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ADMINISTRATION OF PLANNING IN LESOTHO: THE SECOND LAG

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I

A conference on research and training in African public administration (held in the early seventies) stressed that current research in this field should contribute to an understanding of significant institutions and processes in, and have an applied use for, particular countries, while at the same time laying the foundations for the formulation at a later stage of worthwhile hypotheses.¹ This paper is based on an examination of the evolution of the planning machinery in one country, namely Lesotho. While its central argument derives from this specifically-focused research, it is submitted that it provides an explanatory device or even hypothesis in embryo, applicable more broadly to the development of the machinery of planning (and with at least some relevance to institutional development in general) in new countries.

The argument contends that there are certain factors in the planning environment, in the manner in which the planning agency is set up, in the nature and scope of the tasks it is required to perform, and in the attitudes of the civil service, which combine almost inevitably - to retard the expeditious and effective establishment and operation of the planning machinery. This phase - after the formal launching of a central planning agency by the newly independent government - during which progress in practice lags far behind that initially anticipated, is here described as the 'second lag'.

The 'first lag' would refer to the situation existing before the establishment of a central planning agency, principally to the period of colonial rule. While colonial administrators were required to engage in some of the tasks of planning, the product of their efforts is generally regarded as defective. Kamarck, for example, in common with many other observers, described colonial plans as having been prepared by 'administrators with little or no economic background',

in which 'the coordination of investments in various sectors was non-existent' and as generally lacking any 'consistent development strategy'. He acknowledged, however, that they had one virtue seldom present in early post-independence plans: 'they were carried out'.²

In Lesotho's case it seems fair to conclude that both the plans produced and the method of preparation were inadequate. Wallman provides a useful record of some unsatisfactory aspects of project preparation and planning in the early sixties.³ A UNESCO mission described a plan prepared for 1963-1966 as 'not strictly a development plan since no targets were set';⁴ while one drafted in 1966 was acknowledged by one of the people principally responsible for it, as simply representing 'the maximum demands of Ministries in 1966, unevaluated and unphased'.⁵ A more comprehensive criticism of economic policy and programming in pre-independence Basutoland was that

... the old fashioned doctrine has prevailed (as it always does where administration is devoid of economic advice) and has been reflected in the laissez-faire attitudes of the British authorities to the Basotho's economic problems. This complacent fallacy ... explains the total ineffectiveness of the British administrators' so-called 'development' programmes. They have tinkered away with the trivia of infrastructure, and with disconnected pilot schemes, and have nagged away at the bewildered farmer to achieve miracles from his five acres of eroded land.

The leader of the Basutoland Congress Party, Ntsu Mokhehle, complained at the time that British money was doing no more than financing government services and such other infrastructure 'as is conducive to Her Majesty's Government's concept of maintaining a colony. Not a single industry has been established'.⁷

II

Riggs acknowledged what he described as 'the spectre of determinism' in his ecological approach to development administration but rejected the view of administrative behaviour as 'nothing more than the outcome of a particular configuration of interacting pressures'. He asserted rather that both the influence of the new environment upon the subject and the subject upon its environment should be specified.⁸ While the validity of this point is recognized, in this assessment of the likelihood of a second lag in establishing the machinery and processes of planning, the 'spectre of determinism' looms large. That such an early period of disappointment appears inherent in the situation and almost inevitable is suggested in the observations of a number of writers. Weidner, for example, notes that most new organizations, 'particularly those with innovative goals', undergo a period of anarchy in their early operating years. 'It is something that must be lived through. It may help to recognize the inevitability of this period'.⁹ Colin Leys argues that there are a 'superabundance' of reasons for planning to fail, and therefore that it was 'more or less bound to fail, given the probability that many of these factors will be present in any situation'.¹⁰ Papanek writes that the exercise of the planning function inevitably raises serious opposition. As the 'advocate of economic rationality' and having a concern for long-term goals, a central planning agency often conflicts with the Ministry of Finance, 'concerned with balancing the budget' and with operational ministries and political leaders. Further, it will find itself 'trespassing on territory previously staked out by other agencies, who find they now have to contend with a new institution in what they have come to regard as their private preserve'.¹¹ Haq discusses the 'usual teething troubles' of planning agencies which suffer from 'shortage of staff, absence of statistical data, uncertain status in Government and resentment from other strongly entrenched Ministries and Departments'.¹² One sees this too in White's 'paradigm' indicating early problems followed by later improvements in the position of the planning machinery,¹³

