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# Southern Africa in the 1980s and beyond

Institute of Southern African Studies 1980-1990

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# Southern Africa in the 1980s and beyond

Institute of Southern African Studies 1980-1990



Selected Papers Presented to the ISAS 10th Anniversary Workshop Held at  
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## Errata

p.14	line 6	feeds not needs
p.17	line 9	augments not arguments
p.18	line 7	form not from
p.288	No. 21	Kimane not Limane
p.296	No. 7	Nthongoa not Nthogoa

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## INTRODUCTION

The Institute of Southern African Studies commemorated the occasion of its Tenth Anniversary in 1990 with a series of activities intended to capture the mandate for which it was established. One of the activities for that occasion was to hold a three day workshop for retrospection and for a critical review of the Institute's future direction in the context of the Southern African region in the 1990s.

The papers in this publication form a debate on the essential future character of research activities and the direction the Institute should consider in its quest to provide the country and the region with relevant and reliable studies, as well as high-level manpower training in Southern African studies. The document is an evidence of transformation, a process of growth and a demonstration of unusual ability to respond to the research problems from a multidisciplinary dimension.

At the time the Institute was conceived, a number of Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia were under firm colonial racist domination. The concern of the period was therefore directed at self-sufficiency and self-reliance within a heightened apartheid system in South Africa. Then the Institute hosted a regional workshop whose main objective was to "advise the newly-established institute" in setting its research priorities.

The commemoration of the tenth anniversary occurs at a time of universal expectancy, having reached an extraordinary juncture in the history of Southern Africa. The political and economic ideologies which shackled the governments of Southern African countries, the false democracies, are all showing gaping cracks of imminent collapse.

The wars of dispersion, the discriminatory and derogatory statutes shuttered the nations and social order of Southern Africa. Although from the 1960s to the early 80s our hopes were raised as each Southern African country shed its colonial yoke, the oppression both in body and spirit did not seem to ease. We faced one another with mutual suspicion and enmity. We killed each other without a qualm. As we mused on the dangers looming over our region and amongst our nations the future prospects seemed dark indeed. Now, almost overnight, the regional prospects have begun to change! The hard mould of apartheid history is being dissolved and reshaped before our eyes. The threat of total-onslaught has begun to recede and the

seeds of a new freedom have begun to germinate. There is a challenge to the old discriminatory systems which brought so much harm and hardship to countless Southern Africans. Perhaps never before have the Southern African peoples experienced such a responsive period so important for its future as the present transition. The central question is what does it mean for us? What are the possibilities and dangers? More important therefore, is, what is in store for the scholar community dedicated to scientific investigation expected to unravel the tangled scene? Are these events amenable to our current repertoires of skills or should we explore more innovative and responsive approaches?

This publication represents a selected collection of papers from the workshop, and edited within the Institute of Southern African Studies. The volume represents a multi-disciplinary suggestions on research areas which the Institute should consider for the last decade of the twentieth century. In most cases the papers highlight areas likely to require immediate attention of scholars and each subject area is discussed from a multi-disciplinary dimension, both the character of the problem and the approaches to tackle them are broad based. Although the authors come from varied ideological backgrounds each paper attempts a consolidated approach. Therefore, the papers are not a presentation of a certain theoretical and analytical school, but are more eclectic in approach.

The Institute decided to publish these papers for a number of reasons. It is hoped that the publication will provide the wider community with the information on what the Institute is about and what it has to offer and will promote academic exchange and discussion within and between the Institute and the region it is serving. It is also hoped that policy makers and planners will be encouraged to make use of the Institute's resources and skills.

The publication is divided into six parts. The introductory part serves to acquaint the reader with the history and the role of the Institute in the solution of problems through research and the best possible ways to disseminate research findings. The second part deals with the socio-cultural environment of Southern Africa especially with regard to development in the region and the different research approaches.

The third part focuses on economic development issues and the endeavours in strategies for regional cooperation for economic liberation. Implication of



population dynamics, educational and health issues which affect or influence development are also discussed. The fourth part discusses industrial and labour issues in the region and in Lesotho in particular. The fifth part examines factors that have affected political development in Southern Africa. While the sixth and final part deals with areas of science and technology, an area often neglected in the predominantly social science and humanity oriented small universities. Where there are science and technology institutes, these operate in isolation from the social scientists, educationists and lawyers.

The workshop as well as the publication were made possible by the generous sponsorship of IDRC, Ford Foundation, SAREC and USIS and by the cooperation of the organizers, the support of participants from the region and locally.

On behalf of the Institute of Southern African Studies and the National University of Lesotho, I would like to express our deep gratitude for the assistance, cooperation and support magnanimously given during this time.

G.M. Malahleha  
Director  
Institute for Southern African Studies  
December 1992.

# **SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND**

**FRANK BAFFOE**

**Frank Baffoe and Associates (PTY) Ltd., Maseru**

On this auspicious occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS), I want to join all those wishing the Institute a clearer vision of hopes and commitment to the mission of its founding fathers. The mission of ISAS to serve as a research and high-level manpower training centre in Southern African studies in the subregion still remains a noble one.

I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to the Director of ISAS, Dr G.M. Malahleha, for the kind invitation to deliver this keynote address. It was both an honour and a privilege, and I therefore accepted it with great humility. It is my sincere belief that there are more suitable and more competent people who could perform this function. I am however, undaunted by this thought because I view my role on this occasion today as a challenge.

The invitation to deliver a keynote address provides a remarkable opportunity to present a mind at work on a burning subject of contemporary interest and concern - Southern Africa. I wish to use this unique opportunity to present some of my personal thoughts about recent events and pressing problems facing the subregion. In doing this I shall be mindful of the difference between the image of a future that one wants and the image of the future which is bound to become a reality.

Time flies! ISAS is now ten years old without our consent. It seems like yesterday when some of us had the privilege of serving as midwives to ISAS' birth. Time indeed flies, but what does this trite old saying really mean?

I think that the important thing is not the speed of time; it is what takes place in time and space. The direction of the change and its content are of critical importance. This means that we first have to be able to tell what is the substance of the changes which are going on around us. We can solve a problem only if we have defined it properly, and often its definition is half the solution.

Let me illustrate this with an experience I had some 18 years ago at the Makerere University in Uganda. I was lecturing to a class of 290 students during Idi Amin's reign of dictatorship and societal terror. Amin's mobilising political slogan was: "We are moving at a supersonic speed". We lived then in fear and in a subdued atmosphere of uncertainty. One day I questioned my students in class as to the meaning of the slogan. Was I risking my life at the time? With hindsight, I think I was simply naive. Since no student braved an answer, I drew their attention to the fact that Amin had not told the Ugandans the direction the supersonic movement was taking. Yes indeed, it could be forward in progress or backward in destruction. We now know what happened.

The failure of the dons of Makerere University to use their critical research capacity to focus on the essence of Uganda's societal, political, power and economic dynamics resulted as a matter of fact in their conferring on Idi Amin an honorary Ph.D in March 1976. The eulogy on the occasion included the statement: "Never in history has a leader done so much for his people in so short a time".

It has been suggested that the phrase from his people should have read to his people, because this would be a more appropriate epitaph of Amin's eight-year reign of terror.

Let me now return to some other facts. I want to single out some of those that can help us define one of the major themes of changes in Southern Africa. The first is the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in the mid-1970s. The formal political independence of Angola and Mozambique dealt a heavy blow to the naive belief that "Westerners were civilised; non-Westerners were natives in the sense that they had no human rights", and, by the same token, Western civilisation, in whatever sense defined, had come to stay.

Internationally, the 1970s reflected an era of a socioeconomic syndrome consisting of economic growth expectations, a consumption orientation, the reliance on international prerequisites such as free trade and convertibility as well as national full employment and social welfare. The position of the countries of the developing world was extremely marginalised. They were just pawns in the international political, economic and military power game.

The political achievements of the 1970s not only brought forth the venom of international exploitation but also the verve of a people committed to regaining their birthright as a means of fulfilling the potential of their human life-changes. This process culminated in the political independence of Zimbabwe. It took a full decade thereafter for Namibia to regain its political independence in the midst of devastating destabilisation in the subregion, and regional economic and political regrouping in Europe, North America and Far East Asia. Namibia's independence should be seen as a vital aspect of the evolving new Southern Africa.

The new Southern Africa will be weighed down by the heavy hands of history. The existing socioeconomic, political and power structures deny many people the basic opportunities of participating in the life of society: a minimum income, education and training, housing, social security and citizenship rights.

Since the prevalent structures prevent the realisation of our human life-changes, the task is to listen to those who question established assumptions and values, and indeed work towards the creation of a general sociopolitical environment which allows the majority a hearing. To do this we must not only break out of the glass-and-concrete towers of administrative and institutional structures but we must also shatter our ossified thinking patterns. This is an agenda of change with improvement, a change in attitudes.

I have not mentioned the most important development within Southern Africa. The past 13 months, and especially the past 8 months, have been months of hope because of the crumbling of the apartheid system. I insist however, that they must equally be months of decisions both in South Africa and in Southern Africa. Apartheid is crumbling and the options are staring squarely at us.

So far there has been an uneasy feeling. We are all standing on the banks watching the changing tides, looking with great interest and excitement to see what course the racing torrent of Southern African history is going to take. We are all

following the events taking place, particularly in South Africa, full of hope but not without a sense of fear and anxiety because we seem to be unable to control the course of events. We keep on asking: What will be the outcome of the process of negotiation in South Africa?

Many an idea or ideology has been proven wrong and ineffective, many a doctrine has proved to be false. Apartheid and the one-party system are living examples. We can therefore not hide behind the memories of ideals, using them as shields. The building blocks of the old world of Southern Africa are crumbling and they will soon be lying in a heap of rubble waiting for a master-builder (or master-builders) to put them together again, but in a new edifice. Remember the saying: Facts are not what counts in history; what counts is how people assess them and act upon them.

This brings me back to the reason we have gathered here today. I am assured that the main purpose of the workshop is to review the research activities of the Institute during the past ten years, the issues it has been addressing and the way it has been managing its activities. In the light of the established past experiences, it is envisaged that the workshop will also establish a research agenda for Southern Africa during the 1990s.

I purposely do not want to preempt the research recommendations that will emanate from the various sub-themes which cover areas like political development, regional security, destabilisation, hegemony of South Africa, regional cooperation, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund, agricultural development, industrial and investment policies, labour migrancy, cultural issues, ethnicity and gender, education, population, health, science and technology.

I sincerely believe that those dealing with the sub-themes are competent enough to enlighten us on their various areas of specialisation. The Director's remarks are also educative.

In spite of this observation, I take the liberty of putting forward my own thoughts on the future of ISAS in terms of fulfilling its mandate of research and teaching.

My point of departure is that research is a complex subject, having many dimensions in many different fields of knowledge. I am talking about scientific enquiry which is more equivalent to the German word *Wissenschaft* embracing all knowledge - arts and humanities as well as natural science.

The history of research development, beginning with the cave man, parallels, for the most part, the history of human achievement. Research is a technique resulting in knowledge accumulation, an accumulation that has built the modern world. By the same token, business and government require a high order of problem-solving skills to meet the demands of place to work and live. The role of research as a problem-solver has become increasingly important to all societies and economies.

It must be emphasised at this juncture that those days are gone when a national economy could compete successfully in the global economic game on the basis of its natural resource endowment. As a matter of fact, the emergence of the global economy implies that a nation's (or a region's) competitiveness is now determined not so much by the availability of natural resources as by its ability to generate and deploy new knowledge.

Can we here today say of ISAS that it has effectively efficiently contributed to the subregion's ability to generate and deploy new knowledge so as to improve and strengthen its competitiveness in the global game of economics and politics? We definitely will not deny the fact that ISAS has a vital role to play. The pertinent question is how?

I want to remind you of the keynote address given by Dr Michael M. Sefali, then Director of ISAS, at a Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa, held at ISAS, November 23-27, 1981. While Dr. Sefali could apologetically say then that "the weak scientific and technological basis inherited from the colonial past is still another major constraint on the development process" in the subregion, any attempt to rationalise the appalling research capacity today will only betray our incapacity to learn to act. We all have ideas but none of us is prepared to pay the price.

It is not enough to have a research institute like ISAS; behind it there must be systems and programmes operating efficiently and effectively and a state of mind

conducive to decision-making; and there must be processes which galvanise the dynamic forces of society.

My contention is that ISAS cannot accomplish its mandate within the existing context of physical and other infrastructural facilities as well as of the available human resource capabilities for developing science and technology. For ISAS to be able to promote and coordinate research projects dealing with Southern African matters, it must have a solid infrastructural foundation for science and technology. The issue is essentially expenditure on research and development.

The starting point is to develop ISAS as an organisation whose focus shifts from the academic, ivory tower environment into a market-oriented research organisation. This will mean injecting business principles into the research and teaching programmes of ISAS.

There is no reason why the business community in the subregion would not fund research and development activities in ISAS if these activities would enhance the competitiveness of the sector. The Institute must be restructured to offer research and development services on commercial basis. The subregion is in dire need of innovative science and technology-driven growth and development. There is abundant testimony to the vital link between the implementation of the fruits of science and technology (in the broadest sense) and societal and economic transformation.

This is the challenge facing ISAS in the 1990s and in terms of its role in the subregion.

In conclusion I want to argue that now that apartheid and destabilisation politics are beginning to be no longer paramount in the way we South Africans view our sociopolitical and economic affairs it should be possible to get by without enemy concepts and without manipulating statistics. The basic principle in the subregion must be to replace the hegemonic rule of apartheid South Africa and confrontation, by collective regional interest based on cooperation and collective self-reliance.

The second basic task that must be performed to avoid the torrent sweeping us into an uncertain future is to set up a new interregional political and economic order that is based on interdependence and no longer hegemonic.

The states of Southern Africa are moving towards cooperation on the basis of interdependence within a common framework of a greater economic region. This process may not proceed smoothly as hoped for (and rightly so); but we must not be alarmed at the prospect of a greater political and economic region. If these countries grow steadily more worried their fears could easily become what the social scientists have termed self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, we must tighten the reins and not let them slack.



# **INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: THE CASE OF ISAS**

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## **Introduction**

This paper attempts to show the link between information and Development Research. The argument is that there is a symbiotic link between the two. The paper indicates also that Documentation supports and stimulates research. The role of publication and grey literature is emphasized and all are highlighted by an example of the activities of the Documentation Centre of ISAS in the past ten years.

## **The Volume of Information In Research And Development**

Research is the essence of science and science here is defined broadly to include both the natural and socio-economic sciences. Other activities - teaching, communication, organisation, etc. are auxiliary to the *raison d'être* of a scientist, that is the creation of new knowledge and the transfer of existing scientific, technological and socio-economic knowledge into new realms and applications. In case of scientific and technological research the objective is to convert the creativity of scientists and technologists into new understanding and capability.

The research function is therefore essentially, it can be argued, a creative process for solving problems, the solutions of which are not readily apparent. Effectiveness in the research process relates primarily to finding problems to solutions that will have high value in accordance with long term organisation

objectives. Efficiency in the research process is an expression of how economically resources are used to generate solutions. In a very broad sense, the product of research - differentiating it from engineering or manufacturing, is a statement of the solution to a complex problem, or the production of new and useful knowledge. This knowledge is taken by others, they being engineers, economists, scientists, politicians, sociologists etc. and is converted into new or improved products, methods or procedures. Hence we can conclude the only real product of research is data and information for use in or guidance of other functions.

If it can be accepted that research produces information then it can also be argued that information feeds research. In other words there is a symbiotic process throughout.

For example, in our region, the majority of the population live in rural areas in relative isolation. A vital part of the development process therefore are extension services through which modern, practical knowledge and simple government practices can be brought to the individual especially in the important areas of health care and agricultural practice. It is also a mechanism whereby information on new techniques, new crop varieties, marketing systems and the like, may be brought to a small scale farmer. Generally these extension services are run by central government but many may also be run by parastatal bodies and commercial companies where the small-holders are growing a cash crop.

So, although a development project may have as its foundation a scientific or technological improvement for the benefit of the people, the types of information needed and produced range far beyond surely scientific and technical.

Thus for example, the introduction of high-yielding hybrid maize not only involves the breeding and distribution of the seed maize but also depends on detailed and exact information about the selection of suitable areas for introduction, with the correct soils and climate, the caliber of the farmer and where necessary his education in the appropriate husbandry; the supply of

fertilizers and the credit required for their purchase, the development of distribution system for the marketing of surplus production and helping the farmer and his family deal with any additional cash income that he may be lucky enough to obtain from the exercise.

As well as utilizing such information needed for preliminary research and resource surveys, such an exercise provides information for development planners, the economists, financial institutions and most importantly the extension services.

It can be argued also that the concept of an extension system is essentially an extension of an information system of a particular field rather than new topic. There are three sub-systems to which distinct and sometimes institutionalized groups of people correspond. These are generation of knowledge, its transformation and transmission and its application and use.

In our example, knowledge may be generated by agricultural scientists, usually in government or private research institutions. It is transformed and disseminated by what we would call "change agents" who in turn transmit it either to new research projects or competent personnel in extension services via reliable channels of communication; and in this case, it is used by the farmer. This structural model also fits the more restricted subsystem of scientific development, which comprises that one group of people, they being scientists who assume the various roles of knowledge generators, knowledge transmitters and users of knowledge.

Where does information fit into these sub-systems quoted above? Information is not an end in itself but an indispensable means to connect the elements of the overall research and development services -In this way, it is an orderly system and not a heap of unconnected and disorganised parts. Rather, the scientific, technological and socio-economic information services all form that cycle of knowledge as one single process.

That notwithstanding, it is regretted that very valuable research results are produced but they remain in the laboratories, the scientists' offices or

secretaries' files. Diffusion is minimal. However where diffusion exists, its propagation is usually uncorrelated, and hence chaotic.

### *Documenting Research Data and Development (R + D) Results*

We have established the relationship between R + D and information. If it can be accepted that information emanates from research and that information needs research, then it can be argued, information is a valuable resource in R + D. Scientific communication is perhaps the most tangible tool for doing science. Research in the natural sciences for example is, in contrast to most other human endeavours, a highly collective undertaking. Often, researchers learn from the work of others and build on it. The cumulative structure of scientific and technological knowledge is made possible by considerable objectivity in the process of resolving scientific disputes and by the apparent structure of scientific laws compatible with such a cumulation.

The importance of scientific communication is so paramount that recent trends in the analysis of research output is formulated in terms of information and documentation services pertaining to the research projects. In other words the more of good raw data or input into research findings, the more of good quality of research results or output. Summarily it means, "garbage in garbage out."

Meltzer, when discussing Information as a Resource gives an analogy of information processing and dissemination to that of oil. He likens the processing and exploration of oil to determining the best source of information. Drilling and completing wells is analogous to developing search strategies. Recovery of oil is compared to retrieving raw data. The crude oil must be refined and processed, data must be analysed and synthesised (into knowledge). Oil storage and the problems of transporting it are not too different from the problems of maintaining and disseminating information to the ultimate user.

The oil-information analogy may be carried even further when it is considered that there are various graders of oil just as there are various

grades of information, and just as the cost of oil continues to soar so too has the price of information increases. As a commodity, information can be bought and sold. However, unlike other resources, information is not depleted when it is retrieved. It need not lose its value, quantity, content or power. Also information is not consumed or destroyed when it is put into use. It can however be obsolete when it is provided too late.

The generation, processing, synthesis and dissemination of information involves a cost. The central economic fact about the process of research and especially where it involves invention is that it is devoted to the production of information. Invention must be a risky process involving high financial and material expenditure, and hence the by product, which is information itself, is costly. The documenting of research results therefore justifies the existence of documentation centres, research and academic libraries, archives and museums.

#### *The Symbiosis of Research and Information: A case for ISAS*

Information on Lesotho and other countries of the Southern African region is produced by many individuals and agencies. Although some research is formally published, an increasing proportion appears in the form of mimeographed reports generated by short-term externally funded development projects, conference, workshop and seminar papers as well as dissertations submitted to a wide range of universities with research interests in the region. Government departments, parastatals, international organisations, charitable bodies and private individuals are among other contributors to this corpus of information commonly known as 'fugitive' or 'grey' literature.

At ISAS, Documentation Centre, which is at present a major operational component of the Documentation and Publications Division, has a specific mandate which makes it responsible for collecting, classifying and making available to users a comprehensive collection of the "grey literature" on Lesotho. These are material of inter-disciplinary nature with more selective coverage of informally published and semi - or non-published materials relevant to Southern Africa, the Third World, LDC's OAU, the

Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement and the like.

While collecting for researchers, "grey literature" deserves a special mention here, as it is the type of material that requires vigilant documentation. It being "hidden" it is difficult to acquire, sensitive in some cases but likely to provide fresh information for researchers. One should emphasise fresh because it has been proved that for research, information provides good quality results if it is provided at the right time, meaning, promptly.

On the one hand the subject for collection is determined by the research agenda. For example, if a research project is dealing with the South African Destabilisation Policy, the Centre makes certain that a comprehensive collection on destabilisation is acquired. The acquisition will primarily be broader on that topic and secondarily it will cover periphery areas, like Politics and the International Relations. In that way the researcher has an access to a broad spectrum of the research topic. On the other hand, the acquisition policy does anticipate information requests on some topical issues. As at present there is no on-going study on AIDS but the Centre has already started collecting in that field. This then proves that regardless of whether it is Research or Documentation that is conducted first, finally both make a vicious circle kind of interrelationship.

Consequently, at present ISAS has specialized collections for example, on Human Rights, Destabilisation, Women Studies, Agricultural Marketing and Migrant Labour. The collection is largely determined by the research agenda which at the same time stimulates further research into currently debated topics affecting the sub-region. At this point a symbiotic relationship between information flow and research is continuously established.

### **Publishing**

The correct title of ISAS Division we are looking at is the Documentation and Publications Division. One important function which is often overlooked in this Division is Publishing. By design however, this sector was planned to work at three levels. Firstly, to take over immediate products emanating

from the Research Division. Thus it has indeed received manuscripts and unedited research reports from researchers; it has employed professionals who have edited those reports before they are printed and published for the general consumption just as the processed oil is used. In this manner all ISAS scholarly works have been fully fulfilled; and as Cobbe ascertains this proves that publishing can be seen as an integral part of the natural function of a research library . Otherwise, research results remain raw, unknown to the public and thus unusable.

Secondly, the Centre arguments heavily on secondary sources; that implies publishing for the second time. In essence making abstracts, bibliographies, indices clippings etc is an art of announcing what was primarily published elsewhere, but in a different form and perhaps for a different consumer. For example, when a newspaper is published, its information is originally for a limited use - for news. But when this paper is clipped out, selecting those articles which are kept in the clippings format, that second publishing is for the other category of user or researcher of some in-depth study. Again, this sieving of information, its re-packaging and storage indicates the costs involved in the "information industry at the end of which more and more publishing is developed through the titles like Lesotho Clipping which stimulate further research.

At the third stage, one notes that in Africa, where poor publishing facilities contribute to the continent's book famine, the Publications section should win a compliment for ISAS whereby it does not publish its own papers only, but also works from outside the Institute whereby there are also announced and distributed. This has indeed been the case with some examples from several NUL Committees and Departments. There are prospects too that with NUL establishing its Publishing House, this field will be strengthened to fulfil more research results.

*Prospects of Information and Documentation in the Region - ISAS Involvement*

All of the activities that deal with information throughout the world are in a state of rapid change. This involves influx of new ideas from a number of disciplines; expansion of applications; deployment of new systems, techniques and technology and even expansion of new theoretical, experimental and philosophical grounds.

The SADCC countries, Namibia and South Africa are no exception to these changes. Though these are heterogeneous entities, they now form one group within which ISAS should plan its strategies. The situation at the same time poses a dilemma for ISAS which is at different levels of development with all these countries.

### **The Past**

From its inception almost a decade ago, the Documentation and Publications Division of ISAS has focused on a number of issues:

- (a) initially it worked closely with Botswana and Swaziland with whom links are historically and culturally very tight. The intimate cooperations amongst the Documentation Centres of ISAS, NIR and SSRU is indicative;
- (b) later the identification, collection, processing and storing of documents covered the entire SADCC region. This expansion was dictated by the obvious economic and political forces of the given sub-region;
- (c) finally there was the establishing of linkages with other centres and organisations involved in information exchange internationally.

Despite some various problems the identification and collection of documents, especially on Lesotho has been and it continues to be a challenging venture. This would again be strengthened by the establishment of a National Research Council, which unfortunately



is slow to take of the ground.

- (d) Despite its close proximity to Lesotho, South Africa itself, for obvious political reasons, due to its vast area even its massive information, has been very difficult to satisfactorily document about. The same applies to Namibia. Though Documentation on these two countries is continuing, cooperation is almost not there.

The above four categories have respectively accounted for the following:

#### *Southern African Social Science Index (SASSI)*

A major co-operative venture in which the Division intends to participate, depending on funds, is the Southern Africa Social Science Index. This was launched three years ago among sister institutions, NIR in Botswana, SSRU in Swaziland and ISAS in Lesotho. The idea is to standardize methods of data input and exchange by use of modern technology. In the initial stages, exchange would be limited to floppy diskettes. The project proposal is with IDRC for possible funding. The long term objectives of SASSI is also to interconnect in Southern Africa other documentation centres. With future use of distributed databases information can be down loaded electronically from one database to another.

At the present the Division's problems are mainly due to lack of space. Some thousands of documents in the centre are not yet indexed, and a mere attempt to retrieve a document on a given topic can be a nightmare.

#### *Southern African Inter-Library Loan System: + Periodicals In Southern African Libraries (PISAL)*

ISAS is therefore not a member to this system which is based in Pretoria. From Lesotho the National Library and NUL Library participate. The question is then how ISAS can benefit from their membership. There are also a few participants who make input from Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe; three of whom are SADCC members.

## **The Future**

*Information and User Services:* To develop a constituency of information users, the Division has to consider several factors. Information services will have to be constructed around the user and that users right to immediate access to information pertinent to his/her needs. This requires the development of user profiles to identify and synthesize their research interests so that specialized services such as current awareness, and selective dissemination of information (SDI) services could be provided.

*Computer Applications:* Recent technological developments in computer usage and in complex communications systems have resulted in close linkages between data processing and telecommunications and have brought about revolutionary technology in data and information processing. The processing, storage and retrieval of a wide variety of information can now be undertaken on an international scale, and there has been rapid growth of transborder data flows, especially between institutions and corporations in industrialized countries.

In the region, information systems and communications facilities cover a very wide range. They extend from certain countries whose satellite communications facilitate a rapid data processing to those countries which continue to operate through traditional systems of information collection and through postal media and or oral communications.

As we forecast for the 1990's and/or beyond efforts should be made to interconnect, by use of modems and dedicated telephone lines, to the Pan African Documentation Information System in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; to interconnect to SAPES (in Zimbabwe) and to other several database on

varied developmental disciplines such as Environment and Gender.

The Documentation Division has, as already stated accumulated a lot of documents in paper form. Efforts will be made to "convert" the documents into microfiche form. PADIS is always willing to assist member countries, free of charge, to carry out such projects. The advantage of microfiche is the ability to contain volumes and volumes of information on a thin strip. It is also safe and cheaper to maintain.

What does all this entail? For an effective task of supporting research Information and Documentation should have adequate space, staffing, equipment and financial provisions. For research on the other hand to be a reliable source of life for Documentation it should be conducted in an atmosphere of academic freedom, economic growth, political stability and general tranquillity. Otherwise, research is interfered with, and vice versa. So far ISAS, Research and Documentation have no known cases that suffered through censorship, external political or cultural interferences.

## **Conclusion**

The Division is committed to strengthening the Information Network of NUL; to provide accurate information to the University intelligentsia, academic researchers and students in the country and regionally. The will to forge ahead is there, what is needed are the resources outlined above. As we look forward to post apartheid Southern Africa, there are matters within the information profession that will need to be addressed; these comprise maintenance of bibliographical standards; computer networking and the end of all cultural/education boycott of South Africa. But above all, the mechanisms of coming to terms with incompatible systems and methods which for decades have developed differently. The success in that area will consequently promote a successful development research.

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# THE SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSION OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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## Introduction

The "Sociocultural Dimension of National Development in Southern Africa" is quite a mouthful. For someone with Cartesian proclivities, it certainly does not lend itself to any theoretical or philosophical precision. In terms of classical theory and in the context of struggles for "independence" in Africa thus far, there is a definite conceptual incongruity between "national development" and what might be seen as regional integrity (not integration) or common identities (not interests). This is attributable to the phenomenon of "nationalism". Classical nationalism in Europe, which came to be identified with the concept of "nation-state", triumphed precisely because it sought to emphasise the uniqueness of the perceived national entity at the expense of centuries-old regional affinities. These were largely cultural and linguistic and not necessarily technological. Yet, between the 17th and 19th centuries there emerged in Europe a pervasive identity which became known as "European civilization". This had both cultural and technological connotations which were recognized ideologically but denied politically until the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) three hundred years later. If historical analogies are anything to go by, it might be asked: why was the frame of reference for development in Europe at one stage *national* (Adam Smith) and at another *regional* (the Common Marketeers)?

In pursuit of this developmental analogy it could be assumed that African countries, by virtue of imperialist penetration and integration into the world capitalist system, became historical contemporaries of their colonisers. This line of thought would make it possible to postulate a certain telescoping of "national" and "regional" development in particular subregions in Africa, e.g. Southern Africa. One of the implications of such a postulate would be that not only is colonialism a mother of African nationalism but also a foster-parent of regional

integration at the economic level. It is African proto-nationalists who have proved incapable of dealing with the implications of this dialectic or dynamic, both programmatically and conceptually. One of the reasons for this is the inevitable conflict in any nationalism between subjective affirmations in the form of cultural identity and language and the objective structural implications of that to which nationalism is a response, i.e. white domination and capitalist/imperialists exploitation in Southern Africa. All these are not cultural phenomena and observe no boundaries. How do African proto-nationalists contend with them, without changing their terms of reference?

The tendency among proto-nationalists has been to emphasise cultural identity and values as a basis for political organization in a world which has been transnationalised since the end of the 19th century. In some cases the insistence is in spite of the fact that the entities they seek to glorify are themselves products of colonialism. The best historical examples in Southern Africa are the British Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Were these "nations" with identifiable cultural boundaries? Some proto-nationalists might be tempted to rewrite history for their own convenience or might adopt the pragmatic view and even argue that the existence of "nations" or nationalities in Africa pre-dates colonialism. True as this might be, it does not obviate the problem of cultural diversity versus structural integration under the aegis of "nation-building", as is understood by African proto-nationalists.

In the case of Southern Africa, anthropologically and ethnographically, we have not even reached the point where we can say with certainty which of the political entities that emerged during the 19th century had become "nations" and which had remained "tribal" fragments. In other words, if the "sociocultural dimension" of national development was taken seriously, where would one begin? Secondly, if the concept of "Southern Africa" were to be accepted as a historical reality, where would we draw the line and what would be the implications for the various Southern Africa proto-nationalisms and supposed cultural boundaries? It should be noted that, conventionally, the 11th parallel is what marks off Southern Africa geographically. This does not by any means represent a "sociocultural" unit, if that was a necessary dimension for "national development". Yet, economic integration and development has occurred in the region despite the observable cultural diversity. If so, what is the relevance of the "sociocultural dimension"? Could this be one of the lingering illusions of proto-nationalists?

## Culture and the Anthropology of Humankind

The relationship between culture and the history of humankind has exercised the minds of philosophers, historians, sociologists and anthropologists alike for the last two hundred years. Consequently, by now certain axiomatic statements can be made regarding some of the basic issues. For instance, it is generally acknowledged that culture is what distinguishes human beings from brutes. Yet, in modern history cultural distinctions have been used by some human groups as an excuse for drawing invidious distinctions between themselves and others and for brutalizing the target groups. Racial oppression and exploitation in Southern Africa is just one example of this. Nonetheless, it would be a great mistake to give credence to theories which attribute immanent force to culture and race. Fundamentally, the issue is not culture but *structure*. Cultural and somatic differences are often invoked to justify relations of domination and subordination, i.e. structural imposition. Southern African history has been nothing else but this since the arrival of the whites.

This is not to suggest that prior to white colonialism no structural impositions had occurred among the blacks themselves. However, in natural economies where nature is the subject of labour there is no predisposition towards structural imposition. The spread of the Bantu-speakers in Southern Africa, which was marked by a proliferation of small, autonomous chiefdoms, testifies to this. Dissatisfied groups simply hived off and set themselves up as independent entities with a new "tribal" name, even though culturally and linguistically, they were no different from their neighbours. Under the circumstances, "culture" could not have been an issue. That is why it is possible in South African historiography to employ all-embracing cultural categories such as the "Nguni" or the "Sotho", whose history is comprehended in terms of particular chiefs or "tribes". The question of whether this is methodologically justified or not will be reserved for another occasion.

Taken to a more general plane, what is implicit in our short review above is that the assertion culture is not a historical category. Rather, structural relations or organizational forms are. In the event, what would come to most minds is whether or not there could be organizational forms which are not themselves products of culture. This has of course been one of the longstanding arguments between materialists and idealists. In the wake of nationalist struggles in the Third World and a rebellion against Eurocentrism it has once again surfaced. Third

World Marxists, especially, have more or less acknowledged that Marxism does not have appropriate concepts for analysing cultural phenomena precisely because it accorded them a non-determinant role and relegated them to a residual category, the "super-structure".

This is obviously unsatisfactory because it leaves out those institutions which straddle both the super and the infra-structure, e.g. kinship and language, which can be both ideological and instrumental. However, all this does not mean that there is a one-to-one relationship between culture and organizational forms or modes of production. The Chinese in Red China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are culturally akin and yet have developed different forms of organisation and modes of production. This is accounted for by differences in their historical development. More examples could be furnished, e.g. cultural affinities between Latin Americans and Europeans accompanied by dramatic differences in structure, not to say anything about the organizational vicissitudes which have been the mark of the "common European home" since the Second World War. What are the theoretical implications of such structural diversities within recognisable cultural uniformities?

It would seem that the classical view of the anthropology of mankind was not incorrect but became perverted by latter-day anthropologists who abandoned the dynamic concept of (wo)man as the maker of culture in favour of the more passive conception of (wo)man as the product of culture. This is a conservative view which is incapable of explaining how human beings transcend the limits of their culture and open up new vistas of life through their own creativity (*homo faber*). As such, it is incompatible with the more generative concept of (wo)man as the maker of history and new structures, and a veritable agent of new social relations and meanings. Theories of "social change" are no substitute or compensation for this because they were assimilationist in the imperialist or Eurocentric sense. They assume that the impulses for social and cultural change *necessarily* come from outside. In the event the natives could only be presumed to have neither history nor generative powers. Certainly, this was no anthropology of mankind but rather self-justification by colonialists and imperialists.

In contrast, classical theory was universal in its outlook. We can only find fault with it by referring to its rationalist separation between ideology (normative rationalizations) and creative labour (technological rationalizations). It is important



to grasp the significance of the ontological precept that in *doing* we are creating culture and new material conditions for existence. How long it takes for this to be manifest is immaterial and is no valid ground for referring us to pre-existing cultures, as proto-nationalists are wont to do as part of their ideological mystification. It is mystification because it does not describe accurately what they themselves actually do. In most cases their social behaviour is more deviant than that of ordinary citizens. This discrepancy is not without significance. It seems that the rising petit-bourgeoisie in Africa have found "culture" a ready-made tool for deluding the masses.

### Development and the National Question

The denunciation of proto-nationalists and their cultural effusions should not be construed as a negation of all subjective representations in the struggle for national development. What is at issue is the profound question of who are the authentic subjects of the process of development in our circumstances. Who are the cultural bearers of the coming African revolution? There seem to be many pretenders to the throne: monarchs, generals, Bantustan scarecrows, petit-bourgeois upstarts, proletariat opportunists, feckless migrant peasants and the impetuous youth. What a dismal lot, one may think; or what a desolate political landscape, one may surmise. Yet, underneath all this there are genuine forces whose identity is not self-evident. Otherwise, how do we account for the revolutionary pressures that are felt throughout Southern Africa? It is these pressures which constitute the national question. It is the job of the social scientist to fathom them and to discover the new standard-bearers. These questions are alien to conventional theory. Since the 1960s, development had been thought of in naturalistic or physical terms. For instance, according to the natural theology of modernisation theories which held sway for a good 25 years, development was a matter of movement from "traditionalism" to "modernity". The two were defined in antithetical terms. Adoption of Western values and the abandonment of traditional values was seen as the key to development. Although Western values were presented as largely technical or instrumental, it is apparent that the underlying suppositions were more cultural than technical because "Westernisation" was seen as a necessary condition for the successful application of Western technology in Third World countries. This rendered modernisation theories tautological, among other things. Why could it not be assumed that developing countries would borrow selectively from the West according to their own cultural predispositions, as happened among different

civilisations before the rise of monopoly capitalism? It is obvious that modernisation theories were in accord with the drive towards cultural homogenization by the developed countries, except Japan. But the desire to dominate *structurally* was the motive force.

It took underdeveloped countries some time to realise this. But when they did, their protest tended to take a cultural rather than a structural form, as has been said of pro-nationalists. This having been said, it is very important to note that the Latin Americans and Asians did not fall into this trap, as is shown by the *dependence* theory and what came to be known as the "Indian Debate". It is in Africa and the Middle East where cultural revivalism or defensiveness has been most evident. These also happen to be the two regions which are weakest, *structurally*, in the world. Could this be a coincidence? Nobody can be certain. But there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Islamic fundamentalism (including veiled women and a reversion to what are supposed to be Islamic intellectual traditions) gained in strength after the Middle East was plunged into a deep crisis as a result of repeated military and political defeats. The deep and pervasive crisis in Africa has not issued in exactly the same thing, but there has been a growing belief among some African intellectuals that culture is the "missing link" in African development. (This is implicit in my assigned topic.) At the political level there have been some noticeable "Africanist" convulsions, but these have remained purely intuitive. There might be objective reasons for this.

First, we have had an Africanist ideology and movement which ushered in "independence", but in recent years has been accused of having led to the present political malaise and economic crisis on the continent. Therefore, if anybody was to reassert any form of "Africanism", (s)he would have to take into consideration the fact that it has happened before, and that we are now faced with its negations. Secondly, if part of the reason was imperialist domination or neo-colonialism, then how could these be handled under a nationalist perspective, pure and simple? Theoretically and programmatically, this is no easy task, especially after the collapse of Eastern Europe which seemed to preempt any attempt to infuse the new nationalism with socialist ideals. It should be noted that since the Arusha Declaration, the armed struggle in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and in South Africa, the Durban strikes in 1973 and Soweto uprising of 1976, there has been a perceptible trend toward this fusion.

Taken at its face value, this marks a shift from the bourgeois conception of the national question of the independence movement to what might be called a post-independence conception of the national question. The historical and social significance of the latter is that it was a result of disillusionment with the post-independence state in Africa: "Not yet uhuru", as the popular slogan went. The traditional philosophical view is that "there are no negations without affirmations". Logical as this view is, it does not tell us how long in practice it takes to move from one moment to the other. It is obvious that this is neither instantaneous nor automatic. There has been a further disillusionment with countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Considering this, what is going to be the *content* of the new nationalism or its source of inspiration? In my view, this points to the crisis of the African revolution at the present historical juncture (the case could be extended to other regions as well).

If the new radical nationalists had supposed that the emergence of the "Socialist-oriented" African countries signalled the end of the bourgeois nationalism of the independence movement, then they had a big shock waiting for them. The disintegration of the national alliance that brought about independence did not signify the demise of the bourgeois or old-style nationalists. It is possible that this could have been the case, if it had not been for certain international interventions and the relative weakness of contending forces such as the new radical nationalists. The *rapprochement* between the Soviet Union and the United States gave the bourgeois nationalists a further lease of life, despite the deepening crisis in Africa. Nothing illustrates this better than the approved idea of "negotiated settlement" and a more or less a permanent ban on armed struggle. In practice this has meant a compromise with pro-imperialist and pro-capitalist forces in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In South Africa it has given rise to an anomalous situation, where what would have been reactionary forces in the national liberation movement are on the ascendancy and what would have been the radical forces find themselves in a quandary, unable to articulate clearly the meaning of the national question in the light of disillusionment with the post-independence state in Africa and of the great retreat in what were thought to be revolutionary states in Southern Africa.

The apparent differences among various contenders within the national liberation movement in Southern Africa have been construed by the enemies of Africa as "tribal" differences. Ethnic cleavages among modern Africans may or may not occur. The important point to grasp, politically or sociologically, is that whenever

they manifest themselves, these cleavages do so not in terms of themselves but in relation to issues that could be understood otherwise, e.g. political and economic power at the national level. Therefore, they should be seen as rationalizations of these non-ethnic interests. Ideological manipulation of ethnic identities by African leaders is as common as it is contradictory. African leaders are correctly seen as agents of African nationalism and are known to be great believers in "nation-building". Therefore, it is contradictory for them to be at the same time peddlers of "tribalism". We are thus obliged to interpret such opportunism as part of the ideological battles that inhere in the national liberation movement itself. Contrary to popular belief among African intellectuals and academics, since the days of Nkrumah's "African personality" or Senghor's *negritude*, rarely do African nationalists couch their ideological projections in cultural terms. What has distinguished between them so far is the degree to which they lay stress on the Africanist or their common *black* identity in a white-dominated world. As stated earlier, in recent years the trend has been to inject some socialist ideals into the nationalist trajectory. This has made it possible to talk of the radical or progressive wing of the national liberation movement *vis-a-vis* the reformist or liberal bourgeois wing.

This is not to say that there is homogeneity within each broad category. For instance, among the South African movements there are noticeable differences in emphasis between, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) though they might all belong to the same camp. Likewise, there are significant differences between, the African National Congress (ANC), Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and *Inkatha*. Yet, all could be seen as variants of the same political trend - liberal bourgeois reformism. In this context the violent conflict between United Democratic Front (UDF) and *Inkatha* in Natal is very instructive. First of all, culturally and linguistically there is no dividing line between the two. There is a question whether ideologically there is a real difference between the two. This is bearing in mind that at one stage the ANC found it quite acceptable to maintain a dialogue with Gatsha Buthelezi.

Therefore, one suspects that Gatsha Buthelezi is indulging in the same old manipulation of the so-called tribal sentiments, not so much because of ideological revulsion for the UDF or the ANC but as a manoeuvre to gain more political space in the national arena. It would be a gross mistake to suppose that an astute politician such as Buthelezi would nurse the vain hope that under the changing

conditions in South Africa he would be able to hold indefinitely the Kwazulu Bantustan as his footstool. A more realistic interpretation of the situation would be that Buthelezi is playing a disruptive role so as to get guarantees from the ANC and the De Klerk government that when the negotiations actually take place, he, not Kwazulu, will not be left out. The irony of it all is that to carry out his campaign Gatsha Buthelezi has relied on covert support from white diehards who would anyway like to see him stay in his Bantustan forever.

In the meantime, Gatsha Buthelezi regards himself as good an African nationalist as any of the ANC leaders. While the ANC might for good reasons treat him with suspicion because of his apparent Zulu chauvinism, it still has to reconcile this with its SACP-inspired theory of the right of nations to self-determination. This has been mechanically adopted by the ANC, despite the fact that the history of the South African black nationalist movement showed very clearly from the beginning that this was totally irrelevant. Far from joining the national liberation movement as representatives of particular cultural and linguistic groups, South African black nationalists were bound together by common new values, namely Western education, the English language and Western liberal ideology. In general, they assumed, like the white liberal theorists of "social change", that African societies and culture would become civilised accordingly. Whether or not this perception of the future of African societies was justified or desirable, the fact is that African languages and culture were not a *casus belli* on anybody's part. The rallying point was the rights of blacks (especially the "civilised" ones) *vis-a-vis* those of whites under liberal democracy. This did not mean lack of appreciation of African languages and traditions, as is shown by the many and animated literary writings in what was condescendingly referred to as the "vernacular" (a concept about which I have views but cannot go into here).

It should be understood that the glorification of African traditions at an earlier stage was not seen as an antithesis of western civilisation but rather as its animation by African interlocutors. Written African verse in stanzas and prose was the best approximation to 19th century European literary forms. In other words, there was a conscious effort towards reaching what were thought to be universal standards. It was not until the end of the Second World War that white racism and intransigence led to a questioning or rejection of what was supposed to be universal. This issued in an emphasis on African symbols and identity, and "Africanism" instead of an assimilation liberalism. The rise of the Youth League

within the ranks of the ANC and the stringent anti-liberalism or *herrenvolk* of the Unity Movement were clear expressions of an assertive black nationalism or nationhood. Even here existing cultural and linguistic differences remained inconsequential. When the Afrikaner government tried to manipulate them by introducing such policies as Bantu Authorities (1951), Bantu Education (1954), and Bantu Self-Rule (1959-60), it encountered strong opposition from all the national movements, civic and peasant organizations, including the so-called tribal chiefs in some instance (Thembuland, Pondoland and Sekhukhuniland in particular). The failure of the South African Government and the Bantustan leaders to appeal to tribal or traditional sentiment demonstrates the incompatibility between this and its historical successor, African nationalism.

### The Passing of Tradition and Development

It is obvious that whatever African traditional social formations represented was undermined and transformed irrevocably by European colonialism in South Africa. As is known, the first thing colonialism did was to deprive African societies of their territorial base. Secondly, it destroyed their natural economy. The latter was replaced by colonial capitalism which, unlike classical capitalism, had contradictory transformational effects. Included among these were the so-called processes of "dissolution" and "preservation", which are epitomised first by the policy of Native Reserves and then by something as grotesque as the Bantustans. In the meantime, no Africans were willing to return to the "tribal" past, including the monarchies in Lesotho and Swaziland and various Bantustan leaders. The only difference was that the leadership, unlike the ordinary people, had found an advantage in maintaining the same policies of "dissolution" and "preservation" as the colonial or settler governments. They derived value from maintaining "traditional relations of domination, while not forfeiting any of the benefits of modern capitalism, e.g. opportunities for capitalist accumulation, bourgeois styles of life and consumption. This is probably what everybody aspires to but very few can attain. It is the social, economic and cultural implications of such aspirations and practice that need to be examined, not the illusion of traditional values and culture.

As it must have become apparent by now, the basic thesis in this paper is that the source of nationalism in Southern Africa, as elsewhere in the colonial world, is

*structural domination.* Second; cultural deprivation or depravity is a necessary concomitant of this. Third, it is one thing to acknowledge cultural deprivation among oppressed peoples, but it is quite another to presuppose that this deprivation can be remedied by reverting to an imagined pristine state, however defined. We simply do not know what the peoples of Southern Africa might have done if over the last three hundred years they had enjoyed freedom of cultural action. Nor are we able to anticipate what they might do in the future, without imposing our own preconceived ideas, which are ultimately a reflection of our own structural interests. Implicit in this argument are two major issues: one concerns the question of democratic pluralism and the other the question of development in the historical sense.

"Democratic pluralism", as an evolving political concept, is in conflict with a number of precepts which had been associated with national development, as has already been intimated. But if we were to distinguish between social and political movements, this would not be the case. The demand by the people to be heard and to have the right to fulfil themselves, socially and culturally, through their own organizations does not amount to class determination of the type of development within which this might occur historically, popular democracy has been realised under the concept of liberal and social democracy. But in both cases bourgeois rights and culture had been predominant. This has been so because the class which inaugurated the economic and political mode of organization which made all this possible was the bourgeoisie. Hence we can talk of the bourgeois revolution, starting from the 18th century in Europe. It is a question whether or not this spread to the colonies. But for the time being we note that bourgeois values pervade the ex-colonial world, including the settler societies in Southern Africa. As far as development is concerned, what does this signify?

The whole of Southern Africa had already been incorporated into a capitalist system by the end of the 19th century. The native economies having been deliberately undermined, the Africans had no choice but to participate in the new economic system, and they gradually embraced its values. Under normal circumstances, this would have implied a replacement of the pre-existing modes of production with a new expansive and socially progressive mode of production: modern capitalism. As in all cases of colonial capitalism, this did not happen. Instead, the Africans were obliged by extra-economic means to serve colonial capitalism as servile and itinerant labour. Under the circumstances, they could not

be beneficiaries of expansive and progressive capitalism. On the contrary, they became victims of parasitic colonial capitalism and white structural racism. Any attempts to develop themselves were thwarted by the system, i.e. they could not reproduce themselves socially either as agents of the pre-existing modes of production or the capitalist mode of production. It is only logical that at some point they found it necessary to rebel against the system and to develop their own nationalism. However, what is most important to observe is the fact that the nationalist rebellion was not necessarily anti-capitalist. It was against being underdeveloped by colonial capitalism. But what were the prospects for development in post-colonial capitalism or after independence?

