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Peace, Nationalism & The State of Human Rights in Swaziland

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
By

Dr. Paul Bischoff

Human & Peoples Rights
Project Monograph No.7

Series

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I. Introduction

Nationalism And Human Rights In Africa

Nationalism and human rights are much maligned terms. In an African context their use has often been superficial. This has led to accounts which have detracted from giving an objective explanation.

Can these terms be used to give an objective account and, if so, how are they to be used properly? To what extent can they assist in indicating to us the state of political and economic rights as averred to by the Banjul Charter in our area of concern, Swaziland?

The objective the explanation needs to fulfill in social science, is one of problem solving. Historical man is a social being whose needs and the problems he faces in meeting those needs differ over time. The definition of need and on how those needs are met depend on the objective factors that impinge on a particular society. The structure of relations in which members of that society interact, in which wealth is created and distributed, in which knowledge is created and applied as technology, provides the context in which need is addressed.

Concepts such as nationalism and human rights need to be applied appropriate to a historical African setting. Only such an approach will make them relevant tools in explanation.

Foreign Penetration

It is foreign penetration, past and present, which characterizes the social, political and economic patterns in Africa. Nationalism and the state of human rights are conditioned effects of the external factor of foreign penetration. Nationalism describes a response to the external factor, whilst the state of human rights is about the condition of human need in the face of the largely foreign determination of how wealth is accumulated and of how its distribution is to be defended by the state.¹

The nature of the African state in the way it responds and adapts to the external factor needs to be of concern to students of nationalism and the condition of human rights. The ambit within which the African state moves is a limited one. This has to do with the foreign domination of the African economy. The economic relations of production are determined by an international capitalist framework of necessary capitalist production. It is this system that operates to a logic of the

maximization of opportunity and of profit which gives shape to the essential structure and thrust of the African economy. Subject to the dictates of the world market and of international capital, the African economy is the preserve of those outside and inside forces who represent the interests of the world economy. The post-colonial state in Africa has had to find the terms on which to relate to these forces or this social power.

If one also considers the arbitrary nature of the colonial drawn borders, boundaries which were not intended to facilitate or encourage the harnessing of common cultural and natural resources within a given national entity, the nature and functions of the African state are to be seen as ones which are severely handicapped and self-limiting.²

The structural impediments to indigenous and self-sustained development, the limited role an African state plays in the structural transformation of the economy and in indigenous development, is the background to a treatment of nationalism and human rights.

The African state, unable to guarantee national, broad based and sustained development in the social and economic organisation of society can also not ensure the welfare of the mass of its people. It cannot guarantee or make adequate provisions for the material basis on which humanness depends, adequate food, shelter, health care and education. The principal reason for this lies in the foreign economic domination of the African economy.

The post-colonial role of the African state is to direct and expand the foreign economic exploitation of its economy, not to restructure it. Donors of aid and investors will not contemplate plans of restructure which are of little economic use in the short-term, costly, and bear the risk of failure.

Most important of all, restructuring entails the mobilisation of people on a massive scale, something which orientates a country inwards and towards the inward development of an economy in ways which go beyond the scope set by initial and limited programmes of restructure. To the foreign donor or investor this bears a risk. It may signify the beginnings of systematic withdrawal from a reliance on the import-export trade within a world capitalist economy with all the economic, strategic, and political implications such as process may entail for the Western alliance in the international political economy.

The inability by the African state to initiate a process of new and indigenous accumulation on account of the external attempt to freeze

the African economy in its present international position, is therefore to be seen as one obstacle to the provision of material and spiritual needs to the mass of the African population.

In the face of these odds, the extent to which the state can encourage the provision of material and spiritual needs, is an indicator for the assessment of the state of human rights in an individual country. The state's predisposition will in this regard say something about its social nature.

The Character of the State

The African state is more than just a post-colonial state, one which has inherited a role prescribed to it under colonialism. In the thirty years in which the new states of Africa have emerged, states have in part shed their colonially structured political forms and substituted these for new ones. Since these developing state forms have in general been unable to transform the Western orientation of their economies, it is opportune to pose the question as to what impact the indigenization of political rule has had on the lives of the mass of the population. In this regard what seems most pertinent is to ask whether the nationalization of political rule did lead to an increase and redistribution of wealth and how broadly this was felt.

We are therefore looking at the African state not only as a body whose function in the capitalist world economy is a circumscribed and limited one. In addition its role needs to be seen as social whose determination as to what lies in the national interest has to do with who governs the state. Up to the recent past it has been taken for granted that in view of the fact that the economic destiny of the African states is a guided one, one that is subject to the external factor, the African governing class stood united with its population on one vital component of the national interest, namely the reduction of presence of the external factor including obtaining a share in the wealth produced by the foreign firms and receiving a greater income from the production and export of raw materials.

Since 1973, African economies have seen the inflow of capital investment flows and the subsequent development of parts of their export sectors.³ Greater incorporation into the world economy's market structures has encouraged and deepened the hold the Western oriented petit-bourgeoisie have attempted to exercise over the African state. Comprador policies have vied with state policies aimed at structural

transformation. Greater class differentiation taking place within African society has shown itself at the level of the state, on whether state policy tends to favour those responsible for the external sector of the economy or the working class or peasantry, the mass of the population. Both types of policies are not mutually exclusive and will be found in any African State. What is important is the determination of "the mix" between the two and the bearing this has on the relative distribution of resources affecting the populace in regard to health, education, housing, a social economic infrastructure, access to land, credit and the possession of expertise.

The Context of Nationalism and Human Rights

Nationalism in the African context should be judged according to whether it is the people oriented and contributes towards changing the conditions under which the masses live. It is a matter of testing its dynamism as a social theory of change for the better of all.⁴

What would seem to militate against African or Swazi nationalism as essentially dynamic is that we are dealing with nationalism which is a response to an imposed set of factors conditioning economic, social and (at least during the colonial period,) political life. It is a response which falls back on an ideology whose source lies in a culture that accommodates itself within the new way of life but which is unable to transcend it with another. Thus, whilst traditional structures which have survived colonialism are essential to the unfolding of a new nation, the new nation is not able to impose a way of life or an indigenous form of sustained development on itself. As such the nationalist response is a fragmentary one, unlike its earlier European counterpart unable to implement full national indigenous development.

If nationalism does not promote indigenous or even development, if its response to foreign domination is incoherent and fragmentary, then nationalism has primarily an ideological role to play. Nationalism as an ideological force downplays and obscures the degree to which the external factor directs the fortune of a country. A nationalist state will have those who rule pretend to themselves and the population that the nation rules when it does not.

Demonstrations of the power of bureaucracy, administrative formalism, ceremonialism, and rhetoric are the means employed in order to achieve this. A nationalism without a popular or development dimension, one that operates at a predominantly ideological level, removes

those who rule the state from their obligations towards meeting the needs of the masses and lays them open to manipulation from those class forces which predominate in the existing social and economic establishment. Corruption within the state administration becomes a way for life which, if it is to be upheld, is accompanied by the excessive secretiveness in which affairs of state are conducted and the authoritarianism that is needed to uphold this particular state of affairs. Such a regime will be particularly prone to external influence, the neglect of the needs of its population for basic human rights and the use of force against any opposition.

An Analysis

Any analysis of human rights and nationalism in Africa must therefore work on the two aspects to political rule discussed above. One is to discover the colonially derived structure of the state and to see in what sense and to what extent the post-colonial state still fulfills a mere directorship role over an open ended and to all intents and purposes, internalized economy. The other is to analyze the constituency of the governing class. To see to what extent it is beholden to a metropolitan bourgeoisie or whether it will also respond to the broad demands of the urban and rural working people.

A Definition of Human Rights

Human rights revolve around the relationship between the state and its society in regard to conditions of life or the mass availability of the basic necessities of modern life that state and/or private economic activity (both domestic and foreign) create.

Human rights has a political as well as a socio-economic dimension to it. Two additional factors contribute to the nature of the human rights situation in a state. Those are the political nature of the state—what kind of representation it allows its population, and the interrelation between the state and the external factor.⁵

The state of human rights differs from state in Africa as elsewhere. This is because the domestically prevailing economic, cultural and political conditions put their own stamp on social relations and impose a particular way of life on a country. It is the manner in which the state and the external factor acting on the state seek, for better or for worse, to preserve or change the way of life and the quality of life of a people, that determines the state of human rights for both the

masses as well as the individual. The responses and effects are as a result produced, profoundly affects the economic and political state of human rights in a particular African country.

Human rights are the concrete demands that can be made by a people vis-a-vis its state. It is known that the African state has nominal powers to affect the state of socio-economic relations and that the external factor plays a vital role in determining the outlines of the broadstream of what is in the end a limited and exclusive type of development. Nevertheless, the individual African state has nominal powers to structure the content of development policy. It will exercise these powers in tune with its ideological commitments, its social base of support and the way it is used to mediate social, ethnic or class conflict to its particular advantage.

II. Swaziland - The Economic And Political Context

The Position of the Swazi State in Southern Africa

Swaziland has been described as a hostage of South Africa. It derives its overwhelming majority of imports from its neighbour and many of its enterprises are owned by South African capital.⁶ In its foreign policy it has been labeled as a collaborator state whose aim it is to assist Pretoria to subdue the forces of revolution and national liberation in the south-eastern part of Southern Africa. As such its sovereign status is challenged and comparisons have been drawn between it and the nominally independent Bantustan states within Southern Africa.⁷

An investigation into the state of human rights in Swaziland may well provide evidence to assist the Swazi state's and the Swazi peoples' characteristically own existence. Evidence for this ought to rest in the conditions of life and the character of political participation to which the Swazi masses subject to under Swazi state rule.

Economic integration with South Africa has not produced social or political conditions akin to those existent in South Africa or the Bantustan Republics. If not unique, these conditions do have their own character. Their history is tied to the nature of British colonial rule and the political response to it. This history has given today's Swazi state its essential social and political character and defines the parameters of state influence on social relations and determines the Swazi state's position vis-a-vis foreign capital and its people. State action is often ambiguous and lies within the ambit of attempting to uphold popular welfare whilst also encouraging capitalist expansion. The state thereby contributes to shaping the state of economic and political rights, human rights in short.

The structure of the state—the way in which the people and collective interest groups affect state policy, as well as the ways in which, as a result, the state interprets popular interests, would seem one way to describe the state of civil and political rights.

The Economic Context

Swaziland was originally drawn into the world of systematic com-

modity exchange relations in a haphazard and once established, uneven way. Early capital formation took place through commercial farming and mining operations, and laid the basis for the expansion of capitalist relations of production against those of the pre-capitalist mode of production. The low intensity investment during the early part of colonial rule, came to be substituted by large investments of international capital after the end of the Second World War. Altogether new economic sectors were built up and generally came to dominate the economy. These commanding heights of the economy gave the economy a new unity which it had lacked previously.

Swaziland was essentially of no direct interest to British capital prior to the late 1930's. British imperialism however encouraged Swaziland's economic integration with South Africa. In particular, Swaziland's membership of the South African Customs Union after 1910, made her part of a protectionist area in which the needs of South African farming, mining and manufacturing capital predominated and were articulated by the South African state vis-a-vis the other minor member states or Union.

Swaziland's economy came to be an extension of South Africa's markets in labour, trade, commerce, service industries, and agricultural commodities. Swaziland provided mining and farm labour, agricultural and livestock commodities in exchange for services and manufactured goods which came from or via South Africa. This dependence has become one of the conditions for the reproduction of Swaziland's social and economic structures today.⁸

International Capital Investment

Multinational investment came to Swaziland in the form of British mining capital prior to 1939. This drew Swaziland directly into the mainstream of the international economy and established the outlines of a Swazi economic entity, to something that was more than an extension of the South African market. Swaziland became part of the international economies of asbestos, sugar, woodpulp, iron-ore, and citrus fruit. International agrobusinesses now displaced the settler farmer as the important economic factor and started large scale investments in the establishment of forestry as a new sector in the economy. This resulted in the production and processing of timber into wood pulp and for industrial use. Irrigation schemes for the production of sugar, the growing of pineapple and citrus fruit; mining capital's presence in the exploitation of tin, asbestos, and iron-ore completed

this new picture.