A final example comes from Seers who compares the situation to a prototype plot of the dramatist: 'in this certain types of people, all of whom are individually well meaning and intelligent, are so constituted that they are logically bound, when they are brought together, to produce results which appear tragic or comic or both'. The three leading parts - the politician, the planner and the traditional civil servant - may each be played quite reasonably according to 'their own lights', but the outcome is irrational because of basic differences in approach, tasks, education and the experiences which have moulded them. As time passes, however, the situation may well improve: planning tends to become more realistic; experience teaches politicians the need to confront the strategic issue before the country; universities structure relevant social science syllabi; the younger civil service recruits have a more dynamic approach to policy issues than their seniors who in any case 'become more accustomed in the course of time to the planning office as part of the administrative scene'.¹⁴

It is necessary at this point to mention that the principal argument contends that early failure is almost inevitable, not absolutely so. The presence of certain rather special elements in the environment may serve to prevent a second lag: these would include unusually firm and consistent political backing for planning, combined with either a substantial rise in domestic resources (for example, the discovery of new mineral deposits or a dramatic increase in the price of major exports), or/and an unusually high degree of project preparedness and donor readiness to accelerate aid negotiation. In Lesotho in the early years after independence no such special circumstances prevailed; on the contrary the environment in which planning had to operate was both harsh and circumscribed beyond the norm of other African countries. In particular, the administration of planning suffered from unconvincing support by the political leaders for planning, a paucity of domestic resources, comprehensive dependence on neighbouring South Africa, donor dominance of the development programme, and numerous administrative obstacles and shortcomings in statistics and information.

III

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECOND LAG

Youth versus experience

The first dysfunctional phenomenon 'logically bound' to occur appears to be the conflict between youth-inexperience and age-experience. The general problem of an 'educational generation gap', in which a more highly educated post-independence generation of recruits challenges their more experienced and already entrenched seniors has been widely noted.¹⁵ Of more immediate concern is the fact that until relatively recently, few universities offered training for planning specialists, nor was the field of study emphasized. Thus most products of such training belong to the post-independence generation. Tinbergen's survey of nineteen countries, which showed clearly that a high proportion of planning personnel had no previous employment, confirmed that planning was generally carried out by younger members of the civil service.¹⁶ Thus not only is the agency itself new, and its procedures and concepts innovative, but the people responsible for establishing it are young; and, as Papanek notes, 'youth in itself is enough to cause opposition among some conservative bureaucrats'.¹⁷

This factor has been present in Lesotho and has been the cause of considerable disaffection. Two comments by Basotho civil servants may be mentioned:

The youth and the image of young-smart-qualified of the Central Planning and Development Office caused a lot of resentment. Middle-aged civil servants did not want someone like ... coming in and saying do this and do that. Often they would rather fill in the project memorandum badly than go and ask the Planning Office how to do it.¹⁸

... you have a generation gap. The CPDO is staffed almost entirely with very young bright upstart college graduates and I think that people in the ministries - just because in Basotho society elders are held in great respect cannot take these people seriously no matter what their qualifications.¹⁹

The situation is not so much that younger people are placed hierarchically above their seniors - as was the case with District Officers in Kenya²⁰ - but that they are placed in a position of having to require their more experienced colleagues in the ministries to conform to new practices. When the response from the older administrators has been indifferent or negative, these less experienced, often more enthusiastic officers have become resentful and frustrated. That such a situation might be temporary is clear; however, in Lesotho, the rapid turnover of staff and the continual promotion out of the Office of its relatively more experienced members has left the Office lacking both experience and seniority.²¹ For example, not one member of the CPDO who had gained some experience from participating in the formulation of Lesotho's First Plan was still in the Office when preparation of the country's Second Plan commenced.

