosphere.

At the national level coloured representatives lack legitimacy and do not have access to substantial powers of patronage

1988/1989 Comparisons

It is worth comparing the results of the 1989 parliamentary elections with the 1988 municipal elections (see *Indicator SA Political Monitor* Vol6/No4: 18-20).

On the one hand, the results of the 1988 elections represent a stand-off in the sense that there was no clear victor when it came to the participation vs non-participation debate. There was a noticeable increase in 'coloured' voter participation though perhaps not as much as the state had hoped for in areas such as the Western Cape. The increased percentage poll was probably due to a whole host of factors, including the state of emergency which prevented freedom of association and organisation, the Bureau of Information's advertising blitz, the prior vote system and the fact that management committees had promoted patronage through the allocation of housing.

On the other hand, the 1989 elections were a clear victory for the non-participation

lobby. What are the reasons for these contradictory trends?:

- police violence in mid-1989 led to a rejection of the elections in certain areas;
- the Bureau of Information did not promote the HoR elections as enthusiastically as the municipal elections;
- the municipal elections were not fought on official party-political grounds (the names of parties did not appear on the ballot).
- party officials were able to persuade people to vote in the municipal elections on technical grounds, for the provision of improved urban services;
- there appears to be greater antipathy to the HoR because of its explicitly racially-defined political orientation.

Finally, local government is the level of government closest to the citizens in any society. This is not simply a liberal-democratic platitude. It would seem as if there is greater political scope for management committees, especially those with extensive powers delegated from the mother city council. Central-level MPs generally do not have access to the support-building resources and the substantial powers of patronage which operate at the local level.

Despite the Labour Party's convincing victory at the 1989 polls, the tricameral system remains an abomination. Even from the government's perspective, the HoR has outlived its usefulness. Besides the pressing question of African political incorporation, it is patently clear that a new political deal is needed for the coloured community, and that the tricameral system has failed in its objective of co-opting significant numbers into the system.

In the interim, one can expect that the Labour Party is going to sustain its obstructionist stance within the HoR. On entering the tricameral system Hendrickse claimed that the Labour Party's immediate aim was the abolition of the three legislative pillars of apartheid, viz the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act. The party is prepared to withhold its assent from vital but non-controversial legislation to achieve this aim. For the foreseeable future, one can therefore predict greater confrontation between the National Party government and the Labour Party. **DPWA**

ECONOMIC

M O N I T O R

Mamphela Ramphele, founder of community health services and rural development projects. Close associate of black consciousness leader, Steve Biko. Co-author with Francis Wilson of the Carnegie report, *Uprooting Poverty: the South African challenge*. (See Wilson/Simkins debate, this monitor: 35-42.)




Subject: Mamphela Ramphele · Artist: Sue Williamson · Portfolio: Silkscreen Series, *A Few South Africans*

LEADERS IN TRAILERS

**HENRED
FRUEHAUF**

Johannesburg: P.O. Box 782, Germiston 1400.
Telephone: 827-9241



Sanlam

Assuring your tomorrow

Heeley Bates Goodship & Associates 10723/1/R

NEW FROM I.R. Data PUBLICATIONS !

Labour Law Briefs

Labour Law Briefs is a new publication dealing with legal developments in the world of labour relations which is ;

AUTHORITATIVE - the contributing editors (Prof. A. Landman, Prof. P.A.K. Le Roux, Prof. Johan Piron) are all well known and acknowledged experts in their field with extensive experience in the teaching and adjudication of labour law.

REGULAR - LLB is a *monthly* publication which ensures that subscribers are kept up to date with new developments in labour law.

PRACTICAL - although LLB is aimed primarily at a lay readership, it will provide busy attorneys, IR practitioners, unionists and other interested parties with a means of keeping abreast of important trends briefly, factually and objectively !

For further details contact ;

IRD PUBLICATIONS (PTY) LTD.

Box 52711. Saxonwold. 2132. 3rd Floor, MSL House, Baker St. Rosebank.

Tel. (011) 788-5355 Telex. 4-20614.

Sharing the State Pantry

By Francis Wilson

Director, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit,
University of Cape Town

The new conventional wisdom in South Africa is that, wherever possible, activities currently run by the state should be privatised. After the rhetoric of the Reagan-Thatcher years, 'the state' is castigated because it is inefficient, it has grown too big, it misallocates resources, it encourages corruption, it levies high taxes and its overpaid employees are unproductive. Against the background of these debates, some reviewers have strongly criticised the overview report for the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, particularly its recommendations for strategies for action (see Gouws, Louw, Owen, Savage, Volschenk in various periodicals: 1989). In the following two separate contributions, Wilson and Simkins discuss the central issues of redistribution, state intervention, productive investment and economic growth.

In response to our critics, it needs to be said immediately that the Carnegie report, *Uprooting Poverty: the South African challenge* (1989), is by no means blind to the dangers of state interference in the economy. Indeed, the report contains trenchant criticism of much state policy in South Africa, together with warnings about the probable consequences of excessive state intervention in a future economy. At the same time, it points to some of the dangers and drawbacks of recommending free markets for all spheres of economic activity.

The report does not, of course, rely only on state action to deal with the problem of poverty. It also offers a range of other proactive proposals for the creation and distribution of resources. Nevertheless, the issue raised by our reviewers is an extremely important one. It takes us to the heart of the debate: the role of the state in dealing with poverty.

Empirical Evidence

Is the most effective policy for eliminating poverty in any society always to decrease (by means of privatisation), rather than to increase, the role of the state? Let us start with some of the facts.

In the United States total central government expenditure, expressed as a percentage of GNP, between 1972 and 1986 rose from 19% to 25%. In the United Kingdom, over the same period, the proportions rose from 32% to 41%. The Reagan and Thatcher eras notwithstanding, the state, particularly in Britain, is playing a

large and increasing role in these two economies.

Is there, perhaps, some correlation between the relative importance of the state in any economy and the standard of living, the rate of growth, or even the quality of life? And how does South Africa compare with other countries? Table one provides some basic information on expenditure by the central government in nineteen countries. (It is important to note that the data does not take account of the different proportions of decentralised state expenditure through such bodies as provincial or city councils.)

The table indicates that there does not appear to be any correlation whatever between the size of the state, measured by central government expenditure as a proportion of GNP, and the performance of that economy, measured whether by wealth (GNP) per capita or by the average annual growth rate over the past twenty years. Similarly, there does not appear to be any correlation between any of these indicators and the quality of life, measured by life expectancy at birth.

Compared with other countries the table shows the relative size of the state in the South African economy to be not that large, whilst the rate of growth of that economy has been abysmal. Clearly, more empirical work needs to be done. Nevertheless, on the basis of this evidence, if the ratio of central government expenditure to a country's GNP is a reasonable measure of the relative size of the state in a national economy, it cannot be argued that a large state sector is necessarily bad for economic growth or for the quality of life. In other words, the

Is the most effective policy for eliminating poverty in society to decrease or increase the role of the state?

Table 1
Central Government Expenditure and Quality of Life
Comparative Correlations for 19 Countries (1986)

Country	% of GNP	GNP/per capita		Life expectancy at birth (Years)
		\$ US	Ave annual growth (1965-1986)	
India	16	290	1,8	57
Japan	17	12 840	4,3	78
South Korea	18	2 370	6,7	69
Switzerland	19	17 680	1,4	77
USA	25	17 480	1,6	75
Brazil	26	1 810	4,3	65
Singapore	27	7 410	7,6	73
South Africa	27	1 850	0,4	61
Australia	28	11 920	1,7	78
West Germany	30	12 080	2,5	75
Sri Lanka	31	400	2,9	70
Zimbabwe	35	620	1,2	58
United Kingdom	41	8 870	1,7	75
France	44	10 720	2,8	77
Sweden	44	13 160	1,6	77
Botswana	49	840	8,8	59
Netherlands	57	10 020	1,9	77
Hungary	63	2 020	3,9	71
Israel	72	6 210	2,6	75

Note: In some cases (particularly that of South Africa) the World Bank figures, used here, for life expectancy are higher than those provided in the Unicef report, *The State of the World's Children 1988*.

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report 1988*.

Some aspects of economic life can be handled more efficiently and effectively by government than by private enterprise

optimum size of the state can be different in different circumstances. Also, this depends critically on a number of factors including the pattern of expenditure of the state, the efficiency of the bureaucrats who run it and also, to a lesser extent, on fiscal policy and the sources of state revenue.

Funding Expenditure

As far as the actual funding of state expenditure is concerned, clearly there can be a marginal rate of taxation which is so high that all further economic activity is discouraged. We need to examine with some care the various sources of government revenue before asserting that raising further revenue inevitably is going to be economically harmful. Table two, though far from comprehensive, has been drawn up simply to illustrate the point.

From the three parts of this table (see data base) it can be deduced that the level (measured as a proportion) of taxation, namely that on income, profit and capital gains, will itself depend not so much on the proportion of government revenue in GNP as on the way in which that revenue has been collected. Thus although the state in Sweden spends a high proportion of GNP, the level of taxation on income, profit and capital gains is relatively low. Further, South Africa's taxation on these sources of

income is double that of Sweden's (despite the fact that South Africa does not tax capital gains) but significantly less than that of Australia.

In South Africa, domestic taxes on goods and services (such as sales tax) are relatively high as a source of government revenue. On the other hand, social security contributions constitute 0,23% of GNP in South Africa compared with 12,3% of GNP in Sweden. Of course, some of these differences are more in the nature of book entries, with some countries, for example, paying social security benefits out of central taxes rather than from specially earmarked contributions. Nevertheless, they do point to important factors that have to be taken into account in any analysis of the economics of public finance.

A recent World Bank study (Gelb et al:1988) contrasts the views of Adam Smith (for whom most government employees were unproductive) with what is described as the 'now-conventional' approach to development (which 'views government as imperfect but well-meaning and educable, as definitely part of the solution rather than as part of the problem'). Both approaches, the authors assert, are simplistic. What is required is a more sophisticated theory of policy-making. That is surely correct.

Our goal here is more modest, however. It is simply to make the point that whilst some of the arguments in favour of privatisation of nationalised industries have come to be more widely accepted, it surely remains true that there are other aspects of economic life that can be handled more efficiently and effectively by government than by private enterprise. These aspects will vary according to particular historical circumstances and the economy in question.

