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INDICATOR

S O U T H

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UNIVERSITY OF NATAL.
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Indicator Project South Africa.
Indicator: a barometer of social trends

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
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The series of photographs of unemployed and self-employed workers in the Durban area (see Economic, Rural and Industrial Monitor covers and articles) were taken by freelance photographer Billy Paddock for Indicator SA.

INDICATOR PROJECT

The Indicator Project South Africa (IPSA) is a publication unit which falls under the auspices of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, Durban. It was established in 1982 in response to the evident need to monitor key developments in South African society during a critical phase of flux and change. The project aims to contribute to informed debate among key decision makers, through providing a data analysis, trend diagnosis and policy prognosis service. To promote these objectives, IPSA publishes a quarterly journal divided into five 'monitors' – namely political, economic, rural and regional, urban, and industrial – as well as producing occasional focuses on the major issues of the day.

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
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
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


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
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Ruling Party Politics

Circling around the May-poll

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

Tensions between white nationalist factions have been fuelled by changing NP policies and the election — government supporters and members of the extreme right AWB clash at a meeting in Pietersburg last year.



AFRAPIX: Steve Hilton-Borber

The general election on 6 May is not likely to produce any dramatically new dispensation in South Africa. Nevertheless, all indications are that it will take white politics one step closer to a major departure from the broad parliamentary pattern which has held since 1948. The election may very well produce the last overall majority that the National Party will win in its present form.

At the root of the change slowly taking place in white politics in South Africa is a process which may be referred to as a clarification or crystallisation of ideology among white voters. In the past, white politics and election outcomes have been the result of a confused interplay of traditional loyalties on the one hand, and policy interest on the other. As traditional loyalties have weakened, policy interests have emerged more and more clearly as the basis for political choice.

The National Party's huge strength in previous decades resulted from a confusion of these two dimensions. The modernisation of white voter orientations means that the National Party is finally going to be forced into clear policy decisions. The May poll will not yet result in any new alignment but it is likely to define the parameters of choices facing the National Party and all other white parties.

Breakdown of Bonding

Some of the major trends that have taken place over the past forty years illustrate the nature of the changes in white politics. Firstly, overall percentage polls, after rising with the emergence of the NP as the political voice of Afrikaners, have been dropping, reflecting the steady erosion of the traditional 'bonding' between voter and party. Table 1 demonstrates the variation in average turnouts for elections in South Africa since 1948.

Voting as an act of ethnic solidarity is far simpler than casting a vote as an act of political choice. The choices in the poll on 6 May are more complex than ever before, and the voter turnout is likely to reflect this complexity in a low percentage poll. Closely related to the loosening voter/party bond which has yielded lower polls over the last two decades, has been the decreasing Afrikaans support for the NP. Taking pre-election opinion poll findings — mainly those of Mark-en Meningsopnames (M&M) — Afrikaans support for the NP declined from 87 percent in 1977 to 64 percent in 1981 (see table 2).

A check calculation based on the 1981 election results confirms that some four out of ten Afrikaners were outside of the NP by 1981, with most of them either deviating to the right or into the wilderness of a stayaway vote. Opinion polls conducted by M&M during 1985 and 1986

Data Trends

The traditional ethnic bonding between the Afrikaner voter and the National Party has eroded steadily over the last ten years

English support for the ruling party tends to increase in response to civil unrest, external pressures, or when the government maintains a clear reform profile

Patterns of Participation in White Politics

Table 1

Average Voter Turnout, General Elections 1948/81



Table 2

Comparative Pre-Election NP Support

Election Year	% Support for NP among Afrikaans speakers	% Support for NP among English speakers	Notes
1966	N/A	30+	1. Poll modified slightly by 1981 election results. 2. Polls conducted during by-election phase.
1970	85	23	
1974	84	18	Source: Mark- en Meningsopnames Edms Bpk
1977	87	31	
1981 ¹	64	28	
1985 ² (Late)	N/A	26	
1986 (June)	N/A	37	

showed that the proportion of Afrikaners supporting the NP fell slightly after the party's split and the establishment of the Conservative Party (CP); the support varying between 57 percent and 61 percent between June 1985 and June 1986.

Accompanying the breakdown in traditional bonding between Afrikaans voters and the NP, English-speaker support for the NP has become conversely more and more important as a component of government support. Earlier survey analyses published in Indicator SA (Political Monitor Vol2/No1: pp11-13; Vol3/No1: pp5-8) have shown that English support for the NP can vary widely. Broadly, it increases when the government is under pressure (either civil unrest or external criticism) or when the government has a clear reform profile but does not try to exploit *boerehaat* sentiments among non-Afrikaners. Opinion polls show the variability in the proportions of English speakers supporting the NP between 1966/86 (see table 2).

The only time that English-speaker support

for the government has risen above the 50 percent mark was at the time of the referendum in November 1983. This was exceptional, however. The pattern in the past suggests that support for the NP can vary between a high of about 40 percent (of English-speaking voters) and a low of 15 to 20 percent, depending on the constellation of pressures on and responses by government.

NP on a Tightrope

The above trends suggest quite clearly that political interests or perceptions of political needs (as opposed to traditional, ethnic loyalties) will probably feature more strongly than ever before in the forthcoming poll. One of the most important trends which has taken place since the 'Soweto' disturbances of 1976/77 has been a growing differentiation in such perceptions within the white electorate, particularly within the NP support base.

Excerpts from the author's own research,

presented in table 3, illustrate the very wide spread of political attitudes among NP supporters, compared with that among the two major opposition parties. These selected results show the dilemma of the NP quite clearly. It has both change-orientated and conservative supporters in substantial numbers, whereas the Progressive Federal Party and, to an even greater extent, the Conservative Party, have clear majorities either supporting or rejecting change respectively.

The majority of NP supporters, unlike either major opposition party, also doggedly clings to an optimistic view of South Africa's future. This is a consistent outlook, despite the serious turmoil and external pressure which has developed from 1983 onwards.

The outcomes of the various by-elections up to the October 1985 Sasolburg result — which gave the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) its first seat in parliament — suggested that the NP was quite seriously threatened from the right. Broadly, my own calculations at the time showed that with the government on a reform path and the economy in deep recession, between 35 and 53 seats would have been marginal in contests between the government and the two rightwing parties operating in an election pact. NP control of the Transvaal seemed very seriously under threat.

Since mid-1986, however, the situation has altered to the advantage of the government:

- The economy commenced a belated and hesitant recovery in the second half of 1986;
- good rains have fallen recently in many of the drought-stricken platteland constituencies;
- The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and other rightwing factions engaged in controversial political tactics (taking over and disrupting meetings in the Transvaal);
- the two rightwing parties have bickered endlessly over issues that are obscure to most Afrikaans voters and have recently failed, once again, to achieve unification;
- The government declared a new state of emergency, this time accompanied by an apparent decline in black protest and violence;
- The USA imposed its well-known sanctions act against South Africa; and
- The cabinet rejected the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals.

The upshot of all these developments is that the threat from the right has quite probably receded to a point where the two rightwing parties are not likely to improve meaningfully on their present strength in parliament.

Nevertheless, the memories in the NP of a rampant rightwing and the fear that the CP and the HNP may yet form an election

pact still constitute a severe constraint on the NP. Thus few opportunities are to be given to the right wing to exploit. This pre-election strategy probably accounts for the State President's actions in referring the reformist group areas report of the President's Council back to that body, then replacing its chairman; in curbing the relatively progressive stance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; in imposing strict political discipline on the cabinet and caucus; and in chastising Reverend Hendrickse's petty apartheid 'breach' and rebuking verligte MP Albert Nothnagel.

Reformist Disaffection

These actions and the temporary halt to further reform planning since the mid-1986 abolition of influx control have exacted a heavy penalty on the party from 'the left'. The resignations of Dr Dennis Worrall, Mr Wynand Malan and some dozen or more significant members of the NP intelligentsia all over the country are dramatic illustrations of the problem. Furthermore, the NP may lose seats it could have won fairly easily in Natal as a consequence of turning down the Indaba proposals. The penalties inherent in having too wide and varied a support-base

The slow demise of ethnic party loyalties means that white voter behaviour in the May election will probably reflect the primacy of policy interests

Survey

Table 3 **Political Policy Orientations & Attitudes among White Voters by Major Party Support, January 1986**
(N=1808 voters, nationwide)

	PFP	NP	CP
General Political Morale			
Pessimism	55%	28%	75%
Optimism	24%	41%	8%
Perceived Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction among Blacks			
Blacks satisfied	3%	28%	45%
Blacks dissatisfied	97%	70%	55%
Support for Power-sharing with Blacks without Domination			
Support	61%	42%	4%
Acceptance	27%	39%	11%
Rejection	6%	9%	75%
Black Voting Rights versus White Interests			
Support equal rights	88%	41%	6%
Only rights which do not threaten white interests	10%	48%	40%
Maintain/restore status quo	2%	8%	47%
Response to Overseas Pressure			
Government should adjust by reform	69%	35%	1%
No adjustment/reject pressures	32%	64%	98%

Note Results abridged, uncertain responses omitted.



AFRPIX: Sandy Smit



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
However, in the May poll the NP once more will stave off the implications of a divided spectrum of support. One may anticipate that if there is no election pact between the two rightwing parties, then the State President will announce some or another high-key reform proposal just before polling day — possibly including plans to co-opt blacks onto the

President's Council, onto the cabinet as deputy ministers or in the new category of assistant ministers, or onto some other body yet to be established. The party will also exploit to the hilt patriotic rejection of sanctions and the external threat. The ANC may even play into the government's hands with a few badly timed acts of sabotage.

Apart from refunding the income tax loan levy, the government cannot deliver much on the economic front, however. The issue of teacher and civil servant salary increases has been deferred until after the elections, and the economic recovery will not yet have yielded results sufficient to reconsolidate support lost through bread-and-butter protest.

One may expect, therefore, that in the forthcoming general election the government will lose a few seats (perhaps up to roughly seven) to the left, hold the rightwing at bay and be returned to power once again with an overall majority. It could be the last time that this will happen, however.

The turning of the tide in white politics could become clear in a large stayaway vote (though the NP will lose more voters to the 'political wilderness' than actually lose seats), disinterest or disaffection among the youth, and promising showings by the few independent candidates, like Dr Worrall, Dr Lategan and Wynand Malan (see Markinor 1986 poll of 2 000 whites in 'Research in Action' No 84, February 1987).



Holding The Centre

Even the most cursory assessment of politics in Europe shows that parties in the mildly liberal/reformist centre do not normally command majority support. The



AFRPIX: P. auf der Heyde

AFRPIX: Dave Hartman

major political action is between the conservatives/Christian Democrats and the socialists/social democrats. By comparison, the distribution of political interests among South African whites at present is most probably quite substantially out of alignment with the policy positions of the parties they actually support. Only the rightwing parties have a fair coherence between voter attitudes and party divisions. The dilemma is depicted schematically (and very roughly) in the accompanying diagram (not drawn to scale). It is clear that the spectrum of support that the NP is attempting to hold in the political 'centre' is abnormally broad

The essential problem facing the NP is neatly exemplified by the formidable election contests facing two of its 'crown princes', Ministers F W de Klerk and Chris Heunis. Both are facing redoubtable opposition but from opposite ends of the political spectrum. Mr de Klerk faces a serious threat from the CP in Vereeniging and Mr Heunis an almost equal threat from the constitutional reformist, independent candidate Dr Worrall. Because of the ruling party's identity problem, both ministers will be fighting the election with one political hand tied behind their backs, as it were.

How the NP will resolve this tension between 1987/89 (when the next elections should be held) and beyond, will be critical for its survival. Leaving out, for purposes of argument only, the effects and consequences of black opposition or external political action, it is fairly clear from opinion poll results that the largest white party in South Africa will most probably have the following profile. It will be cautiously reformist, committed to normalising South African society while protecting minority interest and political participation, be able to negotiate

responsibly with black groupings, and have a positive answer to external sanctions. A part of the PFP and a part of the NP could combine to form such a party.

Alternatively, what are the prospects for a NP merger or coalition with minority parties on the white right? On the one hand, the CP/HNP take too extreme a view to incorporate all conservative support. With reference to the diagram, they lose support heavily among pragmatic conservatives. On the other hand, part of the NP in combination with a small part of the CP would consolidate non-reactionary but conservative white voters.

Independent Reformist Option

In other words, politics in South Africa may be too clearly defined and high key to allow much room for a typical centre party. Two major parties, with smaller fringe parties on the left or reactionary rightwing extremities would probably be the appropriate categorisation of parties in South Africa.

At this stage it is too soon to detect whether the NP will finally relinquish its traditional goal of representing Afrikanerdom and instead seek a rational position in South Africa's (white) political spectrum. It is clearly being pulled both ways, and the resolution of the dilemma will inevitably involve a further split (or series of splits) to either the left or the right. If it does not move, however, one may anticipate a new but fairly small centre-reformist party emerging after the forthcoming May elections, built around the core of the current group of independent candidates. Such a party, in a later election, could well hold the balance of power. *PPA*

Above, from left to right: CP leader Dr Andries Treurnicht, who enters the election without a strategic rightwing pact; Minister of National Education F W de Klerk, an NP 'crown prince' who faces a strong CP challenge in his constituency; PFP members on their withdrawal from the President's Council in November 1986 over the group areas stalemate — PFP, NRP and Independent calls for accelerated reform have united a centre-liberal opposition.

POST-WAR WHITE POLITICS

COMPOSITION OF HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 1948 - 1986

Compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Election Year	Total number of seats in parliament	Communist Party of SA ¹ (Party banned under Suppression of Communism Act, 1950; AIP unseated 1952)	South African Communist Party ¹ (MP prevented from taking seat)	(Formed 1954) Liberal Party ²	No candidates	(Party dissolves 1968 after Prevention of Political Interference Act)	Progressive Party (Formed 1959)	SA Labour Party ⁶	Dominion Party ⁷	United Party ⁶⁵	African Party ⁹ (1951 AP and HNP merge and form National Party)	Herren side National Party ⁷⁰	Independents ²
1948	153	1 ¹	1 ¹	2 ²				4 ⁶	0	65	9 ⁹	70 ⁷⁰	2 ²
1953	159			2 ²				4 ⁶		57	94 ⁹⁴		
1958	159			2 ²				0	(Formed 1953) Union Federal Party	53	103 ¹⁰³		1 ¹
1961	159						1 ¹	0	(11 UP MPs secede 1959)	49	National Union (1 NP MP resigns 1961)	105 ¹⁰⁵	4 ⁴
1966	166						1			39	126 ¹²⁶		—
1970	166						1			47	118 ¹¹⁸		—
1974	171						7			41	123 ¹²³		—
1977	165 ⁴						17			10	134 ¹³⁴		—
1981	165						26			8	131 ¹³¹		—
1987	—						()			()	()		()

Key
¹ Elected under Representation of Whites Act, 1951.
² Elected under Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951.
³ Party participated in government.
⁴ Number of MPs no longer sit in SA parliament excluding Walvis Bay.

Sources
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Policy Review

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Because of the emergency regulations, the free flow of information relating to unrest is severely restricted. Certain news reports have had to be excluded because of the latest regulations. This newspaper will do its utmost to keep readers informed.

Government restrictions

In terms of the State of Emergency regulations, news, pictures and comment in this newspaper are restricted. The *Star* will continue to make every effort to provide proper and full coverage. Where it falls, readers be told.

Emergency 239

THE EMERGENCY

This newspaper has been produced under emergency regulations which amount to censorship. The restrictions effectively suppress information of public interest. No details of 'unrest' or security force action can be published without permission. However, within the limits of these restrictions, City Press will continue to make every effort to provide objective coverage.

BUREAU FOR INFORMATION OR BEARER OF BAD TIDINGS?

By Dr Paul Vorster,
Department of Communication Studies,
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The mere mention of the Bureau for Information conjures up negative connotations for many people. Can the Bureau improve the flow of information between a government notorious for its unwillingness and inability to communicate, and the public? If so, Stoffel van der Merwe's men should be given another chance.

It is common cause that the Bureau got off to a poor start, partly because of a linkage to the old Rhodde/Mulder style of government communication. In the 1970s the activities of the former Department of Information involved more secret projects than open ones, with alleged misuse of taxpayers' money, inter alia on the Citizen newspaper project.

A second reason for the Bureau's troublesome birth was the prevailing circumstances when it came to life. In fact the first major hurdle the Bureau has had to try and cross has been the two states of emergency. The perception that the Bureau is responsible for this state of affairs will have to change before its image can improve. Since other state departments still have their own public relations officers, it often happens that they release their own information — provided it is good news. When the news is bad, as is often the case, the announcement is left to the Bureau.

A third reason for the Bureau's negative image was the style of the former Deputy Minister of Information, Mr Louis Nel. His handling of the fledgling organisation, which included the so-called 'Peace Song', gave rise to heated public debate and venomous press criticism. Fortuitously, Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, previously a professor in political science, was appointed Bureau head in December 1986, replacing Mr Nel.

Emergency and your letters

IN terms of the emergency regulations we may have been prohibited from publishing certain letters that express your views on the political situation and the unrest in the country.

For your own protection, these letters have been destroyed as the police have the power to enter and search our offices without a warrant.

QUOTE

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions and to send, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

Freedom and Responsibility

Complete avoidance of tension in a pluralist society is never likely to occur. In times of great stress, when dissident expression is frequently viewed as poison rather than as a safety valve, suppression is more likely to be an appropriate antidote (Chaffee and Patrick 1975: p214/26). It must never be forgotten, however, that communication helps keep society on an even keel by managing social tension.

The widely accepted social responsibility theory is often taken as a theoretical framework for determining the relationship between the press and government. The basic premise is that freedom carries concomitant responsibilities (Siebert et al 1956). Some of the underlying principles of this theory are:

- Since freedom of expression is the keystone of political liberty, it must be especially protected;
- government should therefore intervene only when the need is great and vital social interests are at stake, and then cautiously; and
- a well-informed, balanced and educated public opinion is the best safeguard for a democracy.

In other words, the South African government has the duty to support the free flow of information to the

Survey

Table 1
THE INFLUX ABOLITION ADVERT, APRIL 1986

	MALE	FEMALE
Spontaneous recall	51%	43%
Prompted recall	10%	10%
Total recall	61%	53%
Total reading	43%	37%
Total reading as % of total recall	70%	70%

Table 2
COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PRESIDENT'S REFORM ADVERTS

AGE GROUPS	% Respondents who read advert	
	January 1986 Ad 1 (Omnichack)	April 1986 Ad 2 (Markinor)
18-24	39%	30%
25-34	40%	44%
50+	54%	47%
SEX		
Men	53%	52%
Women	39%	35%
LANGUAGE		
Afrikaans	47%	41%
English	43%	44%

fullest possible extent, both in principle and in practice. Yet simultaneously, this must be done in accordance with the accepted international practice of protecting national security. In the same way that big business has the right to keep certain information secret, government also has the right to reserve certain information. The criterion here must not be political expediency, but whether secrecy or disclosure will best serve the public interest.

The government must provide adequate, accurate and timely information to the public, through the press in its intermediary role as watchdog. Furthermore, since communication is ideally a two-way process, the Bureau should facilitate feedback from the public to government. It should function not only as spokesperson for government, but simultaneously be sensitive to public reactions.

Reaction to Adverts

The mode of political communication in South Africa is changing and political advertising will be used much more in years to come. The Bureau promoted the State President's state-of-the-union address on 31 January 1986 with the help of an advert designed by outside public relations specialists.

POLITICAL TRENDS

It seems that political communication in the post-Rubicon Republic has entered a more professional phase.

A follow-up advert on influx control reform was launched in April 1986. For those members of the public it reached and for the new communications initiative by the government, it must probably be regarded as a success, subject to the qualification that promises must be changed into deeds. At the time the campaign was criticised in some political and media circles. But what was the reaction of the general public?

These issues were researched by Markinor, using a sample of 1 000 white adults in metropolitan areas. Respondents were asked whether they recalled having seen a message signed by President Botha in the newspapers; if the answer was 'no' they were shown a copy of the influx abolition advert as a memory aid. They were then asked whether they had actually read this particular message (see table 1). The survey showed that in total six out of ten white South Africans in metropolitan areas had been reached by this advertising campaign; approximately four out of ten read what the State President had to say in this advert. These findings correlate by and large with a survey done by Omnichack after the first reform advert was published in January 1986 (see table 2).

Firstly, who were the people reading the influx reform advert? Markinor found the highest reading score among males, the higher income groups, and middle and older age groups (all white). Relatively low reading scores emerged for non-working women, the very young generation, and the low income category. Secondly, what were white public attitudes concerning the advert itself, and to political advertising as a mode of communication between the government (through the Bureau) and the public?

A number of statements were shown to respondents, describing various attitudes towards this type of communication, the State President and his policy. Of the Omnichack respondents, 57 percent fully agreed with the use of political advertising, 26 percent partly agreed and 16 percent disagreed. A second related statement regarding the money spent on the advertisement was also presented and 48 percent fully agreed, 31 percent partly agreed and 20 percent disagreed, in spite of the fact that the money, in the final analysis, came out of the pocket of the taxpayer.

Approval of this mode of governmental communication was then correlated with the attitude of Markinor respondents to the State President's reform plans (see table 3). Approval is highest (72 percent) among those respondents who fully support reform, and is lowest (30 percent) among those who oppose these plans. It is significant that even among non-supporters, acceptance for political advertising as a mode of communication with the public is 57 percent.

Communication Agenda

Although much has happened since, the survey results appear to show substantial general support for the Bureau among the white public. If this is so, the onus is on the Bureau not to repeat schemes like the 'Peace Song' and to establish a trend towards more open and effective communication. In order to

function effectively, however, it should have a channel to inform government of the implications of its communication policies.

Hopefully government will seek, and listen, to advice from communications specialists more often in future than in the past. In this way South Africa will be saved from such spectacles as the Rubicon I speech in Durban in August 1985 and the recent public humiliation of Labour Party leader Mr Alan Hendrickse on prime-time television news. In short, there is an urgent need for the Bureau to continually remind government that communication is the central nervous system of the body politic. You ignore it at your peril!

Since any political system is dynamic and subject to continuous change, the role the Bureau is supposed to play needs to be re-examined from time to time. A list of possible tasks for the Bureau (not in any particular order) follows:

National policy
Success, especially in communication, must be

Survey

Table 3
CORRELATED ADVERT ATTITUDE & REFORM SUPPORT

MARKINOR SURVEY

Statement No 1

'I think it is a good idea to communicate with the people of SA in this way.'

	Support State President's reform plans		
	Agree fully	Agree partly	Disagree
Fully support	72%	44%	30%
Partly support	21%	36%	27%
Don't support	7%	20%	43%

Statement No 2

'I think the State President is sincere in his efforts to find a solution for South Africa's racial problems.'
Almost nine out of every ten respondents (87%) agreed with this statement; (64%) fully agreed and (23%) partly agreed, while 11% disagreed.

Statement No 3

'I think the abolition of influx control and the old pass laws is right.'
In response, 51% fully agreed, 25% partly agreed and 22% disagreed.

NOTES ON SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Interviews were conducted in May 1986 on a face to face basis in private homes in the language respondents preferred. A minimum 20 percent check-back was administered on each interviewer's work.

Coverage was restricted to 500 white males and 500 white females, 16 years and older, living in the major metropolitan areas.

The sample was stratified by city and within city by different zones: respondents within each city were selected according to quotas which proportionately reflected the composition of the white population.

planned for and the implementation of such plans monitored. Just as there cannot be progress in the economic field without monetary and fiscal policies, there cannot be progress in the field of communication without an unambiguous policy.

The best premise for such a communications policy would be to facilitate and not to restrict the free flow of information. It should contribute to the development of the communications infrastructure in the country as a whole. It should spell out the rights and duties of government through a clear formulation of the national policy and objectives to be pursued. This will give purpose to the Bureau's activities and will also enable it to be monitored more effectively.

An advisory board

Government policy cannot be formulated in isolation and without consultation with interested bodies. Therefore, communications policy should have the input and support of people outside government. For this purpose an Advisory Board for Communication is strongly recommended and should receive the highest possible priority. There is a well established precedent for this, namely the State President's Economic Advisory Board.

Government spokesperson

The public will probably benefit if government appoints a spokesperson to make some of the day to day announcements on behalf of the cabinet, e.g. during routine news conferences. This person should be fully bilingual and at ease in front of newspeople and TV cameras. The White House system of a presidential spokesperson is well established and works well.

Communications ombudsman

The appointment of an ombudsman for the government would probably go a long way towards making government more accessible to the public. The so-called faceless bureaucracy would become almost human with a respected and able ombudsman serving as a channel to facilitate communication on certain issues.

Communication culture

The Bureau must do everything possible, and a little more, to persuade government that more open and timely communication is not only part and parcel of a democracy, but also in the long run in its own best interests.

The way to achieve this is by getting results through their communications projects, e.g. the Bureau's efforts to persuade the people from Soweto to reconsider the rent boycott, which, though it may offer the people short-term benefits, is in the long run counter-productive. According to a Business Day report (6/1/87) the boycott has effectively been ended, with a very low percentage of defaulters. **IPJA**

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Chronology

CURBING THE FOURTH ESTATE

Compiled by Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Emergency Media Regulations		The Court Challenges
Proclamation 121 Govt Gazette No 9877 21/7/85 Withdrawn Proc39 (7/3/86)	Regulations under Public Safety Act (PSA), 1953 ● SAP Commissioner, or person acting on his authority, can control the reporting and transmission of news on conduct of security forces maintaining public safety and terminating the emergency (Reg6(1)(i)). ● Unless disclosed by Minister, no one can disclose identity of persons detained under emergency regulations (Reg8(d)).	
Proc208 GG10004 21/11/85	Amendment of regulations under PSA ● Without consent of SAP Commissioner or commissioned officer, no one is allowed to manufacture, reproduce, publish or distribute in or outside SA, any film, reproduction or sound recording of a public disturbance, strike or boycott, the damaging of property or assault on or killing of persons, or of people and security forces involved in these incidents.	
Proc109 GG10280 12/6/86	Regulations under PSA ● No one may make, write or print a 'subversive statement' which: promotes the objects of unlawful organisations; incites the public to take part in unlawful strikes, boycotts, protest processions, civil disobedience campaigns; opposes the government and security forces who are maintaining public order; undermines military service; aggravates feelings of hostility between one section of the public and another; weakens public confidence in the termination of the emergency; or encourages foreign action against SA (Reg1(viii)(a)-(f), Reg10). ● Minister of Law and Order or person authorised by him may seize copies of any publication which include 'subversive statements' (Reg11 & 12). ● Reg9 reimposes restrictions of Proc208 (see above).	16 July 1986 Natal Supreme Court Metel and Allied Workers Union challenges definitions of 'subversive statement', among other curbs. Court finds parts of five out of six definitions of 'subversive statement' in Proc109 void on grounds of vagueness. Only section which remains in force deals with inciting the public to take part in unlawful strikes, support boycotts, acts of civil disobedience or undermine compulsory military service.
Proc110 GG10293 17/6/86	Amends regulations in Proc109 ● All definitions of 'subversive statement' apply to self-governing homelands.	20 August 1986 Natal Supreme Court Argus, Soan, Natal Newspapers and Natal Witness challenge Reg7-12 of Proc109. State concedes regulations relating to news reports about conduct of security and presence of journalists in townships and unrest areas are invalid, particularly because some of regulations had been promulgated by telex. On 16 June 1986, SAP Commissioner, via telex, in terms of Reg7(1)(c)&(d) prohibited media from reporting on conduct of security forces and prevented presence of journalists in African townships or areas where unrest was occurring. 4 September 1986 Natal Supreme Court Strikes down two regulations which allow security forces to confiscate newspapers, offer applications from Soan, Argus, Natal Newspapers and Natal Witness.
Govt Notice 1355 GG10309 21/6/86 Divisional SAP Commissioner for W Province	In terms of Reg7 of Proc109 ● Without consent of Divisional SAP Commissioner, no one can publish or disseminate statements of officials of 109 organisations in W Cape (Order4).	30 July 1986 Cosatu gets out of court settlement for Divisional SAP Commissioner to drop provisions of GN1355; probably on basis of Rand Supreme Court judgment that makes it illegal for SAP Commissioner to issue orders in terms of emergency regulations.
Proc140 GG10382 1/8/86	Amends Proc109 ● Empowers SAP Commissioner to issue regulations and orders.	
GN1881 GG10429 3/9/86 SAP Commissioner	● Except with written consent of SAP Commissioner or commissioned officer, no one can announce, disseminate, take or send any comments or news concerning security force actions (Reg2). ● Prohibits media representatives in unrest areas, restricted gatherings or in sight of security force actions (Reg3).	
Proc224 GG10541 11/12/86	Regulations under PSA ● No one may make, publish or impart into SA 'subversive statements' (Reg5), which now include, in addition to definitions in Proc109 (see above), statements which incite the public to take part in unrest, educational and consumer boycotts, or attend restricted gatherings; replace authority of state with alternative legal and local govt structures; stay away from work or strike contrary to Labour Relations Act procedures; or commit any act regulated against by SAP Commissioner which delays termination of the emergency (Reg1). ● News is outlawed on actions and deployment of security forces; restricted gatherings, boycotts, alternative state structures; the treatment and release of detainees; statements made by restricted persons (Reg3(1)). ● Outlaws publication of blank spaces, deletion of news reports or photographs which highlight effect of emergency regulations (Reg3(3)). ● Without consent of security forces, journalists are prohibited from being present at unrest incidents (Reg2). ● The Minister or SAP Commissioner may seize any publication and prohibit production thereof for a specific period (Reg6 & 7).	
GN101 GG10584 8/1/87 SAP Commissioner Repeated GN236 (29/1/87)	In terms of Proc224 ● Amends definition of 'subversive statement' to include support of unlawful organisation.	
GN102 GG10584 8/1/87 SAP Commissioner Withdrawn GN237 (29/1/87)	In terms of Reg7 of Proc109 ● Prohibits editor of publication from publishing advertisements or reports which improve the public image of unlawful organisations or defend or justify the resistance of that organisation against authority of state.	29 January 1987 Rand Supreme Court After application from Argus and Soan, GN102 declared null and void, because SAP Commissioner had exceeded authority.
Proc18 GG10599 29/1/87	Amends regulations in Proc224 ● Enlarged definition of 'subversive statement' makes it illegal to support or take part in activities of an unlawful organisation.	
GN238 GG10605 29/1/87 SAP Commissioner	● Prohibits publication of advertisements which defend and praise activities of unlawful organisations.	

Note
All proclamations are issued by the State President.

Sources Government Printer, Government Gazette, Pretoria Indicator SA press clippings

Diagnosis

A media watcher chronicles the elaborate institutional merging of the state's news management and media repression functions over the last three years of civil unrest coverage. Tracing the tensions between two government media factions to the communication fiasco of the State President's 'Rubicon I' address, Ruth Tomaselli unravels the maze of promulgated media controls and assesses their relative impact during the two states of emergency.

On 6 May, the white electorate goes to the polls. Political commentators agree that the reasons for an election at this juncture are far from clear, and the election campaign on both sides lacks any defined parameters. In the circumstances, this is hardly surprising: much of the past two years has been spent under states of emergency, with no indications of when the current one will be lifted; major political opponents of the government are either in prison, in exile or in hiding, while their organisations are banned or disrupted; virtually nothing which presents extra-parliamentary opposition in a favourable light may be published or disseminated; and the massive clampdown on information in all sorts of areas is being extended on an almost ad hoc basis. None of the above would seem the appropriate setting for a free and fair election in which the issues and options were clear to the electorate.

Two questions present themselves: what are the issues of this election; and how did we get to a position where we find it impossible to debate these issues in an unfettered way? Curiously, the answer to the first question is also the answer to the second. In the final few paragraphs of his opening speech in Parliament this year the State President got as close as he ever had to outlining the National Party platform. He exhorted the white electorate to 'unite' against revolution incited from abroad; to unite against foreign interference in our affairs; to unite for a stronger economy through harder work and thrift; and to unite for a democratic and stable constitutional future.

In other words, stability and prosperity are identified with the National Party, while chaos and poverty will, deliberately or by default, be chosen by anyone opposing them. And, continues the logic, since 'we are in a state of war' (as Minister of Defence Magnus Malan put it), no one, wittingly or unwittingly, is to be allowed to advocate chaos and revolution. And *that's* an order. To implement that order, a matrix of legal and institutional forms have been introduced over the past two years which severely curtail the already limited freedom of the press and broadcast media.

It is widely agreed that the low point of the government's ability to communicate with its electorate came with the debacle of the State President's Rubicon I speech in Durban in August 1985. This media extravaganza may have been the best documented example of a media non-event, but it was not the only problem between the government and the media. Two other 'communication gaps' between the media and the government — or at least the image that government wished to portray — were:

- a lack of co-operation between government officials, particularly ministers, and the domestic press; and
- a perception on the part of the government that the almost daily coverage of 'unrest' by foreign journalists acted as a spark, or catalyst, for further violence on the part of activists who 'played up for the cameras'. More importantly, these reports sensationalised the crisis in the country, thereby contributing to South Africa's negative image.


The government's response to its communications crisis was ambivalent, and over the following few months vacillated between attempts at media repression and media management. A preliminary attempt at the management of media was begun as early as 1984 with the establishment of a 'Forum' under the chairmanship of Louis Nel, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information. The purpose of the venture was to co-ordinate the activities of the state's numerous public relations and press liaison officials and the press. This Forum worked on an ad hoc basis, and seems to have had little organisational structure or success in promoting a more accessible flow of information.

Calls for some machinery to replace the dissolved and discredited Department of

A PRESSING EMERGENCY

The Commercial Media Under the Bureau

By Ruth Tomaselli, Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit, University of Natal



There have been frequent confrontations between the security forces and journalists covering the civil unrest of 1984 to 1986. Without state consent, reporters are now banned from unrest areas (pre-emergency file picture).

Information (active in the 1970s) resulted in the setting up of the Bureau for Information in September 1985. Under the leadership of Louis Nel, then known as Deputy Minister of Information, the Bureau drew its staff primarily from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nel stressed that the Bureau's role was the free flow of information, and its establishment was initially hailed by the press as a victory by 'the supporters of a free and better-informed press' over 'those in the government who advocate a media crackdown' (Daily News 19/9/85).

During the first half of 1986, the Bureau played a low-key role, devoting most of its energy to the orchestration of 'information campaigns' designed to publicise 'reform initiatives'. These included the advertising campaigns selling Rubicon II and the moratorium on influx control. Several books and pamphlets were also produced, the most controversial of which was *Talking to the ANC*, the purpose of which seems to have been misinterpreted by many thousands of black readers. Controversial too, was the Bureau's 'peace song', an exercise which cost the taxpayer in excess of R1,5m, and earned Louis Nel the nickname 'Louis Liedjie' in the Afrikaans press. It has also been suggested that this was his 'death knell', resulting in the loss of his position in the later cabinet shuffle, when Stoffel van der Merwe took over as Deputy Minister of Information.

Management & Repression

When the first emergency was declared in June 1985, it seemed that the government anticipated that the 'situation' would soon be under control, and that no further measures would be

needed against the media in the coverage of the 'unrest'. When the political violence continued unabated, a scapegoat was needed, and the media, particularly the foreign media, were focused on. Harassment of journalists in connection with their 'unrest' coverage became commonplace — several were arrested or detained, while others were threatened with arrest, assaulted, or had their film and notes confiscated (Index on Censorship 7/86).