Heightened expectation and suspicion

The publicity and fanfare which typically accompanies the establishment of a central planning agency, and the initial words of support it receives from the highest political quarters, serve to raise considerable expectations of the new agency's capacity to contribute to the country's progress. It is highly unlikely, however, that locally qualified personnel will be immediately available to fulfil such expectations; and even if they were, anticipated development - based on a probable overestimation of the potential impact of planning - would not follow in consequence. Simultaneously as expectations are raised, suspicions are aroused among many influential members of the civil service, who are disturbed by the new agency's 'trespassing' on their territory, demanding new ways of thinking, intruding with new terminology and advice, and inevitably adding to an already heavy workload. In Lesotho, the resultant negative attitude towards planning seriously hindered the efforts of the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO), so reducing its chances of early success, and aggravating the extent of the setback. Suspicion soon turned to scepticism and vocal criticism once it became apparent that the new agency was not proving an instant panacea.

Ambitious terms of reference

Invariably - and certainly in Lesotho - when the planning machinery is established it is provided with terms of reference which cover the full gamut of planning tasks, including long-term, medium-term and annual plans; research; economic advice; progress reporting, monitoring and evaluation; capital budgets; project preparation; and aid negotiation. The miniscule staff posted to man the office would be incapable of fulfilling these functions even if supported by the necessary data and the full backing of the ministries.²² Such a discrepancy appears predetermined in so far as governments feel it necessary to demonstrate externally, particularly to would-be donors, and internally to potential critics, that they are in earnest about relating resources to priorities and planning the direction of the new country's progress. It is not politically acceptable to admit to the establishment of a planning office merely for the purpose of project preparation as to enhance aid opportunities. Furthermore, such a comprehensive range of tasks does present a planning office with a challenge as to the role it should be filling. However, in the prevailing mood of the civil service, its inability to perform many of the prescribed functions is given as evidence of the Office's failure; and the disparaging description, 'begging office', is applied where in fact it may be fulfilling just the initially limited role intended for it.

The first plan

Immediately a central planning agency is established, it is usually required to commence preparation of a five-year plan. Not only will the agency itself lack both personnel and data, but the ministries will not have the capacity to prepare satisfactory sectoral submissions. Although itself weak, the planning office (which attracts the first qualified planning personnel) is likely to have substantially greater planning capacity than the ministries, and thus given the limited time allowed, it will have little choice but to take over some of the ministries' work.

While this initiative is necessary, friction 'will almost invariably follow since the Ministries resist implementing projects prepared by an outside authority'.²³ Pratt illustrates the problem in his discussion of the preparation of Tanzania's first plan: the ministries felt themselves seriously intruded upon and beleaguered by the Ministry of Development Planning, and several failed entirely to cooperate.

The suspicions which had been built up during the months of controversy when the plan was being prepared left a heritage of hostility and a mood of non-cooperation which were important obstacles to the effective implementation of the plan. 24

In Lesotho, preparation of the First Plan took place without benefit of a functioning planning machinery, with limited consultation and weak sectoral contributions. Because of the 'inability of the Ministries to produce drafts' much of the plan was necessarily written in the CPDO. Had the Planning Office not taken this initiative the Plan may not have been produced at all.

This has the unfortunate effect that some ministries are committed to implementing policies with which they do not feel involved. They may have agreed with the drafts in a negative way (i.e. they did not actively disagree with them) but they do not feel that the policies are their own, or that they need make any special effort to implement them. 25

The Planning Office reaped little credit for its efforts; rather it attracted substantial criticism - yet in the circumstances it is difficult to imagine how it could have done much better. The Plan did little to encourage interest in or respect for planning procedures or the Office. The post-Plan mood was not as hostile as indicated in Pratt's example; it would be more accurate to describe it as uncooperative and cynically indifferent as to whether projects presented related to the Plan or not.