Policy Challenge

In South Africa today the particular circumstances challenging policy-makers relate to the pattern of poverty and wealth created by a century of industrial revolution. That pattern of deep inequality is mapped out in some detail in *Uprooting Poverty*.

It is this pattern, traced through the rural and urban areas of the country that poses such a formidable challenge to all those thinking through appropriate economic policies to be pursued in a democratic, non-racial society. In arguing as the Carnegie report did, that any new

government must aim both for growth as well as for a redistribution of wealth and income, it was saying no more than what seemed perfectly obvious. However, use of the word 'redistribution' seems to have touched off a strong reaction by some critics.

The essence of our argument is that the extreme inequality that exists in the South African political economy flows in large measure from the way in which the state, controlled for over three hundred years by whites, has been systematically used to appropriate assets (such as land) or to invest resources (for example, in education or in loans to farmers) primarily for the benefit of whites. The process of redistribution requires ways to be found to reshape this historical bias so as to reduce inequality (as measured by a high Gini co-efficient) and to de-racialise the pattern of income distribution.

At the same time, as was argued in the Carnegie report, it is essential that all such policies are compatible with, indeed supportive of, a process of rapid economic growth. One important part of any policy of redistribution with growth is the pattern of state expenditure.

In South Africa between 1949-1975, expenditure on social security, which had been well above that expected for a country with this level of per capita income, fell to well below the value predicted from comparison of the international data (see table 3).

Commenting on these data trends Simkins argues that this perverse movement may in part be explained by changes in the definition of welfare expenditure in a world of greatly changing entitlements, but that it 'must also be a testimony to a period of rigid political repression' (253:30). Great damage was done to, for example, black education in the second half of the 1950s and most of the 1960s by Verwoerd's policy on its financing.

Are there, asks Simkins: 'any indications from the post 1975/76 period to indicate that this percentage decline has been halted or reversed? One is the rapid expansion of education; another is the rise in old-age pensions. No clear indication in respect of agricultural subsidies and health are apparent. Housing policy, on the other hand, is steadily deteriorating under the influence of misguided principles, a circumstance we shall come to regret' (ibid:30).

Table 2.1
Sources of central government current revenue 1986
Expressed as % of total government current revenue

Country	Taxes on income, profit, capital gains (1)	Social security contribns	Domestic taxes on goods & services	Taxes on international trade & transacs	Other taxes	Non-tax revenue
Sweden	16	30	30	1	8	16
Brazil	18	21	16	2	4	39
South Korea	25	2	43	15	4	13
South Africa	52	1	33	3	3	9
Australia	60	0	24	5	1	11
Japan	67	0	19	2	8	5

Table 2.2
Total government current revenue as % of GNP

Country	(2)
Sweden	41
Brazil	27
South Korea	19
South Africa	23
Australia	26
Japan	13

Table 2.3
Taxes on income, profit and capital gains as % of GNP

Country	% (1)x(2)
Sweden	6,6
Brazil	4,9
South Korea	4,6
South Africa	12,0
Australia	15,6
Japan	8,7

Note: Calculated by multiplying column 1 in table 2.1 times the column in table 2.2.
Source: World Development Report 1988

Table 3
Per capita income and social security expenditure

Date	Per capita SA income in 1966 \$US	Actual social security expenditure as % of personal income	Predicted values from international cross-section
1949	362	7,2	3,9
1959	441	6,9	4,6
1969	602	5,1	6,4
1975	658	4,5	7,0

Source: Simkins, Carnegie Conference Paper No253: 30

Three Scenarios

One Carnegie working group examined the possible impact of a policy of redistribution with growth (Simkins et al:1985). It focused on the possibility of increasing social investment expenditure on education, health, social welfare, and housing under different possible growth rates for the economy over the period 1983-1990.

The different prospects, depending on the

The state must reshape the pattern of its expenditure to ensure better housing, health and social security for the poor

Without redistribution, the political stability necessary for investor confidence to sustain economic growth is simply not possible

growth rates assumed, were startling, ranging from:

- a pessimistic scenario with little movement towards justice and development in the context of declining per capita after-tax incomes;
- a median scenario with a more than 100% increase in black per capita educational expenditure, plus 15% improvement in health expenditure, more than 50% increase in social welfare payments to blacks, and 40% state financing of serviced urban housing sites;
- an even more optimistic scenario, based on more rapid economic growth, which meant considerably more rapid progress towards equal per capita state spending.

This exercise, whilst speculative, is useful in focusing attention on two crucial factors: firstly, the importance of the role of the state in shaping the pattern of its expenditure so as to ensure better housing, health, and social security for the very poor in society; and secondly, the fundamental necessity of growth if these goals are to be achieved. In the event, actual growth rates have been even slower than the most pessimistic forecast whilst the demands of the state in other areas, notably defence, have escalated. By the end of the 1980s the state seems more likely to be reducing social investment expenditure than increasing it.

In summarising the findings of a Carnegie workshop convened specially to examine the interaction between macro-economic policy and the problem of poverty, Moll (20:36) concluded that: 'Based on Latin American experience, (it is suggested that) redistribution measures are difficult to implement but are more effective and long-lasting where they are supply-side directed (e.g. land reform) and have a relatively low long-term fiscal commitment rather than undifferentiated demand-side measures (e.g. large nominal wage-rises)'.

Absolute poverty in South Africa is above all a rural or peri-urban problem, affecting particularly the unemployed, aged, women and female-headed households, children, and the sick. Moll argues further that, 'imaginative redistributive efforts would be needed; ideas might include food stamp-type programmes, school feeding, preventative health care, rural housing, land reform combined with large-scale agricultural training and marketing schemes, and effective pensions and social security systems' (ibid: 38).

Deepen Debate

The debate about the proper role of the state in alleviating poverty in South Africa has only just begun. Clearly, there is room for fundamental differences of opinion. But in our view the argument should revolve not so much around some theoretical question about the optimum proportion of GNP that should be spent by the state, as around the practical question concerning how the state actually spends the resources at its disposal in particular circumstances.

Virtually all the criticism of the economic track record of the present government made by the most ardent 'free-marketters' is beyond dispute. Indeed, the degree of waste, of corruption, and of misallocation of scarce resources is a legacy that will haunt South Africa for years to come. But whilst there are areas of the economy that clearly require the bracing medicine of privatisation and removal of government restrictions, it is just as apparent that the government has a central role to play (not least by means of allocating public funds) in reshaping the pattern of growth in such a way that resources are channeled to the poor.

Without redistribution the political stability necessary for investor confidence to sustain economic growth is simply not possible. And in this process of growing towards equality the state has a central role to play. One major task from now on must surely be to deepen the debate as to how best it can do so. **IPJA**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Extracted from *The Political Economy of South Africa*, forthcoming. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1989.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Geib A, JB Knight, RH Sabot. 'Lewis through a looking glass: public sector employment, rent seeking, and economic growth', *World Bank PPR Working Paper Series*, WPS 133, 1988.
- Gouws R. 'Armoede nie so ontwortel', *Die Suid Afrikaan*, April 1989.
- Louw L. 'Demystifying poverty in South Africa', *Southern African Freedom Review*, Vol2/No4, Autumn 1989.
- Moll TC. 'Macro-economic policy and poverty', *Carnegie Post-Conference Series* No20. Cape Town: Saldru, UCT, 1989.
- Owen K. 'Study avoids successes to sustain old argument', *Cape Times* 30/1/89.
- Savage M. Review of Uprooting Poverty, *SA Sociological Review*, Vol1/No2, April 1989.
- Simkins C. 'Public expenditure and the poor: political and economic constraints on policy choices up to the year 2000', *Carnegie Conference Paper* No253. Cape Town: Saldru, UCT, 1984.
- Simkins C, I Abedian, D Hendrie, P Le Roux. 'Justice, development and the national budget', *Carnegie Post-Conference Series* No6. Cape Town: Saldru, UCT, 1985.
- Volschenk C. 'Armoede: hoe om dit uit te roei', *Finansies en Tegniek*, 3/2/89.
- Wilson F and M Ramphela. *Uprooting Poverty: The South African challenge*. Cape Town: David Phillip, 1989.

Can Populism Uproot Poverty?

By Charles Simkins of The Urban Foundation

U*prooting Poverty* by Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele - the flagship of the publications to come out of the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa - is divided into three parts. The first, longest and best part describes 'the many faces of poverty'. It is detailed and accurate. For this achievement alone, the book deserves to be remembered.

The second and third parts of *Uprooting Poverty* are much weaker. They seek to analyse the causes of poverty and to outline a strategy for dealing with it. The analysis is seriously incomplete. For instance, although there is a chapter on macro-forces, there is no serious attempt to locate poverty within the wider economic structure. It follows that the strategic policy discussion is poorly grounded. It is further vitiated by Wilson's and Ramphele's anxiety not to offend any of the sensibilities of their imagined audience. Key controversial issues are often dealt with by making a few rather coy observations rather than constructing arguments capable of yielding serious conclusions.

The book reflects accurately enough the set of concerns articulated in the deliberations of the Second Carnegie Inquiry as a whole and particularly in the papers delivered to the 1984 conference at the University of Cape Town. Indeed, Wilson and Ramphele have gone out of their way to discuss as many conference papers as possible. So the question becomes: Why has the Inquiry turned out in the way that it has?

Three guiding principles are stated by Wilson and Ramphele in the preface to the book. Firstly, it was decided that the centre of gravity of the Inquiry had, as far as possible, to be black rather than white. Secondly, the output was to be produced not by a few expert analysts, but by a large number of people, across a wide political spectrum and from diverse disciplines. Thirdly, the Inquiry was, at the insistence of black participants, to have an action orientation rather than simply a data-gathering orientation, in which whites were more interested (1989:pp x-xi). (In terms of achievement rather than intention, the whites seem to have had their way.)

Given the political environment of the eighties, it was inevitable that the Inquiry should have been greatly influenced by issues around which popular mobilisation took place. Indeed, the purpose of the Inquiry was to try and read into popular politics a concern about poverty. That was an objective both worthy and difficult. Hearts animated by a fervent desire for political power are not necessarily prepared for the careful analysis and hard work needed to tackle the problem of poverty.

