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# THE BANTUSTAN BRAIN GAIN

A Study into the Nature and Causes of  
Brain Drain from Independent Africa  
to the South African Bantustans

By

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Institute of Southern African Studies

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National University of Lesotho

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*Kwesi K.Prah,* Head ISAS Research Division

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgements	I
1. The Problem	1
2. The South African Homelands	21
3. The Dimensions	34
4. Methodological Issues	52
5. Attitudes in Source Countries and Attitudes of Migrants	56
6. Responsible Factors and Concluding Remarks	68

# The Problem

## Conceptual Considerations

In essence the concept of "brain drain" or "talent drain" is meant to capture the notion of the transfer of "highly skilled labour" and expertise from the countries to which such expertise is native, to other countries. As Helmut Faulwetter has indicated, while a universally accepted formulation of the phrase "highly skilled labour" does not exist, there is some measure of agreement with regards to the general category of persons, covered under the rubric. He suggests that, "highly skilled labour" covers;

those having completed college education and possessing a university degree, as well as those who have acquired significant occupational experience and knowledge through practical work.<sup>1</sup>

A distinction should be made between voluntary and involuntary migration. The former category of migrants consist of those who through their own volition decide for various reasons to seek employment outside their native countries. It is this group which is centrally the object of this study. Involuntary migrants are those elements who due to pressures of a social, political, or military kind, are forced to transfer their occupational and living habitat to another country. Such exiles are generally refugees, and fall outside the scope of this study. Voluntary migrants are often described as "economic refugees".

It is important to note that significantly the movement or transfer of "highly skilled labour" operates from poorer to richer and developmentally better endowed countries. In effect, the drift of intellect and highly skilled labour represents "brain gain" for the more developed countries. The costs of training the highly skilled labour is borne by the poorer country but the

benefits of the education and training of such highly skilled migrants are reaped by the more developed target country. Thus for the recipient country, the phenomenon of "brain drain" serves to expand its overall national wealth and more particularly, strengthen its human resource base and capacity.

A good part of the cream of such intellect and highly skilled labour are top-class elements with education acquired in the developed countries at considerable cost. Estimates of the UNCTAD Secretariat suggest that the capitalized value of skilled migration from the developing countries to the three developed countries, Canada, the U.S.A. and the U.K. for the 12 year period of 1961-1972 amounted to about 42 billion U.S. dollars or an average of 3.5 billion U.S. dollars per year.<sup>2</sup> Out of an estimated total of 300,000 emigrants from developing countries to the industrialized countries of the western world, about 230,000 went to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.<sup>3</sup> UNCTAD estimates reveal that the gain for the developed countries which benefit from brain drain from the poor countries runs into hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars.<sup>4</sup> The number of highly skilled persons emigrating to the U.S. between 1974 and 1979 has been estimated at about 190,000.<sup>5</sup> A U.S. government study of 1974 indicated that between 20 to 50 percent of the annual increase in engineers came from developing countries. 50 percent of the annual increase in medical doctors are from the developing countries.<sup>6</sup>

Most of the phenomenon of brain drain occurs within the ambit globally of the capitalist world. It has been argued that in the language of political economy, it is a feature of capitalism that, specific and requisite production factors are created and nurtured where socio-economically maximum capital utilization is available. It is thus in this fashion that the process of the internationalization of capitalist relations induces an international drift of labour sources, from the less developed countries to the more developed countries within the entire capitalist world.<sup>7</sup> Faulwetter has drawn attention to the fact that contemporary bourgeois economics often conveys the impression that the concept of resource transfer focusses on formal or official development assistance, transfers of a bilateral and multilateral kind,

private investments or multilaterally financed investments, loans either for development projects or adjustment of payments, and the transfer of technology. The World Bank for example registers under the "totality of net flows of resources" only resources which flow from developed countries to underdeveloped ones.<sup>8</sup> In fact, transfer from the developing to the developed countries takes place in different forms. These include visible forms like officially recorded flows, profit transfers, debt and interest payments, and capital exportation. Invisible transfers are not recorded.

These involve the transfer of part of the surplus value from developing countries to industrialized market-economy countries. A permanent under-pricing of export commodities from developing countries is the result of monopoly conditions. The prices paid for these commodities represent only a part of their real value. In turn, developing countries are forced to pay exorbitant prices for their imports. The flow of the value difference in most cases is such as to bring about a transfer of resources (value) to the economies of the highly developed capitalist countries, using prices as a means of transport. For this there is no compensation. The available income in the latter increases in absolute terms. One example of such an invisible transfer is represented by income pricing. Another form of invisible transfer is represented by income and wealth outflows which have nothing to do with official trade or economic relations, but which are a result of international economic conditions. Two examples are smuggling and the brain drain.<sup>9</sup>

This structural explanation underscores the objective basis of the phenomenon and reduces to a subsidiary but relevant category, volitional and subjectivist explanations of the phenomenon.

In an UNCTAD study of a few years ago, the argument was made that the flow of highly skilled intellect is much more than a simple movement of people. More importantly, it is an economic manifestation.



It is a real transfer of productive resources from poor to rich countries. In as much as technology is a combination of knowledge and capital equipment, the migration of people with skills is clearly a transfer of technology. Since such transfer takes place from the developing to the developed countries, or from the poor to the rich, the phenomenon has been termed a "reverse" transfer of technology. Further, in so far as knowledge and skills are acquired as the combined result of investment in education, training and allied activities and nurture the maintenance of the persons concerned, they could be considered as a form of productive resource embodied in human beings, or human capital.<sup>10</sup>

While it is difficult to put a specific and quantifiable value on the human resources siphoned-off by the receiving countries, it is currently, universally accepted that the drift in highly skilled labour represents high-value technological and know-how transfer in the reverse direction. This point is clearly acknowledged in the UNCTAD study, which describes the transfer in the reverse direction as a fundamental contradiction built into the migration system.

The disturbing and morally unnerving fact about this contradiction is that at a point in time and history when such highly skilled manpower and intellect is most needed in the developing countries, to assist in the combat against poverty, disease, educational and cultural backwardness, and general underdevelopment, the crucial manpower is siphoned-off to generally less needy areas of the world.<sup>11</sup> This fact is attested to by Benson Riungu in a recent article, describing the phenomenon of reserve human resource transfer as "an anomalous situation".<sup>12</sup> Conservative estimates suggest that, annually, the transfer of highly skilled labour from the developing to developed countries number between 60,000 and 70,000.<sup>13</sup> Precise figures on the volume of such migratory movements are hard to come by, and difficult to quantify.<sup>14</sup>

Another corroborative picture of the dimensions of brain drain is given by

the Director of the Technology Division of the UNCTAD Secretariat indicating that brain drain for underdeveloped countries involves between 20 to 70 percent of the annual output of various categories of highly trained personnel.

Migration of such large numbers has made it difficult for the developing countries concerned to reach that critical mass of scientific and technological manpower which alone could engineer the breakthroughs needed for accelerated economic, social and technological transformations. Moreover, attention has to be paid to the magnitude of investments that have been made and then lost through such migration.<sup>15</sup>

According to the Inter-governmental Committee for Migration (IMC), there are in Europe alone some 30,000 highly trained expatriate personnel who collectively constitute a valuable human resource potential which is now missing.<sup>16</sup>

Increasingly the UN system is directing attention to the brain drain phenomenon, or as it is described since the 1972 UNCTAD conference, as "reverse transfer of technology".

In structure, two categories of people can be identified. Firstly, there are those who go out as students from poor or developing countries to the developed and industrialized world to study. On the completion of their studies, many stay on and take on jobs in their host countries. Apart from the material benefits of employment in the host country and the quality of life, many become "acculturated" and educated away from their roots through the socialization process they undergo in the host country, Cesar Moyano recalls:

A sentence taken from an interview with someone queuing for a visa at a foreign embassy gives eloquent support to the view of the disparity between educational system and employment opportunities as one of the determining factors of

emigration: "We have been educated to live in another country."<sup>17</sup>

For various reasons, the longer they stay outside, the more difficult it becomes for them to return to their native countries. Secondly, there are others who are trained professionals migrating from underdeveloped to developed countries.

A number and range of factors have been identified as the principal pull factors which induce and encourage professionals and highly trained personnel to migrate from their native countries. Principal among these appear to be better salaries, benefits, attractive wage structures and a quality of life relatively free from consumer shortages. These economic factors constitute possibly the most crucial considerations. It is a fundamental law of capitalism that capital attracts labour, skilled or unskilled, but the need for skilled or unskilled labour depends on the extent of capitalist development, the degree of capital concentration and the differentiation of production. Most studies agree that economic considerations represent the essence of the factors which promote skilled migration. As Krugman and Bhagwati have observed;

The evidence that migration is influenced by economic incentives is so uniform and secure that; if anyone should argue for any particular case that economic gain has no effect, one should be sceptical; particularly where migrants do in fact gain economically from their move. Furthermore, such evidence as there is suggests responsiveness to the possibilities of gain from migration.<sup>18</sup>

The search for material rewards constitutes the primary force motivating the brain drain or brain gain phenomenon. But this is built within the international capitalist structure; the enlarging and deepening globalization process of the world capitalist system. For some professionals, support including libraries, laboratories, and better working conditions are of importance. Social and political stability free from the uncertainties and turbulence

of most Third World states, as is often found in the developed countries are of some significance. The wish and hope of providing what is considered by some to be desirable conditions for the education and socialization of their families also plays a pulling role in professional class migration.

While the push factors may be essentially the reverse side of the pull factors, attention can be drawn to those factors closely related to the conditions of underdevelopment in the naive countries. Principal amongst these are unattractive and often socially debilitating remunerative conditions; an over-supply of highly-educated professionals in a narrow occupational field with a consequent depression of wages and salaries; discrimination, repression and sometimes terror arising out of intolerant social climates, diverging political opinion, race, religion, caste, ethnicity, or a combination of these factors.<sup>19</sup>

There are those whose migratory push drive is fuelled by the fear of what Goodwin and Nacht have described as "intellectual and professional decay".<sup>20</sup> Like Gulliver, they could in their worst fears be slowly paralysed by a complex of existential factors prevalent in the poor and underdeveloped countries to which they are native. These conditions nurture loss of morale, poor professional performance, low productivity and output. Goodwin and Nacht relate that;

We were told of more than two hundred young Turkish scholars who returned from American graduate training "flying over the clouds", they thought they would reform their system in the image they had come to know and respect. After two decades, they grew tired and discouraged with the prospect of old forces of reaction building up against them once again and with no continued reinforcement.<sup>21</sup>

Under such and similar conditions professionals and highly trained personnel with a measure of marketability become highly prone to migration.

## UN Concerns

In pursuit of policies to arrest the adverse effects for the developing countries of the migration of highly skilled manpower to the developing world, UNCTAD has raised the call for what it describes as a "reverse technology transfer taxation scheme", whereby immigrants and if possible their host or target countries should be taxed to compensate the source countries for their losses through migration.<sup>22</sup> Some developing countries in order to stem the tide of out-migration are adopting restrictive measures through passport regulations, foreign exchange controls, and exit permit requirements. For example in 1971, Sri Lanka passed a Passport and Exit Permit Act to control and monitor out-migration. Exit permits require the opening of a commercial bank account in Sri Lanka into which at least 10 percent of the earnings of migrants should be deposited, as remittance from abroad.<sup>23</sup> In the last few years the Ghanaian authorities have created facilities for Ghanaian expatriates to hold hard currency accounts in Ghana. Customs duty and tax exemptions allow Ghanaian expatriates to bring in personal effects free of charge if they have been out of the country for more than two years. The Ghana Housing Corporation has also instituted for years now, a scheme for home construction and part-payment for Ghanaian expatriates.

In 1958, the Indian government created a talent pool for its nationals abroad enrolled in the Indian Abroad section of the National Register. This organization assists Indians abroad to find job openings in India.<sup>24</sup> Increasingly in recent years, the developed industrialized countries have instituted laws on immigration intended to check the flow of migrants. The World Employment Conference of 1976, organized under the auspices of the International Labour Organization (ILO) recommended the use of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the migrant-exporting and migrant-receiving countries aimed at replacing unilateral formulae for immigration control.<sup>25</sup> In an address made to the 1977 ILO Conference, Prince Hassan of Jordan proposed an International Compensatory Facility for the benefit of developing countries suffering from the brain drain phenomenon. In essence the proposal argued that countries which lose an important segment of their highly-trained manpower through brain drain should be entitled to financial compensation which those countries benefitting from such migratory practices should be liable for compensation. Others have suggested

the possibility of levying a supplementary tax on incomes made by developing – country migrants in the brain gain countries. According to UNCTAD these possible measures are as follows:

(a) A modest contribution by host developed countries, in the form either of direct assessment or of tax-sharing arrangements under an agreed formula, supplemented by the possibility of permitting from developing countries migrants to make voluntary, tax-deductible contributions to charitable organizations in developing countries and of earmarking, again on a voluntary basis, up to 10 per cent of their income tax payments in developed countries for developmental purposes:

(b) A moderate supplementary tax levied on the income of developing-country skilled migrants in developed countries (say, at a rate of 5 per cent for a period of no more than 10 years) under a global tax system, representing the contribution of individual migrants to the development process of their home countries.