Thus in the early years after its publication, the First Plan reinforced the second lag; towards the end of the plan period, however, (as will be discussed), it may be said to have contributed towards overcoming it.

Contradictory pressures

The pressures exerted on a central planning agency in the early years are not only numerous, they are often contradictory. Vernon, for example, notes that from the day he commences work the planner is the target of two streams of demands: one requires him to 'frame policies to meet the crisis already in being, without waiting a moment to improve his knowledge'; the other requires that he 'develop a global long-term strategy that is comprehensive, consistent and optimal'.²⁶ Clearly, overemphasis on one to the neglect of the other involves dangers for the planner. Similarly, the planner is usually advised that the first plan should be adaptable and flexible; yet he is also told that it is intended as a solid guide 'and not a chameleon'.²⁷

In Lesotho, expectations and requirements of the CPDO are often contradictory. While some civil servants want it to take initiative and lead, others prefer it to remain in the background and not interfere. A further inconsistency is involved in the fact that many of those who encourage a more positive role, baulk at the idea of raising its status and authority so as to enable it to exact compliance with its procedures. Yet others who expect it to carry out functions more actively and effectively, e.g. to improve its coordinative function, are obviously unenthusiastic about being coordinated by it and losing their room for manoeuvre. A final indication of this is seen in the criticism of the planners if they misunderstand donor intentions, and suspicion that they may be in cahoots with donors if they anticipate accurately donor reactions to projects.

Uncertainty results too from the numerous new ideas and emphases which circulate. These are picked up at international conferences and seminars, and visiting missions are frequently brimming with innovations about development and planning. An awareness of possible improvements and exposure to new methods has its advantages, but the consistent flow of suggestions also creates doubts about ongoing procedures and detracts from a determination to persevere with undertakings.

Paucity of statistics

Lack of reliable statistics is an obstacle which confronts planners not only at the commencement of their work, but which continues to plague them thereafter. A newly-established central statistical bureau faces many difficulties comparable with a central planning office in terms of qualified personnel, initiating of new information-gathering procedures and the response of civil servants to them; in addition, the demand for statistics is likely to outpace its capacity to produce more and better information once its performance begins to improve.

A continuing impediment to statistical development derives from the fact that improved questionnaires, collection procedures and classifications tend to negate the validity of benchmark data, thus reducing the usefulness of any early conclusions as to discerned trends and projections based on extrapolation. This can be seen most dramatically with Lesotho's rapidly rising import figures : it is uncertain to what extent they are attributable to a real increase, and to what extent to substantially more comprehensive data collection. One observes this problem too in the National Accounts for the years 1966/67 to 1971/72 produced in March 1975. These superseded the National Accounts for 1966/67 and 1967/68 published in 1968 and 1971 respectively, and were not comparable with those for 1964/65 and 1965/66 issued in 1967, nor with those for the period 1954/55 to 1965/66 compiled by an adviser. Sources of information and methods employed for the most recent sets of figures differed in a number of ways from the earlier sets.²⁸

A further example of this snag with base data, as also the drawback of legislative gaps, is found in the statistics produced for the populations of Lesotho's six lowland towns. Comparing the figures for 1966 and 1971/72, a survey found that except for Maseru, all the other towns had decreased in size. An analysis of the two sets of results concluded that this would be 'inconceivable' and 'grotesquely erroneous', pointing out that until township boundaries are refined and mapped in detail (which requires legislation) no meaningful comparisons could be made

between successive population counts and no projections could be relied on. Thus the country lacks a key variable in the forward planning of adequate social services in the urban areas.²⁹

