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A. Ojebode; B.R. Ojebuyi; N.J. Onyechi; O. Oladapo; O.J. Oyedele  
and I.A. Fadipe

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## **Summary**

The problem of ineffective policing still persists in post-colonial Africa and as a result, both donors and governments are seeking non-state alternatives or complements to the state apparatuses. These alternatives include private sector provision, donor-driven interventions and community-based or community-driven crime prevention practices. There is no shortage of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa and they come in a variety of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and ethnic militias, and neighbourhood guards. However, the effectiveness of CBCP practices is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. This study looks at the effectiveness of CBCP practices, considers possible reasons for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness, and on the basis of the research, makes some policy recommendations.

**Keywords:** Community participation, community associations, communitisation, community-based crime prevention, trust in government, trust in police, social capital

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# Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AU	African Union
CBCP	Community-Based Crime Prevention
CIT	Communication Infrastructure Theory
DFID	Department for International Development
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FRSC	Federal Road Safety Commission
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
PCRC	Police-Community Relations Committee
SJG	Security, Justice and Growth
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

# Executive summary

The crisis in the criminal justice system, especially in African nations, has been the subject of academic and policy debates with the consensus being that state apparatuses alone are incapable of improving the crime situation. As Killingray (1986) explains, the adoption and extension of indirect rule in the British colonies, especially in Africa, created a phenomenon where the British tactically retreated from close or effective control of their territories. Policing was thin and often non-existent over much of the African empire and African 'traditional' rulers had responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The problem of ineffective policing still persists in post-colonial Africa. As a result, both donors and governments are seeking non-state alternatives or complements to the state apparatuses. These alternatives include private sector provision, donor-driven interventions and community-based or community-driven crime prevention practices.

In Africa, there is no shortage of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices. They come in a variety of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and ethnic militias, and neighbourhood guards. However, whereas the failure of the criminal justice system and formal crime prevention is hardly debatable, the effectiveness of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. In this study, we ask: how effective are these CBCP practices and what explains their effectiveness or ineffectiveness?

We conceptualised effectiveness in terms of citizens' perception of their safety and of the crime level in their community. We also included the extent to which they attribute these two to the CBCP in their communities. This measure has important limitations but given the problems of crime data sourcing and fidelity in Africa, we reluctantly left out official measures of crime rate reduction as an index of effectiveness of CBCP, focusing rather on the experiences and expressions of the citizens who daily bear the brunt of crimes.

Through a combination of descriptive and small-N comparative case study designs, we collected primary data in four stages in a total of 18 communities in Ibadan, Nigeria. Descriptive quantitative and qualitative analyses and process tracing showed that CBCP practices were widely prevalent in Ibadan and were driven by community development associations. These practices combined elements of different non-state models such as paid security provisioning, vigilantism and neighbourhood watches. The communities also work closely with the police. Most residents described their communities as safe and crime levels as low. Importantly, most of them attributed this to their community's CBCP practices. Social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure were high in the studied communities. These may be the factors that make it possible for the communities to organise themselves in the first instance. However, we found these factors to be equally high in both effective CBCP communities and ineffective CBCP communities. This, therefore, makes it implausible to argue that these factors explain the effectiveness of CBCP.

What makes a CBCP effective is the ability of the community development association to apply what we call the communitisation strategy, a strategy that plays out in three forms. First, the associations driving the CBCP declared nearly everything, including private spaces, as subject to community inspection and oversight. CBCPs could be intrusive of private spaces and might even be dictatorial. However, citizens did not mind this intrusion, claiming that intrusion for the sake of security was better than privacy with insecurity. Secondly, community associations also communitised some of the private concerns and problems of their members, shielding them from the complications that arise in Nigeria each time a citizen has to report a matter to the police. The association thus stood in, in the place of the concerned or aggrieved individual members. Third, community associations also

communitised the role of the state: they stepped in to fund the police by supplying their vehicles with fuel, constructing police posts, repairing police patrol vans and giving police officers monetary incentives so that the communities can be well patrolled and protected. They also supplied intelligence and facilitated the arrest of suspects. The officers reciprocated by patrolling regularly and responding rapidly to distress calls from the community associations.

A comparison of two CBCP practices – one effective, the other not – showed that effectiveness depended on the ability of the community associations to deploy the strategy summed up above. Through an exploration of the contexts, we discovered that a conjuncture of cultural and contextual factors impacted on the ability of the community associations to apply those three strategies.

Policies seeking to strengthen CBCP must (i) support communitisation strategies and (ii) create a delicate balance between protecting citizens' rights without weakening the strength of the community associations. An approach that seeks citizens' interpretation of their rights and privileges is important in drafting such policies. Policies also need to recognise that in some contexts even such strategies will have limited efficacy.

# Introduction

Decades after African nations obtained political independence, most of them have yet to come up with criminal justice systems that work. Crime rates are high and state apparatuses appear to be incapable of bringing them down. A recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC 2013) shows that Africa occupies one of the topmost positions in global crime prevalence. With a homicide rate of 12.5 per 100,000 population, compared with the global average of 6.2, Africa ranks behind only the Americas in homicide prevalence. Not only this, whereas crime rates seem to be stable or falling in Europe, they are rising in Africa (Institute for Security Studies and Africa Check 2014).

African governments and international donors are aware of this failure of the state criminal justice system and are actively seeking out alternatives or complements from the non-state sector. As Baker (2009) and Jenkins (2013) observe, this is a diverse sector including actors such as traditional rulers, informal levels of government, religious organisations, community-based organisations, and youth groups, most of whom operate at the community level. The activities of these actors in non-state sectors are what we call community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices.

These practices take numerous forms and are widespread. Forms of CBCP include ethnic militias, religious militias, vigilante groups, community-paid neighbourhood guards, and volunteer neighbourhood watches, operating in different African countries. Specific examples include the Oodua People's Congress in Nigeria, the South African vigilante groups (Baker 2002) and South African street courts (Burman and Sharf 1990). While some are state-initiated and/or state-supported such as the Sierra Leonean Partnership Boards (Baker 2008), the *Sungusungu* in Tanzania (Fleisher 2000; Cross 2013; Cross 2014) and the *nyumba kumi* in Kenya, others, such as those found in most Nigerian neighbourhoods, are entirely owned and controlled by the community. Some are initiated and/or sponsored by donors (Brogden 2005; Schultz and Tabanico 2007). Kenya resorted to community based crime prevention methods after the Westgate incident (Kivoto 2014). In Ghana, the police service adopted a community based system para-militaristic in its approach (Crews and Crews 2007). In the view of Denney (2015), these widely varied practices can be located at some point along the spectrum between totally informal and totally formal policing.

However, whereas the failure of the criminal justice system and formal crime prevention is hardly debatable, the effectiveness of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. In this study, we ask: how effective are these CBCP practices and what explains their effectiveness or ineffectiveness?

This is an important policy question for a number of reasons. First, starting from 2008, the African Union (AU) Security Sector Reform Policy Framework insisted on reforms that are marked by the slogan 'ownership by local communities' (AU 2013). Second, at the national levels and apparently in line with the AU policy framework, African nations are not only attempting security sector reforms but are doing so in a fashion that gives recognition to non-state, especially community-based, initiatives. For instance, in Kenya, a good part of the post-Westgate attack reform was the recourse to community-based crime prevention methods especially the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative (Kivoto 2014). In Ghana, the Ghana Police Service is attempting a switch from a 'para-militaristic philosophy to a more community-centred approach' (Crews and Crews 2007). In Nigeria, in August 2015, the Federal Government of Nigeria with funds from three international partners – Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation and Open Society Foundation – inaugurated a panel to address a comprehensive criminal justice reform (*Premium Times* 2015). Within the same month, the Inspector General of Police, the overall police boss, announced that the nation would pursue

'community-driven' policing more deliberately and systematically in order to 'tackle the inadequate manpower profile in the Nigeria Police Force' (Channels TV 2015). Within the same month, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, a victim of oil pipeline vandalism, announced that it would adopt 'community based policing to protect the vast network of oil and gas pipelines in Nigeria' (Okafor 2015). In Uganda, government began in 2014 the recruitment of 11 million crime preventers. These, according to government, are to be volunteers who will be trained in community-based crime prevention and work with the police. As at June 2015, about a million of such people have been trained and have begun work. This came in the same year that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored a CBCP project in Karamoja, Uganda, which trained hundreds of police officers in community policing and held security dialogues with over 4,600 citizens (UNDP 2014; Ugandan Parliament 2015).

Third, studies of CBCP show that they can have both positive and negative outcomes. Nolte (2007), working on the Odua People's Congress in Southwest Nigeria, observes that community strategies were effective in fighting criminals, restoring law and order, and even championing change, and Baker (2008) reports that in post-war Sierra Leone, Police Local Partnership Boards helped to overcome mistrust of government and the police. On the other hand, it has also been shown that while CBCP may be effective in reducing petty crime and even homicides and armed robbery, in many cases they replace these crimes with another, notably mob justice and abuse of citizens' rights (Baker 2002; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In addition to this, some community-based crime prevention isolates segments of the community – foreigners, those from another ethnic group – which can provoke the use of violence against them (Baker 2008). The question thus has to be asked about the conditions that make CBCP effective or ineffective.

## 1 Constructing explanations for the (in)effectiveness of CBCP

Community-based crime prevention is based on faith in the power of the collective. For a collective effort to produce intended results, the individuals making up this collective must work together; there must be tangible but also intangible resources; and finally there must be opportunities and avenues for the on-going exchange of ideas. In that order, these refer to participation, social capital and communication infrastructure.

In development studies, the concept of participation, specifically community participation, has been the subject of robust scholarly disquisitions. Worried by the growing misuse of the term, development scholars began to specify what participation truly means. Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation is most likely the first disambiguation of that concept. Arnstein held that several activities lumped up as participation were rather non-participatory and she categorised participation into an eight-rung ladder at the bottom of which is manipulation and at the topmost level of which is citizen control. Others have attempted to improve on Arnstein's ladder (e.g. Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994; Wilcox 1999) and come up with different sizes of the ladder. Cornwall (2008), however, goes beyond categorisation into the deeper issues of who is participating and who is not, 'in what and for whose benefit'. Literature on community participation in CBCP not only shows variations in the levels of participation in different communities but also suggests that where participation is narrow and passive, CBCP has a greater tendency to be ineffective (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Dammert 2005).

Putnam (2000) argues that the most general forms of social capital are trust and social participation. Coleman (1988) describes social capital in terms of the influence of informal

and horizontal local social relationships, as well as formal hierarchical relationships, on a given setting. Specifically, it refers to the set of rules, networks, values and organisations that promote trust, mutual support and cooperation in a society.

With reference to crime prevention, many studies have found that crime prevention efforts are effective - that is, fear of crime and crime rates actually drop - where there is high social capital and high collective efficacy (Maxwell, Garner and Skogan 2011; Rukus and Warner 2012; Ansari 2013; Abdullah, Marzbali, Bahauddin and Tilaki 2015). However, a few studies are either inconclusive about the connection between these variables or suggest that the relationship varies from one community to another (Nero 2010).

Communication infrastructure refers to the whole array of communication facilities, practices, forums and opportunities that are available to a community for its members to 'story-tell' their experiences and concerns. Studies on community communication and communication infrastructure have been summed up into a coherent theoretical framework known as the Communication Infrastructure Theory (CIT).

CIT, roughly summarised, 'distinguishes local communities in terms of whether they have communication resources that can be activated to construct community, thereby enabling collective action for common purpose' (Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2006). Studies employing CIT suggest that civic engagement and community participation could be greater where the communication infrastructure is rich but they are inconclusive on the causal pathway that this takes. Richness encompasses the questions of what communication infrastructure is available [variety and nature] and who uses them and how often.

Explaining the effectiveness or otherwise of crime prevention must also take into consideration factors of population density and poverty. While one might expect that high density populations provide human surveillance that then discourages crime, especially property theft, most studies suggest that crime rates rise with population density. On the one hand, dense populations are difficult to organise for effective community interventions; on the other, dense populations are difficult to police. It is also the case that dense populations make more property available for possible theft (Nolan III 2004; Harries 2006; Shichor, Decker and O'Brien 2006).

The link between poverty and crime has also been established in the literature. As far back as 1949, Shaw established the correlation between economic instability and crime rates. Studies that follow largely agree on this as well (Shaw 1949; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Ouimet 2012; Lightowlers 2015).

The foregoing explanations informed both our hypothesis and research design. Our central research question is: how effective are CBCP practices and what explains their effectiveness or ineffectiveness? We hypothesised that communities whose CBCP are effective have wider community participation, greater social capital, greater collective efficacy, and better communication infrastructure than those communities whose CBCP are ineffective. We control for the role of poverty and population density through case selection.

## 2 Research design and methods

As a way of setting the scene, we briefly review the regional evidence on community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices before going into the detailed case study in Nigeria. Regional evidence across Africa shows that the practice of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) is not only widespread but also varied in its form and structure. Importantly, the practice also turns out a variety of outcomes: while some are considered effective, others are considered ineffective while yet others produce inconclusive outcomes.