(c) The creation of specially chartered organizations under international, regional or country auspices in conformity with a model organization arrangement to be prepared and continually revised in accordance with internationally agreed procedures: these organizations could receive and spend funds raised through measures set out in (a) and (b) above:

(d) Possible extension of the IMF compensatory financing facility to take account of "adjustment problems" associated with unwarranted fluctuations in currency.<sup>26</sup>

As Schaldt rightly confirms, with the realities of divergent interests in the contemporary world, no comprehensive international agreement along the above stated lines has so far been possible. The developed countries have strong objections to an International Labour Compensatory Facility.<sup>27</sup>

The attention and efforts of UNCTAD in pursuit of palliatives for the brain drain phenomenon are at the analytical level considerable. Practical and hard solutions are however thin. Within the framework of UNCTAD, issues impinging on the drift of highly trained manpower from the developing to the developed countries have been under consideration since the meeting in Santiago, Chile, 1972. From that point in time to the present the UNCTAD Secretariat has generated a mass of studies on the volume, structure and directions of flow of highly skilled personnel. An important pre-occupative strand in these transactions relate to the general policies pursued at the national, regional and international levels, plus the conceptual and methodological considerations relevant to the reverse transfer of technology.

Two important meetings on the theme were held in 1983 and 1984 in response to a mandate of the UN General Assembly formulated under Resolution 37/207 of the General Assembly. This mandate invited experts and institutions to:

formulate policies and concrete measures with a view to mitigating the adverse consequences for the developing countries of the reverse transfer of technology, including the proposal for the establishment of an international labour compensatory facility.<sup>28</sup>

In meetings under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1978 and 1982, an attempt was made to focus on conceptual and methodological matters.<sup>29</sup> As from 1983 to the present, efforts have been more directed toward formulating viable policy recommendations and concrete solutions. The principal and essential components of what is conceived to be an integrated programme of action on international skill exchanges have been delineated, and some headway has been made with regards to the examination of technical and substantive dimensions of these components.<sup>30</sup>

On September 2, 1985, Yves Berthelot, the Deputy Secretary-General of UNCTAD pointed out that the efforts of UNCTAD at various experts' meet-

ings on the issue should be understood in the wider context of efforts being made by the developing countries to advance the pace of their technological and economic development. The crucial factor of human resources, especially skilled manpower have increasingly become one of the main resources for all these countries. The need to mobilize and use human resources for development purposes constitutes a major concern for developing countries and the international community as a whole.<sup>31</sup> The summary position of UNCTAD on the problem of brain drain was put out as: "Preliminary Outline of a Set of Guidelines on the Reverse Transfer of Technology".<sup>32</sup> As one of its leading agenda issues in the near future, UNCTAD has committed itself, "to consider and formulate an integrated programme of action on the reverse transfer of technology and recommend the modalities for its implementation."<sup>33</sup> Another UN agency which in the past has shown concern for the issue of the international brain drain phenomenon has been the United Institute for Training and Research. Its interests date from the 1970s.<sup>34</sup>

## The South African Connection

It is noteworthy that while the main directions of the flow of brain drain have been in favour of the developed countries of the First World, in recent years there is an increasing tide of skill flow among the developing countries themselves. This trend is identifiable to two emerging phenomena. Firstly, some of the developing countries in relative terms are making considerable advances in their human resource skill profiles. Secondly, there are those cases where accumulating surpluses of investible resources, are accompanied by excess demand for skills in others.<sup>35</sup> The phenomenology of these trends are such that to some extent complementarities have been created in the economies of these two sets of underdeveloped countries i.e. skill-rich, resource-poor countries and skill-poor, resource-rich countries.<sup>36</sup>

An insight into the above is provided by Bhagavan. He has argued that in spite of the fact that in absolute figures, highly skilled and technologically



equipped people in countries like Sri Lanka, India, the Phillipines, Pakistan, and Egypt are considerably large when considered as percentages of their overall and economically active populations, they are in fact quite small. One would therefore expect a shortage or demand within these countries. But the reality of the situation is different. Indeed large numbers of skilled personnel emigrate from these countries to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. The explanation Bhagavan offers is that in these skill-endowed and skill-exporting countries, the relative sizes and the developmental growth rates of the industrial sectors are relatively small and often insignificant in proportion to the total population because they "have grown largely in step with the consumption demands of the middle and upper classes, who constitute 5 to 10 percent of the population". The rate of growth has tended to level off once this demand is met, but the production and development of skilled personnel has more or less steadily continued.<sup>37</sup>

In Latin America, the experience of oil-rich Venezuela is confirmatory of the trend of skill-rich resource-poor emigrants moving into skill-poor resource-rich countries. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s the flow into Venezuela was steady. This consisted largely of migrants from the Caribbean and Latin America. While Colombians, Dominicans and other Caribbeans tended to fill the lower levels, Chileans, Argentinians, Bolivians, Uruguayans and Peruvians occupy the higher skilled levels. The stream started depreciating and flowing in the opposite direction in 1979 when the Venezuelan economy started levelling off.<sup>38</sup>

On the African continent, South Africa is the most technologically advanced and developed country. The concentration of capital in the Republic of South Africa is second to none on the continent. Since the late 19th century, South Africa has attracted migrant labour from the whole region and further afield. Most of the labour from the Southern African region drawn into the Republic of South Africa is unskilled. Skilled labour has tended to come from Europe. However during the last decade, South Africa has been drawing skilled and highly skilled labour from within Africa but outside the Southern African region; specifically from Eastern and Western Africa. This highly skilled labour or personnel is being drawn into

the so-called Homelands or Bantustans. From fairly small and relatively insignificant beginnings in the late 1970s, the size of this emigration has magnified. The international stigma attached to South Africa because of its Apartheid policies of institutionalized racism, throws the African brain drain into South Africa into a special, topical and sharp relief.

To many minds it raises issues of the "cultural boycott", the OAU position vis-a-vis South Africa, and sanctions. The sensitivity of the issue is underscored by the fact that, in a world which increasingly is morally revolted by the Apartheid system, and where most countries and peoples are being discouraged to have social and economic intercourse with South Africa, Africans from different corners of Black Africa are streaming into South Africa. The poignancy of the situation is highlighted by the fact that all this is happening at a time when the resistance to the Apartheid system is increasing in scope. While thousands of South Africans are drifting into exile to escape and resist the Apartheid system, other Africans are going in to work within the system, propping it up, and drawing salaries far better than can be obtained anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

Most African governments whose highly-skilled citizens work in South Africa are unhappy with this situation. Despite their not infrequent protestations the flow into the Homelands, of skilled African personnel continues. Accusations and counter-accusations are not uncommon on the issue. They range from accusations of political and national treachery on the one hand, and on the other hand, migrants who argue that for various reasons life is better in the homelands than in their native countries. What the present study however reveals is that most migrants, once they are outside South Africa tend to hide or conceal the fact that they work in South Africa. This has opened them up also to the charge of being "mercenaries and opportunists who would stop at nothing to have their greed satisfied".<sup>39</sup>

The fact that most of these highly skilled African migrants currently working in the South African homelands are from Ghana and Uganda is not coincidental. These two countries show a skill-rich resource-poor profile. Furthermore, they are countries which in the last two decades have seen a lot of political turbulence and repression, shattered or retrogressing econ-

omies, social dislocations and general societal instability. This is particularly true of the Ugandan case. These factors are of significance in understanding the great trek of talent from these countries into the South African homelands. Their presence however offers an argument for the apologists of the Apartheid system who argue that South Africa is attractive for other Africans even in the face of Apartheid. Migrants from within the region do not attract as much attention as other African migrants from further afield. For one thing they ethno-linguistically fit more easily into South Africa. For another many are interwoven consanguinally with South Africans. This is particularly true of the Basotho, the Batswana, the Swazi, Malawians, Zimbabweans, Zambians and Namibians. These relations stretch back in time. It is the West Africans and the East Africans; who are more or less new migrants, who attract attention for their novelty and distance covered. Their ability to melt into the social landscape is not as strong as other Africans from the region who have stronger ethno-linguistic bonds in the area. Many tend to circulate within their own communities, reinforcing social cleavages which accentuate their relative foreignness to the Southern African region. Their better-paid circumstances may also attract resentment and hostility especially among competing local social classes.

There are those who would argue that whatever the moral merits or demerits of the situation may be, the fact that Africans from different corners of the continent are being thrown together would in the long run facilitate the difficult but generally amongst Africans desirable process of African unity.<sup>40</sup>

## NOTES

1. Helmut Faulwetter. *Brain Drain and Human Rights*. MI Bulletin of the GDR Committee for Human Rights. No.3. 1986. p.162. It has been suggested by Walter Adams that the term brain drain was launched into popular usage in recent years by a British Royal Society report of 1962, to describe the emigration of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the United Kingdom to North America. See Walter Adams. *Talent that won't*

stay put. *Population Bulletin*, 25. No.3. June 1969. Jorge d'Oliveira e Sousa of the UNCTAD has observed with regard to its vintage that, it has been a known phenomenon at least in the western world since Atheneus, an ancient Greek chronicler recorded in about A.D.150 "the drain of Greek brains to Alexandria". See Jorge d'Oliveira e Sousa. *The Measurement of Human Resource Flows*. In, *Trade and Development*. UNCTAD Review.No.6. 1985.p.109.

2. See *Summary and Conclusions; The Reverse Transfer of Technology, A Survey of its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implications*. UNCTAD. TD/B/C.6/47. 1979.

3. Le transfert inverse des techniques UNCTAD. TD/B/AC./11/25. Rev. I 1974. Quoted here from Rodolfo Bertonecello. *Background to Research on the Emigration of Argentines*; In A.E. Lattes and E. Oteiza (ed). *The Dynamics of Argentine Migration (1955-1984): Democracy and the Return of Expatriates*. UNRISD. Geneva. 1987. p.20.

4. *The Feasibility of Measuring International Flows of Human Resources*. UNCTAD. TD/B/C.6/82, 27/5. 1982. See Helmut Faulwetter. *The International Transfer of Resources: Flows of Income from Developing Countries*. In *Trade and Development*. No.6. 1985. p.104.

5. *Towards an Integrated Approach to International Skill Exchange*. UNCTAD. TD/B/AC.35/2, 29/8. 1983. See H. Faulwetter (1985) *Ibid*.

6. *Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility*. Congressional Research Service. U.S. Government. Washington. 1974. See H. Faulwetter (1985) *Ibid* p.105.

7. H. Faulwetter. (1986) *Ibid*. p.162.

8. See, *Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Bank. Washington. 1984. Statistical Annex. Table 18. Also, *The Development Committee; Its First Ten Years 1974-1984*. Washington. 1984. Quoted here from H. Faulwetter. *The International Transfer of Resources: Flows of Income from Developing Countries*. In *Trade and Development*. No.6. 1985. p.90-91.

9. Helmut Faulwetter. Ibid. 1985. p.90-93.

10. *Towards an Integrated Approach to International Skill Exchange: Proposals for Policy and Action on Reverse Transfer of Technology.* UNCTAD. TD/B/AC.35/2. Geneva. 29 August. 1983.

11 .Ibid.

12. Benson Riungu. ICM. A Plug in the Third World Brain Drain. *Development Horizons*. No.2. March 1988. p.20.

13. UNCTAD. TD/B/AC/35/2. Op. cit.

14. See B.M.A. Balasooriya. The Brain Drain. *Economic Review* Colombo. Sept. 1975. *Case Studies in Reverse Transfer of Technology* (Brain Drain). *Surveys of Problems and Policies in India* (TD/B/AC.4/6. Geneva. 13 Dec. 1977). For the Phillipines (TC/B/C.6.AC.4/5). Facts and figures are available for also Sri Lanka, Pakistan, e.t.c. See H. Faulwetter (1986). Op. cit. See also M. J. Boodhoo and A. Baksh. *The Impact of Brain Drain on Development: A Case Study of Guyana*. Kuala Lumpur. 1981. J.A. Sackey. The Migration of High Level Personnel from Guyana. *Transition*. 1978. Vol.1. No.1.

15. Meeting of Governmental Experts on Reverse Transfer of Technology: Statement made by S.J. Patel, Director, Technology Division, UNCTAD/CA/2190. Sept. 1983. Quoted here from H. Faulwetter (1986) Op. cit.

16. Benson Riungu. Op. cit. The ICM was created in 1974 in Latin America where the phenomenon of brain drain was then ravaging the fabric of the development concerns of the Latin American countries. It has since spread its activities to the wider underdeveloped world. With the programme "Return of Talent", which has as its goal the reversing of the brain drain in many countries. Since its inception some 13 years ago, the ICM has demonstrated some results. With U.S. government and EEC aid, by 1981 it had succeeded in getting about 3000 Latin Americans back into Latin America. In 1981 the organization was invited to Africa, and has since started a pilot scheme covering Kenya, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. By 1988 the ICM had received

1082 applications from potential returnees for placement in Africa. See Benson Riungu. Op. cit. See also *Tokten : A Ten-Year Brain Gain*. UNDP. New York. 1988.