This particular weakness has had a number of consequences for the effectiveness and standing of Lesotho's CPDO. Firstly, it has made it more problematic to justify one project above another, leaving departments with an impression of arbitrariness, particularly those which may have had a project rejected. This matter is aggravated by a general shortage of alternatives which 'plays into the hands' of those who submit projects of dubious worth, for they can argue that there is no adequate substitute for that which they have submitted',³⁰ Secondly, lack of data has rendered the inclusion of economic indicators in project memoranda unfeasible or of dubious value. This has complicated the task of evaluating progress, so leaving the Office groping around in its attempts to monitor the impact of various undertakings. Thirdly, as has been noted, improved methods of statistical collection detract from the reliability of benchmark figures, so complicating the discernment of trends and the extrapolation of projections.

Initiating new procedures

The preparation of a five-year plan is one of the exercises a central planning agency is required to carry out. It may face obstacles, and the product may be unsatisfactory; yet, because of a political mandate, it will be completed. It will also be charged with numerous other tasks, some of which it will be incapable of implementing at the outset but which, from time to time, it will endeavour to introduce. The CPDO's single experiment with an annual plan provides an example. The Office itself put considerable effort into producing the plan, and after much coaxing a number of departments prepared submissions.

The document was, however, completed too late to be useful and for this and other reasons was not published. This failure meant that the CPDO would have encountered decidedly more resistance had it attempted to produce a plan the following year, which it chose not to. A second illustration is provided by the Office's various attempts at instituting progress reporting procedures. It has, however, lacked both the capacity to provide helpful responses to those ministries which complied, and the authority to discipline those that did not; that is, it has been unable to back up the procedures with either rewards or sanctions, and in consequence they have failed. This has adversely affected the Office's credibility, so contributing to the second lag; for its next attempt to institute a reporting system will meet with even less cooperation.

Limited resources

The focus of this article is on the evolution of the planning machinery, not on development in general. Yet there are links, however unclearly connected; as indicated by Haq's example, planners are likely to be blamed for failures and to reap credit for advances, whatever the extent of their responsibility.³¹ In practice, planning procedures and agencies have generally attracted considerable disapprobation following the poor economic performance of the early post-independence years.

The extremely restricted circumstance in which the Lesotho Government found itself after independence certainly weakened the position of the CPDO. The country's economic plight and the determination to end recurrent dependence stress thrift and caution, so restraining the more adventurous programmes which the planners may have in mind, as well as reinforcing the control of the already better established and more authoritative Budget Office. Secondly, limited capital left the Planning Office with reduced room for manoeuvre, less patronage to dispense and diminished influence over the direction of development.

If (planning) means we should just set targets, everyone accepts that there is a need for goals. But when that means marshalling scarce resources away from something to put into something else - that's where the shoe rubs. If you say to someone that we should like a project in this field, that is not a problem. If you say we should not like a project in that field because we have only so much money and manpower and executive capacity, and therefore we have to use it there instead, you have a problem... That's a hell of a lot harder and takes a lot more muscle than to decide the priorities of new money.³²

Two further consequences were, firstly, that departments tended to be more fiercely competitive for the fixed (or slowly expanding) allocation of resources, which impeded the CPDO's attempts at coordination and harmonization of programmes; and, secondly, the Planning Office's discretion to reject offers of aid which it considered irrelevant to identified national priorities was severely curtailed.

Time-lag

Contrasting the immediate post-independence pressures for evidence of development with the usual inadequate capacity to prepare projects (with all their attendant studies-engineering, marketing, soil-type, etc.) a substantial time-lag between conception and implementation appears almost inevitable. Typically, the time required to prepare detailed memoranda; obtain technical support information; interest, negotiate with and obtain final agreement from donors; and await the arrival of equipment and personnel are underestimated. This is aggravated by the practice in Lesotho of preparing memoranda on more important projects, not as final documents, but rather with the purpose of interesting donors. Thus, if successful, the first donor contribution will probably be at a prefeasibility study stage. During the extended hiatus that follows there is an overall impression of much preparation (amidst raised expectations) without proportionate concrete results.