An effective CBCP is conceptualised as one that produces an actual reduction in crime rates and results in citizens' favourable perception of their safety. Whereas citizens' perception of their own safety can be measured through a survey, studying actual reduction in crime rates is problematic. This is because, very often, crime rate statistics are based on police records, but as Bruce (2010) observes, police records in Africa 'cannot be relied on as an indicator of trends in violent crime' for several reasons. This is because in many African countries, citizens do not report crimes because of fear of getting into trouble with the police; police records are not properly kept and the few that are kept are declared 'classified documents' not for public or researchers' access. In addition to this, police records are sometimes manipulated to give an exaggerated picture of crime rate reduction and success in official crime prevention efforts (Bruce 2010). Therefore, the effectiveness of CBCP in this study was determined based on two sources. The first source was the views of the citizens, community leaders and the police obtained through interviews, focus group discussions and surveys. The second source was our participant observation at community security meetings and community security patrols.

This could be interpreted as a major limitation of the study especially when one views citizens' perceptions as being at variance with reality, and that reality has ascendance over perception. However, the literature shows that citizens' perception of security is important. It very much influences how they view government and its responsiveness to citizens' needs; indeed whether they support government at all.

To understand whether and why CBCP practices were effective or ineffective in the selected communities, we combined descriptive large-N surveys and quasi-experimental small-N comparative case study designs. While a Large-N survey is a suitable design when it comes to analysis of larger data, a small-N case study is case-oriented and suitable for tracing causal relationship (Emmenegger, Schraff and Walter 2014). Based largely on Mills' method of similarity or difference, small-N case study designs allow researchers to make causal explanations through spatial, longitudinal or dynamic comparisons of carefully selected cases (Gerring 2012). This is a particularly useful method for policy-engaged research because it combines the strength of experimental research with the value of observing citizens in their real-life contexts thus providing a platform strong enough to make credible policy suggestions.

We applied a large-N survey method to afford us the opportunity of harvesting a diversity of views which is important in such a multi-ethnic and multicultural city. However, surveys alone would have been inadequate to study a people with a strong oral tradition, who live in a string of interconnected clusters. These tradition and settlement patterns, therefore, necessitated the adoption of ethnographic methods and small-N case studies.

The study was conducted in Ibadan, Nigeria because community-driven CBCP is prevalent in the city; the city straddles the wide spectrum of socio-economic statuses and population densities in Nigeria. It is multi-ethnic and multinational, therefore providing the opportunity to harness a diversity of views and practices. Historically, Ibadan metamorphosed from a war camp situated beside the Savannah—*Eba-Odan*. It was founded by a group of warriors led

by Lagelu. The place was originally a sort of 'no man's land serving as an informal boundary between the inhabitants of the savannah (*Qdan*) who were the Oyo people, and the forest (Igbo) dwellers, the Ijebu and Egba' (Layonu, Okosun, Kehinde and Ishola, cited by Ademowo 2015). Besides, empirical evidence has shown that Ibadan has high incidents of motor park violence (Ademowo 2015), and like Johannesburg in South Africa, Ibadan has a 'history of organic growth and change and high crime rates', with both cities having a high prevalence of neighbourhood enclosures to check crimes (Fabiya 2006). With some measure of certainty, the findings of studies based in Ibadan, therefore, should present a credible platform for formulating policies that might work in similar socio-cultural contexts.

For the first round of data collection, we divided the city into two vast swathes based on population density, and from each swathe we chose nine communities. We then conducted a survey in those 18 communities in order to assess the effectiveness of their CBCPs. In that first survey, we asked community members to describe their sense of safety, the activities of their neighbourhood association in charge of the CBCP, the level of crime in their neighbourhood, the person to whom they would rather report crime, and the connection between the level of safety and the activities of their neighbourhood associations. This led us to classify the 18 communities into two strata: communities with effective CBCP and those with ineffective CBCP.

From each stratum, we selected three communities. Although the second survey was not intended to be a comparison of these groups of communities, we thought it wise to spread the selection of communities across performance levels of CBCP, socio-economic profiles and population density in order to provide a diversity of views and experiences. The six selected communities were *Agbowo*, *Laaniba*, *Oladele II*, *Old Bodija*, *Onireke* and *Sasa*.

In each of the selected communities, we investigated community participation, social capital, and communication infrastructure. From each community, 40 adults responded to the survey totalling 240 adults. These were selected through systematic random sampling of each fifth house. In each house, the household head or, in his/her absence, the first volunteering adult was selected. Survey data was analysed descriptively and through correlation. After this, we interviewed community leaders and conducted a focus group discussion with residents in each community.

The last round of data collection was qualitative. For this we selected two communities both of which had a low socio-economic profile and were densely populated but varied on the effectiveness of their CBCP - *Sasa* and *Oja'ba*. This pair helped us to hold both poverty and population density constant. Population density and socio-economic status have been shown to affect the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts: crime prevention efforts produce better outcomes where both population density and poverty are low. The selection thus enabled us to rule out these two variables as possible explanations for the variation in the effectiveness of CBCP in the selected communities.

We conducted two focus group discussions with residents of each community, with discussants numbering between eight and ten for each discussion session. We conducted in-depth interviews with the chairs of the resident associations and the police boss in each of the stations that serviced the two communities. We participated in six monthly meetings of the resident associations and in two security patrols with association members.

Through process tracing, we established a causal pathway that explains why CBCP works in one community but not in the other, even though these two have in common all the factors that matter. By examining socio-cultural and other contextual factors, we concluded that poverty and population density, as well as economic and demographic factors such as unemployment and youth population, were rather implausible explanations for the effectiveness or otherwise of CBCP practices.


# 3 The regional picture

## 3.1 Crime rates and crime rate trends in Africa

Official and other statistics show that the crime rate in Africa is high. Of nearly half a million homicides committed globally in 2012, only 5 per cent occurred in Europe; 31 per cent occurred in Africa; just next to the Americas' 36 per cent (UNODC 2013). Numbeo (2015) ranked six African countries as among the twenty nations with the highest crime rates in the world. These include South Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Libya. When homicide rates per 100,000 population were calculated, Africa again came second to the Americas. For example, statistics from the victimisation surveys in Africa (UNODC 2010) revealed that in Rwanda, during the period 2003-2008, out of the number of crime cases reported, 68.9 per cent were crimes at the household level while 31.1 per cent were personal/individual cases. In other African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Tanzania and Uganda, robbery, corruption, consumer fraud, sexual assault, kidnapping, and property crimes involving car hijacking, theft of livestock, and burglary were prevalent, although to varying degrees.

As indicated by UNODC, out of 437,000 (almost half a million) deaths caused by intentional homicide globally in 2012, more than a third (36 per cent) happened in the Americas, 31 per cent occurred in Africa, 28 per cent in Asia, and just 5 per cent in Europe (UNODC 2014). Figure 3.1 shows that Africa has the second homicide rate among the regions of the world.

**Figure 3.1: The 2012 homicide rates by region (per 100,000 inhabitants)**



Own Elaboration  
Source: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC 2014)

The world average for the period is 6.2 per 100,000 inhabitants but the African rate is twice that (UNODC 2014). Other forms of crime, such as arson, child trafficking, drug abuse, drug trafficking, commercial crimes, kidnapping and illicit firearms possession and use also plague African nations in different proportions (Harrendorf, Heiskanen and Malby 2010; UNODC 2014).

More worrisome is the fact that crime rates seem to be increasing rather than decreasing. UNODC (2014) reports increases in homicide rates in Eastern Africa with Kenya and Uganda in the lead since 2004. In South Sudan, there have been high levels of firearm

availability, and this situation has increased the lethality associated with cattle rustling, especially in the Wunlit Triangle—a region that witnessed one of the highest homicide rates in the world in 2013 at over 60 per 100,000 inhabitants. And, although South Africa experienced a steady decrease in homicide rates between 1995 and 2011 of more than 50 per cent, from 64.9 to 30.0 per 100,000 inhabitants, the country witnessed an increase to 31 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. Since then, the trend has continued to rise. In fact, the 2013/2014 crime statistics in South Africa show that the country was less safe than it was two years earlier. Cases of murder, specifically house robbery, and hijacking, have continued to rise in the country. As reported by the South African Police Service, between 2013 and 2014, the murder rate went up by 5 per cent, with more than 17,000 cases. This increase amounts to over 800 cases more than the previous year. Specifically, the average number of murders committed each day rose from 45 in 2012/13 to 47 in 2013/14 (South Sudan Monitor 2011; Eye Witness News, 2014; Institute for Security Studies and Africa Check, 2014; South African Police Service, 2015).

With respect to organised, armed conflict, De Villiers (2015) shows that there was an escalation of conflict in Africa in 2014, with five Sub-Saharan countries recording an estimated 74 per cent of all deaths related to conflicts on the continent. Data on trends of violence and conflict-related fatalities in Africa released by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED 2015) show that Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria accounted for 26 per cent, 10 per cent, and 9 per cent respectively of all organised, armed conflicts in Africa in 2014. This trend shows a continued pattern since 2013, when these countries were responsible for approximately 33 per cent, 10 per cent, and 9 per cent, respectively, with only Somalia recording a reduction. In 2014, Libya and South Sudan joined the category of most violent countries as they accounted for 10 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of violent conflict in Africa. However, DR Congo, which was high on the list in 2013, recorded a reduction in her relative violence rate to 7 per cent of violent conflict in Africa in 2014. In Libya, the rate of conflicts tripled (i.e. approximately 500 conflicts in 2014 compared to 160 conflicts in 2013). The country also witnessed a sharp increase in remote violence tactics (i.e. approximately 280 instances in 2014 compared to 110 in 2013) and violence against civilians (i.e. approximately 270 instances in 2014, up from 108 instances in 2013).

When riots and protests are not considered, the least violent African countries in 2014 were Benin, Botswana, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Nigeria is the deadliest country in Africa recording over 29 per cent of all organised, armed conflict-related fatalities in Africa in 2014, with 6,383 deaths in 2014 (ACLED 2015), largely caused by the insurgency in the north east. This is almost twice the number of deaths reported in South Sudan which recorded 16 per cent of all organised, armed conflict-related deaths.

The high rate of crime in Africa has been explained as a product of several factors. These include political factors such as state fragility and state failure, and historical factors such as the history of inter-ethnic and interracial injustices including apartheid. Others are economic factors such as unemployment and corruption, and the balloon effect resulting from the improved successes of anti-drug law enforcement in Europe and the Caribbean, which are said to be responsible for increased drug trafficking in West Africa (UNODC 2007; *The Economist* 2009; Wyler and Cook 2009; UNODC 2015). This, however, is not to suggest that African governments are not fighting crime. The next section is an overview of their efforts.

### **3.2 State policing and crime prevention efforts in Africa**

Prominent among different measures adopted by African countries to reduce or prevent crimes are efforts to establish the rule of law, criminal justice systems and police forces. Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya and many other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, have long established police forces with crime prevention mandates, among other duties (Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008).

In Nigeria for example, despite proclaimed reforms by successive governments, there has been little improvement in crime-fighting efforts (Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008). Growing allegations of corruption and incompetence in crime fighting have been continually levelled against the Nigeria Police (Hills 2008), compelling the government to establish some security and anti-corruption agencies such as the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), the State Security Service (SSS), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (Odekunle 2004; Obuah 2010). In addition to these, Nigeria has embarked on several security programmes and projects. For instance, in collaboration with the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), Nigeria launched its Security, Justice and Growth (SJG) programme in 2002 to address core issues of security and access to justice. The programme was successful, ending in 2010 with most of its objectives achieved (DFID2010).

In 2008, the government of Ghana signed a US\$12.5 million financing agreement with the European Commission to enable the Police Service to embark on a massive recruitment drive and increase the number of cops on the beat. Also, Ghana's judicial service rolled out aggressive judicial reforms. It adopted court automation, built more law courts, appointed more judges and established weekend courts to expedite the pace of justice (Integrated Regional Information Networks, IRIN 2008).

South Africa in 1996 established the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). The Strategy was designed to rebuild the Criminal Justice system to ensure appropriate sentencing and an effective criminal justice process. It also focused on a public education programme, community policing, a victim empowerment programme, and sustained care for juveniles, among other objectives (Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention 2015; South African Government 2015). However, the campaign failed to achieve its objectives because of its many shortcomings (see Masiza and Ntlokonkulu 2002; Newhan 2005; Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008). In 2009, the South African president promised to boost the police from 183,000 to 205,000 in three years but there were doubts that this would reduce the South African crime rate significantly (*The Economist* 2009).

State policing in African states has failed to meet the aspirations of citizens because of inherent historical, cultural, ideological, economic and political challenges. This failure has its roots in the colonial experience of indirect rule, which gave the power to maintain law and order in communities to traditional rulers and their agencies (Killingray 1986). With examples in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, Killingray (1986) observed that under this system, the Native Police Authority or Tribal Messengers under the control of the traditional rulers were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, while the Government Police Force was a micro establishment with minimal control at the city centres. This failure to assume full control eventually culminated in arbitrary rule and the forceful migration of some people into other areas. The same method was adopted at independence by the countries concerned, although other security bodies were also established with an expansion of the police and military. The system did little to prevent fragmentation, as it depended on expressions of loyalty centred on regional and communal, rather than on national, identity (Marenin 2009).

Over time, this phenomenon has culminated in full blown political and economic crises in some African countries, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Southern Sudan, where various interests and ethnic leaders constantly manipulate the weaknesses of the state apparatus to establish control. Marenin (2009) has highlighted some basic problems that confront the state police in most African countries. These problems, which emanate from the historical conditions highlighted above, include the lack of operational and occupational

autonomy; weak professional ethics or standards as a result of inherent colonial mentalities; a negative public perception of the police as corrupt, brutal and inefficient; the lack of public acceptability and legitimacy of the state; abuse of power; weak national identities; lack of resources; corruption; and inefficient management.

