

## 1 Introduction

In rural southern Africa, access to wild resources is critical to livelihoods and various attempts have been made by policy-makers to increase the income derived from them by poor communities. This article examines the resulting existing and emerging institutional arrangements in the tourism/safari hunting and forestry sectors and assesses their impact on livelihoods. Case studies of wildlife and forestry management initiatives involving communities are drawn from the Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa programme study areas: Eastern Cape (South Africa), Chiredzi District (Zimbabwe) and Zambézia province (Mozambique). Broadly speaking, four types of initiative, with different emphases, can be identified. These are community participation; partnerships or joint ventures between communities and the private sector; ecoregional conservation; and redistribution or restitution. To an extent these reflect different national priorities and contexts and these categories are rarely totally differentiated; overlaps and continuities exist. However, a key trend, particularly in South Africa (which is returned to and looked at in more detail in article 6 in Part III of this *Bulletin*) is the emergence of a number of policy approaches that seek to link private sector tourism and forestry operations with community or local involvement, usually with an emphasis on “pro-poor” commercial investment.

## 2 Community participation in wild resources management

Southern Africa has long been at the forefront of attempts to promote community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (see, for example, Hulme and Murphree 2001; Arve Benjaminsen *et al.* 2002). CBNRM has acquired the status of conventional wisdom in the region, most recently spreading to small-scale initiatives and policies in Mozambique. Essentially it describes arrangements for the decentralised sustainable utilisation of wild resources. The most high profile CBNRM scheme in the region has been Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE scheme (Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources), in which district councils gained authority over hunting quotas and leased them to professional hunting operators. Essentially, this was an attempt to disburse wildlife

# Part II: Resources and Policies

## 3. Wild Resources Management in Southern Africa:

*Participation,  
Partnerships,  
Ecoregions and  
Redistribution*

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### Box 1: A perception of CAMPFIRE

'CAMPFIRE money is being looted and little finds its way back to the community. If it does, it will not be adequate to meet my family's daily requirements and other necessities. The whole process reduces me to the status of a beggar. I am a man! CAMPFIRE is more about the National Park than us. We used to hunt and eat meat often, but now there are too many restrictions, yet our crops are being severely damaged by problem animals every year and the compensation is too little and untimely.'

Source: Mombeshora *et al.* (2001).

revenue (from safari hunting and ecotourism) and devolve authority to the local level. The central tenet of this scheme is that, in contrast to colonial-style "fortress conservation", there should be no conflict between the economic survival of agricultural communities and foraging needs of wildlife; rather, they should complement each other (Murphree 1990; Logan and Mosely 2002). Communities neighbouring protected areas should receive direct benefits from them and have some say in wildlife management and use if conservation policies are to be effective.

The SLSA research programme investigated the experience of community wildlife management in recent years in Zimbabwe's lowveld (see *SLSA Research Paper 1*). Does it offer a viable alternative or even add-on to other livelihood activities? Wards 4 and 5 of Sangwe communal area in Chiredzi District bordering Gonarezhou National Park, for example, have CAMPFIRE committees and school blocks, clinics, grinding mills, small dams and shops have been built with the proceeds. However, the scheme's reputation in Chiredzi has been tarnished by corruption scandals and a lack of real devolution of power: communities are not involved in the sale of hunting rights and are suspicious of misappropriation by the council.

Many people in the area view CAMPFIRE merely as another means of enforcing unpopular natural resource conservation legislation. Resource monitors on each village committee are meant to inform the police about anyone they discover cutting trees, cultivating streambanks, causing veld fires or poisoning watercourses (for fishing). There are bitter complaints about damage to property, fields and livestock caused by marauding elephants and carnivores. Four people have been killed by

elephants in these wards since 1996 – mainly children herding cattle. There have been long time lags in dealing with compensation claims and compensation that has been paid is regarded as insufficient. In this context it remains more lucrative to poach than wait for meagre CAMPFIRE dividends and, in some cases, poaching can be read as, in part, a political demonstration. The frustrations of one interviewee, a self-confessed poacher, are summed up in Box 1.