Two examples are provided by the proposals for a national abattoir and the National Teachers' Training College. As early as 1962 the Basutoland Department of Health condemned the Maseru slaughterhouse and recommended the building of a new abattoir.

In 1967 the National Planning Board repeated the proposal as did the Ministry of Interior on a number of occasions during the next few years. The project was included in the First Plan and in the five-year period, negotiations with a donor appeared to reach an advanced stage. It has again been listed in the Second Plan, but by 1976 (fourteen years after the idea was first proposed) commencement still seemed a distant prospect.³³ The case for a National Teachers' Training College (to replace seven small inadequately equipped and staffed colleges) was first recommended in 1964, and repeated in 1966 and 1967. In 1969 a UNESCO and World Bank project identification mission visited Lesotho, and under an agreement with DANIDA in 1970 a Danish mission arrived in 1971 to study the project. Progress was delayed by a number of factors such as obtaining the consent of Church organizations, inability to supervise buildings locally, complications about the recruitment of foreign staff and dovetailing a variety of donor inputs. Early in 1975 (that is, eleven years after inception) the College commenced training student teachers - in temporary quarters since the building of the College had barely commenced.

IV

THE END OF THE SECOND LAG ?

According to the pattern suggested by White's 'paradigm' and Seers' 'plot', with the passing of time certain components in the planning environment may change sufficiently to boost the role of planning and the status and effectiveness of the planning machinery. In Lesotho, certain alterations of this nature have indeed combined to bolster the position of the CPDO.

Firstly, the substantial increase in domestically-available resources - largely consequent upon the increased earnings of migrant workers and the renegotiated terms of the customs union agreement - has placed the Government in a stronger position to determine the direction of development.

Whereas at independence Lesotho was dependent on British support for over half its recurrent budget and was not in a position to contribute at all to its own capital development programme, in the financial year 1975/6 it supported its own recurrent expenditure and budgeted some R6.8 million of its own capital for development projects. This provides an illustration (supportive of Haq's argument noted above) of an improvement in the economic situation from which a central planning office gains some advantages, but for which it can claim no more than marginal responsibility. The complex pattern of pressures - domestic, external, political, economic - which motivated South Africa's decision-makers - governmental, industrial and mining - to concede to increased salaries for black workers, owed little to the efforts of the Lesotho Government, let alone the CPDO. Similarly, although the CPDO and other Lesotho Government departments participated in the Customs Union negotiations of the late sixties, much of the initiative originated from the other two small members of the Union. On the other hand, (as will be discussed below), for the CPDO the blessing has not been unmixed.

It has benefitted in the following ways. First, in the words of a member of the Planning Office, 'We no longer feel that each time we spend money we are in danger of catching a cold'.³⁴ A more expansive approach towards development projects has provided a more congenial atmosphere for the planners. Second, the CPDO is able to approach donors with more confidence that if necessary Lesotho will be able to contribute to local costs of projects. Thirdly, (and combined with increased donor interest in Lesotho), the Office is in a relatively stronger position to reject offers of assistance which fail to conform to national requirements. Fourth, the growth in the Government's recurrent budget has permitted a marked increase in the staff of the Office (professional, administrative, clerical) at the very time when this was most urgently needed to handle the burgeoning responsibilities of aid negotiation. And finally, the enlarged professional staff, local and expatriates, has provided the CPDO with a greater concentration of competences and boosted its influence vis-à-vis the Budget Office.

A second factor has been the consistent donor support which ultimately has forced departments and ministries to concede the necessity of negotiating foreign assistance through the Planning Office. Further, donors, particularly the UNDP, have done much to institute reviews of the technical assistance personnel, while regular visits by British personnel from the Southern African Development Division in Blantyre serve to keep British-assisted projects under closer scrutiny than was possible previously. In addition, the Planning Office has made considerable headway in attracting new donor interest and in encouraging an acceptance of a programme rather than a project approach to the negotiations.