The deep economic crisis, continued political strife and lack of democracy, and accelerated immiseration of the majority of the people after 30 years of independence in Africa would suggest that post-colonial capitalism in Africa has not been a great improvement on colonial capitalism, except for the change of white for black faces. African leaders are known for their corruption and shameless use of state revenues for indulging in conspicuous consumption. Nonetheless, the various African kleptocracies are not in themselves an explanation of the deep crisis in Africa, objectionable as they might be. They are only part of a pervasive malaise that has to be explained and which is not limited to the African continent. In other words, it cannot be argued, as the Southern African racists (among others) are inclined to, that Africans are by nature or culture dishonest and autocratic. Ridiculous as such suppositions are, they are as much a product of cultural determinism as the cultural nationalism or revivalism espoused by some African intellectuals and politicians. It is patently clear that African development has not failed because of cultural reasons.

Cultural degradation, alienation and impoverishment are characteristic phenomena under imperialism but never a cause for it. The mistake African proto-nationalists made, it would appear, is that they spontaneously embraced capitalism without pondering the implications of its imperialist foundations. Imperialism or capitalism in its monopoly stage exhibited two major characteristics: (a) far from expanding capitalist development in such a way that the gap between advanced and backward capitalist countries is narrowed, it created increased polarisation between the two through systematic transfer of value from the latter to the former. In 1989 in the midst of the worst economic crisis in Africa there was a net flow of value from Africa to the developed countries (see ECA Economic Report for 1989). (b) A



refusal to accept any political and cultural autonomy anywhere in the world, as is shown by repeated military invasions and billions of dollars' worth of military aid to pro-imperialist regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia; promotion of destabilisation programmes and low-intensity warfare in Africa (especially in Southern Africa), and decades-long subterfuge in Eastern Europe. If this be the case, what options are there for development in the Third World in general and in Southern Africa in particular?

### **Regional Self-Reliance and the Non-Capitalist Path to Development**

It has to be admitted that there is a general economic and political crisis in the world. However, at present this is more of a crisis for under- and semi-developed countries than it is for the developed countries. If this can be construed as a crisis of global capitalism, then the worst dilemma is faced by the underdeveloped countries. They have not achieved capitalist development, and they cannot aspire to socialists development after the demise of the Eastern European economies. It is worth noting that even in this instance our two modal reference points are both European. This should confirm the racial prejudices of the Europeans and their descendants and contradict the lofty claims of black proto-nationalists. What models for independent development have the latter been able to evolve since liberation from colonialism? Imitation of models from either side of what used to be called the "Iron Curtain" has proved inimical to African development. This might be a justification for rejecting all forms of Eurocentrism. It would be particularly so, if it is recalled that of all the underdeveloped regions, the Far East, which is renowned for its cultural traditions, has fared best in resisting Western capitalist penetration and in promoting national development, irrespective of professed ideological preferences. This observation might encourage my "culturalist" adversaries to seize on the fact to discredit my argument against attributing any determinant role to "culture" in the ontological sense as regards development. Of course, one would not be so foolish as to play into their hands. The case of the Far East was introduced to raise an even more fundamental question than the role of "culture", as is popularly understood.

Asia is the site of what are known as ancient civilisations. Although sociologists have used the term "civilisation" descriptively, it is apparent that it signifies something more than just "culture". The fact that it has been used normatively by European racists and Southern African white settlers to draw invidious

distinctions between themselves and the rest of humanity does not detract from this simple observation. In his monumental study the ill-fated English historian Arnold Toynbee could identify only 27 "civilisations" in the history of mankind. It has been argued, and was argued against Toynbee that this is simply a matter of definition. Nonetheless, we are accustomed to hearing of Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, or European civilization, among others, but not so much of Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa, Khoi-Khoi, or Twa. Although under the impact of European racism, especially, the issue has become emotive, it would seem that there is a question to answer. This is not related to our taken-for-granted antinomies such as "developed"/"underdeveloped" or "backward"/"advanced". It is important for us to come to terms with these qualitative differences because they are implicit in our notions about "development" and in the study of the social evolution of the African societies themselves. For instance, how do historians and anthropologists decide whether the societies they study in Africa are "bands", "tribes", "chiefdoms", or "kingdoms"? Is it only a matter of scale, or is there something else?

It seems to me that the state of the arts, by which we mean the level of development of technical skills and knowledge, codification of various forms of information, elaboration of forms of organization and expression, is the key to the categorisation of societies. Historically, the societies that came to be known as "civilisations" excelled in the development of arts as defined above. The precise forms these took probably do not matter but what characterised all the societies in question was the development of the art of writing, mathematical and scientific knowledge, and of abstract forms of expression (art and literature). It is interesting to note that lack of development or advancement in black Africa is associated with the absence of the former two attributes. Indeed, all development programmes in Africa are aimed at enhancing these capacities. This is somewhat inconsistent with the proto-nationalist conception of the problem. It is impossible to invoke traditions that never existed. Likewise, relying on traditions developed elsewhere is culturally alienating or marks the passing of tradition. Thus, the proto-nationalist get caught up between sentiment and structure. Yet, all is not lost.

African nationalism is a valid response against racial oppression and imperialist domination. But like any other movement, it must be adaptable. For instance, it is obvious that in an integrated world there can be no African science *sui generis*. The most African nationalists can insist on is the indigenisation of scientific knowledge and activity. Similarly, the chances of developing a civilisation which

is peculiarly African are gone forever. Modern industrial culture has universal implications but these need not be equated with cultural homogenization or imperialism. What the African nationalists might be called upon to do, like their counterparts elsewhere, is to increase the scope for cultural action, without being prescriptive or derivative about it. The true agents of cultural development are the people themselves, if they be free of structural imposition, whether it be it from traditional autocrats, independence kleptocrats, colonial settlers or imperialists.

The implications of the perspective we have developed here are far-reaching. It is a rejection of proto-nationalist cultural determination, colonial and neo-colonial capitalism and imperialism. According to received conventions, this would leave only the theoretical alternative, socialism. But "socialism" as a development model is itself on trial. Consequently, new conceptual and theoretical issues regarding its status have come to the fore. On reflection, it can be said that the classical European concept of socialism was too prescriptive and rationalist to have worked in practice. It overlooked the subjectivity and voluntarism of human behaviour. The negations of capitalism need not express themselves in a uniform manner everywhere in the world. Therefore, the way real people react to them is a matter of social choice. What is a matter of logic is the negations themselves, i.e. the ending crisis of accumulation in Third World countries and the imperative to find a way out.

With everything considered, including the dramatic collapse of the so-called socialist societies in Eastern Europe, it would appear that the way out is not and cannot be capitalism, as is generally understood. According to this view, not even the social democratic version of capitalism, i.e. the welfare state, is possible under imperialism. At least in the Third World, if not the former Second World, a non-capitalist path for accumulation and distribution will have to be found. As far as logic and historical experience can tell, this cannot be realised, without a rapture with imperialism. This is the only "sociocultural" context that makes sense in the totality of things. If it is the historical role of barbarians to liberate the civilised, this time they cannot do it except in concert. Regional cooperation is not only a necessity but a historical reality even in Southern Africa. The form it will take ultimately is what the contemporary struggles are about in the region. But if this is basic, then what is going to happen in South Africa in the short-term is vitally important.

**THE SOCIOCULTURAL ENVIRONMENT IN LESOTHO  
AS IT IMPINGES ON DEVELOPMENT:  
FOCUS ON CHILDREN**

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**Introduction**

The point that development takes place within a certain sociocultural environment need not be debated further. Our perceptions regarding the components of such environment and actors within it, however, differ markedly. In my opinion, the "sociocultural" environment is often defined using formulation and aspirations of the adult populations, excluding and never reflecting upon those of the youth. Even the literature, we know, is silent about children and issues that are of interest to them. In a concomitant manner research activity which attempted to relate development to sociocultural factors has kept children invisible and unimportant in making nations progress.

From its inception up to now, the Institute of Southern African Studies has tended to follow the same pattern. None of the research activities it has sponsored, except one current one,<sup>1</sup> has focused on matters and issues which are of concern to children. The Institute is not alone here; researchers in various disciplines have failed to draw on their observations of and participation with children in an attempt to present some answers to issues that pertain to them. Other institutional researchers have exhibited the same neglect and silence when it comes to matters that affect children. On the whole this is a reflection of societal models which focus on adult values and priorities. Historically, this is a fact common to all

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<sup>1</sup> Reference is being made to the study by M.M.Tuoane on "the Economic contribution of children in Agricultural Production and its Effects on Population growth and Education".

societies.<sup>2</sup> The involvement of children as part of the sociocultural environment that has a bearing on developmental processes is as vital as that of adults. The age difference of the persons involved and the diversity of roles they play makes the task of understanding the relationship or position of parent and child in research most difficult. Research is undertaken by adults. Perhaps that is why issues that affect them have dominated the activity, putting children's concerns in the background. Even in family issues such as conflicts in the home, family violence, broken homes, maintenance and others, researchers have more often than not preoccupied themselves with these problems as they relate to adults, although matters that affect the family unavoidably affect children in numerous ways.

People, and certainly a good number of academics, would question and challenge the wisdom of "studying children". In our attitudes we still consider children simply as appendages till they become adults. In that sense children are regarded as having no opinions, no voice of their own and therefore no place in decision-making in society. Their actions are said to be of no vital consequence. Having stated this, perhaps one would justifiably place children among other "marginal groups" in society.

Academics, like the rest, have failed to recognise that the very existence of children imposes certain demands on societies. The scope of these demands is very wide indeed and as Foster (1974) rightly observes, this is quite obvious in the "Bill of Rights for Children" which proposes that a child has a moral right and should have a legal right in the following respects:

- i) to be regarded as a person;
- ii) to receive parental love and affection;
- iii) to be supported, maintained, educated;
- iv) to receive fair treatment;
- v) to be free of legal disabilities;
- vi) to earn and keep his own earnings;

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Sandra Burman (1986:1-2) in the chapter entitled "The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa: An Introduction", observes that South African children "are often invisible socially and seem to be so unimportant in the progress of a nation that they do not appear at all in the pages of most history books...".

- vii) to seek and obtain medical care and treatment and counselling;  
and
- viii) to receive special care, consideration and protection.

These may not be rules that are capable of application. However, it may not be totally wrong to take them as aspirations towards "fair treatment" in a world in which old parental dominance tends to break down.

Children's issues, by implication, have to be studied within the context of today's family structure. Child health, childcare, education and so on are dependent, for instance, on the social place of the family a child comes from. In the midst of all research concerns it does not appear as if there has been an understanding that the complexities of society are relevant to childhood. Research has not considered how children's experiences are actually shaped and how they contribute to the design of the social fabric and its development. These are complex issues and are of critical importance, yet little is known about them.

To understand the intricacies involved perhaps one may highlight issues that relate to various disciplines, indicating also areas in which research is still badly needed. In this attempt it will be realised how interdisciplinary some of the research issues are.

### **Legal Issues**

Our knowledge of child law is still wanting in many respects, yet such knowledge would be an invaluable tool for improving the lot of children.

Generally, legal research has concentrated on the relationship between man and woman as if it is the only one of primary concern in the legal sphere. The relationship of parent and child has thus been ignored. For example, the degree of intrusion of legal regulation into parent-child relations has not been considered a vital issue that needs to be carefully studied from the standpoint of a child. Issues relating to family stability have surfaced in research, but how far have we gone to demonstrate, for example, that a stable parental union underlies the relation of parent and child?

No attention has been paid to the fact that there is a high possibility that in some cases united parents may try to assert their will on a reluctant child. In custody cases, for example, children may be given to one of the two parents. But we have not considered that children by their nature are likely to find it difficult to make their views known about their parents. We do not have information as to how many children give in to custody orders which do not fit their interests.

By virtue of their age children are dependent on adults to protect their interests, but is there any guarantee that this happens in the majority, if not in all circumstances? Reading the literature on juvenile justice makes one guess that false pretexts are often used. The welfare-oriented model of juvenile justice especially has in recent years been under serious attack. Questions have been raised "In whose best interest"<sup>3</sup> such models are, while others have asked whether there is really such a thing as "juvenile justice".<sup>4</sup> The main issue in such questions has been whether denying "due process" demanded for adults, and replacing it with informal procedures, uninformed police, social workers, etc. is actually in the best interests of the child, and whether it represents "fair treatment" before the law.

As a consequence of lack of knowledge about and interest in the literature focusing on juveniles, Lesotho enacted the Children's Protection Act in 1980 with the same welfare orientation. The consequence of this is that the Act has hardly been implemented. The Act seems not to fit, in a number of respects, the sociocultural aspirations of the Basotho society. For instance, the idea of institutional placement of children with any type of disability is not yet developed among the Basotho. How would a Mosotho parent accept or even comprehend the whole idea of a child being taken to "a place of safe custody"<sup>5</sup> How would the police appreciate that they now have an additional responsibility to issue licences to children who want to attend a music festival at the national stadium or some other place?<sup>6</sup> My

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<sup>3</sup> Such as in the work of Taylor, L., et.al: *In Whose Best Interests?* (1979).

<sup>4</sup> In particular, the work of Morris, A., et.al: *Juvenile Justice?* (1980).

<sup>5</sup> Sec.7 of the Children's Protection Act 1980, Lesotho.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, Sec. 19.

contention is that if all these issues had been carefully studied through proper research, the provisions of this Act would not be vague and irrelevant to the practical realities of this country.

We have in addition the issue of "children born outside marriage",<sup>7</sup> which is now causing concern in various quarters. Arguments are that the legal status of such children needs to be seriously addressed. There is need for the amelioration of the status of such children as they are constitutionally entitled to equal protection. Legal disabilities that discriminate against such children ought to be removed; they should be given succession rights like all other children, for instance.

There may be recognition in other disciplines that "children born outside marriage" start life at a huge disadvantage; the factual difference that they bear from other children cannot be ignored. However, we do not know the size of this problem, as there has not been research addressing this cadre of children, the difficulties they encounter, nor the role the extended family may play in caring or failing to compensate for the prima facie disadvantages faced by such children. Although there are no official statistics, discussions with various workers in childcare and health institutions indicate that the incidence of "children born outside marriage" is increasing and more children are being abandoned.

The term "illegitimate" child is common in the legal profession, but no one has cared to consider whether it could affect the concerned children negatively. The use of the term "child born outside marriage" may sound a bit more "neutral" than the former. It could be suggested that there is a need to study the effects that may result from the use of both concepts.

In a broken family there is tension and the child's interests are in jeopardy. The rights and duties of parents to the child are strained. Matters become more complicated, as each parent may be tempted to use the child as an instrument against the other. Of course, the fact that the child could take advantage of such circumstances cannot be ruled out totally. The main issue is the relevance of the child's wishes in determining his custody and also which parent has authority over him. Is the child's will taken into consideration?

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<sup>7</sup> Also referred to as illegitimate children.



## Child Health

Despite improved health facilities, Lesotho is still faced with a number of problems in this sphere as well.

For example, infant and child mortality is still extremely difficult to measure, mainly because of the ineffective registration systems employed. Proper methods for the registration of births and deaths would greatly assist analyses of infant and child mortality. If such information is incomplete it means we lack one principle that is an indicator of socioeconomic development or underdevelopment of a country. Perhaps not all of these problems can be blamed on the health facilities' registration procedures. Further complications have been caused by the delay in the release of the 1986 population census results, so that 1976 population census and the 1977 Lesotho World Fertility Survey data are still heavily relied upon.

Basically information regarding both Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Child Mortality Rate (CMR) is inadequate, and there is need for in-depth and ongoing research. Many programmes intended to improve the health of children generally have still not been evaluated, representing a further area of research.

A number of diseases have been cited to be the cause of infant and child deaths. Included here are diarrhoea, respiratory infections, nutritional deficiencies and so on. Health education is certainly the primary way to counteract these problems. However, and to achieve this, statistics are not in themselves sufficient; in addition there needs to be an assessment of community knowledge and behaviour toward the diseases. Only such data would assist in the formulation of national control strategies to promote the good health of children. Table 1 below indicates some of the diseases that are common among children in Lesotho. Appropriate, representative and accurate data regarding these diseases is needed if effective control programmes are to be developed.

**Table I: Ten Most Common Diseases in All Hospitals in 1988 for Various Age Groups**

Age Group in Years			
Rank Order	0 - 1		F
All causes		705	585
1. Diarrhoea		167	131
2. Pneumonia		148	142
3. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor		63	32
4. Injuries (incl. fractures)		36	44
5. Skin diseases		34	37
6. Respiratory disease (exclud. pneumonia)		39	21
7. Measles		9	12
8. Eye diseases		9	10
9. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea)		12	6
10. Typhoid		3	1
Age Group in Year			
Rank Order	1 - 4	M	F
All causes		1018	878
1. Injuries (incl. fractures)		254	209
2. Diarrhoea		150	118
3. Pneumonia		124	136
4. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor		112	92
5. Skin diseases		50	48
6. Respiratory diseases (exclud. pneumonia)		33	22
7. Measles		28	25
8. Eye diseases		22	20
9. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea)		21	19
10. Typhoid		8	9

**Table I (continued)**

Rank Order	Age Group in Years	
	5 - 14	
All causes	1269	800
1. Injuries (incl. fractures)	746	282
2. Skin diseases	71	70
3. Typhoid	68	69
4. Pneumonia	45	36
5. Eye diseases	49	28
6. Measles	27	22
7. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea)	24	19
8. Diarrhoea	15	20
9. Respiratory diseases (exclud. pneumonia)	19	16
10. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor	8	4

Source: Local Government, Ministry of Health, 1990.

The necessary assessment should take into consideration traditional methods of treatment. Effort should also be made to combine clinical investigations with knowledge and behaviours at community level. This would produce up-to-date data about the socioeconomic and also cultural factors that influence IMR and CMR.

Although breastfeeding is still highly regarded by Basotho women of different socioeconomic groups, research is needed to find out how appropriate this feeding method is for working mothers. From personal experience I am of the belief that it becomes impossible to continue with full breastfeeding while in paid employment.

There are further issues which need investigation. Questions such as whether a doctor should prescribe contraceptives to children are sensitive ground, and

perhaps have legal implications. But these are matters for which answers must be sought. Research about the knowledge, attitudes and practices regarding family planning and birth control methods among children must be undertaken. Connected to this are issues relating to teenage pregnancies, a growing phenomenon in Lesotho today.

A further point which has to be recognised in health systems research is that in general terms social place determines the type of health care an individual child receives. Some children are destined to become part of the dismal infant mortality statistics by virtue of being born into families with low socioeconomic standards. Comparative research would provide information about how similar disadvantages have been dealt with in other countries.

### **Early Childhood Development and Education**

This is an area in which research is also greatly needed. Nowadays education determines whether one can in fact hope to have a decent, stable home environment.

Research into early childhood development remains inadequate. Consideration has to be given to issues such as whether the working mothers continue to have enough time to attend to their infants. Preschool facilities are extremely inadequate in Lesotho. The effects of this on early stimulation are hardly known.

The school system is marked by a number of shortcomings, for example the rising drop-out and repeat rates. The Ministry of Education has cited the increase in the number of children entering primary schools over the past ten years as a contributing factor (Ministry of Education: 1989). However, there has been no research about the causes of dropping out and repeating, and what happens to those that do so. Assumptions are that some of the drop-outs end up as part of the juvenile delinquency statistics.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Table 2.

**Table II: Juveniles Who Committed Crimes 1986-1988**

Crimes	Period		
	1986	1987	1988
Rape	649	675	841
Indecent Assault	58	38	59
Concealment of Birth	3	5	
Murder	349	388	566
Theft (Common)	370	324	361
Robbery	388	338	201
Assaults	1205	1181	1249
Drugs	23	46	55
Housebreaking and Theft	294	371	390

Source: Department of Police Statistics, 1989.

Furthermore, the reality of education in Lesotho is that it imposes the burden of costs on parents, and to some extent on the churches which have historically sponsored and supported the system of education at various levels. It has been suggested that the high total cost of education - uniforms, fees, books, transportation, pocket money and so on - contributes to the high drop-out rate among children from poor families. Other reasons may include the high pupil-teacher ratios, high enrolment figures in schools, poor quality of teachers, increasing drug, solvent and alcohol abuse,<sup>9</sup> etc. Many of these remain topics for future research.

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<sup>9</sup> See in particular, study by Malahleha, G.M., Meursing, K., and Morojele, N., *Use of Alcohol Among High School Students in Lesotho*, (1989).

Despite the paucity of information on the number of disabled people in Lesotho, it is evident that a number of schools admit children who otherwise would fit in special education institutions. The lack of such information makes it difficult to determine the number of affected children and the type of facility they require. Claims have been put forward that parents tend to be overprotective for fear that their disabled children would be abused if sent to school. The extent to which this happens in reality is not known, but if such children are to be afforded equal rights the issues need to be studied.

If the national education policy is to be pursued, that is that every Mosotho child should at least complete the seven years of primary schooling,<sup>10</sup> the above issues need to be investigated.

### **Political Climate**

Perhaps one point which is seldom thought to be of any significance as far as children are concerned is the political environment in which they grow up. No one has thought about the question of what happens to children who grow up in politically unstable countries (Lesotho is perhaps no exception to this) and definitely the political climate of South Africa has a bearing on what goes on in this country. Children who are growing up today have lived with political turmoil and have known nothing but "political violence" by their parents. What prospects have they of knowing about peace and stability during their lifetime?

Crimes of violence are reported to have risen among children. Could this be attributed to the political environment noted above or are there some other causes? Many of these crimes occur in urban areas with different socioeconomic conditions from those that prevail in the rural areas.

In recent years there have been numerous uprisings in secondary schools in the country, some of which have caused serious disruption of school activity and/or

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<sup>10</sup> Set out in general terms in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, and expanded in *The Clarification of Lesotho's Education Policies and Priorities, Part II - Operation's Plan 1989/1990*, (1989).

considerable damage to school property. The origin of such unrest remains a matter of pure speculation. A number of factors have been blamed, including tension between the different providers of education, government of Lesotho, churches and the community; poor school administration; poor quality of teaching; and the influence of unrest in South African schools. There is also a reported incidence of alcohol abuse among school children and this is another likely factor contributory to the unrest.

## **Economic Issues**

Despite the declining economy, it is difficult to estimate the numbers of children involved in the labour market as there is very little research in this area.

Furthermore, if we are to stick to the principle that children ought to have the right to earn and keep their earnings (Foster, 1974), does the extent of child labour need to be investigated? When children are forced by the poverty of their families to seek employment, can that still be designated child labour?

If the concept of child labour is accepted, what do we know about children engaged in paid work in the informal sector as against the formal sector? If there are any differences for the two sectors, what causes them? What about households and families? Does child labour occur in them too?

Traditionally, children in Lesotho are accustomed to doing certain household chores. Is this taken as a normal activity or does it also constitute child labour? What is the position of herdboys in relation to the concept of child labour? The numbers of children involved in these types of labour and a full account of the reasons for engaging in them are unknown.

Migration is a fact of economic life for most families in Lesotho. While it is a viable activity in economic terms, it may bear certain negative consequences for the families. For instance, a child whose father is a migrant labourer, absent from home for most of the year, cannot hope to have a decent stable home environment. There is limited data that attempts to demonstrate the effects of labour migration on the family, let alone on children.

## Conclusion

One can cite numerous areas in which children's issues are inadequately researched in Lesotho. In this paper, research has largely been equated with a fact-finding mission. The general lack of information on issues relating to children's interests makes it imperative that research on them has to be in the main exploratory as well as policy oriented.

To facilitate effective planning we need to clarify options, and because of the scarcity of resources available to improve the lot of children, it is necessary to expand the factual base on which development programmes and policies can be founded.

Finally, we need to bear in mind that by protecting children society is at the same time protecting itself. Without physically and psychologically sane children, society as a whole would be doomed. We need research that focuses on children in their best interests. It is necessary to look beyond the interests of adults. It is my hope that in the next ten years ISAS will promote an interest in children's issues, and that funding agencies will regard this as a priority area.

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**THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIOCULTURAL  
ENVIRONMENT FOR WOMEN AND THEIR  
ASSUMPTION OF MANAGEMENT POSITIONS:  
THE CASE OF LESOTHO**

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**Introduction**

"Feminist" literature from all cultures highlights the point that women are poorly represented in executive management positions in the formal organisations, and that there are obvious and "hidden" obstacles that have an adverse impact on their motivation and advancement (Boserup, 1970; Spender, 1982; Ntimo-Makara, 1985; Batezat and Mwalo, 1989 and Rawaf, 1990 to mention a few.)

In Lesotho, and indeed in most if not all Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries, the situation is no different. It precludes women from getting involved in policy making and also affects the extent to which women can directly and effectively influence the direction of social development. For Lesotho, in particular, to fully deploy the expertise of its female professional labour is not a matter to be viewed as a mere egalitarian gesture. It is rather a dire necessity for socioeconomic and cultural development.

As a case, this paper will attempt to highlight the situational, organisational and, particularly, dispositional factors that affect and shape the situation of women in Lesotho. It will also give a general picture of developments that have taken place during the past ten years to advance or retard the progress of women and the possible impact of this on the development of the country, as well as make suggestions on what has to be done in the 1990s and beyond in order to redress the situation and forge ahead in a positive manner.

On the whole, the comments and observations in this paper are based on and greatly influenced by my 1985 study. Although I have not conducted a "parallel study" in the real sense of the word since then, an attempt was made to update data about some of the formal sector areas in which women are heavily employed, to determine numbers of women actually holding senior management positions. I have also had informal discussions with some men and women about the situation in organisations as regards evidence of more women assuming positions of responsibility, evidence of general change in attitude among men and women and what prospects people feel there are for improvement.

### **An Overview of the Situation of Women in Lesotho: Some basic facts.**

Women constitute the majority of potentially economically active people in the age group 15-64 years. This is because there has always been a marked sex imbalance in the population, which in 1987-88 stood at 49% males to 51% females (Bureau of Statistics, 1988). Women also constitute the most important home-based human resource for the country. This is because an estimated 45%-60% of men are migrant workers.

Another consequence of the continued absence of men from home is that between 65% and 75% of the rural households are actually headed and managed by women on a daily basis for the greater part of the year.

The most striking feature of Lesotho's education system is the predominance of females, particularly at the primary through secondary levels. The 1976 census estimated male and female adult literacy at 40% and 60% respectively (1988 Statistics Report p.1). This situation is unique among African countries and even majority of other developing countries where *normally* men have more years of schooling. The trend in Lesotho is attributable to, among other factors, the unusual excess of females in the population and the high level of male labour migration. The female predominance in the school system has also broken through into higher education as the following figures for enrolment at the National University of Lesotho (NUL) show. (See Tables I - IV).

**Table I: Basotho Students at NUL and Field of Study 1977/78**

Field of Study	F	M	Total	Women as % of total
B.A. Administration	35	35	70	50
B.A. Economics	28	54	82	34.1
B.A. General	17	12	29	58.6
B.A. and Concurrent Certificate in Ed.	74	33	107	69.2
B.Sc. General	30	65	95	31.6
B.Sc. Education	5	10	15	33.3
B.Sc. CCE	15	24	39	38.5
B. Commerce	39	53	92	42.4
LL.B.	9	12	21	42.9
Diploma in Stats.	4	-	4	100
Diploma in Theo.	-	1	1	0
Certificate in Stats.	-	1	1	0
B.A. Law	14	10	24	58.3
TOTAL	270	310	580	46.6%

Source: Derived from "Table 42/37" in *The Kingdom of Lesotho Education Statistics, 1977*. Maseru: Bureau of Statistics, 1978, p.44.

**Table II: First year Basotho students at NUL 1981/82**

Courses	Science based		Arts based		All courses	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
First Degrees	41	30	90	97	131	127
Certificates and Diplomas	4	5	28	22	32	27
TOTAL	45	35	118	119	163	154

Source: The Kingdom of Lesotho *Education Statistics, 1981*. Maseru: Bureau of Statistics, 1982, p.65.

**Table III: Full-Time Basotho Students at NUL by Field of Study and Sex 1985/86**

Field of Study	Sex		Total	Females as % of Total
	M	F		
B.A. Administration	12	15	27	56
B.A. Economics	12	12	24	50
B.A.General	16	26	42	62
B.A.Education	42	85	127	67
B.A. Law	36	15	51	29.4
B.A.(URP)	3	5	8	63
B.Sc. General	123	49	172	29
B.Sc. Education	58	41	99	41.4
B. Commerce	33	71	104	68.2
B. Education	19	36	55	66
Post.Grad.Cert.Educ.	3	4	7	57
	357	359	716	50.1

Note: The table has excluded the sub-degree programmes.

Source: Derived from Table 59(65) of the *1985 Education Statistics Report*, p.56.

**Table IV: Full-time Basotho students at NUL by Field and Sex 1986/87**

Field of Study	Sex		Total	Females % of Total
	M	F		
B.A. Administration	7	8	15	53
B.A. Economics	16	13	29	45.1
B.A. General	20	24	44	55
B.A. Education	37	109	146	75
B.A. Law	36	22	58	38
B.Sc. General	132	47	179	26.3
B.Sc. Education	54	33	87	38
B. Commerce	40	72	112	64.3
B. Education	12	38	50	76
Post Grad.Cert.Educ.	3	6	9	67
	357	372	729	51

Note: The table has excluded the sub-degree programmes.

Source: Derived from Table 62(59) of the *1986 Education Statistics Report*, p.63.

The trend over the past five years indicates that Basotho women have constituted more than 51% of the total number of Basotho students studying at the National University of Lesotho. (NUL computer service unit, 1989). From the above tables, it would seem that the popular areas of specialisation by women include Education, Administration and Commerce.

Women constitute the majority of the labour force in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. As indicated in the development plans, women in general and rural women in particular have become the major target group for most of the government's rural development projects. These are unfortunately often conceived and planned on their behalf without input from them. The expressed intention, however, is to get women more involved in and responsive to the development initiatives through increased participation. More than 80% of participants in these projects are women.

Since Appiah (1981) reported that 28,2% of the labour force was employed by the government, it remains the largest single employer in Lesotho. In the teaching service, more than 70% of the qualified primary level personnel are female and women account for 50-60% of teachers at post-primary level. Despite this very few of them are heads of schools and school managers.

Mulligan (et al., [eds.] 1976) noted that despite the high numerical involvement and participation by women in the agricultural economy and in the public and private sector, there appeared to be some unwillingness or hesitation to promote them to positions of major responsibility. Malahleha (1984), Gay (1982) and Ntimo-Makara (1985), made similar observations, and all of them attribute this to the cultural bias against women. The employment statistics indicate that the proportion of women in executive positions is actually decreasing despite the increase in educational qualifications.

As of January 1986, the government of Lesotho had two female permanent secretaries (Information and Broadcasting and Commerce and Industry), a deputy permanent secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were also female directors for Tourism, Food and Nutrition Coordination Office (FNCO), Lesotho Dispensary Association (LDA), National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS) and deputy director for Central Planning. It is significant to note that there was no female cabinet minister. Since 1986 we have had a *minister of state* in charge of Youth and



Women's Affairs; a permanent secretary for Health who has since left the civil service, and a few directors for NMDS, Tourism, Soil Conservation and several other subdirectors in ministries such as CPDO and Education. The general feeling among women is that we have regressed in this regard and women are getting a raw deal.

The situation is not encouraging either for the NUL. The four top administrators of the university are all male. The academic office is the only one in the central administration headed by a woman. The university Council is all male, none of the seven faculties in the university is headed by a woman and there are only two female deputy deans (for Science and Education); only one of the four Institutes is directed by a woman and out of more than twenty four academic departments, only nine are headed by women. There are only two women on a sixteen-person-strong academic staff appointments committee, and not one woman professor. Kunene and Mascarenhas (1989) have reported a more or less similar situation for the 1988 Canadian International Development Agency/Association of Commonwealth Universities (CIDA/ACU) *Women's Programme Needs Assessment Survey* covering universities in Eastern and Southern Africa.

### **What is the Problem? The Sociocultural Environment**

There is a commonly held belief that men are better leaders than women. This basically reflects cultural attitudes and values that are heavily underlined by patriarchal social orientations intended to maintain male superiority. The socialisation process in different institutional contexts outside the home explicitly or implicitly reinforces most of these attitudes. The cultural factor helps to reinforce and perpetuate the situation in which women suffer subtle discrimination, even in the formal institutions.

The political and legal institutions have made women's position that of a perpetual minor (Maope 1984; Mamashela 1984). Addressing a workshop on identification and analysis of women's legal problems organised by the Lesotho Federation of Women Lawyers at the Lakeside Hotel, Maseru, in May 1990, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Prisons, Law and Constitutional Affairs the Honourable K. Maope pointed out that laws reflect the values of society, thus oppressive laws reflect the interest of society. He argued that in Lesotho religion

and culture are among the values of society that reinforce the oppression of women.

Organisations, too, do not operate in a vacuum. They are influenced by the sociocultural dictates in the environment. The respondents in Ntimo-Makara's 1985 study cited the following problems facing women in employment in the formal sector:

1. Because their overall legal status is low, their authority is generally undermined and they are, therefore, not taken seriously by "society" in general. They are often ridiculed.
2. For the same reason, their authority is undermined even by other women in and out of the work situation.
3. They have to struggle to cope with the strains of holding full-time jobs and ever-increasing family responsibilities; added to this is the expectation that women have to continuously *prove* themselves through hard work and outstanding performance in order to justify their holding certain positions or even being promoted to them.
4. Because of the generally disguised subtle prejudices and some regulated differential terms of service such as those governing married women in the civil service, it is difficult if not impossible for the majority of women to move up the ladder. For more or less the same reasons, they often fail to take advantage of career development opportunities such as further study. This counts against them in the long run when promotions to senior positions are considered. Women felt and still feel that these problems are a result of cultural influences, most of them imparted during and through the process of socialisation. As one respondent put it:

Men consciously exploit this cultural claim that they are superior. They do it all to their advantage; sometimes even when they know that they are no better than an average woman.

Women's attempts to tackle these problems range from direct confrontation to discussion to doing nothing at all -depending on who they are dealing with and under what circumstances. Here are how some of the women have indicated they deal with the problems.

(A Motswana, Ph.D - in her late 30s):

Confrontation is painful, risky and costly in terms of sustaining long-term relations. At least it earns one a great deal of respect. In confronting them one has to avoid generalisations. Take them on an individual basis. Otherwise they dismiss you. I try to transcend the male/female stereotype reaction. It needs a lot of effort and strong willpower to do.

(A Mosotho, Permanent Secretary - in her late 30s):

I have survived as a result of understanding the problem people have in accepting a woman holding a senior position. I have tried to exert myself more while I give time for the people I work with to accept that sex makes no difference to how much and what I am capable of doing as a person.

(A Mosotho. Graduate - Senior Police Officer in her late 20s):

I ignore them (male colleagues) and keep doing what they feel I ought to be employed to do, that is, being relegated to a junior position by refusing me a chance to perform or execute the functions of my rank and responsibility. I ought to be doing other functions. But I am not involved because my immediate male bosses do not want me to. I never participate in meetings or planning sessions because nobody ever communicates and invites me to them. So I never know when they meet or what they discuss, let alone why. I hear most of the things from male colleagues of my rank or the junior officers.

It is only when things go wrong and my bosses want to exploit my expertise that I am suddenly "ordered" to attend some meeting and write out a paper. Deep down they know that I have a lot to offer my department because of my academic background. It is a pity because

in the capital city, I would have to be completely in charge on my own; yet I do not even have an idea of what one does running a station because they won't let me do it here so that I can learn.

Asked what steps she was taking to ensure that this situation is rectified, she replied.

I am playing it all cool. I will not demand that I be involved but I am going to wait patiently until the right time comes. They, too, are not yet ready to listen and learn. It would not be much help if I were to talk to them now. The time is surely coming and it will be when they run into problems. Then they will have to accept their own deficiencies and recognising that I have a lot to offer, they will have no choice but to involve me.

Although women can still retain their designated positions and continue to earn corresponding salaries, they are effectively relegated to junior "operative" levels by being deliberately blocked from performing the functions of their positions. Women who strive to get to the top are often regarded as threats by their male colleagues. In an interview a postgraduate female ex-civil servant director of one of the government's units said:

It is a very funny attitude these men have because we have been competing with them through our educational career and we have always outperformed them at school. But here, they display some unfounded condescending arrogance yet they know women are capable of achieving. In the end you just wonder why you should continue the fight at all.

We are to remember that women, like men, are liable to make mistakes in the normal course of the execution of their duties. However, it would seem that things get blown out of proportion if the error has been committed by a woman. This is a part of male campaign to reinforce an already biased position against women's success in areas that men regard as their own. A senior female Advances Manager in one of the local commercial banks summed it all up as follows:

It is the traditional outlook towards women that has hampered their rise to reasonable jobs. On average, Basotho women are more brilliant than most of their male colleagues. Even so, the "system" continues to promote the less educated, less brilliant and less hardworking men. This demoralises women a lot and it encourages men to suppress them. Basotho men have an inferiority complex. They know that their women colleagues have more potential than them. Yet their ambition forces them to limit the chances of better opportunities for women so that they can perpetuate their stay in power. No woman would wish to do the spade-work while some men or someone else gets the benefit from her efforts. It is the exploitation of women's talent by men in Lesotho that demoralizes most women. It is men who would usually claim that we are our own enemies because they want to justify their unfairness.

Perhaps the public needs to demonstrate more confidence in women so that they, too, should not doubt their own capabilities. Because of the continued emphasis on women's inferior status, most women have come to believe that they have inborn inabilities that could make it difficult for them to operate in senior positions in the public sphere.

In an attempt to get as many views on this issue as possible, I have made a deliberate effort to also seek male opinion through informal interviews with senior male civil servants, some of whom are retired, male professionals in private organisations, senior personnel in the education sector and the ordinary men in my village and place of work.

Their overall position was that, while acknowledging certain facts about women, i.e. that they constitute a higher percentage than men of people employed in the formal sector, and that on the whole they are better educated/longer schooled than their male colleagues, they still held some reservations about actually letting the women appear even more stronger by giving them senior positions in the formal organisations. I had assumed that professional men with a great deal of experience and from many years of formal schooling would assess the issues against their *presumably better informed background* and, therefore, display a less negative attitude. Few of them made explicit reference to the disabling laws that have relegated women to the status of minors, let alone felt that they should be

reviewed. A male Managing Director of one of the local commercial banks had this to say about the female staff in his bank:

Before long women have taken over this place. These women work hard and are more dedicated to their work. Almost all of the women who are part of our high and middle level management are not university graduates; whereas their male colleagues are. But the women still come up on top in efficiency and overall performance. It is a real pity that our men are generally lazy and do not give in all the effort to their work. They just seem satisfied to do the bare minimum.

### **The Policy Makers' Views**

Like several other governments in Africa and the SADCC region in particular, the Lesotho government is a signatory to almost all of the United Nations declarations whose sole intention is to promote the lot of women worldwide. One must recognise some positive steps that the government has taken over the past ten or so years, particularly within the framework of the Women's Decade.

The worrying thing is that often the absence of the accompanying logistic framework and clearly defined modalities of implementation of the many well-intentioned policies undercuts efforts to improve the situation. The major stumbling block is the law. The Honourable Chief Justice B. Cullinan (May, 1990) pointed to the prominent role of Basotho women in public life when he noted that about 40% of magistrates in Lesotho are women, who by far outperform their male counterparts in terms of quality of work. But, again, he pointed to the adverse effect of the law on women. In the case of Zimbabwe, Bateratz and Mwalo (1989: 65) point out that while the passing of the legislation is a positive step for women, the enforcement of laws has been weak. One is inclined to say that our governments have the power, but somehow they seem to lack the political will to initiate reforms and follow them up to their logical end. Social transformation, much talked about as the priority goal, cannot come about unless our governments are prepared to take the leap, set the tone and create the climate and environment so vital to the success of such a process.

Officially opening a seminar on "Another Development for Lesotho" in Maseru, Lesotho (14th-18th December 1987) and specifically addressing the question of women's participation, His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II said:

.... We must also seek to right another wrong, namely the inferior social status that women in some instances suffer. It is our women who, more than any other section of our society, have had to pay the price of the lack of economic progress in development. The amount of responsibility they take has not been matched by any significant growth in their status, or in their influence. Women's rights - social, legal and political are - directly related to a self reliance strategy for Lesotho's "Another Development". We shall not succeed in socially transforming our society unless we are prepared to alter the status of women. It is not a favour that "Another Development" demands, it is a right. We must recognize the right of women to define, for all of us, their own problems, their own ideas, their essential contribution, and we need their commitment, their energy and their equal participation, if we are going to ensure "Another Development" in its fullest extent.

For most of us women participants at that seminar, this statement was understood to suggest that perhaps in the "New" Lesotho the long talked about "structural reforms" would finally be effected with all the vigour and the determination they deserve. Sadly, we still do not see any evidence that we are anywhere near even taking off the ground in that direction.

### **What can be done? The Way Forward into the 1990s and beyond: Research Priorities:**

One dare say that time is long overdue for our societies to adopt a much more "adaptive" approach and attitude in a world that is fast changing socioculturally, politically, economically, religiously and otherwise.

Presentations by other speakers have already pointed at some of the areas that must be concentrated on in the 1990s. For the purpose of emphasis, some will be repeated here.

1. Education for awareness creation is most vital. There is need for a well planned and organised campaign to sensitise both men and women to these gender issues. It is a fact that for any meaningful change to occur, there must also be transformation of social structures. This calls for society's reassessment of some of its norms and values. The education campaign has to be promoted on all fronts, both formally and informally.
2. "Objective" dissemination of information through effective use of the available media is vital. Ignorance and misinformation are the major problems for most of our societies. There is an appreciable amount of information on gender issues in all of our countries. The problem is ~~that~~ people are just not informed. The education function would best be promoted if this were to take place.
3. The "disabling" redundant laws should be reviewed urgently. Our governments need to muster enough political will to do something about them right away.
4. The establishment of a Women's Studies Unit within ISAS to facilitate research on gender issues should be a priority. Perhaps, as has already been suggested, such a unit would promote the flow of access of information to publishing networks. It would also help facilitate the promotion of the priorities outlined above.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, one has to reiterate the major point that culturally motivated biases, slavishly nurtured in the name of "preserving the culture", despite their proven redundancy in the sociocultural environment which has so drastically changed in so many ways, have negative implications for the development of the country. The legal system is generally regarded as a stumbling block because it relegates women to the status of minor. This effectively incapacitates women because it has implications for their career prospects, chances for promotion and even their overall psychological fulfilment.



The government has a duty to take the lead and set the pace with regard to the gender issue in general. Although government can easily enact laws and regulations, on the whole it has still fallen far short of creating the corresponding statutory logistic framework that ensures the implementation of the laws passed.

This situation is generally very counter-productive. It undercuts most of the development objectives that deal with maximising the deployment of the available human resources. Malahleha (1984) clearly sums up the situation in which Basotho women find themselves when she points out that on one hand they are expected to participate effectively and efficiently in development efforts, while on the other hand the very legal framework and the social structures within which they must operate make impossible the realisation of these national expectations.

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# EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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## Introduction

The decade of the 1980s saw some dramatic changes in Southern Africa. On the negative side were the continuing crisis in Angola, the deepening tragedy of Mozambique and the near collapse of Zambia as a viable entity. But fortunately there were some positive developments too: the birth of Namibia as a sovereign nation; the hopeful happenings south of the Limpopo; and the robust performance of Botswana's economy with salubrious developments in other sectors.

The situation is pregnant with possibilities. Not only are there problems and challenges of unusual complexity but also opportunities hitherto not within our reach. The tenth anniversary of the Institute of Southern African Studies of the National University of Lesotho provides an occasion to take stock of the regional situation and project ourselves into the future.

In this paper I address a limited aspect of the contemporary situation in Southern Africa - that of the interface between education and development. In the first section an attempt is made to get a global scenario of the current state of the development process in the region. This is followed by an analysis of the contribution education has been making to development, particularly in terms of the private and social returns of education. In the third section the impact of development on educational expansion is considered. I conclude by stressing the dialectical association between education and development.

## Contemporary Development in Southern Africa

A brief account of the contemporary development process in the region provides a suitable background to the subject matter of the paper. During the 1980s all countries of the region, with the exception of two, witnessed a decrease in their per capita GNP (Table 1). In the case of Zambia, there has been a substantial decline in the national income. Mozambique has gone down from the sixth lowest position in 1985 to the bottom of the list of 121 countries with at least a million inhabitants for which data are available.

**Table I: Development of Southern African Countries as Measured by their GNP (in US \$)**

	1981	1988
Botswana	1 010	1 010
Lesotho	540	420
Malawi	200	170
Mozambique	160 (1985)	100
Swaziland	760	810
Tanzania	280	160
Zambia	600	290
Zimbabwe	870	650

Note: Statistics for Angola are not available.

Sources: For 1981 figures: World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*.  
Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.141 & p.204.

For 1988 figures: World Bank, *World Development Report 1990*. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.178 & Box A.1: Basic Indicators for Economies with Populations of Less than 1 Million, p.243.

For Mozambique's 1985 figure: World Bank, *World Development Report 1987*. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.202.

It is interesting that while the GNPs of countries within the region have generally been falling, primary school enrolment has been expanding in all countries for which detailed figures are available (i.e., except Angola and Swaziland). The same is the case with secondary education the most dramatic expansion taking place in Zimbabwe: from 6% to 45% of the relevant age group between 1965 and 1987 (*World Development Report 1990*, Table 29: Education, p.234).

## **Education and Development**

All this suggests that there is no direct, one-to-one and short-term casual connection or even one based on co-association between education and what may loosely be called "development". How then are education and development interrelated? Education is a private and social investment.

Firstly, why should anyone spend money on education? There are of course many other things - goods and services - which can claim our attention. People prefer education to the alternatives because by going through an institutional programme they can expect to earn more money than otherwise. Of course there are important social and political considerations for every educational programmes; but if someone argues on economic grounds for greater expenditures on a particular system of education or on education in general, he should be prepared to justify his case in terms of costs and benefits accruing from the expenditure.

Education is in general terms positively correlated with personal earnings, although one's income is additionally determined by other factors such as age, sex, race (in certain cases), inherent ability, socioeconomic background, place of residence, sector of employment, occupational level, on-the-job training, incidence of inter-

regional and interoccupational mobility, and pressure by trade unions and professional associations.

Education as private investment may be calculated by means of cross-sectional evidence by correlating the present earnings of adults and amounts of education they had. This gives what can be called age-earnings profiles by levels of education.

Age-earnings profiles by educational levels have been constructed in various countries including Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. The most important conclusions that can be drawn from the profiles are:

- a) The highest point reached in one's career is just after the age of forty, beyond which the curve levels off or even goes down. Changes in the earning process do not seem to be affected by either the amount of education or level of education attained.
- b) Educational attainment has a positive correlation to the steepness of the increase in earnings throughout the early period of the working life. It is usually, but not always, positively correlated with the starting salary.
- c) Finally, educational attainment is positively associated with the lateness of the age when the subject receives his maximum earnings and also with the amount of retirement earnings.

The social returns of education can be conceived in several different ways: the formal and the informal sector; education accompanying demographic changes and health-related behaviour leading to better nutrition and increased life expectancy; the social mobility function and impact on income redistribution; curricular reform and the reorganisation of the school system and their potential influence on national integration and education as a factor in personal development.

Clearly some of the supposed effects of education on the development process are non-economic and even those which are cannot all be expressed in monetary

terms. However, several attempts have been made to match labour incomes to the level of education and costs of undergoing training for the purpose of computing rates of return to education. This is on the assumption that education can change people's behaviour which may reflect in greater productivity, an important ingredient of socioeconomic development. George Psacharopoulos (1985) gives the following figures for three countries of the SADCC region.

**Table II: Returns to Investment in Education in Three Countries of Southern Africa**

		Social			Private		
		Pri- mary	Secon- dary	Higher	Pri- mary	Secon- dary	Higher
Botswana	1983	42.0	41.0	15.0	99.0	76.0	38.0
Lesotho	1980	10.7	18.6	10.2	15.5	26.7	36.5
Malawi	1982	14.7	15.2	11.5	15.7	16.8	46.6

Source: Psacharopoulos, 1985: Appendix Table A-1.

Psacharopoulos dealt with 16 African countries and estimated their average social returns to education at 27% for the primary, 17% for the secondary, and 12% for the higher levels. Neither the figures in Table II nor Psacharopoulos's averages, taken singly or together, present a clear picture that can be generalized except that private returns to education are consistently higher than social returns. They also suggest that in some Southern African countries the dividend from secondary education may be higher than that from primary education a departure from the prevailing pattern elsewhere in Africa. Perhaps this has to do with the relatively advanced stage of primary schooling in some of the Southern African countries as compared to other countries of the continent. The higher monetary returns of secondary education may also be a result of the utter neglect of secondary education for Africans in the colonial period which has probably added a scarcity premium to it.



The study of the social and private returns of education involves analysis in monetary terms. However, education can also contribute to development in several other ways that may not be easily measured in money.

An important influence of education lies in the fields of health, nutrition and family planning. An attempt is being made here to examine the inter-connection of education and health in the SADCC region. As indicators for health life expectancy at birth and under-five mortality rate and for education the adult female literacy rate has been selected.. These are being placed together to give us some indication of the association between education and health (Table III).