Ostensibly the CAMPFIRE programme has allowed multiple resource use in the communal areas of the lowveld (wildlife, livestock and crops) and yet its driving philosophy appears to be a conservation one not a development one. CAMPFIRE areas are a *de facto* buffer zone aimed at taking the strain off protected areas. Further, as some commentators have observed, CAMPFIRE is an explicitly non-redistributive development model which, notwithstanding its participatory rhetoric, legitimises the *status quo* with regard to land and resource ownership. Indeed, it could even be argued that it makes way for the expansion of commercial wildlife interests into communal areas in the guise of public-private partnerships (Hughes 2001; Wolmer 2001).

Research in Derre Forest Reserve, Zambézia province, also threw up some problems with CBNRM as it is being implemented in Mozambique (*SLSA Research Paper 10*). This is a place where limited livelihood options exist, and where poverty is extreme and widespread. Gaining access to forest resources for livelihoods and incomes is therefore critical. In this context, the state, with donor support, is seeking to develop a role, albeit limited, for communities in forest exploitation. In a portion of the forest reserve, designated as a "buffer zone",

### **Box 2: Amadiba horse and hiking trail: from participatory project to business**

The Amadiba Horse and Hiking trail is a community-based initiative located on South Africa's Wild Coast in the Eastern Cape. The enterprise is run by the Amadiba community, through their established organisation, the Amadiba Coastal Community Development Association (ACCODA), with the support of a local NGO. The trail has undergone considerable internal changes in the course of its brief history. These can be summarised as an increasingly "commercial" (or "business-like") approach in the way the trail relates to its staff and to the wider world, and reduced scope for participation in higher-level decision-making.

Originally the initiative had a very participatory ethic. It was designed to involve the Amadiba people in all aspects of running a project, including planning, implementation, management and decision-making, with benefits accruing primarily to the community who received jobs as tour guides and camp site managers, and revenue from hiring out horses and leasing a camp site to a fly fishing company.

The approach has had limitations: it has remained a small-scale enterprise catering only to the budget international market, it involves intensive NGO support, a long time scale, and has had several management problems. The local part-time jobs created are useful supplements but it is not clear that residents prefer this small-scale approach to opportunities from formal sector investment. Lack of entrepreneurial experience (and perhaps interest) is a constraint, which seems to have been exacerbated rather than addressed by the project's emphasis on community-management.

However, the initiative has become a flagship pilot project for the development of the tourism sector along the length of the Wild Coast and received substantial EU funding which has led to changes. Some of these changes are largely symbolic, as in the switch from "staff" to "service providers", and from "project" to "business", reflecting a change in attitude rather than in substance. Others, such as the disbandment of the management committee and the creation of centralised and professionalised structures for administration and management, represent a move away from the participatory approach that characterised the trail in its earlier phase. The top-down manner in which the restructuring process was initiated and implemented adds weight to the opinions of "service providers" that they now work for a conventional business over which they have little control.

These changes hold out the promise of a more efficiently-run (and thus more marketable and more profitable) enterprise, with enhanced benefits for staff and the wider community. Such potential, however, must be set against the increasing centralisation and managerialism that have occurred as part of the restructuring process, which runs the risk of endangering the genuinely participative and uniquely local qualities that have characterised the trail to date.

*Source: SLSA Research Paper 7.*

the potential for the exploitation of non-timber forest products and other income-generating activities is being investigated, training provided (for example in beekeeping), and a strategy for reducing bush fires being developed. Local ownership of the process through the creation and/or strengthening of local institutions to provide leadership and the general involvement of the community in the management of the project is

considered to be important. However, there are questions about legitimacy and inclusion in relation to these institutions and the degree of community involvement. Many representatives are outsiders from the provincial capital and the "community", who are participating in the management seems to translate, in practice, as community leaders from pre-existing institutions: local government and traditional authorities. This

means there is a degree of complementarity, as well as the inevitable power struggles, between the new and pre-existing institutions. However, the fact that the new management institution replicates existing power relations and that the membership fee excludes the majority of the community who are unable to afford it, contributes to a perception that it is largely an elite organisation, hence contravening the spirit and aims of the natural resources management policy framework and poverty reduction thrust.

In South Africa, the recent history of a small, community-based tourism venture in the Eastern Cape illustrates a wider trend in the nature of policy and institutions for wild resources management away from “community” decision-making towards an increasingly commercially focused model (see below and Box 2).