The objective entailed two important limitations. Firstly, as Sigmund Freud pointed out long ago, whereas the ethical conduct of a group may rise above or sink below that of an individual, the intellectual capacity of a group is always below that of an individual. Analysis by consensus, as it were, can never reach the originality and brilliance of the best individual work. Secondly, the content of contemporary popular front politics had serious limitations.


For the first time since the post-Sharpeville repression, there was an opportunity for widespread black political mobilisation in the early eighties. Not surprisingly, the extra-parliamentary movement seized on themes and analyses developed in the fifties. But the fifties oppositional synthesis is as obsolete as the classical apartheid of Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd which called it forth. A great deal of it needs revision if real political progress is to be made. But to challenge it in excited circumstances is to risk powerful emotional rejection from the 'mass democratic movement'. Wilson and Ramphele have clearly made a series of judgments about what could and could not be said. It is no accident, then, that their argument brings some things powerfully into focus and leaves others out.

Mobilised Grievance

There certainly is layer after layer of human misery for researchers to investigate in South Africa. When Trudi Thomas describes a paralysed old woman in the Ciskei, persistently scraping the bottom of an empty pot and putting her claw-like hand

One major purpose of the Carnegie inquiry was to try and read into popular politics a deeper analytical concern about poverty

An inherent limitation of this objective is that analysis by consensus can never reach the originality and brilliance of the best individual work



Dog day afternoon in Verda. A grandmother and grandchild made ill by bad water. The Carnegie inquiry uncovered layer after layer of human misery in South Africa

to her mouth in despairing imitation of eating, or when a resettled person exclaims in despair: *Die mense wat dood is, is beter af as die wat soos ons lewe*, the only human response is nausea. To describe such conditions is to expose, and to expose is to indict the system which produces them. Description of poverty becomes a means to the political mobilisation of grievances. Unfortunately, the outcome of grievance mobilisation need not be the eradication of poverty. It won't be, unless analysis is as careful as description, unless the heart is guided by the head.

More depressingly, one sometimes wonders to what extent the eradication of poverty is the ultimate purpose of mobilisation around poverty issues. When I argued at the Carnegie conference that between 1960 and 1980 there had been a substantial percentage reduction in black poverty not only in the cities, but among the majority of black households in the homelands, there was certainly a debate to be had about the reliability of the data and methods used (see Simkins/McGrath in *Indicator SA Economic Monitor*, Vol2/No3:10-16). What was disturbing, however, was the clear indication that many conference participants found the possibility that the contention might be true to be unwelcome.

For anyone really concerned with poverty, my finding, if true, should have been good news. It means that there are aspects of the system which, despite the assault of apartheid on the poor described by Wilson and Ramphele, are working in the direction of reducing poverty. It follows that the

system might not have to be reconstructed at as high a cost as some have supposed. But it also raises questions about the supposedly harmonious relationship between old dreams of the radical reversal of political power and the construction of conditions for the ending of mass poverty. A subtle reassessment of this relationship is the truly subversive intellectual project of our time. Wilson and Ramphele do not attempt it.

A desire to run together themes which may not belong together seriously weakens the strategic discussion. Take the sanctions issue, for instance. Wilson and Ramphele rightly stress that the point to be decided is whether actions, which in the short-term increase poverty, should be undertaken to redistribute political power in favour of the poor and to improve the growth prospects of the economy in the long run. They immediately disclaim any intention to assess any actions in terms of this criterion. But they do not leave the matter quite there. Instead, there appears a symbolic assertion to indicate that, after all, their hearts are in the right place. 'It is not for nothing that the children of Israel complained bitterly to Moses that all his talk would do nothing but worsen their condition' (1989:350).

How is one to respond to such a way of arguing? The Dutch Reformed Church once clearly led the field in respect of the disagreeable habit of identifying the kingdom of God with the political ascendancy of its constituency. Alas, the last decade has seen the emergence of several new close contenders.

Power & Poverty

The expectation of a decisive day on which the battle against poverty changes form is to be found elsewhere in the book. 'We distinguish ... between what can usefully be done now and what will need to be done, after the political transition, in a more democratic society: the former primarily by independent non-governmental organisations, the latter primarily by the state' (1989:259). And again, the cover blurb tells us: 'Tackling head on the fact that in South Africa poverty is a profoundly political issue, the authors of this book argue that without a fundamental redistribution of political power, poverty will remain a central feature of the economy.' The question then is, where will this redistribution of power come from?

One possible answer is that it will come from Americans in aircraft carriers, or in whatever other form direct international intervention in our political life will take. It may. But there is no necessary congruence between the interests of foreigners and the elimination of South African poverty. A more plausible suggestion is that a redistribution of power will come from popular political mobilisation, with the assistance of international pressure and mediation. But unless one takes an highly voluntarist view of mobilisation, one has to investigate the structural possibilities and constraints. By so doing, one arrives at a more sophisticated conception of power than Wilson and Ramphela use.

The central point is that, however the political adjustments may play out, white dominance of social and economic structures is already at an end in South Africa. The main demographic trends illustrate this inevitable conclusion:

- White people at present are 14% of the population; shortly after the turn of the century, this proportion will drop to less than 10%.
- Whites are thinly stretched both in town and country; 60% lived in the PWV region, Durban and Cape Town in 1980, but only 27% of the total population in these areas was white in that year. By the year 2000, this proportion will drop to 15%.
- In 1985, only 370 000 white people lived on the 87% of the land reserved for them. There were ten times as many black people on the same land and twenty-five times as many more in the rural areas of the homelands.

Changing income distribution is no less dramatic. On its slightly idiosyncratic

definition of personal income, the Bureau of Market Research estimates that black people received 32% of personal income in 1970 and 45% in 1985. By the year 2000, this figure will have reached between 55% and 60%. The faster economic growth, the larger will be the share of black income in the whole. These demographic and economic changes demand rapid institutional innovation. It is in responding to these imperatives that the opportunities for the reduction in poverty lie, rather than (worthy activity though it is) raising capital for co-operatives by jumble sales (1989:284). In so doing, one has to consider very carefully the provision of basic needs given the existing level of economic development.

Take housing, for instance. In their prescription for this sector, Wilson and Ramphela do battle with the issue of the roles of the state and the private sector (1989:335-35). Back and forth the argument rages. On the one hand, they see arguments for privatisation as attempts by the privileged to forestall claims by the poor on the common wealth of the society. On the other, they worry about the dangers of state participation becoming bureaucratically hidebound, or a means of control. They refer to scarce resources and competing claims; but they call for a massive infusion of funds from the state. At the end of the day, the outcome remains uncertain: 'The precise form of [state] intervention, the appropriate structures by which it is mediated, the best way of ensuring real democratic participation and a flexible approach to specific local situations, all require further thought and debate' (1989:336).

Economic Constraints

One way to take the argument forward is to observe that, on the basis of international cross-sectional studies, South Africa spends a slightly larger than average proportions of (a) its gross national product on housing and (b) its state budget on public housing and subsidies. As in a number of other fields, the abnormal thing about South African public spending is a large racial differential in entitlements rather than low aggregate spending. In housing, the position is particularly perverse. The richer the group, the more it is provided for by way of public housing and subsidisation of private housing.

The erection of housing with state help for whites, coloureds and Asians presently exceeds what is required to provide for new

The description of poverty can become a means to the political mobilisation of grievances but this will not necessarily eradicate poverty

Questions are left unanswered about the relationship between the transfer of power and the construction of conditions to end poverty

Nothing is said by Wilson and Ramphela about creating the conditions for private investment in enterprises producing marketable output

The reduction of poverty in Southern Africa requires, more than anything else, a climate that will increase the rate of productive investment

households in the cities, whereas fewer than a quarter of the corresponding increment in African households are catered for in this way. Now it is quite impossible at present for the state to provide conventional houses for even all the metropolitan households which need it, by making up the difference between what people can afford and what these houses cost. Anyone who maintains otherwise has lost all sight of that most fundamental economic concept: the budget constraint. What the state can do is equalise entitlements and access to them. By so doing, it can provide secure tenure on at least a serviced site for every urban household which wants it and keep the state budget within bearable limits.

The state can also provide the framework within which households can make their investments with whatever help they can find from employers, trade unions, community organisations etc. The function of the public sector is to provide a context within which the private sector can make its maximum contribution, something which present policy (although seen by Wilson and Ramphela as one of 'privatisation') fails to achieve. Assuming that the delivery of land is determined by market forces and that suitable new financing arrangements are devised, this approach is capable of catering for far more people than reliance on mass state housing construction ever can.

Or take investment. Wilson and Ramphela devote twenty-one pages to proposals for public investment in the fields of sewerage, water, energy, afforestation, housing, health and education. But they say nothing about creating the conditions for private investment in enterprises producing marketable output. But this would worsen one of the three alarming features of the pattern of investment since the mid-seventies - a very high proportion of investment in publicly owned enterprises. (The other two are rapidly increasing capital intensity and a declining rate of investment).

Quite how the pattern as a whole is to be explained is a controversial matter. One possible view is that it has to do with confidence. Economic stagnation in the economies of inter-war Europe may be ascribed to pessimism resulting from the uncertainties of social change. Our economy now requires that (predominantly) white savings can be channeled into investment opportunities arising out of the development of the black market. This requires major innovation and is not so easy to do in a racially segmented society, with the threat of expropriation in the air. But it

has to be done if a wide range of wage-goods is to be produced along with the incomes necessary to purchase them.

Productive Climate

In the thirties, Keynes was in favour of a 'somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment', but this requires a rather more efficient state than we have at present or are likely to have in the future. The alternative is to create a better set of markets for the deployment of loanable funds. To do so requires a supporting set of political agreements.

And here we are at the heart of the matter. The reduction of poverty in Southern Africa requires, more than anything else, a climate within which the rate of productive investment will increase sharply. A number of sub-Saharan African countries have taken national self-realisation to imply strongly statist economic policies. In none of these countries has this led to significant and sustained economic progress; in some it has led to alarming retrogression.