17. Cesar Moyano. The Emigration of Argentines through the Eyes of the Argentine Press. In A.E. Lattes and E. Oteiza. (ed) *The Dynamics of Argentine Migration (1955-1984). Democracy and the Return of Expatriates*. UNRISD, 1987. P.117.

18. Paul Krugman and Jagdish Bhagwati, The Decision to Migrate: A Survey. In J. Bhagwati (ed). *The Brain Drain and Taxation, 11. Theory and Empirical Analysis*. Amsterdam. 1976. p.40. See also Cesar Moyano, The Emigration of Argentines through the Eyes of the Argentine Press. In A.E. Lattes and E. Oteiza. *The Dynamics of Argentine Migration. (1955-1985)* Op cit. UNRISD. 1987. P.116.

19. Markus Schladt. Brain Drain Unaddressed. *Development Forum*. UN Publication. Vo. 15. No.1. Jan-Feb 1987. See also M. Rochester. Preparing Libraries for the 21st. Century. *International Federation of Library Associations Journal*. Vol. 14. No.1. 1988. p.37.

20. Crauford D. Goodwin and Michael Nacht. *Decline and Renewal. Causes and Cures of Decay Among Foreign-Trained Intellectuals and Professionals in the Third World*. New York. 1986.

21. C.D. Goodwin and M. Nacht. Ibid. p.14.

22. Some UNCTAD documents on reverse transfer of technology:

TD/239. Technology: Development Aspects of the Reverse Transfer of Technology: Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat (to be reproduced in Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fifth Session, Vol. III, Basic Documentation).

TD/B/AC.11/25/Rev.1. The Reverse Transfer of Technology: Economic Effects of the Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries (United Nations Publication, Sales No.E. 75.II.D.1)

TD/B/C.6/7. The Reverse Transfer of Technology: Its Dimensions, Econ-

omic Effects and Policy Implications: Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat.

TD/B/C.6/28 TD/B/C/C.6/AC.4/10. Report of the Group of Government Experts on Reverse Transfer of Technology, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 27 February to 7 March 1978.

TD/B/C.6/41. Development Aspects of the Reverse Transfer of Technology: Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/2. The Reverse Transfer of Technology (brain drain): International Resource Flow Accounting, Compensation, Taxation and related Policy Proposals: study by Professor J.N. Bhagwati.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/3. Case Studies in Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain): A Survey of Problems and Policies in Pakistan: Study by Professor S.M. Naseem.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/4. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in Sri Lanka: Study prepared by the Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/5. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in the Philippines: Study by Mrs. Loretta Makasiar Sicat.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/6. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in India: Study by the Secretariat of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India.

TD/B/C.6/AC.4/7. Legal and Administrative Aspects of Compensation, Taxation and related Policy measures; suggestions for an optimal policy mix; Study by Dr. Richard Pomp and Dr. Oliver Oldman.

CTD/B/C.6/AC.4/8/Rev.1. Co-operative Exchange of Skills among Developing Countries: Policies for Collective Self-reliance (United Nations Publication, Sales No.E.79.II.D.1).

23. Markus Schladt. Op. cit.

24. Markus Schladt. Ibid.

25. Markus Schladt. Ibid.

26. UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/C.6/47. 1979.

27. Markus Schladt. Op. cit.

28. Quoted here from UNCTAD Bulletin. No. 215. October 1985.

29. See UNCTAD Bulletin. No. 195.

30. UNCTAD Bulletin. No.215. Op. cit. Attention has been drawn to the fact that at the 1985 meeting as well as in two previous ones, developed countries which have been the main recipients of the international brain drain have absented themselves. Turkey has been the exception. Finland and Norway attended the 1985 meeting, but without taking any active part. Developed brain drain recipient countries have resisted attendance because of the General Assembly Resolution 37/207 relating to the proposal to establish an international labour compensatory facility. Developed countries are firmly opposed to any consideration being accorded to such a facility. These difficulties are being encountered notwithstanding the fact that in December 1984, the General Assembly of the U.N. in its Resolution 39/211 invited the Secretary-General of the U.N. to undertake intensive consultations with governments and regional bodies with a view of securing full participation at subsequent meetings of experts on the reverse transfer of technology. The consultations were undertaken on his behalf by the Officer-in-Charge of UNCTAD.

31. UNCTAD Bulletin. No.215. Ibid.

32. UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/AC.35/12. 1985.

33. Proceedings; Experts' Meeting, Reverse Transfer of Technology UNCTAD. 26th August – 4th September, 1985.

34. See *The Brain Drain: Emigration and Return*. Oxford. Pergamon Press for UNITAR. 1978.

35. See. *The Reverse Transfer of Technology. A Survey of its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implications* UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/C.6/47.

36. Ibid. The UNCTAD has over the past decade been examining the possibilities which this trend opens up for cooperation for mutual advantage,



based on four notions: Framework of approach is set out, predicated on four basic elements: i) identifying specific areas of co-operation; ii) ensuring reciprocity and preferential arrangements in skill exchanges among developing countries iii) defining agreed norms of employment of developing country personnel in other developing countries; and iv) establishing an institutional structure for tackling these tasks.

37. See. M.R. Bhagavan. *Technological Transformation of Developing Countries. SAREC Report. R4. 1984. Stockholm. 1984. p.26.* See also, *Co-operative Exchange of Skills Among Developing Countries* UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/8. 1978.

38. Adela Pellegrino. *Argentiniens in Venezuela.* In Alfredo E. Lattes and Enrique Oteiza, (ed). *The Dynamics of Argentine Migration (1955-1984). Democracy and the Return of Expatriates.* UNRISD, Geneva. 1987.

39. Interview. Ghanaian Government Representative. Harare. August 29th. 1987.

40. Interview, Ghanaian U.N. Expert. Nairobi. November 5th. 1987.

## The South African Homelands

One of the most important and essential pillars of the South African system of institutionalized "Baaskap" or Apartheid philosophy, is the Homeland system. While racist notions of social organization have been a remarkable feature of South African society from the earliest years of white settlement, the Apartheid System as we currently know it, is of fairly recent vintage, and is traceable to policies developed with the rise of National Party power in 1948.<sup>1</sup>

As Selby has textually demonstrated, the idea of parallel institutions and separate development are of considerable age. Cecil Rhodes gave it a try when the Cape Colony developed local institutions for Africans in the Glen Grey Reserve. It was later adapted to the Transkei area. Lord Milner's choice of Sir Godfrey Lagden as Chairman of the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1903 resulted in a report recommending the separation of black and white as voters and land occupiers.<sup>2</sup> In an appendix to the Act of Union, Lord Selborne formulated that "native territories in South Africa should be governed apart from the parliamentary institutions and on different lines, so as to achieve the principle of native self-government".<sup>3</sup> Smut's view on these matters deserves lengthy and eloquent recall.

We have realized that political ideas which apply to our White civilization largely do not apply to the administration of Native affairs...and so a practice has grown up in South Africa of creating parallel institutions - giving the Natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines with institutions for Whites. It may be that on those parallel lines we may yet be able to solve a problem which may otherwise be insoluble...Instead of mixing up Black and White in the old haphazard way, which instead of lifting up the Black de-

graded the Whites, we are now trying to lay down a policy of keeping them apart as much as possible in our institutions. In land ownership, settlement and forms of government we are trying to keep apart, and in that way laying down in outline a general policy which it may take a hundred years to work out, but which in the end may be the solution of our Native problem. Thus in South Africa you will have in the long run large areas cultivated by Blacks and governed by Blacks, where they will look after themselves in all their forms of living and development, while in suitable parts you will have your White communities which will govern themselves separately according to the accepted European principles. The Blacks will, of course be free to go and to work in the White areas, but as far as possible the White and Black areas will be separate, and such that each community will be satisfied and developed according to its own proper lines.<sup>4</sup>

With specific reference to the Homeland system, its early origins have been traced to the recommendation of the South African Inter-Colonial Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905, relating to the partition and segregation of land and people in the country. The central object of the recommendations of this Commission was to stop and exclude Africans from the increasing acquisition of land in predominantly white-owned and white-settled areas.

The protection of African interests in land was not a feature of these recommendations. As Blausten has rightly indicated, the Natives Land Act of 1913 gave a concrete and manifest institutional framework for the recommendations, by designating particular areas already largely under firm African occupation to Africans, and legally excluding or prohibiting Africans from land acquisition rights in most areas of the country. Two decades later, in 1936, the Bantu Land and Trust Act, formulated the apportionment of "native reserves" which in historical effect laid down "the territorial basis of separate development". This latter notion and line of policy ultimately created conditions under which Africans herded into Bantustans had *de jure*

access to only 13.7 percent of the country.<sup>5</sup>

While most Africans living in and out of the South African Homelands accept the phenomenology of the Bantustans as a fact of life, the general picture obtained during interviews in the course of the present study reveal that the Bantustan concept is rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Black people of South Africa. The Homeland system is viewed as a racist social contrivance entrenching the reality of African land dispossession, political subjugation and disenfranchisement, and the sociological inferiority of the African within the Apartheid state and its class structures. In the light of these points and the increasing popular stridency of African nationalist resistance in South Africa, it is shortsighted and highly apologetic to suggest that;

The Black Homelands of South Africa are there to stay. They are a political fact established by a government that has the overwhelming strength to impose its authority. It is only through the full exploitation of the Homelands concept that the Africans can develop politically and economically. Denied for years any means of effecting fundamental political change in South Africa, the Africans at last have a means of doing this.<sup>6</sup>

This argument implicitly accepts the permanence of the structure of the Apartheid state in South Africa. Equally misplaced is Gwendolen Carter's proposal for the partition of South Africa.<sup>7</sup>

As has been earlier stated, the Homelands system represents the flower, of the Apartheid system. The creation of so-called self-governing and ultimately "independent" homelands, for blacks has been the strategic objective of the South African government's policy of Apartheid or separate development. The formula was conceived by Dr. Verwoerd, who was Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966. It was conceptualized as an instrument for the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism constituted as class rule within the capitalist state. During the 1950s and 60s it continued

to offer some room for the development of productive forces.<sup>8</sup> By the 1970s, it had become a millstone around the neck of South African capitalism. Through the divide-and-rule method Africans have been fragmented into ten sub-ethnicities and an attempt is made to cultivate ruling groups and lineages to serve as civil custodians of Pretoria-delegated praetorian guards, and patronized state power. The unspoken object of this policy of grand apartheid is to ensure that "there no longer exists an African majority in South Africa".<sup>9</sup> This is the only viable constitution for white-minority rule. Thus the Bantustan strategy of the Apartheid philosophy attempts in practice the "reincorporation of a modified form of tribal authority structure into the overall structure of domination", with chiefs acting as paid agents of the South African state.<sup>10</sup> The ruling groups and lineage clusters cultivated within the Bantustans are in effect a nascent petty bourgeoisie nurtured through the largesse of the South African state, in order to preserve "a reserve army of labour", in latter day "Native Reserves". These Bantustans are meant to provide the conditions for the cheapest reproduction of labour power and labour time for South African industry. This offers higher rates of profit for a capitalist system still heavily dependent on international investment for more organically advanced capitalism.<sup>11</sup>

### Forging Bantustans:

Until 1913, Africans were allowed to acquire land outside "Native Reserves". The Natives Land Act of that year put an end to the practice, except in those areas which had been variously, so designated by the authorities. Furthermore, the Act "recognized" the Native Reserves by apportioning and sanctioning areas of African occupation not totalling more than 7.3 percent of the total land area of South Africa. Initially the courts adjudicated that the prohibition of African land purchase rights was untenable in the Cape. However the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 extended the prohibition to the whole country except for those areas excluded from the prohibition in accordance to the terms of the Act. In addition the 1936 Act designated

15.25 million acres which could gradually over time be added on to the Reserves through purchases undertaken by the South African Bantu Trust and individual Africans.<sup>12</sup> In total about 14 million acres were released, this included State-owned land held in trust. By 1976, 2.3 million acres of the 1936 apportionment was still technically available for purchase as additions to the Homelands.

Territorial separatism was followed by the institution of separate governmental structures and a separate franchise. In some areas, particularly in the Transkei local councils had been in force for decades. In the Transkei, District Councils were instituted in 1894. The council system operative in the Transkei was expanded into other African areas by the Native Affairs Act of 1920.

