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DEVELOPMENT AND DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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DEVELOPMENT AND DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Edited by
Michael Sefali and John Bardill

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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

Michael Sefali
John Bardill*

Like most countries in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World the independent majority-ruled nations of southern Africa face innumerable problems, from the underdeveloped and dependent nature of their economies to the fragile and unstable nature of their political institutions. In southern Africa these problems have been seriously compounded by an additional factor - the vulnerability of such states to economic and political pressure from the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Over the past twenty years South Africa's policy towards its neighbours has been characterized by a mixture of peaceful diplomatic overtures and punitive threats and actions. From dialogue and detente to the proposed Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), the overtures have held out the offer of South African aid and support to those states prepared to accommodate South Africa's domestic and regional policies. CONSAS, however, has been rejected by all independent states in the region.

The failure of these diplomatic initiatives led South Africa to attempt to secure its interests in the sub-continent by more forceful means, ranging from economic reprisals to military intervention. Designed to destabilize the economic and political systems of neighbouring and nearby states, such actions were intended to realize a number of related objectives. These included the neutralization of the ability of such states to provide an effective springboard for the activities of liberation movements hostile to

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South Africa; the perpetuation of the weaknesses and divisions that characterize most of the states in the region, thereby reinforcing their dependence on Pretoria; and the creation over time of a more favourable climate for initiatives such as CONSAS and the strings attached to them.

The achievement of such objectives, although always important, has become increasingly crucial for Pretoria in recent years as a result of the rapidly changing geo-political situation in the sub-continent and the mounting domestic crisis, economic and political, confronted by the South African regime. The independence of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, and that of Zimbabwe in 1980, deprived Pretoria of a vital cordon of friendly buffer states on its northern border. In its place was erected a very different cordon of states that were hostile to apartheid and sympathetic to the aims and aspirations of South African and Namibian liberation movements. Not surprisingly these movements, spearheaded by the ANC and SWAPO, took advantage of the situation to step up their guerrilla campaigns against the white minority regime. This was accompanied by a growing spirit of resistance within South Africa itself, revealed most noticeably in the upsurge in black working class protest and the Soweto uprising. With the South African economic boom of the 1960s showing signs of turning into recession in the 1970s, Pretoria's problems were clearly coming to assume dramatic proportions.

The South African response was equally dramatic, involving as it did the discrediting and removal of Prime Minister Vorster and his supporters in 1978, the accession to power of a new regime, headed by Prime Minister P.W. Botha, that brought the military to the forefront of decision-making, and the rapid formulation by this regime of a new and comprehensive strategy aimed at resolving the crisis threatening the Republic. Based on the 1977 Defence White Paper and bearing the unmistakable imprint of General Malan, Botha's Defence Minister and right-hand man, this total strategy, as it has come to be known, called for the mobilization of all the economic, political, military and psychological resources at the disposal of the state in a co-ordinated defence of capital accumulation and apartheid in South Africa. One crucial aspect of total strategy was the regionalization of the Republic's domestic struggles. Based on the premise that attack is the best form of

defence, the battle was now to be taken to the frontline states. And the years since 1978 have witnessed an increasingly determined offensive by Pretoria against their territorial integrity, economic viability and political cohesion.

If the countries of southern Africa are to succeed in devising and implementing national and regional strategies to withstand Pretoria's offensive, and to continue their support for the liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa, a detailed understanding will be required of the forces underlying destabilization, of the internal weaknesses that render such countries susceptible to it, and of the resources that can be mobilized against it. It is here that social scientists in the region can play an important part. And it is in recognition of this fact that efforts have been made in recent years to encourage and co-ordinate their research into these and other questions. An important development in this respect was the formation in 1978 of the Southern African Universities Social Science Conference with the aim of promoting research among social scientists working in the independent states of southern Africa. Conferences have been held in Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

Another milestone was the International Workshop on research priorities in southern Africa, held under the auspices of the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Lesotho, Roma, in November 1981. One outcome of the workshop was the adoption of the Roma Declaration on research and development in southern Africa, a document that attempted to identify strategies for the co-ordination of research and the exchange of ideas among scholars in the region. Another outcome was the decision to set up a committee charged with the task of contacting universities and research institutions in the region with a view to the establishment of a regional research association. The committee's coordinator was Dr. Michael Sefali, the Director of ISAS at Roma. In 1983 the committee's work was consummated in the formation of the Southern African Development Research Association (SADRA), which held its inaugural congress at the National University of Lesotho on 17 October 1983. The preamble of the constitution adopted by congress commits SADRA to "research which upholds the right of self-determination and national, social and economic liberation for the peoples of Southern Africa."