The SADCC countries have all seen the need for a new approach and have taken steps to liberalise their investment policies. The recent initiatives in Zimbabwe are but one manifestation of a process which has been gaining momentum over the past few years. They recognise that there is no choice; the sub-continent continues to need international help to develop. The terms on which this help is obtained must, of course, be the subject of shrewd bargaining. But however the details are worked out, they imply a modified, deracialised capitalism.

Even those who consider socialism to be morally superior to capitalism must come to realise that the path to it lies through a negotiated settlement and an accompanying evolutionary economic policy, rather than through a revolutionary seizure of power. Such a settlement must embody both a thoroughgoing respect for liberty and a commitment to the rapid raising of the living standards of the mass of people. This means taking existing achievements and structure rather more seriously than Wilson and Ramphela have done. In the process, one may find that populist mobilisation and economic development bear a rather more awkward relation to one another than *Uprooting Poverty* supposes. **DPQA**

Reference
Wilson F and M Ramphela. *Uprooting Poverty: The South African challenge*.
Cape Town: David Philip, 1989.

Economic Outlook

by Professors Mike McGrath and Merle Holden,
University of Natal,
Pietermaritzburg and Durban

RETROSPECT

The first six months of 1989 have seen a slowing in the rate of expansion of the economy, with annualised real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) falling from over 3% in 1988, to 1,5% and 0,5% respectively in the first and second quarters of 1989 (see figure 1). Real gross domestic expenditure surged at an annualised rate of 6% in the first quarter of 1989, driven largely by an extraordinary increase in government expenditure. It then resumed on a lowered growth trend at an annualised 2% per annum, reflecting the cumulative impact of the retrospective monetary and credit policy introduced in 1988.

Further evidence of cyclical cooling in the economy is given by:


- the fall in the composite coincident of business cycle indicators in the first and second quarters of 1989, following the leading business cycle indicator which had turned in the first quarter of 1988 (see figure 2);
- a stagnating tendency in the index of manufacturing production of durables in the first half of 1989;
- the volume of wholesale and retail sales, which levelled out in the first half of 1989, and the trend in motor vehicle sales which softened from May 1989 onward;
- the net number of new company registrations, which had levelled out in 1988, but then fell markedly in the second quarter of 1989;
- registered unemployment in the non-African groups, which had declined to a three-year lowpoint of 45 100 in January 1989, but then moved upwards;

- the level of African unemployment, as recorded by the Current Population Survey, which had similarly declined from one million people in August 1987 to 732 000 in April 1989, but then also moved upwards again to 789 000 in May 1989.

Despite these downward indications in the economy, business confidence, as measured by the Standard Bank Index of Business Confidence (see figure 3), has continued to rise. However, the government has seemed constrained and has had to maintain its restrictive policy stance for several reasons.

Firstly, inflation accelerated in the first two quarters of 1989, once again rising above 15% per annum in the second quarter. Secondly, gross foreign reserves were further diminished to a level equal to some 1,5 to 1,75 months' imports of goods. On the current account of the balance of payments, a high level of imports (following a resurgence in private sector fixed investment) and a steep decline in the price of gold from US \$412 at the beginning of 1989 to less than US \$360 late in May 1989, acted to depress the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. This occurred at a time when the current account surplus needed bolstering because of the obligation to repay debt.


Secondly, the growth rate of the broadly defined money supply (M3) has remained above the 18% upper limit of the target range throughout 1989, growing by 23,7% in August 1989. Lastly, the annualised real increase in Exchequer issues to central



government departments for the first four months of the 1989/90 fiscal year amounted to a very large 13,7%, indicating that the Budget objective for 1989/90 of avoiding any growth in real government expenditure may be difficult to attain.

Despite these overhanging problems, by September 1989 the prospects for a 'soft landing' for the economy in 1990 still seemed reasonably good, and interest rates appeared to have reached a ceiling level.

In response to the appreciating US dollar and incipient, escalating inflation, the OECD economies increased their interest rates in the first week of October 1989. With its critically low level of foreign reserves, and the prospect of a short-term capital outflow from a switch in trade financing, the South African Reserve Bank was forced to announce an increase in the Bank Rate from 17 to 18%. The commercial banks immediately followed suit by increasing the prime overdraft rate to 21%.



SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK

The results of the September general election were received with guarded optimism by the local business community and international bankers, who have learnt that a 'wait and see' policy is the best way of dealing with the National Party's promises of reform. The Stock Exchange too was unmoved, indicating the predominance of short-term issues in determining the level of share prices.

However, the wisdom which the new State President has shown in allowing protest marches, in meeting with the delegation of black clerics, and in releasing eight security prisoners (including the key figure of Sisulu), will unquestionably bring with it economic rewards. The timing of these actions will divert an intensification of pressures for sanctions in the USA and Europe, and if the State President can start a process of political negotiation which is recognised as having legitimacy, this in itself may halt further moves to sanctions and disinvestment.

The National Party election manifesto had promised:


- to cut personal income tax, with a reduction in the marginal rates to a maximum of 40% at the income level of R100 000 instead of the present 45% at R80 000;
- to cut company tax to 40% from 50%, together with the phasing out of tax abatements (as recommended by the Margo Commission);
- to cut inflation to more acceptable levels;

- to privatise and deregulate the economy; and
- to reconstruct agriculture and promote tourism.

Progress is now being made with state initiatives in privatisation and deregulation. However, the achievement of the goals of reducing income taxation and the rate of inflation seems remote given the social and security priorities which ratchet government expenditures upwards and also raise the core inflation rate.

The immediate prospects for the economy in the wake of the recent interest rate increases now appear bleak. The increase to 25% in the prime overdraft rate in 1984 rapidly diminished the demand for durable consumer goods, motor cars and new residential construction, while decreasing gross domestic expenditure by 8% in the following year. The level of GDP actually fell in three of the following five quarters.

Interest rates, with a real 6% prime rate, have now risen to approximately the same level as prevailed at the end of 1984. This indicates that a repeat of the 1984-1985 crash in domestic expenditure may be about to occur. An easing of monetary controls cannot be contemplated in the short-term. This will mean that the economy now looks set to land very heavily in 1990.



LONG-TERM PROSPECTS

From a longer run perspective, the future growth performance of the economy still depends critically on external economic events and internal political developments. The South African economy has been buffeted by severe external shocks in the period 1980 to 1987 and this has had a deleterious effect on growth and welfare. It is not clear to what extent foreign disturbances will continue to exert either favourable or unfavourable effects on the welfare of the economy in the coming five years. This will depend on how rapidly the industrialised world grows, whether real international interest rates rise or fall, the changing real value of the foreign debt and changes in the terms of trade.

It has been estimated that over the period 1980 to 1987 the decline in South Africa's terms of trade accounted for a loss amounting to 3,7% of GDP. This loss was largely due to the decline in the dollar price of gold. Changes in the real interest rate paid on foreign debt accounted for a further loss of 5,8%, while changes in the real value of foreign debt accounted for a loss of 12,8% of GDP. In view of such magnitudes it is not surprising that economic performance has been so poor in this period, nor that political unrest reached such heights.

Future world economic scenarios do not hold the promise of any vastly favourable changes which will impinge on the South African economy. The

International Monetary Fund is forecasting world growth rates in the range of 2 to 3% for the next five years. This rate of growth will only be sufficient to counteract the long-run underlying downward drift in commodity prices, and hence commodity prices should remain steady. Changes in real international interest rates will therefore depend very much on what the US decides to do about their budget deficit. If it improves we would look for a decline in nominal interest rates internationally, with beneficial effects for servicing South Africa's foreign debt.

Future changes in the real value of foreign debt are a function of value of the rand coupled with changes in prices of tradable goods. It is not anticipated that these changes are likely to be substantial over the next five years. In any event, as the foreign debt is repaid and the likelihood of capital inflows is low in the present political climate, changes in the real value of the foreign debt will be of lesser importance to welfare in the economy.

The world price of gold remains an uncertainty in any look into the future. The price of gold continues to drive the South African economy. The demand for gold is very different to the demand for other commodities, in that gold is used both as a monetary asset and for industrial purposes. However, it has been shown that in recent years the price of gold and the value of the US dollar have moved together. In



Union members toyi-toyi at the Cosatu congress, July 1989. Without genuine political reform, economic problems cannot be resolved and black worker expectations met.

AFRPIX: CEDRIC NUNN

particular, a one percent appreciation in the trade-weighted value of the dollar has been associated with a one percent fall in the dollar price of gold.

It would appear that any prognosis as to the price of gold would depend on the expected future value of the dollar. Once again, if the US twin deficits were reduced this would have to be accompanied by a real depreciation of the dollar and concomitantly, an increase in the price of gold. It is also possible that a shift in investor portfolios away from dollars could occur as a result of adverse expectations regarding the US foreign debt. This we would see as being favourable for the future price of gold. However, a cautious growth scenario would assume no large gold price increases over the next five years.

Isolated Economy

Economic sanctions have had their effect on the economy by leading to adverse shifts in the international terms of trade facing the country. Financial sanctions have insured that South Africa is unable to receive resource transfers which would encourage the accumulation of capital and improve our standard of living. In contrast, we are servicing our debts by a real resource transfer to our creditors. Furthermore, many of our creditors are reluctant to receive this debt service in the only possible way by trade surpluses because of the erection of barriers to exports in the form of sanctions. It is tribute to belt-tightening by South Africans that we have been able to dampen imports and a tribute to exporters to have found new markets in the face of adversity.

In the process of generating trade surpluses of the requisite size to finance capital outflows a real

depreciation of the currency has occurred. This means that the real wage in terms of tradable goods has declined. The additional foreign exchange to service and repay debt has been obtained by putting the country's resources on sale on world markets. South African exports have been shown to be insensitive to world prices, and to generate additional export volume prices have had to be substantially reduced.

Despite attempts to isolate South Africa from the world economy by sanctions it still remains open to the vagaries of international economic events. As the economy becomes more isolated, however, external shocks will be felt less keenly. This insulation of external shocks will only be achieved at the cost of a lower level of the benefits from free trade and without the benefit of foreign savings and investment.

A glimmer of hope has emerged once again on the political front. With new developments, there is the prospect that the South African economy eventually may be able to break its tendency to international isolation and move onto a higher growth path, unconstrained both by sporadic domestic political instability and intensifying levels of international impatience.