Africans and Coloured males with certain defined economic and educational qualifications had since 1853 been on the Common Electoral Roll in the Cape. These rights obtained also in Natal although to a more limited extent. While the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 withdrew the right of Africans in the Cape to acquire land outside the Reserves, the Representation of Natives Act of the same year abolished African access to the Common Electoral Roll in the Cape, and placed them in a separate roll with the right to elect three white members of the House of Assembly and two white members of the Cape Provincial Council. Africans throughout South Africa were given rights to elect four white Senators through the agency of electoral colleges consisting of Headmen and Chiefs. In addition the 1936 Representation of Natives Act established a Natives Representative Council, conceived as an advisory body, in-part nominated and in-part elected, on which a total of 16 Africans would sit with white native commissioners, chaired by the Secretary for Native Affairs. As has been noted, it was "the first and last official body that recognized that Africans had interests in common".<sup>13</sup> The Native Laws Amendment Act, Act 46 of 1937, made a beginning of the establishment of Black townships in areas outside the Homelands. The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, Act 25 of 1945 controlled the movement of Blacks to the urban areas.<sup>14</sup> The Bantu Authorities Act, Act 68 of 1951 in effect superseded the Natives Representative

Council. It was one of the early and most important measures undertaken by the National Party administration to establish the structure of Apartheid. By this Act, various levels of government were created in the Homelands.

For each group regarded by the authorities as "a tribe", a Tribal Authority was established. More than one Tribal Authority could constitute a Community Authority, and a Regional Authority consisted of a combination of two or more Tribal and, or, Community Authorities. A Territorial Authority defined a whole Native area. The Territorial Authority interfaced with the Commissioner-General for each area in an advisory capacity.<sup>15</sup> Maylam has argued that the Tomlinson Commission Report of 1954 had suggested a wide-ranging job creation programme in the Native Reserves, which would serve the purpose of holding Africans in the reserves, and checking the flow of African migrants to the white urban enclaves. The government however was in hindsight unwilling to provide the investment required for such a job creation programme [16]

It was Dr. Verwoerd who as Minister of Native Affairs from 1950 to 1958 when he became Prime Minister, laid the foundations of modern South African institutionalized racism under the Apartheid system. His vision of the ethnic fragmentation of the Africans was based on the recognition that this was the only way of maintaining *Baaskap*.

An important instrument he forged for this objective was the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959. This Act was premised on the rationale that the African people of South Africa do not constitute a homogeneous racial category, but rather are made up of distinct and separate ethnic or national units based on language and culture. Furthermore, the development and welfare of these ethnic and sub-ethnic groups was to be pursued along lines which would ensure the steady but gradual evolution towards so-called self-government.<sup>17</sup> Regarding this Act Verwoerd commented that:

My belief is that the development of South Africa on the basis of this Bill will create so much friendship, so much gratitude, so many mutual interests in the propulsive development that

there will be no danger of hostile Bantu states, but that there will arise what I call a commonwealth, founded on common interests and linked together by common interests in this southern part of Africa. In other words, I believe that these dangers of foreign ideologies, of foreign navies and so on, will not materialize.<sup>18</sup>

The Act defined eight Bantu "national units" and formulated more tightly than hitherto, the constitutional powers of tribal, regional and territorial powers according to the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The Act established the appointment of Commissioner-Generals to represent the white-minority government in the Bantustans. Representatives of Territorial Authorities were to be appointed to administer the urban areas. The provisions of the 1936 Act providing for African parliamentary representation was scrapped. In pursuit of the Verwoerd vision, in 1963, the Transkei Constitution Act devolved some powers to the Bantustan administration with its own so-called Legislative Assembly led by Chief Minister Keizer Matanzima.<sup>19</sup> This Act asserted that, all Xhosa and Sotho language speakers of "Transkeian origin" were Transkeian citizens.

Ciskei and Tswana Territorial Authorities were instituted in 1961, and analogous institutions were established for the Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, Venda and Shangaan in 1969. An equivalent for the Zulu was established in 1970. The Transkei Constitution Act required that all Xhosa and Sotho-speaking Africans who were designated as Transkei citizens lose their South African citizenship. This provision applied immediately to over 1,300,000 Africans who were located outside the Homeland. A good proportion of them had been born and brought up outside the Homeland. The non-recognition of the Homeland by the international community in effect meant that Homeland citizens are stateless. The Bantu States Citizenship Act of 1970 affirmed the idea that every African within the territorial area of South Africa must be a citizen of a homeland irrespective of where he may be living within the borders of South Africa. This Act was followed by the Bantu States Constitution Act, Act 21, of 1971 which opened the way for the possibility of so-called self-government for the Bantustans.<sup>20</sup> The



conferment of such status was vested in the State President. This Act also established Legislative and Executive Councils for all the Bantustans.

The evolution of the Bantustans have been since then such that today there are 10 Bantustans, classified according to the so-called constitutional development into "independent" homelands and "self-governing" homelands. The "independent" homelands are supposed to be Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and Venda, and the "self-governing" homelands are Gazankulu, Kangwane, Kwa-Ndebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa.<sup>21</sup>

Bophuthatswana was granted a Legislative Council on 1st June 1972 with Lucas Mangope as leader. It became "independent" on the 6th December 1977, about a year after the Transkei which was granted "independent" status on the 26th October 1976. Elections in Venda for the Legislative Council were held on the 15th and 16th August 1973, and "independent" status was accorded as from the 13th September 1979. In the Ciskei, the elections for the Legislative Council were first held from the 19th to the 23rd of February 1973, and "independent" status came into effect from the 4th December 1981.<sup>22</sup>

With regards to the so-called "self-governing" homelands which have as it were not achieved "independence", Gazankulu which was formerly referred to as Mashangana Territorial Authority was given a Legislative Council in July 1971, and became "self-governing" in February 1973. Kangwane established its Legislative Council in October 1977 and became a "self-governing state" in 1984. Kwa-Ndebele also became "self-governing" in the same year. Kwazulu was granted the status of a "self-governing state" in March 1972. Its Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi has consistently refused to accept so-called "independence". In the tide of the rising popular resistance to Apartheid, in recent years, many inhabitants of the homelands are rejecting more defiantly the notion of "independence". During 1987 resistance to this in KwaNdebele exploded into violent confrontation between pro and contra elements on the issue. The Lovedu homeland of Lebowa was extended "self-government" status in September 1972. Qwaqwa, the smallest of the Bantustans perched on the northeast corner of the Lesotho border was given a Legislative Council in October 1971 and

"self-governing" status in 1974.

### Puppet Administrations:

Throughout Africa and the wider world it is generally surmised that the South African Homelands administrations are puppet structures of the Pretoria regime, put in place in order to give a longer lease on life to the white-minority rule system in South Africa. The homelands system is maintained through subsidies and largesse from Pretoria. It is important to note that no homeland administration is in a serious sense representative of the people falling under its administration. Half or more of the seats in each Legislative Assembly are solely restricted to Chiefs. Again only 14 percent of the then estimated 5 million registered to vote. The implicit support which the Homelands administrations by their very existence give to the Apartheid system makes them unpopular with the African population of South Africa. Their active collusion with and actions in support of the South African security services has invariably put them on a collision course with the movements for liberation in South Africa. While many of the homeland leaders have their differences with the Pretoria regime, and often give voice to this, the common ground they share in giving credibility to the Apartheid system depicts them in the eyes of the wider world as collaborators in the racist system of oppression which the Apartheid state represents. Migrants from independent Africa, who form the subject of this present study are, along the above line of reasoning, seen as elements buttressing and helping to make the Apartheid system work at the level of the Homelands set-up.

In view of the general universal isolation of South Africa, and the international non-recognition of the Homelands, the Homeland leaders have been at pains to attract and cultivate foreign expertise and capital. Highly trained African migrants in search of lucrative employment are drawn to the Homelands. As Schrire has pointed out, "partly because of a scarcity of trained blacks, whites continue to fill many of the important administrative positions and the vitally important activities of the various economic development corporations are outside their control".<sup>23</sup> There are however positions

in the teaching (Secondary and Tertiary), medical and para-medical services, and technical expertise which attract highly trained and skilled Africans from independent Africa. Most of these positions are not particularly attractive for whites. The dearth of trained expertise is further aggravated by the post-1976 levels of white South African emigration.

The fact that many highly skilled migrants to the South African homelands endeavour to keep their work association with the Bantustans quiet and possibly secret to the wider world, indicates fundamental discomfiture with the wider implications of their work association. The support and services they offer to the maintenance of the homeland system is growing in size as their numbers increase.

## NOTES

1. See K. K. Prah. Who Are the South Africans? Proceedings, *South Africa: Current Events seen Against Historical Background*. EDICESA Publication. Harare, 1987. See also L. M. Thompson. Afrikaner Nationalist Historiography and the Policy of Apartheid. *Journal of African History* Vol. 3. No. 1. 1962. Also C. J. P. Le Roux. *Die Verhouding tussen Blank en Nie-Blank in die Oranjerivierkolonie. 1900-1910*. Pretoria, 1986. p.1. And, P. J. van der Merwe. *Die Trekhoer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie. 1657-1842*. Kaapstad 1938. Also see, Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido. The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism. In S. Marks and S. Trapido (ed.) *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in 20th Century South Africa*. Harlow. 1987.

2. John Selby. *A Short History of South Africa*. London. 1973. p.230.

3. John Selby. *Ibid*.

4. Jan Smuts. Speech made in May 1917 at the Imperial Institute, London. Quoted here from John Selby. *Ibid*. p.229. See also A. S. Dreyer. Die Filosofiese Grondslag van die Beleid van Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling. *Journal of Racial Affairs*. October 1971. pp.145-154. See also Peter Wal-

she. *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa*. Craighall. 1987. p.58.

5. See Richard Blausten. Foreign Investment in the Black South African Homelands. *African Affairs*. Vol.75. No.299. April 1976. See also Paul Maylam. *A History of the African People of South Africa: From the Early Iron Age to the 1970s*, Claremont. 1986. p.166. The author notes that the 1936 Act had two main provisions. "Firstly it set aside an extra 7,250,000 morgen of land to be added in the course of time to the African reserves. Secondly, the Act tried to remove rent-paying African tenants from white-owned land by penalising landowners who kept such tenants and to tie the number of labour tenants on white farms more closely to the labour requirements of these farmers".

6. Richard Blausten. Ibid. See also similar argumentation in G. Cronje. *Voodijskap en Apartheid*. Pretoria. 1948.

7. For a brief and succinct critique of the Apartheid ideology see the epilogue of J. P. Feddema. *Transvaal-Botswana Kiezen voor de Modern Wereld*. Baarn. 1972. p.204. See Gwendolen M. Carter. *Separate Development : The Challenge of the Transkei*. The Alfred Hoernle Memorial Lecture. 1966.

8. See J. L. Sadie. Population and Economic Development in South Africa. *South African Journal of Economics*. 1972. pp.205-222.

9. See P. Maylam. Op cit. p.71.

10. Frank Molteno, quoted here from P. Maylam. Comaroff has drawn attention to the fact that the policy of divide-and-rule is well recognized by Africans. Among the Tswana of Bophuthatswana it is described as *Pu-sokgaogano* or (The Government of Division). See John L. Comaroff. Chiefship in a South African Homeland. In *The Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 1. No.1. 1974. p.36.

11. There is an ongoing discussion on Capitalism and the Apartheid System. For example see, F. A. Johnstone. White Supremacy and White Prosperity in South Africa Today. In, *African Affairs* Vol.69. 1970. M. Legassick and H. Wolpe. The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa.

In *Review of African Political Economy* Vol.7. 1976. Also M. Williams. An Analysis of South African Capitalism. Neo-Ricardianism or Marxism. In, *Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists*. Vol.4. 1975. And F. Curtis. Contradiction and Uneven Development in South Africa : The Constrained Allocation of African Labour Power. In *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol.22. 1984.

12. See M. Ballinger. *From Union to Apartheid*. Johannesburg 1969. p.18.

13. See P. Maylam. Op cit. p.167.

14. See D. Marais. *Constitutional Development of South Africa*. Johannesburg. 1955. p.53.

15. D. Marais. Ibid.

16. P. Maylam. Op cit. p.167. While the Government abandoned the Tomlinson Report, in its own interest, it helped to create some job-openings in the Homelands. Davenport reveals that 85,554 new jobs for Africans were found in the Homelands and the adjoining border areas, in the period 1960-1972. As is explained by Davenport, this figure of under 8000 jobs per year was far below the 50,000 jobs per year stipulated as necessary by the Tomlinson Report. See T. R. H. Davenport. *South Africa. A Modern History*. Johannesburg. 1981. p.298.

17. D. Marais. Op cit. p.54.

18. Quoted here from T. R. H. Davenport. *South Africa. A Modern History*. Johannesburg. 1981. pp. Hermann Giliomee makes perceptive remarks on the evolving patterns of Afrikaner ideology from the Verwoerd to Vorster eras. In Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee. *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power*. Cape Town. 1979. pp.118-119.

19. The opportunism of Chief Keizer Matanzima is well captured in words by Brain Lapping. *Apartheid: A History*. London. 1986. p.143. On G. Buthelezi and Inkatha, see, G. Maree and G. Hamilton. *An Appetite for Power*. Johannesburg. 1987.

20. D. Marais. Op cit. p.54.

21. See T. R. H. Davenport. *South Africa. A Modern History* (3rd Edition). Johannesburg. 1987. p.414.

22. D. Marais. Op cit. p.55. The author has some mistakes with regards to dates.

23. R. A. Schrire. The Just Political Order. In Sheila T. van der Horst and Jane Reid. (ed). *A Review : Race Discrimination in South Africa*. Claremont. 1981. p.4.