Thus the experience of community-based wild resources management in Sangwe, Derre and the Wild Coast throws up several concerns. These include: revenue generated can be insufficient to compensate for opportunity costs; CBNRM institutions may not be representative of many members of those communities and community participation may be at odds with efforts to increase efficiency and profitability. Also donors have become increasingly worried about the high transactions costs involved in reaching remote areas with low population densities, the low replicability of these initiatives, and the prioritisation of conservation above poverty reduction goals in many cases (Livestock and Wildlife Advisory Group 2002).

### **3 Private-community partnerships**

The neo-liberal model that currently dominates development thinking promotes an investment-led approach, with the role of the state being to provide an enabling environment to stimulate private sector involvement.<sup>1</sup> This is tempered in southern Africa, to some extent, by a government and donor discourse on “pro-poor growth”. Wild resources are being commercialised, with coastal, forest and other “wilderness” areas being marketed as tourism assets, and state forests (particularly plantations) being privatised. There is also increasing pressure on governments to channel

biodiversity conservation subsidies into programmes that stimulate growth and address poverty (see *SLSA Research Papers* 6, 8 and 18; and article 6 in Part III of this *Bulletin*).

In this context, communities are not simply being encouraged to be more business-oriented in their wild resources management ventures (as at Amadiba, see above), but they are being encouraged to enter into formal partnerships with the private sector. This is reflected in a shift in the language of natural resources management in the region: CBNRM is giving way to talk of public-private and private-community partnerships or joint ventures. This is a more market/growth focused approach and initiatives are no longer exclusively “community-based” and are more explicitly development rather than conservation related, with socio-economic benefits an end in themselves, not just an incentive for conservation. Governments and donors are starting to treat wildlife and forestry issues as part of poverty and growth strategies, rather than leaving them to conservation departments. This encompasses a variety of initiatives with different emphases but which share a common theme: to reconcile economic growth and social justice by encouraging private sector activity in using forests, wildlife and wild resources and, to varying degrees, to enhance the benefits to the poor.

In southern Africa, this approach is by far the most developed in South Africa where initiatives come under the label of “black economic empowerment”. This is a catch-all phrase for economic growth that aims at redistributing benefits and providing opportunities to “historically disadvantaged individuals” (see Part III). The South African government has developed several mechanisms to encourage the private sector to provide knock-on benefits to local people. This is easiest to do in situations where it is commercialising state assets where equity strings can be attached to private sector bidders. In adjudicating the bids for forestry and tourism concessions,<sup>2</sup> for example, potential economic performance is not the sole criterion. Potential private sector concessionaires are asked to provide details of specifically how they aim to address community development, with preferential regard for bids with the strongest economic empowerment proposals that focus on uplifting

### **Box 3: Hotel commercialisation in the Eastern Cape, South Africa**

The Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) is commercialising the string of hotels that it owns along the Wild Coast (inherited from Bantustan agencies). This process is seen by ECDC as an opportunity to secure land and equity rights for communities while also developing tourism nodes. In principle, the criteria for allocating sites to bidders (alongside the credibility of the proposal, fulfilment of an environmental impact assessment, and due diligence in the process) include black economic empowerment concerns. However, limitations on all sides (government capacity, private sector investment interest and community expertise and rights) mean that it is progressing slowly.

*Source: SLSA Research Paper 6.*

marginalised people (see *SLSA Research Papers 8 and 18*). Box 3 provides one such example

The sort of benefits stipulated include: community equity stakes in forest and tourism concessions; paying lease fees or revenue shares to communities for use of their land, providing preferential employment to local people, local out-sourcing, procurement and contracting, and local enterprise opportunities and business training and support. A relatively progressive example of a South African forestry concessionaire's assistance for local communities is illustrated in Box 4.

In Zimbabwe, the implicit or explicit threat from the state to expropriate land for resettlement has galvanised private sector tourism and safari concerns in and around the Save Valley Conservancy to provide similar assistance to local communities in the form of "neighbour outreach"

programmes. They have made attempts to employ local staff, and source local products, as well as spending money on community development projects, usually with a wildlife/tourism/conservation focus (*SLSA Research Paper 1*; and see article 6, this *Bulletin*).

However, in regulating cases of community-private partnership, the state does not always have the power derived from adjudicating tenders or wielding the axe of land designation. The private sector is almost always the stronger partner and initiator of joint-ventures, with communities often relegated to the role of landowner and employee, ceding representation to NGOs or community leaders in processes that are not always transparent.