As economists, concerned with the welfare of all South Africans, which we believe will be maximised within a non-racial free market economy, we must add our support to the demands for the release of all political prisoners, the ending of the state of emergency, and the commencement of constitutional negotiations at which all the black leaders with legitimacy are represented. These are preconditions for genuine political reform, which patently is the route which South Africa must follow if it is to achieve its true long-run economic potential. **IPVA**

URBAN

M O N I T O R

Nokukanya Lutuli, widow of ex-ANC President-General and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Chief Albert Lutuli. Participants in defiance campaign of 1950s, they lived in banishment in Grootville, Natal, until the Chief's death in 1967. (See reports on defiance campaign of 1989, this monitor: 49-57.)



Subject: Nokukanya Lutuli · Artist: Sue Williamson · Portfolio: Silkscreen Series, *A Few South Africans*

A major objective of the defiance campaign is to force open legal space for the extra-parliamentary organisations

It aims to create a popular mood for a revitalisation of opposition structures made dormant by the state of emergency

with amandla salutes from the top of a building. They completely dwarfed the white supervisors on either side, who looked on passively, sadly - perhaps even with a certain resignation?

This striking image symbolises the marches as a whole. White minority rule had become irrelevant. Obsolete. The marches represented the non-racial democracy of the future. This was most dramatically conveyed outside the Durban City Hall by the lowering of the South African flag and the hoisting of the African National Congress (ANC) flag in its place.

In a sense, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was indeed in control, albeit temporarily. It had taken over the main streets of the major cities of the country - for the first time ever in the long struggle against apartheid. The ideological, psychological and emotional impact is clearly of enormous value.

MDM Strategy

The defiance campaign did not fall from the skies. It is part of the MDM's strategy and is linked to its many other campaigns - including those around the elections, the Labour Relations Act, the ANC Constitutional Guidelines, the Conference for a Democratic Future, and the consumer boycott.

However, the defiance campaign has not flowed from any finely-tuned blueprint worked out by some secret, centralised structure of the MDM; and there is a sense in which the spontaneous energies of the masses have also defined the form and content of the campaign. Nevertheless, there is a method in the campaign.

A key aspect of the defiance campaign is to force open legal space for the extra-parliamentary organisations. The MDM has increasingly felt that the state of emergency persists in part because the people have come to accept it. As a speaker at an unbanning of the South African National Students Congress (Sansco) meeting said: 'The defiance campaign is aimed to lift the most important state of emergency - that within ourselves. We have to lift the fear of the government from our hearts and to challenge our own obedience to unjust laws'.

The MDM decided that as from 20 August 1989 - the fifth anniversary of the formation of the United Democratic Front

(UDF) - public meetings would be held throughout the country at which the UDF and its banned affiliates would be 'unbanned' by the people. Restricted political activists would also refuse to conform to their restrictions. Linked to this campaign would be the defiance of segregated facilities and the call for 'open cities'.

The general aim of the defiance campaign is to bring people out into open struggle against the regime, re-build their self-confidence, and create the mood for the revitalisation of structures made dormant by the state of emergency. It was designed to shake off a certain lethargy that had crept into the ranks of the extra-parliamentary movement.

The defiance campaign has served to re-assert the presence of the extra-parliamentary movement as an alternative to participation in the tricameral parliament. It evolved in the direction of overshadowing the elections, suggesting to people that the MDM was not simply calling for an abstract boycott of the elections but offering them concrete opportunities to shape the future of this country through their own struggles. The low polls in the House of Delegates and House of Representatives (see Bhamjee and Cameron in this edition:27-32) must be partly attributed to the impact of the defiance campaign.

By focusing on petty apartheid beach and hospital restrictions, the campaign also serves to expose how hollow the government's reform initiatives are, so making it more vulnerable to greater pressure from the international community. The sight of police zealously baton-charging and sjambokking black picnickers on a 'whites-only' beach must surely appear ludicrous overseas and further alienate people from the South African government.

Negotiation Pressure

The defiance campaign has also increasingly become a means through which pressure is put on the government to create a climate conducive to genuine negotiations with the authentic representatives of the majority. The campaign is not only meant to reinforce support for the MDM but to convey to government the centrality of the MDM to any negotiated settlement of South Africa's future.



The freedom march in Durban city centre, September 1989. More than 170 000 people have taken part in similar marches in all the major centres

AFRAPIX: WARREN PARKER

Another important aspect of MDM activity is to ensure that Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners are not released into a vacuum. The people must be mobilised and organised to receive their leaders back into their organisations and communities. The release of eight Rivonia trialists and others, including Sisulu, Mhlaba and Kathrada, announced in mid-October, is an important case in point.

One of the most striking aspects of the defiance campaign is the extent to which it has deepened the non-racial content of the MDM and drawn in people from the widest levels of society. This has served as a forerunner of the massive 'Conference for a Democratic Future'. The energies unleashed by the campaign, harnessed at this conference into concrete strategies and goals, will enable the MDM to unite the maximum number of people in the struggle against apartheid.

In a sense the campaign can already claim concrete successes in respect of the desegregation of facilities. The Johannesburg City Council's recent decision to lift racial restrictions on all public amenities might well have happened anyway - but the defiance campaign must surely have put pressure on the council and facilitated the mood for its implementation. East London has also gone the same way, and other city councils are also talking of following suit. The government is also giving considered attention to reviewing the Separate Amenities Act.

Contrast with 1950s

The momentum for the defiance campaign can be traced to the hunger strikes by detainees in 1988. This brazen defiance from behind bars was remarkably successful in securing the release of detainees (even though several were then served with restriction orders).

The reintroduction of segregated facilities in Boksburg and Carletonville also led to calls for a defiance campaign. And when in June this year the government renewed the state of emergency despite earlier suggestions that it would not, the MDM was clear that the people themselves would have to take action to lift the emergency. The deaths and injuries to people caused by the police during the anti-election campaign in the Western Cape added further impetus to the campaign and led directly to the protest marches.

To some extent the proud defiance campaign tradition of the 1950s loomed over decisions about strategy. But the present defiance campaign also differs from that of the 1950s in quite fundamental respects.

Firstly, the number and range of participants in the present campaign is far greater than in the 1950s. The congress movement that organised the earlier campaign and its participants were far more homogeneous and directed than the broad movement organising the present campaign and its participants. The role of the churches is considerably more significant in the present campaign. And unlike in the 1950s, the trade unions today are very powerful. They are a key component of the defiance campaign (see Segal in this edition:68-70), particularly because of the severe repression suffered by political and community organisations since 1985.

Secondly, the 1950s campaign took place in the context of a government relentlessly implementing racial policies and a state that was becoming increasingly powerful. The campaign was in a sense defensive, seeking to prevent the further encroachment of racial policies on the whole society. The present campaign occurs at a time when the government is moving away from rigid racial policies and the state is somewhat more fractured and indecisive. The MDM is

The defiance campaign will also both reinforce support for the MDM and convey to government its central role in any negotiated settlement

The state has sought to co-opt the defiance campaign within the framework of the reform initiative

The major challenge facing the MDM is to convert its mobilising success and amorphous anti-apartheid support into organisational gains

on the offensive as part of an overall thrust to transform society. The transfer of social power to the majority is certainly on the agenda today.

Thirdly, the 1950s campaign was meant to signify the congress movement's turn towards mass struggle instead of relying only on petitions, memoranda, deputations and other forms of representations to the government, involving leadership figures only. The campaign was meant to create mass organisation. The current defiance campaign occurs on the basis of an established commitment to mass struggle and to a more developed organisational infrastructure. The purpose is not so much to form new organisations but rather to revitalise and re-shape existing organisations.

The 1950s campaign, moreover, was linked to the mobilising appeal of leadership figures, while the present campaign has a much more organisational focus. The earlier campaign also had a greater civil rights content. Ultimately, the fundamental difference between the two campaigns is that the present campaign, taking place in the context that it does, has the potential of significantly advancing the struggle for the abolition of apartheid.

Contradictions

The defiance campaign is not without its contradictions for the MDM. To begin with, the links with other aspects of MDM strategy and goals have not been clearly spelt out. Hence different groups have different interpretations of the campaign. The broad range of participants has provided for a somewhat amorphous anti-apartheid consciousness. The clearer content and vision of the congress movement, particularly its emphasis on the role and interests of the working class, has not necessarily been asserted. Certain tensions have already surfaced, with some church representatives opposing the inclusion of Communist Party banners in the marches.

It is not only the extra-parliamentary movement that has gained through the defiance campaign. The state has too. Initially the state reacted harshly against the campaign, particularly in the Western Cape, resulting in an outcry locally and internationally - but it subsequently relented and allowed most of the campaign activities to go ahead. The protest marches have come to represent the most visible

demonstration of the 'new' FW de Klerk era and have certainly helped to boost the state's image at home and abroad.

The state has sought to co-opt the campaign within the framework of its reform initiative. This poses new ideological tasks for the MDM - especially around its contention that the state is not committed to any meaningful changes.

While persistent use of protest marches in support of concrete local demands might be very useful, the MDM will have to guard against the dissipation of too much energy in organising marches around national demands. The over-use of marches could also lessen their ideological impact as they become somewhat institutionalised and disappear from the front-page of newspapers. While the marches have obvious value in boosting people's morale, they should not serve to create a false sense of optimism and immediacy of victory.

The major challenge facing the MDM is to convert its mobilising success into organisational gain. Not only do organisations participating in the campaign obviously need to be strengthened and united into a more clearly-defined alliance, but there are significant numbers of free-floating individuals participating who have to be channelled into organisational structures.

On what terms and for exactly how long the government will allow the defiance campaign to continue is not clear. The MDM will clearly have to think of creative new ways of taking its support forward. Its strategies will also have to make allowance for the emergence of a more strident extra-parliamentary rightwing which is obviously vehemently opposed to the open expression of mass defiance that is sweeping over the country. There is also an imperative to convert the symbolic desegregation of facilities when protestors converged on them into a permanent lifting of racial restrictions.