These investments represented the second phase in the capitalist development of Swaziland. Commercial farming, the creation of a labour reservoir with the alienation of land of 1907, had initially made the Swazi economy an appendage to the selective agricultural and labour needs of South African capital. The second phase however, markedly intensified the economy's capitalist orientation and the peripheralized it in an international sense.

Direct international investment in Swaziland created the outlines for a national economy by bringing about a first divorce between Swazi production and South African market needs. The country started to produce for the international market. Its products and their place of origin became a standardised feature of the world market. This created the potential for investment and the use of the country as a national forward production base for export to South African and OAU Africa.

Apart from the production of raw materials, by the late 1980's in manufacturing the two dominant industries were sugar production and woodpulp milling. These made up just about half of the manufacturing industry's contribution to GDP. The rest of manufacturing is concentrated in light industrial production.⁹ It is estimated that roughly one third of this part of manufacturing is South African in origin and the other half being either foreign or nationally owned.

The Distribution of Wealth

The disparity in wealth is evident in the rural areas itself, where on 60% of the land, 25% of homesteads appear impoverished and 20% appear to have some wealth,¹⁰ where on the privately owned remaining 40% of the land, production is for capitalist markets and on capitalist lines.

In addition there are the differences in wealth between the rural and urban areas, especially the communally owned land as one production area and that of the towns as another. The production output of the Swazi Nation Land area has shown a near to constant fall, as compared to a near to constant rise in the output of industry and the service sectors of the economy.¹¹ A large proportion of people from the Swazi Nation Land Area are wage workers in the towns. The production figures for the two areas are relatable, in that the urban sector of the economy is predominantly in foreign or South African hands,¹²

that the industrial sector is also foreign owned, (owned often in conjunction with the royal fund, *Tibiyo Taka-Ngwane*) and that both sectors employ a good number of expatriates in management or positions of expertise, it becomes clear, that the disparity of wealth between the rural and urban sector reveals itself in the social and economic differences between a foreign technocracy, foreign resident bourgeoisie, local aristocracy-cum-dependent bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the rural based wage worker and small subsistence farmer on the other.¹³

The Political Context

In Swaziland, human rights and nationalism derive their meaning from outside the context of the post-colonial state and the open-ended economy. Whilst it is true that Swaziland has a pronounced export-oriented economy and a post-colonial state whose directorship role is distinct, Swaziland's governing class derives its main social base of support not from the product of this structure, the urban petit bourgeoisie. Instead, its support largely comes from the working population of the rural areas where an aristocracy and a monarchy subordinate the masses as subjects of the king by the latter's power to grant citizenship and access to land as a means of production and basis for housing.¹⁴

Power based on a communal edifice of social, economic and political relations is not power based on capital it is power based on non-capitalist forms of political and social organisation. It is this communal edifice which has been the culture for the growth of the peculiar nationalist ideology of the state. Swazi nationalism as we know it today, is not anti-capitalist, nor is it one of mass populism. Rather it carries the features of a form of authoritarian populism.

It is the position of the monarchy at the head of the aristocracy and nobility,¹⁵ the way it articulates itself at the head of the social formation, which is crucial for an understanding of Swazi nationalism. Whether this nationalism is to be assessed as capable of democratic transformation or whether it is to be seen as authoritarian and static can inform us further as to the state of human rights in Swaziland.

The Context Of Civil Rights: Dlamini Nationalist Rule

The interpreter of Swazi nationalism is the monarch, its architect, the

late King Sobhuza II, (1899–1982). This royally led nationalist movement is a social movement which emerged with the rise of a more authoritarian monarchy and responded to the political challenge of a petit bourgeois led nationalism prior to decolonization in the early 1960's. By 1966, the leading petit bourgeois nationalist movement had either been neutralized or absorbed into the royal movement so that by 1968, at the time of the colonial transfer of state power, it was the royal or Dlamini nationalist movement, called the *Imbokodvo* which inherited the post colonial state.

Dlamini Nationalism's Political Struggle For Nationalist Supremacy 1960–68

The emergence of urban based political parties divided Swazi politics into two. On the one hand there was the monarchy and the royalist movement whose social base of support and leadership was predominantly rural. On the other hand there were the urban based political parties whose power originated in the towns. Both sets of forces wished to make inroads into the territory of the other. In this contest, the royally led nationalist movement was to establish itself as the most credible national force.

The first attempt (between 1960-1964) to gain supremacy over the unfolding of the political events of decolonization,¹⁶ was for the King to determine the framework of decolonization politics, a political process to be dominated by himself, the aristocracy, nobility and the settlers who were to oppose the colonial regime, urban petit bourgeois forces and conscious working people.¹⁷

Second, was the call for British recognition of the Swazi state as a protected state, a call which intended to reconfirm the monarchy at national level as the predominant political force domestically. Third, was the post 1964 switch in class alliance from the settlers to the urban petit bourgeois forces, willing to submit to Dlamini nationalism, widening thereby its social base and promoting the establishments of a hegemony which, for the first time, was to span the interests of both town and country.

The royalist alliance with elements of the urban petit bourgeoisie, opened the way for a broader nationalism and consensus between town and country. This responded to the interests of a fast expanding capitalist economy which needed a stable post-colonial state that could "deliver" peace and the infrastructure for development.

By the time of independence, Dlamini nationalism had organizationally, socially and ideologically undergone shifts in emphasis. On the assumption of power, its broad coalition was opposed only by those in the petit bourgeoisie who sought to give leadership to the working people. The other petit bourgeois nationalists, together with the "nationalism" of monopoly and settler capital had found a home in Dlamini nationalism whose symbol of unity, the King, had considerably gained in legitimacy and stature. British attempts to impose their own political and constitutional solutions had been only partially released. Nevertheless, the outcome was essentially favourable to imperialism since the pro-bourgeois constituent was now prominent in giving direction to the post-colonial state after independence in 1968.

III. Dlamini Nationalism And The Question Of Development

In the period between 1964-1967, *Imbokodvo* had managed to win the allegiance of those sections of the population which stood outside the Swazi state structure. These included ex-South African and European immigrants and urban Swazis consisting of professionals, teachers, shopkeepers, traders, businessmen, white-collar employees and farmers whose common trait was that they had all sided against the main petit bourgeois political party the Ngwane National Liberation Congress the NNLC and were, as a result, essentially of a pro-bourgeois and pro-capitalist disposition.

The development of the country was to be dominated by the development of capitalism as far as this now dominant grouping within the coalition of Dlamini-rule was concerned.

Monopolists and Anti-Monopolists

Preceding and following independence a political debate took place in Swaziland. It centered around the issue of monopolies and to what extent companies, which would monopolize the production for a particular commodity on the local market, should be allowed or encouraged to operate in the country. It showed up a divide within the ruling coalition of monopolies and as such of foreign control or its alternative, the promotion of indigenous production under local capitalism. The outcome of it allowed for a relative open door policy to foreign capital.

The "monopolists" argued that equity participation by the Swazi state in the monopoly companies investing in the country would secure the interests of the Swazi nation in that the Swazi state would gain access to profits that had hitherto been unavailable.

Those in favour of promoting indigenous commodity production were in favour of selective monopoly investment in order to avoid the total monopolization of the domestic market by big South African capital.

By conducting the debate along the lines of whether the Swazi state should participate in the economy in association with big capital, the issue was raised of how much control the post colonial state should

have over the making and control of overall economic development policy vis-a-vis capitalists enterprise.

With the raising of funds for indigenous industrial and social development in mind, the “anti-monopolists” foresaw greater neo-colonial dependence, warning, that a continuation of such a development policy would bring eventually hardship. Instead, it was suggested, that cabinet government should embark on a major industrialization drive and that state participation in the economy, especially in the adaptation of technology to local conditions, should be funded by the national retention of monopoly profits through a system of levies placed on companies. Only the revival of competition could lead to a situation where “the end product should be reasonable living for all citizens when in fact at the moment a minority enjoyed good living and the rest subsisted in dire poverty.”¹⁸

The “anti-monopolists” implied that allowing *Tibiyo*’ participation in the economy was unproductive since all it amounted to was being given protection money and fears were expressed about the corruption of government officials this could bring if no adequate provisions were made.

The anti-monopolists attacked the discrimination of the existing institutions in giving Swazi farmers and Swazi business access to the financial market and of furthering the interests of established settler producers and commerce. Seen against the background of the small financial means of the petit bourgeoisie, where in 1967, out of a total of 900 tax returns from Africans, mainly Swazis, only 201 were found to be liable to be taxed and were assessed for a total sum of a mere \$19,762,. Credit providing institutions such as the Swazi Credit Bank were criticized for helping the “haves” and neglecting the “have nots”. The highly skewed income distribution favouring the settlers, who formed 4.9% of the population and took 24% of the total wage bill, made them question the very essence of independence since they thought “the rich should get poorer and the poor richer” if freedom was to have been achieved.¹⁹

The monopolists remained unmoved and the structure of the coalition which included and represented all established capitalist interests prevented anything more than the debating of these issues. It was pointed out by the apologists for an Open Door policy of capital investment that the monopolies were not necessarily a destructive influence since the domestic market was in any case too small to support any scale of indigenous production, so that Swaziland had to look to-

wards her participation in the South African Customs Union (S.A.C.U.) which it could only effectively do through companies that could compete with South African industry on the South African market. As such, the country was competing for foreign extra-regional capitalist investment with a host of other states in the Third World and had to discipline its policies accordingly. Controls such as levies could not be contemplated and a relatively laissez-faire policy towards capitalist accumulation adopted by the state.

IV. The Relationship Between Dlamini Nationalism And Foreign Capital

Sobhuza II was in favour of controlled capitalist development taking place on Swazi Nation Land. Such control meant that the monarchy would oversee any development by remaining the leaseholder over land to be developed. It was only such an arrangement which would not be seen as an intrusion on communal property relations and a return to the period of the concessionaires, that made the limited introduction of capitalist relations of production at all politically feasible. The first dealings that were to lead to eventual ventures with monopoly capital began during the 1940's.

In the interests of an economically rational use of land, during the 1940's and 1950's Turner and Newall for their asbestos mining operation, as well as the Colonial Development Corporation, and Courtaulds and others were in need of Swazi Nation Land. Sobhuza II approached by the colonial administration on the issue of exchanges and/or compensation for the acquisition of Swazi Nation Land for the purposes of capitalist development, was responsible for mediating these demands to the Swazi National Council.

Sobhuza II was aided by the monopolies who offered the Swazi state real material incentives. These new sources of revenue to the Swazi Nation, transferred through the Colonial Treasury, were therefore seen to boost the independence of the Swazi State to be recognized as an entity of its own. The direct link between capital and Swazi state was significant in that it made the Swazi ruling classes, foremost the monarch and the "progressive nobility", identify closely with this particular kind of capitalist development of the country by international monopolies. It is at this conjuncture that Dlamini nationalism objectively begins to have its future as a social and economic power co-determined by the extent to which it is able to buy itself the alliance of overseas capital. In turn, International capital at the time of decolonization, came to recognize the stabilizing influence of the monarchy and eventually acknowledge and later support a benign form of royal authoritarian rule.