Education, mediated by other factors, is also associated with several other processes that have a direct bearing on development: increasing the productivity in urban and rural sectors; promotion of social mobility for those who have achieved it; the improvement of women's status and strengthening the process of national integration. Volumes have been written on each of these topics. There are obviously conditions which limit the role of education in all these fields. Also not everyone is convinced of a cause-effect relationship between education and development, so much that they argue for a relationship of covariation or co-association between them. Even when education is seen as contributing to development, much more information is needed about how this impact is channelled that is, about its mode of operation.

### **Impact of Development on Educational Expansion.**

Education's possible bearing on development is just one side of the interface between education and development. It is also necessary to address the problem of how development influences education. Is there a linear path of progression of education following a developmental process? Is this universal? Or can different societies blaze different paths of educational advancement in the wake of socioeconomic development? If the latter is the case, what are the factors that shape the path of educational progress? These are some of the questions that should be posed in this connection.

**Table III: Female Literacy Rate, Under Five Mortality and Life Expectancy at Birth Among Nine Countries of the SADCC Region**

	% Literacy among females (1985)	U5MR (1987)	Life expectancy at birth (1987)
Angola	n.a.	288	45
Botswana	69	95	59
Lesotho	84	139	57
Malawi	31	267	48
Mozambique	22	295	47
Swaziland	66	177	57
Tanzania	88	179	54
Zambia	67	130	54
Zimbabwe	67	116	59

Note: U5MR = Under five mortality rate.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989*. Table 8: Basic Indicators on Less Populous Countries (p.108) for Swaziland. Table 1: Basic Indicators (p.94) for all other countries.

Taking Botswana as an example, it is clear that the impact of development has been reflected differently in various sectors of the education system. Between 1965, on the eve of independence and 1985, Botswana's education system responded unevenly to the growth in the national income as is evident from the following figures.

The per capita GDP during this period grew steadily from P240 in 1966 to P1190 in 1985-86, an increase of about 400% (Granberg & Parkinson, 1988: Table A2.1, p.259). This is to be matched by what happened in primary and secondary education. While enrolment in the primary school rose by slightly more than

225%, in the secondary school enrolment registered a dramatic increase of more than 2000%. (CSO, 1986:55). The massive growth was partly due to the small base of secondary school enrolment -- 1531 in 1966, in terms of which even a small increase (and in the present case the increase was not small) would appear very large. But the expansion also took place because of the thrust of government policy - the determined effort to step up secondary education. This has been so despite the fact that, in Africa, the returns of primary education, especially in terms of literacy and numeracy, are said to be higher than the corresponding benefits from either secondary or tertiary education. Finally, development has its own logic and exigencies. Once a "modern" sector grows in a country's economy, the demand for formally trained manpower, at the higher and middle level, rises. With this comes an expansion of secondary and tertiary education.

In examining the impact of development on education, development should not be considered as a self-sustained, autonomous force. Development in all countries of Southern Africa, even when a country is tied to the philosophy of market economy, is closely monitored by a centralised authority. So is schooling as an instrument of enhancing education. The role of government policy in the expansion of secondary education is thus understandable.

So far, an attempt has been made to delineate the linkage between socioeconomic development and educational progress. A case of positive achievement, illustrated by the example of Botswana was chosen. What happens when socioeconomic development slides down, that is, there is negative development? Random examples mainly from Tanzania will be selected.

It is obvious that although Tanzania's economic development, as measured by GNP per head, has gone down considerably (by more than 42% between 1981 and 1986) the country's educational expansion has continued. This will caution those who tend to pose a short-term, one-to-one cause-effect relationship or even co-association between education and development. Formal education may be seen as an end in itself or as a political ploy so that special efforts are made to continue with it even when the going is tough on the developmental front. Or maybe there is time lag between economic stagnation and educational stagnation - the educational institutions and mechanisms which were created earlier go on delivering the goods for some time before they finally succumb to economic pressures. Finally, the quantitative expansion of education may be a shield that hides a deplorable decline of educational standards.

**Table IV: Tanzania : Economic Growth & Education**

Aspects of Education	Years			
	1965		1985	
Primary School Enrolment (% of age group)	32		72	
Secondary School Enrolment (% of age group)	2		3	
	1960	1980	1985	
Adult Literacy (% of age group)	10	79	93(m)/88(f)	
	1981	1985	1986	1988
GNP per capita	280	290	250	160

Source: For primary and secondary school enrolment: World Bank, *World Development Report 1988*. Table 30: Education, p.280.

For the 1985 figures of adult literacy and GNP per capita: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989*. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.94.

For adult literacy 1960 & 1980: World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*. Table 25: Education, p.196.

For the GNP figures for the years 1981, 1986 and 1988: World Bank, *World Development Reports of 1983* (Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.148); of 1988 (Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.222); and of 1990 (Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.178).

## GNP and Education

For a long time an attempt has been made to associate education with "development", conceived solely in terms of the per capita Gross National Product. Until recently, social scientists have - reluctantly - accepted this measure, coupled with the rate at which it is changing, as perhaps one of the most convenient ways of ranking countries by their socioeconomic success.

The inadequacies of this measure are, however, many. A major problem is that the per capita GNP cannot fully reflect the structure and distribution of the national income. It also leaves out the factors that fall outside the monetised sphere and fails to take note of "social" or "real" values of things that may vary from their market prices. Furthermore, as a market-related concept, it is not readily applicable to centrally planned, let alone subsistence economies. Then there are the technical problems of pricing the commodity in a market under inflationary pressure and of comparing countries with different economic systems. Even within the same country, comparisons of the GNP for different years may be difficult because of changes in the quality of goods and services and the marketing of new products and services.

One of the early thinkers who drew our attention to the weakness of the GNP approach was the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal who advocated the need for conceptualising development as a total process in which both economic and non-economic factors are closely intertwined. Other attempts have followed such as the Statistical Unit of the Geneva-based United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (1969), Adelman and Morris (1967;1973) and Seers (1972). Very recently the UNDP's *Human Development Report 1990* has advocated the use of a new measure called the *human development index* to be constructed in terms of purchasing power, life expectancy and literacy.

In the rest of this section the interface between education and "human development" in Southern Africa as it emerges from the UNDP's study will be discussed. The figures are slightly dated, but they have not changed significantly since then.

What kind of interface between "human development" and education emerges for the countries mentioned in Table V? To provide a rough answer to this question, we applied Spearman's rank order correlation formula ( $\rho = 1 - \frac{6 \sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$ ) where D is the difference between the two rankings for each case and N stands for the number of the data in columns (3) and (5). The value of  $\rho$ , i.e., the rank order correlation is +0,52,38. Thus the association between adult literacy and human development in the eight countries of Southern Africa is positive, but moderate.

**Table V: Education & Human Development in Southern Africa**

Countries (1)	Life Expectancy (2)	Adult Literacy (3)	Real GDP p.c. (4)	HDI (5)	DNP p.c. (6)
Angola	45	41	1 000	0.304	
Botswana	59	71	2 496	0.646	1 050
Lesotho	57	73	1 585	0.580	370
Malawi	48	42	476	0.250	160
Mozambique	47	39	500	0.239	170
Tanzania	54	75	405	0.413	180
Zambia	54	76	717	0.481	250
Zimbabwe	59	74	1 184	0.576	580

Notes

1. Swaziland's human development index is not available.
2. Life expectancy, as at birth, has been calculated in years. The figures are for 1987.
3. The adult literacy rate is in percentage and relates to 1985.
4. GDP per capita has been adjusted to reflect the purchasing power of the national currency. Figures are in US\$ and are for 1987.

5. GNP figures are per head of the population and for 1987.

Sources

For columns (2), (3), (4) and (5): UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990*, as quoted in *The Economist* (London), 26 May-1 June, 1990, pp.17-18 and 78-79.

For column (6): World Bank, *World Development Report 1989*. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p.164.

**Table VI: Female Enrolment in Primary and Secondary Schools in Southern Africa (1987 figures)**

Countries (1)	Female enrolment in primary schools (2)	Female enrolment in secondary schools (3)
Botswana	117	33
Lesotho	125	26 (1986 figure)
Malawi	59	3
Mozambique	59	4
Tanzania	66	3
Zambia	92	13
Zimbabwe	132	36

Notes

1. Figures for Angola and Swaziland are not available.
2. Data refer to the percentage of the relevant age groups enrolled in primary and secondary schools.

Sources

For the figure in col.3 under Lesotho: World Bank, *World Development Report 1989*. Table 29: Education, p.220.

For other figures: World Bank, *World Development Report 1990*. Table 29: Education, p.234.

This exercise partly involves a statistical tautology. Adult literacy rate is a component of human development index and literacy is an aspect of education. It is to be expected, therefore, that the two variables, education and human development are in some way associated. We thus took primary and secondary school enrolment of females as alternative indicators of educational development and examined the extent to which they are correlated to human development (Table VI).

Applying the Spearman rank order correlation formula to the figures female enrolment in primary schools (Table VI) and human development (Table V), the correlation is computed at +0,84,82. The association is positive and high. A similar exercise is carried out with regard to female enrolment in secondary schools. The correlation is found to be +0,7768 which is positive and substantial.

## Conclusion

The human development index in Southern Africa is correlated to female enrolment in primary and secondary schools to a much greater extent than it is to adult literacy rate. The close interface between human development and education may be true of other proxies of education as well. We may hypothesise that this is so because of the broad basis on which HDI is constructed.

As was argued above, the causality issue has not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of all, although there should be general agreement about an associative relationship between the two variables. What is more, just as education contributes to development, so can development to education - and in ways which may not easily fit in with the prevailing orthodoxy. How else should we explain the rationale of setting up a School (Faculty) of Mines at the University of Zambia and a Cocoa Research Institute in Ghana?

In the African context, can the interface between education and development have a better simile than the tail-biting Dahomeyan serpent *ouroboros*, symbolising the eternal circle of action and reaction? Whichever extremity is considered, it always leads to the other end: in semiology, the head of the *ouroboros* biting the tail or the tail penetrating the mouth of the serpent (one wonders what the sequence is) -



in real life, education and development relentlessly interacting with each other in a spiralling process of reintegration at a higher level.

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# **AGRICULTURAL MARKETING DEVELOPMENT IN LESOTHO**

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## **Introduction**

Livestock industry has a historical and contemporary significance as a component of the economic and social structure of Lesotho and Basotho. The Basotho have a long-standing record of investing in livestock, particularly cattle. From cattle they derived multiple products/by-products and uses such as meat, milk, dung, draught power, ceremonial sacrifices, and bridewealth payment. The Basotho also adopted small stock, mainly angora goats and merino sheep. These provide meat and are important in the fulfilment of ceremonial and cultural obligations. Above all, they are a vital source of cash income through wool and mohair sold mostly in the international export markets.

Despite the predominant role played by livestock, several analysis have since the 1930s expressed concern about future development of livestock farming. Debates are dominated by such issues as appropriate marketing infrastructure, herd quality, range management and degradation. Problems are generally identified very consistently and amplifying the importance of national debates on these issues. However, solutions and proposals in respect of implementation and acceptability to livestock owners are often contentious and have political understones.

The overall purpose of this paper is to articulate the roles and functions of the informal and formal marketing channels utilized by Basotho livestock owners. More specific analysis focuses on cattle marketing as well as dairy farming as a

specialized subject matter within a broader study area. Therefore, the paper expediently deals firstly with the broad issues and perspectives in respect of utilization of informal and formal marketing channels for cattle. Secondly, it outlines the fundamental economic and marketing forces which separate and differentiate formal and informal marketing channels in the milk marketing system. The paper draws extensively from the research findings of the authors under the Agricultural Marketing Research Project (AMRP) of ISAS.

### **Perspective on Cattle Marketing in Lesotho.**

The Lesotho livestock industry is characterized by overstocking, range degradation, low marketed offtake of animals and animal products, low reproduction and high mortality rates. There exist two perspectives on cattle marketing in Lesotho. These have been termed the dominant and alternative perspectives.

#### *Dominant Perspective.*

The dominant perspective on the livestock production, utilization, and marketing environment in Lesotho is that Basotho stockowners are traditional, subsistence-oriented peasants who place great value on their livestock for social and cultural reasons, hence the low marketed offtake of animals. It is also argued that before markets were organized by the government or projects no markets existed for Basotho cattle. It is further argued that Basotho stockowners are burdened with surplus cattle which they would sell if only markets existed.

#### *Alternative Perspective*

The other perspective is the view that Basotho own large numbers of livestock because they regard their livestock as capital assets, generating returns competitive with other available investments. This was evident in the 1970s when mine wages increased substantially and cattle imports increased. The higher migrant remittances meant that there was less need to sell cattle to get cash and at the same time they had surplus funds to invest. Low cattle prices in the RSA and low

interest rates paid on savings accounts in Lesotho Banks, encouraged Basotho to invest their surplus funds in cattle.

### *Marketing Channels Utilized by Basotho Stockowners*

In order to find the appropriate perspective, the AMRP within ISAS undertook a study of the Lesotho cattle marketing system in 1985/86. In addition a survey of livestock-owning households was undertaken in the winter of 1985. The survey was jointly completed by the Farming System Research Project at the Research Division, Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Marketing Research Project, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho. A total of 137 households were interviewed in 18 rural areas scattered around Lesotho, with three cluster areas selected randomly from each of the six geo-climatic zones in the country. The study's findings were that marketing channels available to Basotho stockowners can be categorized into formal and informal.

#### *Formal Marketing Channels*

The formal marketing channels available to Basotho stockowners are Livestock Products Marketing Services (LPMS) auctions, National Abattoir and Feedlot Complex (NAFC), and private butcheries. The LPMS is a section of the Ministry of Agriculture while NAFC is a parastatal. LPMS organises cattle auction sales at a number of locations around the country. At these auctions NAFC is the dominant purchaser although recently a number of butcheries and the Royal Lesotho Defence Force have been attending. The LPMS is responsible for maintaining sales yards and transporting cattle to the buyers. For all these services LPMS charges buyers a 6% commission on sales value.

There are approximately 30 auction sales yards in the country although only 13 are presently used. Between 1985-88 LPMS organized an average of 46 cattle auction sales in the country per year. In 1987, an arrangement was made with the South African Meat Board for NAFC to export Lesotho's livestock to RSA abattoirs. At present NAFC is exporting cattle to the Bloemfontein abattoir.

Farmers from villages far from sales yards wishing to sell cattle register with the local Livestock Assistant who in turn submits the list to the District Livestock Officer (DLO). The DLO forwards the list to LPMS which then sets a date for an auction. LPMS usually recommends that a minimum of 20 cattle be offered for sale at these unscheduled auctions. Stockowners who wish to sell to the NAFC can do so indirectly through the LPMS auctions or directly to the NAFC at Maseru.

The National Feedlot's handling capacity is 3,600 cattle at any time and if cattle are fed for an average of 90 days, it can accommodate 14,400 cattle per year. The National Feedlot buys cattle from three sources: LPMS auction sales, direct purchases from farmers, and imports from the RSA. The National Abattoir design capacity is 100 cattle and 200 sheep or goats per day on a single shift day. Most of the animals supplied to the abattoir are from the National Feedlot. The abattoir slaughters animals on custom and proprietary basis. Under custom slaughter, an individual or firm commissions the abattoir to slaughter animals for a fixed fee. Under proprietary slaughter the abattoir slaughters animals which it owns and sells the parts.

Butcheries are the other formal marketing channel utilized by Basotho stockowners. Very few butchers attend LPMS auction sales eg. in 1987/88 only about five butchers attended regularly. Before the early 1980s, the common practice was for farmers to sell animals directly to butcheries. Under the present marketing system dominated by NAFC, the situation is changing. This is because butchers are now advised to buy animals slaughtered at the National Abattoir or have them custom slaughtered. The majority of butcheries purchase cattle from the NAFC. In 1985, Maseru butchers purchased 64% of their cattle from the National Feedlot, the majority of which were purchased by the Feedlot from the RSA. With regards to sheep, most butchers purchase from RSA farmers. In 1985, Maseru butchers purchased 81% of the sheep from RSA farmers (Swallow, Mokitimi and Brokken, 1986). Butchers prefer to import sheep because the supply from Basotho farmers is irregular. RSA suppliers also provide 30 day credit unlike Basotho farmers who demand cash on delivery. In comparing Tables I and II, it is evident that the number of animals slaughtered by butcheries is much more than those sold through LPMS auctions. This means that most of the animals slaughtered by the butcheries are imported from the RSA.

**Table I: Number of Cattle sold through LPMS auction sales (1979-1988)**

Year	Number	Average Price (M)
1979	198	162
1980	2 134	185
1981	4 158	303
1982	2 161	289
1983	1 539	255
1984	1 234	295
1985	1 155	340
1986	1 575	396
1986/87	3 378	487
1987/88	4 983	651

Source: *LPMS Annual Reports* and Swallow, Mokitimi and Brokken (1986).

**Table II: Estimated Number of Animals Slaughtered by Butcheries (1978-1985)**

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
1978	10 837	55 385	573
1979	16 416	67 945	625
1980	15 851	85 793	525
1981	14 655	89 968	223
1982	10 171	93 534	652
1983	5 166	53 145	878
1984	6 998	57 744	604
1985	8 581	65 053	395

Source: Bureau of Statistics (1987).

### *Informal Marketing Channels*

Individuals such as farmers and traditional doctors are the most important informal marketing channel utilized by Basotho stockowners. Individuals purchase animals for home consumption, bridewealth payments *bohali* and ceremonies (wedding, funerals etc.). Traditional doctors in most cases purchase oxen and colored goats for rituals. Farmers purchase animals for draft power and also to increase their herds or replace fallen or stolen stock. Before 1984, Basotho stockowners increased their herds by importing animals from the RSA. The mid-1970s experienced large wage increases in the RSA mines and cattle imports rose dramatically as miners invested the increased wages in cattle. Between 1975-78 the cattle imported increased from 8,000 - 58,000 (this was the peak). Since 1984 the importation of animals has been restricted to those of improved breeds or those for slaughter. This means those farmers who wish to increase their herds have to acquire animals from within the country.

In the livestock owning households survey, respondents were asked the source of cattle, sheep and goats purchases: 62% of cattle, 83% of the sheep and 95% of the goats were purchased from farmers in the neighborhood. That is the same village or nearby village; 31% of the cattle, 1% of the sheep and 2% of the goats were purchased from the RSA. It is possible that the percentage of animals purchased from the RSA has decreased because of the restrictions on imports. Most purchased animals were males. It can be argued that farmers retain the females to build up their herds.

Under stock sales, most animals were also sold to farmers in the neighborhood: 82% of the cattle, 61% of the sheep and 90% of the goats. Most of the animals sold were males. This further supports the argument that farmers retain the females for building their herds. Butcheries were the second most important marketing channel utilized by the stockowners with the National Feedlot and LPMS auction sales last.

Data on animals slaughtered by rural households also indicate that the informal market is the most important marketing channel utilized by Basotho stockowners (Table II). Animals slaughtered came from own herd, purchases and gifts. It can be concluded that most of the slaughtered animals by rural households are purchased. As noted earlier, data from utilization of the formal marketing system



channels indicate they handle small numbers. This means most of the animals slaughtered by rural households are purchased from farmers in the neighborhood.

**Table III: Number of Animals Slaughtered by Rural Households**

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
1979/80	13 351	43 113	24
930			
1980/81	14 598	49 636	29
415			
1981/82	20 279	79 050	36
402			
1982/83	17 500	80 000	37

Source: Unpublished data from Bureau of Statistics.

### **Appropriate Perspective on Cattle Marketing in Lesotho**

Evidence from the studies leads to the acceptance of the perspective that Basotho regard their livestock as capital assets, because livestock generate returns competitive with other investments opportunities. Analysts have recently stressed the importance of cattle as investment goods in Lesotho. Over the period 1978-84, the average interest rate on savings accounts in Lesotho banks was 10%. This compared unfavorably with significant positive rates of return from livestock investment found by the studies. The studies findings are that the estimated returns to capital investment were 8,3% for cattle, 7,2% for sheep and 10,1% for goats. Respondents in the survey were asked questions regarding the most important reasons for owning livestock. The majority of reasons given were economic. This further supports the conclusion that economic factors dominate social and cultural factors in determining how and why Basotho own and manage their livestock.

## Marketing Channels Utilized by Basotho Dairy Farmers

The dairy marketing system comprises the formal and informal marketing channels. These marketing channels differ both in their price discovery process and in the phases through which the product passes before reaching the consumer. The aim is to explore the main features of the milk marketing sub-system.

The expression "price discovery" is used in literature of agricultural economies as a process of establishing commodity prices. The process takes place in many ways. It involves numerous alternative physical and institutional arrangements which vary from informal to formal marketing sub-systems of markets. Buyers and sellers may privately agree on what prices they deem equitable; prices may be established through auctions; a monopolist may set prices that buyers should accept prior to the transaction taking place. Alternatively, monopolists would strive to dictate prices at which they buy.

### *Formal Marketing Channels*

The formal milk marketing sub-system consists of two scenarios. Firstly, the Lesotho Dairy Products Company is the only formal marketing channel which purchases raw milk, and performs three major marketing functions of processing, packaging and distribution. Since the import controls were instituted in 1988, there is less competition. Milk imports constitute the second milk marketing channel and the marketing functions are mainly performed by foreign firms made up of dairy plants, supermarkets and retail shops. The formal marketing channels perform operations such as enforcing certain minimum standards of hygiene, quality control, processing and packaging of milk which all contribute towards changing the form of the final product.

In dealing with the formal marketing channels, emphasis is placed on utilization of locally produced milk from the farm to the consumer. Therefore, the sub-system presented in the figure excludes imports, hence no attempt was made to present the entire system of milk marketing channels. The area of inquiry is to highlight the relative importance of formal marketing channels against the utilization of informal marketing alternatives.

The milk collection centres which were established in 1987 through the Canada/Lesotho Dairy Development Project perform the vital function of supplying milk to the dairy plant. Milk collected at the centres is cooled and stored in bulk before it is transported to the dairy plant in Maseru for processing. Since the collection centres were built the utilization of formal marketing channels has been growing.

Despite the establishment of the dairy plant and collection centres, the volume of milk marketed through formal marketing channels remains low. It has been established through a survey (Mochebelele, 1990) that only 31,2% of milk produced by local farmers is marketed through the Lesotho Dairy Products Company. In other words most of the milk is retained by households for domestic consumption or selling through informal marketing channels directly from the farms. The survey further established that the 31,2% of milk delivered to the dairy plant comes from 23% of dairy farmers. The remaining 77% of farmers do not utilize formal marketing channels for the disposal of their produce.

#### *Milk Distribution and Collection*

Farmers arrange their own transport to deliver milk to either the processing plant or the collection centres depending on which is more convenient. The modes of milk delivery involve either the use of own transport, or arrangements among farmers who have vehicles. In cases where alternate arrangements are practiced, members draw up a rota such as a week for each farmer. This practice facilitates a close to optimal use of resources and provides an effective means of cutting costs. However, it promotes efficiency only among farmers who have resources and are clustered in the same location but becomes practically impossible for sparsely located farmers in the rural areas.

The most common transport is the independent individual farmers' vehicles. But this is expensive as all costs are borne by individual farmers. In many ways, the economies of scale benefit farmers who share transport organized and paid for jointly through the dairy associations. But this is not often possible because of lack of concentration of farmers in most areas. Use of public transport for milk delivery has a number of inconveniences, for example it is unreliable and leads to late deliveries.

Some of the reasons why the utilization of formal milk marketing channels is low are: lack of organized and efficient means of transport; the economies of scale which do not justify transporting small quantities of milk to distant collection centres or make direct deliveries to the dairy plant; and the problem of moving the product from the collection centres to the dairy plant. Tests made at the dairy plant sometimes lead to rejection of milk on the basis of substandard hygiene and quality control. In cases where milk is delivered from a collection centre in bulk tanks, losses are larger and affect all farmers in the centre concerned. To avoid the problem of joint liability it is imperative that all tests be made at the milk collection centres where farmers carry individual liability for their actions and mismanagement. Collective liability of losses arising from bulk deliveries of milk to the plant from collection centres is more likely to promote inefficiencies.

As noted in Mochebele *et al.* (1990), the formal milk marketing channel (milk processing plant) tends to be a residual claimant of milk which cannot be successfully sold at a higher price through the informal marketing channels. In this way, the volume of milk intake at the plant is subject to seasonal variations in demand and supply in the informal marketing channels.

During summer when supply is high; when local supply of vegetables is high and competes with milk; and when the risk arising from perishability of milk is high; there is a general tendency for farmers to deliver more or all milk to the dairy plant. As these factors change the demand a supply imbalance again in winter, a higher ratio of milk tends to be marketed through informal marketing outlets. Larger farmers, who are few in number, are the exception. For the latter group, a "premium" gained from a higher price offered in the informal marketing outlets does not compensate for the inconvenience of irregular payments and collection of debts from many customers who buy in small volume. This also becomes time-consuming, and complicates both the financial accounting and planning.

In some milk marketing systems, the formal channels adopt a variable price depending on the demand a supply imbalances. In winter when supply is low, the dairy plants would offer a price premium to induce stable supply and full utilization of processing capacity. In contrast, a lower price in summer would be rationalized on the basis of excess supply. This option would potentially sustain a high milk intake in the formal markets in winter. It is important however, to note that the dairy plant is not likely to offer a premium in winter because supply requirements can still be met through import arrangements at less cost from the

RSA. This is the fundamental issue which would predispose the Lesotho Dairy Products Company to continue dependence on imports to meet its capacity requirements.

We contend that a potential for a higher utilization of formal marketing channels exists, but there are many constraints related to uneasy access to the central marketing centres. The increased intake of milk in areas where collection centres have been established that utilization of formal markets is below its potential level.

### *Milk Pricing*

In the formal marketing channels, farmers are primarily price takers. There is an unequal bargaining power between the atomistic number of farmers who sell to a single dairy plant which has monopsony power. The milk price is gazetted by the Ministry of Agriculture with the advice from other government departments and the dairy plant.

Since the milk collection centres were established, a two price system was effected. Farmers whose milk is precooled at the collection centres benefit from a price premium of two cents per litre. These collection centres have tended to stimulate milk sales from a nuclei of farmers situated in their locality centres. However, the beneficiaries of these spinoffs from the premium remain limited to a few farmers. At the moment, only three milk collection centres are operational.

Although farmers have limited influence on the price paid through formal channels, there are some benefits which do not exist in the informal marketing outlets. The formal marketing channels ensure stability in incomes and minimize risk to farmers. This reduces the incidence of dairy and seasonal fluctuations in demand for milk which farmers face in the informal marketing outlets. The milk collection centres and the dairy plant purchase all milk delivered daily by farmers, giving them a steady and reliable flow of income. Payments are made at convenient time and at fixed periods once or twice a month. Because farmers get lump sum revenue at fixed times, a measure of systematic planning is ensured in procurement of feed and other farm supplies.

## *Informal Marketing Channels*

In terms of both the number of farmers, and the volume of trade for locally produced milk, informal marketing channels are of more significance than formal marketing channels. About 77% of farmers rely on informal marketing outlets for sale of their farm produce.

### Major Outlets and the Price Discovery Mechanics:

The informal marketing outlets can be sub-divided into two main categories: direct sales from the farm to the consumer and direct sales to local institutions. In both cases, the transactions between the buyer and the seller take place at the farm gate. As a result they do not normally involve transportation costs. The transactions also eliminate other marketing functions such as processing, packaging, and product differentiation which would otherwise be performed in the formal marketing channels which involve the dairy plant. An alternative expression often used to explain this is "milk is milk."

The informal outlets account for 50% of total milk produced in Lesotho (figure 1). Out of this 50%, 42,3% is the share of direct milk sales over-the-fence to final consumers in the neighbourhood. The other share, 7,7% of milk sales goes to local institutions.

The institutions take many forms: hospitals, clinics, schools, hotels and restaurants. The share of these institutions is relatively low since they have a general tendency to deal in processed and packaged milk from the formal marketing channels. These institutions also tend to buy in bulk, therefore, individual small farmers often do not meet their requirements.

The milk pricing process in the informal marketing channels is primarily independent, free of legislation, and does not conform or relate with the formal pricing system. In this system, there are many buyers and many milk producing and selling farmers. Without clear appreciation of the institutional structure within which these farmers operate, one would easily be compelled to conclude that perfect competition prevails. However, because of the collusive nature of the farmers, they tend to wield a market power over the consumers.

The most notable institutional structures through which farmers exercise market power are dairy farmers associations and cooperatives. These interest groups tend to foster uniform, but unlegislated form of pricing system within their locations and among members. It was found in the survey that even farmers who were not organized into associations or any form of groups are generally collusive in asserting power to ensure high, and uniform price in given areas where over-the-fence milk sales are made.

Because of the power base derived from collusive behaviour, the market structure in the informal markets assumes a monopolistic form. In this market there is an element of demand pull inflation in that there is too much money or high demand chasing a limited supply of milk. Farmers maximize their returns through milk sale prices which are significantly higher than the delivery price to the dairy plant. Consumers tend to prefer direct sale arrangements with farmers, perhaps influenced by dislike for processed milk and its comparatively high price. These forces create prevalence of artificial market conditions in favour of producers.

To quote Adam Smith (from Gould and Ferguson, 1980, p.210).

"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." By this, Smith attempted to show that the external market controls exercised by farmers are more amorphous than the government regulation. That is, when only a small number of producers are in a certain economic activity, there is a strong desire or incentive for them to act collusively to fix a monopoly or a near monopoly price. This practice contravenes the universally accepted parable of perfect competition where all participants, whether demanders or suppliers, regard price as given.

Differences in producer prices reveal the kind of amorphous price discovery process exerted by producers in the informal market outlets. These producers exercise price discrimination between the institutions and individual consumers. The sale price to private consumers is approximately 7% lower than the price charged to institutions. But both prices are maintained well above the delivery price to the dairy plant. However, it is important to note that the informal market price remains competitive in the eyes of a consumer since it is lower than the price of processed and packaged milk sold through formal marketing channels. The high price for processed milk is due to the value-added at different stages before

reaching the final market place and the consumer. These costs all add up and are subsequently passed on to the consumer.

It was not ascertained as to what factors contribute to the discriminatory pricing behaviour towards institutions and immediate consumers. However, common economic reasoning is suspected to prevail in explaining this tendency. Differences in demand elasticities and the ability of producers to separate markets into sub-markets are the principal causes which lead to price discrimination in monopolistic markets.

The principal problem with the informal marketing channel is the tendency to restrict expansion. Since farmers do not get contracts and there is no obligation for the customers to buy all the milk produced, losses are incurred when the demand is low. A case was made earlier for summer months when supply is high while effective demand is low. Because of this market insecurity, farmers tend to keep small herds as a means of minimizing risk. Without guaranteed market, heavy losses are imminent since milk is highly perishable. Therefore, unless access to the dairy plant becomes easy and more collection centres are established, the rural dairy farmers are unlikely to expand their operations. An alternative solution would be a decrease in the prices during summer to stimulate demand. However, prices tend to be less responsive to supply-demand imbalances in the informal markets.


### **Alternative Ways of Milk Disposal**

Besides marketing milk for cash income earnings, there are two other main forms of usage. These are retention of milk for household consumption and for the maintenance of calves before weaning. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1980s that policy pronouncements emphasized milk as an income earner as against the initial overemphasis of milk production towards meeting household requirements.

Even though these two forms of milk disposal are not income earning, they are cost-saving. They account for less than 20% of total milk production. Milk retained for home consumption and for herd boys makes up 12,3% with calf feeding making 6,4%. The use of milk substitutes (milk replacer) for calf feeding is not common, rather, farmers tend to raise calves on whole milk from their farms.



## A SUBSYSTEM OF LESOTHO MILK MARKETING NETWORK



Source: Mochebele M. (1990)

## Conclusion

The paper sought to articulate the roles and functions of the informal and formal marketing channels utilized by Basotho livestock owners. It is evident from the research findings that the utilization of informal marketing channels in Lesotho prevails over the formal markets in the livestock industry. The supporting evidence indicates that 82% of cattle, 62% of sheep and 92% of goats are sold through informal marketing arrangements. A similar trend is documented for milk marketing, where only 31% of total milk produced in Lesotho is marketed through formal marketing outlets. The main reasons are the inadequacy of the marketing infrastructure and lack of price incentives of the formal marketing channels.

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**REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION**  
**IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:**  
**THE CASE OF THE SADCC INDUSTRIAL**  
**SECTOR**

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**Introduction**

Various definitions of economic integration exist, some of which exhibit serious anomalies in the characterisation of this phenomenon. The existence of economic interest between two or more countries, for instance, may not in itself entail economic integration or linkage. Thus, a significant volume of trade between countries could continue uninterrupted without the creation of, say, a free trade area, a customs union or an economic community. Furthermore, most economic literature on integration has generally laid stress on the instruments used such as free trade, market unification and policy coordination while very little attention has been paid to the integrating countries' peculiar conditions and objectives. The net result of this bias has been the general disregard for a careful analysis of the various economic and political actors who initiate the process of regional integration and whose special interests are being served or sought.

In the above light, the economic and political environments within which such schemes are developed are ignored by many analysts and this has resulted in a general failure to explain some of the real motives behind integration. The enlightening analysis by Vaitos on the definition of economic integration identified four criteria used in characterising this phenomenon, namely, (a) factor, product and social mobility; (b) uniqueness or similarity of economic stimuli emanating from policies (tariff, fiscal, monetary, etc.) as well as similarity in reactions (with respect to intensity and form) of economic actors; (c) institutional aspects of

"supranational" agencies; and (d) collective use of power in relation to the rest of the world.<sup>1</sup>

It is perhaps at the level of determination of the criteria for measuring the degree of economic integration where most care ought to be taken. It is common among analysts to depend largely on the level of exchanges of goods, services and input in the countries' interaction as a measure of economic integration. On the contrary, as Vaitos pointed out, a realistic or representative analysis of inter-state economic integration would be inadequate unless account is taken of at least three types or levels of interaction, namely, interaction among networks of power; information and knowledge; and exchanges.

The importance of unequal power and knowledge (which include technology and R&D) is reflected in the possible dominance of certain countries in economic integration or cooperation arrangements. The motives of such strong powers as South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union; Kenya in the now defunct East African Community; Nigeria in ECOWAS; and Zimbabwe in SADCC are not always purely economic since they may also embrace national security, influence and/or mere prestige. Insofar as the elements of power and knowledge can never be equal among integrating states, it has been common for countries' inherent development disparities before integration to be accentuated rather than reduced over time.

Against the above background, it would seem unrealistic for integrating countries to work towards equalising condition purely on the basis of exchanges and neglecting the elements of power and knowledge. It is imperative to appreciate that in understanding the meaning and theory of integration, it is important both to look at the instruments of this process and to establish who benefits from the scheme.

Economic integration among developing countries has so far assumed three distinctive but nevertheless overlapping forms. The first one is the *laissez faire* system which is typified by the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). The

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Vaitos, C.V. "Crisis in regional economic cooperation (integration) among developing countries: A Survey", *World Development*, Vol.6, No.6, June, 1978, p.297.

second type is a modified *laissez faire* system in which elements of compensation through planning are introduced. The Central American Common Market (CACM); the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); and the East African Community (EAC) are good examples of this form. The third type of economic integration, the *dirigiste* system, links planning to regulation within the regional context. So far, this last type has been represented only by the Andean Group during the 1969-76 period.

One can also look at economic integration as assuming a multiplicity of approaches, two of which are integration of the market (the one most commonly used by the Third World countries but with least success) and integration by project (through cooperative efforts). Whereas the PTA falls under the former, the SADCC arrangement assumes characteristics of the latter.

Several factors have heightened developing countries' interest in the process of integration and cooperation amongst themselves. The European Economic Community (EEC) provided an encouraging example. The general success of the European Community revealed appealing benefits derived from integrating regional markets. Increasingly, developing countries associated integration with the concept of rapid or accelerated economic development. This is particularly so against the background of the general failure of these countries to achieve most of their set objectives for the restructuring of the world economic order as reflected in a series of UNCTAD meetings beginning with its fourth session in Nairobi in May 1976.

The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was conceived within the context of the North-South dialogue and whose spirit is contained in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, exemplified the need for cooperation. In particular, the NIEO called for the achievement of more rational and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural changes in the world economy; the creation of conditions which permit the further expansion of trade and intensification of economic cooperation among all nations; the strengthening of the economic independence of developing countries; and the establishment and promotion of international economic relations taking into account the agreed differences in development of the developing countries and their specific needs.

The failure of developing countries to achieve most of the above expectations of the international community made them to increasingly build faith on cooperation

among themselves. For Africa in particular, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa contributed significantly to the emergence and/or consolidation of many regional groupings on the continent. Several factors peculiar to the African situation further justified the perceived need to integrate regional economies. The limited size of sub-Saharan African countries; the weak industrial and technological base; the dominance of foreign transnational companies in these economies; the low level of intraregional trade due mainly to restrictive tariff and non-tariff barriers and low industrial output, etc., have all suggested the desirability of integrating national economies.

### **Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) Background**

Conceived by the 'Front Line' states in 1978 and institutionalised by the 1979 Arusha Meeting of ministers that prepared the ground for the April 1980 Lusaka Summit of the Commonwealth heads of state, SADCC consists of eight Southern African countries and one from eastern Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Namibia has since become a member. According to the basic statement of aims agreed upon at the Lusaka Summit, the following are the main objectives of SADCC:

- a) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, on the Republic of South Africa (RSA).
- b) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies;
- c) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; and
- d) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberalisation.

Apart from the 1980 Declaration, the SADCC has no treaty providing binding rules and regulations. The SADCC Memorandum of Understanding of 1981

established the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat but it hardly amounts to a legal treaty, as in the case of the PTA, with constitutionally binding commitments. Consensus and voluntarism rather than binding rules are, thus, the criteria used by SADCC to devise and operationalise jointly agreed objectives.

Mindful of the disparities in development levels and the need to contain polarisation effects, SADCC states decided not to create a supranational institution to oversee the activities of the regional group. Instead, functional responsibilities have been allocated to member countries for coordination while the role of the small Secretariat in Botswana is primarily administrative. Accordingly, Angola has been assigned the task of coordinating energy development and conservation in the region; Zimbabwe food security and land conservation; Botswana crop research and control of animal diseases; Mozambique transport and communications; Swaziland training and manpower development; Tanzania industrialisation and trade; soil conservation and land utilisation are the responsibility of Lesotho in collaboration with Zimbabwe; mining for Zambia; fisheries and wild life for Malawi.

## SADCC Performance

By world standards, the economies of the SADCC countries are very weak and greatly conditioned by extra-regional politico-economic events. The region's total income was estimated at US\$25 billion in 1982.<sup>2</sup> The agricultural sector has continued to be the main source of national income and contributes roughly 34% of the GDP, employing about 79% of the total labour force and accounting for approximately 25% of the region's export receipts. Nevertheless, the area is well endowed with mineral resources. In 1983/84, for instance, it produced close to US\$4 billion worth of mineral resources, most of which were exported out of the region. Mineral resources include diamonds, petroleum oil, copper, nickel, zinc, cobalt, gold, asbestos, chrome, coal and iron.

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SADCC, *SADCC: Investment in Production*, February 1987, p.9.

The manufacturing sector in SADCC has contributed very little to development except in Zimbabwe where it contributed US\$1 195,3 million, or 30% of GDP in 1983. Table 1 gives the manufacturing sector's contribution to SADCC countries' GDP. On average, recent trends in SADCC industrial growth have been poor and the principal explanations for this include the South African destabilisation efforts, especially in Angola and Mozambique where the industrial sector's supportive infrastructure has been crippled. Secondly, the regional manufacturing sector's high dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods during the period of mounting foreign exchange scarcities, resulting in capacity underutilisation, further worsened the sector's performance. Generally, in the majority of member states, the 1980-87 period witnessed significant decline in the manufacturing sector's share of GDP, with the regional average reduced from 31,1% in 1980 to 12% in 1987.<sup>3</sup>

Several country-specific problems have been associated with the poor economic performance of the SADCC region. In Angola, the good oil price of 1985 led to appreciable economic recovery but the South African and US-supported UNITA activities against the Angolan government negatively affected growth. The low price of oil since early 1986 which dropped by over 50% in that year alone, has further worsened Angola's already desperate situation amidst the ever-rising debt service problem.

In Botswana during the 1985/86 period, the marked improvements in economic performance were affected by drought which reduced agricultural output significantly, resulting in the country having to import 90% of its grain requirements during the 1986/87 season. Nevertheless, during this period the generally good performance of the Botswana economy resulted in a 12,7% increase in the overall balance of payments surplus, and the debt service ratio stood at 1% of exports.<sup>4</sup>

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SADCC, *Industry and Trade*, Lusaka meeting, 31 January - 2 February 1990, p.23.

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SADCC, *Annual Progress Report*, July 1986 - August 1987, p.5.



**Table I: The Contribution of the Manufacturing Sector to SADCC Economies' GDP**

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Angola MVA (mill kw)					
Share of MVA in GDP		3.99			
Botswana MVA (mill Pula)	49.3	71.2	81.7	91.6	108.5
Share of MVA in GDP	4.1	3.7	9.0	7.7	7.3
MVA [mill US \$]	63.5	85.5	80.0	83.5	84.5
Lesotho MVA (mill Maloti)	11.9	14.7	17.9	21.1	
Share of MVA in GDP	4.5	4.6	5.1	5.5	
MVA [mill US \$]	15.3	16.9	16.5	18.9	
Malawi MVA (mill K)	89.0	92.0	91.8	98.1	
(1978 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	11.7	12.8	12.4	12.8	12.3
MVA [mill US \$]	109.6	102.8	86.9	83.5	71.8
Mozambique MVA (MVA mill Esc)	30.7	30.8	29.7	27.6	
Share of MVA in GDP	37.3	37.8	34.9	35.2	
Swaziland MVA (mill E)	79.6	83.4	92.6	94.0	
(1980 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	21.8	22.3	22.8	23.5	
MVA [mill US \$]	102.3	101.6	89.3	84.5	
Tanzania MVA (mill T.Shs)	2 288.0	1 804.0	1 482.0	1 351.0	1 171.0
(1976 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	9.4	7.5	6.1	5.5	4.7
MVA [mill US \$]	279.1	217.8	159.6	121.2	76.6
Zambia MVA (mill K)	162.9	180.0	173.0	184.5	
(1980 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	18.5	19.6	20.6	19.8	
MVA [mill US \$]	206.6	207.3	186.4	147.5	
Zimbabwe MVA (mill Z\$)	857.0	1084.0	1 188.0	1 208.0	
Share of MVA in GDP	24.9	25.1	30.0	30.0	
MVA [mill US \$]	1 333.6	1 575.0	1 568.7	1 195.3	

Source: SADCC, *SADCC Macro-economic Survey: 1986*, SADCC Secretariat, 1986, p.104.

In Lesotho and Swaziland, the fall in the South African Rand has had serious negative effects on the two small economies by virtue of their membership of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). In Lesotho, the early 1986 South African blockade and low rainfall further worsened the economic performance of this small, essentially agricultural, economy. Additionally, the 1986/87 period saw the worsening of Lesotho's balance of payments position as a result of increased consumption demand while the budget deficit increased. For Swaziland, on the positive side, the 1986/87 period saw a GDP growth of 9%, explained mainly by the higher sugar production in 1986 and improved performance of the manufacturing sector.

In the case of Malawi, despite better performance in the country's agricultural sector during 1985, high transport costs, caused by disrupted routes to the sea via Mozambique, affected overall economic progress. It was reported that Malawi's current account balance of payments deficit declined marginally from K166,2 million in 1985 to K163,6 million in 1986, despite a 7% increase in the volume of exports and massive 19% reduction in the volume of imports.<sup>5</sup> The country's real GDP fell by 3% during 1986/87 mainly because of the continuing transport problems and low export prices.

The effects of the South African supported MNR rebel activities in Mozambique not only caused major disruptions in the country's economic performance despite improved rainfall in 1986 but also led to mounting tensions between that country and Malawi because of the latter's alleged harbouring of anti-Mozambique MNR rebels. As a result of serious disruptions of the production base by the civil instability that has seen the worsening of the country's trade deficit, the Mozambican government embarked upon a major economic rehabilitation programme during the 1986/87 period.

A poor economic record and foreign exchange scarcities also characterised the Tanzanian economy during the 1985/86 period. As a result of the depressed economic activity and donor reluctance to provide more concessional aid unless the country softened its position on the IMF conditionalities, the new Mwinji government slightly deviated from the economic policies of the former President Nyerere, (if one goes by the economic recovery programme Tanzania presented

to the donors at the June 1986 consultative meeting in Paris). Mainly as a result of the implementation of the "Economic Recovery Programme" earlier embarked upon, the Tanzanian economy performed better during the 1986/87 period than the previous year. Both the manufacturing (including agricultural) and mining sectors (which had been crippled by lack of inputs and machinery) have shown signs of improvements under the new programme.

In Zambia, despite the good agricultural season of 1985/86 (registering an all-time record harvest of nearly 11 million bags of maize), economic performance remained depressed due to foreign exchange scarcity as a result of the depressed copper prices. Copper alone accounts for more than 90% of Zambia's export earnings. Although the system of auctioning foreign currency during the October 1985 to May 1987 period brought some relief to importers, it resulted in higher consumer prices (as the value of the Kwacha fell significantly) while the country's ever-worsening inflation led to a substantial depression in demand and consumption. The country's GDP grew by only 0,75% during the July 1986 - August 1987 period amidst an escalating balance of payment crisis, budget deficit, and depressed export prices.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the agricultural sector performed much better in Zambia during the 1987/88 period due to a combination of price incentives and several policy changes.

Lastly, in Zimbabwe, an appreciable level of economic growth was registered in almost all the economic sectors during 1985. After political independence in 1980, the country's manufacturing sector responded positively to the consumer boom through increased capacity utilisation. This was facilitated by the government's ability to remove sanctions-induced internal constraints on production. This positive growth permitted remarkable improvements in the country's external trade in which exports increased by 27% in 1980 and 7% in 1981. GDP also grew by 26% in the first two years of independence<sup>7</sup>.

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SADCC, *Annual Progress Report*, July 1986 - August 1987, p.6.

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Economic Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Review of Zimbabwe* (Annual Supplement), EIU, 1985, p.7.

However, like in most of the other SADCC countries, the Zimbabwean economic recovery was not self-sustained. The 1982/84 period, for example, witnessed a decline in GDP mainly due to the drought-induced low agricultural output. Sales of maize dropped by close to 70% between 1981/82 and 1983/84. The mining sector, similarly, suffered from both the fall in world prices and the strength of the Zimbabwean dollar, while the resultant foreign exchange shortages have had serious effects on the performance of the manufacturing sector. Due to the mounting balance of payments deficit, the government reimposed import controls. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's debt service rose from 2,6% of its exports earnings in 1980 to over 30% two years later<sup>8</sup>. Against the above background, the shortage of imported inputs in production principally explained the 1986/87 real GDP growth of only 0,18%. This period also witnessed a 11% drop in Zimbabwean agricultural production, mainly because of drought conditions. Notwithstanding the above, the country's agricultural exports rose by 31,6% during the 1986/87 period<sup>9</sup>.

In addition to the country-specific problems analysed above, there are several other related constraints that have affected the SADCC region as a whole. Firstly, the worsening terms of trade is such that prices of most regional export commodities, largely raw materials, have remained either static or declined while the prices of their manufactured imports continue to rise. For example, the raw materials price declined by 1% between 1985 and 1986 while that of manufactured goods rose by 18%. This has worsened the balance of payments position of almost all SADCC countries, most of which presently suffer from a critical shortage of foreign exchange and declining export performance, especially Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Thus, as the 1987 SADCC report observed, "foreign exchange shortages have reduced import capacity, particularly for inputs, spare parts and plant. As a result, capacity underutilisation of as much as 70% in some instances has been reported. In 1986, output declined by 6,7% and 1,04% in Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively"<sup>10</sup>.

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8 Ibid., p.8.

9 SADCC, *Annual Progress Report*, July 1986-August 1987, p.6.

10 Ibid., p.4.

Secondly, with regard to mounting external debt, the OECD put the total outstanding debts of SADCC countries at US\$14,64 billion at the end of 1985 - which was equivalent to approximately 50% of the region's GDP.

### SADCC Cooperation in Industrial Project

Against the background of the general SADCC performance *vis-a-vis* the international and local environments, this part examines SADCC cooperation in one of its strategic sectors: industrial project. Generally, per capita manufactured output in Africa is the lowest in developing countries and of the little manufacturing that exists on the continent, as much as 85% is concentrated in only one-third of the African countries. The Central, Eastern and Southern African regions (excluding South Africa) have registered the lowest rate of growth of the manufacturing sector in Africa.<sup>11</sup> The pattern of industrial growth on the continent has also remained undiversified, with the light industrial, largely agricultural sector being predominant, accounting for 68% of manufactured value added.