These are heady times. There is enormous flux and fluidity. It is much too soon to spell out the full significance of the defiance campaign. In many senses it is how the MDM uses the enormous potential that the defiance campaign has opened out that will determine the ultimate significance of the campaign. However, the initial signs are that the defiance campaign of 1989 will constitute a watershed in this country's history. **TPA**

The SAP & the State First Line of Defence

By Professor Andrew Prior, Department of Political Studies,
University of Cape Town

The South African Police (SAP) form a crucial part of the country's coercive political system. They are the government's first line of defence, implementing and maintaining official policy. How capable is the SAP of defending the South African state? Are mass protest politics and reform policies (see case studies:54) exposing racial and ideological divisions among police ranks? In identifying the changes made to the SAP since the mid-1980s, the author argues that the police will not buckle under extra-parliamentary pressure.

Organisational changes during the 1980s have taken the form of integrating the police force more closely into the state security management system, blurring the relationship between the police and the military. The rise to prominence of the State Security Council in the 1980s reflected the culmination of the state's response to both internal and external opposition. The organisational arrangement was a major contributor to the maintenance of state integrity from 1976-1977 and, more noticeably, between 1985-1987.

Changes made to the SAP since 1985 suggest that the State Security Council identified weaknesses in its structure and moved to rectify them. These weaknesses had to do largely with overall size, representation in the SAP of those population groups over whom increased policing was demanded, and specialised functions which the SAP was now being called upon to perform.

Displaying Division

In a society deeply divided by race and class, the size and composition of the police force is important to the state and to the disputants in society. Groups who are unrepresented or under-represented in the police force will see the imbalance as a reflection of their political vulnerability.

Furthermore, societies which share resources unequally may divide police security unequally. Police protection is offered to the dominant group while the police may view and treat the subordinate group as a potential threat to the established order. The police may then come to be seen

as upholders of this unequal division. In a divided society the state must, therefore, constantly monitor members of subordinate groups in the police force to ensure their loyalty.

The divisions within South African society, and the unequal division of political power, have made the composition of the police force an important issue for the state. The size of the black population makes it impossible for the numerically smaller white group to provide a policing function for the entire society, and the state needs black recruits to police their own communities. This need is aggravated by the increased reluctance of recently urbanised Afrikaners to join the SAP because of other economic fields now open to them.

Since 1976 black political assertiveness expressed through demonstrations and riots has begun to feature prominently in police priorities. This new challenge has demanded an increased policing presence. The rapidly increasing black population will put further pressure upon the government's intention to increase the police complement to 68 000 by the year 2004, when the population of the country will have grown by at least 80% of its present size.

In the accompanying data base, table one shows the growth in the overall size of the regular SAP. Table two represents the relative numbers of blacks to whites in the SAP. It should be noted that difficulties in recruiting have meant that the actual composition of the force between 1983-1987 has been about 15% less than the authorised complement.

In a divided society the state must constantly monitor members of subordinate groups in the police force to ensure their loyalty

The increasing number of black policemen has demanded a revision of racial policies of recruitment and deployment

Data Base

Table 1:
SAP Manpower, Relative Strengths

YEAR	POPULATION	AUTHORISED POLICE	POLICE PER 1 000 POP.
1912	6,1m	8 700	1,42
1938	10m	11 100	1,11
1958	15m	28 500	1,90
1972	23m	34 500	1,48
1983	28m	43 900 (actual:37 000)	
1987	32m	61 197 (actual:60 390)	1,53

Note:
These figures exclude the Police Reserve, the Reserve Police Force, and Special and Municipal Constables.

Table 2:
SAP Manpower, Racial Breakdown

YEAR	ACTUAL WHITE COMPLEMENT	ACTUAL BLACK COMPLEMENT
1912	3 169	2 933
1925	6 354	10 219
1950	10 468	7 343
1975	17 719	15 903
1983	18 302	18 824
1986	26 463	22 458

Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the South African Police

Low status and unpopular methods of law enforcement could be expected to slow down black recruitment into the police force

Reserve Capacity

The regular police force is assisted by two auxiliary police services, known as the Police Reserve and the Reserve Police Force. The former is made up of ex-members of the SAP. When called up, members of this force assist in the performance of regular duties in police stations throughout the country, or are involved in para-military police operations on the country's borders.

In 1986 the Police Reserve totalled 18 302 white and 18 824 black members. Some of these reservists were called upon to perform duty at police stations. Since 1983 it has become common for national servicemen (military conscripts) to be allocated to the Reserve for training and service - an indication of the difficulty experienced by the police in obtaining white recruits.

A second group, the Reserve Police Force, is made up of lay-persons recruited from a wide variety of professions, who provide a part-time, unpaid service of a minimum of eight hours per week. In 1986 this group numbered approximately 20 000 members, of whom about 75% were whites. In 1981,

a Junior Reservist division was introduced made up of white schoolboys over the age of 16. And in 1982, women were first admitted as reservists. These innovations, again, are an indication of the extent of white personnel shortages in the force.

The conclusion is clear: the actual size of the regular police force is no indication of its potential size should the services of the various auxiliary divisions be called upon. In times of emergency it has the capacity to draw upon about 100 000 reasonably well-trained personnel, which is almost double the size of the regular force.

Black Recruitment

The increasing number of blacks in the SAP have demanded a revision of racial policies of recruitment and deployment. The government was under increasing pressure to move towards a more rational utilisation of black personnel in governmental structures. The general principle has remained, however, viz that blacks (including coloureds and Asians) must be recruited into the force to police their own population groups.

This policy does not mean that black police officers cannot exercise their authority over whites (which is the exception rather than the rule), or white officers over blacks (which is general practice). But segregated residential areas and public facilities make it possible for police to provide a policing function for their assigned communities.

Low status and unpopular methods of law enforcement could be expected to slow down, or even stop black recruitment into the SAP. In fact, this has not happened for two reasons. Firstly, in a labour surplus economy, like South Africa, political factors and even physical danger become less significant if measured against the absence of alternative employment. The SAP offers relatively high wages (salary differentials are on the basis of grade rather than race) and better employment security than any other sector of the economy. Secondly, recruitment into the SAP has been stepped up in the rural areas where police action is less overt and job opportunities are bleakest.

Political perceptions may have reduced the number of applicants to the SAP, particularly in the urban township areas, but supply continues to outstrip demand. There is every indication that this trend will persist far into the future.

Besides the conventional divisions of the SAP which are geared towards preventing crime and apprehending offenders, a variety of special units have been created for the specific purpose of controlling political opposition. In addition to the multi-faceted intelligence services which provide a link between the police, military, and the SSC, there are a number of combat divisions which are either directly part of the SAP organisational structure, or which serve some auxiliary role. These units include:

- *Reaction Units*

Originally termed the 'riot police', these units have their origins in the 1976 uprisings. The units were called into existence as a direct response to the SAP's inability to control mass uprisings without indiscriminate shooting and violence. Between 1976 and 1981 these units consisted of policemen trained in riot control, who donned camouflage uniform and used special weaponry.

After 1981 the Reaction Unit became a permanent body, divisions of which were based in the major cities. During 1986 the scale of the uprisings and the numerical swamping of the police by demonstrators made most of these methods ineffective. Armoured vehicles, shotguns and teargas, assisted by helicopter surveillance, became the standard methods of control of township protest and violence.

- *Special Task Force*

Established in 1975, this unit has the function of acting in cases of hijacking, siege, sabotage, and abduction. Relatively small in size, the Special Task Force has strict selection procedures, strong discipline, and its members undergo constant training. In addition, it is highly mobile and able to move to virtually any point in the country at short notice.

- *Counter-Insurgency Unit*

The African National Congress (ANC) campaign of armed incursions into South Africa since the early 1970s persuaded the government to establish this anti-guerrilla unit. Specially trained, highly mobile, and familiar with methods of rural guerrilla warfare, the Counter-Insurgency Unit has been directly responsible for containing and neutralising the ANC's military offensive in South Africa's border areas.

- *Special Guard Unit*

This elite corps has the function of guarding government buildings, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. Consisting of hand-picked members who are trained in hand-to-hand combat, firearms, explosives, anti-terrorist techniques and 'intelligence

Policing Popular Protest Iron Fist vs Velvet Glove

Case Study 1: Rockman's Riot Charges

The police officer, Lieutenant Gregory Rockman, who blew the whistle, saying *police were responsible for the violence* in the Western Cape, believes (anti-election) demonstrations would remain peaceful if only police kept away: 'I cannot allow people any longer to be brutally attacked by police the way they have been since 1 August. I put it on record that the riot unit started this unrest within Mitchell's Plain which I have seen with my own two eyes.'

Lieutenant Rockman had seen protesters standing peacefully who had been attacked by riot policemen. 'I mean, if a child runs away how can you still chase him and sjambok him? How can you still go into the classrooms, kick classroom doors open, just take whoever you wish to take, disrupt a school that is orderly? You cannot do it, you cannot.'

He said riot police said they were acting 'on instructions', but that they should have used their discretion. 'Without warning they just rush the people like wild dogs, even the innocent bystanders, they just hit them like mad. They just go berserk.'

Rockman cited an incident in Mitchell's Plain on Tuesday 5 September, which had made him speak out after 12 years' loyal service to the force. A group of demonstrators had gathered in the town centre. 'I gave them 20 minutes to disperse. They were standing peacefully with placards and singing. I just moved away to get out of sight.'

'I said to some of the riot units: "Gentlemen, listen, this is the time I've given these people, I just want to ask you to take a back seat, out of sight, because our presence actually provokes the people." Then one of the crowd came running to me. He said: "Lieutenant, you've just said you're giving us time to disperse but look, these (the riot police) people are beating us to pieces here" '

When Rockman saw his orders had been countermanded, he was shocked. 'I thought to myself: "I feel so ashamed, being humiliated in this fashion, by my own colleagues." I tried to speak to the crowd because now they were becoming furious.' Among the group were shoppers and bystanders who were totally innocent. 'If I had got innocently assaulted like that I'd also get mad', he said

'I've never used teargas. I've never used a gun or pointed a gun at anybody. I've never beaten anybody.' Rockman said in unrest situations he instructed his men to stand still, while he went to "dialogue" with the people. 'And it worked every time. After I've spoken to them, they don't change their views, but they are willing to co-operate'.

'I don't want to play an oppressive role, because I never joined the police force with that idea. I joined up for prevention of crime and protecting people. And how can I protect them if I commit unlawful acts against them?'