At the inaugural congress it was decided to establish the headquarters of SADRA at the Institute of Southern African Studies at Roma, and to convene a second congress in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1985. In assuming responsibility for the co-ordination of development oriented research in the region, congress also proposed that SADRA should work closely with the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). It was agreed, however, that SADRA should not become a mere agent for SADCC, for this could well impair the academic freedom of SADRA members engaged in SADCC related research.

The inaugural congress was immediately followed by a three-day workshop on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa. Both the congress and workshop were funded by much appreciated donations from SAREC, NORAD, and the IDRC. The EEC and the Ford Foundation also expressed their willingness to contribute to this and future congresses.

This present volume contains the selected proceedings of SADRA's inaugural workshop, held at the National University of Lesotho from 18-20 October 1983. In addition to the opening and keynote addresses, delivered respectively by His Majesty, King Moshoeshoe II, and Lesotho's Foreign Minister, the Honourable E.R. Sekhonyana, fourteen papers were presented on various aspects of development and destabilization in southern Africa. Despite the generous financial assistance mentioned above, constraints of length and cost have made it impossible to publish all of them here. But an effort has been made to ensure that those papers that have been included reflect as comprehensive a range of topics as possible. A list of those papers that have not been included can be found in the Appendix on page 180 of this volume. Copies can be obtained from ISAS, the National University of Lesotho, P.O. Roma 180, Lesotho, as can additional information about the aims, organization and activities of SADRA.

The workshop took place before the signing of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984. To a certain extent, therefore, this volume has been overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the papers presented here still provide a useful background to the conditions that have brought

about this apparent "victory" for South Africa's destabilization strategy. In any case, it would be premature to think that Nkomati, as well as the possibility of similar security agreements with other states in the region, represents an end to destabilization and the beginning of a new era of peace in the sub-continent. For whilst it cannot be denied that the accord was a set-back for the ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa, it would be equally foolish to ignore the fact that Nkomati was the outcome of coercion rather than consent, and that the only effective basis for lasting peace in the region continues to be the dismantling of apartheid. Until this happens, southern Africa will continue to be plagued by violence and instability - a point echoed by all the participants at the workshop.

The scene for this present volume is set by King Moshoeshoe II in his opening address to the workshop. Identifying destabilization as a major challenge to the ability of southern African states to achieve economic liberation, political cohesion and social justice, his Majesty makes an eloquent plea for greater national unity, regional co-operation, and international support and understanding. This plea is endorsed by Lesotho's Foreign Minister, the Honourable E.R. Sekhonyana, in his keynote address. Dismissing Pretoria's argument that destabilization is a justified reaction to Communist inspired threats directed against South Africa's security, the Minister demonstrates convincingly that destabilization should be seen instead as a typically arrogant response by the apartheid regime to efforts by countries like Lesotho to determine and pursue their own independent policies, especially with respect to such issues as the hospitality afforded to South African refugees, the non-recognition of the bantustans, and the establishment of diplomatic links with the socialist countries. Although none of these policies represents a direct threat to South Africa, they have been sufficient to excite the paranoid wrath of Pretoria. The tactics used by South Africa to compel Lesotho to reverse its stance on these issues are outlined briefly by the Minister, as are some of the conditions that render Lesotho vulnerable to them.

Following the keynote address are three papers - by Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, M.M. Ncube, and Yash Tandon - that deal with the general background to destabilization. Davies and O'Meara argue that destabilization

should not be seen merely as a desperate response by Pretoria to the internal and external crises confronting it, and more specifically as an attempt to frustrate the advancing liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa. Rather it should be seen as part of a wider regional policy. A succinct analysis is presented of the origins, objectives, tactics, and changing nature of this policy. Particular emphasis is placed on the regional and destabilizing implications of the total strategy of the Botha regime, on its successes and failures to date, and on the arguments presently taking place within the South African power bloc concerning the future directions this strategy should take.

Ncube offers a definition of destabilization and shows that Pretoria's attempts to justify its attacks on neighbouring states, on the grounds of self-defence and hot-pursuit, have no foundation in either logic or international law. The main purpose of his paper is to locate South Africa's regional policy within the wider context of the dynamics of global imperialism. According to Ncube, destabilization has been designed to serve not only South Africa's economic and political interests but also those of the Western imperialist nations, and especially the United States. The evolving nature of US policy towards southern Africa is discussed in detail, as are the close economic links that bind South Africa to the US and other Western powers. This economic harmony of interests, it is argued, has led America and other Western nations to provide both overt and covert support for the South African war machine and its aggressive policies in the sub-continent. Ncube's conclusion is that the southern African states should not be deceived by public criticism of apartheid in the West into thinking that they can rely upon support from the US and its allies in their struggles against destabilization.