In 1968, the new, broad status of the monarchy was reflected in its

monopolization of all mineral concessions and mineral revenue. For the administration of the revenue a royal fund, *Tibiyo Taka-Ngwane* was established. Its purpose was to accumulate funds for the development projects on SNL and to acquire land for the Swazi Nation. The boundary line between what constituted royal business and what national business again remained open to policy implementation, determined by the King and select members of the Swazi National Council.²⁰

Tibiyo Taka-Ngwane

Finding that the mineral revenue was inadequate for the purposes of *Tibiyo*, the fund came to be the vehicle by which the royal household, the Nation's administration and the fund itself, gained access to the general accumulation of capital in the national economy. Using mineral revenue funds, *Tibiyo* started negotiations with the leading capitalist enterprises on acquiring share capital for them. By 1973, *Tibiyo* was partner to all the major companies in the mining, agro-industrial and service sectors of the economy.

Table 1: *TIBIYO TAKA-NGWANE'S HOLDINGS IN THE SWAZI ECONOMY-1983*

Enterprise	Shareholding percentage
1. Havelock Mines	40
2. Ubombo Ranches	40
3. Swazi Spa Holdings	40
4. Mhlume Swazi Sugar	50
5. Robert's Construction	50
6. Simunye Sugar Corporation	33
7. BCCI	40
8. Swaziland Breweries	40
9. Swaziland Meat Corporation	50

SOURCE: Tibiyo Taka-Ngwane, Financial Statement, 1983.

Tibiyo's participation was only that of a royal investor. In this sense *Tibiyo's* aims were not national or set to establish Swazi control over production but more narrow. Not only had Dlamini nationalism allied itself with capital in a financial and ideological bond but it had also

privatized for itself the government's options for nationalization. As such Dlamini nationalism demonstrated its role as a form of "pseudo-nationalism."

In the post-independence period, the Swazi Nation, having acquired large capitalist property rights, defined the purpose of the Swazi petit bourgeois trading class as ancillary to this new fact. The promotion of small Swazi business - SEDCO - was launched as a result of the King's wish to defuse the sensitive political situation regarding the racial division between the capital and labour, as a second line of defense and in order for Swaziland to "defend" the rule of capital in the country. The promotion of a substantially independent petit-bourgeoisie or the nationalization of settler-owned commercial ventures was never contemplated since Dlamini nationalism's economic sustenance now came from its participation in virtually all large capitalist enterprises of the country and an indigenous policy of development had become subject to the needs of a relative Open Door Policy towards international capital which saw the promotion of an indigenous capitalist sector as a waste of resources that could better be spent on the general improvement of the industrial and commercial infrastructure. *Tibiyo* did not become a generator of an independent Swazi petit bourgeoisie, its own investments were not only often undertaken in collaboration with foreign owned capital in which Swazis at best played managing roles, as an indigenous entrepreneur decreased during the 1970's and early 1980's.

**Table 2: EMPLOYMENT OF ACCUMULATED FUNDS IN
TIBIYO INITIATED CAPITALIST INVESTMENTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TIBIYO'S
TOTAL ACCUMULATION: 1974- 1982**

1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
15	13	19	16	15	8	6	7	8

Source: Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Financial Statement 1983.

The character of the fund was to be found in its growing interest as a subsidiary shareholder to monopoly investment in Swaziland's agro-industrial export economy and its declining interest in its original purpose, the development of the Swazi National communal property areas

and the promotion of Swazi traditional culture. Its increasingly important function was as a major accumulator of local capital in the Swazi economy.

Conclusion:

Dlamini nationalism's economic, political and institutional relations with foreign capital developing an export based economy in the post-war and pre-independence period, served as an important lesson once Dlamini nationalism was in power. In line with multinational capital, it mainly adopted those national economic aims which favoured the growth of multinational capital. This implied following a pro-monopolist economic policy internally and a pro-Western policy externally. In doing so, Dlamini nationalism became the home of all those forces supportive of capitalism and multinational investment. Dlamini nationalism, originally a form of ethnic nationalism had adopted the needs of multinational capital as its own. Dlamini nationalism had become a nationalism that did not formulate economic policies aimed at the restructuring of Swaziland's economy. As a result it can be classed as having become a form of "counter-nationalism", one which opposed and substituted a nationalism which would in effect have tried to formulate the broader social and economic needs of the Swazi nation, something which, in part, would have meant placing greater restrictions on foreign capital invested in Swaziland.

V. Dlamini Nationalism And The Political History Of Independent Swaziland

Politically speaking, the Dlamini nationalist coalition of rule ended as a formal political force with the disbandment of the royalist *Imbokodvo* Movement after the abrogation of the Westminster constitution in 1973. This act restored the absolute policy making powers of the royal Swazi state and allowed it to direct cabinet and ministerial government. In addition to outlawing the right to any formal political organization and political opposition, the Swazi state had to arm itself with new powers over which it had previously not disposed. These included a law on gatherings, penalties for the transgression of this law, new detention laws and the establishment of a defence force.

Between 1973 and 1978, political and social organization was considerably stunted. The states's endeavours to uphold a non-party and non-representative system of government and discourage all manifestations of trade unionism during the rest of the seventies, were however, not entirely successful and met with opposition from students, teachers and the petit bourgeoisie. In response, the royal state in 1978 proceeded to introduce the *tinkhundla* system of representation which favoured the rural supporters of the crown and enabled this rural majority to vet the political dependability of members of the petit bourgeoisie and others it selected to a reconstituted House of Assembly or legislature. Limited political participation was accompanied by the formulation of new industrial legislation which provided for the re-introduction of trade unions in 1980.

Effective political participation in government via the deliberations of the legislature has however not been apparent. Parliament has not provided the impulses government needs on the direction of state policy. As such, the Swazi state relies on the administrative and royal interpretation of policy or simply the state of policy drift and the pure administration of government's day to day activities for its progression. The allowance of trade unions has not been accompanied by active state support for the formation and active functioning of trade unions in industry. These two channels for the expression of popular interests do therefore not seem to provide adequate channels for the expression and formulation of peoples' and workers' grievances.

Whether in political or economic areas conditions do not favour situations where people are able to formulate their concrete demands on the state.

Since independence the political history of Swaziland has been of where Dlamini nationalism has sought at different times to:

- contain or eliminate the activities of persons or organizations associated with politically independent petit bourgeois leadership reminiscent of the pre-independence period.
- to absorb opposition figures into the existing state and socio-economic structure.
- ideologically dominate political thinking away from confrontation and towards the perpetuation of accommodationist politics.
- discourage or downgrade existing political structures able to provide a platform for the open political discussion of national issues.
- create new political structures able to discourage the national debate of issues and to parochialize political issues.
- discourage the political, cultural and social mobilization of different social classes or groups within the indigenous Swazi population.
- encourage social harmony and multiracialism in order to promote economic integration and indigenous participation within the foreign managed, and privately owned economy.
- guarantee political stability in order to better encourage the import of foreign capital as the mainstay to economic growth.
- to substitute national interests for communal interest so that national issues are viewed from a communal perspective only.

The structure of political rule since independence can be summarized as follows:

Phase I: 1968-1972

The emergence of Dlamini state power took place during this period. This period is marked by:

i) the assumption of state power by the Imbokodvo National Movement at independence following its overwhelming success against all other political parties in the 1967 pre-independence elections.

ii) the disintegration of the Imbokodvo National Movement as a political or ideological force.

iii) the establishment of the monarchy as the political and ideological director of national affairs as managed by the post-colonial state.

iv) the paralysis and dissolution of the trade union movement.

v) the formation of a development policy aimed at the rapid import of overseas private capital, the build-up of an infrastructure conducive to investors, the provision of educational facilities for all and the rapid localization of jobs in the government and private sectors.

vi) the forging of new trade links to reduce its trade dependence on South Africa.

Phase II: 1973-1977

This period is marked by the consolidation of Dlamini state power and the emergence of an authoritarian system of government; a development policy in the agricultural export-sector which leads to greater monocultural dependence on the world market; a foreign policy which contains elements of opportunism and a domestic response which leads to the use of coercion by the state. The following events characterize this period.

i) the abrogation of the Westminster constitution with its provision for political party participation in government and a nominally constitutional monarchy;

ii) the prohibition of all political parties and all political activity;

iii) state prevention of all trade union activity;

- iv) the institution of government by royal decree;
- v) the creation of an army as an instrument to quell domestic unrest;
- vi) the expansion of royal ownership in the economy with the formation of *Tisuka* in 1976 ;
- vii) the investment decision taken by government, *Tibiyo* and the monarchy to build a third sugar mill and make sugar the prime income earner amongst exports ;
- viii) the attempt to discuss Swazi territorial claims on South Africa and Mozambican territory with the Pretoria government and the outgoing Portuguese administration in Mozambique.
- ix) the increase in state institutions in the economy through the operations of parastatals such as NIDCS, SEDCO, Royal Swazi Insurance Corporation, Swazi Bank, Swazi Shipping accompanied by first-time controls on South African imports
- x) the appointment of a soldier Prime Minister who gives the army new prominence in political affairs.

Phase III: 1977-1982

This period is marked by petit bourgeois opposition to authoritarian political rule and the absence of institutions to cater for the broadcasting of political, social and economic issues of relevance to government by teachers, students, employees, small businessmen and workers. The Dlamini state attempted to widen its social base by establishing the *Tinkhundla* system of elections. This initiated the re-establishment of a legislature whose lower house was chosen by an electoral college whose members are representatives elected from amongst an electorate mobilized by a system of predominantly rural councils called *Tinkhundla*.

New labour legislation legalized the institutionalization of trade unions and an industrial court for the resolution of labour-employer disputes. The activist teachers' trade union, (SNAT) is banned, and a 60 day detention law is introduced. A liberal-democratically oriented prime minister is appointed for the first time and a drive against corruption launched. In foreign policy, relations with Mozambique are

improved, the PAC is expelled but the ANC's presence is tolerated.

Phase IV: 1982-1986

In August 1982, immediately prior to the demise of the architect of the Dlamini state, Sobhuza II signs a secret security treaty with apartheid South Africa in return for South African assurances to transfer the homeland of *KaNzwane* to Swaziland.²¹ The post-Sobhuza period is marked by the policies of the *Liqoqo* or Supreme Council of State whose dominant figures launched on policies which saw the detention and harassment of political figures opposed to *Liqoqo* rule, the deposition of the Queen regent, the use of *Tinkhundla* to mobilize the rural population in favour of the *Liqoqo*; the neutralization of Parliament and the University's Student Representative Council as foci for the open discussion of *Liqoqo* policy; the attempt to actively suppress and eliminate the activities of the ANC and South African refugees on Swazi territory; the enunciation of a policy of positive neutrality to aid South African attempts to establish a Pax Sudafricano in the South African-Swazi-Mozambican triangle and the establishment of Swaziland and South African trade missions in Pretoria and Mbabane.

Phase V: 1986 onwards

The installation of Mswati III, as King in April 1986, reintroduces a return to a degree of constitutionality last seen in the latter part of the 1977-1982 period. The period up to the early part of 1988 is characterized by the dissolution of the *Liqoqo* as Supreme Council of State, the release of political detainees, the replacement of a number of public office holders closely associated with the *Liqoqo* period, the detention and trial for treason of the leading figures of the former Supreme Council of State, the abolition of the Ministry of Defence and a drive against corruption. Swaziland's political relations with South Africa become cooler, Swazi-Mozambican relations improve. The *Tinkhundla* system of local government and the *Tinkhundla* system of elections come under scrutiny.²²

Conclusion

During the period of independence Dlamini rule has made use of its own brand of nationalism to ideologically and organizationally organise the state rule. Dlamini nationalism has its roots in the past and it is the pre-independence structures that have continued to sustain Dlamini nationalist rule in an organizational and ideological sense since 1968. Policies have hence included:

1. The re-imposition of rule by royal decree and royal absolutism practised on a selective basis in regard to the functioning of ministerial government and the administration, but exercised in an absolute fashion as regards the administration and political control of Swazi Nation Land and access by the monarchy to the resources of the wider economy.