The continued failure of state agencies to prevent crime is the most likely reason for the increasing recourse to non-state actors in Africa. Baker (2010b) listed these actors to include vigilante groups, religious police, ethnic or clan militias, civil defence forces, semi-commercial anti-crime groups, work-based security groups, local government security structures, customary structures, and restorative justice community-based organisations or peace committees. To these one should add fully commercial security providers and the varieties of crime prevention practices organised informally by communities in Africa. As a result, vigilantism and community policing (self-policing) operate in many African States alongside and in competition with ineffectual state policing (Hills 2011).

Hills (2011) identified the specific challenges that undermine internal security and limit the effectiveness of the state police in some African States. In Uganda, the researcher observed that crime detection and prevention are a mirage because most of the police stations do not have case files, or even the transport and communication facilities needed for effective policing. Training and re-training are substandard, commitment to work is very low as there are no programmes for job motivation.

In Ethiopia, the ease with which ordinary citizens have access to guns makes it difficult for the police to effectively prevent insecurity. In addition, the fact that police or army posts are located far away has made it possible for Islamic fundamentalists in Oromo and parts of Somalia to perpetuate religious tensions and banditry. Persistent and increasing unemployment, economic stagnation, and poor strategic planning, are grossly affecting the effectiveness of state policing.

The researchers observed that Namibia and South Africa (after apartheid) have similar problems. Namibia at independence hurriedly adopted the structure and leadership of the old South West African Police (SWAPOL) in the new NAMPOL. But this was little more than camouflage because in reality the police were grossly under-funded. Officers exhibited low morale and high absenteeism because they were not inappropriately trained or promoted. The situation was better however in South Africa.

State policing in Somalia is severely affected by politically-motivated ethnic and factional militia groups who perpetuate chronic extortion and an economy of plunder using conflict and mobilisation. Somalia has a small population of only about 5 million, large expanses of land with very long distances between urban areas, scarce resources and ethnic rivalry between the North and South, making it difficult for the state to effectively maintain law and order. The situation has encouraged the growth of many militia groups that enforce order in their respective territories. This fragmentation of control across clans and lineage makes it easy for teenagers and young adults to inordinately impose their will and plunder both traders and citizens.

### **3.3 Community-based crime prevention practices in Africa**

Community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices are prevalent in Africa, with different structures, names, as well as different degrees of state involvement and formalisation. Community policing, neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, police partnership boards, are some of the names describing the different forms of CBCP in Africa. In the review that follows, we focus on three African countries which present an arguably representative variety of CBCP in Africa. Tanzania, for instance, has one of the oldest traditional CBCP, the *Sungusungu*. South Sudan is emerging from a prolonged crisis that has stretched its official

policing mechanism and capacity beyond the breaking point, while South Africa has high crime rates but relatively sophisticated forms of CBCP.

### **3.3.1 CBCP in Tanzania**

Tanzania is famous for *Sungusungu*, an old movement intended to ward off cattle raiding, and also for *ulinzi shirikishi* which is an adaptation of *Sungusungu* (Cross 2013; Fleisher 2000; Heald 2000; Michael 2000; Heald 2009). *Sungusungu* became a state-sponsored vigilante form of CBCP in Tanzania after many years of informal existence, whereas *ulinzi shirikishi* is a state concept and idea. While the Tanzanian state has allowed *Sungusungu* groups to codify their own laws and exact their own forms of punishment, *ulinzi shirikishi* operates within the framework of state security law (Cross 2013).

It is on record that during the 'peak' period of *Sungusungu* interventions, in the late 1980s, the rates of mugging and robbery dropped in the country by 60 per cent and 72 per cent respectively, with a 20 per cent drop in burglaries and a 24 per cent drop in assault cases (Shadrack 2000). Cross (2013) notes that although community policing in Tanzania was found to facilitate crime prevention and make residents feel safer in their neighbourhoods, it was not necessarily more accountable or responsive than state policing. In some areas, *Sungusungu* members have been accused of the same failings frequently attributed to the state police: soliciting bribes, wrongful arrest, using excessive force and lacking sensitivity when dealing with the public (Cross 2013). Nevertheless, the *Sungusungu* enabled communities to take back power and have heralded a new vision of community responsibility for local safety and security while its legalisation has acted as a check on their excesses (Heald 2009).

### **3.3.2 CBCP in South Sudan**

As an emerging post-conflict state, South Sudan does not have adequate capacity and structures to deal with organised crime and criminality and this hampers her state and nation-building endeavours (Mbugua 2012). The adoption of community policing as a CBCP approach tends to be favoured by some stakeholders in South Sudan to address the issue of insecurity. These include the South Sudan Police Service and other local and international actors.

The framework for CBCP is set out in the 2009 South Sudan Police Act. However, currently there is no common understanding or definition of community policing in South Sudan. It is spoken of in terms of Police Community Relations Committees or voluntary community police officers. In the South Sudan context, CBCP could therefore be understood as having an institutional approach and philosophy, as well as an auxiliary or supplementary police capacity at the local level.

It is not uncommon to experience problems with implementing community-based security reforms in a post-war context like South Sudan. In its post-war history, South Sudan has a range of actors, both local and international, with different understandings and definitions of CBCP, especially community policing. The obviously complex context in which it is implemented also presents a difficult hurdle.

### **3.3.3 CBCP in South Africa**

A common type of CBCP in South Africa is the neighbourhood watch scheme which operates in partnership with the South African Police Service, the Community Policing Forum, local authorities, and private security service providers. The National Crime Prevention Centre in South Africa (2000) produced a manual to guide local authorities in designing their own crime prevention plans. The design includes sections such as the need

for a community crime prevention strategy, the state of communication infrastructure and community participation, and how to plan and implement a crime prevention strategy.

Baker (2002) submitted that the challenges of the state police's inadequate resources, training and institutional accountability has made non-state policing thrive in South Africa, as citizens have had to make their own provisions to guarantee their right to freedom and personal security. But non-state policing has been only slightly effective in complementing the efforts of the state police in ensuring safety in the communities. It has also led to more social isolation in communities, where non-state volunteers have discriminated against minorities, and to a rise in illegal possession of weapons, leading to more violence. It has also negatively affected criminal justice and promoted inequality in access and adjudication of security and justice.

The effectiveness of CBCP in South Africa seems to be undermined by the tension in the expected roles of the police and CBCP actors. The police would want CBCP actors to be intelligence gatherers while the actors would wish for a more amenable police force (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Mutual interracial suspicions and cleavages as well as crises of legitimacy also compromise the effectiveness of CBCP in South Africa (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Owen and Cooper-Knock 2014).

In summary, CBCP practices in Africa are indeed widely prevalent with evidence that they sometimes have a positive impact on security in the society. CBCP actors, especially vigilante groups, provide intelligence and join the police in crime fighting. They are sometimes quickly mobilised in times of emergency (Olaniyi 2005; Fourchard 2008; Hills 2008; Van Der Spuy and Röntschi 2008; DFID 2010; Holmer 2014). In fact, in many communities, local vigilantes have won the local legitimacy that the police seem to have lost (Hills 2008; Pratten 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest that CBCP often performs below the expectations of both government and citizens in Africa. One of the major failures of CBCP in many African countries is that while they may be effective in reducing petty thievery and even homicides and armed robbery, in many cases they replace these crimes with others, notably mob justice and a general abuse of citizens' rights (Baker 2002; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In addition to this, some CBCP often isolate segments of the community – foreigners, those from other ethnic groups - and even provoke the use of violence (Baker 2008). Some actors, especially vigilante groups, have become security threats in themselves and sometimes include criminals in their ranks (IRIN 2008; Adigwe 2013; Al-Akhbar 2013; Holmer 2014).

## 4 Models, practices and reasons for CBCP effectiveness

In the section, we present the general findings and then proceed to explain why CBCP is effective in some communities and not in others.

### 4.1 Community-based crime prevention practices in Ibadan, Nigeria

There is wide prevalence of community-based crime prevention practices in Ibadan, organised and managed by residential associations also called community associations, community-development associations, residents' associations or sometimes, landlords' associations. It is rare to find a neighbourhood where this kind of association does not exist. This wide prevalence is reflected in the responses to our survey: 95.8 per cent knew about the neighbourhood association in their community.

Each association has its unique story of origin but most of them emerged when early settler-neighbours realised that ‘no one can survive in this [jungle] alone’ (Association leader, Male, Sasa). Before government legislated that such associations be formed, neighbours had already taken the initiative to form them. The age of each association is roughly the same as the age of the neighbourhood. While some have elaborate structures with a written constitution, others have rather shifty structures and adopt ad hoc approaches to issues.

The association is usually headed by an executive council of between 8 and 15 members with a chairman or president, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer, financial secretary and a women’s leader. Some include a youth leader in the executive. Membership of the association is mandatory for everyone residing in the neighbourhood under its jurisdiction.

The general meeting is held monthly – usually first or last Saturday of each month – while the executive meeting is held twice a month. Attendance at meetings is mandatory in some places for both landlords and tenants, and in other places, for landlords only – but a monthly contribution of money is mandatory for both in all cases. The average membership size is 50 but a member can mean a person or someone in representation of a building. If there is a building housing multiple households, such a building is expected to send a representative to the neighbourhood meeting; it is not mandatory for every household in a multiple-household building to be represented. This explains why although they all pay levies, only 62.1 per cent of our respondents considered themselves members of their community association.

Most associations are self-funded, relying almost solely on levies from members. Levies vary from community to community. In some communities, contribution is per person whereas in others it is per building. In the latter case, the association values a building and decides how much the owner pays per month as a security (or as development and security) levy. This ranges from 200 Naira (US\$1) to 5,000 Naira (US\$25). Shops, private schools and similar commercial outfits attract higher levies because ‘they attract bad people [thieves, burglars] and so they must be more properly watched’ (Association leader, female, *Onireke*). About 95 per cent of residents considered the levies they paid to be fair. Some associations however get substantial support from businesses within their jurisdiction: an example is one for which a big business outfit donated a meeting hall as part of their corporate social responsibility programme.

The associations engage in what they generally refer to as development activities as well. These include installing and maintaining streetlights within their community, repairing roads and maintaining gutters, buying and maintaining electricity transformers, and fixing other electrical faults in the neighbourhood. They also provide water through boreholes or open wells, give financial and emotional support to distressed members, and settle disputes among members. However, crime prevention is cited as the most important function of the associations: 73.3 per cent of our respondents claimed that their community associations had organised crime prevention activities in the previous three months.

## **4.2 A mix of models**

The community associations combined the elements of three non-state models of security provisioning: private security arrangements, vigilantism and neighbourhood watch. First, the communities had guards whom they hire and pay on a monthly basis. The community with the fewest number of guards had four while some had as many as ten. In some neighbourhoods, such as *Old Bodija* and *Oladele II*, the guards ran day and night shifts while in others, the guards worked only at night. The guards patrolled or stayed beside the entrance and exit gates. All the night guards and most of the day guards carried arms but not all of them were registered as staff of a security company.

Secondly, communities also invited members of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria to assist their guards if there were situations that the guards could not handle. Some communities have a retaining arrangement with the vigilante groups while others paid the vigilantes only when summoned. In a few communities, the hired guards were members of vigilante groups who remitted a part of their income to the group. For some associations, vigilante members are preferred to guards who do not have a corporate affiliation because 'vigilantes are bold and they are prepared in terms of arms and also [protective] charms unlike ordinary guards who will see armed robbers and flee' (Female resident, Sasa).

Third, the associations engaged in neighbourhood watches. A resident whose community hired night-only guards said, 'we are all guards during the day. The night guards work during the night.' Among our respondents, 81.5 per cent claimed that they volunteered to watch over the neighbourhood. A discussant, who is a retiree, said:

*Sometimes you think I am just taking a walk, especially when most people have gone to work when the neighbourhood is near empty. I take a walk but I am really looking round to know if there are any strange faces. As you entered this street, I saw you from afar but you didn't see me.*

(Discussant, Focus Group Discussion)

There was, however, a more active form of neighbourhood watch especially at night. Most community associations had bought whistles for each house. On sighting any strange movements, a resident would sound his/her whistle and other residents would pick it up until the whole neighbourhood would become one choir of whistles. The whistle blowing could go on for over one hour. This not only alerted the guards but also scared the intruders. In other communities, members were actually called out to patrol along with guards, in addition to and while blowing the whistles. Armed with cudgels, long knives and sometimes pistols and guns, men and, occasionally, women engaged in this exercise no matter the time of the night.

Communities adopt whatever works for them in their particular contexts. While it is profitable to classify CBCP practices based on existing models, attempting to ram them into one clear-cut model would do much conceptual harm.

### **4.3 Communitisation as the overarching strategy**

Community associations embarked on numerous crime prevention activities, including constructing gates or iron bars at the entrances and exits to the communities, hiring guards and paying them, organising security seminars for members of the community, installing and maintaining streetlights, conducting censuses and maintaining a register of residents in the community so that strange people are detected and subjected to vigilance, and working with the police. Overarching all of these activities is a strategy which can be described as communitisation, a process or act of declaring as a 'community asset or liability' what ordinarily should be a private property or space or even a public government building. This strategy plays out in two different forms.