Thirdly, with the passing of a few years, and after the initial discouraging delays, some results became apparent. Beyond the raised donor activity, some important feasibility studies were completed which served to broaden the information base and furnished the detailed technical back-up data essential to requests for assistance. Further, some major undertakings such as the Thaba Bosiu, Khomo-khoana and Thaba Tseka projects have become operative. This not only provides some concrete examples of project implementation, but helps restore confidence that at least some of the present project documents being prepared and negotiated will be transformed into reality.

A fourth point is that, despite the initial negative effects of the First Plan, its presence, towards the end of the quinquennium, appeared to contribute to overcoming the second lag. For, as noted in the paragraph above, development activity picked up considerably and (to the surprise of some) a good number of the projects commenced had been included (in varying degrees of detail) in the Plan. It has thus come to be viewed as less unrealistic than originally thought. Further, it has served to provide Government officers with a rough example of a medium-term plan; and thus when preparation of the Second Plan began they could better envisage the nature of the document. Ministries have also come to appreciate that the stronger their submissions, the more likely they would be to attract foreign assistance.

Finally, the nature of the senior civil service has altered particularly insofar as the average age of the men and women holding higher positions is younger than was the case five or ten years previously. They are themselves less reluctant to accept changes and adaptations and feel relatively less resentment towards the 'youth' of the CPDO (though remaining impatient at the continuing lack of experience of its personnel). Further, many of them have received university educations including courses aimed at improving their understanding of planning, and they have risen through a civil service of which the planning machinery was part. Also, those older senior officers who have remained on have gradually come to accept the presence of the CPDO.

Despite these changes in circumstances which promised to boost the effectiveness of the CPDO and so enable it to terminate the second lag, nevertheless the persistence of a number of factors indicated that the transformation might not be totally convincing. Firstly, while the rate of turnover of its personnel has been less alarming than in previous years, the CPDO continued to lose a number of its senior officers. In a matter of three months in the middle of 1975 it lost a Senior Planning Officer, its Deputy Director and Director. Secondly, the Office itself appeared intent on acquiring increasing numbers of expatriates and employing them in fully operational tasks and it was doubtful whether local officers were gaining practical experience or the necessary training. However, as long as the more senior Basotho continue to be transferred out of the Office, this situation seems likely to endure. Thirdly, the enhanced capacity of the CPDO has been accompanied by a mounting workload; in quantitative terms, this results in more aid being absorbed, and more activities initiated; yet qualitatively, it means that the Planning Office is unlikely to effectively commence monitoring projects and their impact, and evaluating developmental policies and directions. Fourthly, the rapid growth of Lesotho's domestic resources has brought both benefits (noted above) and disadvantages to the CPDO. This capital is not subjected to donor criteria, thus diminishing the value to Government of CPDO expertise in this field, while raising the influence of political leaders as to the employment of capital available to Lesotho. Certainly from some decisions of Governments over the last few years, it might appear that the CPDO,

while becoming a more competent aid negotiating agency, might be in the process of being removed further from policy making (measured in terms of advice sought and/or followed).

Examples of some significant measures instituted without referral into the CPDO were the increases in teachers' salaries, the establishment of a Lesotho National Bus Service furnished with a large consignment of imported vehicles, the building of a royal palace, and the negotiations for the construction of a Hilton Hotel in Maseru.

Clearly in all these cases there is a substantial political and/or prestige element which would be likely to preclude the acceptance of planners' views as final on whether to proceed or not. Nevertheless, their advice on the consequences and various aspects of the implementation of these proposals may have been advantageous, and indicative of regard for the CPDO. For instance, in the case of the decision to proceed with the feasibility study for an international airport, the Government disagreed with CPDO opposition to the scheme, but at least gave it the opportunity to study and comment upon proposals. Here, however, an aid request is involved (since the Government intends to employ foreign rather than domestic resources) and the Cabinet may thus have felt compelled to include the Planning Office in the negotiations.