2. The attempt to make the *Tinkhundla* rural councils the focus of political activity and local government in the country. As such, this made politics and local government administration subject to the supervision and guidance of the monarchy.

3. The establishment of *Tibiyo* and *Tisuka* as royal trust funds which supersede the *Lifa* Fund of the pre-independence period, which similar to its predecessor, are meant to be institutions which, although under royal and not government control, are meant to benefit to the national benefit of the Swazi nation as a whole. The funds are a symbol of Royal power and patronage whose economic purpose legitimize the monarch's moral right to rule since it is seen to enhance the economic interests of the Swazi nation.

4. To maintain and extend the Swazi ownership and control of the Swazi Nation Land Area as opposed to the freehold area of the country. This has enabled the monarchy to renew its power to guarantee a minimum of economic and social security to the Swazi masses. It has also given the monarchy the power to impose its own conditions on the operations of foreign capital on Swazi Nation Land, something it is unable to do on freehold land.

Dlamini Nationalism and Human Rights in Swaziland

The Dlamini state has presided over a political and social climate that has been relatively stable since independence. One reason for the stability has been the political skill with which the monarchy succeeded in neutralising the party political opposition. This stemmed from its organizational and political ability to mobilise the rural masses away from pledging support to the urban based parties. The monarchy then proceeded to use state power to finally erase the practice of national politics. Most former political party figures were absorbed into the nationalist movement where they promoted the political, economic and ideological position of the monarchy.

The relative absence of class conflict in politics as shown in the

popular support the royalist movement enjoyed in the run-up to independence, was a factor occasioned by the still relatively underdeveloped class nature of indigenous Swazi society at independence. The existence of a small petit bourgeoisie, a small permanent working class and a small group of independent commercial farmers could distribute but not halt the thrust of a rurally based Dlamini nationalism intent on re-establishing its political and ideological pre-eminence in the political life of the country.

VI. Conditions Of People's Rights Under The Structure Of The Swazi State

The Political Structure

Political demands by the people for social and economic rights are exceptionally limited by the nature of the political institutions in existence and the limited powers the state has vis-a-vis the foreign run economy producing for export to mainly metropolitan economies.

The political system conditions its members to regard political participation as ultimately subject to royal initiative and approval. As such, political participation is characterized by:

- i] the absolutism of royal power over national affairs
- ii] in popular politics the predominance of those people most directly under the control of the royal hierarchy of chiefs
- iii] the limited role politicians play as peoples' representatives
- iv] the alienation and exclusion from political life of sections of the population with tenuous ties to the hierarchy of royal rule.

The symbolism of political participation rather than its substance is therefore the consequence when one looks at political participation.

The institutions of direct or indirect political participation include the *Libandla* (National Council), Parliament and the *Tinkhundla* (rural councils).

The Institutions of Political Representation

The *Libandla*

The Swazi National Council, also called the *Libandla*,²³ constitutes a national assembly and consists of the entire male population in a meeting chaired by the King. When not in actual session, its functions are performed by a smaller executive body, the *Liqoqo*, or royal advi-

sory council.

From the 1930's to the 1950's, a number of representatives of recognized sectional bodies such as the African Chamber of Commerce, the Swazi Progressive Association and the African Returned Soldiers Organizations could be found on it.²⁴ The politics of the day consisted of the Swazi National Council or the *Liqoqo* with the King, taking up political positions vis-a-vis the colonial government. The petit bourgeois element within this anti-colonial front constituted a social group inclined towards taking the political initiative away from the King as leader in the decolonization period. In 1960, this group left the Swazi National Council and subsequently sought to negotiate with the British via a number of newly established political parties whose existence was seen as a political threat to the indigenous Swazi state under royal leadership.

The holding of elections in 1964, necessitated the formation of a royalist party to campaign for votes. The *Imbokodvo* movement's structure and objectives were those of a movement rather than those of a political party. Its sole aim was to defeat the political party as a mobilizing force and as an institution of the post independence period. In its place it seemed to wish to put the indigenous government of the *Libandla* and the *Liqoqo* as the only institutional forms of popular-political participation. After *Imbokodvo*'s overwhelming electoral success in the prelude to the formation of a independent government in 1967, and the abolition of the party political system and the imposition of executive rule by the monarch in 1973, the *Libandla* was however not upgraded as the focus of national political participation.

Instead, the *Tinkhundla* or rural councils that were to operate in 40 centres but also embrace the towns, were chosen to become the focus of a new and decentralised form of national politics.

The *Libandla* continues as an institution through popular participation exhausts itself in assemblies that are called to inform and seek the formal sanction to policy major pronouncements by the King. During the royal interregnum of 1982-1986, the *Libandla*'s powerlessness as an institutional force was demonstrated in that the *Liqoqo* or Supreme Council of State acted quite independently of the *Libandla*, and its members quite clearly rejected its authority.²⁵

Parliament

Parliament is an inheritance from a British exercise in the devolution of power during the pre-independence period of the 1960's. Since

1973, the institution has, following a period of suspension, however been remodeled in relation to the national *Tinkhundla* system of government.

Before 1973, members to Parliament were for the most part directly elected and political parties allowed to canvas. After its reconstitution in 1978 most Members of Parliament were now appointed by an electoral college whilst political parties were now proscribed.

Parliament which consists of a lower house (The House of Assembly) and an upper house (the Senate) vets bills brought before it by Government. Whilst Government Ministries are, as such, meant to be accountable to Parliament, in practice, the legislature has few means at its disposal to enforce Government's accountability. Open and sustained parliamentary opposition to Government policy is discouraged. The legislature plays a largely advisory role and this in a largely technical, non-political manner at that. Parliament can at best make use of publicity generated during parliamentary sessions to invoke a response from Government. Overall, it enjoys little political leverage in the political system.

The *Tinkhundla*

The *Tinkhundla* are rural councils of which there are forty. Each *Tinkhundla* is made up of several chiefdoms. Each chief or noble is responsible for seeing to it that his subjects attend *Tinkhundla* meetings. *Tinkhundla* affairs are supervised by a royal appointee, a commoner called an *indvuna*. In essence, the *Tinkhundla* rely on the chiefs to mobilize the people. In the main the influence of the chief over his subjects derives from his power to allocate or withhold land from the subjects who have pledged allegiance to him and through him to the King. In so far as the chiefs do not have this power in the freehold areas of the country, their influence and the influence of the *Tinkhundla* as a mobilizer of people is restricted to the communal, held areas, the Swazi Nation Land Area, that covers 60% of the total surface area of the country²⁶. In the urban areas it is the regional administrators of the *Tinkhundla* system which call on the people to politically participate. Their influence in doing so is rather limited.

Tinkhundla are also bodies that organize national elections. As such they conduct elections for those living in both freehold as well as communal areas.

Whereas on SNL, the *Tinkhundla* can rely on the chiefs to exhort his subjects to vote, in the rest of the country general appeals by the cen-

tral government are used. There are urban *Tinkhundla* centres, though the electorate living on freehold areas often find that they are usually part of a *Tinkhundla* centre based on SNL. The electoral college who in turn elect members of parliament. This electoral system favours the selection of candidates from the rural areas.²⁷

Tinkhundla are also centres of local government administration. The town councils have been run by the Regional *Tinkhundla* since 1983. The rural *Tinkhundla* have begun to develop the infrastructure to bring local government administration to Swazi Nation Land areas for the first time.

The Rationale Behind *Tinkhundla*

The reasons for *Tinkhundla* are economic and political. Whilst the economic rationale behind the development of a *Tinkhundla* system of government has changed since its original inception in the 1940's, the political purpose has, save for the short *Liqoqo* interregnum of 1982–1986, remained the same: to strengthen and maintain the monarch's control over the political process.

The Political Origin

The original *Tinkhundla* had a political origin. The *Tinkhundla* were established in response to the colonial administration's attempts to initiate development projects on Swazi Nation Land and to gain some administrative hold over the indigenous population settled in the reserve area and ruled by the King. During the 1930's therefore, the *Tinkhundla* were initiated by the monarchy. Popularly known as "communal centres" they were in effect meeting points for people of a particular community or chiefdom to discuss development issues. The King appealed to the colonial administration to recognize this nascent system of indigenous or "national" administration. Even though unable to attract colonial support, the *Tinkhundla* system did form part of a royal response in the pre-war period to colonial attempts to reduce the absolute power the monarchy had over the Swazis in particular the rurally settled population and the chiefs.²⁸

After the Second World War, the *Tinkhundla* were upgraded and further developed by an institutionally strengthened monarchy. The monarch appointed ex-World War Two veterans who had returned from overseas somewhat conscientized and politically aware of world events to the office of *Indvuna*, or royal prefect in charge of individual *inkhundlas*. As such, this potentially politically unstable strata was absorbed into the emergent *tinkhundla* system of royal as opposed to


a colonial system of administration.²⁹

At independence, with the demise of colonial government, the *tinkhundla* had lost its largely symbolic function as an alternative national system of local administration and government. The political ascendancy of Dlamini state power and the progressive decline of any organized political party or trade union opposition to its rule, momentarily obfuscated the need for the *tinkhundla* system.

After the abrogation of the constitution in 1973, the *tinkhundla* system was revived as the basis towards a new constitution and a new political order.

Unlike under the Westminster system where the underlying emphasis for the initiation of political issues lay with the urban based political parties, the *tinkhundla* or rural councils were in the absence of political parties to be the forums for all the political discussion. Political debate was to be confined to communal if not exclusively to primary development issues. These debates were to be initiated by the *indvuna* or royal prefects who were appointed and answerable to the king. As such political life was to be shifted to the *tinkhundla* as rural political foci where political discussion was to be initiated by the convenors of the *tinkhundla* meetings, the royal *tindvuna*. In this way the scope of political discussion was to be narrowed and its initiation controlled.³⁰

Line Chart of the Interrelationships and Flow of Power Within the Swazi System.



This system to all intents and purposes politically isolated the urban classes. There was little scope for the urban classes to use and exploit rural *tinkhundla* meetings for their concerns. *Tinkhundla* as a system of government encouraged the parochialization of political issues and by default, identified the monarch as the national centre of major political decision making.

The *tinkhundla* were to generate development issues and request government assistance to meet its own formulations of development needs. This had a further political rationale behind it.

The maintenance of a minimum of economic activity in a communal property setting, upheld the social cum economic relations which allows the political system governing communal property rights to be reproduced. The control exercised by the monarchy and the chiefdoms in regard to the allocation of land to all Swazi males and the tribute and expressions of loyalty this demanded from the recipient was a substantial lever of power at the disposal of the monarchy and the chiefs. Its social base of support rests on these interactions.

The *tinkhundla* were therefore to encourage the kind of economic activity that would uphold the social and political interactions based on the communal allocation of land as supervised by the monarch and the nobility. The *tinkhundla* were to discourage economic developments that went against "the Swazi way of life", derived from communal land property ownership. *Tinkhundla* were therefore to relieve central government of some of its development responsibilities, to be a feature of the decentralization of government, but also to politically monitor the socio-economic structures development projects introduced so that royal or chiefly power was not to be undermined. As such the *tinkhundla* were to steer against smallholder farm schemes such as had been introduced in the colonial era as well as carefully monitor the introduction of cooperatives.

Economic Reasons

Originally, the *tinkhundla* were intended to preserve and if possible, expand the communal Swazi Nation Land Area. It was thought that they could help achieve self-sufficiency in food production and that a surplus of food or cattle would be used for payment of tribute to the chief and the king.³¹

The *tinkhundla* were, if not to prevent, then to control the excessive use of wage labour in the wider economy. As such they were intended to function as labour bureaux and politically control the outflow of

labour from Swazi Nation Land. In compensation for the labour retained, the *Tinkhundla* area were to start regional development projects after taxing their respective chiefdoms.³²

In the face of capitalist development and the rapid demands for labour during and after the 1950's, the economic purpose of the *Tinkhundla* scheme was lost and the scheme abandoned with their revival after the abrogation of the Westminster constitution in 1973, their economic purpose was refashioned.