However, with the establishment of the Bureau and Nel's intervention and reversal of the expulsion order on the Newsweek staff, it appeared that the thrust of media management was dominant. But not for long. The lobby for media repression, under the leadership of the Minister of Police, Louis le Grange and the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha, soon resumed ascendancy.

In the first week of November 1985, the State President attacked foreign journalists in parliament, warning them 'not to go too far' (Daily News 6/11/85). In a move clearly aimed at the ultimate control of news — particularly its visual depictions — reaching foreign viewers and opinion makers, as well as the South African public, all use of audio-visual equipment for recording or publishing any 'unrest situation' in emergency areas was banned (see box p18).

Furthermore, journalists were required to be accredited by either the police or the Bureau for Information, failing which they were not allowed to report on political violence at all. This latter provision was seen by English-language editors as an attempt by the police 'to usurp the newspaper editor's function of deciding who shall report the news for the reader of the newspaper' (Cape Times 4/11/85). The Cape Times refused to comply with

this requirement and was consequently excluded from all police information for several weeks (Cape Times 14/3/86).

The banning of cameras in November probably marked a rapprochement between the government factions advocating repression and management. Louis Nel now endorsed Le Grange's earlier assertions that 'the mere presence of television and camera crews makes actors out of demonstrators often leading to atrocities especially to the advantage of film recordings' (Natal Mercury 4/11/85).

Deteriorating Relations

With the lifting of the first state of emergency in March 1986, the ban on media coverage of 'unrest areas' was also lifted, but continued to be applied on an ad hoc basis. A series of expulsion orders served on foreign news personnel and continued harassment of local practitioners marked this period. Anger against the foreign media who 'behave like they run this country' (Le Grange, quoted in The Star 14/3/86) was extended to include the 'alternative media', as well as South African correspondents for foreign news organisations, neither of whom were subject to the Media Council.

In view of the fast deteriorating relationship between the state and the media, it came as little surprise that media restrictions were one of the foremost considerations when the second state of emergency was declared on 12 June 1986. These regulations, including six definitions of a 'subversive statement', are by now too well known to dwell on (see box). The definitions contained in the regulations were so vague that most newspapers proceeded with extreme caution; in other words, they practised self-censorship, despite court challenges to the regulations which resulted in the pruning of legislation.

During late November and early December 1986, discussions took place between newspaper executives, the co-chairmen of the Media Council and the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis. The objective of the meetings was a two-pronged attempt to force the media into a more subservient role. Members of the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) were apparently offered exemption from the imminent application of more stringent emergency regulations on what/how events may be reported in return for agreeing to the imposition of self-censorship. This was to be achieved through the mechanism of a 'pepped up' Media Council with which to control the 'commercial press', particularly the mainstream English-language newspapers. The hidden agenda was to isolate newspapers which are not members of the NPU (the so-called 'alternative press'), as well as the widely distributed Weekly Mail, The New Nation

and rightwing Die Afrikaner.

The NPU refused to openly be part of the collusion, and a second comprehensive set of 'emergency' media restrictions were then passed (Government Gazette 11/12/86, summarised in box). The only reports exempted from this blackout are those disclosed or cleared by a minister, his deputy, or an appointed government spokesperson. A pernicious aspect of the new legislation is that the media are forced to conceal the fact and extent of their censorship. The blank spaces and obliterations which became fashionable after the mid-1986 curbs are now prohibited.

In response to an advertisement calling for the unbanning of the ANC on its 75th anniversary, yet more restrictions were gazetted at midnight on 11 December 1986, restricting reporting or advertising calculated to improve or promote the image or esteem of a banned organisation.

Argus and Saan successfully challenged the order on the grounds that it was ultra vires, and exceeded the powers given to the Commissioner of Police under the emergency regulations. Their win was a hollow victory, since new enabling legislation, authorising the Commissioner to impose publication control in respect of any matter he may determine, was promulgated hours after the decision (Government Gazette 29/1/87). The same evening, the Commissioner used his new authority to reinstate the earlier restriction, thus restoring the status quo. The legislation is more significant than previous curbs, however, in that it allows the Commissioner to gazette any restrictions on any subject matter at any time — and do it legally, without fear of possible litigation on the grounds of his exceeding his powers.

Perfecting the Flow

Prior to the second emergency, the Bureau concentrated on the management of news, working in the background as the originator of pamphlets, booklets (and songs) aimed at the promotion and popularisation of the government's reform programme, and as the arbitrator between the media and other departments, notably that of Law and Order and Home Affairs. At this stage the Bureau took over both the management and the repressive functions of media control. The Bureau became the sole source of news, disseminated initially through its daily 'news conferences', and later through its 'unrest reports'. The Bureau acts in at least four ways to restrict and control news:

- the severely restricted form in which information is presented;
- the obstructions placed in the way of efforts to verify stories emanating from other sources;

Over the past two years, new legal and institutional forms of state media management have severely curtailed the already limited freedoms of the press

Emergency prohibitions on the publication of 'subversive statements' have enforced self-censorship on newspapers, who are held responsible for interpreting vague definitions

From orchestrating information campaigns to publicising reform initiatives, the Bureau has evolved as a de facto censor-at-source of unrest news and reports

The state's new Press Liaison Centre assists the Bureau with media control through proscribing all reports which may infringe the emergency restrictions

- the undue delays in handling queries from the press, which leads to the loss of news worthiness, and the resultant dropping of 'troublesome' stories;
- concomitant with the above, the refusal of the Bureau to accept responsibility for their de facto role as imprimatur and censor.

The primary source of information issued by the Bureau is their 'daily unrest reports', which present 'security matters' in a 'carefully sanitised and truncated form' (Daily News editorial 19/6/86). These reports are fed directly into the Sapa telexes. The daily 'briefings' instituted at the outset of the second emergency were discontinued within two weeks, since the 'decline in unrest incidents' had led to 'very little worthwhile information emanating from unrest related incidents' (press release from Bureau, quoted in Natal Mercury 26/6/86). After editors met with Nel, the briefings were reinstated in truncated form, and finally abandoned at the end of September 'in the interests of accuracy' (Bureau press release, quoted in Daily News 26/9/86).

It has been in the area of verification that the Bureau has acted as a censor par excellence. Initially, the Bureau accepted questions on any subject, but this did not mean that journalists were given useful answers. Many queries were returned with the rebuttal 'the Bureau cannot be expected to comment on each and every incident' (Natal Mercury 20/6/86). By the beginning of July 1986, the Bureau would no longer accept queries gleaned from sources other than officialdom, and all queries were required to be submitted in writing or by telex, 'and then only when in possession of all the salient and verified facts'.

Telephone responses were given only 'in exceptional cases such as acts of terror' (Bureau press release, quoted in Daily News 26/9/86). Despite allowing themselves ample time to 'verify' the facts, there have been widespread criticisms from both the press and opposition politicians of the Bureau's alleged unprofessionalism and inaccuracy.

In answer to queries on why it took so long for information to be imparted, David Stewart, head of the Bureau, is reported to have replied that 'We are still perfecting the flow of information' (Daily News 19/6/86).

Censors-at-Source

A guiding thread through all the Bureau's responses to the media's inquiries has been a refusal to accept responsibility for their role as censor-at-source. Reports concerning police action, for instance, could not be cleared by the police, who would refer it to the Bureau. The Bureau in turn, invariably said that

they were not in a position to give legal advice or clear reports. This was despite Stewart's acknowledgment that the Commissioner of Police had delegated him as the person responsible for the authorisation of publications (Natal Mercury 3/7/86) — 'The Bureau is however not prepared to act as a censor with regard to such reports. It sees its task as providing information on the state of emergency, not as deciding which reports may or may not be published' (ibid). By neither confirming nor denying reports, the Bureau has left newspapers little alternative other than to act as self-censor and drop contentious stories.

The new year regulations provided the mechanism through which the Bureau has overtly taken to the role of censor. The Inter-departmental Press Liaison Centre (IPLC) was created to proscribe all stories which may infringe the above restrictions. The IPLC is manned on a 24-hour basis by representatives of government departments who work on a rotational basis. They describe themselves as 'merely a channel established to facilitate the referral of reports/articles which, in the opinion of the media, fall within the ambit of regulation 3(1) to the relevant government department(s)' (The Star 18/12/86). Predictably, the majority of articles submitted to the IPLC are not cleared for publication. Of the 201 inquiries received between the 11th and 22nd of December, 19 were authorised. The rest were either refused or said to be 'outside the ambit of the IPLC and should be referred to other government departments' (The Star 29/12/86).

The increased bureaucratisation functions as a further gatekeeping mechanism, since it increases the number of stories which are not verified. Furthermore, even when a report is confirmed, it is often too late to be printed, and is dropped from the news schedule altogether. The bureaucratisation should also be seen as having an important function in the internal coherence of the Bureau. By formulating and refining an elaborate set of procedures and applying them stringently, the Bureau institutionalises its joint media management and repression function.

Many journalists have become accustomed to working under conditions of limited access to news. Some editors find the emergency regulations a useful excuse not to cover what they had previously neglected anyway.

They, and no doubt numerous readers too, are rather relieved at not having to deal with the daily incidents of death, detentions and destruction in all their graphic reality. As the emergency drags on, there is a tendency on the part of both newspaper producers and readers to normalise the media controls obscuring the gathering crisis. **TPA**

THE REALITY FILTER

From Louis Liedjie to a Soft-Shoe Stoffel

By Harald Pakendorf, Freelance Journalist & Political Consultant

Many governments have spokespeople. Many have departments of information. Sometimes they are combined, sometimes they are kept separate. A variety of possibilities exists. For South Africa to have a Bureau for Information is therefore not out of line with general practice in many other societies.

Yet in South Africa there is widespread criticism of the way the Bureau does its work.

At least partly this is based on the assumption that government channels of information in the Western world exist not to control information but to make it freely available. This is a very rosy view of how government works. All governments to some degree seek to control what information becomes available, when, and in what form.

The South African government is really no different.

Diminished Freedoms

The background against which the Bureau for Information came into existence is one of the main reasons for the suspicion surrounding it. The government has a long history of very public and very vociferous attacks on the media — other than the state-run SABC — and there have been many attempts over the years to diminish both the freedom with which information may be gathered and the freedom of opinion newspapers have.

This goes back to the Van Zyl Commission which took thirteen years to compile a massive report on which there was no action; to the establishment of the Press Council, transformed into the Media Council, and now again under threat to get its 'house in order'. There was also the Steyn Commission and a Press Bill, which is still gathering dust somewhere.

Yet, despite the blustering, the government was not hitherto able to bring itself to act directly against the press as a whole. That is, until the latest state of emergency and the wide-ranging regulations inhibiting the free flow of information on almost all scores. This time the freedom of opinion, too, has been curtailed.

Over the years pieces of legislation have progressively diminished the area in

which the press could roam freely. In particular there are those injunctions which forbid discussion of any organisations the government deems to be a danger to the state — such as the SA Communist Party and the ANC. In South Africa, press curbs can be classified into three categories:

- those common to many Western countries where the rights of the individual are protected, such as the prohibition on naming anybody under age in a court case;
- those concerning the particular circumstances the country finds itself in, such as restrictions on reporting on the buying and selling of arms and oil; and
- those which tend to protect the state against the prying eyes of the media and the public. These include powers under the Police Act which make it highly dangerous to be critical of police action and, of course, the latest emergency regulations.

Yet, one must add that newspapers still do have the right, frequently used, to be severely critical of the government and even of its press curbs. But no longer can it be said that adequate information or an adequate exchange of opinions is possible in South Africa. Paradoxically, it seems almost as if the state has decided that to protect the freedom of the press it should be forbidden to do its work. It seems as if a democratic right such as freedom of information and opinion is something which can be put on a shelf, to be taken off, dusted and used whenever it is deemed permissible again.

The Clearing House

Against this background it is understandable that the Bureau started off on the wrong footing. But there is another aspect to this — the Bureau is little more than a clearing house for information. It is not as if it gets all the information available from state departments, decides what to release and then does so. The Bureau receives information already selected by departments and then releases it. In fact, it concentrates on security information, which means that it is largely doing what police information officers had done previously.

The Bureau also reacts to queries from the press but the process takes so long that

In South Africa there is a long history of vociferous state criticism of the media, and legislation has slowly diminished press freedoms

The Bureau is little more than a clearing house for information selected and relayed by individual government departments

A senior cabinet minister, invested with the authority to announce and explain government policy in all areas, should head the Bureau

Ironically, press curbs tend to focus criticism on the government's performance through prohibiting informative commentary on radical political formations

newspapers tend not to use this facility. The problem is that the Bureau is hampered by both the emergency regulations and by its own invidious status as a clearing house. It does not have the necessary standing to act strongly.

Further, the establishment of the Bureau has not meant that the information officers attached to each department have ceased to exist. They are still there and still release their own information, raising the question of whether the Bureau really has a function of its own.

If the Bureau were headed by a senior cabinet minister who could speak with confidence and knowledge on every aspect of government policy, the situation may well have been different. A deputy minister simply does not carry enough weight and his officials do not have enough authority to insist on handling information their way. There is no government spokesperson as such. For authoritative views one still has to go to individual ministers or the State President himself.

In the American system, departmental spokespeople are briefed regularly and can handle press conferences with authority, stating government positions while also explaining them. In Germany there is one chief spokesperson, who is available on a daily basis and carries a great deal of authority. This is by no manner of means the case in South Africa. The Bureau has become just one more hurdle journalists have to surmount or circumvent. Run-of-the-mill information certainly is available, but it is no good looking to this source for hard copy.

Consequently, the Bureau cannot escape the criticism levelled at it until it is headed by a senior cabinet minister who is allowed to speak on behalf of all his colleagues. On the establishment of the Bureau, however, it was made clear that in no way could it or its political head perform this kind of role. This, after all, would be contrary to local tradition! Cabinet ministers like to have their own say in their own way. They do not like others to upstage them.

Second-rate Performance

Since the introduction of the emergency regulations, the media and thus the public have received filtered information. To a large extent, the news is now managed in such a way that it is simply not possible to get even an approximate view of what is happening inside South Africa by reading newspapers, and certainly not by listening to the SABC. But let us be honest. The media have never, not even before the Bureau's inception or the emergency regulations, gone all the way in trying to explain South Africa in its full spectrum to other South Africans.

In a way this is not abnormal. Black newspapers fail to convey news about whites and concentrate on what they feel their readers want to know about — mostly black poverty and the rising tide of radicalisation. Similarly, the real aims and political leanings of Africans are never reflected properly in the white media, who in turn focus on their own constituencies' perceived interests. The state is not the only party to be blamed for a second-rate performance.

It is true that even if anybody wanted to publish an honest picture of events in South Africa today, it is no longer possible to do so. Journalists cannot go where they want to, ask the questions they may want to or publish what they want to — nor can they afterwards express an opinion on really thorny political questions. White people cannot know what blacks are thinking, how the state acts in certain circumstances or the extent of black resentment and anger. We are sheltered from reality.

This is more as a result of the emergency, though, than of the Bureau's establishment. An interesting side-effect of the regulations is that they are focusing attention more and more on government and its political programme. As it is virtually impossible to analyse seriously what the Communist Party does and thinks, or the ANC, UDF and other political formations, they are hardly ever the subjects of substantial critical commentary. If you can write about the government only, that is what you tend to focus on.


The strict controls on what the public may or may not know, have also had an obvious effect on the way the 1987 election campaign is being run. Only in the most circumspect manner can relevant issues be discussed. This is tending to make the election campaign unreal. This government has a distinct advantage in that it may know and say what it likes on issues, while opposition spokespeople may not. This is clearly a distortion and does not make for a fair and open election.

In the longer term, it is difficult to see that the state will change the way it has handled news during the past year. Even when the emergency is lifted, the temptation must remain not to go back even to the limited access to information but fuller freedom of opinion which existed before.

It is more than ever incumbent on journalists to fight daily for what is their right and that of the public — the right to publish and be kept informed. Unfortunately, one has the impression that South African newspeople give in too easily, that today there is not constant pushing at the borders of the curbs. There is an acceptance of what is happening. JPA

ECONOMIC

M O N I T O R



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FEATHERBEDDING A VOTER CONSTITUENCY

Deploying Employment in the Public Service?

By Prof Jill Nattrass, Development Studies Unit, University of Natal

New findings on employment trends in the public service reveal several distinct features that are cause for concern. Firstly, proportionate African employment has declined since 1975, despite the creation of some 147 000 new government jobs and the urgent need to alleviate high black unemployment. Secondly, the apparent official policy of preferential employment for whites has entailed much higher costs of job creation, and thus significantly increased the public sector wage bill.

One of the current anomalies on the South African economic scene is the fact that, notwithstanding an ongoing commitment from the government to rationalise the public service and reduce public expenditure, the last ten years has seen a steady escalation in the economic role of the public sector. Government spending has increased significantly, both as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product and in terms of the public sector wage bill or labour costs. The latter has risen in relative importance from 16 percent of the nation's total wage bill in 1975 to 21,4 percent in 1985.

Part of the anomaly could be explained, perhaps, in terms of the government's reaction to the continued depressed state of the economy. No matter how much one might like to see a smaller public sector, one of the most effective means of countering a severe economic recession is to increase government spending, usually through expanding the public service.

Under such circumstances, however, employment practices in the public service should reflect the needs of the wider economy. In other words, the higher wage bill should be a reflection of higher levels of employment rather than

The cover picture (p25) and the one below depict two typical scenes of the unemployment crisis — firstly, a female worker earns R4 a day on a temporary public works project in Cato Manor; secondly, casual labourers clamour for jobs with a prospective employer in downtown Durban.

Table 1

Changing Public Service Employment & Wage Levels, 1975- 1985


Category of Government	Annual Average % Growth Rate		
	Employment	Wage Bill (Current Prices)	Average Wage (Current Prices)
Central Government	3,4	17,1	13,7
Provincial Government	2,0	15,8	13,8
Local Authorities	0,2	15,9	15,7
SATS	0,8	12,3	11,5

increased public service salaries. Even more importantly, the growth in public sector employment should create the type of jobs that can be filled by those who have been hardest hit by unemployment — which, in the South African context, is the African community.

Wage or Employment Increase?

The data presented in table 1 shows the changes in employment levels, the total wage bill and average wage rate for four divisions of the public service, namely central government, provincial government, local authorities and the South African Transport Services (SATS). One can draw a number of conclusions from the data:

- Both increased levels of employment and increased wage rates have contributed to the growing public service wage bill.
- Significant numbers of new jobs were created in the public service between 1975 and 1985.
- The increase in employment was not spread evenly throughout the public service.
- The public sector wage bill on the whole rose at roughly the inflation rate. However, the average wage rate rose more slowly, which suggests that earnings in real terms in the public sector fell over the ten year period.
- Both employment levels and the average wage rate increased much more slowly in SATS than they did in the other three categories of the public service. This trend is probably a reflection of the increased use of normal business principles by SATS management. When one remembers the historical role played by the South African Railways in the alleviation



of the 'poor white' problem, this is an interesting development.

Employment levels rose much more rapidly in central government undertakings than they did in the other three sectors shown. This seems to imply that central government was more successful in selling its message on the need to rationalise the public service to the outside branches of government, than it was in applying the principle to its own operations! Or, alternatively, that there was a change in the state's employment practices in response to the deepening economic recession, but that this change did not filter down to the lower arms of the public service.

Post-1960 Trends

Historically, the public service has always employed a high proportion of whites



relative to the other population groups. Nevertheless, from 1960 onwards the percentage of whites employed by central government (including the homelands and the control boards) actually declined from 47 percent of the total in 1960, to 36 percent in 1970, and to 28 percent in 1977 (Nattrass 1981). The percentage of Africans employed in the public sector rose concomitantly, from 48 percent in 1960, to 50 percent in 1970, reaching 58 percent in 1977.

Over the last decade, the continued *beswating* (Africanisation) of the public sector remained a desirable objective, especially in terms of the need for additional jobs for the African group. Unfortunately, the post-1960 trend of increased African employment has been reversed in recent years. By 1985 African employment as a percentage of public sector employment had fallen to 52 percent; at the same time the white proportion had increased again, to reach 32 percent of the total.

Over the ten year period from 1975 to 1985, some 147 000 jobs were created in the central government, the self-governing homeland administrations, the provincial administrations, the trading departments of the public service and the control boards. Of these new jobs, 73 percent were created in the central government itself. Somewhat ironically, in view of the more urgent need for jobs in these areas, employment levels in the public service of the homelands actually declined over the period. This trend is no doubt a reflection of Pretoria's very stringent budgeting in selected areas of government expenditure.

Uneven Job Spread

Table 2 contains employment data relating to the central government (excluding the homelands), the provincial authorities and the local governments. It shows the racial breakdown of the new jobs created between 1975/85 in these three branches of the public service.

Although Africans held 47 percent of all the jobs available in central, provincial and local government sectors in 1975, only one in five of the new jobs created in these sectors over the last decade has been filled by an African employee. As a result, by 1985 the African share of total employment in these sectors had declined to 43 percent. Had the African group been able to maintain its share of the public service jobs, African employment in the sector would have risen by 64 000 jobs over the period instead of by only 28 500.

In terms of these figures it is difficult to argue that the growth in public sector employment is a reflection of

At the expense of other race groups a significant number of jobs were created for white workers in the public service between 1975 and 1985, especially at central government level

The post-1960 trend of increased African employment or beswarming of the public service has been reversed over the last decade

Although the racial wage gap has narrowed somewhat through larger African wage increases, the racial spread of new public employment opportunities has been skewed

Table 2

Public Sector Job Creation by Race Group of Employee, 1975-1985

Race Group	Number of Jobs Created	Percentage of Total	Average Annual % Growth Rate
White	60 455	43,3	2,0
Coloured	38 906	27,8	3,7
Indian	11 950	8,5	5,5
African	28 551	20,4	0,8
Total	139 862	100,0	1,8

government action to alleviate the hardships flowing from the recession. Far from assisting the groups who have been most affected by growing unemployment levels, what the government has actually done seems to be to favour the creation of jobs for whites at the expense of prospective opportunities for Africans! Jobs for pals? perhaps. Jobs for voters? certainly. Jobs for the needy? definitely not!

Quite apart from the very obvious political and social costs of discriminating against the African community, the policy of replacing Africans with workers from the other population groups has a significant financial cost. The average cost of a job in the three sectors of government included in table 2 was R10 400 in 1985. The cost per white job was R16 970, while that of an African job was only R4 800.

On this basis, if white employment had been maintained at 1975 levels and the increase that took place in white employment had been transferred to the African group, at current wage costs the wage bill for these three sectors in 1985 would have been R730m less. It might be argued that this would only represent a 3 percent reduction in the wage bill, and consequently that this sum of money is not really significant. Yet R730m was larger than the entire budget vote for Education and Training, which is the source of funds for African education outside the homelands and stood at only R705m in 1985.

The Outcome

On the plus side of the balance sheet it must be acknowledged that average African wages in the public sector rose faster over the decade to 1985 than did those of any other population group. African

wage increases averaged 16,6 percent a year, as against 11,2 percent for white employees, 15,2 percent for coloureds and 14,8 percent for Indians.

However, any redistribution benefits that might have arisen from the attempt to narrow the wage gap (in relative terms) were completely overshadowed by the state's skewed employment policy. The consequence of the transfer of jobs from Africans to the other race groups was that the African share of the wage bill of central, provincial and local government remained constant at 27 percent, while the African share of employment in these sectors fell.

The general outcome of this type of employment policy is clear. The government is contributing to growing African unemployment through its apparent policy of featherbedding its voting public. In addition, through its policy of increasing African wage rates but not African employment, it is also contributing to the growing divide that is emerging in African society, between those who have a relatively well paid wage job and those who cannot even find one.

From the findings of this small study it is very clear that not only does the South African state experience conflicts between different policy fields, but that there are also serious clashes between the government's stated policy in a particular area and its own actions. Under present economic and political conditions, South Africa can ill afford the luxury of a schizophrenic state. There is an urgent need for the development of a consistent government policy that is implemented on a wide front — starting with the public sector itself. JPA

Reference
 Nattrass J. *The South African Economy: Its Growth and Change*. Oxford University Press, Cape Town: 1981.

The chronic socio-political problems of South Africa, augmented by repeated economic mismanagement over the past two decades, have culminated in an almost intractable combination of poverty and unemployment. The extent of this crisis is startling:

- Aggregate estimates of national unemployment vary from a conservative 1,5 million people to a level as high as four million.
- Approximately 50 percent of the potentially economically active population in the homelands is without work.
- 1984 Estimates suggested that 39 percent of males and 54 percent of females in rural areas had been without work for more than two years.
- The farming community is estimated to have laid off 25 000 labourers (20 percent of the total number) during the period 1975-1985.
- Over the last three years, 200 000 jobs have been axed in the industrial sector, while capacity utilisation has dropped to 83 percent.

Generally speaking, the ability of both individuals and nations to consume is directly in proportion to the ability to produce. Low production usually means widespread poverty, while high production is the norm for affluent nations. Unfortunately there exists no simple policy to guarantee a rising standard of living — the required solution is invariably multi-faceted and must be directed at the very roots of poverty and unemployment.

The PWP Approach

One of the major components of a solution to these problems in South Africa has to be a co-ordinated grid of public works programmes (PWPs). If the country is to increase its overall standard of living, a programme of this kind is essential under any feasible political and economic dispensation.

PWPs are employment creation projects which can have substantial short-term and long-term benefits. In practice they are normally undertaken on a scale of some magnitude. The immediate benefit of a PWP implemented on an adequate scale would be rapid elevation of employment levels. Furthermore, if wages paid on the project are set high enough, this could also lead to some reduction in widespread poverty.

If correctly conceived and implemented, a PWP can be a valuable skills learning exercise for the participants while also generating infrastructure. Both of these assets are among the preconditions for renewed economic growth in the country. One of the most vital components of a policy which seeks to alleviate poverty is the widespread dissemination of productive

PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES

Challenging Unemployment & Poverty

By Iraj Abedian & Barry Standish,
School of Economics,
University of Cape Town

The Egyptian pyramids may well have been the monumental achievement of the world's first public works programme. In this century, massive road and building construction projects were undertaken in the USA during the depression years to alleviate large scale unemployment. At the same time in South Africa, similar ventures implemented by the government successfully addressed the 'poor white' problem, an experience indelibly stamped in images of the pre-war period.

In 1932 the plight of South Africa's poor whites was a focus of the first Carnegie sponsored inquiry. Fifty years later, a second Carnegie inquiry was initiated — this time to probe conditions of black poverty and rural underdevelopment. Drawing on debate at a Carnegie workshop on unemployment held in late 1986, economists Standish and Abedian summarise the successes and flaws of public works programmes. They recommend that these projects should be designed with the two-fold objective of increasing the incomes of the poor, while absorbing labour in constructive work.



Billy Paddock

Jobless people have been gainfully employed on a public works programme in Durban's Cato Manor area, clearing dense bush to prepare land for residential development.

skills. Wages received are directly related to labour productivity. Productivity among other factors in turn is related to the skills of workers.

The infrastructure creation output of PWPs is supportive of economic growth in two ways. Firstly, these projects can generate infrastructure of a social nature which will contribute to an improved quality of life as well as a greater ability to work. PWPs can make a general contribution to health care through the building of hospitals and clinics; improved sanitation and water planning; and provision for the future through the building of schools, nurseries and day-care centres. Secondly, PWPs can involve projects such as the establishment of irrigation schemes, forestation projects

and transportation networks in rural areas. In urban areas PWPs can also contribute to economic growth through the establishment of industrial areas, possibly for the use of small businesses.

Efficient Principles

Public works assist people by providing them with direct employment and training, while incorporating education schemes. As an 'enabling approach', they avoid the pitfalls of indignity, dependence creation and indigency promotion so commonly associated with a variety of anti-poverty social welfare schemes. These projects also act as a catalyst in furthering grassroots participation in national development.

PWPs have the potential for absorbing

labour in constructive work. A major challenge in the fight against poverty and unemployment lies in the twofold objective of increasing the income (and consumption) of the poor, and efficiently utilising scarce resources. The latter, in the context of the developing economy, implies the use of resources for expanding the productive capacity of the economy. PWPs are particularly superior in this respect.

Implemented on efficient principles, drawing unskilled labour into the programme, PWPs provide both training and sustenance to labour, then release trained workers to the private sector. In effect, a flow of labour is allowed to escape from the stock of poor. When public works are reinforced on the social and political frontiers, they can go a long way to reducing poverty and unemployment.

The Pitfalls

Nevertheless, as with any major public undertaking the potential for wasting resources is vast. Among the more common reasons for the failure of a PWP to live up to expectations are:

- Many public works ventures have been on a trivial scale — there have been few systematic attempts to scale them to the needs of the economy.
- Several PWPs have been characterised by technical hastiness and incompetence, as well as poor choice of technology.
- Schemes have sometimes been ad hoc in nature, lacking spatial focus or any links to national rural development and infrastructure planning schemes.
- Organisational infirmities, makeshift administrative arrangements and lack of managerial and engineering skills have resulted in poor project planning, programming and management.
- There is often an imbalance between centralisation and effective involvement of local administrations and popular bodies in crucial programme decision, planning and implementation.
- Evidence also suggests that if employees are not paid a wage they regard as fair and which provides an incentive to work, labour productivity will be low; hence PWPs will be highly inefficient in producing assets.

Lastly, it should be emphasised that unemployment and poverty are political as well as economic problems. The government's response to these issues reflects its ideology, the availability and nature of advice and financing, and the relative importance it attaches to the various affected groups. Political factors are thus important in shaping the design of PWPs and in determining what effects they have on poverty and unemployment over time.

Table

POTENTIAL FOR PWP 'JOB CREATION' IN SOUTH AFRICA

(Based on the 1985 Relief Package Expenditures)

Percentage of Government Budget ¹	PWP Budget	No of jobs (that could be created) by a PWP at R2 036/job
10%	R3 757m	1 845 285
12%	R4 509m	2 214 637
14%	R5 260m	2 416 012
15,8% ²	R5 937m	2 583 497
16%	R6 012m	2 952 849

¹ The total government budget for 1986/87 is R37 571m.

² This was the percentage of the 1932 budget that was spent on PWPs for 'poor whites'.

Hypothetical PWP Budgets


Two issues are particularly critical when implementing a PWP — how many people need to be accommodated and how much the operation will cost. Unfortunately, answers to both questions require detailed statistical evidence which is either not available or is debatable. The best the authors can do is to base estimates on a financial analysis of the government's unemployment relief package of 1985, and measure potential opportunities with respect to a hypothetical, aggregate PWP budget. These calculations are presented in the accompanying table.

While it would be naive to assume that the 'cost per job' or 'cost per trainee' would remain constant at a given level irrespective of the type of job or field of training, the calculations do give some indication of the possible benefits. Of course, the cost of job creation in the rural areas where unemployment is most concentrated, would be considerably less than in urban areas.

It would seem reasonable to suggest that any amount ranging from 14 to 16 percent of the government budget would suffice to finance a package of PWPs, containing a mix of 'jobs' and 'training' opportunities for almost all of the unemployed people of South Africa. The government's PWP of the 1930s succeeded only when the government allocated 15,8 percent of the national budget to the programme. A similar proportion of the 1986/87 budget, committed to a well conceived programme, would go a long way to initially halting

Implemented on efficient principles within a national grid, these ventures offer sustenance to unskilled labour and provide skills for the private sector

Unskilled labourer on road construction project near Botha's Hill (Natal). Public works programmes can provide scores of unemployed people with jobs while also improving service and facility infrastructures.



Billu Prasad

Should 15,8 percent of the budget be spent on public works programmes, the cycle of black poverty could be broken through the potential creation of 2,6 million jobs

and ultimately reversing a cycle of black poverty that has been neglected for far too long.

Independent Initiative

For a programme to encompass the scope and direction of a successful PWP in South Africa, it must enjoy both a high social profile and public acceptance. Consequently, ultimate authority for the programme, whether this is explicit or merely implicit, rests with the government and the people. The alienation between government and most of the potential beneficiaries of public works will endanger the programme, however, should government become institutionally or ideologically involved at anything more than a distance.

For the PWP to be successful, authority

must be vested in some independent body with clearly defined parameters. Allocation of funds and control of both the programme and individual projects are then undertaken through this body. As the degree of independence is very much related to the sources and conditions of funding, there is a strong need to explore alternatives other than a simple expenditure vote of parliament.

Obviously a PWP implemented on a scale large enough to do justice to the problem will require a substantial amount of resources. Given the extensive potential benefits of the proposed PWPs the raising of necessary finance is not beyond the capabilities of the country. In initiating the projects, finance is not the primary problem. Realising the urgency for a programme and establishing a firm commitment to implementing it are more fundamental issues. *DDA*

Time Running Out

STRUCTURAL CHANGE & POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Dr R W Bethlehem, Group Economics Consultant,
Johannesburg Consolidated Investments

Structural change slowly reveals itself to planners over extended periods of time and is usually beyond even the power of governments to influence. Between now and the end of the century, fundamental demographic and socio-economic change will dramatically alter the face of South Africa. The process of structural change is reflected currently in acute socio-political tension and conflict on the surface of our society.

The objective of all economic management, be it centred on the individual firm or on macro-economic stabilisation, is to identify structural change and plan accordingly. If this is not done, the dangers of maladjustment and wastage of resources are increased. Only in special circumstances does structural change itself become the possible goal of policy making. When this happens, the role of government takes on particular importance in determining the future nature and performance of a country.

In the business world, more immediate organisational problems often tend to dominate the attention of managers and to obscure underlying structural developments until appropriate action is overdue or too late. This tendency is even more evident in government economic planning in South Africa. In recent years political expediency has played a perverse role in deferring action on structural matters, when these required urgent official attention. This shortcoming needs to be highlighted and corrected if the country is to stand any chance of escaping a retrogression towards the status of a Third World country — overwhelmed by rising population, falling production, increasing poverty and escalating political conflict.

Demographic Patterns

In South Africa it is in the area of population growth that the most obvious transformation is occurring. When assessing the impact this will have, it is not enough merely to draw attention to a probable increase in the total national population (including all the homelands) to nearly 47,5 million by the year 2000, of whom about 41,5 million will be black people (see table 1). Deeper probing of demographic trends is necessary.

Firstly, there is the massive increase in the black population which derives from the differential age structures of race groups in South Africa. In 1980 no less than 60 percent of the African group was under the age of 20 years, compared with 57 percent of the 'coloured', 50 percent of the Indian and 42 percent of the white groups, respectively.

A second significant feature that planners will have to face is the major geographical shifts in population which are altering the very character of the country's cities. Comparative figures for urbanised race groups at the turn of the century show that out of a total urban population of 1,2 million in 1904, only 29,1 percent was African. By 1980 South Africa's urbanised population of approximately 14,3 million was about equally divided between Africans (7,6 million) and 'non-Africans', i.e. whites, coloureds and Indians (6,7 million). Projections are that by the year 2000, urbanised Africans will outnumber the urbanised non-African population by about three to one.

The possibility of the white community retaining its present proportion of total national income is ruled out, given current demographic trends. In absolute terms there is a clear shift of economic power towards the African community, although this remains unacknowledged in their ownership or influence in the corporate sector. The persistence of black exclusion from corporate ownership, therefore, no less than their exclusion from the institutions of constitutional authority, naturally have become issues of increasing political contention and dispute.

This demographic transformation has other far-reaching implications, especially as far as the state's future dependence on Africans as a source of tax revenue is concerned. At present, the major source of direct taxes is the white community — individuals make up the best part of R11 400m; corporations, R8 430m. Therefore, if income is to be redistributed to Africans two possibilities present themselves for maintaining government revenue levels. Either Africans will have to increase their contributions to direct tax, which implies a massive rise in their total personal incomes; or there must be a major shift to indirect taxation.