The general performance of individual SADCC economies has already been presented. Suffice it to mention here that the SADCC countries industrial sector is relatively underdeveloped, with Zimbabwe being by far the most industrially developed country in the region, with the manufacturing value added contributing roughly 30% to the country's GDP in 1983 - while this was as low as 5,5% in Tanzania and Lesotho, 7,7% in Botswana, and 12,8% in Malawi.

Recent trends in SADCC industrial growth have generally been unfavourable and the principle constraints accounting for this include South African destabilisation efforts; the regional manufacturing sectors import-intensive characteristic amidst foreign exchange scarcities and balance of payments problems; restrictive national markets and, quite often, an unfavourable investment climate due to a combination of geopolitical factors and faulty government policies.

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United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa*, Part 1, E/CN., 14/802, p.66.

## *Investment Policies and Mechanisms*

Under the SADCC system of decentralisation of sectoral functions, Tanzania was allocated the responsibility of coordinating both the industrial and trade sectors. Although SADCC was established in 1980, the institutionalisation of actual coordination of the industrial sector was effected only by the end of 1982. According to the 1981 Action Plan in the Memorandum for Industrial Cooperation, SADCC countries agreed on five objectives, namely:

- a) to reduce external dependence, nationally and regionally, on imports of industrial products and inputs from outside the region;
- b) in particular, reduce dependence on the Republic of South Africa, which is the largest single source of such products and inputs for five of the nine SADCC states and a significant one for two more;
- c) to increase the size (absolutely and relative to total national production) of the industrial sector, both nationally and regionally;
- d) to increase the scope and diversity of the industrial sectors of the member states and the region through increasing the range of final products, intermediate goods and capital goods produced;
- e) to increase the linkages within the national and regional industrial sectors to make particular industries and industrial activities as a whole more integrated and self-reliant and less dependent on raw materials, intermediate inputs and spares from outside the region.<sup>12</sup>

To realise the above objectives, the SADCC Council of Ministers resolved in 1981 that the industrial coordination function should consist of three phases. In the short term, SADCC should aim at greater utilisation of installed plant capacities so that supply gaps in other countries are filled. In the medium term, it was agreed that "trade matching could be applied to projects already under

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SADCC, *Industrial Cooperation*, Blantyre, November 1981, pp. 1-2.

implementation or planned which could have a national surplus to meet regional supply gaps. Such integration could be planned in advance and also modify priorities in national plans to take account of parallel projects, thus fostering specialisation".<sup>13</sup> In the long run, the SADCC Council of Ministers maintained that there is need to plan regionally relevant investment decisions within the context of industrial complementarity and realisation of economies of scale. To achieve the above broad policy guidelines, SADCC recognises that both the private and public enterprises that are involved in productive and commercial undertakings should be supported.

According to the 1981 Memorandum on SADCC industrial cooperation, the priority industrial project areas in the region relate primarily to the satisfaction of the people's basic need in food, clothing, housing, health care, water and its supply, transport and communications, and education. At the level of implementation, priority is given to the following sectors:

- food and agro-industries;
- building materials and construction;
- metal and metal products;
- engineering and engineering products;
- chemical and
- forest-based industries.<sup>14</sup>

In the long-term perspective, the development of such core industries as those relating to the manufacture of basic fertilisers, pesticides and pharmaceuticals has been recognised in SADCC.

The mechanisms adopted by the SADCC in order to realise the priorities above included the expansion of existing industrial capacity, in addition to creating new capacity so as to meet regional demand. Paramount to this is SADCC's recognition of the need to rehabilitate existing industries within the region. It has been discovered that although the earlier analysed level of industrial development

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<sup>13</sup> SADCC, *SADCC Industry and Trade Activities*, Arusha, January 1988, pp. 2-3.

<sup>14</sup> SADCC, *Industrial Cooperation*, op.cit., p.5.

in the SADCC region is quite modest, the existing industries generally operate far below their full potential. In SADCC, the underutilisation of installed capacities is not so much because of market limitations (i.e. lack of demand for the commodities produced) but principally because of inadequate inputs as a result of foreign exchange scarcity.

At the August 1985 SADCC workshop on rehabilitation, it was recognised that industrial rehabilitation should be undertaken on a selective basis, focusing primarily on industries using indigenous resources, those with export possibilities and those with potential to satisfy basic needs. It was further recognised that in carrying out a project rehabilitation exercise, there was need to take into account existing and potential interlinkages between the industrial sector and other sectors of the economy, especially agriculture and transport. Such supportive facilities as the provision of trained manpower in industrial skills, research in cost reduction and technology upgrading, standardisation of quality control, preventive maintenance schemes and manpower service were equally perceived to be essential in the rehabilitation programme.<sup>15</sup> By January 1988, six projects were under rehabilitation; the Basotho Fruit and Vegetable Cannery in Lesotho; Portland Cement Company in Malawi; cement plants in Mozambique; printing ink in Tanzania; the crushed stones project in Zambia; and Zimphos sulphuric acid in Zimbabwe.

Although rehabilitation has been recognised as one of the most effective approaches towards increasing industrial production in a region where existing industries are working inefficiently and below capacity, there is still room for improvement in the area of coordination. The current practice in SADCC is to ask member states to present their lists of projects that require rehabilitation. The nature of the lists presented by countries has varied significantly principally because these were drawn up before the SADCC agreed upon the earlier presented criteria for rehabilitation. As a result, in drawing up their lists, countries hardly considered the importance of taking into account existing and potential interlinkages and complementarities within the region.

Another aspect that deserves mention is the criteria of selecting and promoting regional projects. To qualify for promotion, a project is expected to contribute

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SADCC, *Industry*, Harare, January 1988, p.9.



towards the SADCC goals of economic independence. In addition to this general criterion, the project must satisfy any of the following conditions: "the ability of the project to meet internal consumption and have surplus to export particularly to the SADCC region; obtain raw materials within SADCC; the possibility of transporting raw materials and products within the region; a funding gap in foreign exchange; bankability; and a reasonable implementation period".<sup>16</sup> The implementation of such approved regional projects is the responsibility of the appropriate institution(s).

Lastly, SADCC recognises the role of intra-regional trade in the realisation of enhanced industrial production. Trade in manufactured products within SADCC presently accounts for about 50% of total intraregional trade and the products involved include textiles, clothing, footwear, chemicals, soaps, pharmaceutical products and agricultural machinery. A system of direct trade measures and bilateral agreements is being developed in the region and these include multi-year purchase contracts, counter-purchases, preferential import licensing and product specific tariff reductions. The current efforts towards the creation of export pre-financing revolving funds in SADCC countries and the development of a Regional Export Credit Fund are all in line with the new SADCC realisation that

the regional market has to be accessible to regional producers in order to stimulate both regional production and investment... The priority, therefore, is fully to utilise the regional market as a *basis* for industrial development since.... the development of modern industrial enterprises often requires the expenditure of large amounts of capital and the national markets of the SADCC member states are not of sufficient size to sustain these investments.<sup>17</sup>

What all this means is that trade in SADCC is seen not as an end in itself but as an instrument for the realisation of expanded material production, in line with the production/project oriented approach to integration.

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16 SADCC, *SADCC Industry and Trade Activities*, op.cit., p.5.

17 SADCC, *SADCC Investment in Production*, op.cit., p.36.

With regard to the implementation status of the SADCC industrial programme, it required a total of US\$1,434,81 million (excluding the trade element) by December 1987, of which US\$282,19 million had, by then, been secured. Additionally, of the original 55 projects in the industrial field, 39 were under implementation of which seven had already been completed.<sup>18</sup>

One noticeable feature of the pattern of industrial projects distribution among SADCC members is that it is highly skewed in favour of the country coordinating the industrial sector, Tanzania. By 1986/87, for example, 99,2% of all completed SADCC capital investment projects (foreign exchange component) were concentrated in Tanzania while 81% of all capital investment projects under implementation were located in the same country. Furthermore, Tanzania got the lion's share (55,5%) of all the SADCC capital investment projects under negotiation during the same period. Table 2 shows the accumulated distribution, by country, of industrial projects by 1986/87. While this bias in favour of Tanzania could be justified on redistributive grounds given the relatively low level of industrialisation in the country *vis-a-vis* other SADCC members, a genuine concern could still be raised over the low distributional priority being accorded to countries such as Malawi, Swaziland, and Botswana which have a similar status to Tanzania in the industrial field.

### *Transnational Corporations and SADCC Industrialisation*

Direct foreign investment is presently encouraged, to varying degrees, in all the SADCC states. While in some countries foreign investment is allowed in restricted areas, in some it is promoted in all sectors of the economy as joint ventures and/or wholly-owned private companies. Foreign investment is currently receiving priority within SADCC in the following broad areas:

- (i) production of those consumer goods that meet the basic needs of the people;
- (ii) resource-based ventures such as agro-based industries;

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SADCC, *SADCC Industry and Trade Activities*, op.cit., pp.11, 30-31.

**Table II: Accumulated Distribution by Country of Industrial Projects - Foreign Exchange Component, 1986/87**

Category	Total	Mill. US \$								
		Ang	Bots	Les	Mal	Moz	Swa	Tan	Zam	Zim
AI	188/422	-	-	1/416	-	-	-	187/006	-	-
	100%	-	-	0.8%	-	-	-	99.2%	-	-
AI-AII	264/058	0	0/835	1/164	0	25	0	214/307	12	10/5
	100%	0%	0.5%	0.55	0%	9.5%	0	81%	4.5%	4%
AI-AIII	386/888	0	3/595	2/166	109	32/28	1/04	214/307	14	10/5
	100%	0%	1%	0.5%	28%	8.5%	0.5%	55.5%	3.5%	2.9%
AI-AIV	1/272/122		0	3/595	2/166	109	337/88	1/04	723/941	8410/5
	100%	0%	0.5%	0%	8.5%	26.5%	0%	57%	6.5%	1%
AI-AV	1/304/352		0	5/005	6/076	110/41	337/88	1/04	724/841	10019/1
	100%	0%	0.5%	0.5%	8.5%	26%	0%	55.5%	7.5%	1.5%

- AI = Completed capital investment projects
- AI = Capital investment projects under implementation
- AIII = Capital investment projects under negotiation (with foreign funder)
- AIV = Capital investment project requiring funding
- AV = Capital investment projects being revised

Source: Haarlov, J., *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa...*, op.cit.,p.102.

- (iii) investment in such core industries as petrochemicals, iron and steel;
- (iv) export oriented industries which have the potential to diversify the economies export base and generate foreign exchange;
- (v) development of intermediate goods industries.<sup>19</sup>

SADCC maintains that foreign enterprises are in control of investment resources of finance, technology and expertise and hence, hopes, to progressively involve them in the process of consultations with the regional enterprise.<sup>20</sup>

Although direct foreign investment in Southern Africa is concentrated in the more profitable South Africa, many transnational corporations (TNCs) used that country as a convenient bridgehead for their subregional operations. While a considerable number of mainly British and American firms have diversified their operations from South Africa into the neighbouring SADCC countries, some have independently penetrated the SADCC region in such areas as mining, banking and major agricultural estates and agro-industries.

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19 SADCC, *Investment Policies and Mechanisms of SADCC Countries*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1986, pp. 6-7.

20 SADCC, *Industry and Trade, Mining, Tourism*, op.cit.,p.5.

South African investments have also been exported to SADCC states. A closer examination of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho can illustrate this.<sup>21</sup> The dominance of Western and especially South African-based TNCs in Zimbabwe is quite remarkable and they are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, mining, finance, distribution and property sectors. In 1975, for example, over 75% of manufacturing holdings were owned by foreign companies.<sup>22</sup> During the 1980s, Zimbabwe held an estimated one-third of SADCC's total foreign investment.<sup>23</sup>

South African investment is considerable in Zimbabwe because the pre-independence sanctions and UDI in Rhodesia worked to the disadvantage of the British and American investment and, thus, consolidated the South African position. As has been observed,

most investment in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) between 1965 and 1979 was from funds "locked-up" behind the sanctions wall, but a substantial portion of the fresh capital from external sources originated from South of the Limpopo. In addition, the Rhodesian private sector received up to US \$40 million a year in credit loans from South African banks during the 1970s.<sup>24</sup>

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21 For the *Zambian Case*, see Saasa, O.S., *Zambia's Policies Towards Foreign Investment: The Case of the Mining and Non-mining Sectors*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987.

22 Thompson, C.B., "Regional Economic Policy Crisis Conditions: The Case of SADCC", *Current African Issue*, SIAS, No.6, 1986, p.10.

23 Clarke, S. *Financial Aspects of Economic Sanctions on South Africa*, London, Africa Bureau, 1981, p.88.

24 Bowman, L., Bratton, M. and Murapa, R., "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependence, Destabilisation and Liberation", Callaghy, T.M. (ed), *South Africa in Southern Africa*, New

By 1979, it was estimated that South African investment in Zimbabwe was 479 million<sup>25</sup> and that approximately one-quarter of the country's total capital was contributed by South Africa.<sup>26</sup> For Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS states), geographical proximity to and economic intimacy with South African have facilitated effective integration of their economies in the South African matrix, thus allowing for extensive foreign investment from that country. In Botswana, almost all South African investment is directed towards the mining sector. The Anglo American Corporation (AAC) controls Botswana's copper-nickel mine which is jointly held with Amax. Nickel, dominated by Western interests, represents one of Botswana's largest exports and its production and is the second largest employer next to government. In 1984, exports of Botswana diamonds, also dominated by foreign interest, totalled P616 million or 76% of the country's total export earnings.<sup>27</sup>

In Swaziland foreign investment is also well consolidated. In commercial agriculture, which dominates external trade, the country is dependent on a few foreign-owned establishments which are responsible for over 90% of total production.<sup>28</sup> Foreign capital is also pronounced in tourism. Swaziland's present open policy is designed to solicit foreign investment. Combined with South Africa's current "deconcentration" policy designed to diffuse its industrial establishment into the Bantustans and adjacent neighbours, the Swazi government's policy has continued to attract foreign investment through generous tax incentives;

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York, Praeger, 1983, p.328.

25 Clarke, D.G., *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe*, Gwelo, CIIR, 1980, p.133.

26 Hanion, J. Conflict and Dependence in Southern Africa, *Third World Affairs*, 1985, p.216.

27 Economic Intelligence Unit, *op.cit.*, p.30.

28 ILO (JASPA), *Reducing Dependence: A Strategy for Productive Employment and Development in Swaziland*, Addis Ababa, ILO, 1977, p.2.

commitment against nationalisation; liberal policies on dividend and profit repatriations and a guaranteed supply of cheap docile labour.

Lastly, Lesotho is also dominated by Western and South African investments. De Beers has substantial investments in the country's diamond mining and processing. Foreign trade interests dominate the manufacturing sector and in 1982 accounted for 6% of GDP at factor cost, employing about 6000 people, which is 46% of the number employed by the government in a country in which 85% of the total population is dependent on cultivation and herding.<sup>29</sup>

Overall, the preceding analysis demonstrates a very high level of transnational corporate activity in most SADCC economies. The degree and pattern of foreign direct investment in the region have, thus, remained as important considerations in analysing the integration of production among SADCC countries *vis-a-vis* the sharing of benefits from cooperation (see below).

## Critical Review and Conclusions

This paper has so far revealed several salient features of the SADCC economies, their performance, and the regional group's industrial objectives as well as investment policies and mechanisms. Emphasis has been placed on identifying the constraints that have slowed down progress in the realisation of SADCC goals. These have included the generally poor economic performance of SADCC economies; regional political instability; mounting external debt; inadequate development finance from both local and external sources; foreign exchange scarcity amidst import-intensive production systems; and idle capacity in industry.

Several issues have emerged in the preceding analysis. Firstly, the level of foreign finance in SADCC, constituting 86,26% of the total requirements as of August 1987, raises issues regarding the extent to which SADCC's objective of "reduction of economic dependence particularly, but not only, on the RSA", is being realised. Hence, although there is a lot of enthusiasm within SADCC at the level of project identification, one notes that those regional projects which fail to attract foreign blessing usually lag behind, or are completely abandoned. As a result, since

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Economic Intelligence Unit, op.cit., p.45.

SADCC was created in 1980, the pace and pattern of project implementation has been critically influenced by the availability of foreign finance.

Notwithstanding the above concern, it could still be argued that dependence on foreign development finance in itself may not necessarily conflict with the SADCC objective of self-reliance as long as such finance is directed towards those projects and programmes with long-term dependence-reducing effects and as long as the terms under which donor assistance is received do not compromise the attainment of the set goals. For example, if the conditions under which foreign finance is received promote the development of physical and human resources; promote intra- and inter-sectoral linkages and industrial diversification; lead to the acquisition of the required technologies and related inputs; and promote research and development (R&D), then the long-term effects of such dependence should be positive. Nevertheless, greater efforts should be directed towards the mobilisation of SADCC-based financial and human resources to complement externally derived ones. In the final sphere, this could be realised, *inter alia*, through enhanced cooperation among national development banks within SADCC, and the promotion of joint ventures between regional investors.

Several developments in the SADCC industrial sector merit re-examination and re-focusing. Firstly, the current main preoccupation of the SADCC industrial coordinating country has been project identification. As UNIDO noted, "the role of Tanzania is restricted mainly to project identification, largely through sub-sectoral studies. It does not cover harmonisation of industrial policies, legislation... and overall industrial promotion activities and machineries".<sup>30</sup> If this problem is not taken seriously under the current SADCC initiatives (started in 1986 focusing on harmonisation of SADCC investment policies and mechanisms), it will continue to lead to the development of industrial programmes that are isolated from each other. In the past, this had led to the absence of inter- and intra-sectoral linkages, duplication of industrial projects resulting in excess capacity and thus wastage of scarce regional resources, both human and material.

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UNIDO, *Industrial Cooperation through SADCC*, Preliminary Report prepared by UNIDO Regional and Country Studies Branch, Mimeo, 1983, p.16



Secondly, the 1982 guidelines for industrial projects are hardly used in regional industrial planning. There has been a tendency among SADCC countries to submit for funding regional projects that were already under way at the national level so at the time of their selection the SADCC criteria were not used. Besides, 75 % of all investment costs covered a few large projects, mainly in the textiles and pulp/paper subsectors, thus confirming the assertion that SADCC industrial planning does not follow the agreed strategy and criteria for project proposals.<sup>31</sup>

Thirdly, SADCC has recognised the need to give priority to plant rehabilitation rather than escalating the number of new projects. This position is held against the background of the region's general problem of capacity underutilisation.

In practice, however, this has not been the case. The 1986 SADCC macro-economic survey revealed that "in practice, the balance of investment resources has weighted heavily (85 %) in favour of new investment, compared to investments in rehabilitation (14%)".<sup>32</sup> SADCC thus needs to re-orient its implementation programmes in accordance with its stated strategies. This calls for greater effort towards implementing carefully selected rehabilitation activities in a way that would ultimately produce the required structural changes in the SADCC economies.

Lastly, the level of foreign investment in the SADCC region as presented in the last section raises issue regarding, for instance, who would be the principle beneficiary when the right investment climate (i.e. a stable political climate in the region, an efficient national administration, and appreciable rate of return on investment) is created. In the SADCC region where TNCs have dominated the productive and intra and extraregional export sectors, it appears that the interrelationship between policies towards foreign investment and those relating to

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31 See Wangwe, S.M., "Planning for Industry and Mining in SADCC"; SADCC, *Macro-economic Survey: Report on the Lilongwe Workshop*, August, 1986, p.91.

32 Ibid, p.91.

regional economic integration is very strong.<sup>33</sup> It has been noted that several incentives have been extended to provide investment. These include tax holidays for infant industries; taxable allowances linked to technical training expenses; refund or draw back on import taxes for inputs required to produce exportable commodities and double taxation agreements. And yet TNCs main attributes and operational strategies have given them an advantage over local entrepreneurs. For example, TNC's technological dominance, company-specific assets such as trademarks, managerial skills, corporate controls, etc., all place these giant firms at an advantage over their local competitors.<sup>34</sup>

Regarding TNCs and their effect on redistributive considerations in regional cooperation, the observation by Vaitos is quite revealing:

Regional cooperation, if it is pursued solely on the basis of commercial integration...implies, by definition, an increase in the bargaining power of transnational enterprises (TNEs). The merging of several domestic markets while retaining various autonomous governmental authority with the power to independently set or accept terms with the foreign investors, will imply that the TNEs will promote investments in the country which offers them the more favourable conditions. Thus, the member countries are competing with each other as to which will provide the most favourable terms to foreign firms.<sup>35</sup>

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33 For an empirical application of this theoretical relationship, see Tiront, E., *Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment Policies: The Angean case*, Ph.D dissertation, MIT, Cambridge Mass, 1976.

34 For a more detailed analysis of the strength of TNCs as applied to Tanzania and Zambia, see Saasa, O., *The Control of TNCs in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis of National Policy-making towards International Investment in Tanzania and Zambia*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 1982.

35 Vaitos, C.V., "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (integration) among Developing Countries: A Survey. *World Development*, Vol.6, No.6, June 1978, p.290.

Furthermore, although the reduction of obstacles to effective flow of capital into SADCC is important, several studies have doubted the ability of special incentives to attract direct foreign investment. In its 1985 Report, for instance, the World Bank concluded that "the impact of specific incentives for direct investment is uncertain. Numerous studies have suggested that business executives tend to ignore or downplay incentives in making decisions on where to invest".<sup>36</sup>

SADCC seems to have recognised the potential negative effects of member states engaging in "wars of incentives" among themselves in their efforts to attract investors. Following the compilation and publication of *Mechanisms of SADCC Countries* in 1986, SADCC is examining the possibilities of how to effectively harmonise the member countries' investment policies *vis-a-vis* the recognition that "unbalanced and competitive development can be avoided by seeking and emphasizing strategies which are clearly beneficial...and by emphasizing that regional balance is essential not only for sustained cooperation but also for sustained development".<sup>37</sup> Memories of Kenya's industrial dominance in the East African Community and Southern Rhodesia's lead in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are still fresh in the minds of the SADCC leaders, thus prompting them to be cautious on the issue of distribution of benefits from cooperation. As Green commented over the general manufacturing dominance of Zimbabwe in the region, "great care and imagination will be needed to devise trade agreements with its neighbours which both facilitate Zimbabwean production for export and give some guarantee of relatively balanced new production and export opportunities for its partners".<sup>38</sup> One cannot put it any better.

Whatever approach SADCC intends to pursue in its industrial cooperation efforts, it is clear from its document presented at the January 1990 Lusaka meeting with

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36 World Bank, *World Bank Development Report, 1985*, Oxford University Press, 1985.

37 SADCC, *SADCC Investment in Production, op.cit.*, p.25.

38 Green R.H., "Towards Southern African Regionalism: The Emergence of a dialogue", *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol.XI, 1978/79, p.46.

donors that while the redistributive considerations are important, the Group is increasingly determined to depend on a combination of market forces and limited controls to attain its industrial goals. The 1990 document outlined the following macro-economic policies that are perceived to be conducive to industrial growth in the SADCC region:

- a system of flexible and market-oriented foreign exchange rates that will encourage exports; foster greater utilisation of domestic, rather than imported inputs; and increased industrial efficiency by ensuring that investment decisions reflect the underlying regional and international competitive position of member states;
- a tariff-based system of industrial protection, with a reasonably uniform tariff schedule, designed to avoid investment in inefficient projects protected by import bans or very high tariffs;
- effective anti-inflationary policies;
- a stable tax structure that encourages both domestic and foreign investment and;
- freedom from arbitrary government intervention in business decision-making.

Against the above background, the present SADCC approach is to exploit the benefits of *planned* and coordinated industrial and trade strategies while at the same time recognising the importance of responding positively to *market* signals in their industrial cooperation efforts.

# HEALTH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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"It is changes that are chiefly responsible for diseases, especially the greatest changes, the violent alternations both in the seasons and in other things" Hippocrates.

## Introduction

This assertion, made 3 000 years ago, is as apt today as when it was made. In recent decades Southern Africa has experienced violent alterations which cannot be adequately expressed in words, and the changes which have occurred have had repercussions on the life style and health status of the peoples of the region.

The next time you ask someone "how are you?" and you get the automatic response "fine", be grateful. For if that person told you how he/she really felt physically, emotionally and mentally you might wish you had never asked, as you would be likely to hear a recital or an "Ode to my health".

It is always easy to define illness, but the opposite of this state, which is health, is a very difficult quality to define. It is partly a biological status, a matter of how well *all* the body's component parts are working. It is partly a consequence of behaviour, a reflection of our ability to coexist with other people, yet at the same time it is also a product of personal and philosophical values intimately tied to our concept of self, that is what we think we ought to be and what we think we really are. Therefore any venture into research on maintaining a healthy state as against research on ailments is indeed almost a mission impossible as it is fraught with innumerable imponderables.

The World Health Organisation's definition of health is enough to discourage scientific investigation. It views health as an idealistic "state of complete physical,

mental and social wellbeing and not merely absence of disease or infirmity". Psychiatrist Alexander Lowen views it as "the truth of the body",<sup>1</sup> while to the Scottish poet James Thompson health was "the vital principle of bliss".

These are latter-day conceptions of health. Somehow provision for health seems to have done a complete circle; first it was an art, then a science, and now it is a combination of both. Where one lays emphasis depends to a great extent on one's inclination, background training and area of operation in the health field. This influences one's approach to the provision of health and also to the studies in that field. It is difficult to identify an exact point in history when medicine became established as a science. However, this process had profound consequences, as the profession moved from the emphasis on "art" to mechanical business. A person requiring treatment has come to be regarded as a piece of hardware. To the outsider the world of medicine is a closed community. Its workings are protected by a code of secrecy and surrounded by an aura calculated to induce an attitude of submission in those being treated. The former director of the WHO lamented that "the major and most expensive part of medical technology as applied today appears to be far more for the satisfaction of the health profession than for the benefit of the consumer of health care".<sup>2</sup>

It may appear as if one is being harsh on the medical profession and also undermining the tremendous achievements in medical research. The technological advances in the battle against disease are considerable. For example, immunology has resulted in the control of many of the ills that plagued our ancestors for centuries. Vast stores of information about measures useful in solving health problems have been gathered through scientific methods of investigation. We have tremendously powerful tools with which to work: the laboratory, the epidemiological method coupled with statistical techniques for studying disease as it affects masses of people, our intricate and highly developed hospitals and other health facilities. Nonetheless it is becoming evident that there are unresolved issues and gaps in our knowledge; the great breakthroughs of tomorrow will almost certainly come from the behavioural rather than the medical sphere. That

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<sup>1</sup> Lowen, A., 1970. *Pleasure*. Coward-McCann, New York, p.140.

<sup>2</sup> Mahler, H., 1977. *The Listener*. August, p.130.

is, in a greatly expanded understanding of why we behave as we do, and more particularly how we can go about changing behaviour that is harmful to our health. It is in the "public" area of health that we are weak.

The concept of research for the development of national health systems is as old as the World Health Organisation. Yet only in 1976 was there an explicit recognition that in order to achieve this it is necessary to provide financial support and to consider it as a research priority. From then on a different approach was considered. That consideration may have been the catalyst which enabled the Alma Ata conference to take a major leap into Primary Health Care (1979) and produced a further commitment in 1981 with a declaration of the Health For All (HFA) strategy (which led to a Health Research Strategy for HFA [1986]).

Exactly what was the Alma Ata Declaration? An extract from the declaration reads

Emphasizing that enough is known about primary health care for governments to initiate or expand its implementation, but also recognizing that many long-range and complex issues need to be resolved, that the *traditional systems of medicine calls for further research* and that new problems are constantly emerging as implementations proceed.

RECOMMENDS that every programme should set aside a percentage of its funds for continuing health service research, organizing health service research and development units .....

The sub-committee of the WHO on Health Research Strategy for HFA/2000 was even more precise on these issues:

Considering that health needs of a particular country are specific to that country, and that the practice of health and technology can play only a limited role towards fulfilment of the goal of HFA/2000, *the crux of the problem and the challenge for the future be in the assimilation, adaptation and modification of the technologies already available so as to make them more relevant, appropriate and applicable to the needs of*

the community and the health care system into which they are to be with integrated.

All this can best be achieved through a systematic compilation and analysis of information on people's behaviour in health.

Extensive quotation is deliberately employed here not only for emphasis but also to provide a comprehensive understanding of the rationale behind the actions that followed these declarations. It is ironic that while the Northern hemisphere thought for many years it had discovered a new approach, the Southern hemisphere had already been providing health services from a broadly based understanding of health. Consideration of health within a social milieu is more in keeping with the developing world's perception of the provision of health.

These noble declarations did not necessarily result in a flurry of activity. It requires a reconciliation of the philosophies of numerous disciplines to establish a coherent ground theory. Hitherto the few who dared to present a different view from that of the medical profession had been in the fields of anthropology or psychology. All along followers of these disciplines had understood the structure and functioning of medicine and viewed health from a systems point of view. Yet more often than not they were dismissed and accused of engaging in polemics. Now there is a new bandwagon which all and sundry can ride on: "Health Systems Research" (HSR). With the aim to optimise the utilisation of techniques and resources within countries, health systems research is recognised as a vital tool for improving organisation, functioning and utilisation of health systems at all levels. It is based on the understanding that no one discipline has the sole prerogative of finding answers for health problems.

## **Health Systems Research**

For some time now health policy, programmes and finances have been conceived and implemented without the benefit of adequate and appropriate or country-specific knowledge and information. Health Systems Research is based on the belief that each country has unique characteristics and a unique environment, and so each has a potential to contribute to global understanding of a wide variety of health and disease issues.



Over the last four decades different disciplines seem to have expressed substantial agreement on what health systems research is, its scope and distinctive characteristics. While it is not considered necessary to provide a definition of HSR here, or to describe it in detail, it is necessary to emphasise certain features because of their relevance to the status of health research and the problems being encountered by the Southern African countries in their endeavour to promote and to strengthen health research strategy. It is possible that these problems are not necessarily peculiar to the region and that what applies here could well be generalised to other countries.

Health Systems Research is designed for action and indeed is a prelude to action. This is a characteristic shared with much of the traditional bio-medical and scientific research. However the difference, apart from subject, lies in its time-scale and immediacy. Traditional medical or epidemiological research may take years before it is approved for application, as precise findings are tested and fitted into a gradually developing and occasionally receding body of knowledge and practice. On the other hand health systems research identifies relevant knowledge and principles from an array of disciplinary areas and then combines these in a problem-solving exercise using the principle of unity derived from the various disciplinary areas. The results of such an exercise are expected to be integrated into current and planned policies, allocation of resources, utilisation and reorganisation of services and many other areas which would enhance health utilisation and improve the quality of service in administration, finance and actual delivery.

The subject matter of health systems research is two-fold. In the first instance its concerns are with quantities and distributions relating to consumers of health services, be they individuals, groups, communities or areas. While it also deals with the more traditional areas of mortality and morbidity it goes beyond to look into health behaviour, socioeconomic characteristics, health needs and resources, manpower and technologies. Secondly it addresses issues relating to the structures and processes wherein health is produced, managed and treated: policies, priorities and the need for balance in managerial and professional demands; and procedures on all the different levels from the individual to the national level.

The major tenets of Health Systems Research are that every country, no matter how poor, needs to conduct health systems research. This can enable it to better

understand its own problems, enhance the impact of resources, improve management, foster innovation and make a contribution to regional health issues.

It is quite evident that most of these subject areas, especially in the second category, are not in the field of traditional medical scientific research. Indeed there is such a sharp difference that followers of both the bio-medical and social sciences, in relating HSR to familiar practices, frequently ask whether it is research or science on the other hand, it is difficult for the majority of decision-makers and managers, whose expertise is acquired through practice and whose mode of operation is based on "gut feeling" or tradition to recognise that some issues are researchable and to see how research could contribute to their understanding, or to the modification and application of their practices.

The factors affecting health and health care go well beyond the health sector. If Health Systems Research were to confine itself to issues conventionally labelled "health" or "medicine" it would fall short of its major goal of providing a broader and deeper understanding of existing technologies and science in the areas of health and disease. It would not be in a position to tackle the factors that promote or hinder prevention, treatment and care, or to discover effective or efficient means of optimising health.

As Hippocrates clearly stated, changes are chiefly responsible for disease. It has been established that problems of poverty, nutrition, housing, pollution and life style (such as abuse of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, and promiscuity), are now major determinants of health. While some of the consequences could perhaps be mitigated within the health sector, prevention lies in other sections of the society and relates to culture and the economy. The actions of other government departments and local offices, for example those concerned with taxation policies and industrial and commercial practices are also crucial. Above all the activities of these departments need to be combined with educational and social services. Policies in all these sectors need to be analysed for their health implications.

It is very clear from the above that Health Systems Research inevitably requires multidisciplinary activity. It follows therefore that the research team must comprise people of different disciplines. Some people may have adequate knowledge in more than one discipline, but this is an exception to the rule. One

important aspect that needs to be seriously recognised is that scientists of different "persuasions" often find it difficult to accept, share and integrate each others' perspectives and knowledge. The practicalities of mobilising the necessary skills are formidable.

## **Health Systems Research in Southern Africa**

Following the international declaration, the WHO organised workshops in the Southern African region to promote HSR. The first workshop, held in 1987, primarily assessed health research in the different countries of the region. Delegates outlined the position of health research resources in their respective countries, as well as their achievements and needs. As would be expected the status of health research in these countries varied; some paid very little attention to health research, some recognised its importance and others placed more emphasis on epidemiology and medical research. After a week of intensive deliberations researchers felt they might have established some strategies for understanding health problems. This workshop was followed by training programmes and other workshops. Most of these have been intercountry workshops which in some instances have arrived at specific research assignments to be carried out in the various countries. Constant supervision has assured completion of studies.

Reports from countries at these periodic meetings have been used to assess progress in health systems research. Although in most cases one gets the impression that there has been increased recognition and acceptance of this approach, it is difficult to assess the quality and impact of health systems research nationally. Lack of progress is often not reported, while half-hearted attempts and failures rarely get publicised. In addition, the reporting focuses on research for health rather than health research for development.

## **Shortcomings and Criticisms**

The criticisms voiced about Health Systems Research for development ring familiar to social scientists. The main criticism concerns relevance, because it is

often argued that the perspectives are externally derived and therefore hardly appropriate. It is argued that the activities reflect the interests of the researchers from the north, who more often than not are founders, rather than the interest of the local health services and decision-makers. Furthermore it has been argued that the priorities often do not relate realistically to local health resources that are not immediately relevant to development issues. Yet the Health Systems Research aims to reduce costs, and to determine the impact of development on health; factors which are immediately relevant to development issues.

It is not surprising that one area most likely to come under fierce criticism is methodology and the conduct of research. Can you imagine trying to convince a statistician to consider talking to five people then generalising to a population of two hundred or so? Consensus also becomes a major obstacle, especially because of poor communication among researchers and between researchers, founders and services. Another major problem, which is not only confined to this HSR, is utilisation of the results.

The existence of the "application gap" raises fundamental questions among communities and the organisational structures responsible for health policy and services. In the eyes of its proponents, research is good and useful. But rightly or wrongly it may not have that image in the minds of action-oriented decision-makers and managers. They might see it as

- an esoteric and costly academic exercise;
- a barrier to action or an excuse to postpone action;
- a threat to existing plans and programmes.

The problem is that in reality bio-medical and clinical research predominates in most countries, and the mechanisms which would create an appropriate Health Systems Research mentality either do not exist or do not function properly. The public health concept may be supported verbally, but this does not necessarily result in action. Yet this concept not only ensures sustained health but also bears directly on development issues, as it allows communities to make decision on health.

Each of the Southern African countries has been exposed to the concept of Health Systems Research, but acceptance and application of the concept has varied. In most cases there is room for improvement. The question which needs to be asked is: do the 1990s seem to hold greater potential for drastic changes? There are of course no simple or universal solutions. Existing resources in funds, manpower and institutions, and the past and existing volume of research, differ in the various countries of the region.

The first consideration is strengthening HSR as a research and service strategy. A great volume of research has been done from this perspective, but much of what has been written is hidden in the fugitive literature. Furthermore it has to be accepted that the dominance of bio-medical science in research funding and practice will not change. It is a constraint within which HSR has to work. But more consideration should be given to attracting the bio-medical and allied professions to work within the framework of HSR. More importantly the HSR manpower capability should be strengthened.

This approach would strengthen health research and will enable the Southern African countries to strengthen health action. It would also help the most disadvantaged and accelerate progress towards the fundamental goal of equity in health.

# POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE 1980s AND BEYOND

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## Introduction

The relationship between population and development is a subject that has produced intensive and extensive debate since the eighteenth century, especially after Thomas Malthus presented his theory linking population change to subsistence (Thomlinson, 1965). Although Malthus's theory had a number of flaws, it provoked serious and intensive debates on the population-development nexus. Among his critics was Karl Marx, who called him an apologist for the capitalist system. Subsequent developments, however, indicate that the role population factors play in the development process has no ideological boundaries. Today, both communist/socialist and capitalist countries have acknowledged that population factors play an important role in the process of socioeconomic development, just as socioeconomic development plays an important role in enhancing the wellbeing of the population. Although they were first popularised in Western Countries, the strictest population management programmes in the world today is that of the Republic of China. Among other things, this programme requires that (except in a few circumstances) couples have only one child.

The developing countries have lagged behind in paying adequate attention to the role of population factors in development. In Africa, some people believe that our countries are sparsely populated and that more population is required to exploit the resources we have and to provide a market for our produce and products before we can achieve meaningful development. While others believe that rapid population growth frustrates our efforts to achieve socioeconomic development since it leads countries to devote almost all the national income to consumption,

retards investment in capital formation and stagnates output. Unemployment and related social and political disorders therefore occur.

It should be mentioned, however, that while the debate goes on we risk putting undue emphasis on one side of the relationship and forgetting that it is a complex one that requires the construction of complex analytical models that can take into account every relevant variable on population and socioeconomic development in order to come out with a situation which at one point in time can be regarded as ideal or optimal (Ahlburg, 1987; Lam, 1987; Wallis, 1987; Easterlin, 1980; King 1987). "One point in time" is stressed for the simple reason that both population and socioeconomic factors are dynamic to such an extent that what is optimal at a particular point in time may not hold after the passage of some time.

In spite of the complexity of the relationship, simple and suggestive indicators can be provided to show that population and development affect each other in a number of ways. This is the purpose of this paper. It covers the Southern African region.

The paper will first examine the effect of socioeconomic development on population and then the effect of population on development. Finally the overall demographic and socioeconomic situation in Southern Africa as well as the population and development implications for the region for the 1990s and beyond will be discussed. Given the inadequacy of data, the size of the region and the heterogeneity of its socioeconomic, cultural and political setup, it is difficult to carry out a satisfactory analysis of the situation pertaining to each country. Hence, the generalisations in this paper should be seen within this context.

### **The Influence of Socioeconomic Development on Population**

The influence of socioeconomic development on population is transmitted through the basic population factors of fertility, mortality and migration. When socioeconomic development is faster in some areas than in others, people move from the poorly developed areas to the better developed ones. This is reflected, for example, in the exceptionally rapid population growth rates of urban areas and in the large number of nationals who move out of their countries to countries where economic conditions are perceived to be relatively bearable compared to conditions in their home countries. For examples, see Prah's analysis of skilled

migrants to the Bantustans (Prah, 1989). Many professionals (teachers, doctors, nurses, etc.) have migrated from independent African countries to work in the Bantustans. This creates a braindrain.

While it is possible today to reduce death rates significantly without major socioeconomic development (by the use of antibiotics and insecticides; the evolution of effective public health organisation and programmes and the adoption of suitable low-cost methods of sanitation) investigations show that beyond a certain level, further reductions in mortality cannot be achieved unless substantial economic improvement takes place.

The relationship between fertility and socioeconomic development is somewhat complex because of the different mix in each society of social and cultural norms and values which initially support high fertility. However, if we take a few selected indicators of socioeconomic development such as education, employment opportunities in the modern sector (especially for women), overall increased status of women with respect to access to credit and income and improved health conditions - especially those which increase the survival of children -they generally turn out to be negatively related to fertility. Therefore, it can be argued that the overall effect of a balanced socioeconomic development process is to generate an acceptable redistribution of population, to reduce mortality and to influence fertility to drop to lower manageable levels.

### **The Influence of Population on Socioeconomic Development**

The influence of population on development is examined by discussing three population factors: size, growth rate and age structure. While a large population may eventually provide a large productive force and a market for products of the economy, it is difficult to determine the optimal size. Moreover, both population and the socioeconomic environment are so dynamic that at a given moment a population with a given size and in a given environment may be in a stage of diminishing returns if the population has not received skills through education and appropriate technology. Yet, if the same population in the same environment is given appropriate skills through education and access to technology, it may be of optimum size. Therefore, it is not merely a question of providing numbers to fill empty spaces but providing numbers in the right age group and with skills, knowledge and appropriate technology. High population density does not have a



direct relationship to economic development because there are many examples of densely populated countries which are developed, as well as many that are not developed, and examples of countries which are sparsely populated in both groups.

It has been shown that a high rate of population growth necessitates a higher level of investment to achieve a given per capita output. (see Coale and Hoover, 1958). Therefore, under normal circumstances, the burden of increasing or even maintaining the same level the population's per capita income is greater in a population with a higher growth rate than in one with a low or moderate one. In a rapidly growing population, the tendency to invest in duplicating consumption is very high and leads to limited investible resources (Mason, 1987; Swatz, 1987). Expansion in economic activity is constrained and undesirable elements such as unemployment crop in.

In the case of the age structure of a population, we assume that almost all population growth is through natural increase (i.e. the difference between births and deaths) and that the society receives new members as babies. These babies need to be fed, clothed, sheltered and educated for at least 15 years before they can become economically productive. This creates a high dependency burden or a high ratio of persons in a dependent status because of their age (too young to work) to persons of working age. This situation is typical of many African countries.

### **The Demographic Situation in Southern Africa**

Population growth rates in African countries are almost entirely generated by natural increase and they are the highest in the world. While the death rates have gradually declined in the last few decades, the birth rates are likely to remain almost constantly high over the next two to three decades (Table I and II). The growth rates generated by natural increase are high, ranging from 2,5% in Southern Africa to 3.1% per annum in Eastern and Western Africa; an average of 2.9% per annum for Africa as a whole for the period 1980-85 (Table III). These rates are likely to remain so for the rest of this century and the early part of the next century. This growth in the population of African countries warranted the ECA to state that the "historical trend scenario" of rapid population growth in Africa is "almost a nightmare", and that rapid population growth rates have serious implications on the economic growth of Africa (ECA, 1983). Because of the large

number of young people this type of population growth produces a high dependency burden. (Table IV). This implies an increased burden on African governments. For example, the demand for classrooms, teachers and teaching materials for education and food grows constantly. Yet the current rates of economic growth in these countries do not suggest that Africa is capable of coping with such a situation.

Although Southern Africa experiences the lowest population growth rate of all African regions (Table III), the rate is still extremely high compared to rates of 1.7% for the world and 0.6% and 2.0% for more developed and less developed regions respectively (1980-85). Within Southern Africa, the rates vary from 2.5% in South Africa to 3.8% in Botswana, and although they are projected to experience some decline over the period 1990 to 2005, they will remain quite high, ranging from 2.3% in South Africa to 3.6% in Botswana in 2005. This suggests that the region's population will double within the next 20 to 30 years.

Among the Southern African states, South Africa is the richest, with a Gross National Product of US\$2010 in 1985 compared with US\$870 for Namibia, US\$830 for Botswana, US\$740 for Swaziland and Lesotho for US\$470 in the same period. South Africa's economic dominance in the region is partly reflected by the number of labour migrants it receives from the neighbouring countries. While it gains cheaper and less militant labour, the neighbouring countries such as Lesotho lose an important proportion of the able-bodied male labour force. For example, out of approximately 714 000 members of the labour force in 1986, 166 000 were migrant workers to South Africa. The Basotho constitute about half of the foreign labour force in the gold mines (Table V and VI). In terms of gaining, Lesotho receives income in the form of remittances and deferred payments, which constitute about 55% of Lesotho's Gross National Product. What is lacking is an appropriate way of investing this money so that it generates more employment internally. This is especially necessary given the changing political conditions within South Africa which will require that country to provide attractive employment to its own population.

Some selected economic indicators suggest that while the population of the Southern African countries has continued to increase rapidly, food production has increased marginally or even stagnated, and that income per capita has stagnated or even declined (World Bank, 1990; ECA, 1990a). In Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, for example, food production has declined from an index of 100 in

1978-79 to 78 in Botswana, 87 in Lesotho and 89 in Swaziland in 1988 (ECA 1990:A2). In Namibia, real GDP growth has been in the range 2.6 to 3.1% during the period 1983 to 1987 (EIU 1988:2), rates which are not as consistently high as those of population growth. In South Africa, a country with the minority group enjoying the largest share of national income, the largest racial group lives in extremely poor conditions. While about 30% of the population had literacy rates of 70 to 80% for females and 69 to 87% for males in 1980, the majority of the population had 50% for females and 53% for males (South Africa, 1980: see Table VII for the racial composition). The number of pupils per teacher for primary and secondary schools were 18.7 for Whites, 28.9 for Coloureds, 25.0 for Asians and 47.5 for Blacks in the same period. Given the rapid growth of the black population, these rates are likely to grow worse in the 1990s.

### **Theoretical Framework and General Discussion**

This presentation utilises the theoretical postulates that arose from observing demographic change in a number of Western countries. The postulates are embodied within the theory of the "demographic transition". In brief, it is suggested that a country or society which is still in the agrarian stage or just emerging from it experiences very high mortality rates because of a number of factors (environmental, socioeconomic medical etc) which generate such undesirable consequences as famine and poor health. Because of the high mortality rates the societies develop norms and cultural values such as early marriage and abundant reproduction which lead to high fertility aimed at counterbalancing the effects of mortality.

After the agrarian stage, when farming techniques gradually improve, transportation and distribution networks develop, general knowledge, medical technology and health knowledge increase, the society enters the second stage, broadly called the transition stage. There is usually a decrease in the mortality rate but the values supporting high fertility take longer to change because children remain valuable social, cultural, economic and psychological assets. In other words, while the death rate declines the birth rate remains high leading to a high population growth rate. The Western Countries experienced 0.5 - 1% growth rate during the demographic transition while within the last 30 years Africa has experienced above 2% and sometimes as high as 4% (for example in Kenya). At

a later stage in the transition, as socioeconomic development intensifies, fertility declines and the gap between the birth and death rates narrows.

The third stage, termed the modern stage, is where the now modernised countries are. They have well developed agricultural, industrial, transportation and distribution systems, advanced medical technology and health knowledge. As a result they have gained high control over their survival (mortality levels are low), and couples or individuals (rather than culture or society) have acquired adequate control over their fertility and sexuality so that fertility rate is low.

The question is whether it makes sense for Africa or other developing regions to wait for over 100 years - the time it took the Western countries to evolve to the modern stage - or whether new ways should be adopted to accelerate the transition. Moreover, although the theoretical framework generally holds for the Western countries, exceptions did exist. Africa can borrow the medical technology and knowledge and ways of improving sanitation which took the Western countries long to develop. The more sensible course to take, therefore, is to manipulate the variable of fertility so that the birth rates will experience abrupt declines compatible with those of the death rates. This would somewhat temper the rapid growth rates we are currently experiencing. This suggests that while governments of developing countries make efforts to propel the process of socioeconomic development forward they should adopt programmes of responsible population management aimed at bringing the population growth rates in balance with our ability to generate socioeconomic development. Since the growth rates are already high, it is unlikely that substantial development will take place to reduce fertility without special population management intervention programmes.

Africa's socioeconomic problems are not only the result of rapid population growth rates but also a number of other factors such as stagnation of the productive sector, unfavourable terms of trade, high debt burden, poor social conditions, environmental degradation and political instability. Nevertheless, rapid population growth plays an important role in retarding government efforts to raise national income and consequent income per capita. According to the World Bank if Africa's population growth rates had declined since the early 1970s as has been the case in some parts of Asia (South Asia in particular), current per capita income might have been as much as 10% higher. But instead Africa has "witnessed an increasing dependency ratio and, more recently, a fall in the proportion of its

people who are literate, numerate, adequately fed and healthy, and this has an obvious negative effect on long-term productivity" (World Bank, 1989:25).

Moreover, rapid population growth leads to, among other things, a large number of new entrants to the labour market, increasing land shortage, ecological degradation and social and political tension. Therefore, population factors require well thought out management programmes to ensure that population change is favourable to national efforts to generate socioeconomic development.

Concerted efforts have been made by the ECA and the UN to emphasise the urgent need for member countries to give serious consideration to the population variables, and possibly to accord them the same importance as that given to other aspects of socioeconomic development such as agriculture and food production, industry and technology and foreign debt burden. (For example see UN, 1974; UN 1984; OAU 1985; ECA 1983; UNFPA 1989; Sadik 1990) Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are ranked by the ECA among countries with a high awareness of selected population issues (ECA, 1990b; Sembajwe, 1990). What has been lacking is an explicit population policy to guide the governments in their population management efforts. It is, therefore, hoped that the 1990s will see the formulation and official acceptance of explicit population policies although each country must align its policies to its own culture and socioeconomic circumstances. What would be required to form common elements of these policies are:

1. The commitment of national leaders to the reduction of the rapid population growth rates;
2. The availability of family planning services;
3. The need for a public education programme that links population growth to long-term socio interests as well as to benefits for individual families. (Sembajwe, 1987).