SINCE THE 1970'S

Tinkhundla were now councils to help communities initiate their own development schemes and to solicit the assistance of central government and its ministries in this concern. The focus for their economic activity had now shifted in comparison to the earlier period. Rather than attempt to aim at some precarious form of economic self-sufficiency, the object of the exercise was now more modest; to ensure a minimum of economic activity in a communal property setting. If nothing else, this was to set up an infrastructure at which local development issues could be formulated for implementation by government. Rising living standards amongst an expanding petty bourgeoisie and professional class in the towns stimulated the need for development to reach the Swazi Nation Area provided this could happen within the confines of the established political hierarchy on Swazi Nation Land.

The *tinkhundla's* political purpose blends in with their economic intentions at this point.

THE RDAP

The Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP) has been the state's principal rural development scheme for the communal Swazi Nation Land areas of the country. Initiated by the central government in 1970, it is intended to raise the agricultural productivity and living standards of rural residents. By the early 1980's 125,000 people or an approximate 27% of the total rural population was meant to have been involved by the scheme.³³

The RDA programme was implemented in a way which took care not to bypass the pre-existing rural structures of social and political control. The RDAP affected the rural population deeply. For one there was the issue of whether or not communities were to be included in the scheme, since the RDAP was not all inclusive. For the other, there was the question of relocation of individual farm-steads, the access to

an infrastructure of farm inputs, credit, education and health facilities which the scheme provided for.

The regime of decision making involved government, the chieftaincies and the *Tinkhundla*. It was the latter that were meant to represent the interests of the people vis-a-vis the proposals at hand. Given the generally paternalistic character of these institutions, there is reason to assume, that there have been few guarantees to ensure that there has been a genuine popular input and identification with the scope, design and implementation of the scheme.³⁴ The scheme tends to favour those rural areas which already have some resources and as such, "development potential". There are areas on Swazi Nation Land which are not covered by RDAP. Those that fall under the scheme are again divided between those receiving a maximum and those receiving a minimum of inputs. as has been noted,³⁵ these criteria discriminate against the most disadvantaged areas and those most impoverished. As such, the RDAP seems to encourage uneven development in the rural areas and peripheralizes the rurally most disadvantaged.

What is of interest to us is that the RDAP seems to have strengthened rather than weakened those with political and economic resources and increased living standards unevenly. It has increased agricultural productivity by making inputs available to some. But it has not significantly raised the communal property areas. The literature suggests, that whilst making some more productive, the scheme has not inhibited the country and the region.³⁶

The RDAP therefore seems to have reinforced existing social and productive relations without having been able to either increase the level of popular decision making or the degree of economic self reliance on Swazi Nation Land vis-a-vis industrial, farming or mining capital.

In the encouragement of limited rural development, one aim it would seem is to keep the rural areas sufficiently alive to prevent and work against a permanently settled urban force and assist in upholding a system of migrant labour between the rural and urban areas. This encourages the continued control by chiefs and *tindvunas*, enhances rurally based social and ideological life and thought patterns. The prevention of urbanization maintains greater social cohesion by discouraging urban crime, urban prostitution and cosmopolitanism. This is seen to encourage a "Swazi way of life" and Swazi culture on the basis of which royal government is facilitated.

Contradictions

The basic contradiction in the *Tinkhundla* administration of rural development is its yet undeveloped nature. The *tinkhundla* administration is here to take the responsibility for the formulation and definition of development away from central government and act as coordinating agents between central government and the people. Apparently this is to fill a need since no national institutional systems exist through which popular demands on the direction of development can be formulated.³⁷ Apart from lacking the administrative infrastructure, *tinkhundla* has been handicapped by a related shortage of funds as well as by the reluctance of chiefs to enthusiastically participate in its undertakings. Without support from the chiefs, the *tinkhundla*'s effectiveness is left in doubt since it is the chiefs who organize the people to participate in *Tinkhundla* deliberations and who participate in the *bucopho*, or advisory body to the royal prefect, or *indvuna* of the *inkhundla*.

The contradiction here is that the chiefs do not fall under the *Tinkhundla* and the *tinkhundla* lack the power to unilaterally intervene in the affairs of the individual chiefdom. Chiefs are only responsible to the King as are the *tindvuna* who are not interceptors between the King and the chiefs. As such chiefs are not forced to participate in *tinkhundla* affairs save at election times.³⁸

Chiefs continue to be responsible for the development welfare of their respective communities and act accordingly outside the confines of the individual *inkhundla*. They are only directly answerable to the King, a power that is a prerogative of their institutional independence. The *tinkhundla* system has or cannot be developed to the point where political power can be taken away from the chiefdom and given to the *inkhundla*. The reliance on chiefs to organize the population to participate in *tinkhundla* affairs, places a strain on the notion that a form of popular democracy initiated from the *tinkhundla* above and responded to by the people below, is at work here. Ultimately popular participation depends on the good offices of the chief and there is no other or parallel institutionalized avenue through which popular support for *tinkhundla* projects can be tapped or organized. In the same way as chiefs have in varying degrees given a hearing and responded to the developmental needs of their communities vis-a-vis central government, so one may expect to find a similar pattern of response to the *tinkhundla* call for popular participation in development initiation and development planning. The non-electoral status of chiefs will at best

be able to exercise only some influence on the chief's power to ultimately decide on how to dispose himself towards *tinkhundla* deliberations.

The system of elections as supervised by the *Tinkhundla* as electoral centres gives an even clearer illustration of the social constraints on the exercise of popular democracy in the *tinkhundla* system of administration.

VII. The Political Structure : The Question Of Political Representation

Elections Under The *Tinkhundla* System

National Elections were held under *tinkhundla* supervision in 1978, 1983 and 1987. Elections under the *tinkhundla* political system involves popular participation in the election of an electoral college whose members choose the major proportion of Members of Parliament. The selection of the other Members of Parliament is done by the King. Members of the upper house or Senate are chosen by the new Members of Parliament and the King. The electorate does not choose the electoral candidates it votes for. Neither the Members of Parliament nor the Senators are in any direct sense accountable to the voters. Instead they are accountable to the members of the electoral college or the King.

It is not the voter who is the driving force in this electoral system. It is the *Tinkhundla* administration, the chiefs and the King.

Prelude

The *Tinkhundla* headquarters organize the elections in the *tinkhundla* electoral centres. In the 1987 elections, the run-up to the elections saw the political head of the *Tinkhundla*, the *Indvuna Yetinkhundla*, address all pre-election meetings in the 40 *tinkhundla*. These took the form of briefings on how the elections were to be conducted in each centre followed by question time in which the electorate could address itself to specific questions raised by the address of the *Indvuna Yetinkhundla*.³⁹ No additional meetings apart from this one briefing were held in the *tinkhundla*. Apparently little discussion of community or national issues took place at this one pre-election meeting.

The Elections

The four candidates for election to the electoral college are chosen in secret by the *bucopho* or council-of-chiefs⁴⁰ convened by the *indvuna* of one *inkhundla* area.

The four electoral college candidates, do not campaign for votes prior to the election. Their identities are kept secret until the time of

voting on polling day when they are officially presented to the electorate.

The voters often do not vote as individuals but as subjects of a particular chief. They are directed to vote for a particular candidate since there is no secret ballot.⁴¹

Electoral College

On the declaration of the winners in each *inkhundla*, the two winning candidates are immediately taken to the electoral college meeting where they deliberate on the selection of Members of Parliament in seclusion. The voters make no input into guiding the electoral college's choice of parliamentary representatives.

Thirty of the 40 MPs in the lower chamber of House of Assembly are selected by the 80 members of the electoral college. Ten of the forty MPs are chosen by the King. The newly elected MPs together with the King choose the Senators in the upper chamber or Senate.

The selection of MPs by the members of the electoral college ends in an election by members of the college. Each member is free to nominate any two MP candidates irrespective of whether the two nominees come from his or her particular *inkhundla*. The proviso that the members' nominations are only valid if each nomination has the support of at least five other electoral college members is intended to strengthen the nomination and election of MPs who are known regionally or nationally rather than locally.

The nominees for the House of Assembly are invited to stand before the electoral college and have themselves approved by it. In 1987, 69 out of a possible 80 nominees appeared before the electoral college.⁴² The electoral college then votes in a secret ballot to elect 40 parliamentarians. As such, MPs not selected by the King but elected by college members are accountable to the electoral college rather than directly to the electorate since the electoral college has the power to recall MPs. Senators are elected by the newly chosen MPs and are, only in a general moral sense, accountable to the voting public for their actions.

The Electoral Commission

The seven man electoral commission is appointed by the King. Its function is to coordinate with the *Tinkhundla* administration on the organization of the election as well as to monitor their conduct at the *tinkhundla*, electoral college and House of Assembly levels. In the 1987 elections its members also influenced the voting procedure in

their own favour.⁴³ Where such influence is used by the electoral commission, it is beyond the capacity of the electorate to expose or challenge this especially insofar as members of the electoral college are under oath not to divulge any details of any of the deliberations that surround the selection and election of members of parliament or senators.

The King's Appointees

The King appoints ten Members of Parliament and ten Senators. In 1987 as previously, it has been common practice for the members of cabinet as well as the prime minister to be chosen from the King's list. In 1987 for instance, three out of 10 MPs appointed by the King were re-appointed as ministers whilst another was re-appointed Prime Minister. From the King's list of 10 Senators, five were appointed as Ministers. No minister was chosen from amongst the MPs and Senators elected by the electoral college and the newly elected Members of Parliament.⁴⁴ Thus the King, rather than the electorate acting through the electoral college and the chosen Members of Parliament comes forward with the members of government. In practice, Swazi governments are accountable to the monarch rather than Parliament, even though Parliament would like to believe that Ministers are answerable to them for their actions.

Electoral Democracy?

The individual voter is not the determining factor in the *Tinkhundla* supervised electoral system. Electoral power is exercised by the *indvunas* and chiefs in the *bucopho* when the electoral college nominees are put up by the electoral commission and the *Indvuna Yetinkhundla* supervising the elections at the *Tinkhundla*, Electoral College and Parliament levels, as well as by the monarch who in effect, on his own, chooses the government from amongst his own appointees to Parliament.

If one considers that the chiefs and the *indvuna* in the *bucopho*, the electoral commission and the *Indvuna Yetinkhundla* are either appointed by the king or are also answerable to him, it is clear that it is the monarch who is the determining factor in this electoral system. The *tinkhundla* supervised electoral system is the institutional expression of the political ascendancy of a nationalism under royal leadership, support for which is mobilized using a minimum of political mobilization and varying degrees of institutional, social and political pressures to achieve political participation.⁴⁵

Official and unofficial mechanisms to ensure and control the participation of the voters in the 1987 national elections included the following:

i) a depoliticized electoral campaign. The pre-election meetings were called to inform voters on voting procedure on polling day. The candidates' identities stayed unknown up to the time of voting. The electorate was generally unaware of what their personal choice of candidates ought to depend on. In general, the voting public had not ascertained for itself the difference between a member of the electoral college and that of a Member of Parliament. Very often, voters were not briefed as to the background yet alone political views of the individual candidates presented to them immediately prior to the voting.

ii) the exercise of the royal command to vote. Rural communities were instructed by their chiefs to follow the King's command and present themselves at the *Tinkhundla* centres on the day of the elections.

iii) the absence of a voters roll. This led to the involuntary trucking of townfolk to country areas to record their vote and occurrences where individuals voted more than once.

iv) a bias towards the selection of rural electoral candidates. This bias means that rural persons predominate as electoral candidates. Their presence allows for the appearance of mass rural participation in national affairs and assists in legitimizing the elections as a demonstration of rural support for king and country.

v) the use of chiefs and their representatives to direct voting behaviour. Chiefs let it be known which candidates they supported. This indicated to their subjects what their preference ought to be.