Policy planning to anticipate fundamental structural change has been deferred, increasing the prospects of retrogressive under-development in South Africa


If South Africa is to avoid being overwhelmed by poverty and conflict, GDP must at least match the current population growth rate of 2,5 percent a year

Compared with a 50/50 balance in 1980, by the year 2000 urbanised Africans will outnumber non-Africans (whites, coloureds and Indians) by three to one

If the South African economy is to expand, a radical restructuring of the labour force will have to occur with dramatically increased numbers of skilled workers

Paradoxically, the need to narrow the black/white wage gap is critical, but increases in black wages in turn fuel inflation and increase unemployment

Table 1 SOUTH AFRICA'S POPULATION STRUCTURE, 1904 - 2020



Employment Trends

One of the central issues of the present political conflict in South Africa is the permanent damage that might be done to the economy in the process of a violent transfer of power. There can be little doubt that any failure on the part of the economy to match population growth will also have catastrophic consequences. So far, experience in the 1980s has not been encouraging. On average the increase in real GDP has been barely more than one percent per annum, whereas the average growth in national population has been of the order of 2,5 percent (the African population has been increasing at a rate of over three percent). In short, South Africa has been slipping backwards into a scenario of underdevelopment.

It is worthwhile considering what would happen to the structure of the labour force were the country to succeed in surmounting the economy's present underperformance — if sustained growth were achieved at a level considered to be within South Africa's capacity in terms of earlier Economic Development Programmes (EDP). Table 2 offers a comparison of the structure of the South African labour force in 1980 with that of the United States in 1900 — a period when the latter was on the threshold of Rostowvian, self-sustainable economic expansion. The comparison reveals striking similarities, with sobering implications for the future in South Africa.

If the industrialisation of our economy is to be similarly expanded, to the extent achieved in the United States at the turn of the century, then a radical restructuring of the labour force will have to be undertaken. Whereas unskilled workers today comprise close to 60 percent of South Africa's total labour force, this proportion will have to be reduced to 20 percent (if not lower), with sharp

increases taking place in available professional, technical, service and managerial manpower. Without this correction, industrialisation of the kind contemplated will be impossible. Indeed, if black educational needs are not satisfied, the present shortage of skilled manpower will be exacerbated and the possibilities of expansion lost altogether.

Inflationary wages

It has long been acknowledged, by both the private sector and the government, that the enormous disparities between black and white per capita incomes in South Africa constitute a threat to socio-political stability. The problem has been to reduce disparities without greatly aggravating inflation, because increases in earnings that exceed increases in productivity put upward pressure on prices. With black trade unionism now legally accepted, there is pressure for inflationary wage settlements. But in the long run inflation can also become a threat to job creation, through the dislocation it causes and the malinvestment it encourages.

In South Africa, inflationary wage settlements have led to a capital intensification of production methods, particularly in manufacturing industry but also in the mining and service sectors. In most advanced Western countries a by-product of the move to more capital intensive production has been a secular increase in unemployment. Published figures for unemployment in South Africa are unsatisfactory but nevertheless provide support for the view that a similar process of change has been occurring, albeit in a slightly different way and on a smaller scale.

Table 3 illustrates the changes that have occurred in the rate of skilled unemployment in South Africa, as measured by trends in the registered unemployment of whites, coloureds and

Table 2

COMPARATIVE LABOUR FORCE STRUCTURES, USA & RSA

Year	United States			South Africa		
	1900	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980
Professional, Technical & Managerial %	10,1	24,7	32,5	4,8	5,5	8,8
Clerical & Sales %	7,5	23,6	29,8	8,3	10,5	14,6
Craftsmen & Operators %	23,0	30,6	32,3	20,9	17,0	18,6
Unskilled %	59,4	21,1	5,5	66,0	67,0	58,0

Indians. It reveals three main phases beyond normal cyclical variation — rising unemployment during the 1950s; noticeably falling unemployment in the 1960s; and overall rising unemployment since then. The current trend is expected to continue given the pressures for competitiveness — especially for the manufacturing industry in export markets and against imports in the domestic market — and for maintaining black advancement programmes. Efforts aimed at furthering black advancement through closing wage gaps have had a retarding effect on the economy and have increased unemployment. This is an invidious trade-off!

Finance Problems

The area of finance in South Africa, particularly the financing of Gross Domestic Investment (GDI), is cause for great concern. Three aspects related to structural change of the South African economy need to be considered, namely:

- the contribution of domestic saving to financing GDI;
- the likely effects of a reduced availability of foreign saving on future growth; and
- the financing of central government expenditure.

The changes that have occurred in the structure of domestic savings over the last 35 years are illustrated in table 4. These trends reveal an alarming decline from two sources: personal saving, and saving by general government. This has increased the burden on corporate saving enormously and made worse the country's reliance on savings imported from abroad. It is clear from an examination of annual figures that:

- between 1965 and 1967 (both years included) a net capital inflow of R7 111m was recorded;

- after the Soweto riots, this inflow turned into an outflow which totalled R7 206m from 1977 to 1980;
- between 1980 and 1984 there was a large net inflow of capital (amounting to R7 389m) but this was reversed in 1985 by an outflow of R8 347m;
- as the outflow in 1985 exceeded the surplus on the current account by over R1 200m, net gold and foreign exchange reserves were reduced, and they were reduced further in 1986, although things began to improve in the second half of the year.

A look at the figures for real GDP growth in South Africa (see table 5) reveals a steadily declining tendency over the last twenty years. In the 1950s growth averaged only 4,4 percent but rose to 5,7 percent in the 1960s, dropping to 3,4 percent in the 1970s. In the first five years of the 1980s, real GDP growth averaged only 1,1 percent at a time when

Local corporations have had to finance new investment because of significantly reduced personal and government saving, and the large outflow of foreign capital

Table 3 REGISTERED 'NON-AFRICAN' (SKILLED) UNEMPLOYMENT - RATE %




Table 4

STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC SAVINGS IN RSA

Average % Years	Personal Saving	Corporate Saving	Saving of General Government	Provision for Depreciation	Gross Domestic Saving
1950-1959*	30,7+	8,2+	13,4	47,7	100%
1960-1969	31,8	10,8	14,6	42,8	100%
1970-1979	23,9	19,2	9,0	47,9	100%
1980-1985	11,8	31,1	(1,5)	58,6	100%

*Averages for 1953 to 1959, detail for earlier years not available.

Table 5

FINANCING GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN RSA

Annual Averages Years	At Current Prices - Rm						GDS as % of		Real GDP Growth
	GDP	GDS	GDI	Shortfall	Financed by		GDI	GDP	
					Net Cap. Flow	Reserve Change			
1950-59	3 868	818	900	(82)	93	11	90,0	21,1	4,4%
1960-69	7 950	1 921	1 931	(10)	81	90	99,5	24,2	5,7%
1970-79	26 654	7 249	7 442	(193)	87	106	97,4	27,2	3,4%
1980-85	87 778	22 794	22 521	273	(540)	267	101,2	26,0	1,1%

GDP Gross Domestic Product
 GDS Gross Domestic Saving
 GDI Gross Domestic Investment

Table 6

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN LIABILITIES

Annual Averages Years	Rm			As % of Total Foreign Liabilities		Foreign Liabilities as % of Money GDP		
	Money GDP	Foreign Liabilities		Short-term	Long-term	Short-term	Total	
		Short-term	Long-term					
Gross	1960-1969	7 950	779	3 319	19,0	81,0	9,8	51,5
	1970-1979	26 654	3 302	12 006	21,6	78,4	12,4	57,4
	1980-1985	87 778	17 316	31 341	35,7	64,3	19,8	55,5
Net	1960-1969	7 950	(36)	2 497	(1,5)	101,5	(0,5)	31,0
	1970-1979	26 654	902	9 391	8,8	91,2	3,4	38,6
	1980-1985	87 778	9 119	20 549	30,7	69,3	10,4	33,8

the average dollar price of gold had been the highest ever recorded. The drought and a severe resurgence of socio-political turbulence partly explain this slump, while it also reflects an underlying malaise in policy formulation and application.

Foreign debt

In terms of the Leutwiler agreement (February 1986) on rescheduling South Africa's foreign debt repayment, the country committed itself to a net outflow of capital between 1986/87, unless the

climate of opinion among foreign banking creditors so improves that a return to a situation of net capital inflow becomes possible. This means yet another two years of below par real GDP growth, where par reflects both earlier EDP calculations of potential and the requirements for pacing increases in population. The only way capital outflow can be assured is to keep the demand for imports deliberately low, as import changes have a high positive correlation with changes in aggregate domestic demand.

Table 6 shows the structural alternation in South Africa's foreign debt financing; *inter alia* the rise that occurred after 1980 in short-term foreign liabilities, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of money GDP. Short-term liabilities, as a percentage of total foreign liabilities, remained between 15 percent and 25 percent throughout the period 1956 to 1980. In 1981, however, they rose to above 25 percent, and in 1985 they reached 42.7 percent (the latest year for which figures have been published).

These trends represent a structural shift of serious proportions and help to explain why the crisis itself occurred. Balance of payments problems caused by a collapse in the dollar price of gold and severe drought had resulted in policy action of a very risky kind. Money was borrowed from abroad in the belief that adverse pressure on the balance of payments would only be temporary. When this proved not to be the case, the net reserves not only failed to achieve a hoped for recovery but were depleted still further, thus exposing the country to adverse political pressure from abroad.

Part of the financing problem is the level of central government expenditure in the period since 1980. The percentage of Exchequer issues to money GDP from 1950 to date are:

- around 17 percent throughout the 1950s, rising to 18,6 percent in the 1960s;
- increasing to 24,6 percent in the 1970s, declining to 22,1 percent in 1980;
- rising sharply to 27,1 percent in 1985, the highest in the entire 36 year period under review in this article.

Rand exchange rate

There can be little doubt that the long-run cause of the rand exchange rate collapse of the 1970s and 1980s was the large inflation differential that emerged between South Africa and her leading trading partners. Graphs 1 and 2 demonstrate the long-run link between the rand/dollar exchange rate and the adverse inflation differential vis-a-vis the United States. However, this observation puts the matter too simplistically. The collapse of the exchange rate in the short run has also aggravated inflation, and the short-run collapse of the rand must be linked to the loss of net reserves and the failure of official policy. This process can only be described as a structural deterioration in South Africa's external financing.

It is worthwhile pondering on why the rand collapsed when the gold price on average had never been higher. The cause has to do with the policy response to fluctuations in the gold price itself. Large rises in the price of gold have inevitably generated inflationary expectations and pressures, which have been impossible to contain when domestic liquidity was allowed to

build up in the banking system. This occurred even with a floating exchange rate, because appreciation of the exchange rate was resisted for reasons linked to the worsened position of non-gold exporters.

Rises in the exchange rate prompted by increases in the gold price have often occurred when the prices of other export commodities have been weak or declining. The result has been a build-up of domestic inflationary pressure and a general increase in the internal cost structure. However, there has also been no corresponding downward adjustment in the internal cost structure when the gold price has declined, producing in turn unavoidable exchange rate corrections and adverse feedback effects on domestic prices. There would appear to be little prospect of such a scenario changing in the circumstances now facing the country in the areas of collective bargaining and constitutional change. Both of these encourage a bias towards inflationary wage settlements for black workers.

Socio-Political Setting

Any examination of structural change in South Africa and its relationship to policy formulation must take into account changes in social conditions and attitudes. Space unfortunately does not permit detailed consideration of these aspects of transformation, especially evident in the increasing political radicalism in black schools and the black community. Briefly, an increasing supply of skilled manpower is needed if the economy is to fulfil its potential for growth. If the economy does not expand sufficiently to counterbalance the aspirations of black school leavers, their disaffection and destructive anger will increase.

Three socio-political obstacles that are a source of profound difficulty have to be removed. These are:

- obstacles of an institutional or attitudinal kind which inhibit the free use and mobility of labour;
- obstacles of environmental deprivation which inhibit the ripening of productivity, restricting matriculants and graduates in the black community; and
- obstacles of a political kind which interfere with the optimisation of the economy's growth rate.

Economic sanctions and township unrest, which feed back destructively on entrepreneurial and consumer confidence, are examples of the latter kind. Clearly, the failure to deal adequately with these obstacles, against the background of projected demographic change, will compound the conflict and violence. This scenario could effectively destroy South Africa as a modernising Western-type industrial state.


The long-run collapse of the rand exchange rate has been caused by the large inflation differential between South Africa and her leading trading partners since the 1970s

Sanctions and township unrest feed back destructively on entrepreneurial and consumer confidence, slowing down economic growth

Market forces may bring about the necessary structural changes if the private sector is prepared to risk making strategic investments in certain industries


Graph 1

INFLATION & THE RAND EXCHANGE RATE



Graph 2

RAND/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE



Statistical Sources
 SA — Central Statistical Services
 SA — Human Sciences Research Council
 SA — Reserve Bank
 US — Department of Labour

Projections
 Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd

Challenge of change

Can we rely on market forces to bring about necessary structural changes in South Africa? A solution may well involve establishing strategic industries and undertaking the kind of socio-political investment that the private sector might not feel is economically justifiable. The question really comes down to whether the private sector, when it comes to strategic investment — where both the extended lead time and the uncertainty of ultimate return cause problems — is sufficiently bold to do what needs to be done.

As for government, to the extent that structural change is unavoidable in South Africa, the only responsible approach is adaption and anticipation. The Verwoerdian belief that demographic changes, particularly the process of black urbanisation, could be checked, let alone reversed, is now thoroughly discredited.

Yet the National Party holds to the belief that in other respects the state still has the power to dominate structural forces.

If economic growth in South Africa does not match population growth, and the experience thus far in the 1980s is discouraging, South Africa will be dragged backwards into the condition of a Third World country. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario of declining production levels, of food shortages and of deepening misery among the less privileged. The real danger is that if popular black radicalisation continues along its present course any chance of controlling it will be lost, even to groups such as the ANC. Each day that passes, therefore, in which progress is not made in closing the gap between the main protagonists in the power struggle, is a day lost in meeting the challenge of structural change on the sub-continent. In this sense, at least, time is running out for South Africa.

By Dr Paul Holden, Honorary Research Fellow,
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal

RETROSPECT

In spite of unprecedented international hostility towards South Africa and widespread uncertainty regarding domestic political initiatives towards the end of last year, there were signs that the mild economic recovery that had begun in the middle of 1985 and had petered out in the first quarter of 1986 had resumed. For the last three quarters of 1986, real gross domestic product expanded at an annual rate of approximately three percent. The main impetus for the increase came from a rebuilding of inventories, which, by the end of the first quarter of 1986, had declined by over R7 billion compared with the end of 1981. There was also a rise in private consumption expenditure, which tended to be concentrated in outlays for durable and semi-durable goods.

The strength of this recovery remains in question, however. The continued lack of confidence in the current economic climate is indicated by the further decline in real fixed investment, which is estimated to have fallen by ten percent for the year as a whole — the fifth consecutive year of decline. The fall in 1986 took place in an environment of sharply declining nominal interest rates and large negative real rates.

Furthermore, indications from many retailers are that in many parts of the country, Christmas spending was not as strong as had been hoped, which does not bode well for retail sales in the first part of 1987. Automobile sales registered a decline of some 18 percent during 1986 and, in addition, there are no signs that the rate of inflation is about to abate. On the contrary, it appears that there was some acceleration in the rate of increase in prices and that the consumer price index rose by over 19 percent during last year, compared with an increase of some 16 percent in 1985 — a rate that was already worryingly high.

Other Key Indicators

The unemployment rate appears to have peaked in the third quarter of the year, although any judgement about the numbers of unemployed is little more than guess work due to the unreliability and incomplete coverage of unemployment statistics. It was reported that in the last quarter of 1986 some two million people remained out of work.

On the supply side of the economy, the sectors that registered the largest increases in output were agriculture, public utilities and manufacturing. The real output of the construction and the primary sector (mining and quarrying) declined although it should be emphasised that the reliability of such

figures (which are based on physical output volumes) are notoriously bad.

The current account of the balance of payments continues to register substantial strength in spite of the imposition of sanctions by the United States and other countries. Nevertheless, following the large surplus in 1985, the statistical contribution of the external sector to the growth rate of GDP declined during 1986.

Exchange rates continued to fluctuate wildly in the second half of 1986 and early 1987. After declining sharply during the first part of 1986, the exchange rate strengthened against both the US dollar and a trade weighted basket of currencies during the latter part of the year. This trend continued into January 1987 as the US dollar plunged against other major currencies and the price of gold increased above US \$400 an ounce. By mid-January 1987, the rand rate was approaching 50 US cents, a level that had not been reached since February 1986. On a real exchange rate basis — the nominal exchange rate adjusted for inflation differentials — the appreciation has been larger because the inflation differential between South Africa and its major trading partners is high. Between June 1986 and January 1987 the real exchange rate appreciated by over 30 percent.

The stance of fiscal policy continued to be expansionary during 1986. Preliminary government expenditure estimates show that while expenditure has continued to increase at approximately the same rate, it is likely that the rate of growth of receipts will decline. The ratio of the deficit to GDP is likely to rise from 3,5 percent to close to five percent.

The stance of monetary policy as indicated by interest rates was also expansionary. By early 1987, the BA rate had declined to 8,9 percent compared with 12,5 percent at the beginning of 1986. The prime overdraft rate also declined from 15,5 percent in January 1986 and there were similar dramatic declines in home mortgage rates. The growth of the broadly defined money supply fell quite sharply in spite of the substantial cuts in interest rates. This, to a large extent, reflects the slack demand for bank credit. Growth of credit from the banking system to the private sector grew by only 6,6 percent in the 12 months to September 1986, and on a seasonally adjusted basis, actually declined during the third quarter.

Estimated outcomes for the most important components of GDP, plus forecasts for 1987 are presented in the accompanying table.

THE POLICY DILEMMA

The South African economy is being buffeted by powerful forces, both external and internal, which present economic policy makers with a particularly difficult set of choices. Current problems are acutely pressing and the freedom to manoeuvre is limited.

The overwhelming effect of political uncertainty on the business environment is shown time and again by surveys of business opinion. Solutions to many of the problems facing the economy therefore lie in the political sphere, which makes policy formulation particularly difficult. Policy makers are faced with the following set of conditions:

- While there has been some degree of improvement, the rate of economic expansion remains unacceptably low.
- The unemployment rate is high.
- Private fixed investment continues to decline.
- The economic aspirations of the black population require that their standard of living should rise.
- The rate of price increase continues unabated and is even rising.
- International capital markets remain unavailable as a source of savings to finance investment. To replace this the domestic savings rate has to rise.
- The spectre of foreign sanctions poses a continuing threat to South Africa's foreign trade.

Unlikely Relief Measures

Under these circumstances, determining the correct policy response is at best difficult. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of the current situation which are clear. The advice of those who are advocating more direct controls on the grounds that under such circumstances 'markets do not work' should be resisted as stoutly as possible. In particular, the introduction of wage and price controls must not be allowed to occur. Whatever economic conditions exist, scarce resources have to be allocated among competing demands. The price mechanism will always be the most efficient way of doing this.

The South African economy is already burdened with a huge network of controls on economic activity. In early January 1987, the Small Business Development Corporation published a report stating that many would-be entrepreneurs in the black community were being discouraged by the seemingly endless red tape that has to be circumvented before they could start businesses. Numerous other examples of inefficient and time wasting controls on economic activity exist. To add to this burden can only invite disaster.

The thought of the administrative nightmare that the recent fluctuations in the exchange rate would cause a wage and price control system boggles the imagination. It is hard to comprehend the rationale of businessmen who criticise current policy and then call for wage and price controls. They do not seem to realise that these controls will be administered by the same people responsible for the policy they criticise.

The contention that sanctions will benefit the South

African economy and that import substitution should begin immediately, is also nonsense. It results from the confusion of a shortrun increase in investment demand — produced by the substitution of local supply sources for foreign sources — with an increase in investment taking advantage of opportunities that yield the highest rate of return on a global basis. For consumers, it must necessarily mean a shift from a lower (foreign) to a higher (local) cost supply source. Presumably, those who are pushing import substitution do not envisage sanctions remaining indefinitely. What, then, happens to the import substituting industries once international trade is resumed fully? Will they become another set of the seemingly endless list of special cases which qualify for a high level of protection?

Lastly, the view that all the economy needs is a high gold price to 'rescue' it, is similarly misguided and simplistic. While there is no doubt that a high gold price provides significant benefits to the economy, it also brings with it a host of problems. Often it is not realised that industrialisation, one of the most frequently mentioned policy aims, may not be consistent with a high gold price. This problem, which is commonly known as the 'Dutch Disease', arises because of the upward pressure on the exchange rate resulting from a high gold price.

There is a measure of realisation by South African policy makers that a high exchange rate may lead to difficulties for exporters. Nevertheless, there appears to be little understanding that the exchange rate affects the distribution of output between all goods that are or might be internationally traded (commonly known as tradables), and those that by their very nature cannot be traded (services or 'non-tradables'). The de-industrialisation that has occurred in Britain as a result of high oil prices and in Holland as a result of a high output of natural gas should be borne in mind by those who see gold as South Africa's salvation.

Exchange Rate Effects

The 'low' exchange rate of the middle of 1986 was both an indication that South Africa had become a 'banana republic' and that the appreciation of the exchange rate over the past few months is beneficial to the economy. The view that a depreciated rate is necessarily the result of misguided economic policies is a simplistic one. The most common feature of badly managed economies is an over-valued exchange rate. Virtually all standby agreements arranged with the International Monetary Fund by member countries have an exchange rate devaluation clause.

The Reserve Bank followed the correct policy in allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, certainly given the precarious state of the country's foreign exchange reserves. What is open to question is whether it has been correct in allowing the recent appreciation. Large fluctuations in the exchange rate increase uncertainty for investors in what is already a highly uncertain environment. Furthermore, it is not only exporters but all producers



AFRAPIX. P. auf der Heyde

Disinvestment campaigners protest outside a West German bank — 1986. The South African economy is being buffeted by external pressures and internal political uncertainty.

of traded goods that are adversely affected by an exchange rate appreciation. Recent developments, while undoubtedly good for national confidence, will have had a deflationary impact on investment and production as both exports and local producers of goods that compete with imports become less competitive.

To cope with recent sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries, local producers will have to offer price incentives in order to induce foreign buyers to purchase South African goods affected by sanction legislation. Even producers of goods that are not affected by sanctions are finding that the opprobrium with which South Africa is regarded internationally makes selling overseas more difficult. Price inducements are frequently necessary in order to overcome this resistance. This, for exporters, has the same effect as an appreciation of the exchange rate. Therefore action to reduce the exchange rate itself might become necessary.

An additional consideration when deciding on the appropriate exchange rate is that the best means of encouraging import substitution is by offering local producers a high rate of return to manufacture

previously imported goods. This is best achieved by using the exchange rate to provide the price incentive. Finally, with the rate of inflation in South Africa some 15 percentage points higher than that of its major trading partners, the rate must depreciate by this amount each year in order for the real exchange rate to remain unchanged. Clearly depreciation will be necessary in the future, so the best policy option could well be to allow the rate to go lower immediately and accumulate reserves.

A worrying aspect of recent developments in the economy is the low rate of private savings. While savings by corporations rose during 1986 and the overall savings rate remained approximately in line with longer term trends, private savings declined sharply probably at least partly due to highly negative real interest rates. Because foreign sources of capital are no longer available, the domestic savings rate has to rise in order to finance investment. To this end, policy makers might consider allowing tax concessions on interest in order to stimulate and encourage savings. The increased concession announced in the mini-budget is a step in the right direction.

PROSPECT

The range of policy options open is therefore limited. While action is clearly needed to control inflation, conventional fiscal and monetary restraint would further depress an already slack economy. On the other hand, fiscal and monetary stimulus without complementary anti-inflationary measures run the risk of further accelerating the rate of inflation. Fortunately there is a course of action open which can accommodate both policy aims. The inefficiencies of the controlled part of the economy are well-known and widespread. They have contributed to the low level of demand by pushing up prices in the face of surplus capacity, and to the high level of the budget deficit by then demanding government support when they are faced with unsold output. The agricultural marketing boards, are a prime example of this but many other cases would be amenable to firm action to promote efficiency and competition.

The present policy of market sharing and restriction of competition is responsible for such travesties as VCR video machines retailing in South Africa for nearly four times the price of those in the United States. What is needed is action to prevent market sharing and the over-concentration of industries that harm consumer interests, and the abolition of control boards that in practice are nothing more than organisations run for the benefit of producers. This does not necessarily mean that monopolies need to be broken up, but rather that they be subjected to the fresh winds of international competition by allowing unrestricted imports. Such a policy would immediately have a beneficial effect on the upward movement of prices.

Additional fiscal expansion is clearly necessary. However, public sector spending should be directed towards providing improved educational and housing facilities for the black population. This can most efficiently be done by providing the finance, while allowing the private sector to undertake both the building of houses and the provision of educational facilities. At the same time, current expenditure should be restrained by resisting public sector wage increases, a policy which would be helped if the recommended anti-inflationary policy were to be followed. Nevertheless, some increase in the budget deficit might be necessary. The low rate of growth of the monetary aggregates provides the scope for this to be financed in a non-inflationary manner. Further increases in the savings rate could be achieved by allowing tax concessions on interest earnings in an environment where interest rates are low.

Finally, stimulus to the economy could be further provided by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate sharply and then defending this level. Current policy which has allowed wild fluctuations in the exchange rate has probably severely curtailed investment because of the high degree of

uncertainty surrounding the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. A lower exchange rate would have a stimulatory effect on a major part of the industrial sector of the South African economy. While this would have an upward influence on the price level (which would partly offset the anti-inflationary measures outlined above) it is a price that must be paid in order to get the economy moving vigorously ahead.

OUTCOMES FOR 1986						
Forecast & Estimated Actual & Forecast for 1987						
1986 Actual	2,5	1,0	1,5	-10,0	18,5	44,5
1986 Forecast ¹	0,5	2,9	-0,6	—	14,0	40,5
1987 Forecast	2,5	2,2	1,8	-2,1	19,1	38,0
	Real Gross Domestic Expenditure	Real GDP	Real Private Consumption	Real Fixed Investment	Inflation Rate	Rand/Dollar Exchange Rate

¹ Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch


Forecasts for 1987

Forecasts for 1987 are shown in the accompanying table. The forecast is based on a gold price of \$410 an ounce. There is obviously a high degree of uncertainty surrounding this estimate so the forecasts should be regarded accordingly. It should also be pointed out that there is a significant lag between policy changes occurring and their effects being registered. Therefore these forecasts are based on current policy. It is possible that measures introduced later in the year will affect the main economic aggregates but their influence should be no more than marginal during 1987.

It is anticipated that the recovery will continue, although the rate of expansion will remain subdued. Private fixed investment will continue to decline, although at a reduced rate. Without further policy measures, it is expected that the recovery will dwindle. To conclude, it is forecast that the inflation rate will remain close to 20 percent and that the exchange rate will slip back below the 40 US cents level. *TPA*

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Case Study I

STREET CARWASHERS

Challenging the Myth of the 'Social Pest'

By Douglas Booth, Development Studies Unit,
University of Natal

Both car washing and garbage picking can be examined as appropriate examples of activities in the lower echelons of the informal sector. Drawing on two surveys conducted among self-employed carwashers working Durban's tourist beachfront, researcher Douglas Booth argues that these marginalised workers have little chance of entrance to formal wage employment, nor prospects for material improvement in the present socio-political climate.

In South Africa many people engage in a range of informal employment activities, including the likes of backyard mechanics and carpenters, hawkers, 'pirate' taxidrivers, shoeshiners, cardboard collectors, carparkers and prostitutes. Broadly, these activities are distinguished from those in the formal sector by their small-scale and labour intensive operations, ease of entry, adapted technology and indigenous resources, skills acquired outside formal institutions, and unregulated and competitive markets.

The heterogeneous nature of the informal sector is axiomatic with its wide range of activities in manufacturing, retailing and services, and its diversification in terms of productivity, income levels and the motivations of participants. These characteristics make it clear that the informal sector is stratified, with the upper echelons being characterised by the accumulation of wealth and the lower by subsistence returns (Le Brun and Gerry 1975; House 1984).

Empirical studies of participants in the lower echelons of the informal sector reveal that they typically view their situation as temporary while seeking formal wage employment (House 1984; Booth 1986). It is these people who are the victims of high


unemployment coupled with the lack of unemployment and welfare benefits. The socio-demographic characteristics of many participants, such as their youth, low education, lack of experience in formal wage employment and lack of marketable skills contribute to making them peripheral, or marginal, to the needs of the formal labour market. For these people employment in the informal sector is a survival strategy which may alternate with brief periods of menial work in formal wage employment.

A Local Issue

In recent months the effect of crime along Durban's beachfront on tourism has become a local issue. City councillors, police spokespersons and hotel managers have

Cover caption

Garbage pickers scabble among refuse being offloaded at the Westville site. The two urban case studies focus on Durban's dump pickers and street carwashers.



Billy Poedock

While big business calls for deregulation of the informal sector to create employment, local authorities harass self-employed carwashers and unfairly link them with petty crimes

Carwashers describe their predicament as *uyazama ukuziphilisa*— meaning the desperate people with limited options, who are prepared to tackle any job

invariably attributed the increase in crime to Africans who 'mug and steal by night and work as bogus parking attendants and carwashers by day' (Daily News 18/10/86). Just as *togts* (day labourers) were perceived to be social pests and a threat to the civilised standards of whites in Durban in the 1880s (Swanson 1976: pp165-166), carparkers and carwashers trying to eke out a subsistence in the lower echelons of the informal sector have become scapegoats for Durban's beleaguered tourist industry in the 1980s (Daily News 22/10/86).

Interestingly, in both periods, what are labour issues have been redefined by white public perceptions and local authorities as policing 'problems'. The incongruity of this approach is further highlighted by the fact that business and the press have been vociferous in challenging the government and local authorities to deregulate the informal sector to help alleviate unemployment.

The author conducted two surveys of a total of 68 self-employed carwashers operating at public carparks and African taxi-ranks in Durban. The first survey was undertaken in December 1985 (n = 34), and the second in December 1986 (n = 40) with six respondents interviewed in both surveys. The carwashers were selected at random and interviewed by an experienced fieldworker. Information gained from the author's observations of carwashers in action at each site over the past two years was used to supplement the surveys. It is estimated that up to 120 of them now regularly wash cars in Durban.

While the cheap and convenient service offered by carwashers should not be underestimated, it is ironic that the present survival of carwashers in fact depends just as much upon their beggar/vandal/thief status. In this sense the beggar-carwasher is hired out of a combination of need, sympathy and guilt, or as a nuisance easily banished. The vandal/thief-carwasher, is paid as an 'insurance' policy in the hope vehicles will be protected from vindictive damage or crime.

Categories of Carwashers

Three categories of carwashers can be distinguished according to their commitment and approach to the job:

- Casual — those still attending school and washing only on the weekends and holidays.
- Temporary — those actively looking for full-time wage employment, who divide their time between job hunting and carwashing; they wash cars when shoppers and beachgoers fill public carparks.
- Permanent — includes those who would not accept formal wage employment if it were offered to them, and those who are not actively seeking full-time wage employment despite their desire for such employment.

Temporary carwashers made up

approximately half the sample in both surveys (1985 — 56%; 1986 — 42.5%) with permanent (1985 — 24%; 1986 — 30%) and casual operators (1985 — 21%; 1986 — 27.5%) each making up roughly one quarter of the sample.

Critical to this analysis are the perceptions carwashers have of themselves (see box). The overwhelming majority of carwashers surveyed carry negative perceptions of carwashing and label it humiliating, uncertain and risky work. The beggar/vandal/thief stigma, inclement weather, seasonal clientele, and police harassment combine to make carwashing dehumanising. Typical attitudes expressed by carwashers were: 'I will feel worthless if I am still washing cars in two years'; 'I am not a proper man working like this'; and, 'It is a busy time now but by the end of January there will not be enough money'. Carwashers commonly use the expression *uyazama ukuziphilisa* — desperate people prepared to tackle any job knowing that their choices are limited — to emphasise their predicament.

The most accepted positive perception of carwashing was that it is 'a nice job for school children'. They are well suited to carwashing because it is light work and, while supported by their parents, they are insulated from responsibility. Youth is also an advantage when, in the words of one respondent, 'running towards the oncoming cars (i.e. potential customers) and away from the police'.

Socio-demographic Characteristics

The typical carwasher is an African male between 16 and 25 years of age, who has less than a standard six education and lives with his parents in a formal township dwelling. Fifteen percent of the total sample (1985, 1986) were in the age range 26—35 and three percent over 35 years old. Only 18 percent had progressed beyond standard six and not surprisingly, the better educated respondents were casual operators. Four percent had no fixed address and sheltered in bushes, alleys and doorways.

Only 47 percent of the total sample had ever been employed in either full-time or part-time work in the formal sector; among these, 65 percent had not worked for more than one year and 31 percent not for more than three years. Moreover, the length of such service was typically brief — 75 percent had been employed in their most recent job for one year or less, and only one respondent had been employed in his last job for more than three years. Menial tasks such as packing and labouring were the most common job descriptions given and the lack of formal trade qualifications or marketable skills was universal.

Being young and poorly educated, lacking

formal job training and marketable skills and with poor employment records in labouring-type jobs, carwashers have few bargaining points with prospective employers and are marginalised to the needs of the formal labour market.

Carwashing is characterised by long hours and low and unstable remuneration. Given their inaccessibility to the formal labour market it is not surprising that:

- Forty one percent of the total sample had been engaged in carwashing for more than one year.
- Eighty four percent of the total sample worked a minimum five day week and 51 percent worked a minimum of 45 hours; several carwashers worked seven days a week.
- Although 42 percent of the 1986 sample claimed to have a regular clientele, regulars at public carparks only accounted for an average of 34 percent of weekly earnings.

The weekly earnings of carwashers during peak season confirm the impression that carwashing is a way of making small amounts of money to survive. As one carwasher remarked, 'Only God knows how we survive through these small cash incomes'. In the 1986 sample 48 percent of carwashers averaged R1 or more an hour. Closer examination of those respondents reveals that they worked an average 9,8 hours on Fridays (the busiest day of the week), compared with 7,7 hours among the rest of the sample. The decline in the weekly earnings of carwashers between the two samples — 71 percent of the 1985 sample earned more than R50 compared with only 17,5 percent of the 1986 sample — is attributed to increased competition. Intense police harassment of beachfront operators may also have contributed to the decline in earnings in that area.

Social Victims

Carwashers are well aware of their low public image but claim this is based on misconception. Carwashing is seen as a public relations exercise, which 'depends upon personality' and a 'soft tongue'. While several carwashers complained that some members of the public 'laugh at us' and 'shout at us for not being at school', the majority believe they have the public's 'sympathy' and 'support'. Many had received food and clothing from customers. Not one carwasher complained about interference from shopkeepers and in fact several commended shopkeepers for giving them food and odd jobs.

To operate carwashers need drums or buckets, cloths and water — securing these seemingly trivial items is in fact problematic and exposes them to exploitation. The majority do not own their own drums and either borrow them from friends or taxidrivers; some hire it from shop or service-

CONCEPTUALISING CARWASHING

Respondents in the second survey (n = 40) were presented with ten statements which variously cast carwashing in both a negative and positive light. They were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement.

NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS			POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS		
	% Respondent Response			% Respondent Response	
	Agree	Disagree		Agree	Disagree
A way of making small amounts of money to survive	100,0	—	A nice job for school children	97,5	2,5 ¹
The work of desperate people	97,5	2,5	A prosperous enterprise with room for expansion	35,0	65,0
An uncertain and risky way to make a living	95,0	5,0	Good training for starting your own business	35,0	65,0 ²
A humiliating way to make a living	82,5	17,5 ¹	Good training for wage employment	60,0	40,0 ²
Not a proper job	77,5	22,5 ¹	An enjoyable way to make a living	50,0	50,0

1. Includes 2,5% of the sample who were unsure.
2. Includes 5% of the sample who were unsure.

station attendants for 50 cents a day. Carwashers typically draw their water from public toilets and two carwashers revealed that a toilet supervisor was charging them 20 cents a day for the privilege!

Most carwashers felt more threatened by the infiltration of criminals, leading to police retaliation, than fearing reduced income through increased competition. People are typically introduced to carwashing by friends and this has resulted in strong comradeship at some carparks. At one location carwashers banded together to rid the carpark of known criminals. The police have in fact responded positively to this initiative and, at the time of the second survey at least, were refraining from harassing this particular group of carwashers.

The camaraderie among carwashers is such that this alone induced a large number of respondents to agree with the statement, 'Carwashing is an enjoyable way to make a living' (see box). Respondents operating at an African taxi-rank were particularly attracted by the good relationship with taxidrivers who 'supply all the equipment, play loud music and buy us lunch'. Carwashers at taxi-ranks are expected to open and close doors, collect fares and help mend punctures, but they remain grossly underpaid, washing and servicing each taxi for less than R3 a day.

Despite their shared predicament of struggling to survive, the conditions of carwashing are not conducive to organisation. This is particularly so among the temporary workers because of the way they divide their time between carwashing and searching for work. For the majority, poverty means a preoccupation with getting enough food each day, leaving neither time nor energy to work towards long-term goals. Consequently, carwashers are independent — they regard themselves as one-man operations and eschew partnerships or worker organisations aimed at capturing a

The unpredictable conditions, long hours and low weekly earnings of carwashers indicate that it is no more than a survival strategy, with little growth potential

The carwashers' livelihood is threatened by the petty criminal presence on Durban's beachfront and they have collaborated with the police to clear up some areas

With their insecure and dehumanising beggar/vandal/thief status, most carwashers are simply biding time and eking out a living while looking for formal employment opportunities

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larger market and spreading earnings.

The Uneasy Relationship

Carwashers have been able to establish monopolies in at least two known cases. At the time of the 1985 survey one carwasher had sole control over a carpark with 153 delineated parking bays, which provided him with an average weekly income of R180. The basis of control was his relationship with the police and a promise to 'watch as a vigilante' and 'phone them when someone raids a car'. However, when a new contingent of police who 'did not appreciate my efforts' was assigned to the area, the monopoly was broken. In the second case, two carwashers gained control of a small carpark over a period of one year. These two have built up a regular clientele and chase away other carwashers who threaten to encroach on their territory.

Police harassment is an integral part of social relationships in the informal sector and the majority of carwashers condemned the actions of the Durban City Police. Not surprisingly, given the hysteria associated with crime along the foreshore, the police crackdown on carwashers has been most severe in this area. The police have a range of broadly defined by-laws at their disposal to use against carwashers, including those against loitering, molesting, obstructing and annoying, as well as a specific by-law which prohibits 'washing vehicles in public places' (Section 2, Paragraph (o), Public Notice No 26/1914).

Carwashers are rarely charged, however. Many of the respondents alleged incidents of physical assault. Official action against carwashers is justified on the grounds that washing cars is merely 'an excuse to engage in more nefarious activities' such as encouraging people to park in illegal places; scratching the cars of owners who refuse to pay for services rendered; and, because 'either they themselves are thieves or they are linked to thieves' (Durban City Police Information Officer).

Analysis of the background and working lives of regular carwashers suggests otherwise. Firstly, carwashers work clearly defined areas and it is not in their interests to defile their territory. Secondly, according to a spokesman for the South African Police, carwashers have in fact acted as informers on several occasions, ridding areas of petty criminals. Thirdly, there is nothing sinister in the motives of carwashers; most come from stable home environments and work regular hours at car parks to feed themselves and their families and, in the case of many casual operators, to help pay for their education. Contrary to public allegations, carwashers argue that washing cars 'keeps us busy' and 'deters us from participating in crime'.

The carwashers are adamant that they will not be moved, yet the conflict between local

authorities and carwashers is not going to simply evaporate and needs to be addressed. What can be done, then, to aid self-employed carwashers? Two factors need to be borne in mind here:

- Self-employed carwashing does not have growth or expansion potential;
- Carwashers see their plight as temporary while waiting for admission into the formal labour market.

Workers-in-Waiting

The carwashing market is dominated by service stations with automatic washing machines and the facilities and equipment to offer the likes of hot waxes and vacuum cleaning. To capture a larger slice of this market self-employed carwashers must either lower their prices or offer additional services. Unfortunately, lack of occupational credibility deems both options improbable and in effect serves as a price-fixing mechanism.

Given their beggar/vandal/thief status it is doubtful whether lower prices would attract a significantly larger clientele. Carwashers set flexible prices based on negotiation with potential customers. Over the past year carwashers have attempted to increase prices by lifting their average first bid from R2,29 to R3,35. Further, self-employed carwashers do not have the capital to entertain ideas of expansion.

Carwashing does not offer any skills useful outside the informal sector. Although 35 percent of the 1986 sample agreed with the statement that carwashing is 'good training for starting your own business' (see box), 'good training' was perceived as fostering customer-client relations, and 'own business' invariably referred to a shack shop or vegetable stall. In contrast, perceptions of carwashing as 'good training for wage employment' was reported by 60 percent of the sample; they believed that their self-discipline should endear them to employers.

It would seem that most carwashers do not view themselves as dynamic entrepreneurs. They expect the government to improve their plight by 'building factories and providing jobs'. These informal sector workers should be conceptualised as part of the industrial reserve army or wage labourers-in-waiting. In this sense car washers are victims of the unemployment crisis facing South Africa.

Carwashers are symptomatic of widespread poverty and unemployment. In the absence of macro-solutions to these socio-economic problems, it is time for local authorities to dispel the myth of the carwasher as a social pest. A start can be made by decriminalising carwashing and ensuring that the police identify and co-operate with regular carwashers who are forced to work in the dungeons of the informal sector 'to get bread to eat'. □□□

Case Study 2

THE GARBAGE SCAVENGERS

Pickin' up the Pieces

By Rachelle de Kock, post-graduate student,
Development Studies Unit, University of Natal

Against a national backdrop of rapid population growth, sustained economic recession and high unemployment, more and more black work seekers are turning to unorthodox self-employment activities. In a fascinating survey conducted among Durban's garbage pickers, a development researcher explores the hidden world of those who occupy the very dungeons of South Africa's diverse informal sector.

It is apparent from the hazardous, unpleasant conditions and the fears expressed that these scavengers have adopted a survival strategy to cope with hard times. Working municipal dumps, they retrieve food and clothing, collect materials for resale and search for articles of domestic use. The author finishes her detailed account with practical proposals to formalise the pickers' role in the waste salvage and recycling process.



Billy Paddock

Most pickers surveyed were from the ranks of long-term but poor city dwellers; they tended to be young family breadwinners

The phenomenon of people scavenging and living off garbage dumps is found worldwide, especially in the developing world. Where urbanisation rates greatly exceed the rate of job creation, formal employment opportunities are limited, and unemployment benefits inadequate, significant numbers of urban dwellers are forced to seek some other survival strategy. Empirical studies have shown that the really destitute have very limited options, even in the informal sector.

One survival strategy, to which entry is relatively open, is garbage picking. Even though this activity is common, very little is known about the economics of garbage picking, the characteristics of the people involved and whether it is a viable alternative survival strategy. It is generally accepted, without any real empirical foundation, that garbage pickers are poor

and are forced to scavenge on dumps because they cannot find employment elsewhere. The following study was carried out to examine the work done by garbage pickers in Durban's metropolitan area and to find out where and how the picker fits into the socio-economic hierarchy.

Pickers' Profile

Three garbage dumps in the greater Durban area were chosen, and interviews were conducted with 96 garbage pickers towards the end of 1985. Information was collected concerning:

- demographic characteristics (sex, age, marital status, educational qualifications, place of birth and residential status);
- income obtained through garbage collection;
- types of items collected;
- working conditions and hardships endured by the pickers.

The pickers were interviewed at random, depending on their willingness to be interviewed. The following demographic characteristics were obtained (see also accompanying box):

• Sex

Contrary to the expectation that women would be overrepresented in the lowest occupational strata, they constituted 56 percent of those surveyed. This finding is explained by the economic recession of the last few years — with more men unemployed, they have had to find an alternative way to support themselves and their families.

• Age

The younger age groups predominated, with the majority (58%) being below 30 years of age.

• Family size

This varied between two and sixteen people; nearly two thirds of the pickers had between one and five children.

• Breadwinners

Sixty nine percent of the pickers were the sole earners in their families. Among the 31 percent who were not the only breadwinners, 14 percent said that additional income was brought home by live-in relatives other than their immediate family; only 23 percent overall received a regular wage. Taking these findings together, they clearly indicate the stark degree of poverty and desperation that pushes people into garbage picking and are evidence of the survival role played by the sector itself.

• Urban status

Although one would expect that this occupation would be dominated by relatively recent entrants from rural areas to the urban economy, the pickers surveyed were predominantly from the ranks of the 'well-established' urban poor; 72

Pickers on Three Durban Dumps

Some Survey Statistics (n=96)

Age of pickers	0-10 years	2%		
	11-20 years	26%		
	21-30 years	30%		
	31-40 years	21%		
	41-50 years	7%		
	50+ years	14%		
Level of education	Less than std 3	37%		
	Std 3-5	31%		
	Std 6-8	31%		
	Matric	2%		
Number of years spent picking	Less than a year	19%		
	1-3 years	67%		
	4-6 years	8%		
	7-10 years	3%		
	11+ years	3%		
Items collected frequently	Clothes/material	44%		
	Plastic	33%		
	Organic/food	30%		
	Wood	23%		
	Bottles	20%		
	Metal	9%		
	Paper/cardboard	5%		
	Other items, such as copper, sail (black PVC plastic), and planks	31%		
Usual weekly earnings	R10 or less	44%		
	R11-15	19%		
	R16-25	23%		
	R26-40	13%		
	R40+	2%		
Garbage pickers, hawkers and informal artisans	Average monthly earnings			
	Relative earnings in the greater Durban area			
	Hawkers (n=35)	43%	40%	17%
	Artisans (n=28)	46%	21%	33%
Garbage Pickers (n=95)	44%	42%	14%	

percent were long-term city dwellers of five years or longer.

● **Education**

Fifty percent of the pickers had completed only standard four (i.e. six years of formal schooling), while two percent had a matric certificate. In this sample, where educational levels were extremely low, the better educated were found among the younger generation.

● **Picking activity**

Most pickers (71%) spent between seven and ten hours a day on the dump, and 42 percent picked garbage every day. Fifty three percent of the pickers said that they had never had a steady, paying job. As for transport to the sites, 75 percent walked to the dumps; for the other pickers, transport there and back cost between R3 and R14 a week.

Picking an Occupation

With regard to the number of years spent in this occupation, one would expect that if garbage picking is seen as a survival strategy, it would be viewed by the pickers as a temporary activity — something to tide them over until a better paying and more pleasant job could be found. As expected, 86 percent had in fact been picking off dumps for three years or less. This finding suggests that picking is seen as a temporary measure for bringing in income, which is probably tied to the overall economic trends in the country.

Nevertheless, when asked whether they preferred garbage picking to having a job elsewhere, 40 percent said that they preferred picking. A sense of independence and the value of items picked up were given by the pickers as reasons for their preference. Possibly, pickers who felt they had no chance of obtaining a wage job for the moment would rationalise their existence by saying that they preferred picking.

Of those who said they would rather be formally employed, the reasons given were:

- the work was not stimulating
- they need to earn more or acquire a permanent job
- the low status of the job
- the insecurity of the work
- no access to a workers' union
- non-usage of education or trade skills.

Asked why they undertook this kind of work, 59 percent answered that it was in order to provide for the basic needs of their families, such as food, clothing, rent, etc. Among other reasons, 23 percent mentioned unemployment, and 14 percent responded that it enabled their children to go to school. In response to a question concerning what they liked about picking, the most frequent answers were that it met their basic needs (food, clothes, shelter, etc.), they found valuable items,

that they had no alternative, or simply group solidarity.

Value of Waste

The pickers collect anything of value, either because it can be of use in their homes or because it can be sold. They concentrate on those items which can be sold in townships and shack settlements, to recyclers, scrapyards, garages, and hawkers or brokers (also see box). A large number of pickers (44%) retrieve clothes and material, with most pickers dressing in clothes found on the dump. Shoes and gloves are prized items for pickers because they serve as protection from being hurt while scavenging. Also, many if not most of the pickers eat off the garbage dumps.

Of those interviewed, 92 percent said they

A good picker can fill up to six large bags daily, selling waste paper, plastics or aluminium to hawkers at R2 a bag.



Large recycling companies buy materials from garbage pickers, thereby linking the formal and informal sectors

sold all or part of their collections, while 60 percent said they used some of the items at home. The pickers play an important role in the waste recycling process, not only by making personal use of items, but also by selling it directly to recycling companies or to brokers/hawkers, depending on who offers the best price for the picker's collection. It was learnt from three large recycling companies in Durban that they do indeed buy from garbage pickers. There are thus substantial links with the formal sector.

Some hawkers/brokers have managed to obtain the necessary licensing, and have contracts to salvage garbage from particular dumps. At two of the three dumps, these middlemen had a contract with the municipality to buy all the waste paper and plastic collected on the dump. In some instances, they will buy from a number of pickers on a regular basis. An example of what can be earned this way is the R2 earned per bag of plastic — and a good picker can fill up to six bags (approximately 1m² x 750mm) a day.

The pickers are not employed by the recyclers, which places them in a vulnerable

economic position. The costs are thus kept low for the recycler, who does not have to take out insurance to cover these informal sector workers against injuries, provide any form of pension or face labour organisation.

The majority of pickers live in destitute conditions. Forty four percent earned R10 or less a week, and only two percent earned over R40. The level of income was largely determined by the item collected, the buyer and the effort the picker puts in. Compared with other forms of informal activity, the earning patterns of the garbage pickers were very similar to those found in other studies among hawkers and artisans in the greater Durban area (see box).

Working Hazards

Pickers were asked what they disliked about the work, their greatest problems experienced and what aspects they would like to have changed. In response, the majority indicated that the smell of the dump was offensive, and many cited dirt, broken glass, rotten food, poisons, health hazards and the weather conditions as



Billy Paddock

additional problems.

Twenty nine pickers also complained about harassment from police, municipal authorities and the waste company working the particular dump, which they felt prevented them from feeding their families. The harassment generally occurred because authorities do not welcome the presence of pickers on the dumps; their rationale is the fear of pickers being hurt or killed by tractors or bulldozers used on the dumps, the consequent detrimental publicity and possible insurance claims. Additional problems mentioned were the unpleasant sight of seeing pickers there and a concern by the health department about health conditions.

Conclusions

From the conditions described above, it is clear that garbage picking is a survival activity engaged in by people who have no other alternative. The conditions are unpleasant and hazardous, the income returns low, the pickers are despised by their communities and harassed by the authorities. Most are unemployed, poor,

and have large families to support as the sole breadwinners. Their desperation is indicated by the fact that they eat food found on the garbage dumps, which stands between starvation and survival.

If the economic recession experienced by the country continues, the number of people living off garbage dumps is likely to increase as more people become jobless. More formal job creation is essential, but perhaps it is even more urgent to find ways in which pickers can be allowed to continue, as well as ways to improve their earnings and working conditions. One way would be the general application of the principle of source separation of waste material, such as the Robinson Deep experiment, which is being conducted in Johannesburg at the moment. If this experiment is successful, pickers could be formally employed in the waste industry and be assured of a regular income and better working conditions. *IPAA*

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It is essential to find ways to allow pickers to operate unharassed by local authorities, while improving their wages and working conditions




Billy Padlock

A National Emergency — The First Five Months

	Non-collaboration Politics <i>Community Boycotts & Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Vigilante/Activist/Security Force Clashes</i>	Government Response <i>Sustained Crackdown & Court Challenge</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>External & Domestic Fronts</i>	
JUNE <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>12/13 June National state of emergency, with hundreds detained as many activists go into hiding. Brits stayaway for funeral of Mawu organiser's wife killed in grenade attack. In CT, President Botha and Bishop Tutu meet for talks on the Crossroads/KTC vigilante and comrade clashes, leaving 24 dead and 5 000 refugees.</p> <p>16/18 June Estimated 1,5m workers in national stayaway on tenth anniversary of Soweto uprising. Phones cut off in Cape, Dbn, Kimberley and PWV townships, security forces distribute pamphlets urging residents to stay indoors. Anti-apartheid rallies in several major cities in the west, 90 000 attend New York rally.</p> <p>Consumer boycott launched in Grahamstown to protest emergency; bus boycotts in Duda, Kagiso, Munsieville and KwaThema. In PWV area, strikes at 100 chainstores to demand release of detained Cawusa unionists, businessmen appeal to government to end deadlock. In PE townships, residents remove house and street signs to foil security force raids.</p> <p>27 June Retail strikes end with 920 union members still in detention.</p>	<p>According to Bureau for Information (Binfo) 228 people necklaced this year. Minister of Law and Order, Mr Le Grange, reports 570 unrest deaths so far in 1986. 191 killed by security forces with 15 police fatalities. (SAIRR estimates 754 deaths. RMG 969.)</p> <p>12 June In Dbn police open fire on UND medical students protesting emergency injuring 5. In Duncan Village security forces detain 85 people.</p> <p>13/15 June In Soweto 73 scholars detained for breaching emergency regulations, 51 detained at nearby Meadowlands church. In CT a mosque is teargassed, 180 people are detained in Elsie River church, and in Graaff Reinet, 600 members of church congregation detained.</p> <p>16 June Commemoration meetings restricted to churches except for outdoor Inkatha rally in Dbn. At least 13 people die in political violence, incl 4yr-old Sowetan child.</p> <p>17/20 June Soweto community centre fire-bombed. In KTC bulldozers begin demolishing shacks, refugees given 4 days to leave churches and schools in white areas. CT Supreme Court grants interim order preventing further demolition.</p> <p>25/29 June In Soweto, 3 people die in clashes between 'comrades' and 'Inkatha'; 3 days later 6 people die after an Inkatha rally, when bus is stoned and ploughs into crowd.</p> <p>30 June At least 89 unrest deaths since declaration of emergency, excl 4 ANC insurgent fatalities and 3 others who died in bomb blasts - 25 died in KwaNdebele, 18 in Soweto, 10 in KTC/Crossroads, 8 in PE townships, 5 in Durban and 5 in Tembisa. Binfo death toll for June is 161.</p>	<p>12 June State of emergency declared, giving state wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention, indemnity for security forces, and stipulating no court challenges to regulations. Nationwide raids on extra-parliamentary groups with at least 450 detentions. Blanket ban imposed on reporting of any unrest or security force movements without clearance from police, news on unrest only from Binfo.</p> <p>13 June Unrest funeral restrictions imposed in E Cape and Tvl: Government expels foreign newsman and 2 priests, seizes all copies of 2 newspapers. In Tzaneen, 2 people sentenced to death for murder of 2 suspected police informers previous year.</p> <p>17/21 June News curbs extended to 'self-governing' homelands. In E Cape curfews imposed in 13 magisterial districts, non-residents barred, clothing bearing names of 47 organisations banned, pupil movement restricted. In W Cape press is barred from printing 118 groups, which are also banned from holding meetings. Rand Supreme Court grants interdict restraining Lekoo municipal police after 2 pupils file affidavits of torture.</p> <p>23/24 June Pmb treason trial ends after 13 months, 4 Soawu officials acquitted on all charges. Newsweek chief given deportation order. Controversial Public Safety and Internal Security Amendments enacted.</p> <p>25 June Police issue orders barring Alexandra pupils from school premises during school holidays. Re-opening of African schools postponed for 2 weeks until new ID security system for pupils is ready. 11 N OFS townships have funeral restrictions imposed.</p>	<p>12 June At Swaziland border security forces arrest woman carrying explosives. 30 more South African refugees flown from Lesotho to neighbouring states.</p> <p>14 June On Dbn beachfront car-bomb kills 3 people and injures 69. In Gaborone, a woman dies and 2 others injured in attack on SA refugee house, allegedly by SA forces.</p> <p>22/24 June In Vryheid, 2 landmines defused. In Dbn 3 bombs explode, no injuries; 2 bombs explode in Jhb city centre, injuring 19 people. No one injured by blast at Soweto stadium. In London SA businessmen and Afrikaans academics debate with ANC on BBC, Whitehall invites ANC president for talks at ministerial level.</p> <p>25 June SACC says more than 25 000 South Africans live in exile. Le Grange says in past 8 years there have been 498 sabotage and terrorist attacks, with 98 ANC and PAC insurgents killed and 271 arrested. In Paarl, ANC member is sentenced to 6 yrs for terrorism and in Dbn, 10 people appear in court for Dbn bomb-blasts.</p> <p>26/30 June At Nietverdiend (nr Batswana), 4 ANC insurgents die in clash with security forces. In Queenstown 2 people are injured by bomb-blast in shopping centre, and in Dbn 2 water pipelines are damaged by limpet mine. In CT a 15yr old is given suspended sentence for furthering aims of ANC.</p>	JUNE <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>
JULY <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/7 July Bus company meets residents demands over 6-month boycott in W Rand townships. At Vista University (PE), 650 students who boycotted June tests are not allowed to re-register. Strikes and go-slows for past week by 18 000 miners to protest emergency and unionist detentions. At Modderbee prison on E Rand, 35 detainees start hunger strike. In Soweto several residents threatened with eviction unless they pay 2 months outstanding rent.</p> <p>14 July 'Day of Action' called by Cosatu to protest detentions - extensive stayaway in E Cape, called off in W Cape and N Natal, limited response in PWV area and rest of Natal. 28 townships now affected by rent boycotts, 20 000 Sowetans have payment extended for week. Lekoo town council has lost R45m in rent arrears; Mamelodi residents had not paid since November 1985 when 17 people were shot dead on rent protest march. Tembisa council threatens to cut off services to residents on rent boycott. African schools officially re-open, total stayaway by Duda pupils, 30-50% attendance in PE and W Cape, high 80% in Jhb.</p>	<p>Binfo reports that since September 1984, 937 SAP houses seriously damaged or destroyed, 3 254 SAP vehicles, 8 773 commercial vehicles, 6 850 buses, 1 272 schools, 985 businesses, and 3 920 private homes.</p> <p>1/5 July 222 trade unionists still in detention. Binfo announces 780 detainees will be prosecuted. In Tembisa 1 000 former council employees detained after dismissal in May wage strike. In Kensington (CT), 15yr old is shot dead in police station.</p> <p>8 July Emergency detentions reach 3 482, 1 359 in Cape, 1 665 in Tvl, 164 in OFS and 170 in Natal. Since 1984 more than 21 000 arrested for violence, damage to buildings and vehicles estimated at R61m. In PE townships bus service withdrawn after several stoned.</p> <p>11 July Cosatu president, Elijah Barayi, released from detention with severe restrictions on his movements. In Soweto, residents flee from Mzimphope transit camp after week-long clashes with hostel dwellers, with at least 9 deaths.</p>	<p>1 July Nearly 100 organisations prohibited from holding indoor meetings in 65 magisterial districts. In E Cape all persons banned from school property until mid-July, increased funeral restrictions in CT and W Tvl townships.</p> <p>7/8 July Sowetan Commissioner of police bans 35 organisations and trade unions and SRCs from holding any indoor meetings. Rand Supreme Court orders release of newsman from detention. Dbn Supreme Court grants 3 interdicts restraining police from assaulting detainees. Transkei curfew extended for another year.</p> <p>11 July Government lifts 2-day-old ban on indoor gatherings of trade unions in Jhb and Roodepoort after 4 unions file court challenges. In Bloemfontein, judgment is reserved on release of 2 UDF detainees. Regulations permit DET to refuse registration of pupils and place pupils in class they choose. Two more people given deportation orders.</p> <p>14 July When African schools re-open, all pupils compelled to wear ID cards with school grounds locked and guarded. DET's Cape director says SRC/PtAs to be abolished and communication with NECC ended.</p>	<p>1/4 July In Jhb a limpet mine explosion injures 8 people, in CT a bomb outside Mowbray police station injures 2 SAP members, and in Silverton (Pretoria) an explosion of busstop injures 20 people. 3 ANC suspects shot dead by police near Empangeni and 4 arrested in Soshanguve (Pretoria). Bop businessman shot dead after reporting presence of armed men.</p> <p>5 July In Vosloorus 2 development board members are shot dead by alleged ANC insurgents. In later clash in nearby Kallehong, 3 more development board members are shot dead along with both insurgents.</p> <p>9 July In Jhb 5 suspected ANC insurgents arrested; 20 operatives shot or captured since emergency declared. In 1986 there have now been 16 bomb blasts, killing 4 people and injuring 152.</p> <p>10 July In Alldays district near Batswana border, 6 suspected insurgents killed in shootout with security forces. In Jhb explosive device is detonated outside Stock Exchange.</p>	JULY <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>
JULY <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>15/18 July PE stayaway runs into second day. Tumahole lawyers file case challenging rent increases, after development board takes legal action against 70 rent boycotters. More than 80 Diepkloof prison detainees send protest petition to Le Grange. In Lamontville pupils burn ID cards and boycott classes for 2 weeks, in Uitenhage 2 SRC members expelled for refusing to register, and in Alexandra primary schools on boycott. In Bellville (CT), 34 high school pupils appear in court for not being at school during hours.</p> <p>21/24 July In Soweto 1 000 women from squatter camp march on council and demand sites for houses - council opens rent office in Jhb to enable residents to pay anonymously. Mass boycott of PE schools to commemorate deaths of 2 pupils in 1985.</p> <p>25 July Last day for registration of African schoolchildren, 80% attendance means 300 000 not back at school could be permanently excluded. DET requests presence of SADF at schools. In Ciskei, Fort Hare students stage protest.</p> <p>28/31 July In Dbn, Westville prison detainees start hunger strike. Tembisa mayor resigns over evictions of rent boycotters. Cosatu calls 2-day stayaway in Uitenhage, to protest Langa removals, school security measures and ongoing detentions.</p>	<p>Binfo reports 800 people on trial for necklaced murders, with another 979 unrest arrests by 30 June.</p> <p>15/18 July In Vlaklaagte (KwaNdebele) bodies of 9 men found shot with AK47s; residents accuse vigilantes. In Soweto fighting erupts between residents and council police following raids on rent defaulters, escalation of violence in townships around Jhb.</p> <p>19/23 July In PE townships buses are withdrawn, security forces shoot dead 3 people in clash, New Brighton cordoned off with barbed wire.</p> <p>24/31 July Binfo announces 168 unrest deaths in first 6 weeks of emergency, 121 of them in inhuman violence. PFP report 4 300 people detained under emergency regulations and 700 under other security legislation. In Soweto 3 burnt bodies found. 9 people die in renewed violence in PE townships. In Tontjie (Grahamstown) an informer believed to have betrayed Steve Biko is shot dead.</p>	<p>16/18 July Pmb Supreme Court rejects Mawu application and upholds state of emergency, rules state president acted beyond his powers in denying detainees access to lawyers, declares 6 'vague' clauses invalid. Lawyers throughout country start applying to visit detainees, Pretoria Supreme Court rules detention of Mamelodi doctor unlawful.</p> <p>22/24 July Grahamstown Supreme Court reserves judgment on UDF application to have regulations banning meetings set aside. In Rand Supreme Court, government agrees to release detainees after urgent application.</p> <p>25/31 July PE Supreme Court grants restraining order against council police. Rand Supreme Court rules all bans on meetings made by anyone below rank of police commissioner are invalid, incl prohibitions on Soweto meetings of 26 organisations. Jhb Divisional Commissioner withdraws funeral restrictions in Alexandra. In CT, application by Cosatu is settled out of court, enabling unions to hold meetings. Dbn Supreme Court reserves judgment on validity of emergency regulations. In PE and Boland, divisional police commissioners withdraw their emergency regulations following Grahamstown court decision restricting delegation of president's powers.</p>	<p>19/22 July In Maseru an ANC member is abducted then shot dead in attempt to escape, 2 days later another abduction occurs. In Kallehong, policeman is killed in attack involving grenades and AK47s. In Soshanguve (Pretoria) a bulldozer detonates a landmine. In CT a man is imprisoned for year for refusing to testify in terrorism trial.</p> <p>25/27 July In Porow (CT), home-made car bomb defused outside business complex. In Mdanantsane and Kallehong 4 alleged ANC members killed by security forces in shootouts.</p> <p>29/30 July In Umtata, bomb blast at police station kills 3 policemen and 4 civilians.</p>	JULY <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>
AUG <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/2 Aug CRG claims rent boycotts have cost state more than R250m over past 2 years. JMCs assigned to collect rent arrears. About 1 000 Tembisa council employees reinstated, after being fired more than 2 months before on strike. In Soweto, 1 300 pupils stage walkout of classes over presence of security forces.</p> <p>9/11 Aug 13 families in Sharpeville, Bopheleng and Zamdela evicted after 1 800 eviction orders granted by magistrate, electricity to 150 households cut off. Lekoo Town Council owed R30m-40m in rent and service arrears. PE pupils continue boycott despite DET threat of school closures if pupils are not registered by 8 Aug.</p> <p>13/14 Aug In Soweto, sporadic class stayaways to protest SADF presence on school premises. Unions continue to fight for full pay for detainees, CT city council agrees while several other companies offer port payment or to hold jobs. At Modderbee prison 601 detainees begin indefinite hunger strike to demand lifting of emergency. Partial stayaway in Mdanantsane and Duncan Village to commemorate unrest deaths of 1985.</p>	<p>1/7 Aug PFP reports of at least 3 959 emergency detainees nationally and 619 in Natal. LMG produces list of 350 union leaders and 2 730 members detained. In Ct 5 Clowu members released after court application. In Orlando (Soweto), 4 youths are shot dead, Azapo member and 5 other suspects arrested. In Njoli township (PE), Azapo E Cape leader shot dead, another Azapo member killed in Zwide. In Sebokeng, man is burnt to death, and in Bekkersdal, 7 people die in arson attack. In East London union offices are fire-bombed.</p> <p>9/14 Aug In Centreton (Hankey), 3 people are burnt to death in unrest. In Soweto, security forces break up funeral for 3 youths and man is killed by council police. In KwaNdebele, 200 detainees are released - Trac puts KwaNdebele death toll since May at 160. PFP national list of missing people increases to 5 900. Binfo's death toll since emergency reaches 217, with 40 necklaced killings.</p>	<p>1/7 Aug PW Botha reimposes emergency restrictions invalidated by Supreme Court and delegates powers to divisional commissioners of police, more than 100 orders issued. Rand Supreme Court rules that all detainees held for more than 14 days entitled to make representations to Minister of Law and Order.</p> <p>8 Aug Rand Supreme Court orders release of 2 Tembisa residents, Kallehong council police restrained from assaulting 6 residents. Bloemfontein Supreme Court embargoes allegations by 38 Heilbron residents after police undertake not to permit assaults.</p> <p>11/12 Aug Natal Supreme Court rules 2 key emergency clauses on detentions invalid, specifically detention of UDF official Tsenali, state appeals. Applications for release of detainees, 138 in Natal and over 500 in Tvl and Cape. Dbn court orders release of 6 detainees, immediately re-arrested under Criminal Procedure Act; in Pmb court action, 22 N Natal union detainees released. OFS Judge confirms release of 42 Frankfurt detainees, others released nationwide before court hearings.</p> <p>13/14 Aug Pmb Supreme Court finds Dbn judgment incorrect, 19 detainees' applications for release withdrawn and others refused or halted, pending appeal.</p>	<p>2 Aug In Lakeside, near CT, bomb explodes in a litter bin. In Wolvis Bay, SA enclave in Namibia, 5 people die in bomb blast in butcher's.</p> <p>8 Aug In Shallcross (Dbn) security policeman is killed in grenade attack on home.</p> <p>13 Aug In Sobantu (Pmb), police station is damaged in grenade attack, 1 policeman injured.</p>	AUG <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>
AUG <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>15 Aug Rent boycotts involving 400 000 households in 39 townships cost government approx R30m a month; In PWV area, rent boycotts have already cost R188m. Rent boycott in Tumahole now 17 months old, started when resident was killed on rent protest march. Over R1m donated by foreign governments for relief in KTC/ Guguletu</p>	<p>15/19 Aug 2 People die in Tembisa, 1 in KwaMashu and 1 in Khutsong (Oberholzer), all burnt in unrest. In Tinus (Fort Beaufort) policeman allegedly shoots dead soccer player during game, crowd retaliates and kills him.</p> <p>23/24 Aug In Umlazi, wife of KwaZulu MP Sabelo is killed in grenade attack, and in</p>	<p>15 Aug In E Cape, funeral restrictions reimposed in 13 magisterial districts; restrictions on visits to detainees repealed.</p> <p>18/19 Aug Le Grange releases names of 8 551 detainees; at least 2 000 names missing from list where duration of detention does not exceed 30 days, 3 000 allegedly</p>	<p>16/17 Aug Landmines kill 3 women and 2 children in rural area near Nelspruit and a woman dies in another landmine incident. In Mbabane (Swaziland), a man is injured in alleged SA raid.</p>	AUG <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>