The situation for Namibia is not yet clear since it has just achieved independence. But given the fact that its problems are similar to those countries discussed above, it is imperative that the government of Namibia think seriously about an explicit population policy for the 1990s.

For South Africa, it is reiterated that it needs to continue a programme of reform and economic improvement that favours the black majority. (Anderson and Blake, 1984). Improvements in their literacy, labour skills, job opportunities and freedom of movement and expression should be seen as necessary elements in the process of greater socioeconomic development for the Republic of South Africa. As efforts are made to improve conditions, the government needs a well thought out population management programme to counteract the effects of the high population growth rate.

What has the South African government done so far in the population field? According to Simkins (1990) in 1974 (the World Population Year) the government adopted an official countrywide family planning programme. The approach consisted of the supply-side measures which emphasised the supply of the means to control fertility (Ibid 215). The creation of the Department of National Health and Population Development in the late 1980s, with a mandate to implement a Population Development Programme (PDP) brought about a change in this approach. The policy became broad-based because it incorporated demand-side measures which concentrate on the determinants of demand for fertility control. These include socioeconomic developmental variables such as organisation of production, education, the status of women, as well as mortality and migration.

In all the states discussed, including South Africa which is relatively more industrialised, agriculture still provides the livelihood of the largest proportion of the population. It is therefore imperative that the governments of Southern Africa encourage and facilitate technological innovations in agriculture because population pressure alone is not enough for sustained technological change (Boserup 1965; 1981). Moreover, indigenous technical change is usually confounded by such factors as lack of adaptive learning, capital accumulation and high population growth. (Pingah and Binswanger 1987; Hayami and Ruttan 1987:93). For countries that supply migrant labour, the 1990s will be a period for making concerted efforts to create employment internally, both for the labour migrants who are going to be displaced by South Africans as the political situation in that country stabilises, and the large number of new entrants to the labour market. Lesotho, which sends the largest group of labour migrants to South Africa, faces the greatest challenge in this respect.

## Conclusion and Directions for the 1990s

Available evidence clearly indicates that Africa is a region with the highest population growth rates in the world. Although population growth rates for Southern Africa are among the lowest for Africa, they are very high by world standards (far higher than rates for more developed and other less developed regions). Despite the complex nature of the relationship between population and socioeconomic growth, it has been suggested that the rapid growth rates of population for the region have, and will continue to have, negative effects on the socioeconomic development process of the region.

The need for responsible population management programmes as well as similar programmes for agriculture, industry, trade, environmental management, debt management and political stability has been highlighted. For the population factors, it has been pointed out that while South Africa continues to implement its broad-based population policy and to remove barriers which prevent the majority of its population from participating in all areas of political and socioeconomic development, the other countries in the region should treat the need to formulate explicit population policies for guiding the management of their populations as one of the priorities for the 1990s.

The changing political environment in South Africa suggests the need for neighbouring countries which are still sending a significant proportion of their labour force there to increase the rate at which they create internal opportunities of employment.

It is, generally accepted that while concerted efforts in the socioeconomic development arena may invoke the demographic transition effects over a long-term perspective, we do not have the luxury of the 100 years and more the West had to experience the transition. We need the support of responsible population management programmes to shorten the transition period.

Finally, it is recommended that there is a need for research in the 1990s and beyond in the area of population. It is accepted that currently available data provide enough evidence to guide policy formulation. But as the policies are implemented, there will be a need to carry out research for monitoring programme implementation, success and resulting need to provide corrective measures.

**Table I: Birth Rates for Major Regions and Southern African States**

Area	Birth Rates (Per 1000)					
	1980/ 1985	1985/ 1990	1990/ 1995	1995/ 2000	2000/ 2005	2005/ 2010
World	27.1	26.0	25.0	23.8	22.3	21.0
More Developed Regions	15.5	15.1	14.6	14.1	13.8	13.7
Less Developed Regions	31.0	29.4	28.1	26.5	24.4	22.7
Africa	45.9	45.2	43.9	42.2	40.1	37.5
Eastern Africa	49.4	49.1	48.2	46.8	44.7	41.6
Middle Africa	44.7	44.5	44.0	42.8	41.0	38.3
Northern Africa	39.3	36.5	32.8	29.4	26.3	23.9
Southern Africa	39.6	38.8	37.3	35.4	33.3	31.1
Western Africa	49.2	49.2	48.4	47.2	45.1	42.2
Southern African States: Botswana	49.9	48.8	47.1	45.6	43.8	41.2
Lesotho	41.8	41.2	40.2	39.0	37.2	34.8
Namibia	45.1	44.9	44.2	43.0	41.2	38.4
South Africa	38.7	37.9	36.3	34.2	32.0	29.8
Swaziland	47.3	47.1	46.3	45.3	43.6	41.1

Source: United Nations, 1986. *World Population Prospects; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984*. pp.78-79.



**Table II: Death Rates for Major Regions and Southern African States**

Area	Death Rates (Per 1000)					
	1980/ 1985	1985/ 1990	1990/ 1995	1995/ 2000	2000/ 2005	2005/ 2010
World	10.5	9.9	9.3	8.8	8.5	8.3
More Developed Regions	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.8	10.2
Less Developed Regions	10.8	10.0	9.3	8.7	8.2	7.9
Africa	16.6	15.1	13.7	12.3	11.1	9.9
Eastern Africa	18.3	16.9	15.4	13.8	12.4	11.0
Middle Africa	17.7	16.2	14.8	13.4	12.1	10.8
Northern Africa	12.3	10.5	9.0	7.9	7.0	6.6
Southern Africa	14.2	12.9	11.7	10.5	9.5	8.5
Western Africa	18.3	16.7	15.2	13.7	12.3	10.8
Southern African States						
Botswana	12.6	11.3	10.1	9.0	7.9	7.0
Lesotho	16.5	15.2	13.8	12.6	11.4	10.2
Namibia	17.3	15.9	14.5	13.2	11.8	10.5
South Africa	13.9	12.7	11.5	10.3	9.3	8.4
Swaziland	17.2	15.8	14.4	13.0	11.6	10.3

Source: United Nations, 1986. *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984*. pp.90-91.

**Table III: Annual Rates of Change for Regions and Southern African States**

Area	Annual Rates of Change (%)					
	1980/ 1985	1985/ 1990	1990/ 1995	1995/ 2000	2000/ 2005	2005/ 2010
World	1.67	1.63	1.58	1.51	1.38	1.27
More Developed Regions	0.64	0.60	0.56	0.52	0.45	0.39
Less Developed Regions	2.01	1.94	1.88	1.78	1.62	1.48
Africa	2.92	3.02	3.03	2.99	2.91	2.76
Eastern Africa	3.10	3.24	3.30	3.24	3.06	2.79
Middle Africa	2.71	2.84	2.92	2.94	2.89	2.75
Northern Africa	2.64	2.59	2.38	2.15	1.93	1.74
Southern Africa	2.54	2.59	2.57	2.49	2.38	2.26
Western Africa	3.12	3.26	3.32	3.35	3.29	3.14
Southern African States:						
Botswana	3.82	3.70	3.66	3.63	3.59	3.43
Lesotho	2.52	2.61	2.64	2.65	2.59	2.46
Namibia	2.78	2.91	2.97	2.99	2.94	2.79
South Africa	2.48	2.53	2.49	2.39	2.28	2.14
Swaziland	3.02	3.14	3.20	3.23	3.20	3.09

Source: United Nations, 1986. *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections Assessed in 1984*. pp.54-55.

**Table IV: Broad Age Structure and Dependency Ratios (1990)**

Area	Percentage in Age Group			Dependency Ratio
	< 15	15-64	65+	
World	31.9	62.0	6.2	61.3
More Developed Regions	27.7	66.6	11.7	50.3
Less Developed Regions	34.9	60.6	4.5	64.9
Africa	45.3	51.7	3.0	93.3
Eastern Africa	47.2	50.2	2.6	99.1
Middle Africa	44.5	52.2	3.3	91.5
Northern Africa	41.2	55.2	3.6	81.1
Southern Africa	41.6	54.5	3.9	83.4
Western Africa	47.4	50.0	2.6	100.0
Southern African States:				
Botswana	49.4	48.5	2.1	106.1
Lesotho	42.6	53.8	3.6	85.8
Namibia	44.8	52.0	3.2	92.3
South Africa	40.0	55.9	4.1	78.9
Swaziland	46.5	50.6	3.0	97.8

Source: United Nations, 1986. *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984*. pp.140-223.

**Table V: Black Labour in Gold Mines, 1980-1985 (000)\***

Area	1980	1985
From Outside SA	183(44)	195(43)
From SA	233(56)	256(57)
TOTAL	416(100)	451(57)

\* The figures for South Africa include workers for Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; The figures in brackets are in percentages.

Source: *Sunday Times (Business Times)*. September 28, 1986, p.3. (Taken from latest Chamber of Mines Statistics).

**Table VI: Foreign Black Labour in Gold Mines, 1980-1985  
(000)\***

Country	Year	
	1980	1985
Lesotho	96(52)	98(50)
Botswana	18(10)	18(10)
Swaziland	8(4)	12(6)
Mozambique	40(22)	50(26)
Malawi	14(8)	17(9)
Zimbabwe	6(3)	0(0)
Others	1(1)	0(0)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>195</b>

\* The figures in brackets are in percentages.

Source: *Sunday Times (Business Times)*. September 28, 1986:3. (Taken from the latest Chamber of Mines Statistics).

**Table VII: Racial Compositions of South Africa**

Year	Total Population (millions)%	Asians	Blacks	Coloureds	Whites
1904	5.2	2.4	67.5	8.6	21.6
1951	12.7	2.9	67.6	8.7	20.9
1970	21.8	2.9	70.4	9.4	17.3
2000	47.6	2.7	73.5	9.8	13.8
2020	72.7	2.3	75.6	10.1	12.0

Source: Anderson and Blake (1984:25).

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# THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF LABOUR IN LESOTHO: PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

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## Introduction

In the economic sense, self-sustaining development ought to make "people in general better-off by increasing their command over goods and services and by increasing the choices open to them" (Elkan 1973:15). For the purpose of the discussion that follows, it is important to stress that the human resources of a country constitute a critical cooperant factor of production, without which such other inputs as accumulated capital and natural resources cannot produce the desirable effect of fostering human welfare. A necessary adjunct to this is the fact that it is the quality rather than the sheer quantity of the human resources of a country that is central to the generation of directly productive labour. The productivity of labour can thus best be assured through the inculcation of skills and knowledge in the population by articulated education and training programmes. An important footnote to this is however the fact that high quality labour is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for attaining the desirable level of labour productivity.

In addition to skills, the necessary socioeconomic environment must exist for labour to effectively and efficiently exert its creative potential towards increasing output. In this regard, there must also be employment possibilities, a favourable working environment, adequate pecuniary and other incentives and a reasonable degree of equity in the distribution of the fruits of labour. Thus, development efforts should be geared towards the generation of adequate employment

opportunities such that citizens can apply themselves to both socially and personally rewarding preoccupations. This should also make the distribution of income fairly equitable.

The corollary to this is that any development strategy that does not generate a reasonably high quantum of employment would be characterised by greater disguised or open unemployment as the large proportion of the workforce would be engaged in what Ropper (1958:31) described as "defensive labour" with its attendant low levels of living. Meaningful manpower development should attempt to match skills to the requirements of the economy as defined in relation to available natural resource endowments. Here, the principle of comparative cost advantage becomes handy.

The labour situation in Lesotho will be discussed within the ambit of the above conceptual framework. However, in order to put the subject in a proper perspective, it is necessary to present a brief *resume* of the economic context of labour supply and demand in Lesotho.

### **The Economic Context of Labour Supply and Demand in Lesotho**

In Lesotho, labour demand and supply can best be appreciated within the context of its natural resource potential and physical environment. Being a mountainous country, Lesotho is characterised by a severe shortage of arable land and exploitable mineral resources (Ecket and Wykstra 1979:15; Cobbe 1977:452). The severity of landlessness is evidenced by the fact that in 1986, 25,4% of rural households were landless as compared to 12,7% in 1970 (Bureau of Statistics 1990:57; Kingdom of Lesotho 1986: 20). It has also been stated that only 13% of the land is cultivable and this is largely located in the west of the country where population densities are in the region of 200 per square kilometre as compared to the national average of 45 (Braby 1989:35). Despite this situation, available evidence suggests that 28% of households depend on agriculture as their main source of income and about 66% of currently employed members of the labour force are engaged in this sector (Kingdom of Lesotho 1986:221; Bureau of Statistics 1986). Agriculture contributes 21% to GDP, 9% to GNP and about 50% to total exports. (BOS 1990; Braby, 1989). Lesotho also lacks an industrial base

and the growth of manufacturing "has been erratic" since 1966 (Kingdom of Lesotho 1986:43).

Given these circumstances, employment generation has remained an arduous task, a disproportionately large component of the country's productive labour makes a beeline to South Africa for employment at higher wages. It is thus estimated that 36% of Basotho households rely on miners' remittances as their main source of income, just as the government itself relies heavily on miners' remittances for its sustenance. For instance, it has been pointed out that "The value of miners' remittances in the balance of payments was estimated at M583,6 million in 1986 and contributed about 48% to GNP (Bureau of Statistics 1990:57).

Of very great significance and relevance to Lesotho's economic survival is also the fact that its geographical and ecological circumstances have made the country very highly dependent on South Africa. Not only is it a market for South African goods and services, but also wages and prices, interest rates, customs receipts and exchange rates are all determined by the economic trends in South Africa (see 4th Plan pp. 19,23,43; JASPA 1979:1). Moreover, the landlocked nature of the country has grave implications for transport and communication and the conduct of international trade which, in any event, are unavoidably also currently controlled by South Africa.

Given this scenario, the development and utilisation of Lesotho's human resources must invariably be made in the light of the absorptive capacity and the employment generation potentials of the economy, and the international migrant labour situation.

### **The Stock of Human Resources and the Absorptive Capacity of the Economy**

The Second Five-Year Development Plan 1975-80 (p.42) portrayed Lesotho as possessing a "reservoir of human resources". This conclusion was drawn from the fact that out of the *de jure* population of 1,2 million in 1975, about 664 000 (or 55%) were of working age (15-64). Of these about 540 000 (representing 45% of the total population and 81% of the population of working age) were estimated to be employed at home and abroad. The plan then quickly hedged this seemingly impressive activity level with the reservation that "---it should not be taken as an

indication of a satisfactory employment situation". The reasons adduced for this were that most of the employed worked outside Lesotho, particularly in the South African mines, and even among the resident labour force, most were engaged in the low productivity and low income generating agricultural sector.

In general, therefore, a clearer picture of quality of available manpower can be obtained by classifying the working population according to occupation and area of expertise.

### *Manpower and Employment Situation*

No other nation experiences the same percentage of its labour force working abroad, the degree of dependency on foreign employment for its national income or the drain of its male labour force domestically. Similarly, few countries, if any, have domestic economies that employ relatively so little of their own labour force. (Eckert and Wykstra. 1979:1).

Given the peculiar employment situation in Lesotho, as summarised in the above quotation, one immediately comes to grips with the significance of international migrant labour in the analysis of Lesotho's manpower situation. Commenting on Lesotho's employment situation, the Second Five-Year Development Plan (p.42) identified the problem of inadequate utilisation of the country's human resources which it attributed to "the lack of opportunities for productive labour" which, in turn, "has led to massive outflows of Basotho to work elsewhere in the Southern African region". The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (p.213) however draws attention to the important fact that "Lesotho has a relatively small stock of skilled manpower in the midst of abundance of unskilled labour", while the Third Five-Year Plan (p.84) points to the fact that even this relatively small number of skilled labour is largely "attracted by higher wages to South Africa".

In attempting to analyse the above points statistically, one is however confronted with the difficulty that "comprehensive and detailed figures on Lesotho's

manpower situation are not available" (Fourth Plan, p.213 ) and hence "the employment situation in Lesotho is difficult to access---". (Second Plan, p.43) The analyses that follow will rely largely on an attempt to draw together thin threads of available labour statistics from various sources, the most recent of which is the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey (Bureau of Statistics). It should however be pointed out that the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey includes the people aged 12 years and above in the economically active population. This does not synchronise with the concept of the population of working age (15-64); nor does it allow much room for comparison with other data sources. Moreover, the survey adopted two methods of deriving information on the economically active population. The "gainfully occupied" approach sought information on "usual" activities engaged in within the 12 months preceding the survey while the "labour force" approach sought information on activities engaged in during the week prior to the survey. The latter approach understandably reports a much higher figure (716 270) of economically active persons than the former (623 384). The following section examines data from the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey based on both the current and usual status of economically active population.

(a) *Economically Active Population*

Over time, the *de jure* population of working age in Lesotho has constituted about 55% of the total population. The results of the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey show that out of the usually economically active population 72% of the population was of working age in 1986. They further show that out of the usually active population of 623 384, 73% (or 457 740) were in Lesotho while 27% (or 165 644) were outside. Of those inside, 69% were employed as compared to 99,4% of those outside (Table I). It is also evident from Table I that of the employed usually active population (i.e. 316 181) who were in the country, 35% were paid employees on regular salary/wages, 34% were own-account workers, 17% unpaid family workers, 10% casual and "other" workers and 4% were employers. In contrast, 96,2% of their counterparts outside (165 644) were paid employees on regular salary/wages. 73% (or 121 450) of the usually active population outside Lesotho in 1986 worked in the mines of South Africa.

**Table I: Usually Economic Active Population by Employment Status (1985/86)**

	Inside Lesotho	Migrants Outside
Employment Status		
1. Paid Employees on regular salary/wages	110 244	159 303
2. Casual Workers and Others	31 855	3 226
3. Employer	14 010	275
4. Own-account workers	107 416	1 604
5. Unpaid family workers	52 208	169
6. Members of producer cooperatives	448	-
7. Unemployed	141 559	1 067
Total Labour Force (12 + years) =	457 559	165 644

Source: Bureau of Statistics. *The Labour Force Survey 1985/86*, Maseru, 1989.



**Table II: Labour Force (Usually Economically Active Population 12+yrs)  
Distribution (1985/86)**

	MALE		FEMALE		BOTH	
	empl.	unempl.	empl.	unempl.	empl.	unempl.
1. Workers 141 559 inside Lesotho	166 307		87 979	149 872	53 580	316 182
2. Migrant workers outside Lesotho	153 683	702	10 894		365 164 577	1 067
Total:	319 990	88 681	160 769	53 945	480 759	142 626

Source: Bureau of Statistics. *The Labour Force Survey 1985/86*, Maseru, 1989.

**Table III: Current Employment by Area of Expertise/Occupation Category  
(Percentage Distribution)**

Occupation	% Currently employed in Lesotho
1. Professional, technical and related fields	1.3
2. Administrative and managerial	0.3
3. Clerical and related fields	1.6
4. Sales workers	2.8
5. Service workers	17.9
6. Agriculture and related workers	66.4
7. Production, transport and related fields	8.5
8. Inadequately defined	1.3
Total Number Employed	716 987*

Note: \* The figure includes some migrant workers present in the household (717). Otherwise the figure is 716 270 for currently employed within Lesotho.

Source: Bureau of Statistics. *The Labour Force Survey, 1985/86.*

Table II further indicates that 35% of the male and 26% of the female usually active population inside the country were unemployed in 1986. This compares with only 0,5% of males and 3% of females outside.

Data on current employment (Table III) shows that agriculture and related fields accounted for about 66% (or about 474 000) of total current employment (of 716 270). This is followed, but not too closely, by the services sector (18%). Overall, the point has been made that the majority of the workforce in Lesotho is involved in poorly paid activities (See Second Plan:42).

(b) *The Demand For and Supply of Skills in the Modern Sector*

An important and relevant issue which is not evident in the data discussed above relates to the quality of labour. As the Fourth Development Plan (p.190) rightly observes, skilled manpower is concentrated in the modern sector, which employed only a small proportion (about 6%) of the total labour force in 1980. All the same, the Plan notes that "employment in the modern sector is characterised by acute shortage of managerial, professional, technical, craft and other production levels of skills in all spheres of economic activity". An indication of the level of skill shortage may be discerned from Table III which shows that, taken together, professional, technical, administrative and managerial occupations accounted for only 1,6% of the currently employed workers in the country. Similarly Table IV shows that in government salaried jobs requiring mathematics/science-based professional and technical skills (500), 25% of the jobs were held by Basotho and 43% by expatriates while 32% of the jobs remained unfilled. In contrast, in non-mathematics/science based sub-professional, skilled or semi-skilled fields, the proportion of Basotho employees rises to about 70% while the proportion of expatriate employees drops to 1% or less. What is however pertinent is that even in those job categories in which the Basotho are fairly well represented, the vacancy rates are still as high as 30% (see also Table V.) Table VI not only points to higher levels of employment in industry (both private and parastatals) than in the government service but also shows that in industry, just as in government service, the Basotho do not feature significantly at the professional/technical levels of employment. They maintain greater representation (than non-citizens) in the other employment categories (i.e. sub-professional, skilled/semi-skilled and unskilled.)

**Table IV: Salaried Employment in Government Ministries/Departments  
According to Areas of Skill and Citizenship Vacancies  
(1984/85)**

Skill Categories	No of Jobs Held by Basotho	No of Jobs Held by Expatriates	Vacancies	Total No of Jobs Provisions
1. Maths/Science-Based Professional and Technical	126 25%	215 43%	159 32%	500 100%
2. Maths/Science-Based Sub-Professional and Technical	742 52%	96 7%	585 41%	1 423 100%
3. Non-Maths/Science-Based Professional and Technical	417 40%	345 33%	284 27%	1 046 100%
4. Non-Maths/Science-Based Sub-Professional and Technical	606 68%	11 1%	273 31%	890 100%
5. Skilled Office and Manual Jobs	1 739 69%	22 1%	770 31%	2 531 100%
6. Semi-skilled ad. and Manual Jobs	1 843 72%	-	706 28%	2 549 100%
7. Unskilled Jobs	2 268 89%	-	285 11%	2 553 100%
TOTALS	7 741	689	3 062	11 492

Source: Computed from Table 16.12 (Appendix), *Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91)*, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development, Maseru, p.225.

**Table V : Salaried Employment in Government Ministries/Departments  
(1984/85)**

Ministry/ Department	Total No of Jobs	No of Jobs Filled	Vacancies	Vac- rate %
1. Agriculture & Marketing	2 504	1 979	525	21
2. Health	1 697	1 210	487	29
3. Education, Sports & Culture	725	521	204	28
4. Finance	908	692	216	24
5. Trade & Industry	135	105	30	22
6. Planning & Economic Affairs	480	356	124	26
7. Justice and Prisons	939	865	75	8
8. Interior	723	461	262	36
9. Office of Military Council	829	609	220	27
10. Information & Broadcasting	170	137	33	19
11. Foreign Affairs	108	94	14	13
12. Works	614	343	271	44
13. Transport & Communication	623	421	202	32
14. Coop & Rural Development	539	286	253	47
15. Water, Energy & Mining	323	201	122	38
16. Audit Office	49	32	17	35
17. His Majesty's Office	52	51	1	2
18. National Assembly	54	48	6	11
19. Public Service Commission	20	19	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>11 492</b>	<b>8 430</b>	<b>3 062</b>	<b>24.5%</b>

Source: Table 16.1 *Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1986/87 - 1990/91)*  
Vol.1, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development,  
Maseru, p.192.

**Table VI: Private and Parastatal Employment by Industry, Occupational Group and Citizenship 1980**

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	T		I
	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	C NC	T	
Professional & Technical	- 1	1 3	3 21	2 -	- -	4 10	4 40	20 2	34 76	110	30.91
Other Professional	71 29	6 5	60 33	1 5	2 7	10 5	106 62	12 3	268 149	419	64.27
Sub-Professional & Technician	2 1	2 5	19 5	- -	1 -	1 3	39 26	50 8	114 48	162	70.37
Other Sub-Professional	- -	- -	- -	- -	3 45	- -	- -	- -	3 45	48	6.25
Skilled Office & Manual	298 45	134 1	221 107	1023 84	101 39	94 10	676 28	145 16	2692 330	3022	89.08
Semi-Skilled Office & Manual	1180 -	67 -	1552 30	4838 36	455 -	241 -	35 -	57 6	8425 72	8497	99.15
Unskilled	2280 -	263 -	2542 -	2558 -	807 -	288 -	297 -	147 -	9132 -	9182	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>3831 75</b>	<b>473 14</b>	<b>4397 196</b>	<b>8442 125</b>	<b>1369 91</b>	<b>638 28</b>	<b>1167 156</b>	<b>431 35</b>	<b>20718 720</b>		<b>21438</b>

Note: C - Citizen, NC - Noncitizen, T - total for both C & NC.  
A - Manufacturing, B - Utilities Electricity only, C - Construction.  
D - Wholesale and Retail trade, E - Restaurants, Hotels, Tourism.  
F - Transport, G - Business Service, Insurance and Banking.  
H - Other services excluding no-profit Health Institutions.  
I - Localised position (citizen %).

Source: Fourth National Development Plan, Table 16:15.

It is important to note that in spite of the fact that private sector employers (particularly in the medium-sized and large firms) are often more willing than the government to pay higher wages to obtain the required cadre of employees, they also suffer from skills shortages (c.f. Cobbe 1977:454). This fact was evident from Jone's (1979) study of personnel requirements in selected vocational and middle level technical occupations and in selected professional, managerial and administrative middle-level occupations. His findings (pp.49-52) show that in the former category of occupations, out of a total of 2 346 jobs, 84% were occupied by Basotho, 6% by non-Basotho and 10% were vacant. Similarly in the latter category of occupations, 80% of the total establishment (3 516) was filled by Basotho and 9% by non-Basotho, with 11% remaining vacant.

While these findings corroborated the pattern observed earlier (Table IV) for government salaried jobs with regard to middle-level skills, there are significantly higher response rates and lower vacancy rates in the private sector than in government service. The wage-incentive factor seems to lie at the root of this difference. In general, however, the point should be made that in spite of the relative positions of the private and public sectors in terms of wage payments, which gives a certain advantage to the former over the latter with regard to skill recruitment, the inability of both to meet their skill requirements may be attributed to three factors. Firstly, since wages are generally lower in Lesotho than in South Africa, skills migrate to South Africa and this is a legitimate economic response. Secondly, the output from the various technical and vocational schools is, at the moment, not adequate to contend with both the domestic skill demand and the skill flight to South Africa. Finally, some of the skilled personnel within the country choose to remain as own-account workers rather than work for an organisation.

(c) *Job-Generation in the Economy: Needs and Constraints*

The coexistence of a shortage of skills, vacancies and unemployment reflects the degree of distortion in the development and utilisation of manpower. This situation poses a grave challenge to the government in terms of evolving and implementing salient strategies that would lead to an increase in the stock and retention rate of productive labour and the generation of adequate employment opportunities. In the case of Lesotho, the question of employment creation is compounded by the possibility of South Africa phasing out the migratory labour system. The anticipation that the employment in South Africa will continue to decline and may eventually be phased out is predicated on the following factors:

- (a) South African internalisation policy aimed at replacing migrants;
- (b) the status of the homelands as an alternative source of cheap labour;
- (c) possibilities of an increasing application of labour-saving technology in the mining industry, and
- (d) increased unemployment within South Africa (c.f. ILO/SATEP 1987; Fourth Plan: 194).

A test case for the magnitude of employment requirements in the event of massive migrant labour return was the "sudden return of about 10 000 workers within a short period of time in early 1974, resulting from particularly violent disturbances in some Southern African mine-labour compounds" (Cobbe 1977:455). Under such circumstances, there would naturally emerge a revolution of rising expectation on the part of the returnees that the government would help them out by providing them with alternative means of livelihood. Cobbe however noted that in 1974 this was not forthcoming and the returners either rapidly drifted off from the capital to their rural places or returned to a new migrant job in South Africa. The government itself realises the possibility of such an eventuality occurring again and the need to plan how to accommodate it. Thus the Fourth Plan (p.194) notes that "If the migratory labour system is eventually phased out alternative employment opportunities for the migrant labour will have to be found in Lesotho". The enormity of the problem becomes even more glaring given the fact that "the wage sector in Lesotho is very small and the rate of job creation is very low". In this regard, only a small fraction of migrants who have acquired a few



skills on-the-job can be absorbed into the relatively few job openings available in the modern sector. The rest, together with the mass of unskilled returners, would either be left to ponder the irony of their fate or would be offered an alternative job that would offer far less pay than their previous jobs. They could for example, be used in labour-intensive programmes to carry out public works. This programme was in fact initiated in the aftermath of the 1974 experience on the basis of the recommendation made by "an international interagency financed by UNDP and consisting mainly of World Bank personnel with ILO and FAO members" (Cobbe 1977:455). The recommendation included the creation of a Labour Intensive Construction Unit. The government initiated this experiment during the Second Five-Year Development Plan period as a means of job creation by using labour-intensive technique in the execution of such public works as road-building, soil conservation, establishment of woodlots and construction of fish ponds (Second Plan, p.46). The programme was however confined to food-for-work in the construction and improvement of roads and access track construction and soil conservation works. It was estimated that some 13 500 persons (of which 80% were females) were involved in the programme "at any given point in a year". Given the facts that the employment was seasonal and remuneration made in kind it is doubtful whether this programmes would be sufficient to stem the kind of disequilibrating forces that could be unleashed on the economy in the event of a mass return of migrant workers a situation that would require a lot more than a palliative. Even among the resident population who participated in it, it appears to have served as a useful stopgap during the off-peak farming season and it had to be mounted during such seasons in order for it to work. It is equally doubtful whether it would attract much response (even in the face of their predicament) from returnees who have been accustomed to earning pecuniary returns for their labour. For the programme to be reasonably effective, some cash-wage must be tagged onto it and it must be institutionalised. It would serve a very useful purpose in the face of the limitations on the employment generation capacity of the modern sector of the economy. For instance, the bottlenecks to effective implementation of the government's avowed policy of encouraging the development of manufacturing as a means of creating employment opportunities have been identified to include:

- shortage of natural resources;
- scarcity of export markets and the small size of the domestic market;

- the fact that problems of transport and communication, arising largely from the landlocked nature of Lesotho, hamper transfer of goods;
- the great lead of South Africa in the manufacturing field makes competition difficult within the customs union market;
- the overvaluation of the rand.

(See ILO 1978:2; ECA 1978: 329).

The implications of these macro-economic problems affecting job generation within the modern sector of the economy are thrown into bold relief when one attempts to match employment generation targets with estimated achievements. A glaring example is the abysmal underfulfilment of the rather ambitious employment - generation targets set in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-80). Given that the labour force was estimated to increase from about 540 000 to 600 000, the plan objective was the creation of 60 000 new jobs during the 1975-80 period, out of which 18 500 would be in the modern sector comprising manufacturing, building and construction, civil engineering, tourism, mining, the services sector and the public services. Burke (1981:65) however noted that three years into the plan, only 1 697 jobs had been added in the private sector in the following proportions - industry (36 %), commerce (16 %), tourism (8 %) and mines (40 %).

This situation of gross underfulfilment is also the case with the parastatals - the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) and the Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO). Burke (*Ibid.* 67-75) identified the following internal problems faced by both agencies: job selection, administration, performance and disappointing loan-grants experience and returns on investment (BEDCO was said to be more progressive than LNDC with respect to job selection, loans and returns). These difficulties exert negative effects on the job-generation potentials of the two agencies. Although Burke noted the difficulty of assessing the employment generated by LNDC because of "data problems", she however managed to arrive at a total employment figure of 2 251 in 39 companies as at May 1981. This compares with a figure of 3 800 Basotho employees in 1976

(after nine years of its operation) produced by Cobbe (1977:455) and another figure of 1 975 new jobs between 1975 and 1977 deriving from the joint venture contract between LNDC and Chinese investors (ECA 1978: 326).

The purpose of presenting these figures is simply to underscore the abject situation of indeterminacy of the real employment generation capacity of the corporation due to lack of data. But more importantly, the few data available at LNDC in regard to the employment potentials to companies are in fact based on both approved and already operational projects. Such estimates are bound to be unreliable since some of the approved projects may never actually be put into effect or they may be delayed, while some operational ones might fail even before they get to the stage at which projections had been made in regard to their employment capacity.

BEDCO, on the other hand, was reported to have created 780 jobs in 69 companies between 1979 and May 1981 (Burke 1981:71) in the following proportions in such major areas including clothing (26%), construction materials (19%), furniture and upholstery (12%) and retail food and restaurants (12%). These four areas accounted for 70% of total new jobs. Many more projects were, and continue to be, envisioned for the future but here again employment generation potentials of the companies depend largely on their resilience in standing up to competition from goods imported from South Africa as well as their ability to overcome the internal difficulties which confront them (as listed earlier). As BEDCO itself had earlier pointed out, "the single most serious constraint on growth and survival of small scale industry under the BEDCO umbrella, is the lack of basic work skills in the available labour force-- the most numerous and pressing shortages lie in the following areas: woodworking, metalwork, dressmaking, machine knitting and tailoring" (Burke, p.73). Thus if they did not have the requisite skills to man the companies in the first instance, the objective of employment generation by the companies would remain elusive.

### **An Assessment of Efforts Towards Meeting the Middle and High-level Manpower Requirements**

It is widely acknowledged that education and training are veritable instruments of skill development and improvement. The government of Lesotho has, since

independence, paid significant attention to the education sub-sector judging from the fact that 20-23% of the total recurrent budget between 1981-85 was allocated to it.

In assessing the impact of the government's investment in education and manpower development, one is struck by the rather high rates of attrition and wastage as well as the low levels of performance at the primary and secondary school levels, which incontrovertibly constitute the bedrock of the educational system. There is also the added problem of the considerably higher enrolment of girls than boys in schools, as most school-age male children continue to play their traditional role as herdboys.

Available education statistics show that up to the mid-1980s, the wastage rate between standards 1 and 7 (primary school) was as high as between 55 and 65%. Of those who eventually passed the standard 7 examination (usually 75% of those who took the examination) about 70% enrolled in Form A of secondary school. At this level, the wastage rate between Form A and C is about 40%. Between 60 and 70% of those who eventually get to Form C pass the Junior Certificate examination, out of which 40% or more proceed to Form E and 85% of these finally get to Form E. The rather worrisome development at this stage is the fact that only a third of the candidates for the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate (COSC) obtain a pass grade. Worse still for instance only 4% and 10% of the 3 126 candidates who passed the examination in 1989 were in the Division 1 and 2 categories of pass respectively while 62% were in the GCE category, which is actually not a pass grade (for more details, see Okore, 1990). The implication of this poor level of performance is that relatively few candidates are qualified for entry into National Teachers Training College (NTTC), the higher level Vocational/Technical college (LTI) and the University (NUL), at which institutions middle and high-level manpower is largely trained. Moreover, the level of proficiency of secondary school graduates in science and mathematics is generally low; this has been attributed largely to poor teaching by ill-qualified teaching staff and to inadequate teaching facilities. Thus the science/mathematics-based disciplines are starved of qualified candidate in the institutions of higher learning.

In general, the rate of training remains inadequate to meet the needs of the education, public and private sectors of the economy. This also explains the continuing heavy reliance on expatriates in these sectors at the professional, and

managerial levels of manpower development. To shed further light on the problems of manpower development a brief review of the training schemes in vocational and technical schools and the university is necessary.

Technical and vocational education is visualised as the main source of middle-level manpower for the public and private sectors (Second Development Plan:173). The programme of vocational and technical education has witnessed considerable expansion since the 1970s; such that by 1986 there were nine schools with a total enrolment of 1 335 students. There has also been an expansion in the range of course offered for primary, junior and senior secondary school graduates who spend between one and three years on their respective programmes. Enrolment of COSC (Senior Secondary Certificate) holders has however remained low as less than 25 candidates are enrolled for such courses as architecture, basic electronics, electrical and mechanical engineering. This again is due partly to the poor level of performance of secondary school students in science and mathematics. Moreover, due to the low prestige accorded to technical and vocational training and the lower pay offered to the vocationally/technically trained compared with their university-trained counterparts the best students opt for university education. These conditions have negative effects on the government's efforts at promoting middle-level skill development.

In terms of output, Burke (1981) estimated that 3 280 students graduated from all vocational/technical schools between 1980 and 1984. The Fourth Development Plan (p.73) notes that the Lerotholi Polytechnic alone produced 568 graduates during the 1980-85 plan period in the various courses it offers.

While these figures might appear encouraging, there remains the sad fact that not all the products of the training programme stay in the country. Cobbe (1977:454), for instance, pointed out that by mid-1976, only 8% of the bricklayers, carpenters and electricians who graduated from the Lerotholi Polytechnic between 1974 and 1976 were in Lesotho. This kind of trend does not augur well for the efforts aimed at meeting the skill requirements of the domestic economy.

At the high manpower level, NUL remains the major training centre. At this level of training, we shall restrict our attention to the skewness in the distribution of student output. The Fourth Development Plan (p.214) envisaged on output of 1 824 Basotho graduates from NUL between 1980 and 1989. Assuming that this number graduated roughly in the proportions in which they were admitted (i.e.

according to the admission criteria of humanities (25%), social sciences (38%) science (29%) and law (8%) proposed by NUL Second Plan (1981) this would amount to 456 graduates in Humanities, 693 in the social sciences, 529 in science and 146 in law during the 1980-89 period. Thus the humanities and the social sciences account for over 60% of the graduates. In actual fact, the 1989 output figures show that out of a total of 245 graduates from the degree programmes, 31% obtained degrees in education, 19% in commerce, 16% in humanities and social sciences and 14% in Law.

The NUL Second Five-Year Development Plan (p.7) however, draws attention to the need to restrict intake into Department of Accounting and Commerce. The plan document puts the case as follows:

Although the requirement may be high for B.Comm. graduates, the effective demand is currently very low. Entrepreneurs in the private sector, apart from parastatals, have been reluctant to employ B.Comm. graduates. Unless governments were to enforce a vigorous employment policy in the private sector, the B.Comm. graduates will soon find it difficult to find employment.

The fact however remains that in a market economy the demand for factors of production, including labour, is determined by market forces and the government cannot unilaterally force the private sector employers to take on additional labour when they have no need for it. Nor can the government itself afford to offer jobs to surplus labour on the basis of mere humanitarian considerations. The solution therefore lies in greater efforts towards aligning manpower training programmes to the needs of the economy. For example, the NUL Second Plan (p.58) again noted that "Given the likely long-term development on the Lesotho Highland Water Project, as well as other civil engineering needs of the Lesotho National Economy in roads, water, sewage and general infrastructural development", the establishment of an Engineering/Technology faculty at NUL "warrants serious consideration". Here again, given the prevailing difficulty of recruiting enough qualified candidates for the technical and university science/mathematics-based courses, the priority of the education system should lie first in the strengthening of the science and mathematics curricula and the supply of adequately trained teachers to produce enough candidates for the institutions of higher learning.

Already we are aware of the difficulties faced by the National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS) in recruiting enough candidates for its Overseas Fellowship training programme in specialised fields for which there are no or inadequate training facilities within Lesotho. This problem has been attributed to the unavailability of qualified candidates due to "the weakness in the preparation of secondary school leavers especially in the fields of mathematics and science" (Third National Development Plan, p.84). Furthermore, the government realises that in the light of some prospects of mining that have been looming since the 1970s (see Fourth Plan, P.47), there is a need to train personnel in geology, geophysics, mineralogy and geochemistry. Yet as the Plan notes, the training programme "was not very successful" during the Third Plan period (1980-85). From the 1990 NMDS list of overseas trainees, the situation has not changed much.

There is therefore a dire need to launch a vigorous campaign to improve the training of mathematics and science teachers for the senior secondary schools. At the moment, NUL's modest attempts at such training are not having the desired effect owing to the fact that graduates who are expected to teach in secondary schools do not often choose to do so. As Burke (1981:103) put it, "most of them chose to go into government and parastatals organisations on first appointment, benefits and promotion opportunities being superior to those of teaching". This situation should be arrested through deliberate government attempts to make the teaching profession more attractive.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

In this paper have attempted to highlight some of the factors that affect labour supply and demand in Lesotho. It is clear that the country's geographical and ecological circumstances pre-eminently lie at the root of the fact that its economic fortunes are almost entirely tied to the South African economy. South Africa provides a market for Lesotho's labour while Lesotho provides a market for South African goods and services. This relationship is clearly one between unequal partners. Consequently, there is little choice of policy options open to Lesotho both in terms of its socioeconomic development strategies and its manpower development and utilisation strategies. Lesotho's dilemma is that of maintaining a delicate balance between promoting economic policies aimed at lifting herself by

her own bootstraps and policies that would not run counter to South Africa's dominant economic interests in the Southern African region. Added to the limitations to self-sustaining economic development placed on her by geographical and ecological circumstances, Lesotho's membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) also limits the extent to which she can independently pursue economic development strategies within the limits of available resources. As the Fourth Development Plan (p.43) puts it, "Bearing in mind the problem encountered in the 1970's, a cautious approach to import-substitution has yielded success----". The government is therefore constrained to restrict herself to a "careful use of the infant industry clause in the customs agreement....." All these restrictions impinge upon the economy's potential to expand and create jobs.

The migrant labour system is clearly a mixed blessing. At face value, migrants' remittances stimulate domestic economic activity. As was noted earlier, miners' remittances contribute 48% of Lesotho's GNP. Given this fact, the Bureau of Statistics (1990:57) notes that "should the observed 1984-87 upward trend change, the situation could have considerable repercussions on the national disposable income" as well as on the "country's capacity to sustain the balance of payment on current account". This conclusion derives from the fact that in 1986 the visible trade balance showed an estimated deficit of M756 million and the contribution of miners remittances to balance of payment was estimated at M583,6 million.

Despite the benefits that accrue to Lesotho from the mine labour system, it has been suggested that the largest part (55%) of miners' remittances is spent on food and clothing, with much smaller proportions being used to finance private investments in livestock (11%), building (7%) and agriculture (5%). (ECA 1978:324). This evidence tend to suggest that the bulk of the remittances filters back into South Africa by way of purchase of South African goods and services by citizens. Be this as it may, the weight of the evidence is that Lesotho has a lot more to gain than she has to lose from her present relationship with South Africa. The paradox, however, is to be found in the declared policy of the government that "the continued heavy dependence of Lesotho's economy on South Africa calls for concern and an urgent need for the creation of more jobs in the country" (BOS 1990:57). Yet, given Lesotho's present economic circumstances characterised by slow development in the manufacturing sub-sector, increasing landlessness among the population and low job creation potential of the economy, the call to scale down labour migration is definitely impracticable at the moment. This is because the economy is currently ill-prepared to absorb a possible mass return of its



migrant labour from South Africa. If anything, the state of the economy (the lack of rewarding job opportunities and comparative low wages) fosters the continuing migration of labour to South Africa with its attendant repercussions on family life and the social structure. As long as the demand for Lesotho's labour by South Africa persists, it would prove profitable for Lesotho to maintain the labour migrant system. This must not, however, prejudice the continuing efforts to prepare the ground in the event of a mass return of migrants in the future. For one thing, the government has identified agriculture and rural development as "of prime importance in Lesotho's perceived long and medium term development needs". It also stresses the need to develop the country's natural resources, particularly water and energy (Fourth Development Plan, pp.24-25). This brings to the fore the need to pursue manpower planning more vigorously.

Effective manpower planning can be facilitated if reliable data exist to "permit the computation of reliable transition coefficients to describe the movement from infancy to school, from school to employment or higher education, and from higher education to employment, and other transitions involving, for example, migration, mortality and retirement" (Smith 1976:41). Macro-level manpower planning must therefore be linked to economic, educational and demographic planning with a view to balancing manpower supply and demand in such a way that available skills are utilised to the best possible advantage and the legitimate aspirations of individuals are duly met (*Ibid.* pp.20-21). Availability of reliable data will thus facilitate the drawing up of viable manpower plans based on demographic accounts of the population and the making of plausible projections of manpower availability and needs based on population projections and activity rates. These processes will assist the analysis of labour mobility and manpower utilisation. They should also form part of the macro-level plans towards self-reliant economic development within the limits of available resources.

Lesotho's population is growing at a rather rapid annual rate of 2,6%. Various population projections suggest that the population of working age would be over one million by the year 2000 (see Sembajwe, mimeo.). It is also projected that the labour force would be between 900 000 and one million. Given this scenario, the task ahead in regard to employment generation is titanic. If population growth remains unchecked then there would be even greater difficulties in the future. These situations call for serious efforts to refurbish the educational system in such a way as to reduce the levels of attrition and wastage, and the rates of repetition and drop-out. Related to this is also the need to improve standards and hence the

quality of output. Technical/vocational education should be more rigorously pursued since most of its output can be encouraged to set up own-account establishments rather than wait for government employment. There is also the need for the school system to equip future migrants with necessary skills that would make them more marketable and able to offer competitive labour in private and public sectors outside Lesotho. Technical and vocational education would therefore ensure that there are enough middle-level skills to meet the demands of the modern sector of the economy, produce persons who can work on their own and gradually replace unskilled with skilled labour-export.

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**THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR  
MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:  
FOCUS ON LESOTHO**

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**Introduction**

Labour migration constitutes one of the perennial problems of the political economy of Southern Africa. That is why in academic discourse the region is commonly referred to as "Africa of the Labour Reserves".<sup>1</sup> This paper deals with the future of this problem, focusing primarily on the prospects for the transformation of the regional economy from a labour reservoir to a more productive, growing and labour-absorbing one.

In order to achieve this task we start off with a sketchy periodisation of labour migration in the region: the pre-mineral revolution phase; the mineral revolution (1889-1906); 1906-39 state-capital pressures to extract cheap African labour for the South African mines; increased migration (1940-74) and the 1975-92 era of a steady decline of migration from independent Southern African states to the South African mines.

The second part of the paper deals with Lesotho as a case study. The impact of migration on Lesotho's economy, particularly agriculture and then the options

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<sup>1</sup> Amin, S. (1981). "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms", in D.Cohen and J.Daniel (eds), *The Political Economy of Africa*, Longman, London.

available to Lesotho in order to lessen its dependence on the migrant labour system are discussed. The conclusion is that Lesotho has to rethink and redefine its rural development strategy in order to open up more domestic jobs within the rural economy. To this end, it is argued that the government public works needs to be advanced and the National Union of Mineworkers' (NUM) cooperative strategy strengthened and expanded. The paper primarily focuses on labour migration to the South African mining industry, since this is the sector which continues to absorb a huge proportion of foreign African labour. The paper concentrates more on male rather than female migration because after the 1960s border restrictions, official female migration from Lesotho to South Africa virtually stopped.

### Overview of Past Trends of Migration in Southern Africa

International labour migration in Southern Africa has a fairly long history which can be conveniently divided into five broad phases.<sup>2</sup> The first is the period before the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa. During this period international labour migration was largely a result of the 1820s *Lifaqane* wars and the colonial conquest although the white farms, particularly sugar plantations in the Cape and Natal used to attract seasonal migrant labour from African societies.<sup>3</sup> However, pre-mineral migration was primarily a factor of political exigencies rather than socio-economic imperatives.

The second phase is the mineral revolution era (1889-1906) when the then burgeoning mining industry in South Africa was being firmly established. As the South African mining industry emerged, three major factors of production became necessary to ensure profit maximisation and cost minimisation. These were sufficient capital to finance production, supply of cheap labour and the

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<sup>2</sup> For a closely comparable periodisation of International Labour Migration in Southern Africa see S.Sautho and N.Pule, "ILO Research and Evaluation", NUL, 1989.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed account of how the Basotho were dispossessed of large tracks of fertile land thus resulting in the over-population see D.Innes, *Anglo-American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, Raven Press, Johannesburg, 1984.

maintenance of a low-cost wage structure for a predominantly migratory and semi-peasant workforce. To achieve the last two objectives, the mining houses established various institutional frameworks to facilitate the inflow of sufficient cheap labour to the mining enclaves.

In 1889 the Chamber of Mines (COM) was formed with the express objective of co-ordinating, regulating, controlling and standardising cheap labour supply to the affiliated mines. First argues that the formation of the COM was to guarantee a large and constant flow of African labour at a controlled cost. Attempts in the early 1890s by the COM to co-ordinate recruiting, impose a maximum average wage and prevent labour poaching, repeatedly broke down. If low-grade mines were to be developed it was imperative of mining policy that the COM guarantee ways of bringing down the cost of reproducing the labour force.<sup>4</sup>

Initially the mining companies tried to fulfil their labour demands by engaging local convict labour and importing indentured Chinese labour because during this period African migration to the mines was more discretionary than necessary. The COM set up the labour importing agency to control imported Chinese labour. Between 1904-6 about 63 296 Chinese men were contracted and shipped to South Africa. However the importation of Chinese labour was terminated in 1906.