VIII. Indicators To The State Of Social And Economic Rights – The Areas Of Housing And Health

As averred to by the Banjul Charter, the question of human and social rights embraces looking at the extent to which the state promotes policies aimed at the betterment of living and working conditions for its populace.

The state of human and social rights in Swaziland is ascertainable from a historically and economically inherited set of conditions which constitute the particular quality of life. The degree to which the Swazi state identifies and seeks to transform these conditions of life characterizes it as a force which is more or less willing to promote the state of human and social rights in the country. This notwithstanding the fact that the Swazi state as a Third World state reliant on the international economic structure, has limited means at its disposal to be a "free agent" in the determination of an optimal social and economic policy aimed at a systematic improvement of living conditions.

Two areas which give an indication of the state of social and economic rights are housing and health. The sectors not only are able to indicate the degree of need for the betterment of living conditions but also demonstrate the extent to which the state has identified these needs and addressed itself to them.

The Question of Housing

Conditions Of Housing

There is a considerable shortage of housing amongst low wage earners in the towns and grave deficiencies in the state of housing for the both urban and rural masses of the population. Although the circumstances these sections of the population live in, differ, the basic denominator, their poverty, is the same.

Generally, insofar as it is recognized, the housing problem is viewed as an urban problem in Swaziland. Moreover, it is not articulated as a political issue. This, despite the fact that the question of housing is a factor of national concern and a human rights issue between the government and its people. Whilst the state has intervened in the urban

areas it has generally not done so in the rural areas. As such it has not addressed itself to the national nature of the problem.⁴⁶

With reference to the rural areas, it can be pointed out that it contained 69% of the country's population in 1948.⁴⁷ As can be seen from Table 1, the state of rural housing is indicated by the degree to which modern building materials such as windows, doors, bricks etc. were used in the construction of dwellings. Thus a high 76.02% of the population were not using any or using only some such modern materials in the construction of dwellings. This means that 351,716 people or roughly 58% of the total population of Swaziland live in dwellings which are not in line with modern standards of housing and sanitation.

But this figure of 58% is raised when the urban population is also taken into account. A conservative estimate of the number of people living in eight of the major slum areas in the Mbabane–Manzini corridor in 1984 puts their number at 24,686⁴⁸ and as such raises the total to 59%. These figures do not include housing on privately owned freehold land often inhabited by "squatters" who occupy approximately makeshift housing in line with their insecure status, a pool of 51,000 persons. In addition there is the housing found in the other towns and villages—another pool of 35,688 persons. An estimate of the national total for poor housing therefore probably lies in the region of 60%–70%.⁴⁹

The State of Housing in the Rural Areas

1. HOUSES BUILT OF MODERN BUILDING MATERIALS

Most houses in the rural areas are built of building materials such as mud, thatch, stone and sticks. Only a minority of dwellings is built of more durable and protective modern materials such as brick, mortar, cement, tiles, corrugated iron and wood. A minority of households therefore have potential access to a number of amenities such as piped or running water, electricity and electric or gas cooking all of which contribute to the raising of health, nutritional and educational standards.

Table 3: Homesteads Built With modern Materials

Modern Materials Used On	Number of Homesteads	% of Total
1. All dwellings/sheds	6,178	10.64
2. Most dwellings/sheds	7,746	13.34

3. Some dwellings/sheds	16,437	28.31
4. No dwellings/sheds	27,700	47.71
TOTAL	58,061	100.00%
Total of 1+2 =	13,924	23.98
Total of 3+4 =	44,137	76.02

Compiled from Swaziland Census of Agriculture, 1983-1984, Phase 1, (Mbabane Central Statistical Office, 1986) p.4.

2. HOUSES WITH ACCESS TO CLEAN OR FILTERED WATER

Clean and tapped water as an essential ingredient to sanitary and healthy conditions in homes is lacking from the vast majority of rural houses. 87.98% of the rural population had no access to man-made water supplies and only a small 10% of rural people had access to piped water in 1984:

**Table 4: The State of Living Conditions in Rural Areas
1981-1984**

DOMESTIC WATER SOURCE

Source of Water	Number of Homesteads	% of Total
River or Stream	26,273	45.25
Unprotected Stream	19,816	34.13
Protected Stream	4,994	8.60
	51,083	88%
Borehole	1,374	2.37
Piped Water	5,604	9.65
TOTAL	58,061	100%

Compiled from Swaziland Census of Agriculture, 1983-1984, Phase I, (Mbabane, CSO 1986) p.4.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

State intervention in the rural areas, on Swazi Nation Land, has been motivated by the efforts to incorporate those communities deemed most suitable into wider economic infrastructure in order to make

them into regular producers for the agricultural market. The Rural Development Administration Project [RDAP] was the policy tool for this strategy started in 1970.

Evidence suggests that the quality of housing did improve in those areas subject to full RDAP state support,⁵⁰ whilst the quality of those areas in receipt of a minimum or no RDAP state development support, did fall in comparison to the Maximum RDAP areas.

Insofar as the RDAP scheme has not achieved⁵¹ its aim of substantially raising the agricultural production status of the Swazi Nation Land Area, given the fact that the scheme has at best created a small group of wealthy cash crop farmers, and left the vast majority of the rural communities dependent on wage labour outside their homes,⁵² the effect of state intervention in raising standards of living and inter alia, the state of housing seem to have been minimal.⁵³

Table 5: The State of Housing in Max RDAP Areas as
Opposed to Minimum RDAP or non-RDAP Areas

	Max RDAP Area	Min. RDAP Area	NON RDAP Area	Min RDAP + NON Area Combined
Modern materials used on some or no houses/ dwellings, % of Pop.	74%	80%	77%	78%
TOTAL Pop. in each area*	160,000	110,000	160,000	270,000

*=rounded to the nearest 10,000

Compiled from: Swaziland Census of Agriculture, 1983-84, Phase 1, (Mbabane, CSO, 1986)

Table 6: The State of Housing and Living Conditions Measured by the Source of Domestic Water in Rural Swaziland 1983-1984

	RDAP Area	Non-RADP Area	Min. RDAP Area	Non-RDAP Min.-RDAP Combined
% of Pop. obtaining water from non-piped non-borehole sources	82	88	94	91

Compiled from: Swaziland Census of Agriculture 1983-84, Phase 1, (Mbabane, CSO, 1986)

URBAN AREAS

In the urban areas, the demand for housing is high. Amongst the low income earners, the unemployed and the irregularly employed the situation is acute. A 1986 estimate⁵⁴ puts the demand for urban housing in the range of 27,590- 29,980 housing units for all income groups affecting between 150,365 and 163,690 people. Most affected are the low income groups whose housing needs "are not being catered for" and who have a need for between 20,690- 22,485 housing units affecting between 112,543 people. This represents 81.4% or 74.8% respectively of the total national urban housing need.

Table 7: Order of Magnitude Estimates of Urban Housing Demand By Income Levels 1986

Income Levels	High	Low	% of Total
1.Low/Moderate	22,485	20,690	75
2. Mod./Middle	5,245	4,830	17.5
3. Middle/High	2,250	2,070	7.5
TOTALS	29,980	27,590	100.00

Manzini And Mbabane

Manzini and Mbabane, the two major urban centres, are surrounded by eleven slum settlements whose populations in 1977 made up 16% of the urban total. In a study of eight of the eleven slums the percentage rate of dwellings found to be of a temporary and as such inadequate nature was 83%.⁵⁵ The vast majority of the urban working people were found to live in conditions incompatible with salubrious standards of living.

Malkerns

A settlement in the Manzini-Mbabane corridor called Malkerns, houses mostly female workers who work on the surrounding pineapple and citrus plantations. The dwellings were made mostly of makeshift materials and only 7.9% of them were made of a permanent material. The only source of water was from a nearby polluted stream and there were no sanitary facilities apart from pit latrines. Conditions of health and sanitation were correspondingly poor.⁵⁶

Causes

The prevalence of temporary housing structures is to be associated with the prohibitive cost of building materials measured against the wage rates paid to urban workers. It also has to be seen against the fact that the slum areas mentioned lie in a peri-urban belt outside the municipal boundaries of the towns and as such belong to the Swazi Nation Land Area which fall under the nominal jurisdiction of the chiefs where tenure or settlement is at the discretion of the political authority and consequently insecure. Thus mix of capitalist and communal relations of production work together towards defining the poor housing conditions around the towns.

GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICY

Government Housing Policy in the urban areas as reflected by the state budget on Housing and Community Development between 1971/2-1977/8 did not manage to keep up with the rise in the growth of the urban population during this period. Apart from falling behind in meeting the demand for urban, especially low cost housing, government policy in this area has been marked by fits and starts occasioned by the lack of financial resources and the seeming inability to implement a low cost housing policy.

Table 6: Housing and Community Development* as a % share of Total Recurrent State budget 1971/2–1987/8

1971/2	1972/3	1973/4	1974/5	1975/6	1976/7	1977/8
3.6	3.5	3.0	2.4	1.4	4.8	3.8
1978/9	1979/80	1980/81	1981/2	1982/3	1983/4	
2.1	2.1	2.3	1.6	0.5	0.5	
1984/5	1985/6	1986/7	1987/8**			
0.4	1.1	0.1	1.1			

Source: *Annual Statistics Bulletins, CSO, Mbabane, 1977–1985*

Source: *The Nat. Accounts of Swaziland 1977–1983, Ministry of Finance, (1984–1987)*

* = *Community Development as part of housing budget up to 1983/4*

** = *Estimate*

During the 1970's, the Industrial Housing Company was formed, whose express purpose was to undertake projects which would lead to slum clearance. The Industrial Housing Company did not follow its original brief and proceeded to build the Mobeni flats in Mbabane and Manzini whose rent levels were beyond the reach of slum dwellers. Only two projects, at Two Sticks in Manzini and a small scale self help scheme at Msunduzi in 1976 reached the original target population. Nineteen years after independence, government had not as yet formulated a national housing policy.⁵⁷ As a result, the slums have remained and have continued to absorb the rising urban population.

By 1987, there was a clear need for the formulation of a national housing policy whose purpose was to "increase housing supply at adequate standards that will reach well into the low income levels" something that has hitherto been lacking. For this, housing needs to be recognized as a major priority requiring a sustained and substantial share of financial manpower and land resources.

TISUKA TAKANGWANE

Tisuka is a fund whose original sources of income are national funds derived from the royalties on mineral mined in the country. Tisuka is under royal control by virtue of the fact that the King, acting on behalf of the Swazi Nation, is the recipient and administrator of these

funds and has established Tisuka to act on his behalf in this matter.

Tisuka plays an increasingly important role in the housing sector as a commercial undertaking and controller of some Swazi Nation Land at its disposal.

Since 1980, Tisuka has pledged to make provision for national housing needs. Thus Tisuka would seem to be taking on a substitute role for the function left unfilled by government. But in actual fact the fund would not seem to have fulfilled a national role in that its housing projects have exclusively catered for the middle to upper income groups.⁵⁹

The reasons for this seems to be clearly commercial. Tisuka is a profit making institution. Investment in low cost housing has far less returns on it and returns are far more long term than that for the type of housing it is presently engaged in. If one compared the already high rentals set by the Government run Industrial Housing Company and those of Tisuka it is clear that Tisuka exclusively caters for the upper end of the housing market. As such, it cannot be seen to be acting in a way which would help to meet an acute national need despite the fact that its existence is meant to be of benefit to the Swazi nation as a whole, the majority of whom fall into the low to no income bracket.