#### **4.3.1 Communitisation of personal spaces and problems**

In the process of ensuring safety and preventing crime, community associations in Ibadan exercised an oversight function over, or even control of, private freedoms, spaces and property. The executive council of the associations had a very visible presence and significant powers. From the association, landlords have to obtain clearance for, or at least register, each new tenant they are bringing into the community. In most places, tenants are questioned and asked to explain what prompted them to leave their former residence, and are expected to sign up to certain undertakings. Residents are given a form to fill out. There are cases of associations expelling tenants whose conducts were deemed capable of

compromising the security of the community, and some have done this even without the consent of the tenants' landlords.

In Sasa, the executive council often entered a house with or without the owner's consent to search it or inspect it. There were also cases of houses whose power supply cables were disconnected from the electric poles because the members failed to cooperate with the community association.

When asked to explain from where such legitimacy was derived, community association leaders explained that the land belongs to the community. Mr Olaniregun, a community association chair explained:

*Each person is the owner of his property but the land belongs to the government, it belongs to us all. No one came here with land; we all came here as strangers and bought land. The community is the owner of everything. If tomorrow I am no longer the leader, I cannot lead people into your house and say we want to search. And our people understand; they trust the association. They know it's for the good of everyone that we're doing this. That's why they cooperate.*

(Olaniregun, Interview)

During one of our patrols with the members of an association, they noticed the carcass of a vehicle which had been parked by the roadside within the community for six years. It was thought that criminals might begin to use the carcass as a hideout. The owner was called out and given 48 hours within which to remove the carcass or face sanctions. It was learnt that two weeks after, the association, having notified the police, paid to tow the carcass to the dumping ground outside the community.

Owners of vacant and bushy lots of land were usually put under pressure to clear the lots so as to prevent them from also being used by robbers as hideouts. Parents whose children were considered to be violent, lazy or just deviant were pressured as well to find a solution to the problem. In Onireke, the community association would take offence at the sight of any child who is of school age but not in school, and parents of such a child would be questioned.

*You see, it is our way of ensuring security today and in future. If these kids are not sent to school, what will happen to our kids that we send to school? Our association doesn't mind assisting you financially for a period if that is needed to send your child to school.*

(FGD Discussant, female, Onireke)

The example was given of a day-and-night guard who lived in the gatehouse of a particular house with his school-age son. The community insisted and assisted him financially to enrol the boy in a public school.

At one of the meetings we attended, Alhaji Bidemi, a founding member of a 35-year old association summed it up thus:

*We all have our rights and privileges but the interest of the community is uppermost. If the community says, 'don't sleep', you don't. In some communities, men and women come out to patrol all night. Yes, that is the community saying you dare not sleep and they obeyed.*

(Alhaji Bidemi, FGD Discussant)

An event in Sasa showed that Alhaji Bidemi's comment might have been exaggerated but not totally untrue. A group of youths was planning their 'Carnival' in February 2015. A 'carnival' is an all-night street party involving drinking, loud music, and some fracas resulting in injuries and occasionally deaths. Youth groups try to outdo one another on the wildness of their 'carnival'. The Sasa youth group had printed banners and invitation and put up street decoration without informing the association. The association called them up for tough questioning and then declared: 'there can never be a carnival in this neighbourhood.'

How did residents respond to this seemingly overbearing disposition of the associations? Focus group discussants described the demands and actions of the associations as moderate and acceptable. Noting that inspections are not a regular event, a female discussant in *Old Bodija* asked rather rhetorically:

*What would you rather choose? Privacy without security or security without privacy? And what is privacy? They are not coming to look into our pots of soup or nakedness or something like that. They want to see if you're harbouring criminals or bombs ... you know, with Boko Haram now. And they're taking all these troubles for our sake. If they want to inspect the house, that's a good thing.*

(FGD Discussant, female)

Refusal to allow a community association to inspect one's house was seen by the residents as an indictment: 'it means you have something to hide.'

Whereas the practice of communitising personal spaces is widespread, it is by no means universal. In the super-rich parts of *Onireke*, a community within a community, private spaces are respected. In fact, CBCP is hardly of any effect there as everyone provided his own security by providing high fences round the house and a fulltime guard hired by each landlord or occupant. The chairman of *Onireke* residents' association lamented the lack of cooperation from the elite.

Communitising personal spaces is also not without tension. Occasionally community leaders find residents who insist on their rights to privacy or would not cooperate in some other ways. Such matters have ended in one of three ways: the association leaders used persuasion, most of the time behind the scenes, until the person is co-opted. If this did not work, they meted out some punishment to the resident ranging from disconnecting their house from electricity mains or instructing the guards to not open the community gates for them – such a resident has to open the gates for themselves, which in some communities was considered an insult. Third, and in a few cases, the association took the person to the police and after that the court. A commonly brandished instrument was the government decree that made it mandatory for residents to be actively involved in and cooperate with their community associations or to risk a fine and imprisonment for two months (Oyo State Government 1996; *Nigerian Tribune* 2012).<sup>1</sup> Very often, the associations won.

The corollary to communitisation of private spaces is communitisation of personal problems. Community associations stand by members who suffer misfortunes, especially active members. They also arbitrate between members who have disputes because 'we are one; a member's peace is everyone's peace' (Male resident, *Old Bodija*). They even assume caretaker roles for the property of deceased members, returning the proceeds to the deceased's family members.

However, where the communitisation of private problems was most obvious was in matters involving the police. Most Nigerians avoid the police as much as possible – even when they

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<sup>1</sup> That military decree was revisited by the civilian government in 2012 and passed into law. The original fine of 200 Naira (US\$1) was upgraded to between 5,000 Naira (US\$25) and 10,000 Naira (US\$50) (*Nigerian Tribune* 2012).

are in the right. It is generally believed that if one reported a problem to the police, he or she would be treated as the prime suspect, and there was no estimating the number of times one would be asked to return to the police station over a matter about which one might have just have a passing witness. One could even be detained. Therefore, when residents noticed a problem, they preferred to report to the community association leaders first, who then reported the case to the police.

When asked to whom they would prefer to report a security problem, 93.4 per cent of our respondents said they would rather report to the community association while 6.6 per cent would report to the police. The FGD discussants explained that this was preferred because the police could not detain an association but they could detain an individual. It was safer to report to the association. The association would take the matter up 'as if it is a community matter.'

In *Sasa*, a resident noticed that a long truck had been parked by the roadside for days and bluebottles were gathering around it. He peeped in and found that the truck driver was in it dead and decomposing. According to him, he notified the landlord who notified the police and sanitary officers. The corpse and the truck were removed immediately. He explained:

*If I had reported to the police, they'd have detained me until an autopsy is performed to prove that I was not the one who killed the driver. But you see, they know the chairman (of the community association) and they know he is the community; he speaks for the community. He cannot run away and they cannot detain him. They have a cordial relationship.*

(FGD Discussant, male)

Reporting to the chairman who in turn reported to the police also had the added advantage of attracting a reasonably rapid police response. When an individual lodged a distress call, residents believed, the response from the police was always slow if it ever came.

Communitising personal problems sometimes appeared like shielding members from the law. However, association leaders emphasised the point that they do not stand by members who were accused of criminal misconduct but would rather work with the police to ensure that justice was done. A particularly recurrent example was that of children of members or leaders of the association who were accused of property theft: the association refused to stand by such people.

The success of CBCP does not result from a consultative leadership that respects residents' fundamental right to privacy and follows democratically laid down principles. Rather, it requires the presence of a strong association or a strong leader who at times ignores boundaries, coerces, threatens and also protects as occasions demand.

#### **4.3.2 Communitisation of abdicated state roles and duties**

The police were an important part of the CBCP: they counselled community association leaders; they held monthly Police-Community Relations Committee (PCRC) meetings with communities, and conducted regular patrols at the request of communities.<sup>2</sup> They arbitrated between community associations and their members in the case of any disagreement that communities could not solve internally. Despite this, only 25.4 per cent of our respondents had seen the police talk to residents about crime prevention in the previous one year, while only 24.6 per cent had seen the police attend community meetings.

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<sup>2</sup> PCRC meetings are held for clusters of community associations at a centrally located police station or a designated hall; they are not held for each community association.

Residents, police and community leaders described the relationship between the associations and the police as cordial; 'we are partners in progress.' Chairmen described situations in which they had called the police deep in the night over security breaches and how they had responded immediately. The police also described the kind of assistance they received from the community associations, such as receiving intelligence reports.

However, the interaction between the police and the community association should be understood as abdication by the state of its primary function of funding the police force, and the effort by communities to assume this role – in other words, to communitise them as if they are now the responsibility of the communities. Basic statutory roles of government, which had been neglected, were now being taken up by the communities. Communities tax their members to raise funds to build police posts. In fact, *Oladele II* attempted to build a standard police station but was prevented to do so by the police authorities who, instead, approved a police post. Different but contiguous communities teamed up to build PCRC meeting halls and on a monthly basis contribute money at PCRC meetings to support the police.

Not only this, each time the police was called in distress, community association leaders knew that they had to pay for the fuel for the patrol vehicles to run. This is in addition to the regular contributions that enable the police to maintain regular scheduled patrols of the communities. An association leader explained:

*I got a phone call about 2am three days ago that robbers had entered our area [community] from the NISER end beside the stream. I called the police at Alakara. Those ones don't waste time. They came immediately and chased the bad boys up to IITA, firing shots after them. Now, you call officers at that time, will you then ask them to go away empty handed? They don't manufacture fuel; they're police not NNPC.<sup>3</sup>*  
(Interviewee)

When asked why he called *Alakara* police station, and not *Sasa* police station that was nearer, he explained that his association had 'a relationship with *Alakara*.' Another chairman said, 'Each time I called, I more or less have to say, we'll give you fuel.'

The police officers were not as forthcoming on this as the chairmen of the associations were. They complained about the poor state of patrol vans, the inadequate number of serviceable ones, and lack of money to fuel and maintain them. They acknowledged the critical support of the community associations 'in terms of logistics' but were quick to insist that although they had a 'relationship' with some communities, they would gladly serve any community whether or not such a community supported the police.

Monies and other resources expended in maintaining a 'relationship' with the police were disclosed at executive meetings of the associations but not at the general meetings. In some communities, all of this is shrouded in secrecy, meaning that both the police and the community leaders have doubts about the legality of communitising the abdicated role of the State and the implications of this for the role of the police as neutral arbiters and law enforcement agents.

Did the 'relationship' sometimes impede the performance of the police? Police officers complained a lot about some community associations 'taking the law into their hands.' When the guards apprehended suspected robbers, they would often beat them mercilessly and sometimes tie them up before handing them over to the chairman. Sometimes, the suspected thief was a mere drunk, loiterer or a mentally ill wanderer who was found outside

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<sup>3</sup> NNPC, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, is the official agency in charge of fuel production and marketing in Nigeria.

at the wrong time. Guards did not often bother to investigate or they lacked the skills to do so. There is no mention of reprimand or punishment for such association chairmen or night guards. A police officer said:

*We always plead with them; we explained to them that until the court pronounces someone guilty, you cannot punish the person; you cannot take the law into your hands. Maybe this is the most difficult problem we have with the community associations and their guards.*  
(Police officer, Interview)


The existence of a 'relationship' was the likely reason that the police were reluctant to prosecute community association leaders or their guards for excesses.

Rapid police response to distress calls from chairmen of associations is not automatic. It comes with 'a relationship' nurtured by the associations' readiness to step into the law enforcement and crime prevention role abdicated by government, that of funding the police. This should be understood in the context of the larger state failure which makes CBCP necessary in the first place. The same process goes on with the provision of some other public goods such as electricity and potable water: communities provide and maintain electric cables, electric poles and insulators as well as power transformers to ensure community members have access to electricity, just as they also dig boreholes and open wells to supply water. They also repair roads and construct gutters.

#### 4.4 Effectiveness of the CBCP practices


The foregoing section describes the process and the dynamics of the CBCP in Ibadan. It is important to assess how effective the citizens considered the CBCP practices to be, in terms of crime prevention. To do this we asked them to assess the safety of their neighbourhoods, state if they had been victim of a criminal act in the previous three months, and state if certain criminal acts were a problem in their neighbourhoods. In an earlier survey, we asked if they considered the CBCP practices responsible for the safety of their neighbourhood. Nearly 63.0 per cent of the citizens considered their communities very safe while only 2.1 per cent considered them very unsafe.

**Figure 4.1 Citizens' perception of safety of their communities (n=240)**




Focus group discussants were no less in agreement about the safety of their communities. To investigate further, we asked them to state the most serious problems in the communities. Interestingly, only 8.3 per cent of the respondents considered insecurity to be the most difficult problem of their neighbourhood. The most frequently mentioned problem was the poor condition of local roads (25.8 per cent). The problem of insecurity was the fifth most frequently mentioned, coming after unemployment (8.8 per cent).

**Figure 4.2 Most difficult problem in the neighbourhood as identified by residents (n=240)**



Residents were asked to state if they had been victims of any type of crime in the previous 12 months. Of the respondents, 84.6 per cent stated that they had not been victims of a criminal act within the stated period. In addition to this, only 11.7 per cent considered home-based robbery to be a problem in their neighbourhood; only 10.8 per cent considered robbery outside of the house a serious problem while only 9.2 per cent considered shootings to be a serious problem.