The COM, also established recruiting agencies in different parts of the Southern African region to fulfil its mandate. In 1902 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) was formed to recruit migrant labour from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) was formed in 1912 to recruit cheap labour from South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In the mid-1970s, the COM decided to consolidate WENELA and NRC into the Employment Bureau of Africa Limited (TEBA), which is presently

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<sup>4</sup> The COM was primarily intended to monopolise recruitment of mine labour, reduce competition for labour among affiliated mining houses and fix a standard labour cost. For more details on foreign labour to South Africa see R.Davies *et.al*, *The Struggle for South Africa*. Zed Books, London, 1988; R.First, *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletariat and Peasant*, the Harvesler Press, Sussex, 1983; D.Clark, "The South Africa Chamber of Mines: Policy and Strategy with Reference to foreign labour Supply", DSRG Working Paper No.2, University of Natal, 1977; Sautho and Pule 1989.

the main agency responsible for the supply of migrant labour from the region to the COM-affiliated mines.

It was in the third phase (1906-39) that mining capital, in close alliance with the South African state, set out to apply vigorous economic and extra-economic pressures on the African peasantry to extort cheap migratory labour for the mining industry. Firstly, the South African state enforced discriminatory trade and pricing policies on agricultural produce, which favoured Afrikaner farmers at the expense of African peasants. Secondly, heavy taxation was imposed on African peasant producers. Thirdly, substantial tracts of fertile land were usurped from African peasants through the notorious 1913 Land Act and 1936 Natives Land and Trust Act. Fourthly, the Pass Laws and other influx control laws were enforced on Africans in order to restrict their freedom of movement and channel cheap labour where it was needed.

The Pass Laws were also meant to confine and barricade surplus population (i.e. the unemployed) in the rural slums of the unproductive tribal reserves. Finally, the South African government entered into covert agreements with the colonial regimes in the neighbouring countries on the constant supply of cheap migrant labour to the mines. For example the 1909 Mozambican Convention signed between the Transvaal Republic and Portugal, provided for a stable annual exportation of 100 000 Mozambicans to the Transvaal gold mines.<sup>5</sup> This agreement remained in force until the mid-1970s when Frelimo took power in Mozambique. This agreement was a vivid example of the South African state-capital collusion with colonial regimes in Southern Africa in extracting cheap oscillatory labour from the colonies and thereby undermining peasant subsistence economies.

The fourth phase (1940-74) was a period of increased migration from the neighbouring states to the South African mines, particularly gold mines. Table 1 shows that foreign migrant labour as a proportion of total African labour on the

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<sup>5</sup> Cohen, R. (ed), *Forced Labour in Colonial Africa*, Zed Books, London, 1979; Magubane B., *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, Monthly Review Press, London, 1979; Stahl, C., "Recent Changes in the Demand for Foreign African Labour in South Africa and Future Prospects", in de Vletter (ed), *Labour Migration and Agricultural Development in Southern Africa*, FAO, Rome 1982; R.First *op.cit.*



gold mines rose from 52% to 78%. The higher wages in the South African manufacturing industry attracted more domestic African labour, which came to despise mine jobs.

It was, therefore, during this phase that Southern African states' dependence on the migrant labour system was deepened. The profundity of this dependence is clearly reflected in the fact that the attainment of political independence by these states had no significant effect on reversing this unhealthy economic environment. The editorial of *Moeletsi oa Basotho* bemoaned the failure of political independence in Lesotho to translate into economic independence as follows:

Political independence has not redressed Lesotho's massive labour drainage to South Africa. This economic dependence on South Africa gravely undermines Lesotho's international stature as a sovereign state. The country's socioeconomic stability is largely contingent upon external factors. Once international aid is not forthcoming Basotho become more desperate. Thus we are not masters of our own destiny.<sup>6</sup>

The Southern African states' dependence on the migrant labour system strengthens the apt depiction of the region as a labour reserve economy.

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Moeletsi oa Basotho 1990 Editorial Comments. The text is translated by the author.

**Table I: Africans Employed on the Gold Mines: Selected Years Between 1906 and 1984**

Year	Number Employed (thousands)	Percentage Foreign
1906	81	77
1911	190	60
1916	204	56
1921	173	61
1926	182	62
1931	210	50
1936	297	48
1941	368	52
1946	305	59
1951	299	64
1956	336	65
1961	399	64
1966	370	66
1970	370	72
1971	371	77
1972	362	78
1973	379	79
1974	350	78
1975	322	68
1976	343	58
1977	374	49
1978	389	47
1979	399	46
1980	416	44
1981	422	43
1982	418	43
1983	428	43
1984-	437	42

Source: Santho and Pule, 1989, from Wilson (1972); WENELA TEBA *Annual Report* various years; COM *Annual Report* various years.

During the fifth phase (1975-90) inflow of foreign labour to the South African mines declined steadily. Table 1 shows that between 1975-84 the proportion of foreign African labour of the total African labour on the gold mines dropped from 68% to 42%. Both regional and internal developments in South Africa played a contributory role in the decline. In 1966 Zambia withdrew its workers and in 1974 Malawi withheld its mine labour force from South Africa following a plane crash in which about 74 miners were killed. After lengthy negotiations with the COM, Malawi agreed once again to send its labour to South Africa in 1977. By this time the COM had established a severely restricted quota for Malawi.

With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Southern Africa, the COM regarded the future labour supply from Mozambique as politically uncertain. It therefore reduced the number of Mozambican recruits in 1974 and unilaterally phased out the 1909 Mozambique Convention. From 118 000 in 1975 the number of Mozambican recruits was reduced to 42 000 in 1978. Currently, Mozambique supplies about 50 000 miners to South Africa (see Table II). Thus, Mozambique remains one of the crucial labour suppliers to the South African mines, second only to Lesotho which currently supplies about 93 000 miners to the TEBA member mines. In 1981, the decision by the Zimbabwean government not to renew the recruiting licences of TEBA led to the repatriation of Zimbabwean miners at the end of their contracts.

These regional political developments led the COM to reduce its dependence on foreign African labour. In spite of that the migrant labour quotas from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland stabilised, and in some cases increased, while recruitment of novice labour from these countries has been systematically declining.

There were mainly two domestic factors which precipitated a decline in foreign African labour intake on the South African mines after 1975. Firstly, the increase in miners' wages as a result of workers' struggles and the rise of the gold price on the international market. This increase provided the necessary economic incentive for domestic African labour to take up mine jobs in large numbers. Secondly, the COM's inward-looking labour recruiting strategy was a result of the pressing need for the state and capital to address the chronic structural unemployment crisis in South Africa.

**Table II: Labour Compliment on TEBA Member Mines, February 1992**

<b>Origin</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Lesotho	93 011	23.44
Botswana	14 012	3.53
Swaziland	16 712	4.21
Mozambique	50 149	12.64
Transkei	87 230	21.98
Bophuthatswana	36 718	9.25
Kwasulu	25 106	6.32
Ciskei	7 356	1.85
Other (RSA)	66 440	16.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>396 737</b>	<b>100.00</b>
Local	222 853	56.17
Foreign	173 884	43.83

Source: TEBA - Lesotho, April 1992.

As a concrete expression of the above influences and concerns, the COM embarked on three main strategies aimed at reducing the foreign African labour on the mines. These were (a) internalisation of labour supply policy (b) stabilisation of labour force policy and (c) mechanisation of production. Internalisation of labour supply refers to the COM policy of replacing foreign migrants with domestic workers, thereby reducing the dependence of the mining industry on external and precarious sources of labour supply. The disruptions of the early 1970s had evidently exposed the COM's vulnerability to the political vicissitudes of external labour supplies. The South African state also exerted a lot of pressure on the COM to employ domestic labour so as to reduce internal structural unemployment. As a result of internalisation, it is estimated that the ratio of domestic to foreign labour on the mines is at most 60:40. Stabilisation policy is aimed at creating a professional and disciplined mine labour force. Hence the contract period for migrants has increased substantially. As a result of this policy valid re-engagement guarantee or "bonus" certificates have been introduced. Tough measures are taken against migrants who contravene contract obligations. Mechanisation of production refers to the transformation of the mining industry from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive enterprise. This process is at an advanced stage in the coal mines. The obvious effects of these three processes have been the retrenchment of foreign labour and a substantial reduction of novice labour supply from the South African Labour Commission (SALC). It needs to be emphasised, though, that this three-pronged strategy of reducing foreign labour has been (at least before the De Klerk era) tied to South Africa's regional strategy of exerting pressure on neighbours who have been sympathetic to the liberation struggle in that country while rewarding those supportive of the apartheid regime.<sup>7</sup>

It was in response to this changing pattern of labour demand and supply for the South African mining industry that the Southern African Labour Commission

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<sup>7</sup> See F. De Vletter *Labour Migration to South Africa: Recent Trends and Prospects*, ILO, Lusaka, 1984; K. Matlosa "International Labour Migration in Lesotho: Current Dimensions and Context", Paper Presented to the Canadian Association for African Studies Annual Conference, Carleton University, Canada, 1989; K. Matlosa, "The Changing Labour Demand in South Africa and Prospects for Re-absorption of Returning Basotho Migrants in Lesotho's Economy", in Santho S., and M. Sejanamane (eds) *Southern Africa After Apartheid*, SAPES Books, Harare, 1990.

(SALC)<sup>8</sup> was formed in 1980. Its primary mandate is to coordinate and stabilise migrant labour supply to South Africa, through collective bargaining with the South African state and mining capital on labour agreements in order to establish mutually acceptable quotas of mine labour from member states. The SALC is further charged with the responsibility of striving towards gradual withdrawal of member states from the migrant labour system. To this end is to facilitate members' contingency plans for absorbing returning migrants in case of either gradual or sudden repatriation.

In the early 1980s the apartheid regime threatened to repatriate all foreign migrants in the event of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. How real this threat was is a moot point. It is very likely that it was being used as a deterrent to the imposition of sanctions *per se*. Whatever the case, the SALC took this threat, and many others which followed, quite seriously. In 1984 South Africa threatened, to repatriate about 140 000 Basotho migrants and replace them with Mozambicans unless Lesotho considered signing a Nkomati-type non-aggression pact with South Africa.<sup>9</sup> As Lesotho adamantly refused to enter into a non-aggression pact with South Africa, the latter country imposed a devastating economic blockade on the former in 1985. This economic stranglehold precipitated the military coup of 20 February 1986 and the demise of the Basotho National Party (BNP) government. It is not clear whether the military government signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa, but what is obvious is that relations between the two countries became very cordial and Lesotho's migrant labour quota to TEBA member mines increased from about 101 000 in 1985 to about 109 000 in 1987 (see Table III).

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<sup>8</sup> The SALC is basically a consultative body composed of ministers concerned with labour matters in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola holds observer status in SALC. Independent Namibia has not affiliated. Two other components of the SALC besides governments are worker organisations and employer associations. The Lusaka-based ECA and ILO form the Secretariat of the SALC. The Commission holds annual conferences to consider and assess among other things, members' labour agreements with South Africa, domestic job creation plans to absorb repatriated migrants and migrant working conditions in South Africa.

<sup>9</sup> De Vletter (1984) *op cit*.

In 1986, after the collapse of the Nkomati Accord, South Africa threatened to repatriate about 60 000 Mozambicans upon termination of their contracts in retaliation for a landmine blast attributed to the then proscribed African National Congress (ANC) whose activists were purportedly being harboured by Mozambique.<sup>10</sup> Mainly because of these persistent threats of migrant repatriation, the task of the SALC has become much more burdensome. Paradoxically, the SALC has not as yet initiated well-coordinated contingency programmes for the reabsorption of returning migrants even in the face of all these threats. In this context then, the vexed question is the future of the migrant labour system. To what extent can the Southern African states continue to rely on this system? What are the likely future scenarios and options for the SALC member states?

**Table III: Lesotho Labour Compliment on TEBA Member Mines 1960-1991**

1960	45 698	1987	108 895
1970	62 576	1988	105 116
1980	100 458	1989	105 000
1985	101 120	1990	103 040
1986	106 379	1991	93 319

Source: TEBA - Lesotho, April 1992.

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<sup>10</sup> De Vletter, F. "Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines: New insights on an old problem", *International Labour Review*, Vol.126, No.2, 1987.

## International Labour Migration and Future Scenarios

It is quite evident from the above account that since the mid-1970-s there has been a systematic and deliberate reduction of foreign migrants working on the South African mines through four main strategies employed by state and capital. These have been identified as internalisation, stabilisation, mechanisation and South Africa's regional strategy of sustaining and perpetuating its sub-imperialist politico-economic domination in Southern Africa. Given the soaring structural unemployment, particularly among blacks, in South Africa, we can justifiably project that the decline of foreign labour intake for the mining industry will continue even in the 1990s.

The political independence of South Africa and the establishment of a unitary, democratic and non-racial state is not likely to reverse this trend. The SALC member states will have to reckon with the high employment expectations of black South Africans under a democratic state in the aftermath of independence. The ANC, which is likely to form part of the new government, is clearly aware of the enormous employment challenge that will confront the post-colonial state in South Africa.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the SALC has to take cognisance of the employment pressure that the return of approximately 30 000 exiles will pose for a post-apartheid state in South Africa.

Clearly, the democratic state in independent South Africa will be saddled with the daunting tasks of (a) fair redistribution of economic wealth, opportunities and income (b) resettlement of returnees and their engagement in gainful economic activity and (c) reversal of the upward spiral of the unemployment rate currently estimated in the region of 30%.<sup>12</sup> In order to address the above problems and other social inequalities in South Africa, the ANC argues for the nationalisation of major industries, including the mining monopolies.

Central to the ANC economic strategy for a future non-racial democratic South Africa would then be nationalisation of major industries. The State would also play a central role in ensuring

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<sup>11</sup> *New Nation* 5-11 October 1990; *Sechaba* Vol.24, No.10, October, 1990.

<sup>12</sup> *New Nation* *ibid.*



economic growth so that equitable redistribution of the country's wealth can be a reality.<sup>13</sup>

With particular reference to the future government programme for the mining industry, the *African Communist* proposed three policy guidelines. Revision of the terms of mining leases so as to increase the state's share of the proceeds of mining; use of anti-monopoly legislation to breakup the largest of the mining finance houses and nationalisation of one or more, but not all, of the resulting smaller mining groups.<sup>14</sup>

The ANC nationalisation strategy does not explicitly guarantee the continued participation of foreign migrants in the mining industry. It is not far-fetched to project that when social inequality in South Africa is addressed and nationalisation is embarked upon, foreign migrants are likely to be left in the lurch. Under these circumstances various options ranging from the SALC withdrawal of its migrant labour from South Africa to surviving within the *status quo*, have been advanced.

Stahl and Bohning argue that the SALC member states should take concrete steps towards a phased withdrawal of their migrants over a 15-year period. Such a withdrawal should be undertaken collectively to ensure co-ordination and avoid a situation whereby SALC states could be played against one another by the South African state and mining capital. In order to cushion the adverse effects of such a move on SALC economies, it is argued, the United Nations should be approached to establish a special fund in line with the resolution on accelerated economic development and international action adopted by the 1978 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference on migratory labour in Southern Africa.

The above proposal further notes that creating alternative employment within SALC economies is of utmost importance and the highest priority in the process of withdrawal. It is estimated that the job-creation process may cost the SALC states some US\$2 500 million over a 24-year period. It is argued that this money could be raised by charging a levy on South African employers for each migrant worker employed during the phased withdrawal. The suggested levy is R1 500 per

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<sup>13</sup> *New Nation* *ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *African Communist* No.123, fourth Quarter, 1990.

man-year for the COM and R100 for other mining houses. A threat of sudden *en masse* withdrawal would be used if South Africa were to default.

The withdrawal option suggested by Stahl and Bohning however, has its own shortcomings. Firstly, given the SALC states' extreme economic dependence and political linkages to South Africa, it would be adventuristic for them to withdraw migrant workers without a meaningful reformulation of their economic strategies in order to absorb that labour. Secondly, the question of levying the South African mining capital some US\$2 500 million is impracticable because presently the COM does not need foreign African labour.

Thus, if the SALC states were to withdraw their workers, the mining capital would still extract cheap migrant and commuter labour from the South African Bantustans and townships. Thirdly, the suggestion that the SALC use the sudden and *en masse* withdrawal of labour threat if South Africa defaulted on the levy is completely unrealistic. It is incontrovertible that South Africa has much more political and economic capacity to repatriate foreign migrants than the SALC has to withdraw, let alone absorb, their migrants.

The second option is that of the SALC states attempting to stabilise the migrant labour system in order to survive within it despite its socioeconomic consequences.

This particular school of thought views the Southern African states as almost helpless politico-economic hostages of South Africa with limited powers, if any at all, to extricate themselves. The SALC activities since 1980 bear testimony to the organisation's conviction that this option is optimally viable. SALC member states have concentrated on negotiating labour agreements with and improving conditions of migrant workers in South Africa (SALC 1990) rather than restructuring their domestic economies to absorb their growing labour force.

The past decade has shown that instead of the SALC initiating new economic strategies, policies and programmes geared towards extracting its members from the migrant labour system, it is South Africa which has in fact embarked upon migrant repatriation and retrenchment. This is the major weakness of the SALC. It continues to react to South African pressure rather than create domestic job opportunities. Instead of the SALC governments creating alternative income-generating projects for the repatriated/retrenched migrants, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) seems to have effectively seized this initiative, particularly since the 1987 strike. It has to be borne in mind that the central policy of the

NUM is to dismantle the migrant labour system. As part of its strategy towards this end, the NUM has established mineworkers labour cooperatives in Lesotho, Transkei and Swaziland. The main objectives of these cooperatives are to identify and initiate labour-intensive income-generating projects and engage repatriated/retrrenched migrants in gainful economic production.

### Focus on Lesotho

Lesotho's dependence on labour migration to the South African mining industry is much more pronounced than that of the other SALC member states. It may be argued that Lesotho as a landlocked mountainous country with paltry resources stands to gain through the following spinoffs:

(a) Deferred Payment, which has increased quite phenomenally in the last decade. In 1980 deferred payment to Lesotho was about M24 million. In 1989 this figure shot up to M242 million - a net increase of 908% over a nine-year period.<sup>15</sup> Deferred Pay is the 60% of migrants' wages which is transferred to Lesotho by mining companies. It contributes a substantial amount to government revenue and finances a large slice of the country's trade deficit. It is presently estimated that the 93,000 Basotho miners in the COM mines alone earn Lesotho the sum of M1.1 billion per annum.<sup>16</sup>

(b) Migrant remittances which accrue to the migrants' families and are used largely to finance household consumption and production needs. Presently migrant remittances account for about 80% of most rural households' gross income. This proportion underlines the serious decline of agriculture as an income earner in Lesotho's rural economy. Migrant remittances accruing to Lesotho rose from M18 million per annum in 1980 to M166 million in 1989 - a net increase of 822%.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Stahl C., and Boning W., "Reducing Dependence on Migration in Southern Africa", ILO/SATEP, 1983.

<sup>16</sup> Central Bank, *Quarterly Review*, Lesotho, 1989.

<sup>17</sup> Information received from TEBA, Lesotho Branch, April 1992.

(c) Finally it may also be argued that the migrant labour system is a socioeconomic blessing for the resource-poor economy of Lesotho. It relieves the economy of a large proportion of the domestic labour force which could not be absorbed by the domestic economy given its low labour-absorptive capacity. Table IV provides a succinct synopsis of the labour force participation and unemployment rates in Lesotho. It is estimated that the labour force participation rate was about 56% while the unemployment rate was about 23% in 1985/86. Thus labour migration from Lesotho could be seen as a "safety-valve" for the domestic employment crisis. This is one of the factors that explains the government's inertia in creating productive employment opportunities, not only for the returning migrants but also for the unemployed Basotho who can no longer be absorbed by the mining industry in South Africa.

The above-mentioned spinoffs are not real socioeconomic benefits for Lesotho in the long run. A closer scrutiny of the migrant labour system will reveal that these spinoffs tend to be ephemeral. They are illusory and devoid of any long-term development dynamic and social stability. Consequently these apparent benefits translate into a high socioeconomic cost for the country. Elkan captures this point cogently in relation to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

While one can argue that labour migration provides benefits in the form of income-earning opportunities that would not otherwise exist, the degree of dependence on this source of income, especially in the case of Botswana and Lesotho, must also be regarded as a cost. Whatever may be true of the long run, there is no question but that in the short run if South Africa were to close her frontiers to prospective migrants all the three countries would be worse off, and in Lesotho there would be severe distress. Such a degree of dependence on a particular source of income must be counted as a cost.<sup>18</sup>

As reflected in the above quotation, the migrant labour system may be regarded as both a benefit and a cost for the labour supply states like Lesotho. As

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<sup>18</sup> Elkan W., "Labour Migration from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.28, No.3, 1980.

dependence on labour migration becomes deeply entrenched, economic, particularly agricultural, decline becomes much more intense.

We are in no way trying to construct a mechanistic correlation between the migrant labour system and agricultural decline in Lesotho. The uni-dimensional linkage between migration, labour shortage, low agricultural productivity and low income in rural Lesotho is somewhat tenuous. In another formulation, migration and shortage of labour *per se* do not sufficiently explain Lesotho's agricultural crisis.<sup>19</sup> There are many other endogenous and exogenous variables to Lesotho's agricultural decline besides labour migration. These variables, however, are not the subject of this study.

The emphasis, therefore, is on the extent to which migration has become a disincentive to agricultural pursuits in Lesotho.

The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91) confirms this observation by arguing that:

Dependence on mine wage income has grown since 1978 from 35.5% of GNP to over 50%. The GNP more than doubled but agriculture's share declined from 17% in 1978 to 7.1% in 1984.....As a result of rural residents dependence on off-farm income, total farming effort has declined.

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<sup>19</sup> Central Bank, op.cit.

**Table IV: Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rates by Age and Sex: Preliminary Report of the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey**

Age Group	Participation Rates (%)			Unemployment Rates (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
12-19	40.7	17.5	28.5	28.9	37.1	31.6
20-34	90.8	47.	68.8	22.1	29.4	24.6
35-54	94.7	49.5	71.0	16.1	19.6	17.3
55 and over	77.5	31.9	51.6	25.9	17.1	22.8
Not stated	27.9	2.8	10.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>25.4</b>	<b>23.0</b>

Source: GOL 1987 Socioeconomic indicators of Lesotho.

Table V shows that during the 1970s even when mine wages substantially increased, agriculture's contribution to GNP continued to decline. In 1970/71 mine wage income contributed 32% to GNP while agriculture only 22%. In 1979/80 mine wage income and agriculture's contributions to GNP were 41% and 14% respectively. This may mean that mine remittances are rarely invested in agricultural productivity. Even in cases where remittances are invested in agriculture, smallholder farmers are confronted with a myriad of problems which inhibit increased productivity. These include labour shortage; lack of institutional backup and instruments of production; precarious climatic conditions; the nature of state rural development policy, which has an explicit bias in favour of progressive farmers at the exclusion of small farmers; soil erosion; landlessness; overpopulation and overstocking.

**Table V: Sector Distribution of Gross National Development Product of Lesotho: Selected Years**

Sector	Year/Percentage				
	1970/71	1974/75	1975/76	1977/78	1979/80
Mine wages	32.0	38.2	47.3	44.1	41.1
Agriculture	22.4	20.1	14.7	16.5	14.5
Mining	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.4	2.9
Manufacturing	2.8	3.1	2.7	2.1	2.2
Trade	13.9	8.3	7.6	5.8	5.3
Construction	1.9	3.1	2.8	6.7	4.4
Private	16.4	14.7	14.6	13.1	13.5
Government	5.8	3.3	3.7	3.7	4.6
Other	4.0	8.6	7.6	7.6	11.5
	(in million maloti)				
Total GNP	74 772	158 125	211 990	331 406	444 994

Source: Plath *et al.* 1985 as extracted from IMTF (1983).

Not surprisingly, therefore, farming in Lesotho has virtually become a part-time and very marginal occupation for most rural households.<sup>20</sup> Many studies<sup>21</sup> have shown that a considerable portion of migrant remittances is earmarked for the purchase of livestock and other household items rather than direct investment in profitable agricultural assets.

This explains why the 1970s mine wage increases resulted in a massive rise in the number of goods imported from South Africa rather than real and sustainable development of the domestic economy. It has also subjected Lesotho to an extreme external dependence whose vicissitudes are beyond the control of the government.

### *Reduction in the Employment of Mine novices*

At least since the 1930s economic crisis in Lesotho, it has been very clear that the demand and supply of cheap Basotho migrant labour would be controlled by the COM and not the Lesotho government. The 1970s measures adopted by the COM's to reduce foreign black labour through internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation are a clear testimony of the COM absolute control over migrant labour. Though the 1970s changes did not affect Lesotho drastically, the COM has gradually tightened its employment screws on mine novices from Lesotho.

In 1981, 5% of TEBA's Basotho recruits were novices. This figure plummeted to 3% in 1982 and 1% in 1983.<sup>22</sup> For the gold mines alone the figures for Basotho mine novices as a proportion of total TEBA recruits from Lesotho

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<sup>20</sup> ILO/JASPA, *Options for a Dependent economy; Development, Employment and Equity problems in Lesotho*, ILO, Ethiopia, 1979.

<sup>21</sup> Inter-ministerial Task Force Progress in Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, Masery, 1983; Plath, J. *et al.* "International Labour Migration and Agricultural Development in Lesotho; Farming Systems", Research project, Ministry of Agriculture, 1985.

<sup>22</sup> Plath *ibid*; Eckert, J. and Wykstra, R. "The Future of Basotho Migration to the Republic of South Africa", Research Report No.4, Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis Project, Ministry of Agriculture, 1979.



dropped from 17% in 1975 to 5% in 1985.<sup>23</sup> This reduction of mine novice recruitment effectively translates into a two-pronged socioeconomic disadvantage for Lesotho.

Firstly, since the 1980s a conspicuous trend of internal rural-urban migration in Lesotho has been exacerbated. This comprises largely female migrants<sup>24</sup> who, since the 1960s border restrictions, have been barred from seeking employment in South Africa. This trend is being further aggravated by the retrenchment of some experienced Basotho miners from South Africa. Secondly, the reduction of mine novice recruitment further deepens the employment crisis in Lesotho. This means that the country's annual labour market entrants, estimated at 20 000 in 1988, are being increased.<sup>25</sup> The World Bank projects that by the year 2000 Lesotho's annual labour market entrants will shoot up to 26 000.<sup>26</sup> Presently Lesotho's unemployment rate ranges above 30% with a population growth rate of about 3%.

As argued earlier, drastic cuts in Basotho migrant labour to South Africa are likely to continue in the 1990s. This process may include more repatriation of Basotho miners in favour of the local African labour from the South African townships and Bantustans. Cobbe<sup>27</sup> and Wellings<sup>28</sup> have, however, argued that as long as the gold mining industry does not collapse, some 100 000 Basotho will

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<sup>23</sup> Wellings, P. *Development by Invitation: South African Corporate Investment in Lesotho*, working papers No.11, University of Durban, 1984.

<sup>24</sup> Wilkinson, R., "Migration in Lesotho: Some Comparative Aspects with Particular Reference to the Role of Women", *Geography*, Vol.68, No.300, 1983.

<sup>25</sup> World Bank, *Lesotho Country Economic Memorandum*, Washington, 1987.

<sup>26</sup> World Bank *op cit*.

<sup>27</sup> Cobbe, J. "Emigration and Development in Southern Africa with Special Reference to Lesotho", *The International Migration Review*, Vol.16, No.4, 1982.

<sup>28</sup> Wellings *op cit*.

be assured of employment in South Africa.<sup>29</sup> This likelihood notwithstanding, the on going processes of internalisation, stabilisation mechanisation in the South Africa mining industry as well as the declining price of gold on the World Market warrants a fundamental re-thinking and redefinition of Lesotho's development strategy.

*Alternative Development Strategy Geared towards  
Domestic Employment Creation*

As far back as 1979, the ILO/JASPA Report<sup>30</sup> observed that with regard to the quantitative outflow of Lesotho's labour power, with its attendant socioeconomic disadvantages and political uncertainties, the government is faced with four policy options:

- (a) *laissez-faire*, the outcome of which might mean more or fewer migrants;
- (b) local job creation and rural development, creating domestic income-generating opportunities at a rate that is hopefully equal to the natural population and labour force growth, while exporting surplus labour to South Africa.
- (c) deliberately cutting down the growth in migration and perhaps eventually the absolute numbers of migrants while reabsorbing as many of the returned migrants as possible in domestic productive employment; and

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<sup>29</sup> Cobbe and Wellings argue that the COM may retain a stabilised quota of about 100 000 Basotho miners even at the height of the internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation processes so long as the gold mines continue to operate. The rationale for this policy would be to (a) preserve the diversity of labour sources, (b) hold on to more skilled and experienced Basotho miners and (c) sustain the political grip that South Africa has on Lesotho via the nexus of the migrant labour system.

<sup>30</sup> ILO/JASPA op.cit.

- (d) a radical policy of banning all migration to South Africa as was done in Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1963) and Malawi (1974), combined with an appeal to the United Nations to finance adjustment costs.

A closer examination of these options leads one to conclude that option (b) above is the most optimally practicable if Lesotho is to gradually lessen its dependence on the migrant labour system. Thus Lesotho's redefined and reformulated development strategy needs to be conceptualised within the confines of this option.

The Lesotho government should work out a comprehensive agricultural and rural development strategy that will provide gainful employment for the rural population. This alternative development strategy should be worked out as a matter of urgency given the present political developments, which are likely to bring about a democratic and non-racial state in South Africa. In case of this eventuality we project three scenarios in terms of Lesotho's participation in the migrant labour system in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Firstly, migrant repatriation accompanied by training of the local labour to fill up vacant positions formerly held by Basotho will continue. This is highly likely particularly if nationalisation of the mining industry becomes part of the new regime's agenda. Secondly, Lesotho also has a choice of becoming part of a larger confederal system in a future democratic South Africa. In this manner Lesotho constitutionally becomes part of South Africa and her migrant labourers to the mines are likely not to be repatriated, since they would not be regarded as foreign labour. This is the most intricate and indeed, politically sensitive scenario. As such it is highly dependent on the nature of political relations of Lesotho and with post-apartheid South Africa. Thirdly, assuming that nationalisation of the mining industry does not become part of the economic policy package for a new regime in South Africa, the COM will still exercise its absolute discretion and monopsony on labour demand and supply sources. In this case, the assumption by Cobbe and Wellings, that at least some 100 000 Basotho will be ensured of mine employment as long as the gold mines do not collapse, may not necessarily hold. The present trend shows that COM mines alone have already cut Lesotho labour to about 83 000.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> ILO/JASPA op cit.

Scenarios (b) and (c) above may prove favourable to Lesotho. The possibility of scenario (a) should, however, not be disregarded. It is precisely because of the possibility of scenario (a) that Lesotho needs to open its own domestic employment opportunities particularly in the rural areas. Such a venture would not only stem international migration in the long run, but would also off-set internal rural-urban migration.

Since 1978, the Lesotho government has embarked on public works projects through the Labour-Intensive Construction Unit (LCU) in order to redress both rural-urban and international migrations. In two fundamental ways this public works strategy falls short of opening up viable employment avenues in the rural areas for the retrenched and prospective mine migrants. Firstly it has not been able to absorb retrenched migrants, particularly after the 1987 mineworkers' strike which culminated in the expulsion of about 9 000 Basotho miners. Secondly, it has not been able to transcend mere road construction and maintenance into agricultural productivity and other rural income-generating projects which could attract labour away from migration. In order to be viable, a labour-intensive public works strategy should not only be able to create local jobs and develop the rural area, it should also provide many standby jobs through a readily available "shelf" of projects, should an emergency occur.

NUM has been more successful in catering for its members. In 1988 it established the Basotho Mine Labour Cooperative (BMLC). The BMLC has already initiated income-generating schemes for the retrenched Basotho miners. These schemes include (a) a taxi operation in Maseru with prospects and plans for expansion to other areas (b) brick-making projects which have so far engaged about 100 ex-miners and (c) a variety of income-generating projects for migrants' wives through their own women's cooperatives involving about 100 women in the Butha-Butha district. With a strong infrastructural base and financial support these embryonic NUM rural development projects stand more chance of succeeding.

## **Conclusion**

The evidence provided in this paper points to the grave uncertainty and precariousness of Lesotho's continued participation in the migrant labour system. This is mainly a result of two factors: the reduction of foreign labour on the South African mines by the COM through internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation

and the current political transformation in South Africa which is likely to lead to the establishment of a unitary, democratic and non-racial state. Such a state will certainly have to grapple with the increasing structural unemployment in South Africa itself.

Consequently Lesotho needs to create more viable employment alternatives at home to absorb retrenched and prospective migrants. This strategy, we have argued, needs to be sharply focused on agricultural and rural development. Both the government and the NUM have made a start in this direction. We argue, however, that the government's public works strategy has serious shortcomings as a contingency plan for re absorbing returning Basotho migrants. The public works strategy, therefore, needs to be broadened, diversified and expanded in order to provide employment in the rural economy. Embryonic as it is, the NUM labour co-operative strategy seems to augur well for a reformulated rural development strategy in Lesotho. What makes the NUM co-operative strategy even more ideal is the fact that it is solely an initiative of migrants themselves. Put differently, it is a "bottom-up" rural development strategy which needs support from the government itself.

The government is not totally oblivious of the dire need for a reformulated rural development strategy in Lesotho. For instance, in a representation to the 1990 Donor Round-table Conference, the government noted that despite the fact that 80% of Lesotho's population lives in rural areas, these regions are characterised by low and stagnant agricultural yields, poor off-farm income-earning opportunities and lack of government services. The main income source of rural people, migrant incomes from South Africa, has probably peaked and its future is uncertain. The government has committed itself to increased income-generation and employment opportunities in the rural economy. While a mere commitment is very easy to make, implementation is something else.

# **INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN LESOTHO IN THE 1980s AND THE CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s**

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## **Introduction**

As we enter the last decade of the 20th century, it is imperative that we should critically assess the lessons of the past, which will invariably have a bearing on the future. This paper attempts to assess the industrial relations scene in Lesotho in the 1980s with a view to ascertaining whether the 1990s and beyond will be restful or otherwise, given the changing internal and external socio economic and political reality around us.

To begin with, the economic and employment situation that obtained in the 1980s up to the present will be described. Some theories or systems of industrial relations will also be examined, together with the contexts in which they operate. Industrial relations in Lesotho in the eighties will be explored mainly from the viewpoint of certain major industrial unrest incidents and the role played by various industrial relations actors. In conclusion, prospects for the future of industrial relations in Lesotho, given both the past and the present, will be explored.

## **The Economic Employment Situation in the 80s**

The Lesotho economy is described by various authors as a besieged economy, a classical labour-reserve economy, a hostage economy, a captive economy, a dependent economy, a neo-Bantustan economy and other equally pessimistic

terms<sup>1</sup>. It is thus described because of its excessive dependence on the South African economy as the following table, which depicts the direction of Lesotho's external trade in 1984, shows.

**Table I: Direction of Lesotho's Trade 1984**

<b>Exports</b>	
<b>Destination</b>	<b>%</b>
Republic of South Africa	93
European Economic Community	5
Rest of the world	2
<b>Imports</b>	
<b>Origin</b>	<b>%</b>
Republic of South Africa	95
EEC	2
Rest of the world	3

Source: *Statistical Year Book 1987*, Bureau of Statistics, Maseru.

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Malimate, "Lesotho - A Besieged Enclave Economy" Lesotho Congress of Free Trade Unions country paper prepared for International Confederation of Free Trade Union, Quoted in M. Phafane *The Economic Structure of Lesotho - An Overview* - page 1. R. Southall, "Trade Unions in Lesotho" in *South African Labour Bulletin*, Vol.10, No.3, 1984, Braamfontein, RSA, and others.

**Table II: Production in 000 Tonnes and Average Yield in 00 Kg per Hectare of Main Crops 1979/80 to 1988/89**

Year	Maize		Sorghum		Wheat		Beans		Peas	
	Pro-duction	Yield	Pro-duction	Yield	Pro-duction	Yield	Pro-duction	Yield	Pro-duction	Yield
79/80	105.6	9.6	59.3	9.8	28.2	9.7	3.6	5.2	4.6	7.8
80/81	105.7	8.5	47.7	8.0	17.0	8.5	3.5	4.8	3.2	6.8
81/82	83.0	7.3	26.2	5.4	14.5	6.1	4.9	3.6	4.5	4.9
82/83	76.2	7.3	30.7	6.6	14.8	5.1	1.6	3.5	3.4	3.9
83/84	79.4	6.8	33.8	6.2	17.1	5.8	1.3	1.6	3.6	4.6
84/85	92.4	7.8	54.8	7.3	18.4	5.1	2.5	3.4	3.3	4.4
85/86	86.5	7.1	33.5	6.4	11.0	5.8	3.8	2.2	1.5	4.3
86/87	94.9	6.7	31.2	4.4	18.5	6.7	3.3	2.6	1.5	3.9
87/88	158.6	9.2	53.1	7.0	19.2	6.3	7.4	3.2	2.6	4.8
88/89	98.3	7.5	24.2	5.6	22.9	8.4	6.8	4.0	0.7	4.2

Source: Central Bank of Lesotho. *Annual Report for 1989*, p. 8, in which they quote Bureau of Statistics Figures.



**Table III: GDP by Kind of Economic Activity at Current Prices (in Million Maloti)**

Economic Activity	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
<b>Primary Sector:</b>	88.2	96.9	95.0	115.9	182.9	168.5
Agriculture	87.6	95.3	93.1	114.0	182.1	164.1
Mining & Quarrying	0.6	1.6	1.9	1.9	0.8	4.4
<b>Secondary Sector:</b>	95.8	131.6	137.9	173.0	234.2	297.1
Manufacturing	42.7	49.6	63.7	82.7	111.8	136.0
Electric & Water	2.5	3.7	5.5	4.1	8.4	8.3
Building & Construction	50.6	78.3	68.7	86.2	114.0	152.9
<b>Tertiary Sector:</b>	211.2	253.4	288.2	316.6	403.1	477.9
W/sale & Retail	36.4	44.3	51.9	60.0	72.0	85.0
Catering	6.1	7.4	8.7	10.9	12.7	15.3
Transport & Communications	11.6	14.2	19.2	26.3	35.2	41.5
Finance & Insurance	29.4	29.5	27.2	27.2	41.9	54.4
Real Estate & Business Services	12.1	13.0	14.9	17.0	20.4	28.3
Ownership of Dwellings	27.7	29.9	35.6	38.3	43.0	52.5
Public Admin.	39.1	54.1	60.3	61.0	79.8	87.5
Education	32.4	40.3	45.5	49.1	63.7	74.7
Health	8.6	11.4	13.5	13.6	19.4	21.4
Other Services	7.8	9.3	11.4	13.2	15.0	17.3
Sub-Total	395.2	481.9	521.1	605.5	820.2	943.5
Less Imputed Bank Charges	29.9	31.1	28.7	27.8	41.8	50.9
GDP at Factor Cost	365.3	450.8	492.4	577.6	778.4	892.5
Plus Indirect Taxes	89.1	98.4	122.0	155.5	196.2	207.2
GDP at Market Prices	454.4	549.3	614.4	733.0	974.6	1099.2

Notes: 1. The 1989 figures were all preliminary figures during the complication of the CBL annual report.

2. Totals do not agree with constituent items due to rounding.

Source: Central Bank of Lesotho. *Annual Report for 1989*, p.12, in which they quote Bureau of Statistics figures.

In the 1980s, the national economy had its ups and downs. The agricultural sector, which is referred to as the mainstay of the economy, was particularly hard hit by the prolonged drought in the agricultural years 1981/82, 82/83 and 83/84. Again in 1986/87 crop production was adversely affected by (a) excessive summer rains which delayed planting and did not allow proper weeding, (b) early frost which was particularly devastating in the foothills and mountainous regions, (c) winter drought which curtailed wheat production, and (d) a cutworm epidemic which dealt the final blow to agricultural production in that year. Because of its importance in the national economy, the reduced agricultural production affected the rest of the economic performance. Tables II and III bear testimony to this state of affairs, although unfortunately Table III does not depict the GDP by kind of economic activity prior to 1984.

On the employment situation, the economy did not fare any better. The unceremonial closure of the Letseng-la-Terai diamond mine and the resultant loss of almost 800 jobs in 1983 is a typical example of the unemployment crisis that the economy faced in the 1980s. It should be noted that the loss of income not only affected the said workers, but well over 4 000 people if it is conservatively assumed that each worker has, on average, five dependants according to extended family relationships. The loss of foreign exchange earnings through diamond sales was another blow to the economy.

According to the Central Bank of Lesotho, which bases the domestic employment statistics on the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey (LFS), the labour force was estimated at about 604 800 in 1989 out of a total *de jure* population of about 1,6 million people. The labour force participation rate for males is about 76% whereas for females it is only 37%. The labour force is estimated to increase by about 20 000 people every year, of which only 10% are employed in the domestic formal sector. The unemployment rate for the whole country for both sexes stands at an alarming 23%. It should be remembered that in terms of the so-called "advanced market economies" of the West which most of the developing economies, including Lesotho's economy, are emulating, the acceptable and/or unavoidable unemployment rate is set at 5%. It should further be noted that the unemployment figures, in terms of Labour Force survey of the Bureau of Statistics, exclude the seasonal agricultural workers. In terms of Lesotho's agricultural practices, such workers toil during the ploughing/planting season, the weeding season where applicable, and the harvesting season. In between these

seasons they are engaged in practically no economic activity. (See Tables IV and V).

**Table IV: Lesotho Population and Employment Rate**

Usual activity/age	Males	Females	Total
<b>Labour Force</b>			
<b>Participation rate, %</b>			
12-19	41.1	17.1	28.5
20-34	90.8	45.8	68.3
35-54	94.7	49.2	70.8
55+	77.5	32.1	51.8
Not stated	27.0	2.4	10.5
Total	76.4	36.5	55.5
<b>Unemployment rate, %</b>			
12-19	29.0	37.5	31.7
20-34	22.1	29.3	24.5
35-54	15.9	19.1	17.1
55+	25.6	16.7	22.5
Not stated	0	0	0
Total	21.7	25.1	22.9
Population 12+ years	534 826	588 086	1 123 512
Employed	319 991	160 768	480 759
Unemployed	88 681	53 945	142 626
Total economically			
Active	408 671	21 714	623 385

Source: Adapted from Table 3.2, page 27: *The Labour Force of Lesotho*, Bureau of Statistics, July 1990.

**Table V: Distribution of Employment by Industrial Activity**

ISIC* Code	Industry	Period		
		1982/83	83/84	84/85
290	Quarrying	46	-	-
31	Food & Beverage	1 540	1 579	1 210
31	Textile, Wearing apparel & Leather	887	1 038	2 292
332	Furniture & Fixtures	572	153	238
342	Printing & Publishing	313	326	325
352	Other chemical products	136	196	190
369	Non-metal products	219	332	609
371	Iron & Steel	208	263	277
390	Other industries	298	164	55
3	Total manufacturing	4 173	4 377	5 196
4	Electricity & Water	878	618	885
2-4	All industries	5 097	4 995	6 081

\* International Standard of Industrial Classification.

Source: Bureau of Statistics, *Socio-economic Indicators of Lesotho*, 1987.

The Lesotho government remained the single largest employer in the 1980s. In 1989 it employed a total of 10 787 people in both the civil service and the disciplined forces, which comprise the army, police and the prisons staff. The 1989 employment figure represents a 10.6% increase over 1988. This was despite the IMF/World Bank dictated structural adjustment programme which, among other things, required a reduction in the government payroll. South Africa, particularly its mining industry, remained the largest employer of Basotho nationals, specifically the males. In percentage terms, Basotho employed in South Africa constitute about 70% of all the formal sector employment in Lesotho. Incomes of these migrant workers, taking into account both remittances and deferred pay, account for over 70% of the Lesotho GDP. Development Associates Inc. in 1988 succinctly stated that "A basic fact about Lesotho's economy is that half of its GNP is generated outside its borders... (this) income is used to sustain

consumption levels and patterns far beyond what Lesotho's resource endowment and current production could support..."<sup>2</sup>

**Table VI: Statistics of Basotho Miners and Their Income**

Period	No. employed	Remittances ('000 Maloti)	Deferred Pay ('000M)
1980	120 733	17 662	24 440
1981	123 538	26 928	35 813
1982	117 641	51 004	76 720
1983	115 327	74 207	103 568
1984	114 041	82 923	123 550
1985	116 223	92 675	141 546
1986	121 450	104 776	178 594
1987	125 934	124 354	188 568
1988	124 781	-	-
1989	126 264	-	-

Source: Adapted from M. Phafane: *The Economic Structure of Lesotho. An Overview*, P.8, in which he quotes the figures from the Department of Labour. The 1988 and 1989 figures are quoted from the Central Bank of Lesotho *Annual Report for 1989*.

<sup>2</sup>

Development Associates Inc. "Assistance to Lesotho on Mining Repatriation Issues", March 1988, NP. P.8.

Given the above tables, it is self-evident that when referring to industrial relations within the context of Lesotho, we are talking about a very tiny workforce which is operating amid massive underemployment and unemployment.

## Industrial Relations and their Contexts

Broadly speaking, the term "industrial relations" in this paper, is used to mean relationships between the employees, collectively, and their employers within the context of the workplace, work community and/or within an industry. It is about the network of rules and regulations which govern the workplace, the character of such rules and the manner in which they are formulated, administered and altered where necessary. In other words industrial relations is about the maintenance of stability and regularity in an industry so that production can continue even if the employees and the employers in any particular workplace do not see eye to eye on any aspect of the job. Trivial matters such as personal relationships, conservation or horseplay that takes place between workers, or allocation of tasks by supervisors to their subordinates, are clearly not included in the definition of industrial relations in this context. This is so despite the fact that major industrial disputes and conflicts sometimes originate from these interactions.

Given this definition, four distinct and yet interrelated theories/systems of industrial relations can be identified.<sup>3</sup> Firstly is the unitary/pluralist approach to industrial relations. In this theory, every work organisation is regarded as an integrated and harmonious entity which exists for a common purpose. Each employee identifies with the aims of the organisation and the methods of operation. Both the management which represents the owners of capital, and the workers, who own nothing but their labour power, are said to be complementary partners to the common aims of production and profits. In other words, management and the workforce are merely parts of the same team. Strong leadership of the organisation is required to keep the working order and to ensure commitment to tasks, to managerial office holders and ultimately to the organisation itself.

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For more details on these theories/systems of industrial relations see R. Hyman, *Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction*, MacMillan, London, 1975, and K.Von Beyme, *Challenge to Power: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Capitalist Countries*, Sage publications, London, 1980.

Factionalism is seen as a disease, like trade unionism, which is regarded as an illegitimate intrusion into a unified and cooperative structure of the workplace. In fact trade unions are said to compete with the management for the loyalty and commitment of employees.

The second approach is the industrial conflict perspective, also known as the Oxford approach. In essence, this theory is based on corporate capitalism of the post-19th century era in which managers of workplaces are not necessarily the owners of such industrial enterprises. Industrial conflict is accepted as a norm, but politically motivated conflicts in industries are not. Conflicts are not violent, but essentially arise over economic issue/disputes which can readily be solved through dialogue in appropriate conflict-resolution mechanisms. Trade unions are welcome outgrowths of the informal grouping of workers and they serve two useful purposes of being representatives of employees as well as regulating the inherent industrial conflicts, rather than causing them. The management of both public corporations and private establishments no longer constitutes a class on its own due to open and competitive labour markets and mobility as a result of the widening of educational opportunities and the democratisation process in various societies.

The third theory of industrial relations is the systems model approach, which is a US contribution in this field. In this perspective, industrial relations is equated to a system in which there are actors which comprise (a) the hierarchy of managers and their representatives in a workplace, (b) the hierarchy of non-managerial employees and their spokesmen and (c) specialised third party agencies, whether from governmental or private sources, (e.g. industrial courts, tribunals, independent labour law specialists, etc.). These actors operate in specific technological and environmental contexts, meaning among other things, the technological characteristics of the workplace and/or work community, the market/budgeting constraints which impinge on the actors, the locus and distribution of economic and political power in a society as a whole, and so on. The industrial relations system and other systems are bound together by a specific ideology and a network of rules created to govern the actors at workplaces and in the work community. The network of rules, consisting of procedures for establishing rules and substantive rules and regulations themselves, are all the products of a system. In this context, the word "ideology" means a body of common ideas that defines the role and the place of each actor and defines the

ideas which each actor holds towards the place and function of the others in the system.

The last but not the least important theory of industrial relations is the class conflict analysis which is Marxist in nature. This approach is not strictly a theory of industrial relations *per se*. It is rather a general theory of any given society and of inherent social change following the principles of dialectical materialism, and as such it has implications for the analysis of industrial relations, given the central position accorded to economics in Marxist political economy. In terms of this analysis, industrial conflicts, which arise out of differences in economic power between social classes and groups, are rooted in the structures and institutions of a society itself, particularly the capitalist societies. Such conflicts (between those who buy and sell labour power) are seen as a permanent feature of capitalism. Trade unions are seen to challenge all the prerogatives which go with the ownership of the means of production, and not simply the exercise of control over their members' labour power. In the final analysis trade unions are seen as the inevitable consequence of the capitalist exploitation of wage labour, and as such trade unions are ultimately going to dispossess the capitalist class, in conjunction with other progressive groups in a capitalist society.