## The Dimensions

Two categories of people can be identified in the phenomenon of brain and talent drain to the Bantustans. There are firstly, those whose countries of origin are in the Southern African region, especially from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. People from the region, particularly from these three countries have a long established practice of working in South Africa, although the overwhelming majority of people from these three countries working in South Africa have been semi-skilled and unskilled labourers employed mainly in the mines. The nationalities from which these people are drawn straddle their common borders with South Africa, and many have immediate kinship ties with South Africans.

It is indeed ethno-linguistically difficult or near impossible to distinguish them from South Africans. Brain drain from the BLS countries into South Africa has been a feature of these countries for decades, and is difficult to measure precisely in either quantitative or qualitative terms. South Africa economically dominates the region, providing goods, services, capital resource base, and a labour market for the region. But for Apartheid, and white-minority rule, South Africa could provide a powerful impetus for growth and development throughout the region.

For some members of the intellectual elite with roots of consanguinity in both South Africa and their native countries, employment is sought where opportunities provide the most lucrative returns and some are able to exploit to great personal advantage their more or less dual citizenship rights. The significance of the borders is psychologically minimal. Many were educated in South Africa and spent a good part of their youth and formative years in the Republic of South Africa. In the post-colonial era, some have accepted positions in the independent states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland because they provide opportunities of employment and status

which are barred from them in South Africa.

The economic forces which integrate them as a region is such that both skilled and unskilled labour movement have been part and parcel of life. At the level of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation, the Customs Union has been an important instrument for regional economic relations.<sup>1</sup> The Rand Monetary Area is another important integrative economic instrument in the region. It includes South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland in an arrangement through which the South African Reserve Bank in Pretoria acts ultimately as a central clearing bank for the members of the monetary union.<sup>2</sup> Extensive relations exist between South Africa and the rest of the region. Few African countries admit to trade relations with the Apartheid regime. However the South African authorities have claimed that in 1983 alone, for example, South African exports to the rest of Africa amounted to about R1800 million, which is about 10 percent of the total exports of South Africa. Imports amounted to R400 million or 2.5 percent of her total imports.<sup>3</sup>

The South African authorities further claim that for the same year there was a reciprocal flow of goods between 47 African states and the Republic of South Africa.<sup>4</sup> Extensive trade relations exist between Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and the Republic of South Africa. On the average, per annum, South Africa supplies over 90 percent of consumer goods for the BLS countries. In the face of these realities, labour migration from the rest of the region into South Africa, both at the unskilled and highly skilled levels is not a surprising phenomenon. Much as this phenomenon goes against the grain of global international sensibilities and moral indignation against the racist Apartheid System, Pretoria claims that by 1985, there were 350,000 foreign Blacks legally employed in South Africa.

The major countries of origin being Lesotho (139,000), Mozambique (60,000), Malawi (30,000), Botswana (2,000) and Swaziland (17,000).<sup>5</sup> These figures refer to semi-skilled and unskilled labourers. The South African authorities further contend that foreign Blacks living and working illegally in South Africa far exceed the legal "guest workers".<sup>6</sup> While these illegal workers come from countries all over the region, they are mostly



from Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.

With salary scales in South Africa considerably higher than elsewhere within the region, a whole range of migrants are attracted into the Republic and its Bantustans. This is true for unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and highly skilled migrants, moving from countries within the region to South Africa.

The second category of people that can be identified in the phenomenon of brain and talent drain to the Bantustans are those whose native countries lie outside the Southern African region. Particularly significant for the purposes of this study are the highly skilled migrants from East and West Africa; more specifically Uganda and Ghana respectively.

These migrants are almost exclusively highly skilled. They are mainly secondary school teachers, lecturers and other University staff, medical doctors and dentists, para-medics, and a variety of technicians, engineers, and planners. The overwhelming majority of them are secondary school teachers. Most of the upper echelons are highly qualified internationally. There are however some who claim qualifications they do not possess. But, because of the secrecy with which they are received and the international *cordon sanitaire* around South Africa, their academic and skills credentials are difficult to check. They are illegal migrants not in the sense in which the South African authorities define illegality, that is without registering their presence through the South African immigration authorities. Rather they are in South Africa illegally in the sense that, their governments prohibit them by law to seek employment or even visit South Africa. They are therefore forced to hide their presence in South Africa to the wider world, and many adopt elaborate means and measures to as it were "cover their tracks".

Measures to "cover their tracks" include travelling by road to either Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and flying out of these latter countries whenever they travel out on home leave. With immigration stamps from the BLS countries, they pretend these are their countries of employment. It is a common sight to see Ghanaians or Ugandans from the Bantustans at

Gaborone, Matsapa, and Moshoeshoe I airports, flying out into independent Africa. At these airports, and in flight, they are particularly sensitive and nervous about questions alluding to their stay in the Bantustans.

Many of the Ghanaians are elements who previously worked in Nigeria ("Agege") during the oil-boom years. With the collapse of the oil economy they moved southwards where remunerations for work and openings were more favourable. Some moved first from Nigeria to other countries in the Southern African region, particularly, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Subsequently the attraction of better rewards drew them into the borders of South Africa.

This practice has gone on to the extent that, for example in Lesotho, the Teaching Service authorities are quietly unhappy about accepting Ghanaians and Ugandans into employment for fear that they will move into South Africa at the earliest opportunity and without warning.

Years of war, and a war-shattered economy in Uganda, have stimulated many Ugandans to move southwards into South Africa for employment. Their patterns of behaviour with regards to the sensitivities of working in South Africa are similar to the Ghanaians. In the course of the research for this study, it was found that the practice of migration from Uganda to the Bantustans is so far "institutionalized" that there are, currently operating in Kampala and Nairobi, agents and touts who quietly provide information on employment opportunities in the Bantustans and facilitate movement, for fees.<sup>7</sup>

The precise numbers of highly skilled migrants from independent Africa working in the Bantustans of South Africa are difficult to come-by. However, estimates obtained from various sources suggest that their total numbers are about 7,000. The migrants from the BLS countries are about 3,000 and Ugandans, Ghanaians, Zambians, Zimbabweans, and Mauritians number about 3,500. The Bantustan and Pretoria authorities ensure that their stay is not indicated in their passports.

Ghanaians and Ugandans form about 60% of the highly skilled migrants from Africa. Their contribution in maintaining various services in the Ban-

tustans is considerable, and in the medical and teaching services, crucial. In one hospital in Thaba Nchu (Bophuthatswana) 7 of the 18 medical officers and paramedics are Ugandans. The medical services of the Bantustans are well represented with Ugandans in particular. An increasing number of Ghanaians and Ugandans are moving into the Universities as academics and librarians. Among the prominent Ghanaians can be found Nico Asante, a former Regional Director of Education, (Ashanti Region) now in Transkei; Nico Anim, former Director-General of the Ghana Teaching Service, in the Transkei; Kwasi Nsarko, of the University of Bophuthatswana, a former professor in local government, University of Ghana, Commissioner of Local Government, and previously a lecturer at the Winneba Ideological Institute during the Nkrumah era; the medicus Wilson, of the University of Transkei.

As part of the strategy of breaking out of the stranglehold of the international handsoff policy towards the Bantustans, the Bantustan authorities went out of their way from the onset of their so-called "independence" period to court other Africans and the international community, in order to achieve some measure of recognition outside South Africa. They appear to have failed, but not in attracting some capital and labour. Apart from South African capital, some infusion has come from the West, and the Far East.

There are only poor opportunities for unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled labour. Highly skilled labour of various types are in short supply and the Bantustans provide material rewards difficult to rival elsewhere in Africa. The currency is harder than anywhere in Africa.

The clash of these factors has resulted in the most economically debilitated of the relatively more educated African states serving as source countries for highly skilled migrants.

While most of these migrants are on 2-3 year contracts. Some of them have permanent contracts which provide them indefinite stay in employment.

The breakdown of expatriates in the employ of the Transkei Departments of Education and Health is revealing.

EXPATRIATES: DEPT. OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION TRANS-  
KEI 1987-88

Nationality	Dept. of Ed.	Dept. of Health	
		Doc. & Dents	Pharmacists
Ugandans	89	49	-
Indians	137	18	-
Ghanaians	226	23	1
British	15	6	-
Sri Lankans	36	9	1
Pakistanis	3	-	-
Zambians	2	1	-
Canadians	1	-	-
Sotho	19	-	-
Australians	1	-	-
Bangladeshi	2	5	-
Zimbabweans	2	-	-
Americans	4	1	-
Italians	1	-	-
Filipinos	1	5	-
Swiss	1	-	-
Mauritians	3	-	-
Kenyans	1	2	-
Irish	4	3	-
Belgians	1	1	-
Polish	1	6	-
Germans	5	3	-
Angolans	1	-	-
S. Africans	-	16	-
Dutch	-	5	-
Yugoslavians	-	1	-
Hungarians	-	1	-
Argentinians	-	1	-

Bolivians	-	1	-
Nepalese	-	6	-
Swazis	-	-	1
Iranians	-	-	- 1

**\*In addition to the above**, there are 5 Ugandan Medical Technologists and 1 Ugandan Radiographer.

Ugandans among African highly skilled expatriates are particularly well represented in the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.

EXPATRIATES: DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.

TRANSKEI

1. AGRICULTURE

<u>NO.</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>QUALIFICATIONS</u>
1	Chief Professional Officer	Uganda	B.Sc. M.Sc., Ph.D.
1	Professional Officer	Uganda	B.Sc.

2. FORESTRY/CONSERVATION

1	Senior Professional Officer	Czech.	B.Sc. Diploma.
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3. VETINARY SERVICES

1	State Vet.	Uganda	B.V.M. Ch.
1	State Vet.	Uganda	Degree Vet. Medicine
1	State Vet.	Portugal	B.V.M. Ch.
1	Director of Vet. Services	Iran	M.Sc. (Vet. Medicine)
1	State Vet.	Uganda	B.V.M. Ch.
1	State Vet.	Uganda	B.V.M. Ch.

1 State Vet.	Uganda	B.V.M. Ch.,EAACE
1 State Vet.	Uganda	B.V.M. Ch.
1 State Vet.	Portugal	B.V.M. Ch.
1 State Vet.	Germany	B.V.M. Ch.

#### 4. ENGINEERING SERVICES

1 Inspector of Works	Australia	Trade Training Cert.
1 Engineer	R.S.A.	B.Sc. Agric-Eng.
1 Industrial Technician	Poland	Std 10 + Diploma
1 Engineer	Australia	B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Engineer	U.S.A.	B.Sc. (Engineer)
1 Engineer	Iran	B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Engineer	R.S.A.	B.Sc. Engineering
1 Director Eng. Services	Iran	Dip. Maths, B.Sc.
1 Senior Drilling Inspector	R.S.A.	Senior Certificate
1 Deputy Director Eng.	Iran	B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Artisan (Mechanical)	R.S.A.	Trade Training Cert.
1 Industrial Technician	Poland	Std 10 + Diploma

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GRAND TOTAL = 25

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Figures on academic staff, for the University of Transkei show a wide distribution of origins of staff members. In reality they are distributed over the full range of teaching faculties in the university.

ACADEMIC STAFF ORIGINS. UNITRA. 1983-1987

Year	Transkei & S.A.			Africa	Europe	N.A.	Asia	Total
	Black	White	Total					
1983	50	51	109	8	14	9	9	149
1984-83	54	13	137	13	16	9	14	189
1985	103	52	155	26	15	9	7	222
1986	114	44	158	30	18	8	18	232
1987	125	37	162	37	16	3	15	233

What is also telling from the three preceding tables is the fact that Africa is not the only source of highly trained migrants moving into the Bantustans.<sup>8</sup> As the following table reveals for the year 1985, the overwhelming majority of applicants for temporary work and study permits in Bophuthatswana were Europeans, and other westerners.

Highly skilled migrants started moving into the South African Homelands in 1976-77. From small beginnings in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, by 1980 the tide was rising. With the South African rand in those days stronger than the U.S. dollar the attraction for highly skilled migrants from independent Africa was considerable.

As the flood into the Bantustans continued, African governments became increasingly embarrassed and apprehensive about the flow of talented migrants into the Bantustans.<sup>9</sup> In September 1984, addressing members of the Students Democratic Front within the National University of Lesotho, the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Mr. D. T. Sixishe;

Strongly condemned youth who after graduation having been financially supported by public funds go to the Bantustans to help South Africa with the upliftment of the obnoxious system of Bantu Education.<sup>10</sup>

Shortly after Sixishe's speech, the theme was picked up again in Lesotho by the Mafeteng District Coordinator, Mr. Halemakale M. Motsoene, during a guest speech at Masentle High School in Mafeteng. He condemned;

the unfortunate and selfish malpractice of those who, after being educated by this poor country, leave in pursuit of higher salaries in Bantustans and thus give strength and respectability to the abhorrent system of Apartheid.<sup>10</sup>

While the emphasis in condemnation of the brain drain in the BLS countries has been placed on the heartless selfishness of those highly skilled migrants who drift into the homelands of South Africa, further north in East and West Africa, it is the embarrassing nature of the drift for "the good name" of source countries which has tended to irk the authorities.