Table 9: Average Monthly Rentals Set by the Industrial Housing Comp. and Tisuka in 1985 as Compared to the National Monthly Avg. Wage for Semi-Skilled and Unskilled Labour

Type of Housing	2 Bedroom Flat	3 Bedroom Flat or house	Avg. Wage
Ind. Housing Corp.	E97	—	E187.75
Tisuka	E200	E283	

Compiled from Annual Stats. Bulletin, CSO, 1985; N.L.Thwala, "Tisuka TakaNgwane: A Private Royal Concern or an Agency for National Development?", Unpublished Paper, January, 1988

Swazi nationalism would, as the case of Tisuka and the question of

housing demonstrates, not necessarily be people but rather profit oriented. This logic by which Tisuka operates is consistent with the early beginnings of Dlamini nationalism and its constant effort to give the royal house a material base in the economy; to ensure its political and economic progression and avoid its demise as a social and political power.

The Question Of Health

The state of health of the Swazi population is ascertainable from the incidence of a number of indicators generally associated with economic and social insecurity. For our purposes these include the rate of infant mortality, the incidence of disease related to poor living conditions and poor levels of knowledge regarding hygiene and nutrition such as malnutrition, diarrhoea, and tuberculosis.

Infant Mortality

As regards the infant mortality rate, this was reported to be 156/1000 in 1982, a figure which, even by Third World standards is considered to be very high.

**Table 10: National and Regional
Infant Mortality Rates 1982**

District	Deaths per 1,000 live births
Hhohho	135
Manzini	154
Shiselweni	158
Lubombo	171
National Average	156

Source: National Plan for the Control of Acute Diarrhoeal Diseases in the Kingdom of Swaziland, 1982, p.3.

Swaziland's high infant mortality rate is peculiar as regards both the immediate causes of death as well in consideration of Swaziland's national income.

Whereas malaria is an important constituent cause in the infant mortality rates of other sub-Saharan countries in Africa, this is not the case for Swaziland. Instead, 1/3rd of all infant deaths occur as a result of the diarrhoea-malnutrition syndrome. All in all, low birth

weight, diarrhoea, respiratory tract infections and malnutrition make up 78% of all infant deaths.⁶⁰

Swaziland's GNP per capita income is amongst the highest in sub-Saharan Africa and is relatable to those of Botswana and Zimbabwe. Its apparently high income however, is not reflected in a lower infant mortality rate or one that is comparable to these other countries. In fact, Swaziland's infant mortality figure is akin to that of Tanzania even though its GNP/per capita figure is almost four times as high.⁶¹

Thus, despite a comparatively high GNP per capita figure and the absence of malaria, the high prevalence of malnutrition and diarrhoea and low birth weight as a cause of infant deaths, points to poor socio-economic conditions under which the population exists. This has much to do with the social relations of production and their above lying economic and social structure. It suggests a highly skewed appropriation of wealth as an explanation for the above figures.⁶²

STUNTING

The health of children aged one to four years shows a similar picture. Malnutrition was the major cause and diarrhea the third major cause of mortality in young children during 1983 and 1984. Together, malnutrition and diarrhoea made up approximately half of all young child deaths.⁶³

In addition, Swazi children aged one to three years fail to grow as well as they should. The underlying cause is malnutrition and the rest is seen in a retardation of growth. UNICEF in Swaziland has found that:

"A study of the relationship between the prevalence of nutritional stunting and a range of socio-economic variables found a significant relationship between child nutrition, on the one hand, and parental education and indicators of family income on the other."

Whereas in a healthy, well nourished population, about 3% of children would be expected to show the signs in growth of⁶⁵ chronic under-nutrition, in Swaziland this condition was found to affect 42% of all rural children and approximately 33% of urban and rural children with the same higher percentage applying to the social classes with the least income and the least education wherever they came from.⁶⁶

Table 11: Percentage of Stunted Children by Age and Residential Area⁶⁷

Age in Months	% Stunted (Rural)	% Stunted (Peri-Urban)
3-5	13	3
6-11	17	7
12-17	31	22
18-23	42	35
24-35	30	24
36-47	34	28
48-59	33	26
TOTAL	30	23

Source: National Nutrition Survey, 1983.

Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis as a disease of the poor occurs widely. As one observer has put it:

"What can be seen is that the incidence is high for a country at Swaziland's level of development. A WHO survey in the 1950's reported a high incidence of TB and the incidence would not seem to have declined even though active GCG campaigns have been taking place for quite some time."⁶⁸

Government Health Policy

Government's budgetary commitment to Health has remained relatively **constant** throughout the major part of the post-independence period and **represents about 8%** of recurrent budget commitments.

The Government of Swaziland is committed to the provision of basic health care for all. This strategy has meant first and foremost that clinics have been made more accessible to the rural population. As such a building programme of clinics was undertaken so that at present approximately 70% of the population are within reach of some kind of health care.⁶⁹

Since 1976, a basic health care strategy has involved the *Tinkhundla*. A rural health motivators programme has managed to train 1,126 health motivators in 24 out of 40 *Tinkhundla*.

The health motivators are selected by the chiefs and community of chiefdoms within each *Tinkhundla* region. Each motivator is assigned

30-40 homesteads. Major problems in the use of health motivators has included lack of community participation, lack of support for motivator and low remuneration.⁷⁰

The Limits Of Government Policy On Health With RDAP And Food Security.

With its RDA or rural development programme, the Government has sought to increase the production of food and cash crops. This is intended to strengthen the means by which the populace achieves productive self-sufficiency and lessens the country's reliance on food imports from South Africa. It ought also to have given greater food security thereby increasing the standard of health.

It has become clear, that the RDA programme has not achieved its aims. Instead of raising food production on Swazi Nation Land, it has simply allowed less labour to produce a similar amount of food as before.⁷¹

Table 12 Swazi Nation Land: Production of Maize, Groundnuts and Jugo Beans 1973 /4-1985/6 — (0000s)m tons

Crop	Year	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85
Maize		108	87	86	96	96	65	96	93	52	29	147	147	170
Grd.nuts		2.7	2.5	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.2	.6	.4	.3	.7	.7	1.9
Jugo Beans		1.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	2.7	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.5	.7	.1	1.3	1.7

Compiled From: CSO Annual Bulletins, 1977-1985. Estimated figures incl. Individual Tenure Farms held by Royal Authority.

In the absence of sustained growth on RDA, food security continues to depend on a cash income from wage labour rather than domestic food production.

The wage sector of the local as well as regional economy plays a decisive role in the maintenance of food security. As distinct from Government, private capital based in Swaziland or in South Africa is the largest employer of Swazi labour.

How many people it employs is related to seasonal economic patterns closely related to the state of the world's agricultural commodity markets, the economic and political considerations of the European Economic Community and the United States and the market conditions imposed on South African mining capital.

In economically adverse times, the level of wage work within the country drops and as such, the food security of the unemployed is endangered. In times of such contractions on the world's markets the revenues of the state which are largely based on the economy's participation of these markets, shrinks correspondingly. At a time of adversity it makes the state least able to provide the urgently needed health or welfare services needed to deal with the effects of lesser food security.

Adequate levels of nutrition or a reduction in the incidence of malnutrition and its effects are to a not inconsiderable extent dependent on factors which lie outside the Swaziland Government's control to influence.

The Government has relied on foreign donor aid to make up for shortfall in its commitment to Health as a result.

The Limits Of State Priorities Regarding Health

Ministerial Government initiated the RDA scheme. Along with all other development projects, the RDA programme and its various project must be approved by the Central Rural Development Board (CRDB), a body which is appointed by and responsible to the King. Members of the CRDB are mainly chiefs of leaders within the *Tinkhundla* system.

The criteria by which development projects are judged often differ between ministerial Government and foreign donors on the one hand, and the CRDB, representing the interests of the nobility on the other. It has been suggested that some members of the CRDB wish to uphold the status quo on SNL and therefore perceive proposals for economic development and the democratic mobilisation of the population as a threat to the political nature of their rule.⁷²

Most importantly the RDAP and other development projects have generally not been able to tamper with the system to land allocation by the King and chiefs.

Access to good land or large tracts of land is often related to one's income or status. The well off or well placed tend to obtain greater favour from the chiefs who have the sole authority to apportion land. Consequently, it has been noted, that the socially and economically weakest tend to have small or poor plots.⁷³

The subjective allotment and unequal ownership in the quantity and quality of land has the economically most vulnerable produce only maize, the staple crop, and makes them tend not to be able to cultivate supplementary crops such as millet, sorghum or beans. This would seem to have a direct bearing on their food security, the maintenance of adequate nutritional standards and their absolute reliance

on a wage income.

In periods when the world and regional market is contracting and the demand for seasonal wage workers in agro-industry and other wage sectors falls, these are the sectors of population most prone to unemployment, under-employment, a poor diet, inadequate hygiene and, as such, ill-health.

Table 13: The Distributuion of Land Holdings on Swazi Nation Land

1971-72:	%
Holding- under 1 hectare	27
Holding- 1 ha.- 5 ha.	61
Holdings- above 5 ha.	12

Compiled from C CSO, Annual Statistical Bulletin

Table 14: Homesteads on SNL Reporting No. Ownership of Land or Cattle

1971/2	1978/9	1979/80	1980/1	1981/2	1982/3
4%	6%	6%	9.3%	9.3%	11.2%
Homesteads Reporting No. Ownership of Cattle					
	35%	35%	27.9%	27.9%	27.4%

Sources: CSO Annual Statistical Bulletins 1980-84

CSO Annual Survey of Swazi Nation Land 1971/2

Since the system of land allocation is closely linked to the dispensation of patronage by the king and the chiefs and, as such, a political instrument by which a resourcefully strong social base of support can be won over to support the royal hierarchy in the rural areas, its main area of support, this situation is unlikely to change. Government is unlikely to be able to contemplate other schemes for the allocation of land.

Conclusion

Levels of health and nutrition can be seen to be linked to the mechanisms that exist in the workings of Swaziland's political economic structure. Most important to note here are the existence of a communally based social, political and economic order whose inequalities and lack of economic self-sufficiency, allow capital to draw on a pool of readily available and dependent wage labour. In periods when capi-

tal contracts at a regional or world level, Swaziland's economy which is highly integrated into the world economy, suffers the corresponding consequences in unemployment and the endangerment of the rural population's food security. This can be seen to have its effects, on levels of nutrition, on deficiencies infant mortality, the retardation of growth and the general state of health.

Swaziland's level of integration into the world economy as well as the existence of a system of land allocation based on socio-political rather than socio-economic considerations, would seem not to give the Swaziland Government the adequate resources to act in the interests of the economically most vulnerable sections of the population, those ultimately most prone to ill-health.


It is one thing to talk of the government's incapacity to effect a development policy which encompasses the area of health, it is quite another to look at what Government has done given these structural constraints.

To some extent Government's budget spending, the allocation of state revenue can give an indication of the state's spending priorities.

In relation to Health, the state has given increasing priority to other areas of state activity. In the period from 1973 to 1985, government expenditure on Health grew by six times. The Defence budget or that on Public Order grew by seventeen and seven times respectively.

The state has seen it fit to give increasing priority to the sectors concerned with the preservation of the state, its political system and the social relations necessary to maintain the ways in which the economy and the administration operate.