	Non-collaboration Politics <i>Community Boycotts & Stayaways</i>	General Civil Unrest <i>Vigilante/Activist/Security Force Clashes</i>
	<p>area, 10 000 refugees in care of relief agencies.</p> <p>20 Aug Lamontville pupils stay away to protest suspension of colleague, 3 schools in Bonteheuwel and 2 in Kagiso on boycott. Duda bus and consumer boycott now in third month. Minister of Finance announces that R3,1m of R750m housing fund set aside for families of detainees, R3m to rebuild police houses damaged in attacks.</p> <p>27/28 Aug Zwelentemba youth leader detained in Allied Building Society, collusion with security police sparks off protest campaign. In Lamontville pupils dispersed by police, and at Wits violence flares over meeting to mourn Soweto deaths. In Tembisa 6 councillors appointed as administrators after collapse of town council, 70% of residents still owe rents.</p>	<p>Imbali 5yr-old child is killed in grenade attack on councillor's house. In Chesterfield son of community leader is shot dead after being detained. In Welkom 7 'A Team' vigilantes acquitted on charges of murder, but investigation of alleged collusion with police begins. PE Supreme Court sentences 4 minors for necklace murder of Cookhouse teacher, 9 acquitted.</p> <p>26/27 Aug In White City (Soweto), municipal police and youths clash at barricades set up to prevent evictions, leaving 12 dead. By morning 21 people are dead and councillor - Soweto city council suspends evictions and Deputy Minister of Information agrees to inquest.</p> <p>28 Aug 464 Detainees admitted to hospital since declaration of emergency. In Alexandria, man is shot dead allegedly by comrades, and in Tinas, a municipal policeman is killed.</p>
SEPT <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>4/5 Sept Partial stayaway in Soweto for funeral - 15 unrest victims buried despite ban, 8 000 mourners dispersed, 4 undertakers arrested, with more deaths in clashes. Soweto council owed R22m in unpaid rents. In PE 44 schools still boycotting.</p> <p>6/10 Sept In Soweto, 3 evicted families return home after interim agreement with council, awaiting court application. Fort Hare SRC suspended after stayaway. Most consumer boycotts over except in E Cape where committee members are all detained and meetings banned. DET closes more than 20 schools in E Cape until end of 1986. In Soweto, poor attendance at beginning of fourth term, students demand withdrawal of troops and release of detainees. DPSC names 15 detainees released with restriction orders for duration of emergency.</p> <p>13 Sept DET announces closure of 10 schools in Soweto, 2 in Kaitleng and 1 in Lamontville. Permanent teachers transferred, others retrenched. DET admits existence of 5 or 6 camps for detained children, claims 167 there for re-education.</p> <p>15 Sept In Sharpeville, partial stayaway as residents march on township offices to protest rent evictions, 2 municipal policemen's houses burnt. In PE consumer boycott is conditionally suspended until 3 Nov. Fort Hare students boycott ends when 300 troops occupy campus.</p>	<p>Le Grange's figures for past 2 years of unrest are 1 832 deaths, including 56 members of security forces; 6 325 injuries.</p> <p>3/5 Sept In Soweto police disperse night vigils for 27 victims. Clashes at Umkomaas funeral of UDF organiser, killed by vigilantes.</p> <p>6/7 Sept In Dbn 4 youths killed in police action, 1 allegedly a trained ANC member and KwaMoshu house in grenade attack. In E Cape, 2 burnt bodies found in Alexandria and Rlingelihle.</p> <p>11/12 Sept In Tanti white supervisor shot dead and 1 person killed in unrest. In Sebokeng security forces shoot dead 1 man. In Mzimhlope (Soweto), at least 4 people die as residents and hostel dwellers clash, 2 municipal police injured in grenade attack on training camp, private security guard is stabbed to death. In Zwide 2 SADF members injured and 1 person killed in shootout.</p> <p>14/15 Sept In Mdantsane, woman is killed and several people injured in shootout. PFP estimates 277 people have died since emergency declared.</p>
SEPT <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>17/20 Sept After 10-month boycott, Mamelodi town council issues 600 notices threatening eviction to rent defaulters. After 5-month boycott, Alexandra town council issues rent arrear statements and cuts off water supplies. Minister of Education Gerrit Viljoen says 200-250 black schools still affected by unrest.</p> <p>22/23 Sept CT City Tramways lifts year-long suspension of services to townships. In Lekoa legal steps taken against 2 000 of 30 000 tenants for not paying rents, 51 families evicted so far.</p> <p>24/25 Sept 75 Diepkloof detainees start hunger strike. Alexandra consumer boycott called off indefinitely, with several conditions. Rent boycotts now affecting 54 townships, about 650 000 households, total R40m a month arrears.</p>	<p>16/18 Sept In Soweto man is burnt to death, and in KwaZakele fatality in security force action. Atteridgeville youth dies, allegedly making explosives. In Alexandra, more than 447 vehicles hijacked in past months, 95 arrests.</p> <p>19/20 Sept 100 days since emergency declared, at least 288 people dead with estimated 14 000 detained. In Soweto, Ntato Motlana alleges 4 people killed in security force action at night vigil (Binfo denial). In further unrest woman dies in security force action and 2 men burnt to death, one in Fingo Village (Grahamstown).</p> <p>27/28 Sept 2 people burnt to death in Kwanobuhle (Uitenhage) and Kagiso (Krugersdorp) unrest. Lekoa Town clerk's house petrol-bombed.</p>
OCT <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1 Oct Day of mourning for 177 mineworkers killed in Kinross mine disaster, stayaway on reef supported by pupils in E Cape. Grahamstown consumer boycott launched on 16 June conditionally suspended. Rent boycotts now affecting 54 townships, black councils estimated to be losing between R40m-R80m a month.</p> <p>6/7 Oct All New Brighton residents issued with special ID documents. Unibo students return to class after weeklong boycott. Azanyu's first national congress condemns necklace killings, resolves to expand rent boycotts throughout country. Wits indoor meeting banned, UCT students storm lecture of Connor O'Brien over breaking academic boycott. In Jobavu (Soweto), youths remove house numbers and street names to thwart council evictions.</p>	<p>1/5 Oct In Meadowlands, 9 injured in clashes between residents and squatters; also in Soweto, 1 man dies and 7 injured in municipal police shooting. Queenstown DPSC worker dies in detention in East London.</p> <p>6/9 Oct In Joza (Grahamstown) security force member is shot dead. Continued clashes in Meadowlands, 3 injured in shootout, 1 dead.</p> <p>10/12 Oct Anglican Church claims 200 people have died in Crossroads/KTC violence. Burnt bodies found in Umlazi, Kaitleng, KwaZakele, New Brighton and Soweto unrest. In KwaZakele 2 municipal policemen killed, in Brickfield (Jansenville) man shot dead by police.</p> <p>15 Oct Kwanobuhle municipal policeman shot dead; in Zwide security forces kill 1 man after 4 petrol-bomb attacks, and in Fingo village, municipal police arrest 3 and kill 1 allegedly escaping.</p>
OCT <i>3rd & 4th weeks</i>	<p>17 Oct Tumahole Town Council takes legal action against rent defaulters, sentenced to 800 hours 'weekend' imprisonment. In Soweto, Mosoboto Lote, 1976 student leader jailed for treason, hacked to death after voicing opposition to necklacing.</p> <p>23/24 Oct Wits meeting to mourn Machel's death dispersed. Breakdown of rent boycotts in 54 townships - 25 in Tvl, 21 in Cape, 7 in OFS and 1 in Natal; Soweto arrears in service charges reach R29m, rent deficit R30m. Several Sowetan councillors also not paying rent although they made decision to evict defaulters.</p> <p>27/29 Oct Witwatersrand Command HQ picketed by 15 ECC women, all arrested. In Hanover Park police disperse banned memorial service for Machel, service also banned in Khotso House (Jhb). In Tumahole (Parys), 35 families evicted in June reinstated pending court decision on validity of increased rentals, 700 more summonses temporarily halted.</p> <p>30/31 Oct In Pretoria and KwaNdebele 100s of buses are attacked after Putco hikes fares, KwaNdebele increases later suspended after talks between homeland and SA. In Kaitleng, 115 municipal policemen detained after striking for higher wages and protest march. In Jhb, detainees begin hunger strike (prison service denial). In CT 9 people arrested and 2 policemen injured in Muslim protest against NGK Synod resolution on Islam as a 'false religion'.</p>	<p>16/19 Oct Burnt body found in Dorrington. In Veeplaas security forces shoot alleged escapee dead. In Alexandra and Tembisa 2 people are necklaced, in Queenstown a policeman's son shot dead after failing to stop at roadblock.</p> <p>20/22 Oct In Upington a 20yr-old emergency detainee found hanged in his cell. In Soweto, father of Azopo activist is abducted and murdered, a burnt body is found and 2 buses conveying pupils to exam centre are burnt. Several schools attacked in New Brighton, Kaitleng and Sebokeng.</p> <p>24 Oct Youths disrupt matric exams at several Soweto centres under security force guard. In Parkwood Estate (CT), a 15yr old is shot dead and 1 person injured in shootout with police.</p> <p>25/26 Oct In Lamontville alleged police informer shot dead. In Soweto a man mistaken for municipal policeman is burnt, mob kills 1 man in revenge. In Bekkersdal, a 16yr old is shot dead in police action and another person is killed by security forces in KwaZakele. In Witlokasie (PE), former Robben Island PAC prisoner is killed, and in PE, awaiting trial prisoner charged with murder of policeman dies after assault.</p> <p>27/31 Oct In Soweto, 16yr old is burnt to death, in KTC a Cayco organiser is shot dead by security forces. Near Joza (Grahamstown), child found dead and 6 others critically injured in unrest.</p>
NOV <i>1st & 2nd weeks</i>	<p>1/3 Nov Natalia Development Board owed R2,5m in rents from 13 townships since rent increase controversy started over 3 years before. In Soweto bus boycott begins to protest 17,5% increase, several buses stoned and 6 hijacked. PE consumer boycott resumed.</p> <p>5/6 Nov Putco loses over R60 000 in first 5 days of boycott. In Soweto security forces stop and search all taxis and private minibuses, Binfo rejects allegations that commuters are forced to use buses. In Orlando, eviction rumours spark off clashes between residents and municipal police, leaving 5 dead.</p> <p>13 Nov UDF calls for period between 16 and 26 December to be observed as 'Christmas Against Emergency'.</p>	<p>1/2 Nov Mourners defy restrictions on funeral of Rose Mpetha, wife of jailed union veteran; 1000s dispersed by security forces.</p> <p>5 Nov In Pimville (Soweto), alleged 'trojan horse' incident when 11yr old is shot dead and 5 injured by 4 whites hidden in Putco bus; police investigation.</p> <p>6/9 Nov In Phusongang (Witbank) a woman is set alight, youth is necklaced in Chesterville. In New Brighton and Soweto security force members are fired at by unknown gunmen, man shot dead.</p> <p>10/11 Nov DPSC advisor detained, about 30 members now detained. Homes of Azopo general secretary and Cusa official attacked after peace talks.</p> <p>12/14 Nov Soweto man is necklaced, allegedly hacked a woman to death. In Meadowlands 2 woman are injured in clashes with security forces over evictions. Kwanobuhle youth leader shot dead in home by masked gunmen, in Alexandra man shot dead by police in his home, allegedly armed.</p>

Government Response <i>Sustained Crackdown & Court Challenge</i>	Black Nationalist Activity <i>External & Domestic Fronts</i>	
<p>children under age of 16. Inquest finds no one to blame for deaths of 3 Soweto youths killed by Wredebo officials. Former Azapo president released from detention hours before hearing.</p> <p>20/24 Aug Pmb Supreme Court reserves judgment in application by Argus/Saan newspapers challenging 6 emergency regulations; 2 'telex' regulations found invalid re news on police conduct and presence of journalists in townships and unrest areas. PE court imprisons 16yr-old youth for 12 years for necklace murder.</p> <p>22/29 Aug In Pretoria Supreme Court, Le Grange undertakes that no unlawful action will be taken against Fr Smangalis Mkhatshe after affidavits of torture.</p> <p>31 Aug Binfo reports 234 injuries in political violence during August, 169 attacks on security forces.</p>	<p>Acronyms ECC End Conscription Campaign IRC International Red Cross JMC Joint Management Committee Jadac Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee LWG Labour Monitoring Group Mawu Metal and Allied Workers Union NECC National Education Crisis Committee</p>	
<p>There have now been 248 court applications lodged against emergency regulations.</p> <p>1/3 Sept Le Grange releases 786 names of detainees, bringing official total to 9 337. In King Williamstown, 2 attorneys released from detention served with restriction orders. Worcester court acquits 47 youths on public violence charges, sentences 32 for 7-10 years. Vanderbijlpark court fines policeman R600 for death of 16yr old shot in the back of a police van. New emergency regulations on press coverage of funerals.</p> <p>4 Sept In Pmb Supreme Court, newspaper challenge of 6 emergency regulations is partially successful, seizure of publications halted. Grahamstown Supreme Court rules detention provisions of regulations are valid. In PE man is sentenced for necklace murder.</p> <p>8/9 Sept In PE, 2 hospitalised detainees apply for interdict, alleging police assault - judgment reserved. Jhb inquest into death of Soweto man on 26/2 acquits police. In CT 4 people found guilty of murdering Oudtshoorn councillor, 4 acquitted.</p> <p>10/11 Sept OFS Appeal Court reserves judgment over 2 conflicting Natal judgments on detention regulations. In PE man is found guilty of murder of police informer.</p> <p>12 Sept Dbn Supreme Court grants interdict restraining police from assaulting 24 detainees, incl 19 minors; over 100 claims by detainees of alleged assault proceed.</p>	<p>According to Minister of Law and Order, there have been 170 incidents of 'terrorism' this year, (136 in 1985; 44 in 1984) - 17 landmine, 55 grenade and 47 limpet mine explosions.</p> <p>1/3 Sept In Dbn limpet-mine explosion in supermarket injures 18 people, 1 person dies later. Police arrest 1 ANC suspect and seize armaments.</p> <p>8/9 Sept In Stockholm (Sweden) bomb explodes in ANC offices. In Pretoria 3 ANC guerillas hanged incl Andrew Zondo, bomber of Amanzimtoti shopping centre. 8 ANC members hanged since April 1979.</p> <p>11/14 Sept Jhb magistrate convicts ANC man on 2 charges of terrorism. In Verwoedburg limpet mine is found in shopping complex.</p> <p>15 Sept Senior members of UCT and UWC visit ANC in Lusaka.</p>	SEPT 1st & 2nd weeks
<p>16/17 Sept E Cape funeral restrictions extended for 3 months and restrictions imposed in Atteridgeville. In CT 6 people convicted and 26 acquitted for assault in Nyanga 'people's court'.</p> <p>18/19 Sept Colesberg doctor found guilty of disgraceful conduct for not treating unwell victim. In Dbn, Inkatha branch chairman found guilty of killing one of his own vigilantes.</p> <p>23/24 Sept 3 Oudtshoorn men sentenced to death for necklacing councillor. Dept of Constitutional Planning announces detainees' families to get food and not money from R3m set aside. So far 112 church workers detained, incl 60 priests, 3 bishops and 4 nuns.</p> <p>26/29 Sept Grahamstown Supreme Court reserves judgment on release of hospitalised detainee, orders release of 2 detainees from Middelburg.</p>	<p>16 Sept Bomb explodes near Dbn beachfront, no injuries.</p> <p>20/22 Sept In Glencoe, bomb explodes outside railway station, no injuries. Rand Supreme Court finds 3 guilty of terrorism and high treason, 2 are ANC members.</p> <p>24/25 Sept In Craighall Park limpet mine wrecks house of Soweto's housing director, who resigns 2 days later. Landmine blast in Ubombo (KwaZulu) damages vehicle.</p> <p>26/30 Sept In Braamfontein, hotel bomb blast injures 3 people. In PE 2 men are convicted of terrorism and possession of firearms. Tom Lodge, Wits ANC expert, has office petrolbombed; in Khayelitsha man killed in grenade attack. Mobeni (Dbn) substation damaged by bomb.</p>	SEPT 3rd & 4th weeks
<p>1 Oct Binfo admits to distributing newspaper in E Cape townships after initial denials.</p> <p>6/9 Oct DPSC estimates more than 22 000 detained (PFP lists 16 000 names) under emergency rule, 2 400 under ISA or homeland legislation. UDF declared an affected organisation, effectively cutting off foreign funding, estimated R100 000 frozen though 700 affiliates still able to raise funds.</p> <p>13/14 Oct 2 Jhb inquests find police not to blame for deaths of 13yr-old and 23yr-old Sowetans shot by police in late 1985. First 320 <i>kitkonstabels</i> (black unrest policemen) graduate from 6-week crash course near Koeberg, 700 still in training.</p>	<p>4/5 Oct In Nbizine (KaNgwane) 6 SADF members injured in landmine blast. In Sobantu (Pmb), grenade attack on house injures 2 people.</p> <p>8 Oct In Empidweni district (New Hanover) grenade attack on chief's house injures 1 person. 2 undetonated mines are found in Pont Drift area near Zimbabwe. In Mobeni, limpet mine explodes in stormwater drain, and Osizweni police station (Newcastle) is attacked by guerillas using AK47s, 1 policeman injured.</p> <p>15 Oct Jhb magistrate convicts Bekkersdal man for possession of armaments.</p>	OCT 1st & 2nd weeks
<p>16 Oct In PE 4 of the accused in multiple Kinikini murder trial acquitted, in Jhb necklace murder case withdrawn.</p> <p>18/19 Oct SADF members used by prison service to provide recreation and educational courses for political detainees in 'attempt to change their attitudes'. In Mlungisi (Queenstown) funeral of DPSC detainee is restricted, although magistrate overturns restrictions on conveyance of mourners.</p> <p>23/24 Oct Grahamstown Supreme Court sentences man to hang for burning of white man in Kwanobuhle. 30 Emergency detainees at Victor Verster prison charged with misconduct for refusing to obey orders.</p> <p>25/29 Oct IRC expels members from SA, government threatens to cut IRC visits to political prisoners. PE Supreme Court convicts 2 people on charges of culpable homicide for burning of man in Langa in 1985, charges against 2 other accused withdrawn. Binfo announces that since the emergency was declared, number of people killed by security forces has dropped by 66%, deaths from internicine violence 90% lower.</p>	<p>16 Oct In Soweto 2 grenades thrown at councillor's house. In Manzini (Swaziland) 2 white men raid refugee offices, where files on SA refugees removed in August raid.</p> <p>20/24 Oct In Lamontville limpet mine explodes outside police station, and in Volksrust 2 commercial premises are damaged by limpet mines. In Dbn 2 alleged ANC insurgents arrested; so far this year 70 alleged ANC saboteurs arrested. In Ubombo (KwaZulu) truck is damaged by landmine, 2 alleged ANC insurgents killed in later shoot-out.</p> <p>27/31 Oct Jhb magistrate convicts Steve Marais on charges of terrorism. Several alleged ANC members arrested after assassination of Bop's Brigadier Malope. Swazi police arrest ANC member and seize weapons near SA border. In Umlazi security force member is killed in grenade attack on house. In Bisho (Ciskei) man sentenced for undergoing military training overseas and importing arms.</p>	OCT 3rd & 4th weeks
<p>3/6 Nov Malmesbury magistrate withdraws charges of subversion against Reverend Boesak - allegedly advocating disinvestment, school and consumer boycotts. In Jhb 6 ECC and Jadac members restricted from campaigns of 8 organisations. PE Supreme Court find 3 youths guilty of burning person to death in Langa in 1985.</p> <p>12/13 Nov 3 300 Crossroads squatters sue police for R5m damages over May/June demolitions. Pmb Supreme Court grants interim interdict restraining police from assaulting N Natal detainees. Minister Le Grange pays out R27 000 to Daveyton family of Mphiwa Ngwenya (31), who died in custody in 1985 - R5,5m in official settlements for 717 assault cases 1969-1983 (DPSC). Since 1963, 62 people have died in detention under security laws. DPSC estimates 8 000 children detained since emergency declared.</p> <p>14 Nov Inquest into deaths of 7 alleged ANC insurgents killed in police action in March, Wynberg magistrate finds nobody guilty.</p>	<p>2/5 Nov National serviceman killed by landmine near Barberton, brings death toll to 11 in 14 landmine incidents in E Tvl since April. Rand Supreme Court convicts Marion Sparg on treason charges, 25yr prison sentence.</p> <p>6/7 Nov In Swaziland ANC member is severely injured trying to evade arrest by Swazi police. In Pretoria Regional Court 2 former security policemen charged with espionage and furthering ANC aims.</p> <p>8/11 Nov In Soweto 2 Putca ticket offices damaged by limpet mine explosions. In Newcastle 2 explosions at Game centre and magistrates court, 24 injured.</p> <p>12/13 Nov Dbn magistrates court, 2 appear charged with 'Magoos' bomb blast and murder of 4 people. Brigadier Stadler of security branch estimates 598 ANC 'terrorist attacks' over past 10 years - 200 in 1986, 136 in 1985.</p> <p>14 Nov In Lusaka delegation from SA Evangelical Lutherans holds talks with ANC. Pontdrif landmine explosion injures 2 people.</p>	NOV 1st & 2nd weeks



Billy Paddock

THE QUALIFICATIONS OF INEQUALITY

An 'INSET' Solution?

By Indicator SA Researcher Monica Bot

In South Africa, with its fragmented educational structure, the standard and qualifications of teaching and teachers vary greatly among the different education departments. Recently, the HSRC Education Research Programme reported that some 200 000 teachers in South Africa are in urgent need of training and upgrading. There is a drastic shortage of teachers and of qualified teachers in African education especially.

In July 1986, a workshop was held under the auspices of The Urban Foundation to look at 'possible ways of improving the effectiveness of the considerable involvement of the private sector in teacher development programmes'. The Foundation commissioned Monica Bot to prepare a survey of existing in-service education and training (INSET) programmes available to teachers, a summary of which is presented here.

The quality of any educational system is to a large extent determined by the quality of the teacher corps. The desperate shortage and poor qualifications of teachers, therefore, rank among the most serious of the many problems facing education in South Africa, especially in African, and to a somewhat lesser extent, in coloured schooling.

The Minister of Education and Development Aid, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, has estimated that there is a shortage of 6 579 teachers in African schools

countrywide (Eastern Province Herald 11/4/86).

This problem is compounded by an annual increase of 250 000 in the pupil population, which means that at least 8 000 new teachers must be trained each year (DET 1986). At present, only about 5 000 teachers are produced each year; between now and the year 2002, an estimated 38 000 primary and 31 000 secondary school teachers will have to be trained (The Star 5/8/86).

With regard to qualifications, 62 percent of the black

Table 1 **QUALIFICATIONS OF TEACHERS IN AFRICAN SCHOOLS 1985 (DET)**

	Primary School		Secondary School		Total
	African	White	African	White	
UNQUALIFIED					
Std 8 or lower	5 457	1	24	3	5 485
NTC	22	-	14	40	76
Matric/senior certificate	1 692	1	514	14	2 221
Degree	8	1	126	74	209
QUALIFIED					
Std 6	3 350	-	19	-	3 369
Std 8	18 828	3	706	1	19 538
NTC	49	-	122	9	180
Std 10 & PTC	5 422	7	3 115	44	8 588
Std 10 & JSTC	170	-	2 569	13	2 739
Std 10 & 3 years	279	2	1 250	209	1 740
Degree	31	4	852	282	1 169
TOTAL	35 308	19	9 311	689	45 327

SOME COMPARATIVE DATA

The following summarised comparison of teacher qualifications in 1983 shows the vast differences that exist between African and white teachers (Dostal and Vergnani 1984):

	African	White
Std 10+ with teaching qualification	27%	92%
Std 10+ without teaching qualification	3%	8%
Less qualified	70%	-

The following qualification breakdown is available for teachers employed by the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives):

Qualifications of Teachers in 'Coloured' Schools, 1983

- 7 percent of teachers were graduates
- 37 percent of teachers had a post-matric education diploma
- 53 percent of teachers had a post std 8 education diploma
- 3 percent of teachers had no teaching qualifications (Herman 1984).

Sources

DET Annual Report 1985, RP32/1986.
Herman H. 'The Rate of Attrition in Coloured Schools: 1963-1983', in *Indicator SA* Vol2/No2. CASS, Durban: July 1984.

teachers do not have a matric certificate (Cape Times 29/7/86). Viljoen has also acknowledged that of the 45 059 teachers employed by the Department of Education and Training (DET), 42 000 are not fully qualified (see also table 1); of these, 6 168 teachers had only a standard six certificate, and consequently were in the lowest paid category. African male teachers earn R2 910 per annum and female teachers earn R2 184 (Natal Mercury 16/4/86). Recently, the Department announced that African teachers will receive either one or two salary notch increases to bring about parity with the other education departments (Eastern Province Herald 1/8/86).

Stress & Stalemate

The data presented in table 1 show that the implications of underqualification for the provision of education are serious indeed. African teachers already have to cope with the macro stresses on the educational system, such as rapidly increasing pupil numbers, underfinancing, a lack of facilities, and a rejection of segregated schooling by many if not most of its participants. The low qualification levels of African teachers further undercut the quality of education that pupils receive, and also have a negative impact on their own sense of competency, their promotion possibilities and salary returns.

In addition, there are detrimental consequences for the standing of the teacher vis a vis both parent and pupil perceptions. The following survey results are

telling examples:

- Seventy five percent of a sample of 300 African adults in Natal/KwaZulu blamed black teachers in various ways when asked, 'Why do you think black children so often fail in their examinations?' (The Buthezi Commission 1982).
- Sixty percent of 151 black matric students surveyed in the Transvaal felt that teachers most hampered their progress at school, and 49 percent said that dissatisfaction with teachers would be the main cause of boycotts or demonstrations (Bot and Cullinan 1983).

There are 'underqualified' teachers (teachers who are professionally qualified but have no senior certificate) and 'unqualified' teachers (teachers who are professionally unqualified). In both categories, educational problems can be alleviated and some inequalities eliminated by means of in-service education and training (INSET) of teachers.

Government and private sector initiatives have produced a wide variety of educational programmes to date. INSET is perhaps one of the quickest and most direct ways to try and improve South Africa's education system. However, it must be cautioned that 'INSET strategies are likely to succeed to the extent that they form part of wider strategies to bring about improvements in the conditions under which the teacher works, the provision of education more generally, and the total dispensation of South Africa' (Van Den Berg, paraphrased, 1985). The effect of INSET is therefore limited, if not

accompanied by other policies to improve the overall quality of education.

Departmental Involvement

The various education departments provide a more or less ongoing service with regard to INSET, through courses provided by the inspectorate, subject advisers, colleges for further training/education, teachers' centres, etc. Generally, the emphasis of the kind of INSET they provide is on:

- the improvement of teacher qualifications
- curriculum-related guidance.

The INSET needs of teachers vary enormously across different education departments, according to qualification levels, and broader school and community circumstances. It is imperative that INSET, in order to be effective, is responsive to teacher needs and actively involves teachers in programmes. The teachers in greatest need for INSET are undoubtedly those teaching in African schools.

The main activities of the Department of Education and Training in this field can be summarised as follows (DET: Annual Report 1985 and various PR publications; Star 7/2/86):

- During 1985, more than half of DET's 45 000 serving teachers participated in some form of in-service training, while 262 courses were provided to 9 400 teachers at the College for Further Training in Soshanguve.
- 11 500 African teachers were registered for post-matric teachers' courses at Vista University (4 845 teachers were enrolled for the first year of the Secondary Education Certificate (Further Training) and 1 860 for the second year).
- A further 4 000 teachers are working on their matric qualification under the adult teaching scheme.
- In 1986, 'Project Alpha' was started to increase teacher competency, especially at senior secondary level.
- A management development course is given by Afrox Limited's Performance Educational Services, to improve management skills of (deputy) principals and heads of department. During the next three years, some 13 600 management personnel at school will undergo training.
- Educational advisers provided 198 courses involving 6 930 teachers in decentralised areas (including the homelands).
- Nine in-service courses were given to 263 teachers in educational technology.
- Physical education courses for 728 teachers were held at 26 different institutions.
- At DET's four teacher centres, training was given in the use of classroom media.

Private Initiatives

The field of in-service education and training of teachers is a field where major interest groups outside the education system can make a substantial contribution. 'The key reason for non-official interest in the teacher is that both universities and employers have a direct concern with the "products" of the disadvantaged education systems Until the quality of the teachers in these systems has greatly improved, the quality of education will be such that

they (e.g. employers) will have to continue with short term remedial, compensatory, "rescue" programmes for a very long time' (HSRC INSET Sub-Committee 1985). During 1986, the author compiled an overview of in-service education and training programmes for teachers, on behalf of The Urban Foundation. The data collected on private initiatives in INSET is presented in tables 2 and 3.

The major thrust of non-departmental INSET initiatives lies in the field of training programmes that do not lead to further formal qualifications. Possibly this is because the upgrading of qualifications is perceived to be more the task of the education departments and that non-qualification programmes will have a more immediate practical impact. For instance, according to one educationist, 'curriculum-related INSET and INSET for new roles have a more direct impact on the education system than initial training and upgrading INSET activities, which contain a large academic component unrelated to classroom needs' (Greenland 1983: p110).

To gain an overview of which subject and teaching areas are the focus of non-departmental INSET, programmes can be grouped according to target group and region. Table 2 indicates the number of programmes available to teachers in each province or homeland in specific subjects.

From the comparison, it is clear that there are substantial regional differences in the provision of INSET; teachers in the Transvaal have the largest number of INSET programmes available to them, followed by Natal, the Cape, the Orange Free State, and the homelands. Of these, KwaZulu has the largest number of programmes available to its teachers.

Needs & Priorities

Existing INSET programmes must be viewed against actual needs, i.e. where are inequalities most apparent in African and coloured education, and within these areas, what type of INSET should be prioritised? In view of the tremendous range of educational needs, this is a difficult task. Should upgrading focus on an area where qualifications are lowest (e.g. in primary schools) or on all un- and underqualified teachers? Another issue is that there are limits to the number of teachers that can participate in INSET programmes at any one time, especially in the case of upgrading qualifications. The consequence of decreased attention to classroom teaching by teachers involved in upgrading is inevitable.

The first priority is to provide INSET for educators involved in the initial education and training of teachers and in in-service programmes. In black education, there are 53 training colleges of education, with a total professional staff of approximately 1 700, of whom some five percent have no professional qualifications; about 40 percent have standard ten plus two years professional training and about 50 percent have degrees. Of the non-departmental INSET programmes listed in table 3, six fall into this teacher educator INSET category.

Other target groups suggested by the HSRC INSET working committee are the following:

- Primary school teachers who are professionally

Table 2

REGIONAL AVAILABILITY OF INSET PROGRAMMES (NON-DEPARTMENTAL)

INSET in subject group	Transvaal	Cape	NFS	Natal	Transkei	Bop	Venda	Leskei	KwaZulu	KaNgwane	Gazankulu	KwaNdebele	Lebowa	CwaQwa	Total Avail No of Programmes
English	12	9	4	7	4	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	16
Maths, physical science, biology	8	9	6	7	3	2	2	4	6	3	4	2	4	3	15
General teacher support	4	3	2	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	10
Pre-primary	4	4	3	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7 ¹
Upgrading qualifications	4	2	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	7
Guidance	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	4 ²
Management skills	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	3
Nutritional education	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	37	30	19	31	11	10	9	12	16	11	11	8	12	10	

1 In addition, in all the homelands materials are available from one programme.

2 Two of the programmes are available on request throughout the RSA.

unqualified (15 482 out of 68 795 African teachers, excluding the TBVC homelands), or professionally underqualified (44 886 out of 68 795 African teachers, excluding TBVC). Thirty INSET programmes involve these teachers (1983 data).

- Adult educators and trainers, such as literacy teachers, practical skills trainers, management training personnel, etc. Five INSET programmes aim at this group.

- Secondary school teachers who are professionally unqualified (in 1983, 2 658 out of 20 182 teachers, excl. TBVC), or professionally underqualified (presently, some 7 500 teachers). Thirty two INSET programmes involve these teachers.

- Pre-school teachers — seven INSET programmes cater for this group.

- Qualified teachers, especially principals, their deputies, heads of departments and promotion post holders. Seven programmes are available to these teachers.

The impact made in each of these areas by available INSET programmes is difficult to assess. 'Success rates' are relatively easy to obtain only in the field of upgrading of qualifications. Even then, the exact benefits or impact at the classroom level are not known. Greenland asks, 'What is to count as evidence of effectiveness — pupil achievement, teacher performance, teacher opinion or all three?' (Greenland 1983: p107). Careful evaluation should form part of any programme, and the following four criteria for INSET programmes could serve as a possible guideline: personal growth, professional growth, school growth and societal growth (Van Den Berg 1985).

Recommendations

Firstly, INSET should be provided as close to where the teacher works as is possible. Many participants mention problems of lack of time, work overload and transport, which also contributed to their dropping out of such programmes. By providing INSET close to participant schools, it can be given as and when the

need arises, be more responsive to the particular needs of teachers and schools in a specific area, and thereby increase the likelihood of actual carry-over to the school and classroom. Taking into account the number of teachers in need of INSET, it would of course be ideal if certain types of INSET could be provided in school; which implies that '...minimal levels of head teachers' training and external support services can be defined and then maintained' (Greenland op cit: p114).

Secondly, the upgrading of qualifications is very time consuming for the teacher but most important in terms of their own status, salary and promotion possibilities and for classroom competence. Instead of providing the same matric course to teachers as is given to 18 year-olds, however, these programmes should at the same time aim at being as beneficial as possible to the school; they should improve approaches to teaching on an ongoing basis. In addition, two possible approaches to upgrading of qualifications mentioned in the HSRC INSET Sub-Committee report (op cit: p73) which should be considered are that 'recognition could be given to experience and professional competence'; or that 'a formal qualification, equivalent to senior certificate, but geared to the needs of teachers in service, could be established'.

Thirdly, it is essential that available training facilities be integrated. PFP MP, Ken Andrew, recently pointed out that 'At present, there are places for only 5 269 students at DET teacher training colleges. There are vacant places for 2 767 students at white teacher training colleges. Filling those places with black students would increase the number of black student teachers at college by 53 percent' (Sunday Times 8/6/86).

Finally, there are wide regional variations that exist in the provision of INSET in South Africa and among the various education departments. National and regional co-operation in the field of INSET is therefore essential, both between the various education departments and between these and the private sector, so that funds and resources can be better allocated and duplication avoided.

Table 3 **A BROAD SUBJECT BREAKDOWN OF NON-DEPARTMENTAL INSET PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Name of programme	No of teachers reached annually	Areas where teachers are reached
PHYSICAL SCIENCE, MATHS, BIOLOGY		
Science Education Project (SEP)	500+	W & E Cape, Natal, Tvl, Transkei, KwaZulu, Ciskei, Gazankulu, Lebowa
Science Education Centre (Funda Centre)	301-500	Alexandra, Soweto
Foundation for Education, Science & Technology	n/a	Whole of SA*
Computer-assisted Arithmetic Research Project (Wits/CCE)	26-100	Soweto
MATIP/Gancor	500+	Soweto, Bloemfontein, Broederstroom (Alpha Training Centre), 10 homelands
Shell Science & Maths Resource Centre Educational Trust	301-500	KwaZulu, Natal
Formal In-service Training for Mathematics & Science Teachers Project (FITMAST)	101-200	Natal, Tvl, Cape, OFS
Institute for Mathematics & Science Teaching (IMSTUS/Univ of Stellenbosch)	5 projects: 26-100 2 projects: 101-200 2 projects: 500+	Natal, Tvl, Cape, OFS
Primary Science Programme (UF)	301-500	W & E Cape, Natal, OFS, KaNgwane
Mathematics Education Project (CTPA/UF)	26-100	Cape urban areas
In-service Training Project (high schools) (UPE/CENCE)	301-500	PE, Uitenhage
Research Institute for Education Planning (RIEP/UOFS)	201-300	Gozankulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KwaZulu, OFS, Ciskei
Eshowe College of Education	26-100	KwaZulu
Murray Trust Maths Fellowship (UCT)	500+	Cape Town area
ENGLISH LANGUAGE		
English Language Teaching Information Centre (ELTIC): Form School Pilot Project	26-100	Krugersdorp district
Read, Educate & Develop (READ)	500+	Natal, OFS, E & W Cape, Tvl
SACHED Trust: ELT Course	26-100	Soweto
Teachers Resources Project	201-300	Soweto, Pmb, Cape Town
Standard Two Dictionary Project	26-100	Alexandra, Soweto
Schools' English Language Programme (SELP)	101-200	Soweto
Teachers' English Language Improvement Project (Wits/CCE)	301-500	Soweto, Ciskei, E Rand, E Cape
Secondary Schools' English Research Project (Wits/CCE)	201-300	Soweto, Alexandra
Council for Black Education & Research	201-300	Pta area, KaNgwane (rural areas), Soweto, Cape Town, Durban, Pietersburg
The Anglovaal English Language Centre	101-200	KwaZulu
Operation Upgrade of SA	500+	Whole of SA
Embomswaneni (Ntl Technikon)	500+	Natal
Molteno Project		Whole of SA
INSET for Teachers - 1820 Foundation	101-200	Transkei, Cape
In-service Training: English as a Second Language (UPE/CENCE)	301-500	PE, Uitenhage
University of the North, Dept of Language Methodology	301-500	N Tvl, Lebowa
Bureau of Literacy & Literature	201-300	Whole of SA
PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION		
Institute for Child & Adult Guidance (RAU)	301-500	Soweto, Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, all homelands
Durban & Coastal Society for Early Childhood Education	301-500	Natal (similar courses in Tvl, Cape, OFS)
TREE-High/Scope Training of Teachers Course	26-100	Greater Pmb area
Pre-primary Workshops (Ntl Training College)	101-200	Greater Pmb area
Pre-school INSET (UF)	201-300	PE, Jhb, Durban, Bloemfontein
Grassroots Education Trust	26-100	Cape urban area, W Coast rural area
Early Learning Resource Unit (ELRU)	201-300	Soweto, Viljoenskroon, Grahamstown, Durban, Cape Town, Transkei (training)
MANAGEMENT SKILLS		
Koinonia - Headmasters' Management Skills Programme	26-100	Natal
Educational Leadership Orientation Seminars (ELOS/Univ of Stellenbosch)	500+	Ciskei, Soweto, Cape & Natal Ed Depts, DEC
School Management for School Leaders Project	500+	KaNgwane, QwaQwa
GUIDANCE		
Education Information Centre: Guidance Teachers Resource Package, Enrichment Programme	<25	E Rand
Career Information Centre	26-100	Natal, KwaZulu
Careers Education Project	101-200	Whole of SA - on request
Lifeskills Seminars (Career Resource Centre)	101-200	Whole of SA - on request
HEALTH		
AI/RAMA Nutrition Programme	301-500	Natal, KwaZulu, Soweto, Transkei, E Rand
TEACHER SUPPORT - GENERAL		
Independent Teachers' Centre (Funda Centre)	500+	Soweto
Rand Mines Ltd	201-300	Tvl, Natal, OFS
The Enrichment Course	500+	PWV area
Natal Teachers' Society (NTS)	varies	Natal
Indumiso College of Education	<25	Pmb area
Overhead Projector Project	26-100	Cape (rural areas)
South African Teachers Association: PROGRO	101-200	Cape (urban areas)
Primary Education Upgrading Programme (PEUP)	6 000+	Bophuthatswana
Setotlwane College of Education	26-100	Lebowa (Palokwane)
Video Education Project		Cape, Tvl, Natal, OFS
TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS		
Promat College	101-200	Cape, Tvl, Natal, OFS
Teachers Opportunity Programmes (TOPS)	3 000+	Tvl, KwaZulu, Cape, OFS
SACHED	101-200	Soweto mostly
St Alban's College	101-200	Mamelodi
Univ of Natal (Pmb): Part-time BA for African Teachers	101-200	Pmb area
Univ of Venda	500+	Venda, Gozankulu
Teachers' Academic Upgrading Programme	500+	Bophuthatswana

* Whole of SA includes the four provinces, four independent homelands and six non-independent homelands.