In a news report put out by the *Johannesburg Star* in August 23, 1984, attention was drawn to the fact that "hundreds of Ghanaian workers are flocking to South Africa's homelands in search of jobs, acutely embarrassing the government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings". This embarrassment induced the Ghanaian government to stamp all Ghanaian passports as valid for all countries except South Africa and its Homelands. The newspaper report further noted that according to observers in Accra, "there is little else the government can do apart from condemning the latest exodus". It was pointed out that "Ghana's workers make up one of the largest migrant labour forces in world. But they have choked the labour markets of some countries, causing resentment and often resulting in expulsion". The plight of Ghanaian migrant workers is highlighted in recent history by an observation made by the newspaper report regarding expulsions of Ghanaians from host countries. Referring to 1983 the report indicated that;

Nigeria last year expelled about a million Ghanaian workers, and recently West Germany deported some 4,000.

The embarrassment of Ghanaian authorities is underscored by an editorial in the *Ghanaian Times* headlined "A Twist to Exodus" which called the migration to South Africa a smear on Ghana's image of a champion against apartheid. It read further that;

For what-ever reasons Ghanaians wish to join the exodus



abroad, they are free to do so. But the trail to Transkei is quite intolerable....Ghana cannot afford to be seen to have any association with the bantustan system in any way, because Ghana has got a reputation to maintain for her principled stand against apartheid. To use Ghanaian passports in any exodus to Transkei or the bantustans is to give respect to the apartheid policy and insult our national dignity.<sup>11</sup>

Early in 1988, the Rawlings Government restated its case regarding Ghanaian nationals working in the South African Bantustans:

The Ghanaian government has expressed concern over the large number of Ghanaians residing and working in the Apartheid Republic of South Africa, a practice contrary to the government's (Ghana's) commitment to the struggle for the eradication of Apartheid and the total liberation of South Africa.<sup>12</sup>

The statement further recalled that in 1987, the Ghanaian government advised the general public to stop the practice since it was embarrassing the government and also questions the integrity and sincerity of its policy of absolute commitment to the isolation of racist South Africa. Furthermore it was indicated that the government of Ghana had withdrawn all consular services to Ghanaians living or working in South Africa. The news report affirmed that officially, Ghanaians are not allowed to live or work in the Republic of South Africa or its Bantustans.<sup>13</sup> That is the law. In reality, Ghanaians and Ugandans migrating to the Bantustans have developed routes for entrance. In Lesotho the Tele Bridge has over the past few years been the favourite route into the Transkei. The route to Bophuthatswana runs through Botswana, at the various border gates opening on to the South African Bantustan. Relatively generous economic rewards in Bophuthatswana are increasingly attracting migrants.

The era of active courtship is however over. Homeland leaders increasingly debate publicly the influx of aliens. Complaints have been publicly

registered in Mabatho. In the Transkei it is not infrequent. For example on the 5 July 1983;

Wide-ranging calls for tighter control of entry to Transkei of aliens, expatriates and white South Africans were made in the National Assembly.....<sup>14</sup>

After a scathing attack on the employment of white managers in corporations and semi-government bodies, the M.P. for Umtata, Mr. Mike Mazwana went on to reportedly ask whether aliens coming to the Transkei would not become too entrenched, and referred to Nigeria where a million Ghanaians had to be expelled.

This will obtain here as we have Ghanaians here now. They come to work here and act as recruiting officers for their friends back home.<sup>15</sup>

Suggested K. W. Tamsanqa. Turning to another set of aliens, the Indians, Tamsanqa asserted that there were plenty of foreigners, especially Indians, in the Department of Education.

He did not know how they came into the country. He could not understand how whites from Zimbabwe got in either. One white had said he had a degree and was at Blythswood. It was later found he only had a police diploma.<sup>16</sup>

The Ciskei is also collecting a contingent of skilled migrants from independent Africa. In Venda, Indians, Pakistanis and Filipinos have been arriving since 1980 in a steady stream. More recently some of the highly skilled migrants have been moving from the South African Bantustans into Namibia.<sup>17</sup> Some of the migrants have taken opportunity of institutions of learning to further improve their qualifications. They are to be found in several South African Universities.

From the National University of Lesotho, during the last eight years 15

local staff members have left for different work destinations in the Bantustans. The number for African expatriates who have left the National University of Lesotho for the Bantustans over the same period is 12. The attraction for most of these people are the considerably higher financial rewards offered in the Bantustans.

The following table giving comparative salary figures for academics in Umtata and Roma is indicative.

ACADEMIC SALARIES (LESOTHO AND TRANSKEI S.A.) IN RANDES.1988.

<u>Post</u>	<u>NUL Salaries</u>	<u>UNITRA Salaries</u>
Assistant Lecturer	14628.00	17724.00
Or	15120.00	18423.00
Junior Lecturer	15612.00	19386.00
		20349.00
		21312.00
		22275.00
		26127.00
<hr/>		
Lecturer	18816.00	23979.00
	19584.00	25341.00
	20352.00	26700.00
	21120.00	28059.00
	21888.00	29598.00
	22656.00	31137.00
	23424.00	32676.00
	24192.00	34215.00
	24960.00	35754.00
	25728.00	37344.00
		38931.00
<hr/>		
Senior Lecturer	25788.00	31137.00

	26892.00	32676.00
	27996.00	34215.00
	29100.00	35754.00
	30204.00	37344.00
		38931.00
		40551.00
<hr/>		
Associate Professor	30936.00	35754.00
	32352.00	37344.00
	33768.00	38931.00
		40551.00
		42168.00
		43785.00
<hr/>		
Professor	34992.00	42168.00
	36396.00	43785.00
	37800.00	45402.00
		47022.00
		48858.00
		50697.00
<hr/>		

## Conclusion

From the late 1970s onwards a steady stream of highly skilled migrants have been flowing into the South African Bantustans. There is however among the Africans a preponderance of Ugandans and Ghanaians. Initially they were courted by the Bantustan authorities but as social and economic constraints increase on South Africa, and with most of the openings filled in the Bantustans, competition with locals and rivalry is fast developing. One of the consequences of this is that an anti-foreigner rhetoric is slowly building-up. While most of the migrants are likely to return to their source countries sooner or later, some are bound to make permanent homes in the South African Bantustans.

This is likely to increase familiarity and interaction between Africans, a process most Africans tend to welcome. However whatever measure of such

interaction is achieved, it is at a price the international community today deplores. The presence of foreigners and other Africans in the Bantustans as highly skilled employees strengthens the Apartheid system at the level of the Bantustan structure.

## NOTES

1. South Africa and the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) are members of the Southern African Customs Union. The treaty provides for the free flow of goods and services among member states, which levy the same tariffs on goods imported from outside the customs area.

In 1982-83 the following amounts of money were disbursed to the BLS countries, under the terms of the treaty: Botswana; R116 million, Lesotho; R71 million, Swaziland; M117 million.

These figures, for the respective years account for 32 percent (Botswana), 37 percent (Lesotho) and 61 percent (Swaziland) of total revenue. See *South Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa*. Pretoria. 1985. p.15.

2. Lesotho and Swaziland hold most of their foreign reserves as Rand balances, invested in the South African money market. The treaty provides for a uniform exchange control system. Swaziland and Lesotho have open access to the South African capital markets. See, *South Africa : Mainstay of Southern Africa*. Ibid. p.16.

3. Ibid. p.16.

4. Ibid. p.16. Kobus Meiring, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister in the Pretoria regime.

5. South Africa has used this dependence of the region on its labour market to frequently threaten that if sanctions against her are imposed in any serious form, she would be inclined to "retaliate" by repatriating these foreign workers back to their countries of origin.

See also; Joanmarie Kalter. *The Economic Squeeze. Africa Report*. Sept.-Oct., 1984. p.67.

6. *South Africa : Mainstay of Southern Africa*. Op cit. p.4. The propaganda claim of the South African regime is that "the benefits accruing to the neighbouring countries go far beyond quantifiable earnings and contributions to gross national product.

Employment of both legal and illegal workers in South Africa relieves the pressure on their labour markets to an enormous extent. This in turn promotes social and political stability in the countries concerned. Ibid. p.5.

7. Interview. F. B. 19.6.87. Makerere University. Kampala.

8. At a meeting held in Maseru on the 3.10.88, the Indian High Commissioner for Lesotho based in Maseru revealed that, the Indian Government is unhappy about the drift of Indians into the Bantustans.

Attempts have been made to secure precise information on numbers and the identity of Indian nationals in the Bantustans, but this has so far proven to be a very difficult exercise. A good number of the Indians presently employed in the homelands have previously worked in Nigeria.

In a sense, their case is very similar to the Ghanaian migrants who have drifted southwards from Nigeria. As has been earlier indicated this group constitutes a sizeable proportion of the Ghanaians in the Bantustans.

The number of Mauritians and Filipinos is also increasing rapidly. The *Southscan* of 19.10.88 divulges that for decades the South African authorities have disallowed any kind of oriental immigration. But with the rise of Japanese trade, the notion of "the customer is always white" was cultivated and the Japanese were given "honorary white" status in the Apartheid racial pantheon.

In the last half-decade immigration from the East has been opened up, and Chinese migrants are coming in from mainly Taiwan but also Hong Kong.

The Homeland decentralization points or the former border industries are

their prime economic targets. Massive incentives are offered to industrialists to set up enterprises in these South African peripheries.

Such financial advantages include relocation costs, subsidizing wages for seven years, rent for ten, housing loans and subsidized transport of goods to urban areas. See, South African Chinese: The Totally Voteless Community. *Southscan*. Vol. 3 No.8. 19.10.88.

9. Attention has been drawn to this by M. R. Montsi. *Research Priorities and Support Needs in BLS*. Mimeo. Paper presented at the OSSREA Workshop on Social Science Research Priorities and Support Needs. Arusha, Tanzania, January 1983.

The author argues that the brain drain from the BLS countries to the Bantustans "is equally crippling to the economies of the BLS countries because it is now not a question of the numbers of migrant workers but more a dent into the already painfully limited resource of skilled and professional population of these countries". See also L.B.B.J. Machobane. *Apartheid and the Creation of a New Frontier of Brain Drain. The Southern African Bantustan*. Mimeo. Roma. 1983.

10. *Lesotho Weekly*. Friday, September 26, 1984.

11. *Lesotho Weekly*. Friday, November 9, 1984.

12. *APS News and Features Bulletin*. 1st February. 1988.

13. Ibid. It needs also to be pointed out that one of the problems faced by migrants who as it were transit through Lesotho by first working in Lesotho for a period and then moving on into the Bantustans is that many have difficulties with work and residence permits. This cultivates the psychology of temporariness and makes them prone to move on.

It has been suggested that delays in providing work and residence permits may be motivated by the wish to discourage a flood of highly skilled migrants into the country who may pose a competitive factor to the employment of locals.

14. Transkei MPS Call for Clamp on Aliens. *Daily Despatch*. 6.7.83.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. See also Transkei Warning to Illegal Visitors. *Daily Despatch*. 5.4.84.

17. Interview. C.V. Roma. 29.9.87.



## Methodological Issues

In social science research, the methods employed in data collection are directly advised by the nature and type of data sought. The methods of data collection need to be tailor-made for the data required. The specifics of the research issues and the conditions of the research environment largely dictate the methods and procedures to be adopted. Thus success in data collection depends to a great extent on the level of refinement of the methodological tools for data collection employed in the research exercise.

While the above points are equally true for research endeavours in the natural sciences, the element of quantitative and qualitative precision, laboratory or environmentally controlled conditions, and the relevance of issues of space and time, often imply that in natural science research, influential variables require precise measurement recognition and control to a degree which is not the case in the social sciences. In the social sciences, laboratory conditions are generally inoperative and crucially, the range of influential but indeterminate variables are often very wide.<sup>1</sup>

This study in many ways highlighted some of these concerns. The most important factor affecting the process of data collection was the general sensitivity of the study. Because of the universal condemnation of South Africa for its institutionalization of racism and the elevation of racism to the level of state ideology, most migrants to the South Africa homelands have tended to undertake the act of migration with a high degree of secrecy. In all cases, their national governments strongly discourage this practice, and public opinion in the home countries is not favourable to migration into the homelands. As a result of this migrant's-response to questions relating to this study tended to be either overly circumspect, or often unwilling, uncooperative or stubborn. As a result, the sample of the questionnaire administered on migrants to elicit their attitudes to the phenomenon of brain drain

had to be reduced in size from 200 to a 100. Rather, great reliance was placed on informal interviews which were unstructured and open-ended. Where migrants were willing to complete questionnaires invariably the anonymity of respondents had to be assured. Questionnaires were treated very privately with many respondents asking for assurance that their colleagues should under no circumstance be put into the picture.<sup>2</sup>

Most of the literature and documentary material relevant to the study which was collected in South Africa, was done by South African nationals of all colours. Again here many asked for assurances with regard to their anonymity. Fear of state security control and possible persecution was in some cases expressed. These conditions imposed constraints on the quantity and quality of data particularly with reference to the statistical dimensions of the brain drain from independent Africa, to the Bantustans.