All the above four theories of industrial relations are not without faults, some of which are so severe that they almost invalidate the theories outright. But given the fact that theory enables one to interpret empirical actions and happenings logically and systematically, these theories have been retained despite their weakness. This is particularly so because of the absence of alternatives.

So far industrial relations have been examined essentially from the shop-floor level and at the level of the work community, without any major reference to national policies pertaining to industrial relations. In other words, the national context and/or environment in which industrial relations take place has not been described in detail. There are three distinct environments in which industrial relations take place. Firstly there is the **tripartite** system, which is typified by the International Labour Organization. In this system the three socioeconomic partners, the government, the employers' organisations and the workers' organisations, sit together to decide on the national policies on industrial relations and employment matters. Decisions which are made are binding on all employers and employees in a nation which uses such a system. Secondly, there is the **bilateral** system. In this system, industrial relations policies and other employment issues are decided



by the employers and their workers collectively, with a minimal involvement by the government. Usually the governments only intervene when the two central parties fail to agree. The third system is the **unilateral** system, in which industrial relations policies are totally dominated by the government. The pre-1990 Eastern European countries are said to be typical examples. The other partners - employers and workers - simply follow what has been decided by the government.

Given these various industrial relations theories/systems and the contexts in which they operate, it is appropriate to pose the question: what system of industrial relations obtains in Lesotho? Is there any discernable national policy that governs industrial relations in Lesotho?

### **Industrial Relations in Lesotho**

Of the four theories of industrial relations described above, there is no single one of which the industrial relations system in Lesotho can be said to be a typical example. Lesotho's system can at best be described as a cross-breed covering all the theories, with the exception of the class conflict analysis model. The trade union movement in Lesotho cannot be said to fall within the group of progressive elements who are intending to change the socioeconomic and political order in favour of the working class. After all the trade union movement is too fragmented and weak to be capable of undertaking any revolutionary restructuring of the society.

At the moment there are 38 duly registered trade unions operating in the country. It should be borne in mind that these unions are not organising the migrant workers nor the civil servants which, as it has been pointed out, constitute the bulk of the workforce. The unions' organisational structure is a mixture of industrial unions, general unions and company unions. There are district trade unions which organise workers, not in terms of the industries in which they work, but in terms of the places where workers live and work. There are also industrial unions which organise workers in terms of the industries in which they work. But it is the norm to find more than two rival unions organising in the same industry, the typical example being the food industry which has more than three unions. Lastly there are company-based unions which only organise the employees of a single employer. Example of this type include the union of Basotho Enterprises Development Corporation (BEDCO) Employees, the National University of

Lesotho Academic Staff Association (NULASA) and others. At the apex, there are two rival trade union federations to which most of the unions are affiliated, while others remain independent or unaffiliated.

The Lesotho government openly welcomes the trade unions and coopts them in tripartite forums such as the National Advisory Committee on Labour and the Minimum Wages Board. This is because it believes that these unions are representative and realises the potential of the unions in the settlement of industrial conflicts. This understanding is in line with the industrial conflict theory of industrial relations, as pointed out above. On the other hand, some employers regard trade unions as the cause of industrial unrest. In a recent consultative meeting between the government and the employers on the current upsurge of strikes in the construction, textile and service industries, some employers alleged that "strikes, by and large, occur where workers are unionised and that shows that union leaders do instigate strikes".<sup>4</sup> That attitude towards trade unions is clearly in line with the unitary approach to industrial relations as described above. Again at the recent NULASA case against the NUL administration on negotiation with the former on salary increase, the administration clearly took the unitary approach to industrial relations. In the first instance the administration did not want to recognise NULASA as a union: secondly the administration alleged that it did not have a mandate to negotiate salaries, arguing that such negotiations can only be undertaken by the University Council. On both counts, their arguments were invalidated. The Department of Labour, as a principal governmental agency involved with labour and employment matters, compelled the administration to negotiate with NULASA as a full-fledged and registered union.

In terms of the descriptive American systems model approach to industrial relations, the workers through the hierarchy of their spokespersons (from the shop stewards to the federation officials), the employers' associations and groupings, the government and the judiciary all represent the actors in the industrial relations system of Lesotho.

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A report (by the author to the Vice-Chancellor) on employers meeting on strikes in commercial and industrial undertaking held at the Lesotho Sun on 8th August 1990 at 2.30 p.m.

At a national level, tripartite systems of industrial relations are used to a certain extent. A mention has already been made of tripartite forum such as the National Advisory Committee on Labour, and the Minimum Wages Advisory Board. In this board workers and employers representatives sit together with the Department of Labour officials to deliberate on desirable changes on labour laws and on other policy issues pertaining to labour as well as to decide on new minimum wage levels across all job categories and occupations. These bodies are only advisory to the minister responsible for labour matters. He can either accept their advice and promulgate it into a law, or reject it. In almost all cases in the 1980s, the ministers tended to take a middle course, e.g. if the Wages Board had agreed to raise the minimum wages, say by 20% on the average, the minister would settle on 12 or 15%.

On the other hand, government officials have repeatedly stated that the national labour laws and other policy issues on employment matters provide for the minimum standards that the government would like to see. The government would like to see improvements in salaries, and in conditions and terms of service coming out of the collective bargaining processes between employers and their employees. This is in accordance with the principles of the bilateral system of industrial relations. Unfortunately collective agreements are very rare. Even the few that have been agreed to, have very little benefits for the workers. As a matter of fact, the present Commissioner of Labour stated that some of the collective agreements provide for less favourable benefits than those that law provides for. In such cases, the provisions of the law prevail while those of the collective agreements are invalidated. This points to the fact that the trade union movement in Lesotho has a long way to go before it reaches maturity and achieves noteworthy results.

Given this state of affairs, it would be appropriate to assess the industrial relations scene in the 1980s against the background of the somewhat complicated Lesotho industrial relations system. The 1980s were not restful in terms of industrial relations as compared to the 1970s and preceding decades. With a rather successful expansion of the industrial base in the eighties, domestic employment opportunities grew noticeably in the following industries: textiles and other clothing, the building construction, general manufacturing, catering and other services (see Table III & V). The growth in terms of both employment and contribution to the GDP was not without problem such as strikes and other forms of industrial unrest. Some of the major strikes and other prolonged disturbances included the workers of the following industries: Maluti Sheepskin 1982; J.C. Lai

1982; the Lesotho Union of Banks 1984, 1985, 86/87 and some in 1988; construction companies involved in the Lesotho Highland Water Development Project 1988-90 and finally the teachers' strike of 1990. By major strikes is meant those in which more than five man-days of production were lost. In terms of the labour laws of this country, all the strikes were illegal in that proper procedures were not followed even though in most cases the strikers' grievances were accepted as valid. It should be noted that the right to go on strike in terms of Lesotho labour legislation exists only in theory<sup>5</sup>. In practice, legal strike action is almost impossible because of the long and tedious procedures that have to be followed. It takes almost six months to go on strike legally if all procedures are fully followed. It is very difficult to expect aggrieved workers to be patient for such a long time while different offices, conciliators and arbitrators take their time in trying to solve the grievances.

Invariably the major cause of these strikes was wages/salaries. This was the case with the employees of the Lesotho Highland Development Authority (LHDA) construction companies; the Lesotho Flour Mills; the Lesotho Union of Banks; Maputsoe Industries and others. In most cases, the management refused to accede to the workers' salary increase demands. The management unilaterally set and implement salary increases without consulting union representatives on the plant, despite the recognition agreement and provisions of collective bargaining pertaining to salary increases. The J.C. Lai employees strike was sparked off by management refusal to provide the workers with free protective clothing, as required by law. This particular strike was one of the most bloody in the history of this country. During the height of the discontent, workers assembled on the factory premises and refused to work. As usual the management telephoned the police who came and tried to disperse the strikers. Their spokesperson who tried to reason with the police against dispersal was instantly arrested and his colleagues responded by stoning the police who retaliated with teargas and sjamboks, then bloodshed resulted.

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Molefi, J. "The Lesotho Labour Laws and their Impact on Trade Union Organising", ILS Occasional Paper No.5, Maseru, 1987.

Other causes of strikes, which were identified by the employers at the 8 August 1990 consultative meeting with the Department of Labour referred to above, included the following:

1. That some union officials do not know the procedures to be followed when solving grievances. The procedures are laid down in the labour law texts.
2. That some union officials encourage workers to violate established company - grievance handling procedures.
3. That some employers are ignorant about the labour laws of this country.
4. That the government labour offices take sides with workers when there is a dispute, instead of being impartial.
5. That wage increase demands by workers are generally unrealistic and are not proportionate to productivity. A wage increase of 40% per annum was given as an example of unrealistic demand.
6. That the Labour Department is not doing enough to orientate the newly contracted international companies on Lesotho labour laws and what to expect in the course of their operations in Lesotho.

On their part, some union officials whom I interviewed gave the following reasons for the strikes:

1. That some multinational construction companies treat the Basotho workers unfairly compared to other foreigners, particularly South Africans. They pointed out that two people of similar experience and qualifications (one being a Mosotho and other being a South African) are not paid the same wages. The expatriate workers get more than the local employees.
2. That management, particularly of the Chinese-owned enterprises, do not want to communicate with unions. They also tend to victimise the unionised employees.

3. That some companies set daily or weekly production targets which are almost impossible to meet. As a result employees in such cases toil from 8.00 a.m. to mid-night, without transport provision. This was said to be pervasive in the clothing industry firms, which are mainly managed by the Chinese and other people from the Far East.
4. That in general managers adopt a very hostile attitude to trade unions.
5. That the police unnecessarily intervene in industrial disputes and always take sides with the management.

The list of accusations and counter-accusations could be much longer. The fact of the matter is that the 1980s was not a very quiet and restful decade for industrial relations in Lesotho. The question that remains to be answered is what should be done, by whom, and how, in order to stabilise and harmonise industrial relations in the 1990s.

### **Conclusion: Prospects for Industrial Relations in the 1990s**

To conclude this paper, it is necessary to consider the nature of industrial relations in the 1990s and beyond. While it is very difficult to predict what will happen, the past and present industrial relations in Lesotho will have a bearing on the future. The economic prospects for the 1990s and beyond are brighter than at present provided the Highlands Water Project bears the expected fruits. For example the expected revenue from the sale of water to South Africa, self-sufficiency in electrical power energy and increased revenue from the energy and other spinoff benefits such as increased revenue from the tourism industry associated with the project, and others. Manufacturing industry also shows signs of steady growth even in the formative stages, and the expectation is that even though not very many new investors are likely to come, the present trends and growth will be consolidated. New schemes such as export finance facilities are all going to boost the manufacturing sector. On the bleak side of the economic performance is the anticipated significant loss of South African mining job opportunities for Basotho and the resultant growth of unemployment locally. As hinted above, the normalisation of the political situation in South Africa and the expected democratisation processes in that country are likely to affect us adversely

because apartheid will end and the economic embargo will be lifted. The South African economy is much more attractive for investment purposes than ours in terms of size, infrastructure, availability of raw materials and so on. As such investors will increasingly be attracted to that country rather than Lesotho.

Locally the current move to return the country to democratic rule and political stability also enhances the chances of having equally stable industrial relations. The absence of democracy provides a very fertile soil for the growth of unaccountability at all levels of responsibility, rampant corruption and nepotism, and other social ills.

It goes without saying that harmonisation of industrial relations cannot come about like the biblical manna from heaven. An effort from labour-related institutions both in government and outside is required. Foremost among these institutions is the Department of Labour, particularly its industrial relations inspectorate and the legal sections. If these sections were appropriately staffed, some of the industrial upheavals could have been avoided or at least they could not have lasted as long as they did. The Institute of Labour Studies, is another key institution in the sphere of industrial relations. Its research and education section can play an important role in minimising industrial unrest. The research section could be very effective if it were strengthened so that it could undertake extensive policy-oriented research programmes on labour and general employment matters. The education section, through its short courses on industrial relations for trade union officials and various managerial levels in industries, can also play an important role. After all the lists of the causes of industrial unrest by both the workers and employers point to the fact that proper industrial relations education and training can do a lot to harmonise industrial relations in Lesotho in the 1990s and beyond.

Finally, mention should be made of the new Draft Labour Code which will hopefully be in use shortly. In essence, this Labour Code consolidates into one text more than ten labour laws and regulations which are all currently in force. It also embodies the ILO conventions and recommendations appropriate to the prevailing national economic and social conditions. It further introduces long-awaited labour courts which will help to expedite the settling of industrial disputes. These had hitherto been handled by the overloaded ordinary courts of law, whose staff may not be fully conversant with the law and practice pertaining to ordinary

individual employment relationships and collective labour relations. Again, the application of the draft labour code covers practically every employed person in Lesotho, unlike the present fragmented labour laws which exclude some categories of workers such as domestic workers, public servants and employees of religious and charitable organisations. The notorious summary dismissal provisions of the present Employment Act, in which a worker may be instantly dismissed for allegedly being guilty of unspecified misconduct, are being replaced by more humane and fair labour practices provisions. While this labour code is not necessarily the best piece of legislation around, it has a great potential to make industrial relations more effective and acceptable to all the parties concerned.

In conclusion, one can confidently say prospects for industrial relations harmony are good. The challenge for all industrial relations practitioners and institutions is to pull up their socks and to make maximum use of the advantages.

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# **A CRISIS IN AFRICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: ITS ORIGINS AND MEASURES FOR ITS REVERSAL**

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## **Introduction**

As African countries search for solutions to the economic crisis facing them, attention is drawn to the issue of whether their public administration systems have potential to contribute to the recovery and development efforts. A review of public administration systems in most African countries reveals that they are as much in a crisis as the economic situation they are trying to rectify. The crisis in public administration systems is reflected not only in their inability to shoulder such functions as production, transportation and marketing of agricultural and industrial products - about which there is some dispute as to whether they should be performed by the state - but also those functions which are clearly tasks of the state, including the maintenance of law and order, provision and maintenance of development infrastructure and provision of social services. The crisis is also reflected in a shrinking resource base with declining revenues, both in absolute terms and in relation to expenditure requirements.

It is argued in this paper that to a great extent the crisis in public administration owes much to inept policy actions taken by various African governments. These inept policy actions include taking on loads far in excess of their capacities, structural and organisational forms that are inefficacious for effective policy management, and giving inadequate attention to productivity and management issues in the management of the public service.

While many African governments and the international community have recognised the need to take corrective action to reverse the trend, the actions taken so far are

inadequate to deal squarely with the crisis and in many cases, they seem not to recognise sufficiently the incipient character of that crisis.

The fact that the crisis reveals itself in the failure to fulfil assigned responsibilities, in the diminution of the resource base, and in the decline of efficiency and productivity suggests that the causes are both inherent within the structures and processes of public administration as well as in the context within which the system operates. It appears that ingrained in the system of public administration are structural dysfunctions which undermine the efficiency of the system. At the same time, there has evolved in the general context of African development a constellation of factors which have imposed momentous challenges and severe constraints to the governance process. These dual forces have shaped and determined the performance of African public administration.

While there is a case for a detailed specification of measures needed to resuscitate, rehabilitate and strengthen African countries public administration and the author has done so in a study just to be published soon, this paper is devoted to a broad exploration of the crisis in African public administration including the issue of origins, current condition and prospects for reversal.

### **Historical legacies**

Before colonialism, African governance systems varied according to the levels of development and the socio-political systems in place, but generally their administrative systems lacked the attributes of a modern state.

Colonialism, to a great extent, supplanted or suppressed the various traditional administrative organisations and with them their administrative cultural values. In most parts of Africa the traditional administrative organisations were replaced by bureaucratic organisations styled after the system in the mother country. The civilizing mission of the colonial masters had limited scope and it was mainly concerned with pacifying the natives for purposes of facilitating the exploitation of natural resources. As such little investment was put into the development of complicated administrative infrastructure. The administrative systems consisted of skeletal organisations, large enough only for purposes of extracting revenues and ensuring orderly governance.

Even where the traditional systems were left to operate through what came to be known as "indirect rule", as was the case with most of the British colonies, their role and perspective changed in that they were called upon to foster the colonial masters interests of maintaining law and order and collection of taxes.

The goals of the colonial system naturally dictated the governance system that was put in place. Since the goals were to maintain "law and order" and the collection of taxes, the public administration system that was fostered therefore was highly legalistic; emphasizing loyalty, process, procedures and precedents. Rules and regulations became the main instruments for eliciting compliance and discipline. Administrative training and practices were similarly modelled along these lines. The organisation of the administration was highly hierarchical, inhibiting lower level participation in decision-making; and since it was in the service of the colonial masters, it was highly suppressive and did not respond to public demands. These attributes contributed immensely to the evolution of an administrative culture that was conservative, unresponsive and undevelopmental in orientation. But in so far as the interests of the colonial state remained limited to the goals mentioned earlier, the administrative system seemed to operate effectively.

The evolving public administration culture manifested itself more significantly in three important aspects: management styles, management of financial resources and management of information. Personnel management systems were built on rigid rules with over-regulation of personnel practices and policies. Classification of personnel was usually in terms of duties rather than tasks and people were paid for what they were, rather than for what they did. Furthermore, the systems were characterised by vague job descriptions and performance appraisal systems which valued compliance rather than productivity. The hierarchical structures and administrative practices did not allow for meaningful participation by junior personnel. The evolving financial practices, especially budgeting and financial accountability, were also deficient. Budgeting relied almost entirely on line-item approach to budgeting, using the object of expenditure as the basis for financial allocation. Finally, because the information needed for the kind of decisions taken then was limited, there was little appreciation of sophisticated information management techniques, and moreover, most information was usually treated as confidential and this therefore deliberately limited its circulation.

The attainment of independence ushered in great development expectations as well as new and expanded responsibilities that, in turn, demanded changes in the administrative culture, orientations and capacities. Public administration had to be oriented towards development, as well as be responsive to the interests and expectations of the governed. It had to recruit personnel with a greater range of knowledge and skills.

Most African countries took early steps to reorganise their administrative systems in that direction. Measures taken consisted mainly of organisational restructuring, personnel management systems reforms and enhancement of competence levels. Countries appointed commissions of inquiry to examine the appropriateness of existing structures, processes and procedures and make recommendations on desired changes. Examples of such commissions include the Udoji Commission in Nigeria (1975) the Wamalwa Commission in Swaziland (1975), the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya (1975); to mention just a few.

With respect to competence levels, concerted efforts were made in all countries to expand the educational and training facilities and resources, as well as to secure training opportunities abroad. A country like Zambia which had only about ten graduates when it attained independence, was already graduating more than 500 people a year by 1975. The over-reliance on expatriates to man the public services which was the norm in many countries at independence came to be an exception, and such personnel were in very specialised positions.

Despite these efforts African public administration systems are, as we noted earlier, not in the best of shape. Evidence available indicate that they still exhibit many of the problems inherited at independence. The continued prevalence of the problems, and especially the present crisis condition, suggests that the administrative reforms and improvements of the 1960s and 1970s were both inappropriate and inadequate and left the administrative systems even weaker (in relation to the tasks at hand) than the colonial administrative systems were.

### **Development in the Ecology of Public Administration**

When African countries attained independence in the 1960s they shared a number of adverse ecological characteristics: they were all economically underdeveloped, politically fragile and unstable and many of them were heterogeneous. Other

common features included a poor transport and communication infrastructure, abnormally high rates of illiteracy and a critical shortage of skilled manpower, capital and technology for development.

Pitted against this sad state of affairs, however, were high expectations, enthusiasm on the part of the leadership and citizenry for fast development and better social and economic welfare.

Three decades later and in spite of concerted efforts to ameliorate some of the adverse ecological conditions, the enthusiasm and high hopes have disappeared, and in their place gloom and despair have set in. The ecology is now so volatile, and the challenges so enormous that the administrative systems are almost inoperative. What is it that happened to make the situation so desperate?

#### *Changes in the Nature, Size and Complexity of Tasks*

As independence was attained the functions of governance consisted of maintaining law and order and facilitating the productive efforts of a relatively small economic sector that was dominated by colonial or metropolitan enterprises, with a small insignificant peasant sector. Any other function was carried out in support of these two activities. The maintenance of law and order, while still considered as one of the most important functions of government, was no longer as simple since it now involved the protection of national unity, integrity, sovereignty - task which called for different patterns of public service capabilities. Moreover, with increased population and greater sophistication on the part of the citizenry, there was in many countries an increased incidence of lawlessness which called for much greater capabilities than could have been imagined at the time of independence.

In addition the public administration systems were called upon to take up new tasks including accelerating economic development. In many cases this entailed the ownership and management by government of economic and commercial ventures, as well as the provision of facilities and infrastructures to privately owned and managed economic ventures. It also required the activation and espousal by the government of socioeconomic development by providing social infrastructure like roads, schools, health facilities, water supplies, etc.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s attempts were made in many countries to strengthen administrative capacities to cope with these new tasks. Many countries took steps to reform their administrative structures and organisations, training schemes were undertaken, localisation proceeded well and the number and variety of skilled persons increased appreciably (A Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, 1982). In spite of this, by the 1980s most experts on public administration were decrying the low capacity of African public administration systems, and they were calling for its rejuvenation (AAPAM, 1984; 1986).

### *High Rates of Population Growth and Urbanisation*

Africa has a reputation of recording one of the highest rates of population growth and simultaneously the lowest rate of economic growth. The ECA perspective study covering the period 1988-2000 estimates that Africa's total population will grow to 1,1 billion by the year 2008, from a figure of 208 162 000 in 1970 (ECA: 1988). At the same time urbanization is taking place at an unprecedented rate. Statistics show that the urban population increased as follows: (1970) 8.2 million, (1975) 105 million (1980) 137 million, and (1985) 177 million (UNFPA: 1985). This means the increase over the period 1970-1985) was 216 %.

Simultaneous with the increase and urbanization was the increase in the demand for education. The cumulative effect of all these developments has been an increased pressure on governments to provide more goods and services, jobs for growing number of unemployed youths, more schools and health facilities, and at the extreme end to cope with increasing crime rate. These have imposed constraints on the capacities or the governance systems, many of which have not evolved adequate response capacities.

### *Volatile Economic Performance*

Instead of economic growth, the continent has witnessed economic decline. Poverty, destitution and famine have become the order of the day. Whereas Africa is theoretically part of the developing world, in practical terms, Africa, south of Sahara (excluding South Africa), is developing far less rapidly than any other region in the same category. Table I compares the rate of growth in Africa

south of Sahara with countries in East Asia, Pacific, North Africa, and the Middle East, classified in three categories.

**Table 1: Comparison of rates growth of sub-Saharan Africa low-income countries, developing countries and middle-income countries 1965-1986**

	Average annual GDP growth							Average GDP growth per capita		
	65/ 73	73/ 80	80/ 82	82/ 83	83/ 84	84/ 85	85/ 86	65/ 73	73/ 80	80/ 86
Sub-Sahara Africa	6.4	3.2	-0.2	-1.5	-1.7	2.2	0.5	3.6	0.3	3.4
Low-income	5.5	4.6	6.6	7.7	8.9	9.1	6.5	2.9	2.5	5.4
Developing	6.5	5.4	2.1	2.1	5.1	4.8	4.2	3.9	3.2	1.5
Middle-income countries	7.0	5.7	0.8	0.0	3.6	2.8	3.2	4.4	3.4	-0.3

Source: World Bank: *World Development Report 1987*. Table A.3 and 2.6.

The table reveals that between 1965 and 1985 Africa (south of Sahara) lagged behind in terms of both GNP and GDP per capita. The World Bank put the matter succinctly in its 1981 report:

The low-income countries of Africa South of the Sahara were the principal exception to the overall trend; their growth was so low that per capita incomes actually declined (World Bank: 1981a).

The situation has since worsened. In a document entitled "Beyond Recovery: ECA-Revised Perspectives of Africa's Development, 1988-2008" the ECA reports thus:

... the period 1980-1987 was a very difficult one for Africa. During this period the region passed through a series of repeated and unprecedented crises and growing social and political turbulence and

economic imbalances. The prevailing economic rigidities during this period were further compounded by natural calamities and adverse external developments. The great African drought of 1983-1985 constituted a real threat to the livelihood of millions of African people. The drought caused grave damage to agriculture, the mainstay of the majority of the population and the major source of external revenues.

The ECA document observes that:

... the slow growth in the world economy, the perverse developments in international commodity markets, and in the world's financial and monetary systems which culminated in depressed export earnings, reduced resource flows and an escalation of the debt-servicing obligations, all interactively brought the African economy to the brink of collapse (ECA 1988:6).

The decline in production, compounded by a decline in the demand for primary products and a decrease in the value of exports, pushed many African countries into chronic balance of payments difficulties, forcing them either to resort to massive borrowing at even more stringent conditions, or to curtail their consumption and investments. Most countries initially chose the former alternative which led to the escalation of the debt burden, or to a further decline in production, engineering the economic crisis.

In response to the economic crisis, many African countries adopted structural adjustment measures to contain the situation. While it is not the intention of this chapter to address at length the various structural adjustment measures adopted by African countries, we will briefly mention those measures which have had a bearing on the performance of the public administration system.

The stabilisation and adjustment programmes implemented in African countries are generally aimed at re-establishing the balance of payments equilibrium, reducing the rate of inflation and creating favourable conditions for economic growth. Three main types of actions were proposed in this endeavour: the control of demand, action on the supply side, and the adjustment of the exchange rate. These interrelated broad actions were often formulated in the framework of a package of macro-economic policies. The specific policies differ from country to country, but the following tend to feature in most packages: restriction of demand, devaluation



of currencies, liberalisation of trade, reduction or elimination of subsidies, budget balancing, price incentives, privatisation or rationalisation of public enterprises and removal of price control.

To implement these, African countries have to change the nature and character of their public administration systems with respect to role and scope of government activities, structure and size of the public service and the skills required by it, structure and composition of the budget, laws and regulations, etc. With all these changes, at the end of the day, African public administration systems will be very different creatures from those that existed before the crisis period.

### *The Political System and Political Developments*

Developments in the African political arena have also posed challenges to the public administration systems in Africa. Many African countries were willed into states by the colonial powers. The arrangements for ensuring effective governance at independence, often written out in the form of constitutions, had little, if any, tradition or heritage to back them. The borders separating the various states cut across peoples of common ancestry, having been drawn up artificially by the colonial powers.

In the early years of independence the irrationality of the boundaries, as well as the fragility of the constitutions, tended to be glossed over. After all, the euphoria and goodwill generated by independence were still high. As the years passed euphoria wore down and it soon became apparent that people with little love for one another were conveniently lumped together into artificial nations and that when disputes arose over authority and power to determine resource utilisation and allocation, there was little guidance from the constitution as to how such disputes could be resolved. In due course authority tended to reside wherever power happened to be, and invariably this was where the instruments of coercion resided. That was the beginning of military interventions, secessions, rebellions, the creation of one-party states, and a host of other actions that were infringing upon the inherited constitutions and thereby changing the environment within which public administration had to operate.

The political turmoil that has ensued in many countries has, in turn, created other problems including the exodus of people from their countries (refugees), disruption of production, neglect of infrastructure and a host of others. A few countries such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya and, for some time, Senegal, have been spared these political problems and the positive result of this is clear in terms of the fact that they have been able to register a consistent growth in GDP and their infrastructure is still relatively intact.

Political turmoil damaged the administrative machine, throwing it out of gear by denying it the requisite resources. It is worth noting, however, that in some cases the public administration systems have kept the countries going. For instance, Uganda has been able to survive the political turmoil mainly because of the resilience of the public administration system. But even there, the scars of the political turmoil show very clearly in that the present administrative system has little gear, morale and competence; much of it having been lost during the days of Idi Amin and subsequent regimes. The result has been poor performance and low productivity on the part of the administrative system.

### *Incompatible Sociocultural Contexts*

Another factor affecting the public administration systems in Africa is the nature and character of the sociocultural milieu. In a celebrated study in the 1960s, Fred Riggs suggested that public administration systems in the Third World countries tended to operate ineffectively because the culture of the societies was not congenial to the dictates of a modern administrative machine (Riggs, 1961). In a more recent study, Goran Hyden argued similarly, attributing much of the mess in African management to the lack of congeniality between the demands of modern management and the African cultural milieu (Hyden, 1983).

While one may not want to exaggerate the impact of this factor on Africa's administrative performance, there may be some validity in the assertions. This is especially so since few African countries have tried to reorient their administrative systems to accommodate their particular cultural proclivities (Balogun, 1986). Instead, the cultural proclivities were expected to adjust to the demands of modern administration. Although not much research has been done to determine if

adjustments have taken place, casual observation tends to suggest that it has not, with dire consequences for the performance of the systems.

### **Impact of Historical Legacies and Developments in the Ecology of Public Administration**

The previously mentioned historical legacies, as well as developments in the ecology, had a rather negative impact upon the system of public administration. They transmitted characteristics and modalities of operation which were incongruent with the requirements of an administration system suitable for rapid development. They became too big and over-stretched, highly centralised, emasculated, resource-deficient and inefficient. We shall briefly examine some of the resultant characteristics below.

#### *Too Large a Public Service*

Many commentators on African public administration suggest that the public sector has grown considerably in the last 20 years of Africa's independence. The growth is indicated by big increases in the number of people on the public payroll, the growth in overall public expenditure and the percentage of GDP and GNP per capita that is consumed by the public sector. It is also indicated by the share occupied by the public sector in relation to the other sectors and activities of the economies.

The ECA had this to say about the issue:

Each government in Africa has fingers in every pie. Its interests range from banking and insurance through oil refineries, air and road transport, looking after agriculture and social welfare. Central Government bureaucracies are no longer content with merely shuffling papers from desk to desk, they now brew beer, distribute cement and sell meat. ... (AAPAM 1986:154).

Implicit in the observation is a feeling that the public sector has been growing too fast, and the need to check this growth requires urgent attention. Available evidence supports the contention that there has been a growth in the public sector in Africa as shown in Table II.

**Table II: Growth of the Public Sector in Selected African countries**

	1975	1983	Percentage increase per annum
Ghana	75 000	200 000	15
Malawi	31 840	50 000	7.9
Mali	31 763	49 116	5.6
Nigeria	716 421	1 723 519	15
Sudan	231 612	261 893	2.6
Senegal	61 836	80 390	3.7
Zambia	240 000	280 000	3.3

Source: Lindeaeur et al. 1986, p.36.

The data shows that for Ghana, Malawi and Nigeria, the annual growth of the public service stood at more than 5%, an increase which could not be matched by a growth in either GDP or GNP per capita. In due course therefore, the additional employees were bound to just become consumers, rather than producers, of the national product.

## *The Tendency Towards Centralism*

Partly because of the colonial administrative legacy which was preoccupied with law and order (itself a function of the fragility of imposed rule, which seems for some countries to have stretched into the independence era), there has tended to be an emphasis on concentrated authority and power. The result is that the institutions and structures that have emerged leave little room for the sharing of responsibilities, with most functions and responsibilities tending to gravitate towards the centre.

Thus policy making, which requires informed inputs from various parties, has come to be the sole responsibility of the president or the "presidency", the party politburo or the military council, with dire consequences for the efficaciousness of policy decisions, including policies dealing with socioeconomic development and management issues. Within the ministries it is not unusual for permanent secretaries, who are often burdened with big decisions, to take action on minor issues on projects in far corners of the country.

In some countries decisions were taken in principle to decentralise responsibility for administrative functions and socioeconomic development activities to local governments, parastatal bodies or cooperative organisations; but subsequent or parallel activities whittled away the basis of the decentralisation measures taken. Thus, local government institutions were created and given responsibility for local services but no commensurate authority and power to raise revenue was granted to them.

In almost all countries, government involvement in business activities tended to be conducted through institutions known as parastatals or public enterprises, created because such institutions made it possible for the government to be involved in business activities without being encumbered with the bureaucratic rules and norms that govern the public service. Yet, in almost every country, these same parastatals are subjected to controls by more than three layers of bureaucratic agencies. This robs them of operational authority to make business and other strategic management decisions, thus crippling their efficiency and profitability.

### *Inadequate and Inappropriate Institutional Capacities*

We have noted that African countries had a tendency to build centralised and authoritarian institutions. Despite this centralisation, however, the institutions have had limited capacities for effective policy management. While responsibility, authority and power for policy making are located in the office of the president, the party central committee or the military council, these institutions rarely have the staff to carry out data collection and analysis, provide policy options, monitor and evaluate implementation and advise on policy revisions where appropriate. These weaknesses have tended to result in the formulation of poor or irrelevant policies which often end up either not being implemented, or leading to unanticipated consequences if implemented.

Even where resources exist at the centre, they need to have complementary institutions at the national level that are viable and well articulated. Many of these central agencies do not even have parallel organs at the intermediate and local levels to carry out complementary policy management functions. Where they exist, they are normally weak. Moreover, as noted earlier, in most African countries there are no viable local institutions with which the central government can share responsibility for policy management. Given this situation, there is a great need to build viable policy management institutions at all levels.

### *Declining resources for public management*

Another major contributor to the crisis in public administration is the declining level of the resources that are critical to effective public management, including finance, manpower and material resources.

#### *(a) Finance*

The poor state of the finance of African countries is reflected in increasing fiscal deficits, which have their origins in two types of developments. Initially they were a function of escalating expenditures resulting from governments' commitment to development as a response to the pressures for enhanced public services. This situation was later compounded by the economic crisis which tended to depress the

scale of economic activity (production, trade, imports and exports), which in turn had an adverse impact on the tax base, resulting in a decline in revenues. The decline in financial resources has been compounded by the absence of sound financial management systems and practices. A recent study by the ECA shows that government budgetary systems in Africa have remained archaic; accounting systems have not kept pace with the complexity of modern financial management systems; and auditing and financial controls have been poorly applied, usually concentrating on financial and compliance aspects. Tax administration is poorly managed, with unrealistic laws, poor systems of collection and inadequate information bases; all leading to tax evasion. The effect of all these factors has been to reduce the level of financial resources, which in turn compounds the financial crisis, with adverse effects on the capacity of the public management system.

#### *(b) Manpower*

While African countries have made concerted efforts to train skilled manpower since the early years of independence, with aid agencies playing a significant part in the endeavour, a number of factors have made those efforts seem inadequate. Twenty-five years later, almost all countries face manpower shortages of some sort. The manpower shortage has two elements. While there is an absolute shortage of specific categories of skilled personnel, the available personnel are not making an optimal contribution to productivity. The situation is made worse by a brain-drain, of the few skilled people available, to greener pastures. This situation has come about as a result of the absence, in many African countries, of well-organised and adequately staffed manpower planning agencies; poor manpower management policies which include poor recruitment, training and compensation systems; poor management systems, which are characterised by the absence of performance appraisals, laxity in supervision and generally the absence of an accountability framework.

#### *(c) Inadequate or Inappropriate Administrative Technological Resources*

Administrative technology includes the organisation of office space in such a manner as to facilitate communication, coordination and control. It also includes such things as equipment, furniture, stationery, machinery and gadgets.

African public administration systems generally have inadequate and inappropriate administrative technologies. They are using archaic and outmoded office gear, equipment and machinery is in disrepair, and one often finds a mismatch between the available personnel and the supportive technology. There is also a tendency to acquire new technologies without initially synchronising their compatibility and adaptability. This situation has come about as a result of a number of factors, including the following:

(i) African countries inherited an administrative technology that was adequate for the tasks then at hand, commensurate with the size and complexity of the public service. However, as the tasks of governance expanded, the size and complexity of the public service increased, there was not a commensurate growth in the size and complexity of the administrative technologies. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that public employment tended to grow haphazardly without being related to either the work on hand or the technological resources to be used in performing the work.

(ii) The economic crisis further made it even more difficult to increase the number of technological units or to acquire spares for units which break down, which made the ratio between the available workforce and the administrative technology at its disposal even more unbalanced.

#### *(d) Declining Productivity*

Mainly as a result of a combination of all the above negative characteristics, poor productivity has become pervasive throughout the public service. Development projects are never completed on time, if they are completed at all. Poor productivity is now rampant in the service sector and the public commercial sector and is quickly seeping through into the private sector.

### **Attributes of a Desirable Public Administration System**

This paper has tried to demonstrate that African public administration faced severe problems during the post-independence period. Embodied within its structures are systematic anomalies derived from the inherited colonial administrative apparatus



that inhibit the growth of the system into a development-oriented apparatus. At the same time, the post-independence ecology deprived the system of the necessary dynamism for effective performance. African public administration is now in a dual crisis: a crisis of performance, as well as of sustenance. The system not only fails to accomplish its tasks but it is also unable to confront the challenges of recovery and sustainable development.

As indicated earlier in this paper, the crisis in African public administration is part of the one facing the broader socioeconomic system and thus attempts to redynamise it have to focus on the basic structures of the society in terms of the economic base, political institutions and socio-alignments. However, it must also be acknowledged that public administration is a unique social organism which, while being shaped and conditioned by its ecology, has a potential to react back and transform the ecology. Consequently, a purposeful redynamisation of public administration can enable it to initiate changes in the ecology, leading to the transformation necessary for the desired recovery. Below is a brief review of the desirable attributes of a "combat-ready" public administration.

The first attribute is related to clarity of role and scope, as well as ability to determine optimal level of involvement. It is imperative that the public administration system rationalises its functions and activities so that it handles only as much as its capacity allows.

The second attribute relates to the structure or organisation of the system. A public administration system for recovery has to be organised in such a way that it is flexible enough so as to cope with turbulent and complex situations. It must facilitate the coordination of the various component parts, be open, allow the full utilisation of available talents as well as frequent interchange of personnel among sectors; reduce the specialist/generalist conflicts; promote a better understanding between civil servants and politicians and between top civil servants and those in lower ranks and allow wider integration with the public. How this can be achieved will depend on the particular situation in each country, but it is important that flexibility, capacity and ability to change be an inbuilt element in the organisation system.

The third attribute is the capacity to generate adequate resources from the environment, to utilise the resources optimally and efficiently. The resources include manpower, finance and equipment. We have noted that the economic crisis places great demands on the public administration system for certain types of services, while at the same time shrinking the general level of resources. To balance the two contradictory tendencies will need imagination to devise new ways for revenue generation, of supervising and compensating personnel and of ensuring that resources are allocated where needed most. In short, the public administration system will have to ensure that productivity and efficiency are at the forefront of its operations.

The final set of attributes are to do with attitude, involving dedication, responsibility, responsiveness and accountability. While these can be induced, they are also innate in the individual. One factor affecting the emergence of these attributes is the environment - the political milieu. The issue to raise is: what external controls and influences should be brought to bear on the public administration system to ensure administrative morality, responsibility, responsiveness and accountability to the public? The response will depend largely on the character of the environment. However, the relationships worked out should leave the public administration system confident and not hamstrung by the political system, if it is to function efficiently and effectively.

## Conclusion

The public administration system needed to cope with the multiple challenges will require, in terms of organisation and structure, a system that can ensure capacity to accommodate rapid environmental changes; improved facilities to coordinate the constituent parts; openness and flexibility in both internal and external relations and organisational designs permitting optimal involvement of and accessibility to the citizens. In terms of process, the focus should be on increased professionalism through continuous and systematic training to acquire up-to-date knowledge, skills and techniques; optimal utilisation of manpower, procedures and methods which allow speedier action; and greater involvement of staff in organisational decision-making. In terms of values and attitudes, public servants need to be more result-oriented, honest and cost-conscious, as well as more responsible and responsive to the public. In short there is need for administrative cultural change.

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# REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE NEW SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOWARDS INTERDEPENDENCE

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## Introduction

It is now almost a cliché to say that the 1990s have ushered in a completely new world; a world where all the old ways of conducting international politics and diplomacy have given way to cooperation between the super-powers. Writing on the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe, Nabudere has argued that:

The changes that are currently underway in the USSR and Eastern Europe are of such epochal dimensions that they undermine our view of the world as we have known it since the end of the last world war.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, Fred Halliday has argued that recent events represent an earthquake in world politics.<sup>2</sup>

In Southern Africa, this change has been partly responsible for the "peace" moves which began with the resolution of the Namibian question and are now focused on the ongoing negotiations about the future of South Africa. Though it is too early to reach any definite conclusions about the success or otherwise of the negotiations, it is clear that Southern Africa can no longer remain the same. If the

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<sup>1</sup> Nabudere, Dan Wadada (1990). "Changing Eastern Europe : Chance for Africa", *SAPEM* 3 (5), p.3.

<sup>2</sup> Halliday, Fred (1990). "The End of Cold War". *New Left Review*. No.80 (March/April), p.5.

conditions of governance change in the region's "power-house", so will the whole concept of security policy and management. While a few years ago it was inconceivable to talk about security without belabouring the military balance of forces, it is now regarded as a foregone conclusion that "counting guns" will in future be a pre-occupation of a tiny minority of people in the field of strategic studies.

In the debate on regional security in the new era, traditional realist perceptions on security must be replaced with new ones where the military is put in the background. There is little in orthodox international relations that addresses the predicament of small states such as those in Southern Africa. Past studies of small states, particularly their security policies, have usually focused on small states in Eastern and/or Western Europe, despite the preponderance of small states in the Third World.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, there is a great preoccupation with and certain assumptions about power in much of the literature. Thus, Thucydides' logic that in international relations the powerful do what they want while the weak do what they can<sup>4</sup> is implicit in most analysis, and explicit in Aron and Morgenthau.<sup>5</sup>

Operating within this mould, analysts of Africa have conceived foreign and security policy in terms of the alliance of African states with one or the other of the big powers, and then deduced the options such states had in these alliances as a factor of policy. Needless to say, such studies have rightly been castigated for lacking insight as they concentrated on relatively transient features of a nation's policy and, at least in the case of Africa, on relatively insignificant features. If anything, as I indicated in a paper earlier this year, recent attempts at rapprochement between the super-powers indicate the futility of such an

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<sup>3</sup> See for example Holl (ed) (1983). *Small States in Europe and Dependence*, Luxembourg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Thucydides (1982). *The Peloponnesian War*, London, Penguin.

<sup>5</sup> Morgenthau, Hans (1973). *Politics Among Nations*. New York, Knopf.

rapprochement between the super-powers indicate the futility of such an approach.<sup>6</sup> In fact, current developments indicate clearly that such an approach is totally out of step with the present world political climate.

In the contemporary international system, not only do small states continue to be primarily concerned with their position within a largely fixed international structure, but traditionally stronger states also find their abilities to direct international developments to be limited. All international actors participating in an interdependent international system face similar situations of dependence on the external environment, which can be controlled only to a limited extent. In the Southern African situation, this means that South Africa cannot "call all the shots" in the power game, but that regional institutions like Southern African Customs Union (SACU) will also have a bearing on the reshaping of the regional security structure.

Traditionally, small states face somewhat different problems from the big powers. Accustomed to dependence on the international system and having only marginal impact on it, small states do not suffer any drastic revision with regard to international status. They remain small. On the other hand, the surrounding international environment has been transformed into a system characterised by interdependence. Quite possibly, the national ramifications of participation in such a system differ from those of the traditional setting. Whether the new environment is more beneficial than the previous one is a matter that will be determined in the future.

This paper is devoted to a preliminary discussion of the effects of international interdependence on national security in Southern Africa. The vital question is how participation in an interdependent system may affect the security position of the small Southern African states. In other words, in what respects is this position strengthened, and how could it be threatened, by interdependence?

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<sup>6</sup> Sejanamane, Mafa. "Conceptual Framework on Security Studies". Paper presented at the Initial Workshop of the Security Studies Project of ISAS, Maseru, 1990.

## On National Security

The national security literature is overwhelmingly responsive to conflicting events on the international level and to domestic crisis that challenges the behaviour of the state and the status of the governing groups. However, although the decision-makers' concern about state security goes back to the emergence of the nation-state, the analysts' concern and investigation into national security is more recent.

Agreement on the definition of national security is still largely elusive, though a careful inquiry into the literature discloses that a great deal of it is concerned with military aspects of nation-states' goals.<sup>7</sup> However, little in the literature has, until recently, focused on the equally important developmental process within states and internationally. The strategic conception of security policy conceives security in terms of abstract values and is concerned mainly with the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of nation-states.<sup>8</sup> Thus Trager and Kronenberg have defined security as that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital values against existing and potential adversaries.<sup>9</sup>

Obviously one of the problems of such a definition is how to define "vital values". If the objective of national security policy is the creation of a national consensus around national basic values, there is an implicit assumption that the society is coherent, united and enjoys equilibrium among its forces. Such approaches to defining national security suffer from methodological, operational as well as conceptual deficiencies. They emphasise the role of perception in the decision-making process rather than other, more objective, methods such as socioeconomic approaches.

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<sup>7</sup> Bock, P. and M. Berkowitz (1966). "The Emerging Field of National Security", *World Politics* 19:1, pp.122-136.

<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von (1982). *On War*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.

<sup>9</sup> Trager, Frank and Philip Kronenberg (eds) (1973). *National Security and American Society: Theories, Process and Policy*. Lawrence, Kans, University Press of Kansas, p.43.



The serious impact of perception and misperception is that the drive of security produces aggressive action if the state either requires a high sense of security or feels menaced by the presence of other strong states. This circle of perceiving others' "security as one's own insecurity" will, on the whole, tend to generate mutual insecurity.

A few analysts subscribing to the economic security approach have concentrated on two major issues: (a) the security of strategically high-ranked resources and the economic functions of war systems; and (b) economic development as the essence of security.

Working along this vein, Krause and Nye define economic security as the "absence of threat of severe deprivation of economic welfare", and they point out that "economic security as a goal becomes visible when a country consciously chooses to accept economic inefficiency to avoid becoming more vulnerable to economic impulses from abroad, or when a country stresses national approaches at the expense of integration gains".<sup>10</sup>

From the foregoing, it is obvious how to date the national security concept has been remodelled from purely military aspects to substantial issues of economics. Robert McNamara, an early critic of the classical definition, has argued that:

Security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Krause, L. and Joseph, Nye (1975). "Reflections on the Economics and Politics and International Economic Organisations", in Fred Bergsten and Lawrence Krause (eds), *World Politics and International Economics*. Washington, Brookings Institution.

<sup>11</sup> MacNamara, R. (1968). *The Essence of Security*. New York, Harper and Row, p.149.

From the above discussion, national security has to be viewed as a situational policy, and not necessarily a long-process one. The realisation of national security may appear or disappear according to the perception of threats to the economic performance of the nation-state. Secondly, it is obvious that stressing development needs, particularly if accompanied by an increased role for the citizenry, will enhance the credibility of the regime in power.

Security policy in this context will include the management of external threats and of autonomy. Though these are in essence inseparable, for analytical purposes I have chosen to distinguish between them.

### *The Management of External Threats*

Small states, many analysts have noted, are in general faced with almost identical conditions of political, economic and strategic insecurity in relation to bigger or more powerful neighbours. However, the degree of insecurity differs from case to case and period to period. Again, the measures adopted to protect themselves from external threats will vary along the dimensions of political strategy dictated by the dynamics of the regional and global environment. Thus, the measures states undertake to protect themselves against encroachment upon their sovereignty fall within the broad scheme of management of national security.

### *The Management of Autonomy*

Vital argues that in the final analysis the condition of conflict between a great power and a small state is, ultimately, over autonomy. Autonomy in foreign policy making is defined as a situation in which the state asserts its ability to define its policy directions without the interference of a big power. Thus, the management of autonomy should be seen as the measures which a state takes to ensure and enhance its capability to chart its policies internally and externally. Paradoxically, Vital points out that small states tend to have more, not less, room of manoeuvrability when they face some pressure over autonomy from a bigger state. Why and how do small states succeed in achieving greater degrees of autonomy *vis-a-vis* larger states in periods of disharmony? Under what circumstances is this possible?

It is important to note that it is unlikely that any of the small Southern African states, with the exception of Zimbabwe, could survive a protracted conflict with South Africa. Indeed, even without resorting to economic warfare strategies and/or military engagements, these states are too vulnerable outside an interdependent world, which we seem to be moving into.

### *Challenges of Interdependence*

Though interdependence is clearly better than the current state of dependence of the regional states on South Africa, it should be made clear from the beginning that it is not a panacea. At times it could in fact be worse than the current situation if not managed properly.

It is widely recognised that participation in interdependent relations involves a loss of governmental autonomy. It is this factor which, for example, the former British Prime Minister used against European monetary union - it would involve too much loss of sovereignty, she is reported to have argued. Governments, in this situation, lose control of the outcomes of their policies since these are strongly affected by developments in the international environment.

According to Bengt Sundelius, participation in an interdependent relation may result in two forms of restrictions on governmental autonomy.<sup>12</sup> A reduced policy effectiveness and/or a more limited scope of acceptable policy alternatives may be experienced.<sup>13</sup> Overall, the result would be a loss of control of the outcome of policy.