This last point is taken up by Tandon. Like Ncube, he takes issue with the prevailing view that South Africa is the sole or principal architect of destabilization. The implication of this view is that Western support for Pretoria can be reduced or withdrawn, providing sufficient pressure is brought to bear on Western governments by southern African states and their supporters in the international community. Tandon regards this view as dangerously shortsighted, ignoring as it does the fact that such governments, and especially that of the United States, are unlikely to

trade the certainty of profits, strategic raw materials, and opposition to the Soviet Union that the present apartheid regime guarantees for a new regime that could well jeopardize all these things. According to Tandon, therefore, both Pretoria and Washington have powerful vested interests in the preservation of the status quo in southern Africa. And much of his paper is devoted to a detailed examination of the tactics that have been used to achieve this goal.

One tactic that has been contemplated but not as yet used by South Africa's decision-makers is the "food weapon." This is the subject of the paper by Robert Henderson. Notwithstanding the efforts of SADCC in the area of food security, Henderson demonstrates that the continuing inability of most states in the region to attain self-sufficiency in food production exposes them to pressure from their major supplier of imported grain - the Republic of South Africa. Despite calls from within the Republic for a more aggressive use of the food weapon, he nevertheless argues that there are good reasons for believing that Pretoria will think twice before reducing or suspending its grain exports to neighbouring states as a means of extracting immediate concessions from them, not least because of the adverse effects that this would have on white South African grain producers. Although it is unlikely that the manipulation of grain exports will be used as a direct weapon of economic warfare, Henderson still feels that Pretoria may well be tempted to make use of food exports in a more subtle and limited way, as a means of exercising influence and maintaining the status quo in inter-state relations.

One of the most common tactics employed by Pretoria in destabilizing its neighbours has been the manipulation of domestic conflicts through support for opposition groups such as UNITA, the MNR, and the LLA. Such conflicts are a reflection in part of the tenuous economic situation prevailing in most southern African states. But they are also a reflection of political weaknesses, and particularly the tendency for governments to respond to internal dissent through repression rather than accomodation. In many cases this tendency has been particularly noticeable in the relationship between the state and trade union movements. The nature and implications of this relationship are explored at length in Chris Allen's paper on

destabilization, political stability and trade unions.

The themes presented so far are given more detailed substance by R.O.K. Ajulu, John Daniel, and L.M. Sachikonye in their respective case studies of Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Ajulu and Sachikonye emphasize those factors that have made Lesotho and Zimbabwe targets for the more coercive end of South Africa's destabilization spectrum, and provide details of the specific mechanisms employed by Pretoria. Such mechanisms have not been used to anything like the same extent in Swaziland. For, according to Daniel, the harmony of ideological and economic interest shared by the South African ruling class and the Swazi traditional ruling oligarchy, particularly in the period since the death of King Sobhuza, have rendered Swaziland's leaders far more accommodating than those of Lesotho or Zimbabwe to Pretoria's demands. Swaziland's conservative readiness to accept the status quo in South Africa, argues Daniel, has made it unnecessary therefore for Pretoria to resort to the tougher measures used so frequently in other parts of the region.

All the participants at the workshop endorsed the need for greater regional co-operation through the framework of SADCC, as a necessary precondition for the defeat of South Africa's destabilizing offensive. The prospects for this are explored by Michael Sefali in the final paper in this volume. The background to the emergence of SADCC is outlined, as are the organization's achievements to date. These, it is argued, have been significant, given the magnitude of the problems that have had to be faced. Many difficulties still remain, of course, and these are examined in some detail. Whilst acknowledging, along with all the other workshop participants, that the long-term success of regional co-operation will depend upon the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new non-racial democratic order in South Africa, Sefali nevertheless remains cautiously optimistic about SADCC's future in the short-term.

**OPENING ADDRESS BY
HIS MAJESTY, MOTLOTLEHI MOSHOESHOE II**

On behalf of the National University and the people and Government of Lesotho may I welcome you all - distinguished delegates, researchers, and workshop participants - to this, the inaugural Congress and Workshop on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa, organised under the auspices of the Southern African Development Research Association.