Table 15: Comparative Percentage of Government Expenditure on Health, Defence, and Public Order



Compiled From: Annual Statistical Bulletins, CSO, Mbabane 1977-1985

Table 16: Government Spending on Health, Education,
General Administration, Defence, and Public Order and Safety
as a % of Total Recurrent Budget 1971/2–1983/4

Year Area	71/2	72/3	73/4	74/5	75/6	76/7	77/8	78/9	79/80	80/1	81/2	82/3	83/4	
Health	8	7	6	5	5	8	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	
Education	22	22	21	14	13	16	13	25	22	25	23	21	24	27%
Genl. Admin	18	17	16	9	8	13	10	14	13	14	14	19	15	
Public Order & Safety	9	10	9	7	6	9	8	12	12	11	10	10	11	15%
Defence	-	-	3	2	2	2	5	9	10	8	8	7	8	

Footnotes

1. On this see, T.V. Sathymarthy, *Nationalism in the Contemporary World* (London, Frances Pinter, 1983). "The Modern Janus", *New Left Review*, 92, (May 1975)
2. V.F. Stanis, G.B. Khromushin, V.P. Mozolin (Eds), *The Role of the State in Socio-Economic Reforms in Developing Countries* (Moscow, *Progress*, 1976)
3. H. Lever and C. Huhne, *Debt and Danger*, (Penguin, London 1987)
4. T.O. Ranger would differentiate between Populist and Dynamic Nationalisms and those with an elitist character. T.V. Sathymarthy, 1983, *op. cit.*
5. On the social context of political and economic rights, see, S.E. Heuman, "A Socialist Conception of Human Rights", in A. Pollis and P. Schwab, *Human Rights*, (New York, Praeger, 1979)
6. J. Daniel, *The Political Economy of Colonial and Post Colonial Swaziland*, *South African Labour Bulletin*, Vol. VII [No.6], 1982
7. J. Daniel, "The Domestic and International Dimensions of the Crisis of Political Legitimacy", Research Seminar on Swaziland (Free University of Amsterdam, February 1986)
8. See J. Mugenyi, "Popular Alliances and the State in Swaziland", in: P. Anyang'Nyongo [ed], *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*, (London, ZED Books, 1987)
9. This includes fruit canning, baking, brewing, finished textile production, furniture manufacture, printing, publishing, plastic products, cement, glass products, zip fasteners, agricultural tractors dairy products. See *Barclays Bank*, Swaziland, (Natal, 1986)
10. UNICEF Report *op. cit.*, Section 4 p. 3
11. See, *Annual Statistical Bulletins*, CSO, Mbabane Passim
12. Two thirds of Swaziland's commercial agricultural production is foreign owned. Most of the distribution system and tourism is in foreign hands, *Economic Review*, 1978 - 1982; C.J.L Murray, "Comparative Analysis of the Socio-Economic Background to Health Status in Swaziland", Mimeo, [1986]
13. With a petty bourgeoisie in between. De Vletter found a per-homestead figure if adjusted to 1984 prices of E2,100. In 1984 the average annual income of male persons employed in Administrative or management work were E 13,728. That shows a roughly 1 : 7 ratio in the two incomes. This figure does however downplay the differences in income. For one, the cash income covers a greater number of persons in the homestead than in the case of urban employee. Secondly, the statistics lump together administrative workers with the higher

paid management staff and as such the average income of management cannot be ascertained. Taking these two factors into consideration, it may be safe to speculate that the income differential between members of a homestead and those of management are substantially higher than 1 : 7. See C.J.L. Murray, "Comparative Analysis of the Socio-Economic Background to Health Status in Swaziland", Preliminary Draft, Mimeo, [1986] p.12 and *Annual Statistical Bulletin* [CSO, Mbabane, 1985]

14. Every Swazi subject is entitled to land on communal Swazi Nation Land. To be a subject and citizen is synonymous.

15. Aristocracy is here used to refer to princes of the Dlamini royal house and nobility indicates heads of the chieftaincies.

16. For this period see J. Halpern, *South Africa's Hostages*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965)

17. The royalists and settlers were opposed to the participation of the political parties in the constitutional talks with Britain and the British attempt to set up a multi-party form of representative democracy in which the monarch's power was to be limited.

18. Swazi National Archives, SHA/7.7.67/66

19. J.M.B. Simelane, The Income Tax Law and the Swazi Law and Custom, Seminar on Income Tax Administration (Mbabane, SIMPA, 1984)

20. On this theme see NL Thwala, "*Tisuka Takangwane: A private royal concern or an agency for national development?*", Seminar paper, Faculty of Humanities, January 1988

21. On this see P.H. Bischoff, "Swaziland - A small state in international relations", *Afrika Spectrum*, 86/2, pp175 - 189

22. Thus the chief councillor heading *tinkhundla* has referred to an unofficial opposition to the *tinkhundla* system which deems the system illegal. These are proponents of the liberal-democratic order which would give the urban petit bourgeoisie scope at interpreting and representing the interests of the Swazi Nation. The fact that the urban sectors of the population do not participate in the *tinkhundla* system is not seen as a problem since they are measured in numbers and considered to be "a very minor group" as compared to the rural populace. Interview with L. Shabalala, *Indvuna Yetinkhundla*, Mbabane, 29 January 1988. See also *The Times of Swaziland*, December 1980.

23. C.P. Potholm, Swaziland, *The Dynamics of Political Modernization* (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1972)

24. These represented the interests of indigenous businessmen, civil servants and veterans.

25. When the Queen Regent Dzeliwe was deposed by the Likoqo in

1983, an attempt was made by the forces loyal to Dzeliwe to call together the Libandla in the attempt to assert the Libandla's authority over that of the Liqoqo. However, the Liqoqo asserted itself and the Libandla meeting could not materialize.

26. And on which at the time of the last published census. 66% of the population lived. Report on the 1976 Swaziland Population Census Vol. I (Mbabane, CSO,)

27. There are additional safeguards to ensure that this is so. Thus the section of the population most likely to be urbane and educated, the civil servants (which includes teachers), are expressively "barred from any candidacy". Interview with L. Shabalala, *opt.cit*, 29 January 1988.

28. Interview with *Indvuna Yetinkhundla Shabalala*, September 1987.

29. Swazi civil servants working for the colonial administration had in 1929 formed an association of Swazi civil servants whose members were a politically restive element in the 1940's and 1950's. In 1960 the association constituted itself into Swaziland's first political party.

30. Their controlled nature had in the past colonial era already made it difficult for the petit bourgeoisie to make these royally controlled institutions platforms for their demands. In the 1960's opposition political parties had found that they were on royal orders banned from politically agitating amongst the rural population on Swazi Nation Land.

31. This was notwithstanding the fact that wage labour outside the communal areas did not preclude the continuation of payments of tribute by a migrant labourer whose family still lived on communal land.

32. See P.H. Bischoff, *Swaziland in International Relations, Swaziland's International Relations and Foreign Policy up to 1982*. (Ph.D Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985).

33. The RDAP is also meant to boost agricultural output and increase the autonomy of the local food economy. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Review of the Rural Development Areas programme, Interim Report. (Mbabane, MOAC, 1983) p.7

34. Of interest here are the observations made in regard to cooperatives where chiefs have from the outside exercised political influence and have as such undermined the democratic nature of decision making within them. B. Adelstal, "Cooperative Development in Swaziland," Mimeo. (Mbabane, MOAC, September 1980). See also, JASPA Employment Advisory Mission, Reducing Dependence. Report (Geneva, ILO, 1977).

35. J. Mugenyi, "Popular Alliances and the State in Swaziland", in: P. Anyang'Nyong'o (Ed), *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Afri-*

ca (London, ZED, 1987).

36. M. Neocosmos, 1987, *op.cit.*

37. At present central Government will make administrative decisions in accordance with the aims and objectives of the four year development plans. Popular initiatives come to the government via the individual interventions of the chiefs of particular communities.

Hence the attempt by government to conduct awareness campaigns in regard to issues pertinent to development amongst chiefs. Popular initiative will therefore very much depend on the relations between the individual chief and his community.

38. And even then the *tinkhundla* sometimes finds it difficult to obtain the chiefs cooperation. See *The Swazi Observer*, 12 October 1987.

39. *The Swazi Observer*, 6 October, 1987

40. Or their representatives.

41. Preliminary findings of a 1987 election study, Department of Political and Public Administration Studies, UNISWA, 1988.

42. *Ibid.*

43. One known case happened at the level where the Members of Parliament elect the Senators. The voting procedure was cut short after the members of the electoral commission had been nominated as Senators by only three newly elected MP's. This manipulated of the vote reached the media and after the news was published, the result was annulled and new elections held.

44. *Times of Swaziland*, 18 November 1987.

45. In the November 5th elections of 1987 in a poll conducted by UNISWA, a common response by the predominantly rural voters was that they did not know who they were voting for. They had come to vote solely to fulfill the king's command. The elections were "the King's business" and they did not wish to offend the King by not turning up. This disposition of the voters may explain why many of them after they had cast their vote did not wait to hear the outcome of their voting and left early. (The election of a candidate is announced at the centres of polling) Election Study, *op.cit.*

46. To go into the reasons for this, would be beyond the scope of this piece of work.

47. Swaziland Census of Agriculture, 1983-4, Phase 1, Mbabane Central Statistical Office, 1986), p.1. The rural population here means all those living outside the urban areas, the company towns, or farming estates.

48. These are 1977 figures updated to 1984 on the basis of the national rate of population growth during the intervening years. Hence this is a very conservative estimate.

49. The last available figure on the number of squatters is from 1960. The figure then was 10,000. K. Mathews, squatters on private tenure farms in Swaziland in M. Neocosmos (Ed) *Social Relations in Rural Swaziland* (Kwaluseni, UNISWA/SSRU, 1987).

50. The so called maximum input RDAP areas, the full beneficiaries of the scheme. See Tables 3 and 4 below.

51. Neocosmos, M. *Homogeneity and Differences on Swazi Nation Land*, in M. Neocosmos, (Ed.), *Social Relations* (1987) *op.cit.*

52. J. Mujeni, 1987, *op. cit*

53. As it seems that up to 7000 people are better off in terms of housing as a result of being members of a Max RDAP area.

54. "A National Housing Implementation Plan", (Mbabane, Cooperative Housing Foundation, 1987)

55. *Ibid.*

56. "Slum Clearance Study", (Mbabane, Ministry of Works, Power and Communications Housing Division, 1977), *passim*.

57. This is about to be rectified with the current formulations of a national housing policy.

58. "A National Housing Implementation Plan", Cooperative Housing Foundation, April 14, 1987. p14

59. Interview with the Director of *Tisuka*, 1988.

60. UNICEF Draft Report, 1987, *op.cit.*, Section II, pp22

61. B. Dube, "The Role of UNICEF in Swaziland: A Case Study of Infant Mortality and Plans and Actions." Internship Seminar Paper, Dept. of Political and Pub Admin. Studies, UNISWA, 3.12.1987. (The figure applies to 1984).

62. The unequal distribution of wealth being a result of the unequal access to wealth which is partially explained by high rates of exploitation.

63. UNICEF Draft Report *op.cit.*, Section 2 p.12

64. *Ibid.*, Section 2 p.34

65. These include low weight for age, low weight for height and stunting.

66. UNICEF Report, *op.cit.*, Section 2 p.35.

67. It is apparent that the possession of education or ownership of possessions are socio-economic indicators which are readily relatable to the retardation of growth in children. Thus, the possession of these negatively influences the retardation of growth. The children of those parents with education and some possessions are less likely to be stunted in their growth.

68. C.J.L. Murray, "Comparative Analysis of the Socio-Economic Background to Health Status in Swaziland", Preliminary Draft,

Mimeo, n.d., p.10

69. UNICEF Report, *op.cit.*, Section 6 p.9

70. B. Dube, *op.cit.*

71. M. Neocosmos, "Social Relations in Rural Swaziland", 1987, *op.cit.*, Passim.

72. C. Barnes, Background Paper on Social factors and Government Systems, REDSO/EA, (November 1979). See also R. Levin, "Traditional Land Tenure in Swaziland," in M. Neocosmos, 1987, *op.cit.*, B. Adelstal, *op.cit.* 1

73. B.S. Sikhondze, "Some Factors Which Have Impinged Upon Food Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Swaziland", Paper, History Department, UNISWA, 15 April 1987.

74. Income levels have been found to be directly relevant to the state of health in the case of infant mortality for instance. See, UNICEF, 1987 *op.cit.*, Section 2 p. 9.



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