This potential threat to national security is not easily detected. In contrast, traditional threats to national independence, such as the violation of territory, acts of economic warfare or the building of external military capabilities, are more tangible security concerns. The question here is not if the nation will be unexpectedly invaded, but if it will gradually lose governmental autonomy, economic independence or cultural integrity.

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<sup>12</sup> Holl *op.cit.*, p.286.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

Another problem associated with interdependent relations is that they make it difficult to control the policy process. It becomes, as Sundelius points out:

difficult to set priorities, determine a clear direction of policy, and even to define national interest. Administrative units may undermine the best interests of the governments concerned. The existence of direct channels can also make it easier for others to influence national policy by gaining the support of crucial sub-units.<sup>14</sup>

Participation in interdependent relations can also result in the undermining of the solidity of government. The use of transgovernmental relations is often discussed as one of the significant features of the relations among modern states.<sup>15</sup>

The great scope of such interactions, in combination with the difficulties in controlling them at the centre, involve a potential loss of governmental unity. It becomes increasingly difficult to set priorities, determine a clear direction of policy, and even to define national interest. Keohane and Nye have shown how administrative units may commit an unwilling government to unfavourable dependency relations.

One of the most important features of interdependence is societal sensitivity. Socioeconomic developments in one country can affect and are affected by similar changes in other societies. Indeed the opportunities for governments to harm or threaten others with socioeconomic interruption are greater in an interdependent system. Acts of interference in the domestic conditions of other societies can be used as a means of influence. This can be realised by a wide variety of externally directed activities bordering on economic warfare. At the same time, unintended actions can in fact destabilise the economy of an interdependent state.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.287.

<sup>15</sup> Keohane, R. and J. Nye (1974). "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisations". *World Politics* 27:1, p.39-62.

In these circumstances, it is clear that traditional conceptions of security must be modified to include also this type of external threat to the nation. Existing studies of economic warfare strategies such as blockade, embargo and sanction, should be supplemented with investigations of more modest, low-key techniques of interrupting society. Moreover, in an interdependent world, it is not often that such drastic measures as embargoes are used to change or influence the position of an ally.

### **Opportunities in the Changing Southern Africa**

Involvement in an interdependent system involves more than costs and restraints. Major benefits to society are derived from intimate links with the international environment.

It is widely claimed that in an interdependent relationship the relative power of the participants is equalised. Of course this does not suggest that all parties to an interdependent relationship possess equal power, but merely that their relative capacity to determine outcomes is more equal.<sup>16</sup> Thus, according to Rosenau, states which are traditionally considered weak powers have found ways to strengthen their influence on changes in the international system, while traditionally strong powers have noted a relative loss of control. By becoming much more closely involved in the Southern African economic system through institutions like SACU and the "new-look" SADCC, all the regional states could have much more influence on South Africa than otherwise. This would be a result of the existence of many potential vetoers of outcomes. This obviously results in less process efficiency, but most participants would find greater opportunities to assert their interests internationally.

Another beneficial effect of participation in an interdependent system is that the usefulness of non-coercive strategies of influence is enhanced. According to Klans Knorr, this is the ability to affect the behaviour of another international actor

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<sup>16</sup> Rosenau, J. (1976). "Capabilities and Control in a Interdependent World", *International Security* 1:2 (Fall), pp.32-49.

without resort to superior strength, military or economic.<sup>17</sup> All the Southern African states know from experience that they lack the capacity to change South Africa's behaviour by resorting to superior strength. Should the situation change for the better, they would be best advised to cultivate an environment where they can influence developments through an interdependent mechanism.

International organisations are crucial centres of interaction and decision-making in an interdependent system. Most aspects of the future international order are shaped within multilateral diplomatic context of international organisations. This seems to be the only way for these small states, short of full integration.

But for the regional states to be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by interdependence, there should be peace and stability in the region. These make the nation less vulnerable. If anything, the experience gained from Jonathan's security policy confirms this. While able to effectively mobilise international opinion against Pretoria, Jonathan did not strive for peace and unity, thus leaving room for South Africa and its surrogates like the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) to destabilise his government and finally to bring about his downfall.<sup>18</sup> The ability to mobilise national resources and sentiments behind governmental efforts to resist interruptions or control disturbances is definitely an asset.

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<sup>17</sup> Knorr, K. (1975). *The Power of Nations*, New York, Basic Books, p.316.

<sup>18</sup> For an extended exposition of this see Sejanamane, Mafa *In the Mouth of the Tiger: Lesotho Security Policy Since Independence*. SAPES (forthcoming).

# LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT:

## RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES BEYOND

### THE YEAR 2000

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#### **Introduction**

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is a multipurpose water control and development project which will be constructed in phases during the period 1990-2020. The detailed design, construction of advanced infrastructure and processing of tenders for the construction of the dam and tunnels are either complete or about to be completed to enable the construction of Phase I.

Phase IA will involve the construction of a concrete arch dam on the Malibamatso river at Katse to create the Katse reservoir. Water from this reservoir will flow by gravity through a 45km-long transfer tunnel. At the north end of this tunnel, the 72MW Muela Hydropower plant will be constructed and the water flowing through the power plant will discharge into a tailpond created by the Muela Dam on the Nqoe river. From the Muela tailpond a delivery tunnel, about 35km long, will be built to carry the water to the Ash river, a tributary of the Vaal river, in South Africa. Construction will begin in late 1990 and last for 72 months.

Phase IB includes the construction of a diversion weir on the Matsoku river, the Mohale dam on the Senqunyane river and a transfer tunnel to Katse reservoir. At full development, Phase I will deliver 30m<sup>3</sup>/sec.

Our point of departure is that there is a Phase I of the project and that future phases are a possibility. The project is multidisciplinary and involves modern engineering and construction technologies, water resources and environmental

management, and socioeconomic effects. There are, therefore, many opportunities for long-term research in the LHWP. The purpose of this paper is to highlight these research opportunities, with the aim of generating interest and collecting information that will be useful not only to the LHWP, but also to similar projects in the Southern African region and Africa as a whole.

### **Engineering and Construction Technology**

Many of the engineering tools and machinery used in geotechnical investigations, tunnelling and other construction activities are necessarily state of the art machinery, which is imported from developed countries. However, the materials used in construction are local. Thus it is necessary to study these materials and to test their suitability for construction under Lesotho conditions. Such materials include basalts for use in aggregate production, sandstone products and clays.

### **Water Resources Management**

There is a need to inventorise the water resources of the LHWP, to estimate present and future water use, and to manage the LHWP reservoirs with the objectives of maintaining downstream ecology and human needs, and maximising both the quantities of water to be transferred and hydropower generation.

Research and training opportunities exist in the development and use of stochastic and deterministic models for reservoir operation, forecasting and operation of the hydropower plant.

### **Watershed Management**

The lifespan of water resources development projects can be prolonged either through engineering measures and/or good watershed management. Opportunities exist for long-term monitoring and quantification of erosion and sedimentation rates in small and large catchments, and in the reservoirs. There is a need to develop models to assist in defining experimental research and protection



measures. Use can also be made of modern research techniques, such as remote sensing (e.g. aerial photos, satellite imagery) and geographical information systems.

### **Biology, Ecology and Epidemiology**

The creation of reservoirs and increased development in the LHWP area will have both negative and positive impacts on biological resources and health conditions of the local communities. Inventory studies and biological monitoring of flora and fauna populations are required. Such research should be able to define the need to conserve the flora, fauna and unique habitats.

There is a need to assess and monitor, on a long-term basis, the ecological impacts of regulated flow, compensation, water releases and pollution from construction activities.

The possibility of introducing or increasing the prevalence of waterborne diseases and other infectious diseases should be monitored. There is very little information on the relative abundance and distribution of vectors of infectious agents such as mosquitoes, snails and blackflies. The development and use of mathematical models to aid interpretation, collection and analysis of epidemiological data, and in the design of control programmes is a research priority. Patterns of disease and morbidity in a changing Southern Africa need to be re-examined.

### **Heritage and Cultural Aspects**

The historical occupation and use of the Lesotho highlands has not been fully described, despite the sometimes rich ethno-archaeological evidence in the area. In the later phases of the LHWP, where some reservoirs will be formed within valleys bordered by cave sandstone formations, a detailed archaeological reconnaissance is required.

Through tunnelling operations, the LHWP is creating opportunities for research in palaeobotany and vertebrate palaeontology, as well as studies in palaeo-ecology.

## **Socioeconomic and Rural Development**

Opportunities exist for postgraduate and long-term research into the economic impacts of the LHWP, agricultural and rural development strategies and resource planning and economics. These aspects are particularly relevant for the LHWP area as the improved infrastructure (roads, ferry crossings, clinics, market outlets etc.) is likely to have a significant impact on the standard of living of the affected communities. Legal aspects of the LHWP, such as in areas of contract law, environmental law, industrial relations and health and safety regulations, can be investigated and analysed.

There are also opportunities for long-term research and monitoring of the impacts of the LHWP on communities or individuals in the area. This type of research, as has been undertaken for the Kariba Dam, could involve longitudinal monitoring of changes in social indicators such as health, nutrition and economic, in a few selected communities for periods of up to 20 to 30 years.

### **Role of Local Institutions**

It should be apparent from this brief description of the research opportunities within the LHWP that a number of graduate and long-term studies can be undertaken. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) itself has a number of graduate and postgraduate Basotho on its staff, all trained in various fields relevant to the project. In addition, there are many consultants and expatriate personnel with experience in their fields of specialisation. All these personnel should be available to guide and advise researchers.

Long-term monitoring and research programmes are best undertaken through established institutions which will provide the continuity and resources necessary for successful and relevant research. There is a role for the National University of Lesotho, through its institutions such as the Institute of Southern African Studies, other institutions of learning in Lesotho, the Lesotho government and sub-regional and international organisations to play in promoting useful research in the LHWP.

# ACID PRECIPITATION IN LESOTHO

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## Introduction

Lesotho, the mountain kingdom in the sky, with its clear skies and only a few emerging industries seems such an unlikely place for acid rain from industrial pollution. However, a preliminary survey of rainwater samples collected in Roma and Maseru during the 1991/92 rainy season indicated low pH values indicating acid rain water (Prasad and Del Sette, 1992). These findings raised concern because industries in Lesotho were and still are not emitting pollutants to cause acid rain.

The preliminary samples were collected in Roma and Maseru according to standard procedures and were analysed in the laboratories of the programme for Atmospheric Processes and Management Advice (APMA) of the Division of Earth, Marine and Atmospheric Science and Technology, at the Centre of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria. These samples, particularly those from Roma, also indicated acidification of rain water. Since the pollutants apparently do not come from within Lesotho, the most likely highly industrialized source areas are the Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vaal triangle and the Eastern Transvaal Highveld in South Africa.

Acidification of rain water is of particular concern because many fragile ecosystems in the foothills and highlands are already stressed by overgrazing, overharvesting and periodic droughts. It may also be of interest to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which will supply water to the Vaal River system in the Northern Orange Free State and the Transvaal in South Africa.

To assess the situation, the nature of acidic causes, the degree of human influence, and the seriousness of the effects need to be evaluated. Effective remedial action depends on this understanding.


One factor of utmost importance is the quality of available analytical, biological and meteorological data used in assessing the acid precipitation situation. Analytical precipitation data must be reliable since the levels are so low that small variations in measured parameters can change the interpretations significantly.

## Background

### *What pH is normal?*

The acidity of water solutions is often indicated by giving the pH of the solution. The term pH is a logarithmic scale expressing acidity and alkalinity in a range from 0 to 14, with 7 representing neutral values, less than 7 being acidic, and values greater than 7 being alkaline (Fig.1). If the concentration of hydrogen ions in a solution is written as  $10^x$ , the pH is - x. The lower the pH, the greater the concentration of hydrogen ions, increasing by a factor of ten for each drop of one pH unit. Very acidic solutions have a pH of zero or below. The pH of pure water is 7.

Fig. 1 Measuring the acidity of rain - the pH scale



Determining the "normal" Ph of precipitation, e.g, rain, snow, hail, dew, is difficult because the influence of human activities cannot be easily distinguished. If pure water is exposed to air, the acidity increases because some carbon dioxide in the air dissolves to form weak carbonic acid. The pH of such a solution would be about 5.6. For this reason 5.6 is sometimes considered to be the normal pH of rainfall. However, there are natural phenomena that contribute acid producing gases to the atmosphere, e.g, sulfur dioxide released by volcanoes which can cause the rainwater to have a lower pH, sometimes as low as 4.5. There are also alkaline substances naturally present e.g., ammonia that can neutralize acidity and raise the pH. Therefore, the question of "what is the normal pH of precipitation?" has to very carefully evaluated in each situation. The natural pH for the Southern African region is generally assumed to be 4.6.


### *Causes of acid precipitation*

The major known natural sources that contribute airborne acids and their precursors are products of geothermal emissions, wind-generated materials and biological processes, also nitric oxide from lightning, sulfurous gases from volcanic eruptions and anaerobic decomposition.

The major man-made sources of acidic deposition are primarily sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions from industrial and power-generating plants and transportation vehicles. The emissions may be particles or gases and may be transported hundreds of kilometres before they are converted to acids and deposited.

Large coal-burning industries and energy-generating facilities in South Africa are situated north and northwest of Lesotho; meteorological conditions in the region are often such that these acid emissions could produce acid rain in Lesotho Fig.2.


**Fig.2** Location map showing the rain collection stations in Lesotho, Roma and Maseru and the powerstations in South Africa; 1 = Rooiwal; 2 = Pretoria West; 3 = Kelvin; 4 = Orlando; 5 = Highveld/Taaibos; 6 = Lethabo (under construction); 7 = Grootvlei; 8 = Wilge; 9 = Kendal (under construction); 10 = Kriel; 11 = Matla; 12 = Duvha; 13 = Komati; 14 = Hendrina; 15 = Arnot; 16 = Tutuka (under construction); 17 = Camden; 18 = Ingagane.



### *Atmospheric processes*

Pollutants are emitted into the atmosphere from different sources and locations. Many pollutants from natural and transportation sources disperse pollutants near ground level, while power generating plants and smelter companies have built emission stacks to over 350m above ground level. The tall stacks are supposed to increase dispersion of the precursors of acid rain.

**Fig.3 Schematic showing banking and washout of polluted atmospheric layers over the Lesotho Highlands.**



Transport, transformation and removal are the processes that define the formation and journey of acids and their precursors between source and area of impact.

## *Transport*

Acids and precursors are moved by atmospheric transport in meteorological patterns. Acid rain precursor material may be carried across geographic and political boundaries far from the pollution source. Meteorological patterns can be very complex. Fluctuations within hourly, daily, weekly and seasonal patterns and individual storms affect the transport of materials in the atmosphere.

## *Transformation*

The acid in rain is produced by chemical transformations in the atmosphere. The precursors sulfur dioxide and nitric oxide are emitted and are transformed mainly into sulfuric, nitric with minor amounts of sulfurous, nitrous and other acids.

Globally, the natural emissions of sulfur into the atmosphere are thought to be greater than man-made sources. Natural sources include sulfate in sea water droplets, hydrogen sulfide and other forms of sulfur from anaerobic bacteria and plants, and small amounts of sulfur from volcanoes. However, in highly industrialized regions man-made sources emit much more sulfur dioxide than natural sources, particularly from the combustion of coal in power plants and industrial boilers, and the smelting of non-ferrous ores.

Naturally formed nitric oxide is estimated to be small compared to nitric oxide from human activities. In high-temperature combustion nitric oxide is formed from reaction of nitrogen with oxygen. Fuel motor vehicles and combustion plants (mainly power plants) emit an approximately equal amount of nitric oxide.

In the atmosphere, nitric oxide is oxidized by ozone to nitrogen dioxide. The concentration of nitric oxide, ozone and nitrogen dioxide appears to be affected by the concentration of sunlight. Photochemical "smog" is formed by a reaction of these chemicals with hydrocarbons and other atmospheric chemicals.

In northeastern USA, precipitation acidity increases during the summer months. This suggests that in summer chemical transformations of acids and precursors are more efficient; sulfate also has a summer maximum; but nitrate levels in precipitation are almost constant throughout the year.



## *Removal*

The two major mechanisms for deposition are:

- wet deposition; acid substances and their precursors are suspended and/or dissolved in rain, snow, dew, fog, frost or hail;
- dry deposition; gaseous and particulate matter are transferred to natural surfaces by gravitational settling, turbulent exchange and vegetation uptake.

The rate of dry deposition can vary in different areas, ranging from ten times to one-tenth the contribution of wet deposition.

## *Acid rain assessment techniques*

Wet deposition samples are most commonly used to assess acid precipitation. Dry deposition monitoring is difficult, because of the complexity of the mechanisms involved, the low concentration of pollutants of major concern and their variability in both region and time.

Accurate measurements of acid rain are possible in well-designed experiments. Two of the main problems are common to the analysis of natural water samples; the difficulty of measuring concentrations of chemical species near or below analytical detection limits and field/laboratory contamination of samples by chemical species which sometimes can be in greater concentration than the normal constituent. Standard procedures should be followed in samples collection, preparation and storage of rain water samples. Not all samples are analysed immediately after collection, however, it has been shown that pH meter readings must be taken at the sample collection site to obtain a true value. For minimizing significant changes in constituents due to chemical rearrangement and organism growth, other measured parameters should be analysed as soon as possible after collection.

## *Acidity Measurements*

Three different analytical methods are used to determine rainwater acidity: pH, titration and ion balancing. The pH method measures hydrogen ion concentration, titration determines the strength of ion activity and ion balancing determines ion capacity.

### *What are the effects of acid rain?*

Since the industrial revolution, global emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides to the atmosphere have increased. The problem of acid rain has not only increased with population and industrial growth, but has also become more widespread. Using tall smokestacks to disperse local pollution has contributed to the spread of acid rain by releasing pollutants into regional atmospheric circulation. The remote glaciers near the poles that show natural variability in acid deposition also provide evidence in their more recently formed layers of the increased deposition caused by human activity during the past half century.

Acids from atmospheric deposition may damage the environment by:

- acidifying lakes, streams and groundwater in sensitive watersheds, resulting in damage to fish and other aquatic life; this may affect the trout population in Lesotho;
- affecting human health indirectly through contamination of drinking water and food supplies by toxic metals etched from soils, pipes, and other metal-bearing substances; and
- contributing to the deterioration of manmade structures like buildings and statues, exposed metal surfaces and possibly paint or other surface coating.

The recent forest decline in Europe and eastern USA, is most likely related to acid rain and other airborne pollutants, even though a cause and effect relationship has,

so far, not been established (Krahl-Urban et al. 1988). It is estimated that the airborne pollution damages in German forests amount to US\$200 million a year.

Since the mountain ecosystems in Lesotho are already threatened by overgrazing, soil erosion and recurrent periods of drought, the additional long-term exposure to acid rain may further damage vegetative cover.

### *Measurements of acid rain in Lesotho*

The pH of 128 rainwater samples was measured in a pilot survey during the 1988/89 rainy season (Prasad and Del Sette, 1992). The values were low indicating acid rain. This was surprising because there are no industries in Lesotho emitting sufficient pollutants to make the rain acidic. A second study was then undertaken to follow up with chemical analyses on these unexpected findings and to look for the possible sources of pollutants in the collected rainwater. Arrangements were made with APMA at CSIR in Pretoria for detailed chemical analyses of rainwater samples.

A standard sampling apparatus was used and standard procedures of sampling, preservation and transport of samples and pH measurements in the field were followed [Snyman et al., 1991].

In the laboratory the samples were analyzed according to standard procedures using ion chromatography and atomic absorption instruments. They are required because of the low concentrations of dissolved material. The following measurements were made: pH, conductivity, sulphate, nitrate, ammonia, phosphate, chloride, sodium, potassium, calcium and magnesium (Table I and II).

### *Results of chemical analyses*

The detailed results of the measurements are given in Snyman (1992) and a brief summary of these results is given here (Table I and II). The samples taken at Maseru seem to have been polluted in the collection process and therefore, the results cannot be fully relied upon.

Table I: Rain Water Analyses, Roma

Sam- ple	Date	Time	S	B	?	MM	pH (LAB)	pH (PLD)	EC	Na	K	Ca	Mg	NH <sub>4</sub>	F	Cl	PO <sub>4</sub>	NO <sub>3</sub>	SO <sub>4</sub>	NO <sub>3</sub> + SO <sub>4</sub>
R1	03/09/91	18.00	1	1	Y	2	4.33	4.68	36	30.4	2.8	21.0	16.5	78.5	10.5	32.7	0.0	62.6	97.2	0.64
R2	13/09/91	08.00	1	1	Y	23	4.35	4.21	28	8.7	0.0	11.0	8.2	85.7	10.5	13.8	0.0	55.3	58.3	0.95
R3	23/09/91	09.00	1	1	Y	2	6.77	3.70	91	39.2	6.9	50.9	32.9	435.5	10.5	60.7	0.0	210.3	188.8	1.11
R4	24/09/91	07.45	1	1	Y	13	5.50	3.80	18	8.7	0.0	4.5	8.2	114.2	10.5	15.5	0.0	42.1	36.4	1.16
R5	24/09/91	07.45	2	1	Y	13	5.38	3.80	18	8.7	0.0	4.5	8.2	100.0	10.5	15.5	0.0	42.1	36.4	1.16
R6	28/09/91	10.45	1	1	Y	13	5.91	4.30	11	4.4	0.0	4.5	8.2	78.5	10.5	8.7	0.0	17.3	17.7	0.98
R8	03/10/91	10.45	1	1	Y	2	4.53	4.65	40	0.0	2.6	3.0	32.9	64.3	10.5	25.7	0.0	79.8	134.9	0.59
R9	10/10/91	08.00	1	1	Y	6	4.25	4.03	24	8.7	0.0	39.9	16.5	42.8	10.5	8.5	0.0	32.7	61.0	0.54
R10	13/10/91	10.00	1	1	Y	15	4.79	4.00	21	13.1	0.0	7.5	16.5	100.0	10.5	10.7	0.0	35.6	62.3	0.57
R11	15/10/91	06.35	1	1	Y	43	4.55	4.12	14	4.4	0.0	5.5	8.2	64.3	10.5	6.5	0.0	14.4	39.8	0.36
R12	19/10/91	09.30	1	1	Y	18	5.03	4.33	22	8.7	0.0	1.5	16.5	78.5	10.5	9.6	0.0	35.3	26.2	1.35
R13	21/10/91	07.00	1	1	Y	18	5.99	3.94	13	13.1	0.0	6.0	16.5	114.2	10.5	11.0	0.0	38.4	66.2	0.58
R14	22/10/91	09.00	1	1	Y	16	4.18	3.83	30	4.4	0.0	5.0	16.5	100.0	10.5	7.1	0.0	40.3	67.5	0.60
R15	23/10/91	07.00	1	1	Y	6	4.09	3.80	29	0.0	0.0	2.5	16.5	71.4	10.5	3.7	0.0	22.6	67.7	0.33
R16	24/10/91	07.00	1	1	Y	4	4.91	4.04	13	4.4	0.0	3.0	16.5	71.4	21.1	6.5	0.0	24.8	29.8	0.83
R17	28/10/91	07.00	1	1	Y	3	6.07	4.60	8	4.4	0.0	3.0	24.7	14.3	10.5	11.3	0.0	22.6	14.4	1.57
R18	30/10/91	09.45	1	1	Y	9	5.21	4.01	21	8.7	0.0	11.0	16.5	121.4	10.5	7.9	0.0	45.3	62.7	0.72
R19	31/10/91	08.40	1	1	Y	5	5.77	4.30	8	0.0	0.0	5.5	16.5	64.3	10.5	5.6	0.0	14.2	11.0	1.29
R20	10/11/91	10.15	1	1	Y	15	4.17	4.19	31	17.4	0.0	2.0	24.7	14.3	10.5	15.8	0.0	36.5	65.6	0.56
R21	11/11/91	07.45	1	1	Y	13	5.61	4.25	13	13.1	1.8	9.5	16.5	57.1	10.5	10.7	0.0	19.0	24.6	0.77
R22	20/11/91	08.40	1	1	Y	11	6.28	5.45	19	8.7	0.0	3.0	2.5	71.4	13.7	8.5	0.0	18.7	12.5	1.50
R23	28/11/91	07.20	1	1	Y	9	5.92	4.14	12	4.4	12.8	14.0	16.5	78.5	10.5	5.4	0.0	16.8	34.8	0.48
R30	05/12/91	07.35	1	2	Y	18	5.78	4.61	7	1.7	1.3	4.5	4.1	42.8	10.5	5.9	0.0	11.0	11.5	0.96
R31	09/12/91	08.20	1	2	Y	17	6.31	4.71	8	19.1	1.3	0.0	2.5	14.3	10.5	3.9	0.0	2.6	3.3	0.77
R32	11/12/91	08.40	1	2	Y	8	4.20	3.95	27	4.8	1.5	4.5	4.9	50.0	10.5	6.2	0.0	37.9	56.8	0.67
R33	17/12/91	08.20	1	2	Y	4	5.58	4.33	10	9.1	2.6	3.5	4.1	57.1	10.5	12.1	0.0	28.6	12.9	2.21
R34	20/12/91	09.00	1	2	Y	8	4.05	3.85	29	3.9	2.0	0.5	3.3	35.7	10.5	7.1	0.0	32.9	51.0	0.65
R35	05/01/92	10.00	1	2	Y	9	4.59	4.24	17	4.4	2.0	4.5	6.6	64.3	10.5	5.1	0.0	29.4	46.6	0.63
R36	19/02/92	08.45	1	2	Y	7	4.97	4.25	10	7.4	1.5	3.0	4.9	35.7	10.5	6.8	0.0	27.6	19.4	1.42
R37	20/02/92	09.25	1	2	Y	16	4.02	3.97	32	1.7	1.8	0.0	3.3	35.7	10.5	3.9	0.0	33.7	62.3	0.54

S = SAMPLE NR

B = BATCH NR

? Y = OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE; N = NOT OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE

MM = RAIN FALL VOLUME

EC = ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY IN MICROSIEMENS PER CM

ALL CONCENTRATIONS IN  $\mu\text{eq} / \text{L}$ AMMONIA AS NH<sub>4</sub>

Table II: Rain Water Analyses, Maseru

Sam- ple	Date	Time	S	B	Y	MM	pH (TAB)	pH (FLD)	EC	Na	K	Ca	Mg	NH <sub>4</sub>	F	Cl	PO <sub>4</sub>	NO <sub>3</sub>	SO <sub>4</sub>	NO <sub>2</sub>
M1	03/09/91	08 15	1	1	N	5.0	5.30	5.32	45	8.7	58.8	38.4	49.4	< 11.1	<10.5	73.9	695	91.9	134.9	0.68
M2	03/09/91	08 15	2	1	N	4.8	8.17	5.98	135	21.8	0.0	56.9	98.7	471.2	<10.5	117.1	0	21.8	227.1	0.10
M3	12/09/91	13 20	1	1	N	4.0	4.44	4.41	15	21.8	2.3	12.5	16.5	49.9	<10.5	24.8	0	26.9	45.2	0.60
M4	12/09/91	10 05	2	1	Y	9.5	6.56	4.35	31	13.1	1.5	20.0	49.4	< 11.1	<10.5	32.2	0	86.5	83.5	1.04
M5	12/09/91	10 05	1	1	Y	9.5	4.43	4.28	34	8.7	0.0	9.5	32.9	16.6	<10.5	39.2	0	82.3	90.4	0.91
M6	12/09/91	13 20	2	1	N	3.9	4.43	4.38	23	8.7	0.0	13.5	16.5	27.7	<10.5	15.5	0	29.5	53.1	0.56
M7	23/09/91	14 05	1	1	N	7.5	5.16	5.33	14	0.0	0.0	2.5	8.2	33.3	<10.5	16.9	0	23.9	30.4	0.79
M8	23/09/91	14 05	2	1	N	7.8	5.05	5.32	16	0.0	0.0	1.5	8.2	< 11.1	<10.5	7.1	0	16.0	19.8	0.81
M9	14/10/91	08 01	1	1	N	5.0	5.08	5.39	7	8.7	2.6	0.0	2.5	< 11.1	<10.5	5.6	0	1.8	6.2	0.28
M10	14/10/91	08 01	2	1	N	4.9	4.65	5.40	5	8.7	2.3	0.0	2.5	< 11.1	<10.5	0.0	0	0.0	2.9	0.00
M11	18/11/91	19 45	1	1	N	6.5	6.46	6.19	13	47.9	2.0	24.0	16.5	< 11.1	<10.5	20.6	0	0.0	18.5	0.00
M12	18/11/91	19 45	2	1	N	6.8	6.91	6.24	12	47.9	1.8	23.0	24.7	< 11.1	<10.5	15.2	0	0.0	18.9	0.00
M13a	28/11/91	12 50	1	1	Y	2.4	N/A	5.59		4.4	2.0	27.9	32.9	< 11.1	<10.5	90.0	0	0.0	54.0	0.00
M13b	28/11/91	12 50	2	1	Y	2.4	N/A	5.59		39.2	5.9	30.9	41.1	< 11.1	<10.5	79.3	0	0.0	59.8	0.00
M14	27/11/91	20 45	2	1	N	6.8	6.36	4.65	18	17.4	0.8	50.9	32.9	< 11.1	<10.5	20.3	0	44.7	92.2	0.48
M15	27/11/91	20 45	1	1	N	6.7	6.42	4.69	23	21.8	5.6	41.4	32.9	< 11.1	<10.5	35.3	25.7	0.0	91.8	0.00
M16	03/12/91	04 30	2	1	Y	9.8	6.96	5.41	145	26.5	45.3	27.4	22.2	1031.2	<10.5	32.1	56	19.2	107.6	0.18
M21	03/12/91	04 30	1	1	Y	9.2	6.02	5.53	23	35.7	14.6	19.5	15.6	< 11.1	<10.5	40.9	0	4.8	25.6	0.19
M22	04/12/91	16 05	1	1	Y	4.4	5.81	6.50	11	6.1	5.4	9.0	8.2	< 11.1	<10.5	21.4	0	0.0	12.3	0.00
M23	04/12/91	16 05	2	1	Y	4.6	7.42	6.04	174	13.9	17.1	29.4	7.4	388.1	<10.5	57.5	0	9.8	20.6	0.48
M24	06/12/91	16 30	1	1	N	24.6	5.59	6.19	13	0.0	5.1	13.5	1.6	16.6	<10.5	26.5	0	11.1	17.1	0.65
M25	06/12/91	16 30	2	1	N	23.2	5.87	6.65	4	0.0	0.3	2.0	3.3	< 11.1	<10.5	5.4	0	4.0	5.1	0.79
M26	10/12/91	14 30	1	1	Y	7.2	4.78	5.10	14	10.0	1.5	4.5	8.2	22.2	<10.5	11.0	14	22.1	44.1	0.50
M27	10/12/91	14 30	1 + 2	1	Y	7.2	5.78	4.95	84	154.9	64.2	90.3	26.3	99.8	<10.5	150.6	0	31.3	262.1	0.12
M28	15/12/91	08 30	1 + 2	1	Y	4.0	5.15	6.35	23	11.7	2.8	24.5	18.1	55.4	<10.5	22.9	0	59.2	69.3	0.85
M29	19/12/91	08 00	1	1	N	21.2	4.68	5.05	14	3.0	2.0	0.5	7.4	27.7	<10.5	12.4	0	20.6	38.9	0.53
M30	19/12/91	08 00	2	1	N	22.0	4.33	5.12	15	0.9	1.0	0.0	6.6	< 11.1	<10.5	4.2	0	18.9	33.7	0.56
M32	28/01/92	11 30	2	2	Y	4.5	5.57	6.91	42	22.2	14.1	100.3	40.3	27.7	<10.5	30.5	152	21.3	139.5	0.15
M33	28/01/92	11 30	1	2	Y	5.8	6.81	6.32	104	29.6	45.0	91.8	40.3	360.4	<10.5	36.4	0	87.1	197.2	0.44
M34	30/01/92	09 30	1	2	Y	6.6	5.23	6.60	14	4.4	1.8	14.5	14.8	27.7	<10.5	11.3	0	33.1	54.1	0.61
M35	30/01/92	09 30	2	2	Y	6.7	5.46	6.67	17	6.1	2.0	24.0	18.1	33.3	<10.5	11.0	0	39.8	59.3	0.67
M31	09/01/92	14 00	1 + 2	2	N		5.94	N/A	20	2.0	5.1	36.9	16.5	16.6	<10.5	23.7	0	38.4	39.6	0.97
M36	02/01/92	N/A	1	2	Y		6.16	N/A	23	9.1	4.1	41.9	28.8	22.2	<10.5	16.6	0	30.6	77.2	0.40
M37	02/01/92	N/A	2	2	Y		6.56	N/A	43	10.9	6.1	125.2	77.4	< 11.1	<10.5	82.4	0	3.5	98.5	0.04
M38	16/02/92	01 00	377	2	Y		5.81	N/A	28	6.1	10.2	0.0	4.1	61.0	<10.5	137.4	0	17.1	13.3	1.28
R7	17/03/92	14 00	1	2	Y		5.05	N/A	4	0.0	2.6	1.5	0.0	< 11.1	<10.5	4.8	0	0.0	0.0	

S = SAMPLE NR  
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 Y = OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE; N = NOT OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE  
 MM = RAINFALL VOLUME

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 ALL CONCENTRATIONS IN  $\mu\text{eq/L}$ .  
 AMMONIA AS NH<sub>4</sub>

### *Precipitation*

The rainfall volume in Roma was measured at House SRR 0009 on the University Campus<sup>1</sup> (Table I). The summer 1991/92 was a period of drought in Southern Africa and the rainfall was below the annual mean.

### *pH*

The pH of field measurements was generally lower than the pH measured in the laboratory (Table I). The pH of most rainwater samples measured after each rainfall in Roma is below the 4.6 level which is assumed to be the lower limit for natural acidification in the region.

### *Sulphate and nitrate*

Manmade sources generally contribute to these anions. An  $\text{NO}_3 : \text{SO}_4$  ratio of 1 is supposed to be from an unpolluted area whereas a ratio of 0.5 or less indicates anthropogenic pollution (Galoway et al., 1982). According to these criteria about half the Roma samples are polluted.

### *Ammonia*

Biodegradation of organic material contributes to the ammonia levels in the atmosphere, e.g., emanations from cattle, stables and latrines. The values for both Maseru and Roma are extremely high ( $> 300 \text{ u eg/l}$ ).

### *Chloride*

Higher than average chloride values correlate to higher than average sulphate and nitrate values. No consistent trend in cation values correlates with these higher anion values.

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<sup>1</sup> Many Thanks are due to David Ambrose who made these measurements available.

### *Sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium*

Calcium and magnesium are usually derived from soil dust, but calcium is also associated with fly ash. Sodium and potassium, together with chloride are associated with maritime air, but there is no clear indication of this in the values found.

### *Weather conditions*

During the months September 1991 to February 1992 the upper-level wind directions (approximately 3170m above MSL) were mostly westerly to northwesterly with sometimes northerly and rarely southwesterly. With such wind directions it is quite likely that pollutants are transported south and southwestwards towards Lesotho.

As an example of a pollution event at Roma the following case history is cited from Snyman et al.(1992).

Samples collected at Roma on 10, 13 and 19 October are polluted according to the ratio of nitrate to sulfate ("clean" having a ratio of =1 and "polluted" = 0.5, Galoway et al., 1982). At that time, a very strong Indian Ocean anticyclone was ridging in over the northeastern parts of the subcontinent, as shown for 10 October in Fig. 3. The situation remained more or less similar during the whole period (see 14 October; Fig.4). It is interesting to note that the 700 hPa winds over Irene near Pretoria were from north-northeast ( $3.6\text{m sec}^{-1}$ ) on 13 October (14.00 h), east-northeast ( $4.3\text{m sec}^{-1}$ ) at 02.00 h on 14 October, backing to north-northwest ( $12.2\text{m sec}^{-1}$ ) at 14.00h, while at Bethlehem wind then was from west-northwest. Considering the initially low wind speeds, such a trajectory could have advected polluted air from the Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vaal area towards Lesotho. Looking at the synoptic maps (Fig.4), it could be assumed that polluted air from the industrial area of the Eastern Transvaal Highveld could have been advected along a curving trajectory following the air flow around the ridge and into the trough. Since this synoptic situation was relatively persistent, it should explain the series of pollution episodes measured at Roma when the pH in the field was about 4 (Table I).

Figure 4a. The synoptic situation on 10 October 1991 at 14.00.







Figure 4b. The synoptic situation on 14 October 1991 at 14.00.



Note: For both figures sea-level isobars are dotted and 850 hPa contours are solid lines (SA Weather Bureau, Daily Weather Bulletin).

## Conclusion

Using the criteria of pH measurements and the nitrate to sulphate ratio acid rain does fall in Roma and Maseru. It is most probable that the pollutants are derived from emissions in the urban and industrial centres in South Africa. The Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vaal area and the Eastern Transvaal Highveld are likely to contribute most of the pollutants. However, the westerly winds may also carry emissions from the urban area of Bloemfontein towards Lesotho.

The findings indicate that it is quite possible that acid precipitation falls in the mountain areas of Lesotho. It is strongly recommended to continue with rain water sampling and analysis and to include sampling sites from the highlands of Lesotho.

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**OPENING SPEECH FOR THE INSTITUTE  
OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES  
WORKSHOP TO COMMEMORATE  
ITS 10TH ANNIVERSARY**

**L.B.B.J. MACHOBANE**  
**Hon. Minister of Education,**  
**Maseru**

When I received the invitation to come and open this Conference, I immediately sensed the grandeur of the occasion and likened it to an invitation to a seasonal dance of pundits. Thus, although I truly was badly harassed by the responsibilities of my office, I had in the end to heed the pithy Ashanti proverb which says: "He who cannot dance will say: The drum is bad". By which I mean, I am most grateful and honoured to be here to join you, as it were - colleagues and old friends, as a way of saying: "The drum is good, and I am happy to dance."

The Vice-Chancellor, members of the Diplomatic Corps, representatives of donor agencies, honoured guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Mountain Kingdom. I also wish to thank you all for having found time to come and share with us your ideas about and your expectations of what future research emphasis should be for the Southern African region in order to provide a better environment for its people.

When I first joined the National University of Lesotho in 1970 there were plans for the establishment of a research institute, and differences of opinion were quite sharp as to how modest or how ambitious the structures would be.

The plan in 1976, as reflected in Section 19.(2) of the National University of Lesotho Development Plan of 1976 was:

That the University establish at Roma an Institute of Southern African Studies. This Institute will promote and coordinate research projects dealing with Southern African matters, provide research, conference, seminar and workshop facilities, and collect, receive, store and disseminate information and data on Lesotho and the Southern African region. The Institute should be an integral part of the University with its own advisory board to assist its Director.

It was not by accident that this section of the Development Plan was included under the general heading of research. It was, quite appropriately, sandwiched between a section, on the one hand, that called for the establishment of a National Research Council - which has never materialized, and on the other hand, the statement of an aim to negotiate the removal of the National Archives from Maseru to the University - which I am proud to say that I single-handedly masterminded and the National Archives are now housed in the basement of the University Library.

Be that as it may, the seeds of the Institute's inception were spread around, but perhaps it took too long for them to germinate. However, once they had sprouted, they showed a steadiness and liveliness in growth, to the extent that they tended sometimes to tumble over in a tangle. The venture was novel and naturally it required skilled and experienced direction and visionary leadership. For the National University of Lesotho this was to be the academic cynosure.

At that time it was unthinkable to establish a merger of the various disciplines. We all know how jealously each discipline protects and guards its territorial turf. And yet the fact is that, presently, institutions of higher learning all over the region are challenged to focus on consolidation rather than expansion; to go beyond the narrow confines of disciplinary boundaries.

It is therefore not surprising that it took almost four years of intensive discussion, lobbying and a great deal of sweat before the Institute was finally established. From its inception, the Institute took on a character of its own, which is perhaps unique in many ways. The focus of the service that this institute was to render to the peoples of Southern Africa was futuristic.

Although the area to be covered was wide and seemingly daunting even to the large hearted, the Institute has succeeded in establishing itself as a multidisciplinary, policy - and development - oriented research unit. This is largely attributable to the tenacity, commitment and sacrifice of its staff members over the past ten years. I feel proud that the responsibilities which were entrusted to the Institute have been pursued with diligence and scholarly discipline.

It is, indeed, fitting at this juncture that we should openly and in the nature of the academic tradition, pay tribute to its successive Directors. The first and forceful Director was Dr Gorerazvo Stanislas Mudenge in 1979, who unfortunately had to leave for the service of his country in June 1980, before he completed his term of office. Dr Bethuel Setai took over as Acting Director at that critical period, when the nascent Institute might very well have been shattered, and he kept it together until a permanent appointment was effected several months later. The next appointment was that of Dr Michael Malefetsane Sefali in 1981, who served for a little over one term and succeeded in holding that crucial workshop, of November 23-27, 1981, on Research Priorities in Southern Africa, held here at Roma, featuring distinguished participants, some of whom are with us today. When Dr Sefali departed for the lofty and dangerous apex of an African government ministerial post in 1986, (for as you know, political misfortunes in African governments are often tied up with personal misfortunes), Dr Gwendolyn 'Maphepheng Malahleha picked up the mantle. Finally we cannot forget the energising roles played by the Institute's Heads of the Research Division, Dr James Cobb and Professor Kwesi Kwa Prah and the assiduousness of the Institute's supportive staff. I would like you kindly to join me in giving these men and women a deserving applause.

The Institute has grown from a modest level with only two staff members to a reasonably large establishment with two divisions (the research division and the documentation and publication division). Its activities have expanded to the extent that a number of scholars in the region are somehow or other involved in its research and documentation network. Just to mention a few: 26 scholars are involved in the Human Rights project, 15 on the Conflict and Security Issues and the BLS documentation network.

The Institute has achieved a multidisciplinary status. Its Human Rights project, I believe, has brought together scholars from the science, legal and literary disciplines throughout the region. So also has the study on security issues and

conflict resolution. Smaller projects have also been undertaken which foster a better understanding of the complex issues which seem to thwart our endeavours to move forward. These include studies in early childhood development, contract farming and outgrower schemes, sociocultural studies, human resource development, health, ecology, environment and the SASSI BLS project, to mention a few.

The output of the Institute is well demonstrated by the book and document exhibition in the foyer. Were it not for the acquisition of up-to-date documents and information or the relentless search by the documentation division, I am sure the quality of the researchers' output would have in one way or other been affected. Furthermore, the Institute has been able to draw renowned international scholars to carry out research under the aegis of ISAS, and to deliver seminars and public lectures. These visitors were drawn not only from academicians, but also comprise statesmen and diplomats. We hope that this momentum will not be lost.

In all this, we cannot however forget the role of donors who have generously sponsored the research programmes in ISAS. These include the Ford Foundation, IDRC, SIDA, SAREC, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, NUFFIC and SSRC. They have contributed tremendously to the achievements of ISAS and we are grateful to them and count on their continued support.

The decade that ISAS has just come through was one in which there was strife, despondency and social disintegration in the region. Indeed it was a dingy period for those of us in the region. We seemed bent on a course of self-immolation. The ravages of conflict left countless people of the region traumatised, disoriented and riderless. The social, economic and cultural life of the peoples of the region was jeopardised. I understand that the ramifications of these circumstances will constitute the central theme of your three days of deliberations.

### **The Potential of African Universities**

It is at this point that I would like to make my own humble contribution, by way of suggesting guidelines for the University's role in the solution of the problems of our times, through centres such as the Institute of Southern African Studies and generally through the full complement of the academic staff. The challenge to our university as a centre of social transformation is no less crucial than that faced by



any other African university. Hence we need to view ourselves in that larger context.

There can be little doubt that the universities of Africa have made a major contribution to the development of the countries which they serve. They have constituted the most significant source of high-level manpower for the public service, the professions and private business in almost all African countries.

They have made, and continue to make, essential inputs into the shaping of policy at the highest levels of government through their researches, the service of their members on boards and committees and, more recently, their secondment to ministerial posts and other high public offices. While the evaluation of the benefits of this contribution to policy - making will vary from observer to observer, from time to time and from country to country, the fact of university involvement is indisputable.

Whatever their historical contribution to national development, the import issue for us now is the potential of the African universities for helping in the resolution of the current crisis of economic stagnation and the apparent accompanying social anomaly. For a variety of reasons, the typical African university concentrates, to a much greater degree than its counterpart in the industrialized countries, scarce national resources and talent. It brings together some of the finest and best-trained minds; some of the best-equipped research and teaching facilities; and a selection of the ablest and most highly - motivated youth in the country. That is why so much is expected of it.

### *Research*

In considering the contribution of the universities of Africa to the solution of the current crisis through their research production, key among the issues that should engage our attention are:

- i) the agenda - what issues call most urgently for study?
- ii) how is research best organized and financed?

iii) how do we ensure the most rapid absorption of research findings into productive use?

### *Agenda*

The broad outlines of a research agenda appropriate to these times of crisis easily suggest themselves - research in support of agricultural and industrial production; the organization of society for the maximum mobilization and development of our human and material resources; the development and delivery of the most appropriate and efficient health service system, etc. Within these general categories hundreds of important research subjects can be carved out. The problems that arise in the process relate to the issues of how relevant research is to be organized and financed, the quality of its results, and the application of the new knowledge it yields.

### *Organization and Finance*

The characteristic form of research activity in a typical African university continues to be the small project undertaken by the individual scholar, occasionally in a team with one or two others, on a subject of interest to the researchers. Research thus undertaken ranges from the "routine" research done by all lecturers essentially in support of their teaching activities, to more fundamental and sustained studies by senior scholars. Depending upon the eminence of the researcher and the "attractiveness" and extent of promotion of the project, the latter projects can attract quite substantial funding. In the main, though, such individual projects are usually shoestring operations, supported by funds made available from the resources of their universities. While this approach to research, in which the individual researcher in effect "follows his own nose," has a venerable tradition, and has yielded enormously beneficial results, the modern trend has been decisively towards more institution-based, team-operated projects.

In the present and the foreseeable future, the traditional approach will continue to play an important role in research activity in African universities. But for their research to have a chance of influencing national development, African universities have to place greater emphasis on institutional research. This latter mode of organizing research has implications for the kinds of projects undertaken, and their

financing, as well as what happens to the results. In the first place research of the category is usually large-scale, relatively long-term and therefore expensive. It is usually undertaken at the request, or at least with the concurrence, of some agency in a position to fund or procure funding for it. This ensures not only that the projects are adequately equipped and staffed, but also that in general they relate to some socially relevant problem. It further improves the chances of the results being promptly applied in the solution of the indicated problem. It is precisely these characteristics that make institutional research the most promising in the attack on the crisis facing Africa today.

### *How do We Ensure the Most Rapid Absorption of Research Findings into Productive Use?*

A third particularly difficult category is made of cases in which the new knowledge requires testing and development under actual production conditions before it becomes usable. In such cases, unless the project was commissioned by a body in a position to develop and apply the new process, a real gap between research and useful application emerges.

Unfortunately, this is the fate of much of the research output of our universities, especially in the area of science and technology, and is often the basis of the accusation that the results of university-based research end up gathering dust on shelves. While this charge may be justifiable in the many cases of fanciful, clever, impractical laboratory inventions, it is not always so. Thus a university research body may succeed in developing a process for producing from local grasses, essences for the perfume industry, or new methods for drying fruit and vegetables and reducing post-harvest losses. For these to make any impact on society they need to be developed and tested under commercial conditions. Unless there are agencies interested in taking up what the universities have thus produced, the new processes will remain undeveloped and socially useless. In a sense, this failure cannot be blamed on the university, since the function of the university, *qua* university, can be said to end with the publication of the results of the research.

To deal with the frustration of initiative resulting from this gap between laboratory and market, universities in Africa have resorted to taking out patents on their inventions, developing the processes themselves and even setting up private

companies for the utilisation of their new ideas. There are those who would argue that that is not part of the function of a university or university research institution. That being said, I hasten to add that I am not aware of any significant successes attending the effort of any African university to promote its research results by going commercial with them.

Against this background, therefore - within this context, my submission and my hope is that, especially with its modicum of success in satisfying a great deal of the research priorities that it articulated in 1981, the Institute of Southern African Studies should now aim for a loftier role than before. And that is the role, not only of undertaking research, but of social transformation. Firstly, it should reorient the perception of the university at large toward a more relevant and systematic research agenda, organization and finance, as well as the promotion of a rapid absorption of research findings into productive use. And then the university, and not merely the Institute, should undertake the role of social transformation - nationally and regionally. Activities of the past two to three years at this university have demonstrated clearly that there is sufficient energy, time, and resourcefulness to meet a challenge of this magnitude, once all academics decide that it should be their priority.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Institute of Southern African Studies was originally intended to be the academic cynosure of the University; and not a mere traditional feature of its organizational structure. Let us restore and sharpen that original vision. Let us turn it into a visible, vibrant reality.

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