**Figure 4.3 Percentage considering specific criminal acts as serious problem in their neighbourhood (n=240)**



Criminal acts were considered by very few as serious problems. When asked to compare the crime rate in their communities to that in neighbouring communities, 82.9 per cent of respondents considered the crime rate in their communities to be less.


A majority of the respondents (72.7 per cent) considered their CBCP to be responsible for the low level of crime and high level of safety in their communities. FGD discussants were quite emphatic about this. However, some complained about petty property theft, especially theft of clothes hanging on the line, power generating sets and domestic animals, which they believed would be difficult to stop.

We investigated the possible influence of social capital, communication infrastructure, participation and collective efficacy on the perceived effectiveness of CBCP. First we describe the levels of these variables before addressing their significance.

#### 4.4.1 Social capital

Community residents see others from their immediate communities as being more trustworthy than people from outside their communities. This is evident as shown in Figure 4.4 where more respondents described people who live in their communities as very trustworthy (n=90; 37.5 per cent) and somewhat trustworthy (n=100; 41.7 per cent) but fewer respondents described them as not very trustworthy (n=29; 12.1 per cent) and untrustworthy (n=6; 2.6 per cent). Conversely, fewer respondents described the Nigerian people generally as being trustworthy (n=18; 7.5 per cent) with more respondents describing them as not very trustworthy (73; 30.4 per cent) and untrustworthy (45; 18.8 per cent).

**Figure 4.4 Residents' perception of trust among their neighbours**



Residents had a positive perception of their neighbours in terms of mutual care and degree of cooperation that existed among them in the communities. Table 4.1 shows that 109 (45.4 per cent) and 66 (27.5 per cent) respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively that the people in their communities were willing to help their neighbours. The two values added together (n=175; 72.9 per cent) represent an overwhelming majority for those who had a positive perception of their neighbours compared to only seven (2.9 per cent) and 23 (9.6 per cent) who strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively, that

their neighbours were willing to help others in the communities. The majority of the respondents also agreed (n=116; 48.3 per cent) and strongly agreed (n=73; 30.4 per cent) that their communities were united. Only three (1.3 per cent) and 15 (6.3 per cent) strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively. Respondents also demonstrated a willingness to leave their children or their house keys with their neighbours or allow their kids to eat in their neighbours' houses. As presented in Table 4.1, for example, 105 (43.8 per cent) and 57 (23.8 per cent) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that they would allow their kids to stay with their neighbours whereas only seven (2.9 per cent) respondents strongly disagreed. Similarly, only 15 (6.3 per cent) respondents strongly disagreed with the option of leaving their house keys with their neighbours but 86 (35.8 per cent) and 60 (25.0 per cent) respondents agreed and strongly agreed to leave their house keys with their neighbours. These represent 60.8 per cent of the respondents.

**Table 4.1 Residents' perception of mutual care and cooperation among their neighbours**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	DK	DA	Total
The people of the community are willing to help their neighbours	7 (2.9%)	23 (9.6%)	34 (14.2%)	109 (45.4%)	66 (27.5%)	1 (.4%)	-	240 (100.0)
This Community is very united	3 (1.3%)	15 (6.3%)	32 (13.3%)	116 (48.3%)	73 (30.4%)	1 (.4%)	-	240 (100.0)
I can leave my kids with my neighbours	7 (2.9%)	30 (12.5%)	29 (12.1%)	105 (43.8%)	57 (23.8%)	4 (1.7%)	8 (3.3%)	240 (100.0)
I can leave my house keys with my neighbours	15 (6.3%)	46 (19.2%)	30 (12.5%)	86 (35.8%)	60 (25.0%)	1 (.4%)	2 (.8%)	240 (100.0)
I can allow my kids to eat at my neighbours' house	17 (7.1%)	52 (21.7%)	33 (13.8%)	91 (37.9%)	42 (17.5%)	4 (1.7%)	1 (.4%)	420 (100.0)
I can allow my neighbours' kids to come and watch TV in my house	8 (3.3%)	14 (5.8%)	11 (4.6%)	130 (54.2%)	73 (30.4%)	4 (1.7%)	-	420 (100.0)
I feel free to attend social functions of my neighbours (e.g. naming of babies, weddings and burials)	1 (.4%)	6 (2.5%)	7 (2.9%)	126 (52.5%)	100 (41.7%)	-	-	420 (100.0)
I feel free to ask my neighbours for financial assistance, food items, etc.	33 (13.8%)	47 (19.6%)	39 (16.3%)	70 (29.2%)	49 (20.4%)	1 (.4%)	1 (.4%)	420 (100.0)

Almost all of the residents (n=226; 94.2 per cent) expressed their willingness to attend social functions such as the naming of babies, weddings and burials organised by their neighbours. Only seven (2.9 per cent) of the respondents clearly said that they were not inclined to attend social functions of their neighbours. Seventy (29.2 per cent) and 49 (20.4 per cent) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed to ask their neighbours for financial assistance, food items and other forms of help in times of dire need.

#### **4.4.2 Communication infrastructure**

Communication infrastructure is high and sufficient in the communities selected for the study (see Table 4.2). A majority of the respondents agreed (n=107; 44.6 per cent) and strongly agreed (n=117; 48.8 per cent) that their community associations met sufficiently enough whereas only one (.4 per cent) and 13 (5.4 per cent) strongly disagreed and disagreed,

respectively. Over 54 per cent of the respondents agreed that their community associations shared sufficient information among community members, 33.8 per cent strongly agreed while only two (.8 per cent) respondents strongly disagreed. More than 91 per cent of the respondents confirmed that collective communication in their communities helped members to solve security problems. Only 7.5 per cent of the respondents disagreed with this.

**Table 4.2 Residents' assessment of sufficiency and relevance of information exchange in the community**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Invalid	Total
My community association meets often enough	1 (.4%)	13 (5.4%)	107 (44.6)	117 (48.8%)	2 (.8%)	240 (100.0)
My community association has a conducive meeting hall/place	3 (1.3%)	57 (23.8%)	94 (39.2%)	86 (35.8%)	-	240 (100.0)
My community association discusses issues that are relevant to my needs	1 (.4%)	43 (17.9%)	121 (50.4%)	75 (31.3%)	-	240 (100.0)
My community association shares sufficient information	2 (.8%)	27 (11.3%)	130 (54.2%)	81 (33.8%)	-	240 (100.0)
My community association welcomes suggestions from residents	2 (.8%)	26 (10.8%)	110 (45.8%)	101 (42.1%)	1 (.4%)	420 (100.0)
Information from residents to the association is sufficient	3 (1.3%)	44 (18.3%)	120 (50.0%)	70 (29.2%)	3 (1.3%)	420 (100.0)
Information from one resident to another is sufficient	3 (1.3%)	48 (20.0%)	131 (54.6%)	54 (22.5%)	4 (1.7%)	420 (100.0)
My community association shares timely information	1 (.4%)	31 (12.9%)	142 (59.2%)	64 (26.7%)	2 (.8%)	420 (100.0)
Our communication in this community helps us to solve security problems	-	18 (7.5%)	119 (49.6%)	100 (41.7)	3 (1.3%)	420 (100.0)

Members of the selected communities attended different types of meetings. They employed diverse means of making suggestions or lodging complaints and shared phone contacts among themselves. These are the components of their communication infrastructure. As presented in Table 4.3, meetings of the community associations (n=170; 70.8 per cent) were those most frequently held. This was followed by landlords' meetings with tenants (14.2 per cent). Meetings of tenants within a house (n=21; 8.8 per cent) and meetings of association with police (n=12; 5.0 per cent) were not held frequently. Face-to-face communication (n=184; 76.7 per cent) was the most frequently employed means of sorting issues among community members while communication through Short Message Service (SMS) was the least used means (n=5; 2.1 per cent). Phone calls (n=28; 11.7 per cent) and letters (n=14; 5.8 per cent) were also used occasionally by members to lodge complaints or make suggestions. About 31 per cent of the respondents had the phone numbers of some of their neighbours while 25.8 per cent of them have the phone numbers of most of their neighbours.

**Table 4.3 Communication infrastructure in the communities**

	Meeting Types	Frequency	Percentage
Which type of meeting do you always have?	Meeting of the community association	170	70.8%
	Meeting of association plus police	12	5.0%
	Meeting of tenants within a house	21	8.8%
	A landlord meeting with tenants	34	14.2%
	Invalid	3	1.3%
	Communication means		
What means do you use to make suggestions or lodge complaints to the community association?	Face-to-face	184	76.7%
	Phone calls	28	11.7%
	Letters	14	5.8%
	SMS	5	2.1%
	None	7	2.9%
	Invalid	2	.8%
	Phone Numbers Possessed by Residents		
I have the numbers of	Some of my neighbours	76	31.7%
	Many of my neighbours	62	25.8%
	Few of my neighbours	66	27.5%
	None of my neighbours	32	13.6%
	Invalid	4	1.7%
	Total	420	100.0%

It is likely that the availability of communication infrastructure created opportunities for the exchange of ideas, networking and other forms of communication needed for the CBCP to succeed.

#### **4.4.3 Community participation**

The level of community participation was high among the residents. More than half of the respondents (n=133; 55.4 per cent) confirmed that in the last three months up to the time this survey was conducted, they had attended at least one meeting of their community association. Similarly, 48.8 per cent of the respondents said that in the last three months, they had done some volunteer work for their community associations.


**Table 4.4 Residents' level of community participation**

	Efforts	Frequency	Percentage
In the last three months, have you put in a physical effort to solve a problem in the community?	No	57	23.8%
	Yes	179	74.6%
	DA	12	5.0%
	INAP	1	0.4%
	Invalid	8	3.3%
	Donating materials		
In the last three months, have you donated materials for the work of your community association?	No	56	23.3%
	Yes	180	75.0%
	DA	4	1.7%
	INAP	1	0.4%
	Invalid	5	2.1%
	Total	420	100.0%

Those who had contributed to solve a problem in the community in the previous three months were 74.6 per cent while 75.0 per cent had donated materials for community work.

To what extent do social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure influence the effectiveness of CBCP? To answer this question, we calculated the average score of each community on each of the factors. As Figure 4.5 shows, social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure were high in the studied communities.

**Figure 4.5 Social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure and CBCP effectiveness**



We found that these factors were relatively high in both effective CBCP communities and ineffective CBCP communities. This, therefore, makes it implausible to argue that these factors explain the effectiveness of CBCP. Whereas they form the pillars of community cohesion and thus contribute to the effectiveness of community projects, in this case, CBCP, they do not explain the (in)effectiveness of CBCP. A wide variation in the levels of these factors across the two blocks of communities would have suggested otherwise and so would have made a further probe worthwhile.

#### 4.5 Explaining ineffectiveness: a comparison of two CBCP practices

Not all CBCP practices are effective and in some communities, the performance is too poor to be ignored. The uneven performances presented an opportunity to investigate causal factors in the effectiveness of CBCP through a carefully set up comparative design. For this purpose, we compared an effective CBCP with an ineffective one paying attention to the context, dynamics and the actors. The chosen communities were *Sasa* and *Oja'ba*.

Both communities have CBCP dating back to 35 years in *Sasa* and to pre-colonial times in *Oja'ba*. Both have erected iron bars that serve as gates and hired night-only guards. Each community association holds its general and executive meetings monthly but emergency meetings are more common in *Oja'ba* than in *Sasa*. In both communities, residents contribute money to finance their CBCP practices and projects. In *Sasa* the least is 300 Naira (about US\$1.5) per house; in *Oja'ba* it is 500 Naira (about US\$2.5) but both community associations complained about residents who did not want to pay the monthly

levies. Both associations work with the police for crime prevention and send representatives to the Police-Community Relations Committee (PCRC) meetings.

Compared to other communities that we studied, *Sasa* and *Oja'ba* are both densely populated and fall within a comparable socio-economic profile: most residents are petty traders and artisans. The youth population is also large in both communities and the rate of unemployment in both communities is high but it might be slightly higher in *Oja'ba*.

Despite this level of comparability, the CBCP practices produce widely varied outcomes. In fact, whereas 86.7 per cent of *Sasa* residents considered their CBCP to be effective; only 26.7 per cent of *Oja'ba* residents thought theirs was.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 4.5 A comparison of CBCP performances in *Sasa* and *Oja'ba***

	<i>Sasa</i>	<i>Oja'ba</i>
% that had witnessed a criminal activity in the last week	0%	22.5%
% that knew of a criminal hideout in their community	26.7%	80.0%
% that considered their community unsafe	0%	40.0%
% that knew where hard drug spots are in their community	6.7%	73.3%
% that claimed to know where to buy stolen property in their community	0%	6.7%


Focus group discussants at *Oja'ba* painted the picture of totally inept CBCP practice while describing their experiences:

*Ah! This place is unsafe o! It is God that's been protecting us. Shops are burgled constantly, houses are set on fire and cars are stolen regularly. Street fighting is regular with harming [injuries] and sometimes death. My shop has been burgled twice in [the last] three weeks.*  
(Discussant, FGD)

In *Sasa*, however, the case was different:

*... because the association is very up and doing, we have a security team that handles security matters and because they have been effective, this place [community] has been very safe. We've not had problems on security.*  
(Discussant, FGD)

In an attempt to account for this variation in the performances, we examined the progression between the CBCP activities of *Sasa* community association and the outcomes, and then compared that with that of *Oja'ba*.