This power imbalance is particularly marked in Mozambique, where government and communities

### **Box 4: Eastern Cape forestry concession, South Africa**

The Hans Merensky consortium successfully bid for the Eastern Cape North plantation package. The company has assumed responsibilities for social welfare issues and local business development initiatives that are the traditional preserve of government. This has included:

- enterprise support, including helping establish furniture-making companies and sending people for training; establishing a charcoal project, school uniform sewing project and local shop; and plans to restore an irrigation scheme and set up agricultural projects
- local contracting of security operations and pruning and silviculture work
- building a clinic
- aiding in the research and documentation of land claims within the plantation

*Source: SLSA Research Paper 6*

### **Box 5: Derre Forest Reserve, Mozambique**

Despite a policy of community partnership in forest management in Mozambique, fieldwork in Derre Forest Reserve showed that in practice there is very little evidence of communities actually engaging in negotiations over concessions, participating in co-management, or entering partnerships with private operators. The only contact with the private sector reported by households in the Forest Reserve, where there is a forestry CBNRM project, is occasional casual employment by loggers, though they often bring their own labour gangs. Apart from this, a few individuals involved in the CBNRM programme who are setting up as carpenters know something of plans for the community to apply for a forestry licence for carpentry timber and have heard of logging operators' contacts with the chief. But the carpenters are not allowed to use the wood where they live inside the reserve, the community's application for a licence was stalled, and the operators' contact with the chief appears to have been no more than a quick visit without any form of negotiation. For the majority, their expectations and hopes of forestry in the area are to provide temporary jobs.

The Forestry Act only requires consultation for allocating concessions, not the more common harvesting licences; consultation is "listening to" not securing agreement from and communities themselves cannot get concessions. Without either a veto or their own concession, communities will not be in a commercially strong negotiating position with a partner. Although communities have a role in co-management, power is not actually devolved to community level.

*Source: SLSA Research Papers 10 and 18.*

exert much less leverage *vis-à-vis* the private sector and communities have less influence on the local and national government than in South Africa. There is thus a wide gap between the legislative framework on forestry (which stipulates community involvement) and its implementation. The Mozambican government is unwilling or unable to devolve control to communities, as this would severely restrict investment opportunities and massively increase administrative burdens. In practice, allocating forestry licences and concessions as fast as possible is a greater priority than insisting on the details of community involvement (see Box 5, articles 6 and 7 in this *Bulletin* and *SLSA Research Papers 10 and 18*).

## **4 Ecoregional conservation**

In parallel and overlapping with the emergence, particularly from South Africa, of a joint-venture business philosophy to exploiting wild resources there has been a resurgence in popularity for large-scale and top-down conservation initiatives in the region. In particular, there has been a sudden flurry of interest in what are variously known as Transboundary Natural Resource Management

Areas, Transfrontier Conservation Areas, Transfrontier Parks and Peace Parks. In essence, these all refer to bi- or tri-lateral agreements on conservation initiatives straddling national boundaries in the interests of opening up previously segmented "ecoregions" to migratory species. Allied to ecological arguments is a similar logic to that underpinning the private-community joint ventures discussed above, revolving around the, potentially pro-poor, development potential brought by new private sector opportunities for tourism development. Economies of scale and regional marketing are seen as particularly important benefits to attract tourism investment. These are still in the early stages of development and have also gained mixed reviews. By their very nature these are top-down initiatives and there are fears that this will result in a retreat from the community participation emphasis of previous CBNRM initiatives and will put conservation, big business and other criteria before local livelihoods (see Box 6).

On a smaller scale, another relatively high-profile new conservation initiative proposed for South Africa's Eastern Cape is the Pondoland National Park, or "Pondopark", intended to preserve a

### **Box 6: The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park**

The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) was formally signed into existence in 2002. It binds Kruger National Park in South Africa, Limpopo Park in Mozambique and Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe into what is claimed to be Africa's largest contiguous wildlife area.