Footnote:

The Minister of Law and Order announced the launch of an internal inquiry into police conduct in pre-election conflict in the Western Cape. Subsequently, two senior officers from the Reaction Unit have appeared in court and been acquitted.

*Extracts from interview with Lieutenant Rockman by Carolyn McGibbon, *Sunday Tribune*, 10 September 1989.

gathering', the Special Guard Unit is the South African equivalent of the British SAS. Established in 1984 with an initial intake of 1 000 members, it was intended originally to increase its strength to 10 000 by 1990.

- *Township Police*

The increasingly troubled black townships persuaded the government to look for alternative methods of tightening control. To do this it gave permission in 1981 to 32 black local authorities to establish their own police forces. Although not part of the SAP, township police recruits receive a three month training from the SAP and they enjoy a 'special relationship' with the force. By 1988 all major local authorities, including Soweto, had taken steps to set up their own police units. A primary function of the township police is to protect the

black authorities who were frequently accused and attacked for being functionaries of the white state.

- *Special Constables*

In 1985, in response to increased black township unrest the police formed a special unit to patrol the townships, using methods learned from the British military in Northern Ireland. Armed with shotguns, these units are deployed on foot-patrols in groups of six and step up their presence in times of increased tension. By August 1987, 4 000 *kitskonstabels* had received training and were deployed in the townships nationwide. The government plans to increase their numbers to 8 000 within five years.

There has been no shortage of applicants in spite of poor conditions of service, low pay and the unpopularity of these constables among black communities. The minimum standard of education is standard six, training is limited to six weeks, and salaries were as low as R13 per day in 1988. It is clear that in spite of difficulties, this unit is meeting the state's needs of township pacification and has become a permanent feature of township life.

- *Private Security Firms*

The policing function is considerably lightened because of legislation compelling private businesses to provide their own security function. Certain industries, known as 'keypoints', are obliged to provide protection against acts of sabotage. This has given rise to a burgeoning private enterprise police force, comprising 'security' firms which have the function of providing such protection. By 1988 there were an estimated 500 security operations in the country's economic heartland, the PWV area.

- *Police Intelligence*

This unit is another integral part of the contemporary police function, and is closely tied in with the national intelligence system.

Case Study 2: Playing Ball with Beach Defiance

The well-behaved manner of the thousands of people who thronged to Durban's South and Addington beaches on Sunday was 'a little feather in the cap' for the MDM, said Major-General Johann van Niekerk, SAP Regional Commissioner in Natal. And MDM spokesman Mewa Ramgobin said in the context of the the South African situation and harsh police action in the Western Cape, the SAP in Durban could be complimented on their behaviour.

South beach, Durban, was a fascinating place because it reflected the division and unity of South African society. It was evident those divisions carry right through into the police force, and the Minister of Law and Order could face serious problems in the future if the government continues to use the police to enforce petty apartheid

The unity in society stood out starkly as hundreds of whites, wearing yellow sun visors with slogans saying 'free the beaches' joined the throng of Indian, African and coloured protesters. But the divisions were also starkly there as the white right-wingers, who reversed the MDM sun visors to write on them 'whites only', constantly harassed and even assaulted people. At one stage they even assaulted some people being led away by the police.

While all this was going on, an Indian policeman who had been insulted and a white policeman started arguing loudly about the lack of action being taken against the right-wing. African and Indian policemen also started voicing their displeasure to anyone who was prepared to listen about the white right-ring and about the lack of action of their white colleagues. A number of white policemen also were not too happy to be there, and one white policeman who put on a MDM visor was ordered to remove it.

As the situation with the right-wing got nastier, Captain MacIlravey called in Captain Vernon Hunter of the Reaction Squad who placed a barrier of policemen around the right-wingers. The right-wingers then started haranguing the Indian policemen. Eventually Captain Hunter had to order his men to open a passage through the right-wingers to let some Africans and some of his Indian policemen off the beach.

The differences within the police force were also noticeable when some of the MDM people did something to cause offence, such as displaying an ANC banner. It was always a small group of white policemen, a few with quirks or plastic hoses, who enthusiastically ran them down. Their black colleagues and most of the white policemen merely looked on.

*Extracts from article by Bruce Cameron, *Daily News*, 4 September 1989.

SAP/SADF Overlap

The traditional division between the military task (maintaining territorial integrity) and the police task (maintaining internal stability) has largely fallen away in South Africa. The dispersed nature of the opponents of the South African government has effectively blurred the distinction between the military and police function. Some dissidents belong to the exiled ANC/SACP alliance, which mounts guerrilla warfare operations from outside the country's borders; other opponents are

permanently resident within South Africa, some of whom have also taken to violent attacks against the state.

In 1960, following the Sharpeville shootings, the army was put on alert. A 1963 amendment to the Defence Act gave the authorities the power to deploy troops 'in aid of the civil power' as represented by the SAP, when it was judged to be necessary. Again in 1976, the army was alerted and provided limited assistance to the police.

In 1984, continued and widespread opposition in the townships forced the government to call up 7 000 troops and to mount a massive display of force in support of the police. By 1985 a total of 35 372 SADF members were deployed in 96 African townships nationwide in support of the SAP in the prevention or suppression of internal disorder. These numbers peaked to about 40 000 in 1986 but have dropped significantly since.

By 1988 the special constable unit was performing the task of an active day-to-day policing presence, with units of the Army acting as a backup force in times of increased conflict.

Strengthened Role

The government's long-term response to future periods of widespread civil unrest will be conditioned by its willingness to have the military intervene in domestic conflict, even though this creates the impression that a state of civil war exists in South Africa.

In addition to the organisational structure of the SAP there is also a vast range of bureaucratic and police controls which regulate the lives of the country's residents.

Taken together, the organisational structure and numerical strength (both actual and potential), make the SAP a body capable of wielding formidable power within the political system. The SAP receives the full support of the state, and is protected from the critical gaze of the press, the checks of parliament and the control of the courts.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this study. Firstly, the size of the police force actually belies its capacity to call up large-scale support, both amongst its own former members or conscripts, or amongst disaffected blacks, should the need arise.

Case Study 3: Facing up to Freedom Marches

Column upon column of marching, chanting protesters winding through the streets of Cape Town and Johannesburg vividly illustrate the huge number of people who can be mobilised against the status quo by extra-parliamentary opposition leaders once they are given, or win for themselves, room for manoeuvre.

The image of potentially uncontrollable crowds haunts the security establishment. Blacks have increasingly had to be drafted into the security forces and into the bureaucracy generally, to supplement the 'thin white line'. Black loyalty to the administration cannot be taken for granted, however. African, coloured and Indian policemen account for about 40% of the 65 000 strong SAP force.

The more black policemen are deployed in the frontline to enforce unpopular laws, the greater the risk that they will become alienated from their own people and, hence, the greater risk that they will enforce the law half-heartedly, quit, or even mutiny. For black policemen the state of emergency regulations set them against their own people, casting them into the role of repressors of dissent rather than protectors against criminals.

A front page newspaper photograph comes to mind. It shows a black policeman burning his uniform at the height of the township revolt in 1984-86. So, too, does the 1987 trial and conviction of two black security policemen, Daniel Mokgabudi and Cedric Rabuli, for giving information to the outlawed African National Congress. A pamphlet handed out during the protest march in Johannesburg, issued by the 'ANC inside South Africa' and addressed to black soldiers and policemen, declares: 'Now is the time to choose'....

The police were once used to enforce the liquor laws and the pass laws which prohibited black people from drinking booze and sought to control their movements from cradle to grave. They were impossible to enforce; they were thus abandoned, partly due to pressure from the police themselves.

Similar pressure is building up among policemen of all colours against the emergency regulations. It is fuelled by exhaustion as they are summoned, day in and day out, to enforce the Emergency

*Extract from article by Patrick Laurence, *Daily News*, 19 September 1989.

Secondly, bureaucratic methods of control, which have been partially internalised by the subordinate population group, make the physical policing of the society less necessary. When this is required, physical policing can be readily operationalised, if necessary, by calling in the military. In addition, there may be police co-optation of black communities through exploiting differences of interest.

To conclude, opponents of the South African state are mistaken if they believe that the state's first line of defence is likely to give way under increased pressure. The state's capacity to resist its opponents was tested in the 1986-1987 period and was not found wanting. The post-1987 organisational and numerical changes suggest yet further strengthening of the South African Police. **IPAA**

Segregated Schooling Changing White Attitudes

By Monica Bot and Lawrence Schlemmer

Survey findings show that there has been an important shift in white South African attitudes on the controversial issue of school integration between 1981 and 1987. Bot and Schlemmer comment on the liberalisation of beliefs and stress the voluntary choice of policy options.

The government is wrong to claim that the overwhelming majority of white voters reject open schools under all circumstances

Under the influence of various demographic and ideological shifts in South Africa school integration is becoming a more and more important issue for politicians, educators, parents and other interest groups. While the black education departments have adopted a less rigid approach to the admission of pupils from other population groups, the white Department of Education and Culture requires strict adherence to the 'own affairs' policy as laid down in the constitution. It only allows the children of black diplomats to attend white schools, after permission has been obtained.

Apart from arguing that integration would be irresponsible and not solve black educational problems, government spokesmen also maintain that white resistance to integration is powerful. Speaking in parliament in May this year, Minister Piet Clase said the present education policy 'is based on the Constitution which is an expression of the wishes of the overall majority of the voters of this house' (Hansard 18 15/5/89:cols 8910/1).

Comparative Lessons

Experience in other countries has shown that the integration of schools can be a very complicated and sensitive issue. What emerge as important factors are the number of foreign or minority children in a school, the maintenance of educational standards and the extent to which integration is a voluntary process, supported by parents, staff and pupils. Examples close to South Africa are not exactly encouraging. Recent experience in Zimbabwe may be more comparable to South Africa than countries such as the USA because of historical and

population composition factors. In Harare in the post-independence period, formerly white schools were initially zoned (i.e. admission was restricted to particular surrounding localities) and could charge fees. Black resentment to this policy eventually led to the rezoning of these schools to include children from high-density black townships. With the bussing of black pupils to white schools where there were empty places there was an exodus of white children to private schools, because of a perceived drop in standards, over-crowding and the emigration of teachers. Today, while some primary schools in Zimbabwe have a fair number of white pupils, high schools have a completely black pupil composition in most cases (Picard-Cambridge 1988:17/19).