<sup>4</sup> The second wave of quantitative data collection in *Oja'ba* was discontinued because of extortion and threat to the lives of field workers. Therefore, we relied on the first round of quantitative data for both *Sasa* and *Oja'ba* in this section of the report. We were, however, able to conduct participant observation, interviews and focus group discussions in both communities.

In all the other communities with effective CBCP, the structure and progression is the same. However, in *Oja'ba*, the progression is truncated at some point. Community leaders are unable to totally control the residents and communitise spaces. They manage to develop a 'relationship' with the police and get the police to patrol but they are reluctant to report offenders to the police or to supply police with intelligence.

#### **4.5.1 History, culture and the role of multiple lordships**

The inability of the community leaders in *Oja'ba* to fully communitise spaces and report offenders to police deserves some interrogation. Possible explanations could be the large population of the community, low level of formal education, large droves of unemployed citizens, poor communication infrastructure and lack of participation by the community. Marenin (2009) has also identified some factors that may compromise the overall effectiveness of policing in Sub-Saharan African states. Some of these constraints are perennial political instability, widespread insecurity, identity-based and violent conflicts, corruption, class and status differences, weak civic society organisations, and quest for personal survival by most of the citizens. However, we did not find any of these possible explanations to be plausible.

Residents reported a high level of participation at community association events and activities. They attend meetings and take an active part in development projects. One of our interviewees explained that though he was a building representative and that he did not have to attend meetings, he did attend regularly so as to keep himself abreast of events in the neighbourhood. Leaders of the association also did not complain of low level of participation.

With reference to population and youth unemployment, we found that both *Sasa* and *Agbowo* were as densely populated as *Oja'ba* and yet they had effective CBCP. Both communities also hosted large youth populations with a high level of unemployment. Fourchard (2003) following after Agboola, Olatubara and Alabi, (2001) describes both *Oja'ba* and *Sasa* as urban slums with high levels of illiteracy and poverty. The population figures of the different local governments in which the two communities are found also do not support the overpopulation explanation: the Akinyele Local Government Area where *Sasa* is found had a population of 211,359 in a landmass of 575 km<sup>2</sup> while the Ibadan South West Local Government Area where *Oja'ba* is located has 283,098 to a landmass of 805 km<sup>2</sup> (Oyo State Government 2015)

We also did not find evidence of poor or dysfunctional communication infrastructure in *Oja'ba*. Across the communities, communication infrastructure was significantly related to the effectiveness of CBCP. In *Oja'ba*, however, there was little to suggest that the communication infrastructure was poor. Members of the community reported regular meetings, conducive meeting places and a communication context that enabled regular and free exchange of useful information most of the time.

*We come to meetings a lot and people come many; association meetings are sometimes like parties. Sometimes we have up to 80 per cent of the expected number of people [at meetings]. People come to meetings so that when they need help and assistance, they can get it.*  
(Discussant, FGD)

For the explanation of leaders' inability to communitise space and work with the police successfully, we looked at the history of the community and the power balances in it.

*Oja'ba*, located in the ancient part of the city, is a traditional community of indigenous Ibadan people. Traditional settlements follow kinship and family ties as relatives settled in large

compounds known as *Agbo-Ile*, houses built in circles. Each *Agbo-Ile* is headed by a *Baale* (compound head) and its members are related at least remotely to members of the next compound. Each *Baale* serves for as long as he lives; there is no term of office and removal from office is rare. Most community associations in the traditional parts of the city were ancient compound-based cooperatives or ‘meetings’ that were rebranded as community associations in line with government directives. An interviewee described the associations as ‘handed over by our fathers who inherited them from their fathers’. They are headed mostly by the *Baale* who cannot be removed from office for any reason.

Kin-based settlement type has implications for CBCP. Among the Yoruba, it is unacceptable to report your kin to the police or to any outsiders. It is often said, *a kii ti kóòtù de s’òré*, meaning: we do not return from the law court and remain friends. Reporting a kin to the police or giving out intelligence information on him is an offence to tradition and ancestral relationships. Instead of reporting offenders in *Oja’ba* to the police, leaders ‘call them to order’, during meetings which is a poor alternative.

This contrasts with *Sasa* where nearly everyone is a settler and the community association was formed 35 years ago to meet security and development needs. Leaders of association serve terms of office and can be returned or removed if found incapable. There are no kinship ties and the police is regarded not as an intruder into existing familial ties but as law enforcer and arbiter.

To the problem posed by kin-based settlement should be added the tradition of violent street fighting among the indigenous Ibadan people. There is a popular saying and belief that street fighting is a tradition of Ibadan (*Ijà igboro l’orò Ibadan*). Traditional festivals, religious festivals, youth carnivals, sports competitions, among others, are traditionally accompanied by violent street fights. The reason for this is difficult to find but it is generally acknowledged that this is not a recent phenomenon. A resident averred:


*Those houses and cars were burnt over there. You can see them. They were burnt during the last Egungun festival. That happens every time; no one can do anything about it.*

(Discussant, FGD)

This certainly is beyond the control of the community associations, odd and dangerous as it is. These outbursts often overwhelmed the community associations.

The third explanation for the impotence of the community association in *Oja’ba* is the existence of multiple lords or ‘big men’. These are politicians, transport union leaders and gang leaders who have and maintain groups of followers who oftentimes break the law. These leaders, sometimes called godfathers, have a greater influence than community association leaders and are known to quickly secure the release of their followers when arrested by the police.

The foregoing situation undermines greatly the effectiveness of CBCP in *Oja’ba*. The truncated pathway for the *Oja’ba* CBCP is depicted below:



Possibly at some point, the association communitised spaces and roles, and maintained a relationship with the police. There was an increased police presence and patrols but for kinship reasons, the association was often reluctant to supply to the police intelligence which could lead to the arrest of offenders. Rather, they dealt with offenders 'in-house'. Even when offenders were reported to the police and subsequently arrested, their 'godfathers' got them released and they returned to the community to cause more trouble and taunt or even attack community leaders. Therefore, whether or not an offence or criminal act was reported, the offender returned to the community. This showed the community that the association was impotent and decimated the association's popularity. Consequently, the respect, legitimacy and resources needed to communitise spaces and roles waned, and the association and its CBCP lost importance. Police patrols became mere noisemaking and siren blowing. Cases of crime and lawlessness only multiplied in such an atmosphere.

On the one hand, the most important cause of the effectiveness of CBCP is the ability of the community associations to legitimately communitise private spaces, problems and assume abdicated state roles. On the other hand, explanations for the ineffectiveness of CBCP must go beyond social capital, poverty, unemployment and population density into more fundamental and more plausible possibilities. In the case of *Oja'ba*, a conjuncture of cultural and contextual factors combine to weaken the ability of the association to communitise spaces, problems and roles and thus weakens the overall effectiveness of the CBCP practice.

## 5 Discussion

The prevalence of non-state security provisioning is amply documented in the literature (Baker 2002; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Hills 2014). What has been a subject of controversy is whether these non-state arrangements work and how they work. Our study demonstrates that community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices work effectively in most parts of the city of Ibadan: residents considered them to be the cause of community safety and low levels of crime. The main strategy employed by the community associations that drive CBCP is communitisation – a process of appropriating for the community private spaces and freedoms as well as private problems and concerns, and also assuming the role of funding the police which is a core function of the state. The success or failure of a CBCP arrangement depends on this causal factor.

As confirmed by much of the literature (Baker 2002; Baker 2008; Buur and Jensen 2004; Fourchard 2008; Holmer 2014), the inability of the state to provide security is an obvious reason for CBCP practices. However, the current study leads us to conclude that the tension between state and non-state actors in security provisioning (Baker 2002; Baker 2010a; Baker 2010b; Denney 2015) is not universal. In the CBCP practices that we studied, there is a cordial and complementary relationship between the state, specifically the police, and the community associations that drive the practices. This is, expectedly, not totally devoid of tension, but the complementarity largely overwhelms what may appear to be tension. Hills (2014) describes this kind of relationship in Kano, Nigeria, between the police and culturally legitimate non-state but state-supported security groups, such as the *Hisba*, stressing the importance of informal relationships and the political and professional skills of the officers. The police in Ibadan, like Hills' (2014) in Kano, recognise the importance of these informal associations and groups and would rather deploy 'political ... skills [than] aggressive raids' (Hills 2014).

A major concern expressed in the literature about non-state security provisioning is its lack of accountability which is often used to explain abuse and the recourse to mob justice (Baker 2002; Baker 2008; Baker 2010a; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004). The current study, while

confirming the presence of some excesses, evokes the need to raise some critical questions. The community development associations that drive CBCP in Ibadan openly appropriate private rights, such as the right to privacy, and convert them into community rights; yet, members of the community gladly relinquish these rights in exchange for effective security provisioning. The question thus has to be tackled: whose duty is it to define what is an abuse, and what is not? On the other hand, how much is too much in offering some rights as currency for the right to security?

The place of social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure (Putnam 2000; Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2006) on the perceived effectiveness of CBCP was considered. Studies have shown correlations between these variables and crime rate reduction (Maxwell, Garner and Skogan 2011; Rukus and Warner 2012; Ansari 2013; Abdullah et al. 2015). However, the current study shows that of the three variables, only communication infrastructure was significantly related to the effectiveness of CBCP. Most of the communities, including those with ineffective CBCP, exhibited high levels of social capital, communication infrastructure and community participation. While there is no basis to suggest that social capital and participation do not lead to effective CBCP, there is a basis to suggest that the presence of these variables alone, even in good quantity, does not produce effectiveness of CBCP. What seems to be the most important factor is the presence of a dominant actor who garners these resources together towards fulfilling the objects of a CBCP practice.

Do high population density and poverty limit the effectiveness of CBCP? Both the literature (Shaw 1949; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Nolan III 2004; Harries 2006; Shichor, Decker and O'Brien 2006; Ouimet 2012; Lightowlers 2015) and intuition strongly suggest this to be the case. However, our spatial comparison of two cases that were similar in density and poverty level turns out a counterintuitive finding that contradicts this. These two largely similar communities turned out widely varied levels of CBCP effectiveness. However, since we did not compare two communities with varied population density and poverty levels, our findings do not completely rule out the place of population density and poverty in the success of CBCP. In the cases that we studied, historical, cultural and human factors combine to weaken the capacity of associations to deploy those communitisation strategies which cause CBCP to succeed in other communities.

## 6 Conclusions, policy implications and recommendations

To the question of whether CBCP works, the answer should be in the affirmative in view of the evidence that it does indeed reduce crime rate and improves neighbourhood safety. However, that is only as far as the group driving it can legitimately appropriate for itself certain powers and responsibilities within the community.

'The future is non-state', declares Baker (2010a) in his argument about the ubiquity of non-state actors in the security sector. While strongly agreeing with Baker on this, one should be cautious in suggesting that the state and donor agencies should intervene to facilitate the emergence of non-state actors. Rather, policies should be sensitive to the strengths and resources in the communities and help communities to nurture and maximally deploy these. Killingray's (1986) position is relevant here. The author cites Afigbo's example of the political organisation of the Igbo village group in south-west Nigeria that maintained their cultural uniqueness and refused to break down or fall into disorganisation under British colonial rule. The CBCP situation in Nigeria is one that presents opportunities to donors to demonstrate their ability to support what is locally owned, instead of labouring to attract local ownership to what they have imported.

Based on the present findings, it is recommended that parallel conceptions of state police crime prevention activities and community-based crime prevention practices be revisited. Societal safety may be better ensured by collaborative efforts between state police and community-based actors. This is even more needed in the African context where the number of state police is exceedingly low. Specific trainings on intelligence gathering should also be integrated into police-community relations. Police and community need to work together and use their respective strengths to prevent and tackle crime. This is particularly important because police presence in some parts of the country is quite limited, so working as parallel entities is ineffective. Joint training on intelligence gathering is one way of bringing them together.

It is important at the same time to engage in projects and adopt policies that reduce poverty and check population growth. Urban renewal projects should create more motor-able roads and make police patrols easier. Yet, these alone will not reduce crime rates and increase neighbourhood safety. Community-based crime prevention should be strengthened and formally supported. Where policies exist to support CBCP, such as in Oyo State, they should be implemented, while a policy on CBCP should be enacted where one does not exist. Actions that weaken the power of multiple lords should be embarked upon in particular. This should be one area where force and aggressive raids might be needed to protect CBCP practices. Effectiveness of CBCP is determined by a number of factors which currently are outside of the scope of existing regulatory frameworks and policies on community safety and security in Nigeria. There is need for legal frameworks and policies to address the process of communitisation which contributes significantly to effectiveness of CBCP. This would ensure that CBCP practices are done legally.

Community-based crime prevention has been shown to make people and the entire community safer. This is particularly the case where members of the community take the lead on identifying resolving local problems, and managing public spaces, and do not rely entirely on the state for support in these areas. In trying to promote community-based models in other parts of the country, the Ministry of the Interior and its development partners should actively help facilitate the process of defining clear community roles and responsibilities so that groups can maximise their strengths and resources.

The Nigerian Government and its police service should organise regular training for community leaders in order to minimise the friction sometimes caused by a transition to community-based crime prevention. Capacity building could focus on diplomacy skills and negotiation technique as well as more general instruction on democratic ideals and the drivers of crime.

In some cases, community-based crime prevention has been known to come under the control of local groups who wield parallel power in the area. These not only include criminal elements such as gang leaders, but heads of transport unions as well. With this in mind, the police should focus its efforts on reducing the power and influence of these groups. Such actions may include surveillance, arrests or more aggressive raids.