ACRONYMS

CCE Centre for Continuing Education
 CENCE Centre for Continuing Education
 CTPA Cape Teachers Professional Association
 DEC Department of Education and Culture
 PE Port Elizabeth
 Pmb Pietermaritzburg
 Pta Pretoria
 PWV Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging
 RAU Rand Afrikaans University
 UCT University of Cape Town
 UF Urban Foundation
 UOFS University of the Orange Free State
 UPE University of Port Elizabeth
 Wits University of the Witwatersrand

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WOOLTRU

Managerial Strategies in a Siege Economy

By Professor Frank Horwitz, Graduate School of Business,
University of Cape Town

The private sector has the knowledge and the experience to lead socio-political change as sponsors or agents of 'public' collective bargaining (Godsell 1985). Yet, existing strategies for human resource management in South Africa are inadequate in coping with the effects of a siege economy, rapid environmental change and a high degree of political uncertainty. Numerous external demands which adversely affect the business sector, individual companies and employer organisations, necessitate pro-active policies at the macro-institutional level instead of the current ad hoc responses to specific issues.

A recent study of the survival strategies of multinational companies operating in a South American revolutionary climate found that a conscious managerial effort is required to develop adaptive thinking, the ability to redefine strategies and to carve out new relationships with key interest groups (Austin and Ickis 1986). Similarly, to secure their long-term interests and develop manpower resources requires a pro-active role from South African business leaders in forging relationships with trade unions, community and political organisations. Appropriate styles of managerial leadership will necessitate a shift away from autocratic and coercive modes to management by consent.

Worker Expectations

The acquisition of the industrial franchise by African workers has resulted in a greater democratisation of the workplace in the 1980s. Some 800 recognition agreements between employers and trade unions have been negotiated since freedom of labour association was extended legally to African workers in 1979. The process of institutionalising conflict through

collective bargaining and procedural accommodation has also given black and white employees meaningful negotiation experience in industry and commerce.

The siege economy (see box) will have been a consequence largely of the failure to enter into similar negotiations towards an acceptable political franchise. The resultant crisis and conflict of expectations among African employees has rapidly politicised labour relations, with stayaways or demonstration strikes and racial polarisation becoming serious concerns. The detention of trade union leaders during the state of emergency has further eroded co-operative, democratic processes in the workplace.

The government's espoused policy of moving towards more free enterprise, less intervention in the economy and negotiated political solutions has exacerbated black resentment. These goals have often been contradicted by official actions in precipitating a move towards a closed siege economy, and in placing severe restrictions on human rights and press freedoms.


Human Resource Policies

The precise impact of economic sanctions on employment levels and job creation is difficult to estimate. According to a Project Free Enterprise Study (Nel 1986: p24/26), an estimated one million jobs could be lost if total sanctions are imposed on South Africa. Nel argues that if 600 000 black workers were retrenched, compounding current levels of unemployment, 31,9 percent of all economically active blacks would then be out of work.

For trade unions, job protection and promotion will become even more vital in this uncertain environment. There will also be a concerted demand from black

Cover Caption
Road and drainage construction on a public works project in Botha's Hill, Durban. Both state and private sector initiative can alleviate unemployment.

In an uncertain political and economic climate, business leaders need to forge closer links with trade unions, community and political groups



Billy Poddock

The unemployed wait for casual work in the city. Studies predict that total sanctions on South Africa could increase already high unemployment levels, with one million jobs directly lost.

employees for specific corporate objectives, practical implementation and target achievement dates for black advancement. Revised manning structures will have to facilitate a shift away from the exclusive occupation of unskilled and semi-skilled positions by blacks. Companies will need to develop strategies to meet these needs, restructuring the workforce to ensure that a non-racial mix of employees occurs at all levels.

Work for all

A major criticism of manpower planning in South Africa is that surplus labour tends to be highlighted only during an economic downturn. Employers seriously need to examine their manning and employment philosophies in order to seek ways of enhancing job security, despite continued costs pressures. A search for the optimum balance between a company's economic and financial objectives and its social responsibility to its employees and operational environment is vital.

Because the siege economy will not prove attractive for potential overseas recruits, there is an added incentive for training existing employees of all races who show potential for advancement.

Managers should be given directives to smooth out peaks and valleys in company employment levels to minimise wide fluctuations in the labour force. The long-term rewards would be enhanced community relations and reduced recruiting, training, and retrenchment payment costs.

The threat of mass unemployment to societal stability is exacerbated by the inadequate social security system in South Africa. Employer organisations and government should review their macro-policies on unemployment insurance and medical schemes. Unlike other Western countries there is virtually no effective economic cushion in South Africa which alleviates the emotional and material trauma of prolonged periods of unemployment.

Job creation schemes should become an urgent priority for the state and the business sector; the feasibility of collaborative projects between employer associations and organised labour could be explored. For instance, the development of an appropriate import substitution strategy could to some degree offer alternative employment for retrenched workers from sectors that are heavily reliant on imported

materials and components.

Methods of production

In a siege economy, with full or even partial sanctions, the immediate challenge of merely maintaining employment levels will probably assume greater priority than employment creation. There is a need, therefore, for companies to explore the possibilities of engaging in profitable labour-intensive forms of production and materials handling. Laudable efforts are already being made to stimulate the small business and informal sectors.

However, it is disturbing to observe that due to an inability to cope successfully with industrial relations problems or politically linked stayaways, some companies are seeking to move towards capital intensive activities. These strategies, while improving productivity and lowering manpower costs, could further erode the credibility of the free enterprise system among black employees and endanger social responsibility initiatives.

The fatalistic approach to sanctions in recent statements by government spokesmen, coupled with an erosion of civil liberties, appears to be generating a siege mentality among an increasing number of whites. Yet if existing sanctions were intensified, business confidence will be further undermined, and already high unemployment levels worsened, thereby endangering the very fabric of South African society. If the free enterprise system is associated by employees with large-scale retrenchments and poverty, it is not surprising that many black people perceive it to be collaborating with apartheid (Nel 1986).

Some 350 000 African workers from other countries are legally employed in South Africa. If in retaliation to sanctions the government seeks to repatriate experienced foreign workers, it could increase unemployment and the country's isolation further. Although many foreign migrants are in relatively unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, the recruitment and training costs of replacing them with local black workers will present major difficulties. Furthermore, a new quasi-migrant labour system, with attendant socio-political problems, could well evolve.

Privatisation efforts

The implications of current initiatives on deregulation and privatisation that affect the socio-economic position of employees require careful consideration, particularly in the case of minimum wages and conditions of employment.

A survey of some 134 industrial council (IC) agreements conducted by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (1986) indicated that only three minimum wage rates set exceeded the University of South Africa's

The siege economy could reveal to a varying extent the following features:

Trade and Industry

- Declining international demand for 'non-essential' goods due to boycotts, partial or full disinvestment and varying degrees of trade sanctions.
- Higher local prices and shortages of certain raw materials, consumer and other goods due to a reduction in demand and difficulties in importing raw materials.
- The introduction of 'neo-protectionist' economic policies aimed at protecting local industry.
- Continued high inflation rates and declining living standards.

Employment

- Increasing retrenchments and consequent higher unemployment of all races.
- Lack of meaningful investment in human resource training and development due to cost constraints.
- Continued large disparities in wealth and opportunity between race groups and between employed and unemployed.
- Increasing polarisation of attitudes at the macro level and at the intra-organisational level among employees.
- Reduced levels of organisational commitment by employees.
- A steady efflux from the country of managerial and professional manpower in spite of the weak rand.

Society

- Increased militarisation of society, with possibly more frequent and longer military call-ups having adverse effects on business productivity.
- Increased concern for personal and institutional security, with a siege mentality becoming more predominant.
- A high degree of political rhetoric by various organisations across the political spectrum and an intensification of political opposition in spite of repressive measures.
- Continuing protests and demonstrations, manifested in work stayaways and consumer boycotts.

supplementary living level; only sixteen ICs had rates higher than the R369 a month minimum living level for February 1986. This is because most ICs negotiate minimum wage levels rather than actual wages, frequently to allow flexibility for further increases and negotiated improvements at company or plant level.

Recently, there has been debate on the possible removal or reduction of minimum wage increases and IC exemptions, on the basis that they may affect the viability of business. If most ICs are setting barely liveable wage rates to begin with, it would seem that a move such as this would produce sub-poverty wages. Under these circumstances, employees are hardly likely to be profoundly productive or committed to a free enterprise system.

Steps have also been taken to relax regulations for small businesses, by permitting Wage Board determinations to exempt businesses which employ fewer than 15 people from minimum wage agreements (Business Day 7/3/86). The strategic implications and consequences of this issue need to be carefully examined — a siege economy cannot afford further

Worker confidence in the free enterprise system will be further eroded if Industrial Councils continue to negotiate barely livable minimum wages

Employers and unions need to negotiate a balance between the inherent conflicts of adequate wages, full employment, economic growth and profitability

How can the values, norms and procedures of industrial democracy be achieved without the support of democratic processes and institutions in the wider society?

Private sector lobbying in the political arena should be continuous and not just be concerned with ad hoc socio-political issues and crises

risers in unemployment, nor in poverty level wages. The achievement by employers and trade unions of a negotiated balance between the inherent conflicts of wage cost containment, fuller employment, growth and profitability, presents a major challenge.

Interest group politics

The primary focus of the newer black trade unions has been to establish a shop-floor power base through winning recognition, and to pursue a living wage through collective bargaining. Although the recognition barrier appears to have been overcome, the goal of a comprehensive living wage has not been attained. This, together with the development of an independent political base, and the protection of job security remain major objectives of organised black labour. However, in the absence of political democracy for their members, the achievement of a pervasive industrial democracy will remain elusive.

The key question in this regard is whether the values, norms and procedures of industrial democracy are attainable without the support of democratic processes and structures in the wider society. Certain key trade union leaders believe that it would be inopportune to pursue this question at the present time in South Africa. The general secretary of the Council of Unions of South Africa and the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions, Piroshaw Camay, argues that 'one cannot talk about participation in the economic sector when there is still discrimination on a political level' (FM 29/8/86).

In this context, senior managers will need to rethink and articulate the core values of their organisation, and develop pragmatic policies and implementable strategies. Godsell (1985) argues that business as a corporate citizen has a responsibility to exercise influence on decisions affecting its interests and should play a fundamental role in excising apartheid and transforming political structures.

A plural society reflects various conflict and power interests. An organised employer lobby should therefore enter into regular dialogue and dynamic interaction with interest groups such as political parties and organised labour, and endeavour to formulate joint or bilateral strategies for socio-political change.

Adaptive Response

Whether for altruistic reasons, or simply to seek adaptive and responsive strategies of economic survival, organised business as a key stakeholder in the survival and prosperity of society has an important role to play in achieving a just society. This requires business engagement in the political arena to be continuous and not

merely issue related. The adverse consequences of employer passivity for the credibility of the free enterprise system would be severe. As key agents of socio-political change, the role of business requires a reconceptualisation of the traditional contextual definitions of human resource management.

Human resource management specialists have to reconcile cost consciousness with employee perceptions of their professional and personal credibility. They will need to find pragmatic and socially responsive strategies, particularly for influencing business strategies and facilitating change in corporate culture. However, organisational change cannot occur in a vacuum. Environmental demands are critical variables which affect business decision making and strategic effectiveness.

The current debate on sanctions and the survival of free enterprise, while necessary, is clouding several essential issues which must be urgently addressed. It is imperative to negotiate a socio-political and economic system which:

- addresses a more rational, efficient and fair re-allocation of economic resources and, therefore, the issue of access to and distribution of power;
- provides human rights such as the franchise as well as tangible benefits such as an improved quality of life and socio-economic development; e.g. full employment, greater job security, a living wage, upgraded and comfortable housing, equal non-racial education, social and occupational mobility, and medical care;
- deals with the fairness of the market's distribution of created wealth (Crankshaw 1986: p36);
- provides a new political and social order which is free of racial discrimination and oppression;
- moves demonstrably towards a *toenadering* or commonality of societal values and symbols; but which also accommodates the independence of certain key interest groups such as trade unions.

The immense and complex challenges facing human resource strategists in South Africa do not reflect a stark choice between achieving a living wage and higher employment, but the search for a relative balance between equitable wages, employment security, job creation and continued profitability. *UJDA*

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ADVANCING ISSUES

Black Progress in the Workplace

By Dr Eric Charoux,
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In an earlier Indicator SA article (Vol4/No1), industrial psychologist Blade Nzimande examined the theoretical flaws and problems encountered by black advancement programmes in industry. In a sequel, Eric Charoux surveys the growing corpus of literature on black advancement and challenges the typical criticisms levelled at these organisational efforts. He argues that debate should be pragmatic and functional — stimulating programmes that develop black leadership from the production line to management level.

During the past few years, there has been a major upsurge of interest in what are commonly known as black advancement programmes. In the research sphere, three doctoral theses (Hofmeyer 1982; Charoux 1985; Watts 1985) as well as a number of master's dissertations that deal with various aspects of the subject (Boulle 1978; Godsell 1983) have been produced. On the popular front, two books (Human and Hofmeyer 1985; Charoux 1986) have been produced and specialist publications such as the *IPM Journal* and the *Human Resource Management* journal have devoted whole issues to the topic.

Simultaneously, a number of serious and vexing issues have emerged revealing conflicting interpretations or schools of thought on black advancement. At the broader level the following issues appear to be the most commonly debated in recent literature (Nzimande 1986; IPM June 1986; Charoux 1986):

- Should these programmes be known as

'black advancement' or as 'equal opportunity' instead?

- Why are white managers or researchers designing advancement programmes for black people?
- Is black advancement catering for an elite minority only?

Two Schools of Thought

Some authors (Mercer 1986; Pascoe 1986) believe that the label 'equal opportunity' should be adopted by both management and researchers in their efforts to upgrade the position of black workers. They argue that the development of the employee should happen in an environment which provides for equal opportunities, irrespective of race. Another, less articulated, reason is that the use of this programme label will give the white employee less cause to complain that management is developing the black employee at the former's expense,

Some theorists argue that employee development should take place in an environment which provides for equal opportunities, irrespective of race

Only when and if South African society becomes totally integrated, will the need for 'black' advancement programmes disappear altogether

provoking a white backlash.

Other writers (e.g. Charoux 1986; Project Free Enterprise 1986) insist on the term 'black advancement', arguing that although the 'equal opportunity' lobbyists' intentions are laudable, they are based on idealistic assumptions. These authors argue that the harsh realities of the South African society are based on what Laurence van der Post once described as being 'colour mad'; that there are enormous differences between white and black educational systems, with disastrous impact on the integration of black employees (Charoux 1986:p14); and that the average organisational hierarchy is dominated by white personnel (Human and Hofmeyer 1985:p15).


Consequently, we believe it makes little sense to talk about 'equal opportunity' in this unequal society — other than for the purpose of pulling the wool over the eyes of a few recalcitrant white employees, whose reservations have yet to be publicly heard, or whose power has yet to be specifically felt. In short, until all institutionalised forms of racial discrimination have been removed, the

appropriate name for these programmes should remain as 'black advancement'. This description emphasises the deliberate effort to promote the upward mobility of a disadvantaged majority (Charoux 1986:p147).

Similarly, management researchers like Nzimande (1986) will have to accept that potential black managers should be trained through special advancement programmes. This is not because they are inherently inferior, have a 'genetic' low need for achievement or come from a different culture. It is because the society in which they grow up deprives them of an adequate education and conditions them into believing that they are socially inferior to whites. Only once this society becomes totally integrated, will the term 'equal opportunity' with its numerous assumptions and implications become fully applicable.

Black Advancement by Whites

It has become fashionable nowadays to deride the fact that most black



advancement programmes are designed by whites. Nzimande (1986:p105) comments thus: 'It is ironic that African management candidates rarely participate in the development and implementation of programmes claimed to be developing African leadership in business'. Consequently, blacks become allegedly suspicious of paternalistic advancement programmes, while black candidates on the programmes 'never graduate' but remain in a 'perpetual training' mode.

To respond to these criticisms, there is a fundamental and obvious reason for the lack of black involvement in the design of programmes of this nature. It does not stem from racism, paternalism, repression or all those popular motives imagined by armchair theorists. It has to do with downright, practical reality: the fact that it is an extremely difficult task to design and implement successful black advancement programmes.

Management, irrespective of sex, creed or colour, has at its disposal little or no technology or proven models to rely on when designing black advancement programmes (Charoux 1986:p6/7; Project Free Enterprise 1986:chap 6) and, because of the urgency of the situation, it does not have the luxury of waiting for consultations with all the black employees involved. As long as action, despite its methodological imperfections, is based on a genuine desire to advance the black employee — containing fundamental preconditions such as career paths, with clear performance standards and specific time frames (Charoux 1985, 1986:p44) — it should achieve its objectives.

A New Black Elite?

It is also often argued that black advancement programmes cater for an 'employee elite' (the supervisors and managers), neglecting the needs of the majority. Some writers (e.g. Nzimande 1986) denounce not only the limited impact of these initiatives, but also the self-interest of white management supposedly co-opting a black middle-class to ensure the perpetuation of racial capitalism.

In contemporary South Africa, the capitalist ethic of profitmaking is dominating the business scene. Management, therefore, has to continue to focus its attention on its most critical resource in obtaining an acceptable return on its investment — its leadership dimension. It should therefore come as no surprise that during the past fifteen years or so, black advancement has come to be associated with the development of black leadership potential.

Clearly, though, this process must not stop at the leadership level. Recent data support the notion that management is becoming increasingly conscious of the

dangers of a narrowly focused definition of black advancement. Kerruish (1986:p40) thus argues that 'at the operator and, to a lesser degree, artisan level, statistics show extensive African and coloured advancement over the last four years'.

Towards a Solution

It has been said before: South African management is at a crossroads. It is faced with an often debated dilemma which can be briefly conceptualised, if somewhat simplistically, as follows. If it persists with the western, capitalist ethic, it runs the very real and serious risk of further alienating its black employee population, who will perceive its efforts and misguided attempts as perpetuating an oppressive racist regime. If, on the other hand, it shifts to the socialist mode (assuming it had the power to do so), its intentions would be immediately rejected by a majority of whites. Cries of 'we are dropping our standards' and 'look at our neighbouring states' will echo even more resoundingly than at present through the corridors of corporate offices.

Instead of pondering endlessly as to whether these programmes should be labelled 'black advancement' or 'equal opportunity'; whether whites should or should not design advancement programmes; whether or not it is morally right for a black elite to be nurtured: we should rather concentrate our energies towards working at a mutually acceptable and pragmatic solution, within relatively easy grasp of contemporary organisations. The solution lies in the process of 'cultural synergy' — the exploration of corporate values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours which aims at discovering and enhancing that which is similar (instead of different) between the white and black employee.

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The urgent need for African business leadership means that many designers of advancement programmes rarely consult with the participants

Since the capitalist ethic dominates South African business, it is logical to invest in advancing individual black personnel

HEALTH & SAFETY AT WORK Behind Clause Doors

By Martheanne Finnemore,
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A labour researcher surveys recent breakthroughs in the field of industrial health and safety, outlining two model agreements negotiated in 1986. In comparing these bilateral clauses with the provisions of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act, Finnemore concludes that unions are establishing safeguards superior to those enshrined in statute.

How important are industrial health and safety (IHS) issues to workers and trade unions in an industrial relations climate punctuated by stayaways as a form of political protest and sit-ins to promote wage demands? These issues undoubtedly have a significant impact — safety incidents may trigger industrial unrest in a company where a fatal accident may occur and management is seen to have been negligent.

Many workers do not share the management viewpoint that 90 percent of accidents are caused by careless workers. Instead, they are more likely to believe that accidents frequently occur where workers are pressurised for production, provided with inferior safety equipment, or where management has spent too little on providing a healthy and safe work environment.

Where a company is seen to give minimal attention to issues such as health problems or where a high accident rate exists, IHS is likely to become a focal point of worker interest. For example, the National Union of Textile Workers' campaign against brown lung disease was initiated 'when it became apparent that no precautions were being taken in South Africa to prevent this lung disease' (White 1985).

Considerable training for workers in health and safety is being undertaken, not only within companies, but by various worker support groups such as the Technical Advice Group and the Industrial Health Research Group.

Thus, armed with increasing knowledge, workers through their trade unions or safety committees will be in a better position to bring IHS issues to the attention of management. The Industrial Court may even be resorted to as a means of testing the

fairness of health and safety provisions or practices.

Mosa Deficiencies

A few trade unions under the Cosatu banner have recently negotiated landmark IHS agreements with some companies or are in the process of negotiating. The Industrial Relations Unit at the University of Port Elizabeth is currently undertaking a survey of these important developments. From preliminary findings it appears that Cosatu and Cusa/Azactu unions are making a concerted move in this area, in spite of some employer resistance.

The Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (Mosa) was initially seen by trade unionists as highly protective of management prerogative in this area when first published (Maller and Steinberg 1984). The position was considered to have improved substantially with the subsequent publication of new general Mosa regulations in 1985. In areas where Mosa is seen to be still deficient, the incorporation of clauses (see box) such as those negotiated by the General Workers Union (GWU) and the South African Allied Workers Union (Saawu) in IHS agreements is seen as necessary by unions to further protect the rights of workers.

The failure of Mosa to extend to workers the right to elect their own safety representatives is frequently contrasted with the legislative position in the United Kingdom. Under the Health and Safety at Work Act Regulations, which came into effect in 1978, British unions have the right to appoint safety representatives and to determine the number in consultation with management. The union may also

RECENT INDUSTRIAL HEALTH & SAFETY AGREEMENTS

Two important health and safety agreements were concluded between the General Workers Union (GWU) and Turnall (Cape) on 24 March 1986, and the South African Allied Workers Union (Saawu) and Malcomess (East London) on 17 July 1986.

The following clauses were included in one or both of these agreements; the clauses are analysed alongside, in terms of the perceived deficiencies in the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (Mosa).

Clauses Included in Agreements	Comparison of Negotiated Rights with Mosa
1. Election of Safety Representatives	
Employees are free to elect whomever they choose as safety representatives, having regard to the individual's ability to perform the duties required of a safety representative (GWU/Turnall).	The inclusion of clauses 1 and 2 overcomes the objection by workers and unions to management's prerogative to designate the safety representatives, as per Mosa.
2. Safety Committees and Shop Stewards	
Should no shop stewards be elected as safety representatives, one shop steward may be nominated to attend each meeting of the safety committee (GWU/Turnall).	The inclusion of clauses 1 and 2 overcomes the objection by workers and unions to management's prerogative to designate the safety representatives, as per Mosa.
3. Right to Negotiate Health and Safety Issues	
The company and union agree to negotiate in good faith, over standards, practices and procedures which are conducive to sound occupational health and safety (GWU/Turnall and Saawu/Malcomess).	Standards defined by law only set minimum standards. The inclusion of this clause gives workers the right to negotiate with management for improved standards and any other related issues. This goes far beyond any rights provided for in Mosa or the Labour Relations Act.
4. Right to Information	
Safety representatives will be provided with information relating to occupational health and safety matters which is necessary for them to perform their duties effectively. This clause includes information concerning regulations, procedures, equipment, accident investigations, incidence of industrial disease, dust levels etc. Medical records in the possession of the company doctor may also be provided to the union should an employee give authorisation (GWU/Turnall and similar clause in Saawu/Malcomess).	Section 5(1) of the general administrative regulations of Mosa states: 'Every employer shall ... as far as is reasonable, cause every employee to be made conversant with the dangers to his safety attached to any work he has to perform....' The difference with clause 4 is not only one of scope but also one of compulsion. The term 'as far as is reasonable' implies an assessment by the employer of costs and benefits involved in providing information. Should workers be refused access to information on these grounds, they could allege this refusal to be an unfair labour practice.
5. Right to Inspect Accident and Near Misses	
In the event of a near miss or accident, safety representatives will be granted access to all parts of their particular work areas in order for them to be involved in relevant investigations and reporting. Nothing will be removed until this inspection has taken place (Saawu/Malcomess, and to a lesser extent GWU/Turnall).	As Mosa is formulated, there is no clear right for safety representatives to inspect accidents or near misses in their work areas. Section 10(c) states only that he 'may report in writing to a safety committee or an inspector on any incident which has resulted in the death, serious injury or illness of a worker'. Management retains the right to designate who will inspect the accident (see text).
6. Right to Stop Work	
The safety representatives have the right to stop work in any specific operation where he/she feels that there is a possibility of imminent risk of personal injury. Management must be informed immediately of any such stoppage (Saawu/Malcomess).	Not addressed by Mosa (see text).
7. Right to Call Independent Advisor	
If the safety representatives, after consultation with management, require the assistance at the workplace of an independent advisor or trade union official, then this will be allowed by arrangement with the general manager (Saawu/Malcomess).	This is an additional clause to that in Mosa, which only makes provision for the safety committee to co-opt one or more persons by reason of his/her knowledge of health and safety. As the safety committee may be dominated by management representatives, this option may be closed to workers.

request management to set up a safety committee. In the GWU/Turnall agreement (see clause 1), while agreeing to the election of safety representatives, clause 2 indicates how the union protected its interests by ensuring that at least one shop steward would be represented on the safety committee.

In the Saawu/Malcomess agreement, the union negotiated over the designation of safety representatives. Three management representatives and three union representatives were agreed upon. Thus the union has retained control over the health and safety function at the workplace, with the three union representatives forming an IHS sub-committee. This agreement overcomes the possibility that the union may lose direct control over the safety function should management appoint, or workers elect, representatives who are not union members or shop stewards.

Tempering Prerogatives

Both agreements give the union the right to negotiate on a wide range of issues previously considered management prerogatives. For example, Adler (1986) points out that health problems associated with shift work could be a focus of union interest. The introduction of new technology, maternity provision, the quality of safety equipment, and improvements to dust, heat and noise levels could, inter alia, be subjects for negotiation.

Many trade unions experience difficulty in getting information from management on IHS issues. Although not falling under Mosa, the refusal of the Chamber of Mines' research organisation to make 42 unpublished reports available to the National Union of Mineworkers' investigation into health and safety in gold mining, is consistent with this type of management stance (Leger 1985). It should be noted that provision is made in Mosa for employers, 'as far as is reasonable', to provide certain information to workers. Yet, as Eva and Oswald (1981: p46) point out, employers are likely to be biased in the values they place on the costs and benefits of disclosure.

Unions in the UK have never liked the idea of judges deciding how much a worker's life or health is worth — 'that is why many trade unionists have not

relied on the law but on their power to make the employer improve conditions' (ibid: p46). The IHS agreements currently under negotiation in South African industry aim to overcome the types of disputes which have arisen over disclosure of information in wage negotiations. They will clearly curtail management prerogative in this sphere (see clause 4).

Another issue concerns the right to inspect accidents or near misses. The section of Mosa which describes the function of the safety representatives does not provide safety representatives with the right to inspect accidents but only the potential to report them. The right to inspect accidents is controlled firmly by the employer — section 10(2) of the general administrative regulations of Mosa states that 'an employer shall cause every incident which must be recorded in terms of subregulation (1) to be investigated by a person designated by him or a safety representative or a member of a safety committee'.

As some shop stewards have been refused permission to investigate accidents, trade unions stress the necessity to gain the right for duly elected safety representatives. The right to inspect near misses is also considered important. In various surveys carried out in the UK, it has been estimated that there are at least 300 near misses for every reported accident (Eva and Oswald, op cit).

Safety Stoppages

Establishing the right of safety representatives to call for a stoppage of work (see clause 5) is a major gain made by Saawu. This right was not conceded by Turnall management to the GWU, however. In the latter agreement, the safety representative was directed to refer his concern firstly to his supervisor, then, if still dissatisfied with the response, to the manager and, finally, to the inspector.

On the one hand, the right of a safety representative to stop work places the representative in a powerful position regarding the production process. Management would obviously be concerned over granting this right. On the other hand, it is clear that in certain workplaces such as building sites, foundries and chemical plants — where work is associated with hazardous processes and substances — this right is a necessary one.



Union representatives on health and safety

- *'The law is hard to understand I don't know if it's done purposely.'*
- *'Michael was cleaning his machine when suddenly he slipped and got his hand caught up between the rollers. That is what I think happened he cannot remember The guy hadn't even reached the hospital when they made him sign a form saying it was his fault. They don't care about safety, they are just worried about their image.'* (Interview with shop steward — Rhaese 1986)
- *'Management makes the place look like a new sixpence just before inspectors come — then they walk through in five minutes.'*



The Impending Amending of the LRA

By Chris Albertyn, Director, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Natal

On 19 December 1986, the Department of Manpower published a notice in the government gazette which contained significant amendments to the Labour Relations Act. The draft amendments were submitted for public comment, to be received by the Director-General of Manpower by 6 February 1987. The proposals are mainly a consequence of the National Manpower Commission investigation (RP 45/1984) into dispute settling machinery.

Summarised in broad terms, the Department of Manpower has proposed the following significant amendments:

- to expand the definition of an unfair labour practice;
- to introduce the notion of an unfair dismissal as separate from unfair labour practice;
- to establish a Special Labour Court to sit as an appeal court over the Industrial Court;
- to streamline conciliation board procedures.

Significant Features

For simplicity the proposed amendments will be referred to as 'the Bill' and the existing statute, the Labour Relations Act No 28 of 1956, as amended, will be referred to as 'the Act'.

1. Legal Practitioner

The Bill proposes that the Act be amended to include a definition of legal practitioner. In practice, the presence of legal practitioners in the dispute resolution forums provided for in the Act — the conciliation boards and industrial councils — has greatly enhanced the process of conciliation and settlement. The Bill has not sought to establish a clear right of legal practitioners to appear in those forums and in the Industrial Court, however. The proposed amendment has rather the opposite effect. By defining who is and who is not a legal practitioner, those persons who are not practising attorneys or advocates but who do have a legal training will be excluded from the dispute-settling machinery (unless they are officials or office bearers of companies or trade unions).

2. Unfair Dismissal

The Bill proposes that unfair dismissal should be treated as a separate legal wrong from the now well-established concept of unfair labour practice. The effect of the separation would be to individualise dismissal disputes and to separate them from their collective context as unfair labour practices.

The definition of unfair labour practice in the Act describes broad patterns of misconduct in labour relations. It does not seek to specify in detail each potential instance of wrongfulness between employer

and employee. Rather, it provides a broad open texture, a guideline, within which specific applications can be made.

In contrast, the definition of unfair dismissal in the Bill seeks to specify particular instances of unfairness. It somewhat dilutes the guidelines established by the Industrial Court on retrenchment, whereby an employer should consult with both the trade union and the employees affected by an anticipated retrenchment. The Bill's definition suggests that a trade union need not be consulted prior to an anticipated retrenchment, provided the employees themselves are consulted. Were this to occur, the effect could be subversive of sound collective bargaining.

The Industrial Court has already established a code of conduct as to what amounts to an unfair dismissal, procedurally and substantively. There seems to be no good reason why a separate definition of unfair dismissal should be codified. The current definition of an unfair labour practice in the Act is sufficiently open for it to accommodate dynamic interpretations of what is fair and what is unfair in labour relations.

3. Unfair Labour Practice

Generally, those who drafted the Bill have sought to transfix current interpretations of unfair labour practice. The proposed amendment seeks to summarise what the Industrial Court has to date found to be an unfair labour practice and to prescribe that all those instances will in future constitute unfair labour practices (see box).

What is fair and what is unfair in labour relations depends on the historical circumstances at the time the issue is considered. Thus, whereas the Industrial Court ruled that a duty to bargain at plant level did not exist as a general principle in our law some two years ago, the court could well come to a different conclusion when considering the matter now. The Bill seeks to codify substantively defined unfair labour practices rather than to have a broad, flexible framework as exists in the Act now. The potentially adverse effect is that the Industrial Court may be forced to rule in a particular manner, because of the close definition of an unfair labour practice, when the social and historical circumstances require that in 'fairness' the matter be decided otherwise.

4. Application of the Act

Farming and domestic work still remain excluded from the Act. Given the extent of the proposed amendment one could have expected that farming operations would be brought into the Act, thus implementing a recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission. Instead of an inclusive legislative approach, an amendment is to be made to extend the categories of persons who are excluded from the

provision of the Act.

If enacted, the status of university, college, school and other educational instructors, teachers or lecturers will be changed profoundly. In terms of the current Act they may argue that they are not employees of the state and that they are entitled to the full benefits and protections provided by the Act. The Bill now proposes that they be treated squarely as employees of the state. The effect of their exclusion from the Act would be that they could no longer claim in the Industrial Court to have been unfairly treated.

The proposed amendment runs counter to the tendency in the Western world towards the increasing regulation of public sector employment by statute. In the United States, for example, public sector employees are increasingly entitled to rights of fair conditions of employment. In South Africa, an increasing dichotomy is developing between the rights of private sector and public sector employees. Private sector employees are protected by the provisions of the Act. Public sector employees are now relatively disadvantaged because they have no right to bargain on their wages and working conditions; nor do they have the right to expect fair treatment and fair conditions of employment.

5. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Court

The Bill proposes that a general section entitling the Industrial Court to hear all disputes arising out of the application of the laws administered by the Department of Manpower be removed. Were this to become law, it would be a most unfortunate development. Section 17(11)(a), under which the Court exercises its general power, is one of the few highly flexible features of the Industrial Court's functions. The Court has used this general provision to deal with urgent disputes and to secure quick

settlements between litigating parties.

Currently, the Industrial Court has no power to enforce its own judgments and orders. The enforcement of its decisions rests with the Department of Manpower and the Attorney-General. The net effect is that the judgment may possibly not be enforced because of the very substantial difficulty in proceeding criminally to enforce what fundamentally is a civil judgment. The Bill does not remedy this anomalous situation. Considering that the Bill seeks to improve the Act, it is a pity that it does not propose that the Registrar of the Industrial Court be empowered to issue writs upon the orders of the Court.

6. Special Labour Court

Another proposed amendment is that a new court be established — to be known as the 'Special Labour Court' — which will act as a court of review and appeal of decisions of the Industrial Court. It is also intended to be a court of first reference, i.e. to hear its own cases and not merely to sit as a court of appeal. To be included in the appeals it will hear are those against Section 43 status quo orders. This is likely to cause problems because Section 43 orders are effective only for a period of 30 days and they are intended as a short-term interim remedy. If Section 43 orders could be appealed against there could well be an unnecessary proliferation of litigation and additional costs for parties.

The Bill proposes that the appointees to the Special Labour Court be judges of the Supreme Court. What is needed is a specialist industrial appeal court and the persons who sit in that court should do so by reason of their knowledge of labour relations and labour law. It may be that certain judges would be excellent in carrying out their duties in an industrial

DEFINING UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES

UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE (DRAFT)	CRITICAL COMMENTS
An employee may not be replaced by another employee on conditions of employment which are less favourable than those which were applicable to the replaced employee.	Perhaps intended to prevent black workers from undercutting and displacing white workers in the mining industry.
An employee, trade union or federation may not directly or indirectly boycott any product or in any way support or participate in such a boycott, where such product is manufactured, sold or distributed by an employer who is not involved in a dispute with the employee or members of the trade union or federation concerned. The clause will prohibit worker involvement in: • sympathy boycotts of products of employers other than their own; • secondary boycotts, e.g. where employees of employer A are in dispute, a trade union or a union federation may not boycott employer B for stocking or holding the products of employer A.	It would still be legitimate for employees involved in a dispute with their employer to call for a product boycott, yet the proposal makes a serious inroad into the general right of unions to use boycotts, especially secondary ones, as a form of industrial action. The Industrial Court, and not the legislature, is the proper body to regulate the use of boycotts when intervention is necessary.
An employer (or union) may not unreasonably fail to or refuse to negotiate on an Industrial Council, or otherwise, with a union (or employer organisation) which is representative of the employees employed by such employer or a group of employees who represent a specific interest. This provision is similar to the systems of compulsory bargaining that exist in Europe, the USA, Canada and Japan.	This removes disputes concerning the duty to negotiate from the arena of industrial conflict. It imposes the obligation to negotiate upon an employer even when requested by a union which is representative only of a group of employees who have a 'specific interest'. Hopefully the Industrial Court will interpret a 'specific interest' to mean an economic interest, in the sense of a particular bargaining unit. If the phrase is interpreted more broadly, however, the legislation could require employers to negotiate with a minority union and thus promote industrial unrest.
A union cannot directly or indirectly hinder an employer in negotiations with his employees or some of them, who are not members of such union.	The most problematic provision of the Bill — the newer unions may not demand exclusive bargaining rights nor block the emergence of what workers refer to as 'submarine committees', i.e. minority union and 'sweetheart' committees promoted by management. If the proposal becomes law, more rather than less shop-floor rivalry between majority and minority unions, and between union members and non-members is likely. It will protect those unions (mainly white) which have established exclusive bargaining rights through closed-shop agreements.
An employer's organisation or union may not take action or conclude an agreement with regard to the relationship between employer and employee without the prior authorisation of its members.	This is not only unnecessary but interferes in the internal affairs of organisations. The LRA already requires a ballot before industrial action is undertaken, and adequately ensures that other agreements are not concluded without prior authorisation. The party alleging the absence of prior authorisation would be entitled to have access to a range of information concerning the workings of the other organisation. This would interfere with the right of free association.
NOT UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE (DRAFT) If the re-employment of dismissed workers is done by means of objective criteria and the criteria are fairly applied.	The intention appears to be to exclude claims by employees that a selective dismissal constitutes an unfair labour practice. An unfortunate omission from the proposal is the requirement that the objective criteria themselves be fair and reasonable. (The Industrial Court could perhaps remedy this shortcoming.)

appeal court, but it is possible that the common law training of judges may not equip them adequately to fulfil the industrial relations functions which would be expected of them. In short, being a judge should not be a pre-condition for a position on the appeal court.

7. Settling and Resolving Disputes

The Bill proposes to substitute the word 'resolve' for the word 'settle' where it appears with regard to the powers of an industrial council or conciliation board. Presumably the intention of the proposed amendment is to ensure that an industrial council would not have the power itself to settle a dispute on behalf of the parties who are actually in dispute. Thus, if the parties to the dispute do not themselves settle or resolve the dispute then they would have the right to have their dispute adjudicated by the Industrial Court.

Unfortunately the mere substitution of the word 'resolve' for the word 'settle' does not solve the problem. The word 'resolve' could be interpreted as making it easier (and not more difficult) for an industrial council to purport to settle a dispute between two parties. It could do so merely by resolution. If the intention of the Bill is to prevent an industrial council from depriving a party to a dispute of the right to have the dispute adjudicated by the Industrial Court, then a better method must be found to amend the sections concerned.

8. Conciliation Board Applications

Section 35 of the Act is also to be amended by the Bill. Provided the time limits (which are unnecessarily short) have been complied with in the application for a conciliation board, a board will be appointed by a Divisional Inspector of Manpower. A distinction is made in the time limits between conciliation board application in respect of a dispute arising from an unfair dismissal, and other types of disputes.

The merit of the proposed amendment is that the existing uncertainty and delay in the appointment of conciliation boards will be removed. At present the applicant is never certain whether the Minister will appoint a board, and individual requests are more likely to be refused than granted. Trade union applicants for conciliation boards in disputes over collective issues are more likely to have boards appointed.

In practice, the time periods for the establishment of a conciliation board range between one and six months. The long delays in the establishment of conciliation boards have aggravated industrial disputes, yet the intention of legislation is to bring about settlement. The Bill seeks to improve this situation and to enable the parties to have speedier recourse to a conciliation board. The amendment will ensure a more certain prospect of having a dispute adjudicated by the Industrial Court.

Aggrieved employees now have only a contingent right for their cases to be heard by the Industrial Court — they must first clear the uncertain hurdle of having a conciliation board appointed. The Bill will remove this uncertainty.

9. General Amendments and Exclusions

The Bill proposes certain amendments to the Section 43 procedure for status quo applications. These are designed to simplify the procedure, and are to be welcomed.

The circumstances in which a lawful strike may occur will be diminished by the proposed amendment to Section 65 of the Act. It seeks to prohibit industrial action in a number of circumstances in which it is currently lawful to strike. The existing definition of unlawful strike is extensive and limiting already, particularly as interpreted by our courts.

The secrecy provisions of the Act have been amended, but it is regrettable that the right of a party to refuse the disclosure of the terms of an Industrial Court judgment has been retained. The Supreme Court has protected the identity of individuals in suitable cases by substituting letters for the names of the parties concerned. Anonymity could be similarly protected in the Industrial Court.

A final proposal concerns the scarcely used authority of the Minister of Manpower to require an employer to grant stop-order facilities for the payment of union dues to a majority union. This power is to be deleted from the Act in the proposed amendment to Section 78, presumably because a trade union wanting to claim stop-order rights may do so by claiming that the refusal to grant those rights constitutes an unfair labour practice. There is little doubt that such a claim would succeed if presented to the Industrial Court for determination.

Conclusion

Industrial vs Legal Action

Overall, the establishment of a Special Labour Court is to be welcomed, though many other provisions in the Bill are of doubtful merit. One of the most undesirable amendments sets out a separate procedure for the handling of unfair dismissal apart from unfair labour practice cases by the Industrial Court. A litigant claiming unfair dismissal must satisfy the Court in a number of respects before he/she is entitled to have the case heard by the Court. The considerations are somewhat academic and introduce unnecessary technical aspects which employers could focus upon in order to frustrate the right of an employee to have his/her case heard.

The distinction between unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice is unfortunate because it seeks to separate unfair dismissals from their collective context. Job security is the most important interest workers have. They perceive an unfair dismissal to one of them as a threat of unfair dismissal to all of them. By seeking to individualise the procedure for remedying an unfair dismissal, the Bill runs counter to this historical pattern in South African labour relations. The present definition of unfair labour practice includes an unfair dismissal. A trade union has the right to initiate unfair labour practice claims arising out of individual unfair labour dismissals in circumstances where those dismissals are of concern to workers collectively.

One possible consequence of this proposed amendment is that collective dismissals will be dealt with by unions not as a legal issue but as a test of strength, pursued through industrial action. It would be unfortunate were the Act to change and encourage this outcome. The current single notion of unfair labour practice to deal with all industrial wrongs, including unfair dismissal, has worked well. When a system works, it is usually best not to tamper with it. *IPJA*

MALIGNED

& UNALIGNED

Labour's Oldguard after Tucsa

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

After a 32-year career spanning several eras of labour organisation, the Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tucsa), once one of the largest union groupings in the country, is no more. Although the formal decision to disband was taken by the body's caretaker administration in December 1986, it was clear as early as 1983 that it was not going to survive the decade intact. What does the future hold for the many former Tucsa affiliates — the 'established unions' — that are now unaligned in the wilderness, faced with a competitive trade union environment and economic recession?

After Tucsa's demise many former affiliates are anxiously trying to forge a modus operandi with other union groupings and federations that cross-cut South African industry. Their success will depend on whether they are able to evaluate the various tactical errors that plagued Tucsa's operations from the mid-1970s, and thus develop new strategies and political alliances.

One of the major reasons for the mass exodus of unions from Tucsa over the past three years (see box 1) was its apparent inability to offer affiliates technical services to facilitate effective collective bargaining. This is in sharp contrast to the new labour movement which has provided its members with education and shop steward training, health and safety services, and legal and research support critical for union/management negotiations.

Tucsa's alienation from the black unions emerging in the 1970s ensured that almost all of its own affiliates were later precluded from sharing in this large pool of union resources. The new unions interpreted Tucsa's history and actions as attempts to restrict their access to African workers and undercut their ability to bargain with management (Piper 1984: p9/12). Tucsa affiliates were cut off from these unions as a result of their efforts at:

- organising workers in 'parallel' (segregated) unions

- insisting that the government should force all unions to register
- relying on anachronistic closed-shop agreements; and
- maintaining control of industrial councils.

Political conservatism


With the increasing politicisation of South African trade unionism in the 1980s, Tucsa's white-collar leadership was inexplicably reluctant to commit the federation on political issues beyond the shop-floor. The aging federation failed to develop a coherent response to the detentions of trade unionists, the deaths of union organisers and ordinary members in township conflicts, the constitutional furore, and opposition calls for 1 May and 16 June as statutory public holidays.

Although Tucsa did show that it was prepared to liberalise its political stance in the last three years of its existence, these efforts were largely misdirected. While its leaders were not prepared to recognise 16 June as a public holiday, they claimed they were prepared to acknowledge Labour Day as a holiday, but not on 1 May (Star 21/10/86). Persistent allegations of the federation's perceived collaboration with the ruling National Party did not help its image either. In early 1986 it was alleged — even though Tucsa's last president Robbie Botha denied it — that a Tucsa delegation's visit to Europe had been funded by government sources (Southern Africa Report 1986: p10).

The political conservatism displayed by Tucsa and most affiliates ensured that they were excommunicated from the international trade union movement and other labour organisations. Attempts to keep to the political 'centre' also denied them access to funding, information and solidarity support from anti-apartheid groups and the international community (Scheepers 1983: p55/57). A former Tucsa official, Ruth Imrie, succinctly notes in the federation's official history that it made a strategic mistake not to befriend the newer unions: 'If any criticism can be

Tucsa was denied access to funding, information and solidarity support from the international community because it was reluctant to get involved in national political issues

INTO OBSCURITY: THE DECLINE OF TUCSA AFFILIATES & MEMBERSHIP



Longstanding recruiting battles between Tucsas unions and the ascendant union movement since the 1970s could scuttle prospective mergers between the two groups today

levelled at Grobbelaar (former general secretary), it is perhaps that he allowed some of these groups to alienate themselves from Tucsas, whereas he might have harnessed their energies to the benefit of the established labour movement' (Imrie 1979: p77).

The dissolution of Tucsas will eventually deny many of its former affiliates the favoured representation enjoyed through their participation in a number of statutory government bodies. Since 1979 Tucsas office-bearers have held numerous posts on the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the board of the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), apprenticeship training boards, the Economic Advisory Council and the Regional Development Advisory Council. (Robbie Botha held positions on all these bodies.) The influence that Tucsas had on these bodies is important if one considers that it contributed significantly towards the work of the Wiehahn Commission (Piper 1984: p10). Although some of these unionists will undoubtedly still remain on these bodies their collective influence will diminish.

Tucsas Scenarios

In the search for new alliances, four probable directions can be identified for ex-Tucsas affiliates. They could either:

- join an existing trade union federation
- participate in the activities of co-ordinating industrial federations
- channel their energies into the proposed new Labour Forum (see below);

or

- attempt to form another federation based on Tucsas principles.

Unification unlikely

Despite the fact that many Tucsas unions have disaffiliated because of its conservative image, only one, the Textile Workers Union of Transvaal (TWU) has formally realigned to a black labour federation (Cusa). The distinct type of organisational and administrative structure of Cosatu or Azactu/Cusa unions militates against any unification initiative. In many of these unions worker participation and control of union decision making has been prioritised; while in most Tucsas unions sole authority was left in the hands of a few, usually white, officials (Daniels 1986: p57).

Furthermore, an examination of the general secretary positions held by Tucsas unionists in 1984, revealed that LCM Scheepers, HM Wallis, H Wierzbowski and C du Preez were each the administrative heads of three different unions at the same time (SALDRU 1984). Such 'career unionists' would obviously be perturbed that mergers with the newer unions would mean personal redundancy or significantly reduced control.

Memories of the acrimonious recruiting battles between Tucsas and emerging black unions are still fresh. Today both remain sceptical of each other's bona fides — often, if one party extended an olive branch, the other party would interpret it as a hidden agenda to prevent them from poaching members. The

general secretary of Tucsa's Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU), Norman Daniels, commented; 'We are an old union and a national union. Wherever the NUTW (a Cosatu affiliate) operates, it operates in an area for which we are registered. But where the NUTW has established itself, we have not gone in to try and win members over. The conflict has come where we have had to defend ourselves' (Daniels 1986: p58/59).

Thus it seems unlikely that many of labour's oldguard will merge with the ascendant black unions. Currently only one Tucsa union, the Motor Industries Combined Workers Union (Micwu), seems destined to merge with Cosatu affiliates active in the metal and automobile industries. However, even this initiative is more a product of Micwu's involvement with the industrially based SA Council of the International Metalworkers Federation (SACIMF) than the consequence of intervention by Cosatu's head-office. It is doubtful whether any of the established unions will join the Azactu/Cusa alliance, simply because of this grouping's insistence on 'black leadership'.

The Uwusa connection

The possibility that a caucus of conservative ex-Tucsa unions could form a working alliance with Inkatha's United Workers Union of SA (Uwusa) cannot be discounted. Three months before the decision to disband was taken, Tucsa president Robbie Botha held discussions with senior Uwusa officials (Financial Mail 11/7/86). Whether this meeting was aimed at discussing labour developments in general, or was a specific attempt to form a pact between the two groups, is not known.

Unification would be beneficial to both parties. Firstly, significant ideological similarities are reflected in the constitutions of Tucsa and Uwusa — both are vehemently pro-free enterprise, anti-socialist and pro-foreign investment. Secondly, despite Uwusa's spectacular May Day launch last year, it has since been singularly unsuccessful in signing recognition agreements with employers — even in its Natal homebase.

Elsewhere, especially on the Witwatersrand, Uwusa and Tucsa remnants might profitably link up in order to counter Cosatu. For instance, Robbie Botha is also general secretary of the Mine Surface Officials Association (MSOA) and a joint strategy could conceivably be formulated with Uwusa — with a declared interest in recruiting migrant Zulu miners — to oppose Cosatu's flagship, the National Union of Mineworkers. An informal alliance could provide Uwusa with the skilled unionists it obviously requires, while boosting the membership of Tucsa remnants.

Sectoral Federations in South Africa

Sectoral Federation	Number of Affiliates	Total Membership	Number of ex-Tucsa Members	Cosatu, Azactu/Cusa Participation
Confederation of Metal and Building Unions	10 (1985)	< 174 295	4	None ('Whites-only')
Council of Mining Unions	8 (1983)	±25 000	2	None ('Whites-only')
Federation of Commercial, Hotel and Catering Unions	3 (1985)	±55 913	2	1 Cosatu
Federation of Municipal Employees	3 (1983)	56 401	1	None ('Whites-only')
Federation of Salaried Staff Associations of SA	4 (1983)	44 862	None	None ('Whites-only')
National Union of Liquor and Catering Trades Employees of SA	6 (1983)	13 027	6	None ('Whites-only')
SA Council of the International Metalworkers Federation	10 (1984)	±250 000	3	2 Cosatu 1 Cusa
SA Council of Transport Workers	7 (1985)	21 571	6	None
SA Federation of Textile, Garment and Leatherworker Unions	7 (1987)	170 000	5	1 Cosatu 1 Cusa

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New Sectoral Alliances

Many former Tucsa unionists have shown interest in resurrecting sectoral based union federations. This type of federation tends to place greater emphasis on winning benefits for workers in a specific industry through collective negotiations with employers, rather than setting divisive political priorities (Golding 1984: p5/6). A number of such groupings already exist (see box 2), most of which are dominated by ex-Tucsa unions. However, these federations have not been that active in the 1980s, nor have they been successful in attracting new affiliates — mainly because some of their members still have all-white constitutions!

In order to maximise their bargaining power on industrial councils, former Tucsa unions will have to forge new labour alliances in opposition to employer organisations. For example, the major employer body in the metal industrial council, Seifsa, has had its power-base eroded because of the unification of the major metal unions under the auspices of the SACIMF. This revived federation represents more than 250 000 metalworkers and serves as the focal point for ten unions.

Without the participation of Cosatu and Azactu/Cusa unions, the long-term survival of sectoral federations is dubious. Should ex-Tucsa unions wish to entice black unions into these bodies they will have to re-negotiate closed-shop agreements and other restrictive procedures, disaffiliate from those

Support for free enterprise and foreign investment in SA might pave the way for a merger between a club of conservative Tucsa unions and Inkatha's Uwusa

Affiliation to industrial federations could allow ex-Tucsa unions to form pragmatic alliances with Cosatu affiliates and revamp industrial councils

Should Cosatu or Azactu/Cusa unions reject the newly created Labour Forum, it could become a substitute Tucsa, albeit without its conservative elements

industrial federations which have members with 'whites only' constitutions, and adjust their political platforms.

In the long run, revamped sectoral federations could act as dynamic consultative forums through which the oldguard unions could interact with the ascendant union movement and international labour federations. They may also provide a platform whereby members could gain admittance to statutory bodies such as the NMC, UIF board, etc. In early 1987, one month after the official dissolution of Tucsa, seven unions representing more than 170 000 workers in the clothing, textile and leather industries, established a new sectoral federation, SAFTGLWU. Five Tucsa unions, Cosatu's NUTW and Azactu/Cusa's TWU are involved in this initiative. It has been formed in close association with the International Federation of Textile, Leather and Garment Workers (Southern Africa Report 1987: p10).

Robbie Botha believes that a number of ex-Tucsa unions may find a home in the long established Federation of Salaried Staff Associations (Fedsal). He has claimed that Fedsal may change its name and constitution to accommodate unions that represent other categories of white-collar workers. Should an expanded sectoral federation get off the ground, Tucsa's banking, teaching, state and municipal workers are possible candidates for membership (Botha 1986: p63).

New Labour Forum

Another possible home for ex-Tucsa unions will be the Labour Forum, which is scheduled to be launched during 1987 and is the brainchild of Ike van der Watt, the general secretary of the South African Boilermakers Society (Sabs). The Forum is to canvass the opinions of the entire labour movement on a variety of issues in the hope of establishing a research unit to gather and provide important resources. Specific worker issues that it envisages investigating include the current levels of wage settlements, trends towards automation, the monitoring of economic conditions, hours of work, attitudes towards public holidays, etc.

The objective of this exercise, outlined in the discussion document released by the Forum's steering committee (SALB 1986: p71/72), would be 'to build up relationships and understanding between unions in South Africa', irrespective of political outlook, and 'disseminate' opinions and responses on various issues. According to Van Der Watt only one union, the Media Workers Association of SA, has refused to participate. More than 33 (unidentified) unions have supposedly indicated that they would be prepared to join. Should the Forum become viable, the chances are that it may get

representation on a number of government bodies, or at least be regularly consulted by them.

A Regrouped Tucsa

On the one hand, the more conservative ex-Tucsa unions, possibly including MSOA, the Iron Moulders Society and the Building Society Officials Association, hope to revive Tucsa. According to former president Steve Scheepers, it was the only union federation that was capable of bringing multiracial and ethnically separate unions together. Willie van der Merwe, an official of the Artisan Staff Association, supports Scheepers, claiming that a new middle-of-the-road alliance is needed in order to prevent the new unions from 'taking over' (Finance Week 23-29/10/86). They claim considerable support to form a new federation based on Tucsa's principles but with a 'new policy'.

On the other hand, although its progenitors deny that the Labour Forum will simply become yet another labour federation or a home for former Tucsa unions, there is considerable speculation to the contrary. Even though it seems improbable that some of Tucsa's more conservative elements will join the new forum (MSOA withdrew from preliminary talks in late 1986), many of its centrist breakaway affiliates seem likely members.

Although it is not yet known whether Cosatu or Azactu/Cusa affiliates will participate in the Forum's activities, they are unlikely candidates. The fact that these unions already have their own distinct political identity, and that they are already more than adequately serviced by their own research and support groups, means that the Forum will hold very little attraction.


Cosatu is currently more preoccupied with achieving unity within its own ranks, between the 'workerist' and 'populist' factions, and will not be that interested in building relationships with other unions at this sensitive stage. Without the new movement's participation the Forum could easily take on the appearance of a regrouped Tucsa, but without its conservative elements in control. JPA

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RURAL & REGIONAL

N I T O R



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INFORMAL LENDING

Do-it-Yourself Credit for Black Rural Areas

By Catherine Cross, Community Service Training Programme (CASS), University of Natal

Moves are now in train to make land in rural black areas mortgageable in order to let prospective farmers borrow agricultural capital. Some of the assumptions involved should be questioned — well-intended policies legislated too quickly may do more harm than good. It is possible that mortgaging as a means of helping black agriculture may turn out to be both ineffective and detrimental for most loan recipients.

Evidence from other Third World countries confirms that mortgaging can in fact lead to peasants losing their inherited land. Worse still, they are likely to stay in their home community, much less able to support themselves than before and more than ever lacking the resources to make the move to town (Hill 1982). Added to these characteristic risks, mortgage foreclosures in South Africa's present political climate would carry a real danger of sparking off rural violence and instability.

At the same time, formal lending agencies — banks and building societies as they are usually organised — rarely appear to be effective in lending to rural peasants, even when they are prepared to provide such credit services. Specifically, the formal agencies are usually not able to get their services through to the poor.

The isolation of rural areas and the prevailing poverty of their economy creates massive distribution problems. The difficulty of getting goods and services from the urban core to rural communities is likely to apply as much to credit as to any other formal sector commodity wanted in outlying areas.

Additional difficulties may develop if formal credit institutions succeed in reaching rural communities. In terms of development credit planning, hard won rural savings which are desperately needed to bankroll development should not be drained off to the developed urban sector. Future rural credit initiatives should probably be based on the borrower's ability to repay rather than on pledging land as security. In addition, they should consider in what

sectors the actual and potential demand for credit is concentrated. In short, agriculture may not be the area where formal credit can do the rural economy the most immediate good.

These and other development objectives cannot be set without taking a look at the role of informal credit, the loan granting arm of the informal sector. For credit to work in the rural context, it has to be available from within the community, on very short notice. Informal lending is therefore usually the only viable form of credit available.

In KwaZulu, as elsewhere in the Third World, credit lending between individuals and through semi-institutional credit associations is the economic lifeblood of rural communities, needed for survival in the cash economy. In KwaZulu, preliminary inquiries suggest that a thick, thriving, dense and resilient network of informal money lending and borrowing connections is common in rural areas.

The main field study providing the data for this report was started in February 1986, in a district of KwaZulu that, for the sake of anonymity, will be referred to as 'KwaNgele'. It is a rapidly modernising area lying roughly 30 kilometers from Durban. Income levels have been rising very rapidly in recent years (Cross and Preston-Whyte 1983). In 1981, average household income was R397 a month, well above the Household Effective Level as adjusted for local family size. The informal sector is very strong and widely diffused, supplying roughly one third of the average household income. In this environment, informal credit transactions, an integral part of economic life, are also thick on the ground.

People borrow and lend simultaneously, and deal with a number of other people at the same time; they also deal with the semi-formalised credit associations called *stockfels*, as depositors and as borrowers. Basically savings clubs in which members' contributions go to a different

Cover caption

The provision of bank loans to rural black areas may lead to mortgage foreclosures — development efforts should also take cognisance of the role of community credit groups.

'Stockfels' (savings clubs) and informal credit associations form an integral part of economic life in KwaZulu, with transactions linked to the cash economy

Capital
For the
borrowers, one of
the major uses
of informal credits
is to finance home
construction. Loans
for all purposes
are commonly in
the R100-R500
bracket.

*The survey
found that the
highest debt
burdens occur
among men
and older adults,
whose incomes
and financial
responsibilities
are at their peak.*

*People use
informal loans for
personal
emergencies and
to offset the
hard terms of
formal credit
involved in store
accounts and
hire purchase
transactions*

member every week or month in rotation, these well-established *stockfets* now lend out their capital as well.

Many, if not most of these transactions, appear to be small: they often represent minor cash shortfalls, but sometimes make up the working capital of the small informal selling enterprises, where five rand a day can cover supplies and expenses, and a major capital loan can be under R20. But larger loans of R200-R500 and up also regularly occur, often underwriting capital forming processes or even providing venture capital.

Informal Debt Burden

The survey results indicate that the debt burden for informal borrowing is quite substantial, and higher for men than for women (table 1). Allowing for under-reporting of indebtedness and particularly of loans, the KwaNgele debt burden is probably at least as high as what the data indicate. The average reported debt burden for men was R170, against R81 for women.

There seem to be two peaks for both men's and women's borrowing between R21 and R50, and also between R100 and R200. If these estimates are accurate, then the sample appears to show two alternative patterns of credit use prevailing in this type of community:

- the borrowing peak at R21-R50 reflects a cautious attitude or a low level of credit demand;
- the peak at R100-R200 would seem to indicate a relatively confident attitude and perhaps more involvement in enterprises that need credit.

Substantial differences can also be seen between those who are more financially secure and those who are less so (table 2). Even the poor lend and borrow to the extent that they have the resources to do so; as the respected rural economist Polly Hill (1982) remarks, being 'too poor to borrow' can be worse than net indebtedness. But the highest reported debt burdens occur among older adults, men particularly, whose incomes and whose financial responsibilities are at their peak.

Conversely, the only group admitting to loaning more than they borrow are younger men, who can earn relatively good salaries while still too young to be expected to contribute much to family support. In known cases, networks of informal interest-free lending among young men have provided a very effective and long continuing form of unemployment insurance.

The effective credit ceiling can be seen from people's replies when asked the amount of the largest loan they ever borrowed. Loans appear to be fairly



PHOTO: IEAC/11: Adele Gordon

easily available up to about R100, but become harder to obtain above that level unless the individual is well placed in the credit network. Despite this, most men and many women have experience with informal loans in the R100-R500 bracket.

Vital functions

Informal credit covers some vital functions in the community as well as in the economy of the household. Informal loans are critical to capitalising the informal sector in relation to selling and distribution generally. But in addition, they are closely involved in capitalising the production sector, in the form of construction work specifically.

Informal enterprises appear to be major users of informal credit: Forty seven percent of the women in the sample reported that they have used informal credit for either a large or a small informal enterprise, as against 21 percent of men. People frequently used informal credit, which can usually be rolled over fairly easily, to offset the hard terms of formal sector credit involved in store accounts and for hire purchase transactions.

Borrowing for entertainment needs is also common, but less so for school fees which are seen as too vital an investment to be left to last minute borrowing. The most general use for credit cited was to cope with personal emergencies.



Turning to respondents' most frequent uses for borrowing, an enormous credit demand immediately appears in the important area of home building, ranking joint number one with alcohol consumption for male respondents (table 3). Credit in this sense also feeds directly into savings, with a quarter or more of the sample reporting that meeting payments to their savings club is one of their most frequent credit uses.

A substantial amount of credit also goes to consumption — cash shortfalls for food, clothing, or buying drinks for friends — rather than to capitalisation. For women, buying food was the single most frequent reported occasion of credit use, with capital for informal selling ranking second. Either way, the role of informal credit in preventing the failure of the household economy, in supporting the community's drive toward development, and in local capital forming processes, is clearly very great.

Yet credit is still something that the community views with apprehension and expects borrowers to treat with care. Although nearly everyone insists that credit is essential to survival, it is still viewed as a dubious activity among most older people. This moral view of credit is analogous to the attitude taken to money itself at the point when communities of this type first reluctantly entered the cash

Survey

THE INFORMAL DEBT BURDEN

Table 1
PERSONAL DEBT & CREDIT LOADS IN A PERI-URBAN COMMUNITY OF KWAZULU, 1986
Percentage distribution by columns: N = 62

	BORROWING		LENDING	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
R0-5	10%	16%	23%	19%
R6-20	7%	6%	17%	16%
R21-50	20%	38%	20%	48%
R51-100	13%	13%	20%	9%
R101-200	37%	28%	7%	9%
R201+	13%	—	13%	3%
	30%	32%	30%	32%

Table 2
AVERAGE REPORTED DEBTS & LOANS FOR HIGHER & LOWER INCOME GROUPS
N = 62

	TOTAL DEBTS	TOTAL LOANS	NO OF RESPONDENTS
Younger Men, Higher Income (age less than 35, HH income estimated above R300 a month)	R120	R149	6
Older Men, Higher Income (age over 35, HH income estimated above R300 a month)	R233	R72	16
Men any Age, Lower Income (HH income estimated under R299 a month)	R82	R31	8
Younger Women, Higher Income (age less than 35, HH income estimated above R300 a month)	R58	R51	9
Older Women, Higher Income (age over 36, HH income estimated above R300)	R121	R52	12
Women any Age, Lower Income (HH income estimated under R299 a month)	R51	R50	11

Table 3
WHAT ARE THE MOST COMMON USES FOR INFORMAL CREDIT?
Percentage citing as among 'most frequent uses'

MEN		WOMEN	
House-building	42%	Buying food	
Buying drinks	42%	Informal selling	44%
Buying food	38%	Stockfel contributions	28%
Stockfel contributions	25%	Transport	28%
Transport	21%	Accounts	28%
Illness	17%	School fees	24%
		Clothing	24%
		Illness	16%
		Buying drinks	12%



PHOTOGRAPH: Adele Gordon

A substantial amount of informal credit is spent on consumption—to cover cash shortfalls for food, clothing and entertainment, such as buying drinks for friends.

economy. In conservative quarters, using loan money is a sign of weakness, as economic transactions should be managed with money which has been fairly earned and is already in hand.

But as the rural informal economy works, informal lending may be more dynamic and significant than direct borrowing. Results indicate that the critical role of informal lending seems to be to put disposable money into safekeeping in the form of interpersonal debt obligations, which can be used to secure a line of informal credit, and to obtain loans quickly in case of need. The main use of *stockfel* savings in particular is probably as security for establishing a personal line of credit; the cyclical payout itself will not normally come at the right moment to cope with immediate needs. In this sense, interpersonal lending, rather than credit clubs, seems to be the main informal savings mechanism of the modern rural black community.

High interest rates

The single major problem with informal loans now available is their high cost. Only people with connections and resources can count on getting interest free loans of any size, and recorded interest rates have risen rapidly. Peri-urban interest has roughly doubled in the last five to ten years, and now ranges between 25 and 80

percent both for the peri-urban and rural samples.

These rates seem to be regarded as normal and legitimate by the communities, but comparisons with other Third World regions suggest they are running very high (see bibliography).

The fast and extreme rise in interest rates may be an indirect result of the recent upgrading of black wages, and appears to have resulted in more disposable income in some rural communities at least. If so, the effect on the chances of using informal credit to produce venture capital for starting up an informal small business (Nattrass and Glass 1986) may be serious enough to cut back some of the beneficial effects of the rise in household incomes locally. Informal, interest-bearing credit is getting to the point where an increasing percentage of the community's lower income families may be priced out of the market.

If so, it becomes possible that one of the most useful contributions from the larger economy—formal sector or government—could be to create some competitive opportunities for lending and borrowing at lower rates. While it is unlikely that competition could actually cut rates enough to make informal venture capital widely available, competition from formal lending potentially might hold back the skyrocketing rate of interest rate increases and stabilise the market.

Where do People Look for Loans?

Decision factors

Both men and women look first to, and most approve of as loan sources, the people they are most intimately and confidently

associated with. Then come local credit societies, friends from work, and employers. Privacy is a strong consideration, but privacy alone does not seem to outweigh the drop in confidence that goes with progressively more distant and more impersonal credit sources. Banks seem to have a very unfavourable image; they appear remote, strict, and impatient. Respondents were not aware that bank credit may be cheaper.

Decision factors involved form a clear pattern. The community seems to evaluate potential lenders on five criteria:

- cost — the point of whether or not the borrower will have to pay interest;
- discretion — whether the lender will respect the borrower's desire for total privacy;
- patience — the lender's willingness to be flexible about repayment;
- sympathy or humanity — human warmth and the quality of responding to the borrower's need; and
- reliability — dependability in observing the (usually verbal) loan agreement.

To these credit criteria can be added the more direct factors of access, or convenience; timing, the quick availability of credit; profit, in terms of making or losing money on the deal; and social standing, the effect on the borrower's reputation.

In spite of the relative urban sophistication and polish of KwaNgele's peri-urban population, the lack of confidence in banks and other formal lending institutions was relatively massive. Only 25 percent of respondents admitted to considering banks as possible loan sources and only three people in the sample admitted to having ever taken a bank loan.

The image of banks is one of authoritarian remoteness which enforces an abject discomfort on the borrower. Respondents associated banks with hard loan terms which do not take account of circumstances, accompanied by the danger of losing your property and being put in jail. For those who did approve of this credit source, remarks suggested that it took a person with a cool nerve and ready assets to deal successfully with a bank.