Similar issues are being faced in South Africa, where there has been long-standing resistance to segregated schooling. In Zimbabwe, white government schools were integrated within a relatively short period of time, without adequate preparation to cope with the educational consequences. In South Africa there are ample opportunities to handle this process in a more controlled and professional manner, however, by allowing schools a greater measure of choice and experimentation.

Attitude Shift

Surveys conducted among white South African nationwide between 1981 and 1987 show that while resistance to integrated schools is stronger than resistance to integrated residential areas, the percentage of white respondents wanting strict segregation of schools or residential areas has declined. There is a higher degree of acceptance of some partial or selective

integration process, regardless of language or political affiliation (see table 1).

Over this time period, white South Africans have become more open to the idea of mixed residential areas and mixed schools, with the exception of a slight reversal of support among Afrikaans-speaking whites and NP supporters between 1986 and 1987. It would seem that a fair percentage of respondents are prepared to accept complete integration or integration under certain conditions and in certain circumstances (see table 2).

By 1987 a majority among all white groups, except CP supporters, were prepared to accept at least certain open residential areas, while only among Afrikaans-speaking whites in total or CP supporters is there majority support for strict segregation of schools. Even so, thirty-one percent of Afrikaans-speakers are prepared to accept the opening of white schools under certain circumstances or to certain population groups, and nine percent accept that all schools should be opened to all groups.

What these survey trends show is that there certainly seem to be no grounds for the government to insist that there is an 'overwhelming majority' of white voters who reject open schools under all circumstances. In view of economic constraints on educational provision and expansion, and demographic trends, policy-makers should rather focus on what options could gain optimal acceptance.

The need to develop appropriate strategies is especially salient in the context of the desegregation of residential areas. Since whites are more resistant to open schools than to integrated residential areas, their preparedness to accept open areas may in part be determined by how acceptable the options are for schooling.

User Choice

Early in 1989, a sample of 1 379 whites were given seven detailed policy options for the use of school facilities (see table 3). The following conclusions can be drawn from these results:

- Strict segregation in all schools is supported by a majority of CP-supporters only (57% as opposed to less than 30% among any other group).
- Among English-speaking whites and PFP supporters (the survey was conducted before the formation of the

Survey Trends

**TABLE 1
ON RESIDENTIAL AND EDUCATION SEGREGATION**

1.1 percentage of whites wanting strict application of the Group Areas Act:

	Afrikaans	English	NP	PFP	CP
1981	52%	10%	44%	2%	84% (HNP/NKP)
1986	37%	6%	17%	0%	83%
1987	45%	9%	24%	1%	76%

1.2 percentage of whites wanting strict education segregation:

	Afrikaans	English	NP	PFP	CP
1981	70%	16%	64%	6%	92% (HNP/NKP)
1986	50%	12%	29%	1%	91%
1987	60%	12%	43%	1%	87%

**TABLE 2
ON RESIDENTIAL AND EDUCATION INTEGRATION**

2.1 support for residential integration: complete or subject to majority white support, local government decision-making or in certain cases:

	Afrikaans	English	NP	PFP	CP
1981*	21%	59%	23%	79%	2% (HNP/NKP)
1986	40%	73%	57%	87%	7%
1987	55%	90%	76%	99%	23%

* Option of complete integration not provided in 1981 but responses probably subsumed in percentages given

2.2 support for school integration: complete or subject to certain circumstances or certain population groups:

	Afrikaans	English	NP	PFP	CP
1981	30%	83%	36%	94%	8% (HNP/NKP)
1986	49%	87%	71%	99%	9%
1987	40%	88%	57%	99%	13%

Notes:

Sample size: 1981 n=2 000; 1986 n=1 802; 1987 n=1 733

NKP stands for the now defunct Nasionale Konservatiewe Party.

Source:

Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd: Opinion Survey Nos 4/81, 1/86 and 3/87 for Rapport.

Survey Trends

TABLE 3: ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS

The options are ranked in order of overall support:	Total	Afrikaans 831	English 548	NP 606	PFPP 383	CP 207
3.1 All school education should be strictly segregated with different schools for different races:	20%	30%	5%	18%	3%	57%
3.2 The government should retain separate schools for separate groups but build its own mixed schools in mixed and free settlement areas:	19%	21%	15%	24%	7%	15%
3.3 All government schools should remain segregated but private schools can become mixed for those 'non-whites' who can afford them:	18%	23%	10%	24%	2%	24%
3.4 Segregation should be abolished and all schools should be open to all pupils in an area :	17%	4%	36%	6%	47%	1%
3.5 Where two-thirds or more of white parents agree, government schools should allow a minority of 'non-white' pupils:	10%	8%	12%	11%	12%	1%
3.6 Where two-thirds or more of white parents agree, government schools should become completely mixed:	9%	6%	13%	7%	17%	0%
3.7 All government schools should remain segregated and private schools can become mixed but the government should increase its financial assistance to make private schools cheaper:	4%	5%	4%	7%	4%	1%

Source:

Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd. Opinion survey conducted for the Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, May 1989.

Only one out of five whites support segregation in all schools, whereas one out of six whites feels that all schools should be open

- DP) the first preference by far is for the complete abolition of segregation (36% and 47% respectively, as opposed to less than 6% among the other groups).
- NP supporters prefer segregated government schools combined with either mixed government schools in mixed areas, or with mixed private schools (24% support each option respectively). These two options also gain fairly high support among both Afrikaans-speaking whites and CP-supporters; 44% and 39% respectively.

The attitude differences between language and political groups clearly show that any rigid centrally-determined policy will meet with some resistance. Allowance must be made for more choice by the actual users of education. In general, only one out of five whites supports strict segregation in all schools, and one out of six whites feels that all schools should be open to pupils in an area. Since respondents were asked to

choose one policy approach only, support for the other options in-between these two extremes is likely to be much higher than reflected here..

It is unlikely that the latest proposals made during the federal congress of the National Party - the provision of open private schools in free settlement areas, with a full subsidy in order to make these schools accessible to pupils from less-affluent backgrounds - will meet with much resistance. This policy should be extended to other areas in consultation with the schools and communities concerned. Support for the different options varies between language and political groups. It is important, therefore, that no rigid policy be implemented but that a varied choice of schooling be made available to communities. IDQA

Reference

Pickard-Cambridge C. 'Sharing the Cities: Residential Desegregation in Harare, Windhoek and Mafikeng'. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1988.

INDUSTRIAL

M O N I T O R

Caroline Motsoaledi, participant in defiance campaign of 1950s and women's anti-pass march on Pretoria. Recently reunited with husband, Elias Motsoaledi, ex-SA Congress of Trade Unions leader, released with Sisulu and others in October 1989. (See report on Cosatu and the congress movement, this monitor: 68-70.)



Subject: Caroline Motsoaledi • Artist: Sue Williamson • Portfolio: Silkscreen Series, *A Few South Africans*

Social responsibility is an integral and important part of our company's culture.

Kellogg's

Dedicated to serving the community in which we operate.



580331

Johnnies -
a Major Force
in Mining
since 1889



Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, Limited

Consolidated Building, Cor. Fox and Harrison Street, Johannesburg 2001.
P.O. Box 590, Johannesburg 2000. Phone: (011) 373-9111. Telegrams: "Consols" Jhb.



This graph is about safety, and it is pointed in the right direction. It is about the safety of more than 700 000 people employed in the South African mining industry.

This good safety trend is the result of a R1,6 billion annual investment by the industry on safety and safety related matters.



Chamber of Mines of South Africa

Sharing the Company

Co-determination in the 1990s

By Professor Hermann Giliomee, Department of Political Studies,
University of Cape Town

Will the 1990s see a pressure cooker which not only keeps black wages in check but also leaves the political and economic system unaltered? What will management initiatives be in the face of challenges by black trade unions fighting a militant rearguard action from a weakened bargaining position? What will be the impact on the shopfloor of an alienated white labour force?

In exploring these dilemmas, Giliomee predicts that the issues which will probably dominate industrial relations in the 1990s are demands by black workers for promotion to managerial positions, for meaningful forms of participative involvement and for employer/employee co-determination.

Instead of talking of overthrowing monopolies and nationalisation, the new radical approach to the South African economy talks about the overthrowing of racial monopolies. The demand is for a sizeable contraction of the private sector, which is depicted as almost wholly owned and controlled by white capitalists. This state of affairs is characterised as a racial monopoly which constitutes the instrument of national white domination of black people.

What must come in the place of the status quo? It is interesting that the ANC told a delegation from the (African) National Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc) that black businessmen will flourish in the post-apartheid period because the scope for (black) middle-level private initiative would be endless. What is probably envisaged is that:

- monopolies would be broken up;
- black businessmen would to a large degree take over the control and management of companies from whites;
- the state (if under ANC direction) would control the main means of production.

For the first time the ANC is making a serious bid to woo the black manager and capitalist. Indeed, it says almost in so many words that to gain Nafcoc President Motsuenyane's support is more important than to offer the workers future control over the workplace. It would be strange if the black manager in the 1990s does not

carefully weigh up the prospect of great gains under future ANC hegemony against his slow promotion under the present white regime.

Dual Ideals

Another macro-development which will obviously impact on the labour scene of the 1990s is the dramatically growing proportion of black unemployed in South Africa. Even without comprehensive sanctions, by the year 2000 there will be 8 million economically active people out of work, against roughly 4,5 million in skilled employment and 5,5 million in unskilled employment (Bethlehem 1988).

The 1990s will hold no particular peril for trade unions which carefully adhere to the legal procedures for strikes and other industrial relations issues. It is a different matter when it comes to irregular strikes and stayaways, however. In general one can expect a weakening of trade union power. There is really no way in which the unions can prevent a steady erosion of their strength by the swelling numbers of unemployed, who are prepared to work for virtually any wage.

Obviously, workers with skills and ability will be in a better bargaining position but trade unions with a membership covering a large spectrum of skills will face major problems. These will be compounded by the fact that in the next decade there is

For the first time, the ANC is making a serious bid to woo the black manager as well as the black worker

This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence.

To view a copy of the licence please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>