The theme of this Workshop is most appropriate at this particular period of our history and at this stage in the political and economic life of our region. The black majority-ruled states in our region are faced by the most demanding and urgent task of developing their economies and democratising their political systems in order to ensure both the material upliftment of their citizens and their participation in democratic and popularly based institutions. This is the greatest challenge of our time. We are called upon to work for societies that are fair, just, and humane, where people care for each other and share with each other.

We are therefore converging here because we have accepted that the moral duty and political commitment to the well-being of our societies and the stability of our region should be the paramount objective of all of our policies - social, economic, and political.

We deeply appreciate the fact that the urgent concern about establishing priorities for policy-oriented research, itself the subject of an earlier Research Priorities Workshop held at Roma in November 1981, has now led to the establishment of the Southern African Development Research Association (SADRA). This reflects our commitment to the eradication of the scourges of poverty, deprivation, and apathy in our region and in the world at large. This workshop therefore endorses the spirit and embodies the ideals of the "Roma Declaration" which expressed the concerns of the committed research communities in our region, and reaffirmed the earlier joint declarations of the political leaders of our region. The Lusaka

Declaration, for example, committed all of us to work together towards the vital goal of freeing all of our peoples in Southern Africa from misery and abject poverty, and from the one-sided dependency of the weak upon the strong that so easily distracts and even destroys our efforts towards self-reliance. We are committed also to work towards the development and freedom of each and every one of our citizens.

Economic and political liberation are part of the same struggle towards freedom from poverty and all forms of discrimination, whether racial, religious, social, economic, or political. On the occasion of the independence of Mozambique, President Samora Machel said..."The first day of our political independence is also the first day of the harder and longer struggle for economic independence."

Eight years later, we can all echo President Machel's words from our own experiences, experiences that have led us to form a vital Organisation aimed at promoting collective self-reliance in the region - the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). We know that having established the political will at Lusaka our goal is attainable. We are also aware, however, that it is no easy task that we have on our hands. Much more needs to be done before we can begin to see the end in sight, and we are aware that we shall have to exercise much vigilance if we are to avoid exchanging one form of dependency for another and if we are to resist the tactics of divide and rule that are being used against us. We have come to substitute the phrase "economic liberation" for that of "economic independence" because we have become increasingly aware that we are indeed dependent on one another, nationally, regionally, and internationally. However, in recognising such interdependence, we have come to realise also that unless interdependence is based on genuine partnership then the continuing exploitation of the weak by the strong is all too frequently and sadly accomplished.

The establishment of SADCC therefore reflects our need - as small nations in the throes of struggle - to develop all of our potential to secure a more equitable and more rapid rate of development for all our peoples; our need to free them from deprivation, want, and poverty; our need to seek, respect and honour the basic human rights of our people; and our need to unite together to ensure that the kind of exploitation referred

to earlier is made more difficult. Together the SADCC countries have a combined GDP of some twenty billion US dollars, human resources of some sixty million people, an area of over five million square kilometres, and considerable reserves of iron, copper, gold and diamonds, as well as coal and oil potential. We have vast energy sources in hydro-electric power, as yet not fully developed, and an almost endless potential in the field of solar energy. We have the basis for a balanced agricultural and industrial development. All this potential is far from being realised, however, not least because of our continuing and debilitating dependence on the Republic of South Africa, a situation which Pretoria is keen to perpetuate at almost any cost.

If we are to find economic liberation from this kind of dependence we have literally no alternative but to join together and work out active and realistic strategies that will help to accelerate the development processes in the region. SADCC is obviously of crucial importance here.

Regional co-operation is largely an intergovernmental affair - planned, pursued and carried out by officials - and that co-operation is dedicated to the greater benefit of all the partners. But the consumers of that co-operation are the people of the region themselves who we must never forget are both the instruments and beneficiaries of development. Without their co-operation realistic development cannot take place. The degree of popular support will indeed have a significant effect on the prospects for success. Such support will in turn depend on each country's commitment to the philosophy of total involvement of each and every citizen of our respective countries. The need to feel part of one's own destiny, to feel relevant to one's own community and country, and to feel valued as a full member of society is as much a basic human need as freedom from poverty. As an essential component in the development process, the people are entitled, therefore, to the fullest possible consultation, involvement, and accountability.