Capitalising

What this all adds up to is that the problem in relation to rural credit should not be seen mainly as a question of capitalising agriculture — at least not unless major changes are made in the policies affecting black agriculture. Of these, credit may be the least important. Though it does not seem to be commonly realised, a serviceable form of agricultural credit is available now through the local level

informal credit market — but as black agriculture is functioning at the moment, there seems to be little demand for this kind of loan either in the peri-urban or the rural environment.

The usual level of demand for credit to help with agriculture appears to be very small in peri-urban areas — results so far suggest scattered loans of less than R20 which are considered unimportant, with a relatively low household priority. The rural demand may run a little higher, but preliminary results suggest that only a very small percentage of rural families may be interested in cultivation loans of more than R50-R100. This kind of demand cannot economically be serviced by the formal economy; it would not remotely justify mortgage, which in any case is not used by white South African farmers to secure crop loans.

Instead, rural black families appear to follow the usual strategy of keeping their cultivation expenses to a minimum — and then take this minimum out of the household's running capital. They use their credit for a number of other purposes instead (table 3).

The best way to help capitalise peri-urban agriculture is more likely to be through attacking bottlenecks in the provision of inputs, so as to improve returns and make it more worthwhile for families to borrow small informal amounts when credit is needed. Third World countries such as Zimbabwe and Indonesia have increased their peasant production enormously by making available a support package of inputs, marketing and extension services, with credit coming in only as demand for it arises.

Research results therefore suggest that trying to provide mortgage to rural communities in the hope of assisting agriculture may not be effective. Efforts can perhaps better be directed to increasing overall economic activity.

Credit Linkage

What is likely to be of equal or perhaps even greater urgency than getting credit to agriculture is the question of getting the maximum possible benefit from the circulation of urban wage earnings, by capitalising the informal sector more generally.

One specific area of high potential is home building and construction, where turning over successive small ad hoc loans for materials and services seems to be an enormously popular strategy for building in manageable increments. Another is small-scale selling generally, where locally available informal loans for stock may help many families with no direct access to the formal job market to survive and even to expand to larger operations.

Interest rates on informal loans in peri-urban KwaZulu have roughly doubled over the last decade, pricing lower income families out of the market

Formal lending agencies or government could make a useful contribution to rural financial networks by creating competitive loan opportunities

The ways in which black agriculture functions at the moment poses a low demand for credit in the peri-urban or rural environment

Peasant production in Third World countries has been increased by providing other formal inputs, such as cultivation, extension and marketing services

Besides assisting with household economies, credit is needed to capitalise the informal sector for expanded operations

The formal credit sector and rural community require physical contact points, provided by rural workers/employers, a rural savings bank and pension payout stations

In both these objectives, informal credit seems to be not just the main means at present, but possibly the most effective. Current World Bank research argues that any plan for supplying effective credit to rural communities must take account of the existing structures defined by informal credit — the more so since formal lending institutions find it very difficult to lend into rural communities on an economic basis.

To summarise these findings, it appears that there is going to be a lot of scope for the new forms of credit which Nattrass and Glass have called for (Nattrass and Glass, op cit). The possibilities for making credit effectively available in relation to two main forms of demand should be explored:

- Capital loans into the production and distribution sectors in the R200-R1000 bracket, where informal loans are often not available, or if obtained may need very high interest;
- Backstop credit for the day to day needs of consumption, and particularly for the poor, whose cash shortfalls are not always made up by informal credit.

More than anything else, providing money from the formal sector directly into the rural community needs a point of contact where the community and the outside credit market can come together.

1. Lending to rural workers in town

One possibility which has been drawing attention lately is the idea of channelling loans through the urban employers of rural based labour. The KwaNgele results suggest that the idea has some unanticipated potential. Although general suspicion attached to the idea of employers as lenders, this did not carry through into specific negative associations as it did in the case of banks.

Lending programmes through employers would at least put credit on the normal trip route of rural workers; it would also have the effect of putting the credit transaction into a known framework, more personal and acceptable than an alien institution. And if such loans were made easily transferrable between employers, the problem of tied labour could be avoided. But these loans are not quickly available from within the community, nor does every rural credit user have an urban employer.

2. Savings for a line of credit in rural communities

A continuous rural presence for the formal lending sector is not likely to be practical for economic reasons — the expense is too great and the turnover too low. But if it is conceded at the outset that day to day credit will have to be informal, then it may be possible to link the formal and informal credit cycles in a

way that may serve the purpose.

If the problem is seen as how to assist people with low incomes to secure a line of informal credit, then formal savings schemes may be more useful than formal loans. If the loans are informal and immediate, the savings facility need not be there all the time.

A rural savings bank

If the organised credit markets — or alternatively the government — could be persuaded to oversee the establishment of a (preferably co-operative) rural savings bank, then the necessary community contact point could be at pension payouts, which are bi-monthly. With representatives of the new bank present at bi-monthly pension payouts, then relatively large crowds, including both pensioners and informal sector operators, would be available as potential savers. With money in hand and the need for cash not yet overwhelming, the chances for people in the low income category to start savings accounts would probably be as high as they ever could be — especially if a monthly lottery prize for savings account numbers were added as well.

Money from these accounts could then be re-loaned to anyone in the community wanting small or medium sized capital loans, whether for construction, informal enterprise, consumption needs or any reasonable purpose. However, any enabling legislation to set up such a bank would need to include the provision that rural savings could not be used in the developed core economy, but would have to be retained for development needs in rural areas.

Only time and thorough investigation could tell if this approach is viable. Whichever way it is done, the mobilisation of rural savings could possibly do more to contribute directly to rural development over wide areas than a large number of capital projects. *UNDA*

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QwaQwa

THE MAKESHIFT HOMELAND

IPSA Correspondent Vicki Cadman

QwaQwa, South Africa's smallest homeland, is situated in the foothills of the Drakensberg, on the north-eastern border of Lesotho between Natal and the Orange Free State. Although this tiny territory is officially the homeland of the Southern Sotho, estimates indicate that in 1980 only 11,1 percent of this ethnic group were actually living in the area.

In November 1974 QwaQwa was granted self-governing status, and general elections were held in 1975 and 1980. On both occasions Chief Minister Kenneth Mopeli's Dikwankwela Party won the majority of the 34 elected seats in the 80-member legislative assembly. The remaining 46 seats are filled by nominated members.

Mopeli has so far rejected homeland independence. Shortly after its formation, he joined Chief Buthelezi's South African Black Alliance, which represented an attempt to create a united black front which would oppose apartheid.

POPULATION

	De Facto Population	% Increase
1970	25 334	
1980	200 000 - 300 000*	700 - 1000%
1983	400 000 - 500 000*	1500 - 1900%

* The official census figure for 1980 is 157 620, but the QwaQwa administration maintains that the actual figure is significantly higher. Research estimates support the homeland's claims; the figures presented in table 1 are therefore derived from these alternative sources (Martiny and Sharp 1984: p4; Sharp 1982: p28; Rand Daily Mail 20/1/82).

Analysis

● The dramatic increase in population between 1970/1983 is largely the result of the resettlement of

people to QwaQwa from 'white' South Africa, particularly from white farms in the Orange Free State. Increased mechanisation of white farms and changing conditions of employment — along with the loss of land use and grazing rights, the abolition of labour tenancy and consequent squatting — were all factors that forced many ex-farm labourers to move to the homeland.

● People have also been relocated to QwaQwa from other homelands in the interests of 'ethnic consolidation'. For example, in 1974 Bophuthatswana authorities arranged for the removal of 2 000 South Sotho families from Thaba'Nchu to their 'own' homeland.

● In February 1987 there was renewed speculation that QwaQwa is to incorporate Onverwacht (now Botshabelo), the massive rural slum adjoining a fragment of Bophuthatswana, 50km east of Bloemfontein. Beginning with the removal of 38 000 Sotho-speaking people from Kromdraai/Thaba'Nchu (Bop) in 1979, Onverwacht now has more than 200 000 inhabitants. QwaQwa officials purport to informally represent the South Sotho segment, about a quarter of the settlement's populace.


● With high population densities, the distinction between urban and rural areas becomes superfluous. These terms are sometimes used to distinguish between the 'urban' inhabitants living in Phuthaditjhaba, and those living in the surrounding areas, the 'rural' population.

● Apart from Phuthaditjhaba, the only proclaimed town, most of the habitable areas of the homeland comprise extensive closer settlement villages. These settlements are characterised by urban population densities, coupled with a lack of infrastructure and other urban facilities.

LAND

● By 1985 QwaQwa comprised a single geographic unit covering an area of 65 514 ha. Negotiations concerning the inclusion of a further 80 000 ha are still underway (see map).

● In 1980 it had a population density of 327 people per km², which makes it by far the most densely populated homeland. The average population density for the self-governing homelands is 98 people per km², and for 'white' South Africa, 17 people per km².



AGRICULTURE

● Only 12 percent of the homeland's total land area is arable. With a ratio of 0,2 ha of arable land per family, QwaQwa offers the lowest agricultural potential out of all the homelands. The average equivalent figure for all the homelands is 1,3 ha per family.

● Further, the high population density means that much of the arable land cannot be utilised for agriculture. A 1980 study (DBSA 1986: p2) showed that about 2 000 ha of the 9 218 ha of potentially arable land in the Witsieshoek area was occupied by residential stands.

● By October 1984 there were 19 agricultural projects operating in QwaQwa; 17 were run by the QwaQwa Agricultural Company and the remaining two by the private sector. These projects included a piggery, a trout farm, a chicken farm, stock and dairy farms, wheat and asparagus cultivation schemes.

● There were also 38 community gardens involving 902 participants.

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

In 1980, a mere 11,1 percent of the homeland's total population were classified as economically active. Yet average per capita income (from Gross National Product) in 1980 was R249. Of all the independent and self-governing homelands, only Bophuthatswana had a higher equivalent figure.

This apparent contradiction is explained by the limited local employment opportunities, whereby those of

Table 2 **Average Household Income: Breakdown of Sources, 1981 (as % of total income)**

Area	Urban	Rural	Total
Salaries & wages	79	47,8	53,5
Agriculture	—	5,1	4,2
Domestic production	—	0,4	0,4
Own business	1,6	2,1	2,0
Pensions	2,8	7,3	6,5
Contributions received* <small>*Includes migrant remittances</small>	13,5	32,3	29,0
Income from lodgers	0,3	0,5	0,4
Imputed rent	0,7	4,1	3,5
Other	2,0	0,4	0,7

Table 3 **Number of Migrant & Commuter workers**

	1978	1982	% increase
Migrants	2 000	4 000	100%
Commuters	37 000	60 000	62%

QwaQwa's workers who do find employment, work in the central economy as migrants or commuters. They earn significantly higher wages than they would in the homeland — this factor accounts for the relatively high per capita income in QwaQwa.

Analysis

- In 1981 average household income in Phuthaditjhaba was 70,5 percent higher than in the

surrounding closer settlements. The labour bureaus in the town, situated on or near the only tarred road (see map) tend to attract most employers who need look no further. The development of industry in Phuthaditjhaba has also provided some employment opportunities for QwaQwa's 'urban' inhabitants.

- Salaries and wages constitute the major source of household income in all areas. 'Contributions received', which include migrant remittances, constitute

Table 4

Contribution of Migrant & Commuter Income to GNP

1980 Total GNP = R114,6m			1982 Total GNP = R223,5m		
	Amount	% of GNP		Amount	% of GNP
GDP	R24,8m	21,6	GDP	R44,5m	19,9
Commuter Income	R5,8m	5,1	Commuter Income	R11,8m	5,3
Migrant Income	R86,0m	75,1	Migrant Income	R170,9m	76,5
Minus Foreign Factor Payments	-R2,1m	-1,8	Minus Foreign Factor Payments	-R3,6m	-1,6






Table 5

Composition of QwaQwa's Total National Revenue



THE ROAD TO PHUTHADITJHABA

Poverty on the 29th Parallel

a further 32,3 percent of total 'rural' household income.

- The high dependence of 'rural' households on the above sources of income, indicates the inability of the agricultural sector to provide a living for those in the 'countryside'. Agriculture constitutes only 5,1 percent of 'rural' household income.

- Pensions constitute a further 7,3 percent of 'rural' household income.

REVENUE

Analysis

Migrant and commuter income has about doubled between 1980/82 and continues to comprise over 80 percent of GNP. This highlights two factors — the homeland's inability to provide for its rapidly increasing (and relocated) population, and the artificial inclusion of large numbers of outsider migrants as QwaQwa citizens.

Although 'own sources' as a percentage of total revenue has dropped over the above period, QwaQwa is still relatively less dependent on direct financial aid from South Africa than many of the other homelands. This is because of the predominant contributions of migrant and commuter earnings, and the nascent infrastructure for administration and development.

HEALTH

- In 1982/83 QwaQwa had a ratio of 717 people per hospital bed. This is over double the ratio of 337:1 for Africans in 'white' South Africa; the equivalent figure for whites is 61 people per hospital bed.

EDUCATION

- In 1980, 40,8 percent of the total population of QwaQwa either had no education, or their level of education was unknown; 43,7 percent had less than standard six and only 0,8 percent had matric. *IPSA*

Acknowledgement

The data profiles on QwaQwa and Gazankulu in this Rural & Regional Monitor are the fourth and fifth studies in an ongoing Indicator SA series on the homelands. Earlier editions presented profiles on the Ciskei (IPSA Vol3/No4), KaNgwane (IPSA Vol4/No1) and Venda (IPSA Vol4/No2). We would like to thank the Development Bank of Southern Africa for generously providing Indicator SA with information dossiers on these homelands; a major source for this IPSA series.

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By David Robbins, *The Natal Witness*, Pietermaritzburg

During the hot and dusty summer of 1985/86 journalist Dave Robbins undertook an epic trip across the sub-continent's 29th parallel, through the platteland heart of South Africa. En route from eastern Mtunzini on the Natal coast to the Atlantic's Port Nolloth, he broke his journey in and around Phuthaditjhaba, obscure capital of QwaQwa hidden in the country's interior. Robbins' encounters on the homeland's highway and byways intimately reveal the world of government officials and WaBenzi, the peasants and migrants, the poor and forsaken....

The contrast was startling. To begin with, in the high country, there were the abrupt and tortuously shaped sandstone hills, the massive expanse of the Sterkfontein Dam, the rolling farmlands, two tractors kicking up dust in a red-brown field, a row of thin poplars in golden grass, the emptiness and immeasurable scale of the land. Then, without warning, there was the teeming tightness of QwaQwa. First, the rich and empty farms of the eastern Free State; then the crowding life of South Africa's smallest and most densely populated homeland.

It is somehow visually disconcerting to pass from one place to the other, from the rolling away of maize fields between the ancient and weathered hills to the sudden square-cornered sight of a dusty city as the road descends and a high hill passes on the right. Here is a dense and unmistakably Third World urban spread. It is Phuthaditjhaba, capital of QwaQwa, the 480 square kilometre homeland of which the South Sotho people, all 1,9 million of them living both here and in various other parts of South Africa, are citizens.

It has not infrequently been claimed that if all these so-called citizens took up residence in QwaQwa there would be standing room only. It is hopelessly overcrowded as it is.

The Witsieshoek Rebellion

What are the origins of such a situation? It seemed apt to consider the question as we looked down upon the rows of shining tin factories, at the crowds of blunt-fronted houses, and at the hills on the far side of the actual town crammed with shanties almost as far as the eye could see. Hillside upon degraded hillside teeming with human habitation. Yet, in 1916 a government commission found that the Witsieshoek Reserve (as QwaQwa had been called) was, with a population of only 5 000, already overcrowded. Nevertheless, as African families were forced off white Free State farms, the population at Witsieshoek continue to grow. The state attempted to combat the overcrowding, which was

inflicting increasing damage on a fragile mountain environment, by introducing agricultural betterment schemes and by the culling of livestock. These measures caused the Witsieshoek rebellion of 1950. By 1970 the population was just under 24 000.

Obsessed with the idea of separate development, the Government then changed Witsieshoek into the 'ethnic homeland' of QwaQwa, and decreed that all people of South Sotho cultural or racial origins would henceforth be regarded as citizens. 'Mass relocation began,' Joanne Martiny and John Sharp wrote (1984: p4), 'because the pressures which had been building up against Africans on farms, in towns and other Bantustan areas in the Orange Free State were given a sanctioned focus of release.' In other words, there was somewhere to send unwanted people, and so the unwanted people began to pour into the tiny, already overcrowded and environmentally degraded area in their tens of thousands. According to local estimates, the population had reached 300 000 by 1980, and nearly 500 000 by 1983. Over 1 000 people a square kilometre. Take into account the mountainous and uninhabitable nature of much of the country, and the figure is probably closer to 2 000 people a square kilometre...

Now we are in the streets of Phuthaditjhaba. The cliffs of the high hill which had passed on the right — called QwaQwa mountain — seemed to steer a sort of blasted heat in among the dust and buses and crowds of the Third World streets. Carloads of colourfully dressed young men cruised. It was the beginning of the weekend.

We stopped at a garage because we were having trouble starting the car. An African man who seemed to be in charge offered a few tips. He was friendly and articulate, and a bunch of keys dangled from his belt. His name was Sam. He pointed out his house to us across the road. I asked if he liked living in QwaQwa. 'I couldn't have made it outside,' he said. 'Here I have a little piece of land.' He said the garage, like the hotel, had been financed by the QwaQwa Development Corporation. He told me that 80 percent of the employees in the shiny new factories were women. 'Very badly paid,' he said, shaking his head. Then he brightened. 'We are developing here. Life isn't perfect, but it has to go on. Life has to go on,' he repeated, smiling at us and rattling his keys.

We drove in the industrial area. The factories were already closed, others stood empty with weeds growing tall against silent silver walls. The streets were empty. These industrialists, the vast majority of them white, had been enticed here by massive decentralisation concessions as well as by the lure of cheap and unorganised labour.

We drove out into the crowded hills beyond the limits of the laid out town. The roads were full of holes, and the dust lay centimetres thick on the verges. We passed a soccer field, little more than a bowl of dust upon which dark figures swarmed. The shacks and mud houses perched everywhere, even on the steepest of hillsides, even on the edges of huge eroded dongas.

I said to a man by the roadside: 'It is very hot and dusty in QwaQwa.'

'Dusty, I know; and it rained only three days

Caption
 Overshadowed by the Drakensberg range, the uninhabitable and non-arable terrain of much of QwaQwa reduces its agricultural potential and hampers infrastructural development.

Wynne Harney

From a mere 24 000 in 1970, QwaQwa's tiny population has swollen to more than 500 000 residents today through mass relocation and extended homeland citizenship

The QwaQwa administration rejected homeland-style independence in 1984 because it is too small to be economically viable, situated on 480 km²

With a population density of at least 1 000 people per km², nearly all arable land is filled with housing estates or decentralised industrial sites

ago.'

He was an old man in a ragged hat. His eyes peered out from wizened slits. He said nothing more. Yet his very stance, as he stood there against that crowded backdrop, offered an insight into the depth of the environmental degradation of the place. These people know — it is a realisation which comes sharply to the visitor's mind — they know well enough that they are living in the beginnings of a desert. There is little green in QwaQwa, only the green of the mountains far away.

We drove back into Phuthaditjhaba and to the government offices. The entrance gates, guarded by an apathetic man sitting on a rough wooden chair, were unimposing and untidy. We passed through them unhindered.

The Government Official

'Look, the QwaQwa government's job is to offer services to the people. Health, education, accommodation and so on. Take our schools: they are overcrowded, many teachers are unqualified. We have only twelve or so schools which cater for matric. There are more than a hundred pupils per matric class. This figure is so high because our schools must take in pupils from all over the Free State.'

The government official stopped talking and raised his eyebrows.

'Are people still coming into QwaQwa?' I asked.

'People are still coming in in great numbers,' he replied. 'We are virtually full up so far as I am concerned. One tribal authority has already asked me for land on a recently acquired farm. I have told them we will first look around to try to fill up any available empty space. We wanted to plan these new areas properly.'

I had heard that in an attempt to ease a hopeless situation, the South African government had bought up some neighbouring white farms, and were planning more sales which would ultimately make QwaQwa three times its original size. I now asked the official about this additional land. Would it be retained for agricultural use?

'We hope to do this,' he said. 'Nevertheless, we are going to be forced to look at the less arable areas for housing, especially if the influx of people continues.'

'Do you think QwaQwa could be tempted to accept independence?'

'There was a parliamentary resolution last year (1984) rejecting the idea of independence.'

'Why do you think this is? Is it because the leaders know that QwaQwa is too small to be economically viable?'

'Of course,' the official said. 'There is also another crucial reason. None of us here would like to lose his South African citizenship together with access to the South African economy. We feel that to be relegated to a homeland is not fair. Ordinary

people are generally highly frustrated here,' he added.

He leaned across the desk and spoke with some feeling. 'Look, man, the problem is lack of land. The problem is these farming people can no longer farm. No one may bring animals into QwaQwa any longer. There is too little space to graze what animals there are here. Nearly all the arable land is filled with housing, and even the new industrial estates have been built on what was formerly agricultural land. Very few people can practise any form of agriculture here at all.'

His meeting was imminent, and I had to leave him. He told me it was a liaison meeting between the government, the QwaQwa Development Corporation, and the industrialists operating in the tiny homeland.


'Wages,' he said, standing up and donning his jacket. 'They're quite alarmingly low. Many people were earning only R10 a week, R3 of which is used on bus fares. We have recently managed to persuade the industrialists to raise it to R13, but this is a gentleman's agreement only. If we legislated a minimum wage we might scare them into either reducing their labour force or leaving QwaQwa altogether. There's very little we can do except ask nicely.' He smiled a trifle bitterly.

The WaBenzi

There is a flat-topped hill in Phuthaditjhaba upon which the houses of the QwaQwa government cabinet ministers have been built. From the streets of the town below, only the top storeys of some of the houses can be glimpsed, but if you drive up the back of the hill the full extent of this lavish enclave can be seen. To be seen also is the high security fence which surrounds it, and the big floodlights pointing outwards from the fence. The guards at the gate are armed with Israeli sub-machine guns . . .

We drove across the full length of QwaQwa in less than an hour. We started at the shining tin factories and drove south through kilometre after kilometre of dense housing, sometimes squalid, sometimes beautiful, those smoothly shaped and decorated structures, the sheen of thatch. The air was filled with human sounds, as was the road with traffic. But soon the road worsened and the traffic thinned and we drove on, always climbing now, towards the mountains.

As we travelled, I remembered those men — were they QwaQwa cabinet ministers? — in the Mercedes-Benzes again, and thought of Patrick Marnham's descriptions, in *Dispatches From Africa* (1981: p189), of the *WaBenzi*, that 'derisive mock-tribal name' accorded to the governing and administrative classes in some of the independent African countries to the north. They are men apart, they drive fancy German cars (hence the name) and they stick together in enclaves in the Third World cities. The problem, Marnham suggests, is that they have adopted



Wyndham Hartley

from the whites an administrative machine which does not really work in Africa, not because Africa is backward and is trying to progress, but because it is different and is being forced, unsuccessfully, to conform.

QwaQwa became a self-governing state in 1974, and a year later the Dikwankwetla Party, headed by T K Mopeli, took control of the legislative assembly and the cabinet. Today, T K Mopeli is still the Chief Minister, and there are three other Mopelis in the eight-man cabinet. Martiny and Sharp point out (op cit: p21) that 'none of the

dominant interests in QwaQwa had ever spoken out forcefully against the continuing process of mass relocation' of people into the overcrowded homeland. Indeed, the QwaQwa government has been 'prominent in various attempts to entice still more people to leave common South Africa'. Chiefs and officials have undertaken recruitment drives in the Free State, and 'the SABC's Sesotho radio service, which has studios in Phuthaditjhaba, has broadcast similar appeals, using advertising material of questionable accuracy' (Martiny and Sharp: p22).

A broken-down van with flat tyres converted to a street vendor's stall — QwaQwa 1985.

Almost two million South Sothos living throughout South Africa have been arbitrarily designated as citizens of QwaQwa. If the 1,5m outsiders took up residence there would be standing room only!

It seems astonishing that the discomforts of the people of QwaQwa, especially those who live in the so-called countryside outside Phuthaditjhaba, are being used, indeed increased, by the QwaQwa leadership simply so that its bargaining power is strengthened. With whom and for what does it bargain? The answers are straightforward. With the South African government, for more land, and ultimately for independence. Martiny and Sharp: 'Thus far the chief minister has voiced his opposition to "independence" for QwaQwa, but rumours are rife in the area that he will be channelled into this route in order to gain full control over nearby (white) farms which the South African Development Trust has already purchased and plans to acquire in future'. Who will benefit from an independent QwaQwa, even if it ends up three times its present size? The ordinary people, or the *WaBenzi* in control of this hopelessly overcrowded dormitory state?

Migrants, Pensioners, Peasants

Sunday. Wind. Old newspapers flying in the reddish air. Crowds of people. A great vibrancy and life. Sunday is departure day. Hundreds of minibuses, filled with men, departing. The lifestyle of the migrant worker. Bumper to bumper sometimes, going to Johannesburg. Young boys leap after a football on the sandy place in front of the town hall. They play in and out between the groups of people and the vehicles. Roof-racks high with luggage. Someone carries a chicken by its feet. Women stand on the steps of the bantustan-architecture hall and sing hymns. Red, white and black uniforms ruffled by the wind. The page of a newspaper caught on a swaying aerial as another minibus raises swirls of dust and drives away into the evening. The wind. The quality of a homeland Sunday.

Driving westwards through empty white farmland — referred to by the woman at the QwaQwa Development Corporation as part of 'the pantry of South Africa', which is to be incorporated into an enlarged QwaQwa — there is something which begins to haunt the imagination. All this manipulation, the vastness of this social engineering, why had it not caused more splashing and turbulence than it had? Why so little rebellion? Why not drown the hand that delivers such heavy blows? There are stock answers to these questions. They have to do with a demoralised and ignorant peasantry; with officialdom's sheer physical power; even with the aptness of the policy. These answers never completely satisfy. The imagination seeks for deeper reasons and perceives the stoicism of Africa reinforced by the stoicism of Christianity. The white man's God offers no easy life; He offers only fortitude and comfort through the long storm . . .

I went to this township, called Thusanong, on the outskirts of Clarens one afternoon. A local white woman who ran a thrice-weekly

soup kitchen for African pensioners arranged my visit on one of the soup kitchen days, and when we arrived the pensioners were waiting for us in the community hall.

Strictly speaking, it is possible for Africans in Clarens to work anywhere in the area covered by the Oranje/Vaal Development Board, and in theory therefore the industrial areas of Sasolburg and Vanderbijlpark, over 200 kilometres to the north, were accessible. 'The problem here,' the white woman told me, 'is that it is difficult to find work without travelling, and there is quite simply no money for this.'

I asked the pensioners to tell me about the salaries which could be earned in Clarens itself.

'Sometimes only R30 a month for domestic work; R25 a month for gardening; R50 a fortnight for council workers, but there are only 15 jobs on the council for blacks.'

'How many people live in the township?'

'About a thousand.'

'Are these people citizens of QwaQwa?' I asked the principal, an amiable man named Sejane.

'Yes,' he replied. 'We all are.'

'Have these people no inclination to go and live in QwaQwa?'

He translated the question, and the old man with the gurgling pipe replied promptly: 'It is better to earn small wages here than be jobless there.'

Emotive Doctrines

. . . Segregation, apartheid, separate development. It is all based on fear. It began long before 1948, yet it was the Afrikaner Nationalists who refined it, who preached the emotive doctrine of *swart gevaar*, who completed the task of placing apartheid on the statute books, who refined the ideology into separate development, a system which seemed for a few years to soothe the central fear, and which even now, in its catastrophic decline, is clung to in the forlorn hope that it will somehow soothe that fear again.

QwaQwa grows fuller; the unwanted serfs grow sullen; their urban cousins begin to roar with rage — but still the madness continues. It cannot be relinquished. We guard the gates of black townships. We place black cities in the middle of nowhere (Phuthaditjhaba is one, Onverwacht is another) and then spend billions attracting industry to them so the people have somewhere to work. It is the manifestation of a fear-induced madness.

We would go to Onverwacht, a massive and featureless urban sprawl set down in the central Free State veld. But not yet. For the time being, we were driving into Ficksburg . . .

IPJA

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(extracted from *The 29th Parallel*, by David Robbins. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter: 1986)

GAZANKULU

LAND OF REFUGE AND RELOCATION

IPSA Correspondent Vicki Cadman

Gazankulu attained self-governing status in February 1973. Later in the same year the first elections were held for the homeland's new legislative assembly. Professor Ntsanwisi, a nominated member, was unanimously elected Chief Minister. Since then there have been two general elections, the most recent being held in September 1983.

Chief Minister Ntsanwisi has consistently rejected homeland-style independence and in July 1983 he met with other likeminded homeland leaders to sign a Declaration of Intent. The signatories to this document committed themselves to 'work ceaselessly for the establishment of a greater South Africa based on non-racialism and democracy'.

In 1983 Ntsanwisi established Ximoko Xa Rixaka, a 'national cultural liberation movement' which had approximately 35 000 members by December 1984. The movement aims at promoting the ethnic culture and interests of Gazankulu's Shangaan-Tsonga people, though it claims to be 'fundamentally opposed to apartheid'. It seeks to abolish racial discrimination, while 'identifying government-created institutions through which black interests can be facilitated, without promoting apartheid'.

Analysis

- Between 1970 and 1980 the population of Gazankulu almost doubled, compared with a 26,6 percent increase in neighbouring Venda. Homeland resettlement of Shangaan/Tsonga people from white South Africa and other homelands in the interests of 'ethnic consolidation' was partly responsible for this increase (relatively few people have been relocated to Venda). Further, the loss of many of the chiefs' traditional powers in Gazankulu has made them anxious to attract large numbers of followers, whose taxes will boost the size of the tribal fund, and thus the amount of patronage they will be able to dispense. This factor has exacerbated existing overcrowding.

- Refugees from Mozambique have further swelled the homeland's growing population. In February 1986 it was estimated that 30 000 Mozambican refugees were temporarily settled in Gazankulu. Prior to September 1985, these refugees were subject to continual official harassment as 'illegal immigrants'. After Chief Ntsanwisi intervened on their behalf, the South African government agreed to regard the refugees as 'guests' of Gazankulu, and not to harass or deport them as long as they remained in the homeland.

POPULATION

Table 1 Demographic Trends 1970 — 1980

Population	1970	1980	% Increase
Urban	5 259	15 862	201,6
Rural	266 677	501 365	88,0
Total	271 936	517 227	90,0

LAND AND LOCATION

- Gazankulu is situated in the northern Transvaal (see homeland map, Indicator SA Vol4/No2:p83) adjoining Venda. The isolated position of these two homelands is a major disadvantage in many ways. In 1983 the Development Studies Institute at the Rand Afrikaans University (RAUDSI) identified the most important single constraint on Gazankulu's development as its situation on the periphery of the South African region, with no part of it adjoining the economic core.

- By May 1984, the total area of Gazankulu was 656 531 ha, an area slightly smaller than neighbouring Venda.

- With its larger population, Gazankulu has a population density of 78,7 people per km².

Land consolidation proposals for the five homelands situated in the northern Transvaal have caused considerable tension between the communities of the areas concerned, between 1984 and 1986. In several instances proposals have sparked off unrest, as was the case in Buffelshoek, where fighting broke out between Gazankulu and Lebowa villagers in October 1984. Buffelshoek, along with several other areas, was originally allocated to Gazankulu, but later re-allocated to Lebowa. There have been several other disagreements over homeland consolidation — between Lebowa and KwaNdebele over the Moutse district; and between Venda and Gazankulu, over the proposed allocation of the Ongedacht community to Venda in 1984.

MANUFACTURING

- Gazankulu has three industrial decentralisation points — Nkowankowa, Giyani and Mkhuhlu.

- By March 1984, 100 manufacturing industries had been established in Gazankulu, creating 2 762 jobs at a cost of R11 580 each.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

- In 1980, 58,7 percent of the homeland's population had received no education, or the level of their education was unknown; 8,1 percent had up to standard four or five.

- In 1984/85 the ratio of people to hospital beds in Gazankulu was 292:1.

AGRICULTURE

- Only about 8 percent of Gazankulu's total area is potentially arable. The ratio of arable land to population is 0,8 ha per family (of six), which is lower than the comparative figure for any of the other homelands except Ciskei and QwaQwa.

- Gazankulu was badly affected by the severe drought of 1981-1983. The homeland's cattle herds decreased from 217 000 in June 1982 to 187 000 in February 1983 because of drought and overgrazing.

- The RAUDSI Study (ibid 1983) estimated that of the

62 000 rural families in the homeland, only half had agricultural rights, the remainder being landless. Gazankulu's agricultural resources can support only 6 900 families, with a low annual household income of R2 400.

- These figures highlight the massive overcrowding in the homeland. The RAUDSI Study recommended an emigration rate of 89 percent from Gazankulu's rural areas, and job creation schemes for those residents that the agricultural sector can no longer support.

- At present there are 37 agricultural projects in Gazankulu, including dry land crop production, irrigation schemes, nurseries and livestock breeding schemes.

- There are also 46 community gardens and 4 agricultural co-operatives in the homeland.

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

Table 2

Number of Migrant and Commuter Workers

	1978	1982	% Increase
Migrants	45 000	68 000	51,1
Commuters	6 700	9 000	34,3

Analysis

In 1983, an estimated 182 000 people were economically active in Gazankulu.

The average per capita income (from GDP) was R231 (1982), which was considerably lower than that of Venda. Per capita income from GNP was R579 for the same year, largely because of Gazankulu's huge migrant and commuter workforce. In 1982 the contribution of migrant income to Gazankulu's GNP was R172,2m, compared with R97,5m for neighbouring Venda.

These statistics highlight South Africa's broader rural crisis and the inability of the homelands domestic economies to provide adequate employment for their burgeoning populations. Some 50-75 percent of families in Gazankulu are dependent on migrant labour — the main structural problem is that its economy cannot provide sufficient jobs to absorb the economically active population. Of an estimated 182 000 economically active people, only 21 000 are in paid employment in Gazankulu. This means that the remaining 161 000 people either find employment as migrant or commuter labourers, or are unemployed.

GOVERNMENT REVENUE

Table 3

Contribution of Migrant and Commuter Income to Government Revenue





Table 4

Composition of Gazankulu's Total National Revenue



Analysis

Gazankulu's total national revenue has remained consistently lower than that of neighbouring Venda. Ntsanwisi has frequently accused the South African government of withholding funds from Gazankulu, as punishment for not taking independence. Venda, with a population two thirds the size of its neighbour, received almost R18m more in grants in 1984/85. Although 'own sources' of revenue have improved to 31,4 percent of total revenue, direct financial aid from the South African government coffers still constitutes the major part of Gazankulu's national revenue.

IPAA

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Today, Elizabeth Nkumane will most likely discover Australia.

She will also learn to add and subtract, and find out that there's a lot more to books than just pictures.

She is still a child, her youthful dreams and future before her. Thirsting for knowledge, achievement and pride.

In a word, Education. Sound Education.

Each year the craving to learn gathers momentum. Yet each year in relative terms we invest less. There is a grave danger that tutorial undernourishment will starve our nation.

Our schools are overcrowded. Many of our teachers improperly trained. Politically set curricula warp minds and alienate students.

Children must be taught the truth in order to live by it. With dignity. In happiness.

Many, like us, see these problems, and are helping to find solutions. In a small, yet we like to think, significant way. A small team of people in **BARCLAYS** has the task of studying the needs of schools, colleges and teachers. And helping. Financially and intelligently. With humility. For we, like many others, know that education for all is the genesis of our future.

We know we all are **The Family of Africa.**
We all belong.

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