To boost the effectiveness of police patrols that support community-based crime prevention, the Government should prioritise the construction of more roads in the communities. These should be regularly maintained so that they do not deteriorate.

The effectiveness of community-based crime prevention is determined by a number of factors, many of which fall outside the scope of existing regulatory frameworks and policies that deal with safety and security in Nigeria. Given that community-policing models have been shown to work, specific legal frameworks and policies should be developed to facilitate the process of communitisation.

# Annexes

## Annex 1 Questionnaire for First Round of Data Collection in 18 Communities

### Effectiveness of Community-based crime prevention activities in Ibadan

#### Name of community/neighbourhood: residents' structured interview

- 1) For how long have you lived in this neighbourhood?
- 2) Do you take part in the activities of the neighbourhood association?
- 3) In which of the activities do you take part?
  - a. I attend the meetings
  - b. I contribute money regularly
  - c. I supervise development projects
  - d. I take part (physically) in development projects
  - e. I volunteer to watch over the neighbourhood
  - f. I supervise security projects
  - g. I represent the community during meeting with police representatives (PCRC)
  - h. Any other activities.
- 4) When last did any of these take place in your community?

	Within the last one week	Within the last one month	Long time ago	Don't remember
a. Somebody's property in this neighbourhood got missing – eg okada, car, clothes, phones etc.				
b. Somebody's house in this neighbourhood was burgled during the day				
c. Somebody's house in this neighbourhood was burgled during the night				
d. Somebody was kidnapped in this neighbourhood				
e. Armed robbers attacked someone in this neighbourhood				
f. Street fight among young people				
g. Use of illegal drug				
h. Gun shots in the neighbourhood				
i. Forceful extortion of money or property from residents				
j. Physical assault/attacks people				
k. Rape				

- 5) How often do the following things happen in this community?

	Every time	Occasionally	Rarely	Can't say
a. Stealing of property				
b. Burglary during the day				
c. Burglary during the night				
d. Kidnapping				
e. Armed robbery				
f. Street fight/gangsters' fight/ gangsterism				
g. Use of illegal drug				
h. Gun shots in the neighbourhood				
i. Forceful extortion of money or property from residents				



- 18) Do you think the activities of your neighbourhood association are effective in reducing crimes in your neighbourhood?
- 19) If you notice a strange movement in your neighbourhood or witness an ongoing crime, or suspect a criminal to whom do you report?
- 20) Why?
- 21) Age
- 22) Gender
- 23) Name (optional):
- 24) Status:
- a. Landlord/landlady
  - b. Landlord's/landlady's family or relative
  - c. Tenant
  - d. Tenant's family or relative
  - e. Others

## Annex 2 Questionnaire for Second Round of Data Collection

### A study of community-based interactions in Nigeria

This survey is to help us learn your views, values and experiences on interaction in communities in Ibadan. Your collaboration is important. There are no right or wrong answers and the survey is confidential. We appreciate your cooperation. Thank you.

NC. Questionnaire number / / / /	DE.
EC. Surveyor name	MU. Local Govt Area:
S. Supervisor/ / / /	CB. Community/neighbourhood:
FA. Application date / / / / / /	UR. Urban [ ] Rural [ ] (Tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> one)

#### General Data:

SE. Sex

1. Male 2. Female

EC. Marital Status

01	Single			07 Just living together
02	Married	05	Divorced	
03	Widowed	06	Separated	

ED. Age: \_\_\_\_\_ full years.

**P1.** In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem facing your community/neighbourhood? (ONE OPTION)

Lack of water	1	Bad Government	17
Poor condition of roads	2	Environmental problems	18
Lack of recreation facilities	3	Migration	18
Corruption	4	Drug trafficking	20
Lack of loan facilities for business	5	Gangs	21
Crime	6	Poverty	22
Unemployment, lack of jobs	7	Popular protest (Strikes, road closures, etc.)	23
Delinquency	8	Poor health services	24
Drug addiction	9	Insecurity	25
Economic problems	10	Problem of transportation	26
Problems in the education sector	11	Violence	27
Extortion	12	Poor housing conditions	28
Poor electricity supply	13	Too much noise	29
High cost of living	14	There are no problems in this neighbourhood	70
Shootings	15	Others	77
Loitering on the streets	16	DK	88
		DA	98

**P2.** In the past 12 months, have you attended a town meeting or municipal council session?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Now to change the subject	Yes	No	DK	DA
P3. In the last twelve months have you contributed to help solve a problem in your community?	1	2	88	98
P4. Have you donated money or materials to help solve any problem in the community or neighbourhood?	1	2	88	98
P5. Have you helped with your own work or labour?	1	2	88	98

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations: at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

	once a week	once or twice a month	once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	INAP
<b>P6.</b> Of a religious group?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P7.</b> Of an association of parents of the school?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P8.</b> Of a committee or board of community development?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P9.</b> Of a labour union?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P10.</b> Of a political party?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P11.</b> Of a NGO?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P12.</b> Of an organization of professionals?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P13.</b> Meetings promoted by your neighbourhood/community board?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P14.</b> How often do you attend cleaning activities of your neighbourhood/community?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P15.</b> Cultural activities in your neighbourhood/community?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P16.</b> The practice of any sport, as a player?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>P17. [only to women]</b> Meetings of associations or groups of women or housewives?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

**P18.** Talking about trust, how would you describe the people who live in your neighbourhood or community?

(1) very trustworthy	(2) somewhat trustworthy	(3) not very trustworthy	(4) Untrustworthy	(88) DK	(98) DA
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**P19.** Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people or that one has to be very careful in dealing with others?

(1) You can trust most people	(2) One has to be very careful when dealing with others
(88) NS	(98) NR

**P20** When I needed, my neighbours helped me (1) Agree (2) Undecided (3) Disagree

**P21.** Generally speaking would you say Nigerian people are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?

(1) trustworthy	(2) somewhat trustworthy	(3) not very trustworthy	(4) untrustworthy
(88) DK	(98) DA		

	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
<b>P22A.</b> Is there a community association or board in your neighbourhood / community? (eg Residents' Association, Landlord Association)	1	0 [Go to P 27.]	88	98	99
<b>P23.</b> Are you a member of that association or board?	1	0	88	98	99
<b>CP24.</b> In the last three months, have you attended a meeting called by the association or board of neighbours?	1	0	88	98	99
<b>CP25.</b> In the last three months, have you done any volunteer work for this association or board?	1	0	88	98	99
<b>CP26.</b> In the last three months, have this association or board of residents of this neighbourhood promoted crime prevention activities, such as safety measures for the neighbourhood or other activities?	1	0	88	98	99
<b>CP27.</b> Is there any other association or institution that is promoting programs for the prevention of crime and violence in this neighbourhood/community?	1	0	88	98	99

<b>P28.</b> How much confidence you have in the work done by the following bodies?	trustworthy	somewhat trustworthy	not very trustworthy	Untrustworthy	DK	DA
<b>P28A.</b> The churches/mosques	4	3	2	1	88	98
<b>P28B.</b> The Armed forces	4	3	2	1	88	98
<b>P28C.</b> The Independent National Electoral Commission	4	3	2	1	88	98
<b>P28D.</b> The President of the Nation	4	3	2	1	88	98
<b>P28E.</b> The Parliament	4	3	2	1	88	98

P28. How much confidence you have in the work done by the following bodies?	trustworthy	somewhat trustworthy	not very trustworthy	Untrustworthy	DK	DA
P28F. The Supreme Court	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28G. The National government	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28H. National Human Rights Commission	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28I. The Police	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28J. Fed. Ministry of Youth Development	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28K. The municipal government	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28L. Local government violence prevention council	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28M. Elections in Nigeria	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28N. The political parties	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28O. The Media	4	3	2	1	88	98
P28P. The NGO's	4	3	2	1	88	98

P29. How interested are you in politics?	(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) A little	(4) None	(88) NS	(98) NR
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P30. In general, how satisfied are you with the way dem works in Nigeria?	(1)very satisfied	(2)satisfied	(3) dissatisfied	(4)very dissatisfied	(88) DK	(98) DA
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P31. How much does the federal government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen?

(1)A lot	(2)Some	(3) Little	(4)None	(88) DK	(98) DA
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P32. How much do the local government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen?

(1)A lot	(2)Some	(3) Little	(4)None	(88) DK	(98) DA
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P33. In what year did you move here (the neighbourhood, or community)?

Year	___/___/___/___	(88)	DK	(98)	DA
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P34. Without counting your relatives, approximately, how many friends do you have living in your neighbourhood / community?

(1) None	(3) Between 3 and 5	(5) Between 11 and 20	(88) DK
(2) Between 1 and 2	(4) Between 6 and 10	(6) More than 20	(98) DA

P34xi: I have the phone numbers of (1) Some (2) many (3) few (4) none of my neighbours.

P35. Now, I'm going to read some sentences, for each sentence we would like to know if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.

	strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	disagree	strongly disagree	DK	DA
P35A. The people of the community are willing to help their neighbours	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35B. This community is very united	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35C I can leave my kids with my neighbours	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35E I can keep my house keys with my neighbours	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35F I can allow my kids to eat in my neighbours house	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35D I can allow my neighbours' kids to come and watch TV in my house	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35G I feel free to attend social functions of my neighbours (eg naming, wedding, burial etc)	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P35H I feel free to ask my neighbour's for financial assistance, food items etc	5	4	3	2	1	88	98

P36. I will now ask some general questions about your community. For each phrase we would like to know if it is very likely, likely, neither likely nor unlikely, unlikely, very unlikely.

	very likely	likely	Undecided	unlikely	very unlikely	NS	NR
P36A. Probability that a neighbour do something about it if a child runs away from school	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
P36B. Probability that a neighbour intervene if a fight breaks out in front of his house	5	4	3	2	1	88	98

<b>P36C.</b> probability that a neighbour intervene if a child or adolescent is disrespecting an adult	5	4	3	2	1	88	98
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**P37.** And thinking about this neighbourhood or community where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the state of public spaces ?

	very satisfied	Satisfied	dissatisfied	very dissatisfied	DK	DA
<b>P37A.</b> Park/public playground	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>P37B.</b> Communalhouse	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>P37C.</b> Sports court	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>P37D.</b> Street lighting	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>P37E.</b> Bus stops	1	2	3	4	88	98

**P38.** What about the state of public schools?

(1)	very satisfied	(2)	satisfied	(3)	dissatisfied	(4)	very dissatisfied
(88)	NS	(98)	NR				

**P39.** What about the state of the roads?

(1)	very satisfied	(2)	satisfied	(3)	dissatisfied	(4)	very dissatisfied
(88)	NS	(98)	NR				

[One answer for each item]

<b>P40.</b> In the past 12 months have you adopted any of the following behaviors for fear of being a victim of a crime?	Yes	No	DK	DA
<b>P40A.</b> Reduced my visits to recreation sites/playgrounds	1	2	88	98
<b>P40B.</b> Avoided to participate in public events.	1	2	88	98
<b>P40C.</b> Stopped using of community infrastructure	1	2	88	98
<b>P40D.</b> Felt the need to change neighbourhood or community	1	2	88	98
<b>P40E.</b> Avoided using public transportation	1	2	88	98
<b>P40F.</b> Avoided going out at night	1	2	88	98
<b>P40G.</b> Stopped visiting relatives and friends	1	2	88	98
<b>P40H.</b> Limited the shopping places	1	2	88	98
<b>P40I.</b> Avoided going out alone	1	2	88	98
<b>P40J.</b> Prevented your underage children to go out	1	2	88	98
<b>P40K.</b> Made changes in your house(Razor wired, gates, locks, etc.)	1	2	88	98

**P41.** I will read some of the things that people sometimes say about politicians, the government and I would like you to tell me if [read options]

	strongly agree	agree	disagree	strongly disagree	DK	DA
<b>P41A.</b> The government does not care much for people like you	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>P41B.</b> Politicians are willing to lie to win the election	1	2	3	4	88	98

**P42.** Now, changing the subject, have you been the victim of any type of crime in the last 12 months? That is, have you been the victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or any other type of crime in the last 12 months?

Yes [Go on]                      (2) No [Go to P45.]                      (88) DK [Go to P45.]                      (98) DA [Go to P45.]

**P43.** Thinking about the last criminal act of which you were a victim, from the list that I will read to you, what kind of crime did you experience?

01	Unarmed robbery <b>without</b> aggression or physical threat	08	Household theft, thieves got into the house while no one was home
02	Unarmed robbery <b>with</b> assault or physical threats	09	Extortion
03	Armed robbery	10	[Do not read] Other
04	Physical aggression without robbery	88	DK
05	Rape or sexual assault	98	DA
06	Kidnapping	99	INAP (Was not a victim)
07	Property damage		

**P44.** Could you tell me in which place happened the last criminal act of which you were a victim? **[Read options]**

01	In your home	05	In another country
02	In this neighbourhood or community	88	DK
03	In this town	98	DA
04	In another town	99	INAP <b>[Was not a victim]</b>

**P45.** Please tell me if the following conditions are a serious problem, somewhat serious, little serious, nothing serious or are not a problem in your neighbourhood or community.

	serious	somewhat serious	little serious	nothing serious	not a problem	DK	DA
<b>P45A.</b> Stains , graffiti or paint on the walls	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45B.</b> Abandoned houses	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45C.</b> Garbage on the sidewalks or streets/by the roadside	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45D.</b> Vacant land/plots/lots with high grass	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45E.</b> Streets or dark places or without street lights	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45G.</b> Youth gangs living in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45H.</b> Sale of illegal drugs in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45I.</b> People fighting and arguing in the street	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45J.</b> People who insult or annoy people when they walk through the streets of the neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45K.</b> Drunk people on the streets	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45L.</b> Drugged people in the streets (eg indian hemp smokers)	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45M.</b> Robbery at home	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45N.</b> Robbery on people when they walk down the street	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45O.</b> Shootings	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45P.</b> Brawls or fights between gangs	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>P45Q.</b> Murders	1	2	3	4	5	88	98

**P46A.** How safe do you feel in this neighbourhood?

(1)	very safe	(2)	somewhat safe	(3)	somewhat unsafe	(4)	very unsafe	(88)	DK	(98)	DA
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**P47.** Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighbourhood/community is greater, equal, or less than other neighbourhoods/communities in this town?