While the GLTP project documents emphasise the development benefits that will accrue to communities, there is little evidence so far that the initiatives will lead to increased roles of residents in the tourism industry, or to stronger partnership with the private sector. If anything the reverse may be true. There are several different reasons for this. One is that these proposals derive their logic from a curious blend of agendas in which community development concerns are a late addition. First and foremost they are conservation-orientated initiatives. The rationale for the GLTP revolves around re-establishing "ecological integrity" and migration corridors for mega-fauna across national borders and has been lobbied for principally by conservation organisations keen for a high-profile flagship project. It is also backed by a powerful South African business constituency and three national governments who have invested the initiative with a range of symbolic and practical intents ranging from dismantling the legacies of apartheid and fostering peace and security to reinvigorating Zimbabwe's dormant tourist industry.

Community consultation has been negligible and there are widespread fears that the scheme will lead to a massive disruption of existing local livelihoods, without in turn delivering valuable alternative livelihood strategies. This is looking all too likely, given that current livelihood activities and resources are being given insufficient attention in development plans to date. One effect of the GLTP, for example, will be to police more closely the boundaries of Kruger National Park, which is currently a conduit for illegal labour migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique to South Africa. This transborder labour migration and the consequent remittance income are vitally important to livelihoods in the region (see article 2, this *Bulletin*).

*Source: SLSA Research Paper 4.*

"biodiversity hotspot" with a high level of endemism covering the area from and including Mkambati Nature Reserve to Port St Johns (*SLSA Research Paper 6*). This is yet to be established, but Box 7 illustrates the opportunities and dangers of the scheme by sketching the extreme positive and negative scenarios.

## **5 Land restitution/redistribution and wild resources management**

As the positive scenario for Pondopark suggests, one way in which the balance of power can be swung towards communities in private-community partnerships is when the community has secured land rights in advance of investment. The "community", in this context, is land-owner, lessor and contractual partner rather than just employees or recipients of charity. Thus they are better able to

influence the form of development in line with their own interests by, for example, putting out their own tenders to the private sector.

Where communities have made successful claims for land restitution in South African national parks and other established protected areas, for example, there are emerging precedents for joint tourism ventures with the private sector – the Makuleke land claim in Kruger is the best known example (see article 6, this *Bulletin*). In the Eastern Cape the Dwesa Cwebe community recently won its claim over a provincial nature reserve. These land claims have only been granted with highly restricted use rights that ensure that communities keep the land under conservation and tourism usage. The benefit to them lies in commercial opportunities from their market asset, not in agricultural usage (Reid 2001; *SLSA Research Paper 8*).

### **Box 7: Positive and negative scenarios for Pondopark, South Africa**

#### **The positive scenario**

A process of consultation identifies a park plan that is commercially realistic, and is chosen through informed consultation by a majority of residents because of the net opportunities it creates. Thus a new type of National Park is established, which combines core zone, multiple use and community-managed areas, such that the core biodiversity assets are protected, the subsistence value of community land is maintained, and the commercial value of it increased. Zoning is done to minimise opportunity costs of lost agricultural land use. Tourism opportunities are enhanced due to the biodiversity protection and regional infrastructure and marketing, thus there is competition among investors. Government uses its planning power to select tourism bids on socio-economic as well as commercial criteria, and also, through land reform, shared management bodies or other means, puts commercial assets and decision-making power in the hands of local residents. Government, conservationists, tourism operators, and local residents all make comparable compromises over land-uses and permitted developments, so that fiscal, conservation, commercial, employment, and developmental goals are all served. A tourism hub at Pondopark serves tourism development in the wider region, such that it becomes a motor of growth enabling a range of entrepreneurs to identify and exploit new opportunities, and a substantial source of local jobs. The National Park status brings in international investment to fund conservation and infrastructure, and provincial government is able to redeploy its attention and resources to developing assets in the Western part of the Wild Coast and Eastern Cape province, enjoying synergy with the Park.

#### **The negative scenario**

The Pondopark proposal is "approved" by a few chiefs and a couple of other ministers, then announced by the President, at which point back-tracking becomes impossible. The plan is pushed ahead, through superficial consultation in which communities are informed of the detail, using NGOs as communication and logistical organisation channels and with nothing more than begrudging toleration from provincial government. The zonation provides only limited access to resources for local people, converts agricultural land into non-farming multiple use land. SANParks tries to set up joint management bodies, but lacks the new expertise to truly devolve power. Tourism plans are drawn up only by bureaucrats and conservationists. When land claims are won, there is little scope left for revenue-generating, job-creating development. When government sites are tendered, private sector interest is low, due to design features and low tourism prospects in the region. Thus development is slow and scope for encouraging more equitably structured ventures through tender bidding is minimal. With few benefits around, competition for them between local factions intensifies. Opposition to the park mounts, increasing tension and riskiness of investment. Tangible benefits remain elusive. Provincial government, having watched from the sidelines, seizes a moment to propose alternatives. Eventually, there is either a park that struggles along despite the opportunity costs to local livelihoods, or a local revolt means that the park is degazetted and planning begins again.

