What Impact Do Tax Agents Have on Taxpayers’ Compliance in Uganda? Evidence from Tax Administrative Data

<p dir="ltr">Tax agents occupy a pivotal yet understudied position in tax systems. Most existing knowledge on their role comes from earlier work in high- and upper-middle-income countries. This generally finds that taxpayers hire agents to meet obligations they perceive as complex, while a smaller group seeks to minimise their tax liability through the exploitation of legal loopholes made possible by aggressive tax advice. This dual compliance-avoidance role has scarcely been examined in low-income countries. Exploratory evidence from Uganda, drawn from small surveys of revenue officials and tax agents, suggests a similar pattern – taxpayers primarily engage agents to navigate a complex tax system, and the most requested services are reviewing bookkeeping and preparing returns. On the other hand, tax officials prefer interacting with agents, and view agent-prepared returns as less prone to large audit adjustments. However, these surveys could not establish system-wide effects, due to small samples and limited access to data.</p><p dir="ltr">Summary of <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/articles/report/What_Impact_Do_Tax_Agents_Have_on_Taxpayers_Compliance_in_Uganda_Evidence_from_Tax_Administrative_Data/29064758?file=54537440" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">ICTD Working Paper 221</a>.</p>