The difficulty in getting collectors of documentary material was such that, the material collected in the Transkei was more and different from the type of material collected in Bophuthatswana. These two Bantustans were the only Bantustans from which active data collection took place. Estimates indicate however that these two homelands have over 85 percent of all the highly skilled migrants from independent Africa working in the South African homelands.<sup>3</sup>

South African nationals of the homelands were generally quite forthcoming with information. Most were cooperative and saw the value of the research undertaking as part of the general struggle against apartheid.

Apart from the questionnaires administered in the Bantustans, the documentary material collected, and the informal interviews conducted on both migrants and South African nationals, questionnaires were also administered in selected source countries namely, Uganda, Ghana, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. All this was done during the two year period spanning 1986-88. The questionnaires which were administered in the source countries of the highly skilled migrants were very quickly completed. There was little resistance to this. Indeed most respondents were very forthcoming. In addition most interviews were conducted in the source coun-

tries, and documentary material collected. The focus of data collection in the source countries was to obtain material which will help clarify attitudes in the source countries with regard to the phenomenon of brain drain to the Bantustans.

The general thrust of the data collection was not to obtain precise or definitive statistical insights into the strength of opinions or views on brain drain to the Bantustans either in the source countries or in the Bantustans. The object was to identify the range of views and concerns, estimate their relative strengths in order to make a qualitative assessment of their relative significance.

In-depth interviews of selected informants have been a very useful method employed in this research. The reasons are largely accounted for by the sensitivities of migrants to the problems and dangers of exposure to the wider world. Respondents and informants proved to be more responsive in private. Even then invariably assurances of the discretionary use of the information were necessary. There have been also problems inherent in this method. Figures and hard facts volunteered during in-depth interviews have had to be cross-checked, since the method is particularly prone to subjectivism.

## Conclusion

While data collection for this study on the whole proved to be a fairly sensitive exercise, with time it was possible to obtain enough material to make the study a success. As has been earlier indicated, quantitative precision and demographic data was scanty. However the study was able to cull up enough material to clarify the essential questions thrown up by the study.

The study and its problems of data collection underscore the general sensitivities of the contemporary problems of South Africa.

## NOTES

1. See for example the Foreword to Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz. *Research Methods in the Behavioural Sciences*. London, 1953. See also Pauline V. Young. *Scientific Social Surveys and Research* (3rd Edition) Inglewood Cliffs. 1956. pp. 103-104. Galtung treats some of these issues in an enlightening manner in J. Galtung. *Theory and Methods of Social Research*. London, (2nd Impression). 1969. pp 481-490.

2. Problems of space and costs have not permitted the reproduction in this text, the two questionnaires employed in this study i.e. the questionnaire administered on migrants in the Bantustans and the questionnaire administered on respondents in the source countries.

3. The Transkei and Bophuthatswana are politically and economically the most "advanced" of the South African homelands. Particularly in the case of Bophuthatswana platinum mining at a point in time when world market prices for this commodity are favourable has tended to make the Bophuthatswana economy currently the most bouyant among the South African Bantustans. Bophuthatswana is currently attracting more migrants than Transkei.

## Attitudes in the Source Countries and Attitudes of Migrants

### A. Attitudes in Source Countries

Attitudes in the five source countries in this study differ only slightly. The key line of differentiation lies between the old source countries (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), and the new source countries. These include Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Togo, Tanzania, Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi, but principally and overwhelmingly Uganda and Ghana. The Ivory Coast, Togo, Tanzania, Cameroon and Kenya are represented only in isolated cases. These differences appear to be differences in emphasis in the views expressed and not substantial differences with regards to the general import of the views per se.

#### AGE GROUP PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (PERCENTAGE) IN SOURCE COUNTRIES

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Lesotho</u>	<u>Botswana</u>	<u>Swaziland</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Ghana</u>
20-29	27	45	49	28	30
30-39	38	33	34	32	45
40-49	21	12	12	20	15
50-59	12	9	4	14	8
60 & Over	2	1	1	6	2
	100	100	100	100	100

The gender profile emerged as the following.

### GENDER PROFILE (PERCENTAGE) IN SOURCE COUNTRIES

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Lesotho</u>	<u>Botswana</u>	<u>Swaziland</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Ghana</u>
Male	57	49	56	53	55
Female	43	51	44	47	45

The marital status of the respondents revealed the following.

### MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS (PERCENTAGE) IN SOURCE COUNTRIES

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Lesotho</u>	<u>Botswana</u>	<u>Swaziland</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Ghana</u>
Single	32	54	42	51	48
Married	59	30	56	39	38
Separated	-	3	0	3	4
Divorced	5	8	1	4	6
Widowed	4	5	1	3	4

The respective country components of the study were represented by citizens in each instance. Variously they were drawn from a wide variety of occupational backgrounds including civil servants, surveyors, accountants, nurses, medical doctors, teachers, lawyers, engineers, secretaries, soldiers and police officers, airways personnel, self-employed persons, clerics and businessmen.

One criterion of the structural variables of the sample was that respondents should be persons whose horizons and outlook are wide enough to permit them views on highly skilled migrants to the Bantustans. An implied condition for the selection of such respondents was that they should be social elements who have at least education to the secondary level.

In response to the question; "are you aware of the fact that some nationals of your country are employed in the South African Homelands?" The fol-

lowing data emerged.

AWARENESS OF BRAIN TREK TO THE BANTUSTANS

	Lesotho	Botswana	Swaziland	Uganda	Ghana
Yes	100	92	94	66	64
No	-	6	6	30	35
No Comment		2	-	4	1

It is significant that respondents in Ghana and Uganda were less aware of the brain drain to the Bantustans than respondents from the BLS countries. In the case of the latter, proximity, history, and social intercourse have tended possibly to optimize societal awareness, of the phenomenon. Respondents were also in the BLS countries on the whole less stridently condemnatory of the practice. Furthermore it was noteworthy that whereas on the average more than 50 percent of the respondents from the BLS countries indicated that they have relatives working in the Homelands, the average for Uganda and Ghana was 3 percent.

The responses given to reasons for the out-migration were interesting and educative. Most respondents had clear and fairly definite views on this matter.

REASONS FOR MIGRATION. (REASONS/RESPONDENT) IN SOURCE COUNTRIES

	Lesotho	Botswana	Swaziland	Uganda	Ghana
Higher Salaries/ Benefits/Quality of life	113	101	107	122	130
Lack of local jobs	67	81	73	58	51
Political & Social Reasons	12	9	13	12	7

### Poor Work Conditions

locally	5	6	4	6	8
Local corruption, nepotism e.t.c.	1	2	2	1	2
Other reasons	2	1	1	1	2

Over 55 percent of respondents in all 5 countries felt it was all right to seek employment in the Bantustans for the reasons given above. The average for Uganda and Ghana on this issue was 48 percent.

It appears that respondents from source countries far removed from South Africa tended to be more critical of the brain trek, and were more emphatic about the attraction which economic benefits offer.

Political factors as reasons for migration were particularly weak for respondents in Botswana and Ghana.

Respondents were almost equally divided on whether in their estimation, there are any perceived differences between highly skilled migrants and manual workers working in the Bantustans. This question which had special relevance to the BLS countries was also extensively answered by respondents from the three countries.

Most respondents in the BLS countries felt that apart from the fact that the fundamental difference lies in their salary differentials, another important point is that "educated people have a choice of going or not going to work in the Bantustans, while manual workers have virtually little alternative and are therefore more or less forced by circumstances to seek employment in the Homelands".

Most respondents were of the view that their local authorities, have no right to stem, or halt such migration.



SHOULD GOVERNMENT STOP SUCH MIGRATION? (SOURCE COUNTRIES)

	Lesotho	Botswana	Swaziland	Uganda	Ghana
Yes	46	39	37	47	49
No	54	61	62	52	51
No Comment	-	-	1	1	-

Questioned further on the above issue, the predominant response that emerged suggested that respondents felt that for as long as their home governments cannot provide lucrative salaries for work, political and social stability, and fair and open working conditions it would be wrong for them to attempt to stem or halt the drift. Some respondents felt that the flow should be halted in view of the increasing political turmoil and insecurity in South Africa. Others suggested particularly in the BLS countries that the homeland economies are in competition with their local economies.

"People should not be trained and then leave"; "People should stay at home to develop their own countries" were also not uncommon responses from those who felt the flow should be halted. There were also those who felt that their local governments should intervene to stop the flow of migrants on account of the fact that "there is no freedom because of Apartheid".

Those respondents who have relatives in the homelands, were for the most part "happy with the money they got from relations". A smaller proportion had mixed feelings in view of the explosiveness of the developing struggle for majority rule in South Africa. An equal number expressed the view that although they are happy with the remittances they get from close relatives working in the Bantustans, they know also too well that "the South African Apartheid System oppresses the Blackman". They therefore felt insecure, unsafe, and frustrated by the whole issue. While some suggested that they missed their relatives others indicated that they felt relieved because at home they were frustrated with their job conditions.

52 percent of the whole sample felt that homelands employment supported the apartheid system directly or indirectly. The main reasons given can be

summarized as follows:

(1) Because the homelands are meant to divide Africans, exploit African labour in order to sustain the South African economy which essentially maintains the Apartheid System.

(2) The educated migrants do so wilfully. While the less educated ones also support the system they are more forced by circumstances to seek employment in the homelands.

(3) They give the homelands credibility and respectability and thereby support the Apartheid System.

(4) They work for institutions and organizations which are the brain children of the Apartheid concept.

(5) They are legitimizing the system.

Asked how best the flow of trained people to the Bantustans could be stemmed, 77 percent of the respondents suggested that better salaries and working conditions should be created together with an expansion of local job opportunities. 12 percent indicated that the social and political climates in their countries need to be democratized and opened up to accommodate divergence of views, cultivate political tolerance, accountability and social freedom from nepotism and corruption. A few felt legislation should be introduced to counter the flow while even fewer particularly in the BLS countries felt that the numbers of expatriates in their countries should be reduced, to make room for returning migrants. Some respondents felt that people should be better educated about Apartheid while others argued that returning migrants should be ostracized and politically disenfranchised. This view was stronger among the younger respondents.

In response to the question, "what should be done to such migrants on their return to their countries of origin", the overwhelming majority of respondents felt that they should be provided and attracted with jobs which remunerate them appropriately for their qualifications and skills. They should not be harrassed except for those with criminal records. While a few respondents felt they should be politically educated and discouraged from going

back, an equally small number of respondents suggested that they should be taxed on their earnings in the Bantustans. There were also some 7 per cent of the respondents who were of the view that returnees should be punished. However about a third of the sample felt they should be reabsorbed as quickly as possible into local employment.

Respondents from the BLS countries were more tolerant of Bantustan employment than respondents in Uganda and Ghana. Closer to the realities of Southern African economy and society, and with histories of migratory labour into South Africa, they tend to be more accommodating while remaining largely aware of the evils of the Apartheid System. The dependence syndrome is more acutely present in respondents in the BLS countries. There are those who obviously regard the South African border as "a legalistic inconvenience dividing kith and kin".

Respondents in Ghana and Uganda who are much further removed from the South African scenario were generally more critical. However even then many respondents expressed feelings to the effect that it is the ineptitude of their governments, the economic shambles that their societies have become, the political insecurity, and the poor quality of life and rewards, which are pushing highly trained citizens into the homelands.

## B. Attitudes of Migrants

The sample of migrants in the Bantustans was mainly composed of Ghanaians and Ugandans. A few Mauritians, Zimbabweans, Basotho, Swazis, and Batswana were included. Their age range and distribution was as follows:

### AGE RANGE DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS

Age Range	Percentage
20-29 years	31
29-39 years	34

39-49 years	15
49-59 years	13
60 and over	7

Eighty two percent of the sample consisted of males. This figure indicates clearly that the composition of highly trained migrants to the South African homelands is made up largely of males. 69 percent of those who are married have left their spouses behind in their home countries. The percentage is even higher among secondary school teachers. Doctors, lawyers, dentists, and other elements of the highest levels of migrants have often their children and wives with them. The data on the marital status of migrants was as follows:

#### MARITAL STATUS OF MIGRANTS

Status	Percentage
Single	24
Married	60
Separated	5
Divorced	8
Widowed	3

The overwhelming majority of the migrants have educational qualifications of graduates or post-graduates.

#### EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF MIGRANTS

Level Achieved	Percentage
B.A. or equivalent	69
M.A. or equivalent	9
Ph.D.	3
Other (mainly Diploma)	19

Most migrants received their qualifications from their home countries. The

majority of those with post-graduate qualifications received their credentials from Europe and North America. Among the teachers only 62 percent are teaching in the precise areas of their qualifications. While 67 percent of the migrants indicated that they have children only 17 percent of the married migrants indicated that they have some or all of their children with them. The reasons given for leaving children behind in their home countries were broadly as follows:

- (a) Expensive to keep children with you in the homelands.
- (b) The children are "better-off" being educated in the home country.
- (c) One must save as much as possible in the homelands, and rather send the money home.
- (d) The wife is at home, so its better to keep the children at home.
- (e) The children may feel out of place.