(1)	greater	(2)	Equal	(3)	Less	(88)	DK	(98)	DA
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**P48A.** Have you heard of any Violence Prevention Committee this town?

(1)	Yes	(2)	No	(88)	DK	(98)	DA	(99)	INAP
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**P49.** In the last three months, have you or someone you know attended a meeting called by the Violence Prevention Council in this town?

(1)	Yes	(2)	No	(88)	DK	(98)	DA	(99)	INAP
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**P50.** In the last 12 months, have you seen or heard that any institution has made public works in this neighbourhood/community, such as improving street lighting, cleaning activities, construction or repair of streets , courts or park?

(01) Yes (02) No (88) DK (98) DA

**P51.** In the last 12 months, have you seen or heard that a mosque or church has made efforts to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of this neighbourhood/community?

(01) Yes (02) No (88) DK (98) DA

**P52.** If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith would you have the judicial system will punish the guilty? **[Read options]**

(1)	Much	(2)	Some	(3)	Little	(4)	None
(88)	DK	(98)	DA				

**P53.** In the last 12 months, which of the following actions have you seen the Police do in this neighbourhood/community...

	Yes	No	DK	DA
<b>P53A.</b> Talking to the residents of this neighbourhood	1	2	88	98
<b>P53B.</b> Attend meetings of residents of this neighbourhood	1	2	88	98
<b>P53C.</b> Seen the Police performing activities to prevent crime in this neighbourhood	1	2	88	98
<b>P53D.</b> Relate to children and youth of this neighbourhood through recreational and educational activities	1	2	88	98

Now we will talk about how you exchange information in this community.

<b>P53x1</b> My community association meets often enough	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x2</b> My community association has a conducive meeting hall/place	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x3</b> My community association discusses issues that are relevant to my needs	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x4</b> My community association shares sufficient information	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x5</b> My community association welcomes suggestions from residents	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x6</b> Information from residents to association is sufficient	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x7</b> Information from one resident to another is sufficient	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x8</b> My community association shares timely information	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x9</b> Our communication together in this community helps us to detect and solve security problems	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree			
<b>P53x10</b> Which type of meeting do you always have?	(1) Meeting of the community association	(2) Meeting of association plus police	(3) Meeting of tenants living within a house	(4) A landlord meeting with tenants			
<b>P53x11</b> What means do you use to make suggestions or lodge complaints to the community association?	(1) Face-to-face	(2) Phone calls	(3) Letter	(4) SMS	(5) Social media	(6) e-mail	(7) None

**P54.** In general, you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighbourhood/community?

(1)	very satisfied	(2)	satisfied	(3)	dissatisfied	(4)	very dissatisfied
(88)	NS	(98)	NR				

**P55.** In your opinion this neighbourhood/community is very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe very unsafe?

(1)	very safe	(2)	somewhat safe	(3)	somewhat unsafe	(4)	very unsafe	(88)	DK	(98)	DA
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<b>P55x1</b> When security is jointly organised by the community, it works better than when it is organised by the individual.	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree
<b>P55x2</b> The community association can provide security for me, my family and my property better security than I can provide on my own.	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree
<b>P55x3</b> I have confidence in the security arrangement made by my community association	(4) Strongly agree	(3) Agree	(2) Disagree	(1) Strongly disagree
<b>P55x3</b> I'm capable of providing security for myself and my family.	(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree
<b>P55x4</b> I'm capable of providing security for myself and my property.	(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree

**Now talking about you.**

**P56.** How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently... **[Read options]**

01	Working	06	Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [End]
02	Not working, but have a job? [continue]	07	Not working and not looking for a job [End]
03	Actively looking for a job? [End]	88	DK
04	A student? [end]	98	DA
05	Taking care of the home? [End]		

**P57.** In this job are you: **[Read options]**

01	A salaried employee of the government	05	Unpaid worker
02	A salaried employee of the private sector	88	DK
03	Owner or partner in a business	98	DA
04	Self-employed	99	INAP

**P58A.** The house where you live in is... **[read options]**

01	Rented	04	<b>[Do not read] Other</b>
02	Owned by you	88	DK
04	Owned by your family		

**P59.** Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

00	No income
01	Less than N18,000
02	Between N18,100 and N50,000
03	Between N50,100 and N100,000
04	Between N101,000 and N500,000
05	Above N500,000

**P60.** What was the last year of education you completed? = \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ (Primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = \_\_\_\_\_ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12
University	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15	16		
DK	88					
DA	98					

**P61.** Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

(1)	Yes	(2)	No	(88)	DK	(98)	DA
-----	-----	-----	----	------	----	------	----

**P62.** The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read options]**

01	Is good enough for you and you can save from it	04	Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
02	Is just enough, so that you do not have major problems	88	DK
03	Is not enough for you and you are stretched	98	DA

**P63.** How many people live in your home at this moment \_\_\_\_\_ (88) NS (98) NR

Now to finish, could you tell me if you have in your house: **[Read Options]**

<b>P63A.</b> Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63B.</b> Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63C.</b> Landline telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63D.</b> Vehicle/car	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63E.</b> Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63F.</b> Electricity	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63G.</b> Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>P63H.</b> Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA

**Thank you very much for your collaboration.**

## **Annex 3 Instrument for Third Round of Data Collection – Interview Questions and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Questions**

### **Questions for Focus Group Discussion**

**Screeners:** Are you aware of your neighbourhood or landlord association? Only those who are aware are those to be recruited.

AVOID THOSE WHO FILLED THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. In what ways are you involved in the activities of your neighbourhood association? [Prompt for this]:
  - a. I attend the meetings
  - b. I contribute money regularly
  - c. I supervise development projects
  - d. I take part (physically) in development projects
  - e. I volunteer to watch over the neighbourhood
  - f. I supervise security projects
  - g. I represent the community during meeting with police representatives (PCRC)
2. Why do you participate in the activities of the community association?
3. How do people in your community participate in the activities of the community association?
4. Why is the level of participation high – if it's high? Why is it low – if it's low?
5. How safe would you describe the community? Any criminal activities?
6. Your community association has security arrangements. Please describe the arrangement.
7. How effective is the security arrangement made by the association? Please explain. Examples are important here.
8. Would you say the safety of your community [if community is safe] is the result of the activities of your neighbourhood association? Explain. Examples.
9. Do you think that your association demands too much money/commitment?

### **Questions for Association Leader**

1. How did your association come into existence? Who formed it and when?
2. What are the roles/functions of your association in this community?
3. What connections does your association have with traditional authorities such as the Baale, magaji etc?
4. What does your association do to prevent crime and ensure security in this community?
5. Some residents have said that your association is unable to prevent crime in this neighbourhood. What is your response to this? Would you say the measures you take are effective? Explain. Examples.
6. What challenges/problems does your association face in ensuring security in this community? [Cooperation from members, contributing money etc]
7. When a security issue arises, what does your association do?
8. Describe your association's relationship with the police on security issues.
9. Comment on your participation in police-community relations committee – PCRC
10. How do you think government can strengthen your association?

### **Questions for Police Officer**

1. Please describe the rate of crime in the area that your station covers.
2. Please describe the relationship between your station and the landlords' or community associations in this area.
3. Please comment on your meetings with community associations and your discussions at the meetings.
4. Would you say people prefer to report crimes to you directly or they prefer to go through their community associations?
5. Many communities have security arrangements – such as watchmen, gates, etc. What do you think of the security measures that communities take? Are they effective etc.
6. Do you think community associations sometimes violate the law through their security arrangements? Examples.
7. Please suggest ways of improving security in the communities.

## Annex 4 Assessment of quality of the evidence from existing studies

HIGH (H), MEDIUM (M), LOW (L)

Bibliographic Reference	Quality assessment Indicator							Overall Strength of Evidence
	1. Defined question ?	2. Transparent on data sources?	3. Clear design?	4. Suitable method?	5. Do findings match design?	6. Findings contextualised?	7. Logical policy recomm.?	
1. Abdullah, A., Marzbali, M. H., Bahauddin, A. Tilaki, M. J. M. 2015.	H	H	M	H	H	H	M	M
2. Ademowo, A. J. 2015	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
3. Agbola, T, Olatubara, C. O., Alabi, M. 2001.	H	H	M	M	H	H	L	M
4. Alemika, E. E. O., Chukwuma, I.C., 2004.	H	H	L	M	M	H	L	M
5. Ansari, S. 2013.	H	L	L	L	L	M	L	M
6. Arnstein, S. 1969.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
7. AU (African Union) 2013.	M	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	M
8. Baker, B. 2002.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
9. Baker, B. 2008.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
10. Baker, B. 2009.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
11. Baker, B. 2010a.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
12. Baker, B. 2010b.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
13. Brogden, M., Nijhar, P. 2005.	H	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
14. Brogden, M. 2005.	H	H	M	M	M	M	M	M
15. Bruce, D. 2010.	H	L	M	M	M	H	H	M
16. Burns, D., Hambleton, R., Hoggett, P. 1994.	H	H	H	M	M	H	H	H
17. Buur, L. B. and Jensen, S. 2004	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
18. Channels TV 2015.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
19. Coleman, J. S. 1988.	H	L	M	L	M	M	M	M
20. Cornwall, A. 2008.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
21. Crews, A., Crews, G. A. 2007.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
22. Cross, C. 2013.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
23. Cross, C. 2014.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
24. Dammert, L. 2005.	Spanish							
25. Denney, L. 2015.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
26. DFID (2010)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
27. Emmenegger, Schraff and Walter, 2014	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
28. Eye Witness News. 2014.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
29. Fabiyi, O. O. 2006	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
30. Fleisher, M. L., 2000.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
31. Fourchard, L. 2003.	H	L	M	L	H	M	M	M
32. Fourchard, L. 2008.	H	L	H	H	H	H	H	H
33. Gerring, J. 2012.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
34. Harrendorf, S., Heiskanen, M., Malby, S. [eds.] 2010.	H	H	H	H	M	H	H	H
35. Harries, K. 2006.	H	H	H	M	M	H	H	H
36. Heald, S. 2009.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
37. Heald, S. 2000.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
38. Hills, A. 2008.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
39. Hills, A. 2011	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
40. Hills, A. 2014	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H

41. Hsieh, C., Pugh, M. D 1993.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
42. Institute for Security Studies & Africa Check 2014.	L	L	L	H	M	H	H	M
43. IRIN. 2008.	NA							
44. Jenkins, S. 2013.								
45. Killingray, D. 1986	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
46. Kim, Y. C., Ball-Rokeach,	NA							
47. Kivoto, E. 2014.	NA							
48. Lightowlers, C. L. 2015.	H	H	M	H	H	M	H	H
49. Marenin, O. 2009	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
50. Maxwell, C. D., Garner, J. H. and Skogan, W. G. 2011.	M	H	M	H	H	H	H	M
51. Mbugua, J. K. 2012.	M	H	M	H	H	H	H	M
52. Michael L. F. 2000.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
53. National Crime Prevention Centre, 2000.	NA							
54. Nero, M. 2010.	M	H	H	H	M	H	H	M
55. Nolan III, J. J. 2004.	H	H	M	H	H	M	H	H
56. Nolte, I. 2007.	M	H	H	H	M	H	H	M
57. Numbeo.com 2015.	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
58. Obuah, E. 2010.	M	M	H	H	M	H	H	M
59. Odekunle, F. 2004.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
60. Okafor, C. 2015.	NA							
61. Ouimet, M. 2012.	H	M	M	H	H	M	H	H
62. Owen, O., Cooper-Knock. S. J. 2014.	H	M	M	H	H	M	H	H
63. Oyo State Government 1996.	NA							
64. Oyo State Government, 2015.	NA							
65. <i>Premium Times</i> , 2015.	NA							
66. Putnam, R. D. 2000.	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
67. Rukus, J., Warner, M. E. 2012.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
68. Schultz, P. W., Tabanico, J. J. 2007.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
69. Shadrack, J. 2000.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
70. Shaw, V. B. 1949.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
71. Shichor, D., Decker, D. L., OBrien, R. M. 2006.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
72. South African Police Service. 2015.	NA							
73. South Sudan Monitor 2011.	NA							
74. <i>The Economist</i> 2009.	NA							
75. Ugandan Parliament, 2015	NA							
76. UNDP 2014.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
77. UNODC. 2010.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
78. UNODC. 2014.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
79. UNODC. 2013.	M	L	H	H	M	H	H	M
80. Wilcox, D. 199	NA							

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