Destabilization does not only originate from outside our borders. It can occur within them, and when it does it can seriously obstruct our domestic development processes. We therefore need both regional and national unity if we are to win our struggle against exploitation and destabilization. These two types of unity are, of course, inextricably

interlinked. If we cannot unite as one nation, how can we possibly unite as one region? And if we cannot begin to establish the regional strength necessary to reduce our dependence on South Africa, our chances of promoting internal unity in the face of Pretoria's destabilization efforts will obviously be remote.

Fortunately progress is being made on both these fronts. We already appear to the World as a genuine collective force, standing together against the common threat of external destabilization. This is a united stand of our own making, a creation of the founding fathers of SADCC and not an inheritance from pre-independence arrangements by the metropolitan powers. This is an advantage in our favour. Problems have been and are being identified by us, and possible solutions are being worked out by us and not for us. The late Sir Seretse Khama said..."Southern African development will be achieved by Southern Africans, for Southern Africans." Our continuing progress will not be trouble-free, however, and the many problems that lie ahead will have to be faced with openness and frankness, and with a resolve that will confound our enemies.

In addition to our dependence on South Africa we are also heavily dependent on the international aid community. Our development plans cost money, much more than we ourselves can find. We must be ever aware of the need to convince our aid donors of the mutual benefits that may be gained through our development strategies and plans. We must convince them of the justice of our cause. And we must convince them of our ability to ensure that all of our peoples benefit from our actions. Not all our friends are convinced of our likelihood of success. Some prefer a selective country approach, an approach that can cause discord and lead to destabilization. We must ensure that our solidarity and unity of purpose are not undermined, either directly or indirectly. We must ensure that our mutual trust is so strong that no one can come between us, to divide us and to create and perpetuate what are called "spheres of influence." The danger of exchanging one form of dependency for another can be offset by the diversification of our external links, and above all by the will to convince the outside world of the wisdom of collective self-reliance within the SADCC framework.

Together with other African states we have achieved considerable

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success in focussing the critical attention of the international community on the iniquities of apartheid and oppressive minority rule in South Africa. We must also strive to convince the same international community of the dangerous consequences of South African destabilization for social, economic, and political development in the subcontinent as a whole. We have to play our part in providing a persistent voice of protest. We must involve all our citizens in this unity of purpose.

The realities of the present situation determine the nature of our struggle, and we mean to achieve our goals in the sure knowledge that, if we do not, our situation will become more and more untenable. Success is both essential and possible. We, here, today, must play our part in that success to the best of our ability and with the sure and certain knowledge that we have a basic human right to freedom from political domination and economic exploitation. We owe it to all of our peoples in the region to seek to identify the fundamental obstacles to development, to the eradication of poverty, and to the guaranteeing of popular participation in our political institutions. Accordingly, we owe it to the people to highlight these obstacles to our national and regional decision-makers.

May I take this opportunity to wish you all the best success in your deliberations.

KHOTSO! PULA! NALA!

KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY
THE HONOURABLE E.R. SEKHONYANA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

Mr Chairman
Your Majesty
Mr Pro-Vice-Chancellor
Members of the Diplomatic Corps
Ladies and Gentlemen

May I start by thanking the organisers of this workshop for inviting me to give the keynote address. I will not dwell too much upon a reiteration of the points made by His Majesty this morning. Instead I will restrict myself to the causes and effects of destabilization, and to some possible solutions, using Lesotho as my principal example.

In showing why South Africa wishes to destabilize the situation in Lesotho let me first dispel a number of myths propagated by Pretoria. The first is that South Africa needs to defend itself and retaliate against attacks by elements of the refugee community in Lesotho, especially ANC refugees. Hence the Maseru raid of December 1982, the economic blockade of our borders in 1983, and the de facto embargo placed recently on arms shipments destined for the Lesotho Defence Force, all designed to force us to capitulate to Pretoria's demands.

South African fears of attacks from Lesotho are the result of an unsophisticated appraisal of what we are as Basotho. We know our position. We are a very proud nation. We want to normalise our relationship with Pretoria. But let us appreciate our differences. We do not share your position, but at the same time we can never use Lesotho

as a springboard for attacks against South Africa, because we cannot afford to. It is just that simple. We know what the costs would be.