Most migrants were sponsored by their home governments during their university studies.

#### UNIVERSITY STUDY SPONSORSHIP OF MIGRANTS

Sponsor	Percentage Migrants
Your Government	78
International Organization	11
Self-Sponsored	6
Other	5

The overwhelming majority of Ghanaians, mainly secondary school teachers, had previously worked in Nigeria during the years of the oil-boom. Many of both the Ghanaians and Ugandans have also worked in the BLS countries prior to their advent into the homelands. Indeed, for these latter, it was from the BLS countries that they made enquiries into possibilities of employment in the homelands. Most respondents indicated that they were not promoted in their previous places of employment. Only 24 percent suggested that the criteria for promotion in their last places of work were con-

ducive to good work performance.

The general finding of the study was that migrants would have left their previous jobs even if they had had knowledge of oncoming promotion, in view of the superiorly attractive homelands salaries. Only 17 percent of the migrants indicated that their previous employment had offered them some training. Of those migrants who indicated that they had received training in their previous employment, 72 percent agreed that their training was relevant to the needs of the organization or institution in which they worked. 91 percent of the migrants indicated that they were attracted to the homelands on account of the higher salaries offered.

Regarding the homelands system and Apartheid, the general attitude of migrants was to voice or plead an apolitical position. All agreed that Apartheid is an obnoxious system, but only 4 percent agreed that their presence and work in the homelands may be strengthening and endorsing the Apartheid System. 27 percent of the sample disagreed with the suggestion that their presence in the homelands could be read as an unpatriotic or unsympathetic attitude.

The migrant respondents provided a catalogue of ways by which independent African states can retain their trained manpower. The main ones can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Provide competitive and better salaries. (This was by far the strongest and most persistent recommendation.)
- (2) Provide better conditions of service and working conditions.
- (3) Avoid nepotism, corruption, and occupational favouritism.
- (4) Institutionalize democratic and open political and social processes in the conduct of government and public affairs.
- (5) Create tolerant social climates.
- (6) People should be properly and duly rewarded for their work and societal contribution.

Asked how long migrants intended to stay in the Bantustans, the following picture emerged.

#### PROJECTED LENGTH OF STAY IN THE HOMELANDS

Period	Percentage
1-2 years	26
2-4 years	38
4-6 years	21
6 years or more	15

Regarding their appreciation of the intellectual climate in the Bantustans the following strength of views were expressed.

#### INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE IN THE HOMELANDS

Appreciation	Percentage of Migrants
Very Good	2
Good	3
Fair	32
Poor	39
Very Poor	24

Most migrants expressed the view that the treatment they receive from their hosts is civil, but there are misunderstandings and problems. Some complained that they are over-worked. Others mentioned rivalries in various areas of social and intellectual life. Generally they were satisfied. Only 12 percent suggested however that they could consider settling in the Homelands.

The most difficult feature of their lives in the homelands was indicated to be a feeling of "otherness", not completely belonging and homesickness.

Many complained of missing their families. The most pleasant feature of their lives was being generally able to make ends meet in a way they did not experience in their previous places of work.

Some conceded that they were aware of the fact that there are colleagues amongst them whose claimed academic and training credentials may be false. This refers to migrants from different parts of the world.



## Responsible Factors and Concluding Remarks

The brain drain phenomenon is throughout the world, a worrying issue for those countries which lose their brains. Over the past two decades the United Kingdom authorities have for example often expressed worry and concern about the loss of highly skilled manpower to North America. It is therefore not surprising that in the specific case under study, the Ghanaian and Ugandan authorities have on many occasions raised voices of concern for the loss of highly skilled citizens to the South African Homelands.

The case under study has however a seriously complicating factor. This is that, in this case the recipient country for the highly skilled migrants is a country condemned by the whole international community on account of its racist policies of government and in its general conduct of societal affairs along strictly racist lines. The worst sufferers and victims of South Africa's racial policies are the Africans who form the overwhelming proportion of the population. African politics since the onset of the era of independence in the 1960s has viewed the Apartheid system as its biggest challenge. Ghanaians working in the homelands could be reminded of Nkrumah's first independence day speech in March 1957 when he declared that;

...the independence of Ghana is meaningless, unless it is linked with the total liberation of Africa....<sup>1</sup>

The South African homelands represent the epitome of the Apartheid concept, and are not recognized by any single country in the entire international community. It is for the above reasons an embarrassment for rhetorically nationalistic and so-called "politically progressive" African states to see their

nationals streaming into the South African Bantustans as highly skilled migrants whose service in the Bantustans constitute an important factor strengthening the existence of the Bantustans, and sustaining the Apartheid system.

In a statement made by President Museveni of Uganda and chairman of the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African states in 1988. He announced that;

Ugandan intellectuals and other citizens of the PTA member-states working in the racist republic of South Africa will be blacklisted and their names will be circulated to all PTA member-states so that they can be arrested whenever they are sighted there.<sup>3</sup>

The question has been raised as to whether President Museveni, "was merely talking politics". What has been asked in response to Museveni's statement is that;

.....it is hard to imagine, for instance, that PTA countries can imprison Ugandan professionals for working in South Africa when some 700,000 of their own citizens work as migrants there.<sup>3</sup>

It is however noteworthy that for most countries in the Southern African region while employment in South Africa is a historical phenomenon, it is not generally condoned. It is accepted as "a necessary evil" and in Lesotho as one report indicates, trained Basotho migrants who work in the homelands are regarded as "sell-outs" by the uneducated. The writer however asks;

how can you call somebody who wants survival and in whose "free" and "developing" country no jobs are available, a "sell-out".<sup>4</sup>

A similar point was forcefully made by a Ghanaian teacher based in rural Bophuthatswana.

...the struggle for economic survival brought us here.<sup>5</sup>

A Makerere university professor candidly reaffirmed this argument.

Yes, the person may be behaving selfishly. But these people are going for only purposes of survival. "Myself and my family".<sup>6</sup>

What has also been suggested recently is that Uganda is receiving one million U.S. dollars per month from its citizens working in South Africa, mainly in the homelands.<sup>7</sup> Ghanaian migrants also remit large sums to Ghana in money and goods.

Without any doubt economic factors and competitive rewards constitute the main cluster of reasons why highly skilled migrants from independent Africa move into the Bantustans of South Africa for employment. This is possibly even more so in the case of Ghanaians and Ugandans than those migrants whose countries of origins lie within the Southern African region. For the latter although here again economic factors are the preponderant force pulling them into the Bantustans, in some cases political reasons play some part in motivating the trek. This point was eloquently made in one of the past issues of *Leselinyana La Lesotho* during the period of the Jonathan regime.

Leabua has failed to provide Basotho with jobs. It is clear that Basotho and their children will continue to look for work outside Lesotho in a big way. Matanzima, Mangope, Mopeli, and others will continue to employ Basotho in their Bantustans. ...How can one contribute to the development when he is demanded to produce a party identity? ...during BNP's rule, many more Basotho workforce will leave for South Africa. To label people who run away from the harassment of party

identity "sell-outs", is to fool those who are ignorant.<sup>8</sup>

For migrants from the region, in particular the BLS countries, family ties and consanguinal relations bind and move them in and out of South Africa.

Social unrest and instability in home countries are also responsible factors for the trek into the homelands. As a senior professor from Makerere University said to the present author;

From 1971 to 1978, under Amin the economy was destroyed, there was excessive brutality and social chaos. Then there was also rampant and unbridled exploitation of the society. This led to political and economic anarchy. Many Ugandans were forced to flee. Many were highly qualified and were embraced by a wide variety of African and European countries. But as the situation became worse in many parts of the world, the international institutions became full, neighbouring countries were also full. Many Ugandans came onto waiting lists for years. This sort of thing creates desperation, worsened by the fact that there was more enforced law and order however anti-African in philosophy in the Bantustans than in Uganda. If a person has to choose between starving and going to work in a racist society, their options are narrow, if there are any, and they become vulnerable.<sup>9</sup>

In Ghana years of military rule, brutality, and wholesale violations of human rights have gone on with a steadily collapsing economy. From the early 1960s, the Ghanaian economy has been in ever increasing decline. But it was particularly under the various military regimes to date that excessive repression, social and political intolerance matched by declining job opportunities and material rewards, nepotism and corruption, created a climate which made many highly qualified people prone to migration. Despite the criticism of migrants by the current Rawlings regime, under conditions of an extremely austere IMF-sponsored economy, repression, intolerance and corruption continues, with a penchant for executions. Such a

social climate can hardly attract back highly trained citizens whose marketability is international.<sup>10</sup>

For the near future the South African job market may continue to attract highly skilled migrants. In a study produced by the Renwick International, its director David Hutton-Wilson, pointed out that, mismanagement of the black educational system over the past 30 years, i.e. since the beginning of "Bantu Education" has entrenched the 3rd World population and bred a generation of unschooled and unskilled people.

The report points out that the fact that 6.5 million black children are being educated by teachers of whom only 30 percent have matriculation certificates, and less than 2 percent have graduated is telling. Hutton-Wilson observes that;

This country will continue to require imported skills for at least the next decade.....<sup>11</sup>

Under the combined force of these circumstances it is very likely that highly skilled migrants from independent Africa will continue flowing into the Bantustans. Migrants from other African countries may follow the emerging pattern if economic and social conditions do not improve in their respective countries.

The Apartheid system remains an evil and obnoxious system directed especially against the African majority. This is a point which is well understood by most Africans, in and out of South Africa.

There is legitimate bitterness by exiled South Africans against other Africans helping to maintain that system by giving their highly skilled services to the system. However economic factors constitute the dominant factors governing the human condition, and for as long as attractive rewards are available in South Africa, Africans from beyond the borders will drift into the Bantustans for employment. The only realistic way of stemming the tide for the moment, is for independent African states to create the economic, political, and social climates necessary to attract back their citizens.

While this study has selectively focussed on migrants from independent Africa, it is important to remember that equally large numbers have come in over the same period from mainly Europe and the Indian sub-continent. However, in sum highly skilled migrants in the South African Bantustans, are from all corners of the world.

## NOTES

1. Kwame Nkrumah. Speech at Old Polo Ground. 6th March, 1957.
2. See Special Correspondent in Kampala report. Why Ugandans Work in South Africa. Colin Legum's, *Third World Reports*. 13 July, 1988.
3. Ibid.
4. See Lesotho Evangelical Church Newspaper. *Leselinyana La Lesotho*, 29th July. 1983.
5. Interview. K. A. T. 17.1.88.
6. Interview. B. K. K. G. Makerere University. 13.7.87.
7. See, Why Ugandans Work in South Africa. Colin Legum's, *Third World Reports*. Op cit. In Uganda a graduate teacher earns about 5 U.S. dollars per month while the most highly paid civil servants get 10 U.S. dollars equivalent per month. In the South African Homelands a graduate teacher receives about 600 U.S. dollars equivalent per month. In Ghana a top notch lecturer receives the equivalent of 60 U.S. dollars per month, whereas in the South African Homelands they receive almost 1000 dollars per month. The top notch professor in the National University of Lesotho, receives about the same salary as the top notch lecturer in the South African Homelands. With 12 percent increase in some Bantustans as from December 1988, the gap is growing even wider.
8. They Run Away From Party Identities. *Leselinyana La Lesotho*. 29. July. 1983.

9. Interview. Prof. P. S. D. A. Makerere University. "The points made about the Amin period are equally true about the Obote II period (1980-85). But worse in the sense that under Obote II the countryside was wildly ravaged" Ibid.

10. Recent economic difficulties in Zimbabwe may stimulate a trek of highly skilled migrants into South Africa. See "Brain Drain Hits Harare". *The Star*. September. 22.1988. This article shows that there is movement into the private sector further economic pressure on the trained civil bureaucracy, the health and educational sectors of manpower is likely to increase the attractiveness of the South African Bantustans. Growing economic difficulties in African countries are likely to bring in new migrants from countries in Africa which have hitherto not featured in the phenomenon.

11. See Robyn Chalmers. Immigration, No. 1, Brain Drain Factor. *Sunday Times, Business Times*, 28 August 1988. See also M. Chester. Brain Drain Reaches Crisis Point. *The Johannesburg Star*. 1st August, 1988.

The interesting point to note here is that while South African white highly skilled migrants leave, Africans from independent Africa are coming in. Ghanaian migrants in the Transkei are called "AmaGhana". This term has become a general term used to describe loosely all highly trained "foreign natives" working in the Transkei. Lately in both the Transkei and Bophuthatswana as competition for highly paid jobs increase considerable resentment is building up gradually against highly trained "foreign natives".

The general ideological framework within which this resentment is rationalized is "localism and localization". The argument often takes the form of a discourse for the indigenization of government and general social organization along so-called "national" lines. In reality, it is the result of competition between the local petty bourgeoisie and migrant petty bourgeoisie represented by the highly trained elements.







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