The possibility that the political leaders perceive of the planning machinery rather narrowly in terms of its aid-procuring role finds support in two issues of importance in which the CPDO was included. These concerned the oil crisis - the effects of price increases and the potential effects of South Africa's supply being reduced - and the return of large numbers of workers after the trouble on the mines. In both cases one of the principal responses of the Lesotho Government was to seek foreign aid and advice.

In conclusion, the planning machinery does appear to have overcome the second lag. It has established its position in and has been accepted as part of the administration. In comparison with the first few years of its existence, it is a markedly more efficient organization handling a far more complex donor programme. In terms of initiating and administering the various tasks of planning it has made advances, but these have been limited in the main to those concerned with the procurement of foreign assistance (which the Lesotho Government continues to judge as vital to its development programme). Even in those tasks, however, its own management and the response which it receives leave considerable room for improvement. It has made disappointing progress in enhancing its capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development schemes and the impact of decisions, policies and programmes on the country's economy and on Basotho society. Finally, its potential influence on and relevance to central policy-making remain uncertain.

FOOTNOTES.

1. See D.J. Murray, The strategy for basic research, in Adebayo Adedeji and Colin Baker (eds.), Education and research in public administration in Africa, London, Hutchinson, 1974, p. 313-320.
2. Andrew M. Kamarck, The economics of African development, New York, Praeger, 1971, p. 264-5. Dharam Ghai, The machinery of planning in Kenya, in Mike Faber and Dudley Seers, The crisis in planning. Volume two. The experience, Sussex University Press, 1972, p.121, is one of the few writers to acknowledge some positive contribution of colonial planning to post-independence planning.
3. Sandra Wallman, Take out hunger. Two case studies of rural development in Basutoland, London School of Economics, 1969, p. 165-170.
4. Education in Basutoland, UNESCO Planning Mission Report, August 1964, WS/O165.82 (ED).
5. B.D. Giles, Final report to the Government of Lesotho, Maseru, 10 August 1967, p.9. In UNECA, Bibliography, Economic and social development plans of African countries, May 1968, E/CN.14/LIB/SER. C/4, mention is made of the following: Memorandum of development plans (1945-1955) Maseru (1946), 17 pages; Basutoland Five Year Development Programme (1960-64) Maseru, 1960, 21 pages; Basutoland, Office of the Secretariat Development Plan, 1963-1968, Maseru, 1963, 52 pages.
6. The framework of the economic and financial policies of the Government of Basutoland, 1967-1972, Maseru, Economic Planning Unit, 1966, p. 12.
7. Basutoland Times, Maseru, 11 November 1963, p.7.
8. See Nimrod Raphaeli, Comparative public administration: an overview, in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), Readings in comparative public administration, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1967, p. 21-22, for a discussion of Riggs' views.
9. Edward W. Weidner, Strategy for a development-oriented university, in John Barratt et al. (eds.), Strategy for development, London, Macmillan, 1976, p. 263. The emphases in this section are my own.
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14. Dudley Seers, The prevalence of pseudo planning, in Faber and Seers (Vol. one), op.cit., 19-33.
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17. Papanek, op.cit., p. 173.
18. Personal interview.
19. Personal interview.
20. Compare for example, E. Karanja Ragui, The role of the district officer in Kenya to day, Journal of Administration Overseas, 11, 3, 1972, p. 183.
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26. Raymond Vernon, Comprehensive model building in the planning process: the less developed economies, in Marvin E. Rozen (ed.), comparative economic planning, Boston, Heath and Company, 1967, p. 112.
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Footnotes Cont.

28. Lesotho. National accounts 1966/67-1971/72, Maseru, Bureau of Statistics, March 1975, particularly the preface and introduction.
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30. Albert Waterston, An operational approach to development planning, in Faber and Seers (Vol. one), op.cit., p.91.
31. Haq, op.cit. p. 23-4
32. Personal interview.
33. As an interim measure, the Government has decided to establish a domestically-financed slaughterhouse.
34. Personal interview.



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