*Source: SLSA Research Paper 6.*

However, this constitutes a major opportunity cost and there are concerns that the legal resolution of the land claims still leaves excessive power with conservation authorities, limiting commercial opportunities for communities who face immense practical problems in establishing the legal and technical capacity to develop this approach.

This can be contrasted with emerging *ad hoc* arrangements for wildlife management on newly redistributed land in Zimbabwe's lowveld, where the private sector and, to some extent, the conservation authorities, have been put on the defensive by settlers "self-restituting" land belonging to their ancestors. In most cases there has been an outright rejection of wildlife as a



### Box 8: Indigenous wildlife management in a “former” National Park, Zimbabwe

A portion of Gonarezhou National Park known as “Section 27” (in a former veterinary corridor) has been claimed for resettlement. A total of 50 ha self-contained plots have been allocated to 56 people. These are all members of a relatively wealthy and politically well-connected elite including councillors, war veterans’ leaders, army personnel, policemen and National Parks staff. Yet none of these people have physically relocated to Section 27. The proposal, instead, is to operate it as a mini-conservancy: a further safari concession where revenues would be disbursed to the 56 landowners. This portion of land is strategically a very important one. It would form a corridor linking the rump Gonarezhou National Park to game ranches such as the Malilangwe Conservation Trust and the conservancies beyond. These 56 plot holders envisage benefiting from buying into the Transfrontier Park scheme.

Source: SLSA Research Paper 1.

landuse, as settlers have preferred to hunt “their” animals and clear the land for dryland agriculture in the absence of enforceable contractual obligations to keep the land as wildlife estate. Indeed, even part of Gonarezhou National Park, supposedly part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, has been returned to agriculture. However, there is a proposal to develop another part of this park as an “indigenous” conservancy (Box 8).

## 6 Conclusions

In southern Africa, “natural resource management” has come to stand not for the processes by which people interact with natural resources in their daily struggle for livelihoods, but some form of formal policy, project or programme for the management of natural resources (Murombedzi 2003). This research has tried to re-connect with the livelihoods concerns and contexts of the poor by asking how they get represented in these policies, programmes and concepts for the management of wild resources in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This has raised certain concerns that

are returned to in Part III of this *Bulletin*. The danger is that these policies will constrain more than they enable poor people’s access to resources and income with the opportunity costs outweighing the benefits. Also by prioritising investment over equity, such schemes are likely to benefit local elites, the private sector and the state more than the poor (see article 6, this *Bulletin*). Tourism, in particular, often marginalises the poor and, as the industry’s collapse in Zimbabwe has demonstrated, it relies on an inherently fickle (and thus risky) client-base. As a recent study by DFID admits it is ‘unlikely that the scale of potential impact would make wildlife-based interventions in general a priority over, say, those to support agriculture-based livelihoods’ (Livestock and Wildlife Advisory Group 2002: vii). However, where the state is powerful *vis-à-vis* the private sector (such as where it controls commercially competitive sites) and is willing to prioritise local issues when trade-offs arise and/or communities have firm legal or *de facto* rights over land with high commercial value, the new “pro-poor” policies for the management of wild resources do hold out some hope for improving rural livelihoods.

## Notes

\* This article draws in particular on *SLSA Research Papers* 4, 6, 7, 8 and 18. The complete list of *SLSA Research Papers* is found on page 116 of this *Bulletin* and full text versions are available at [www.ids.ac.uk/slsa](http://www.ids.ac.uk/slsa).

1 Encouraging partnerships between government and the private sector in sustainable development was one of the major and most controversial themes of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.

2. South Africa is in the process of commercialising state forests and selling campsite and photo safari concessions in National Parks (see article 6, Part III, this *Bulletin*)

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