The second myth is that South Africa needs to protect itself against the threat posed by the Communist posture assumed recently by the Lesotho Government. Lesotho has admittedly just extended its ties with Communist countries, but in Pretoria's oversimplistic logic this now seems to mean that Lesotho has immediately become Communist. This, of course, is a very oversimplistic assessment. Communist China's population is well over a billion people, but we are being told that such a country - comprising over a quarter of mankind and a permanent member of the UN Security Council - does not exist. We should not recognise them and have diplomatic relations with them. But why not? Many other countries have diplomatic relations with the Communist bloc without becoming Communist themselves. All we want to do is to affirm our right to enter into diplomatic ties with any country we chose. We not only want to be labelled as independent, we want to be seen as independent. That is a characteristic of any small state. We want to show that we are not one of the so-called "independent homelands." People should see that this is very important as far as we are concerned. But we do not want this to be interpreted as a potential threat of violence against South Africa. We obviously could not afford that. So the Soviet Union, or China, or anybody else will never have the opportunity of using our country for their own purposes. Pretoria has nothing to fear from us on that score, and should perhaps begin to revise its paranoia about Communism accordingly.

If Lesotho, like so many other states in the region, poses no genuine threat to South Africa we may well go on to ask why Pretoria has gone to such lengths to destabilize our regimes. I am sure that the many reasons for this will be explored most fully in the remaining proceedings of this workshop. Here I would like to focus on one very crucial aspect from the point of view of Lesotho.

We all know that South Africa's apartheid policy has come under increasing attack recently, both internally and externally, and that Pretoria's attempt to legitimize its oppressive minority rule by granting so-called self-government to its black majority has failed because of the

world-wide refusal to recognize the "independence" of the bantustans. But if a country like Lesotho could be forced into recognition of the bantustans this could well open the floodgates to wider international recognition. This would provide an opportunity to those Western countries that are already investing in the homelands to go much further towards full-scale economic and political support for these creations of apartheid. In many ways, therefore, Lesotho holds the key. But in the light of our responsibilities to our oppressed brothers in South Africa - responsibilities that have been imposed upon us by the OAU and the whole of the progressive world - we have refused and continue to refuse to unlock the door.

Our refusal has not been motivated by concern for the balkanization of South Africa. Lesotho has nothing to do with the question of whether South Africa is balkanized or not. This is a matter for the South Africans themselves - white, black, coloured, and Indian. Had the bantustans been evolved after genuine consultation with the people who live within these geographical areas, our position would probably have been different. But this was not the case. Recently I asked a South African friend of mine - a Mr Bizi who appears on the King Korn advertisements - why he no longer visits Lesotho. He replied that he no longer had a passport, and to obtain one he would have to go to the Transkei. I asked him why he did not do so, and he said that he had no roots, no connections whatsoever with the Transkei. Yet he is being told that the Transkei is his country. He is no longer a South African. The trauma which goes with this is incalculable. This is sin. This cannot be described in any other terms but as a crime against human nature. When we accept the independence of the homelands we would be legitimizing the denationalisation of 18 million black people. It is for this reason that Lesotho has steadfastly refused to recognize the bantustans. And it is for this reason, amongst others, that we have been subjected to merciless pressure from Pretoria to force us to reverse our position.

The tactics pursued by Pretoria to force us to do this have contained elements of both the "carrot" and the "stick", of conciliatory overtures coupled with punitive threats and actions. The name given to the overtures (the carrot) has changed over time, from dialogue and detente to the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). But their content has remained essentially the same - the promise of South African aid and

support to those states that are prepared to toe Pretoria's line

Like most other states in the region we have refused to be taken-in by Pretoria's offers. And it is because of the failure of the carrot option that Pretoria has switched in recent years to much more forceful means, ranging from threats of economic reprisal to outright military intervention, aimed at destabilizing the economic and political systems of her neighbours and making them more susceptible in the future to the carrot option and the strings attached to it. Destabilization has taken a variety of forms in Lesotho, some of which have already been mentioned - the Maseru raid which far from being designed to destroy ANC military bases in Lesotho (which never in fact existed except in the minds of the South African authorities) was intended as a brutal threat to the Government and people of Lesotho of what can happen to states that refuse to yield to Pretoria's wishes; the hold-up by the South African authorities of arms shipments urgently needed by the Lesotho Defence Force; and the damaging economic blockade of our borders which was introduced in May 1983.

Here I can briefly highlight a number of additional tactics that have been used by South Africa. The most obvious of these has been the support and training given by South Africa to the Lesotho Liberation Army which has been trying since 1979 to overthrow the Government of Lesotho by force. Recently South Africa has moved elements of the LLA to the Matatiele portion of the Transkei, with the specific purpose of keeping things stirred up in Lesotho. This has helped South Africa in at least two ways. First, South Africa does not have to accept liability in terms of the territorial origins of the aggression. And secondly, it helps South Africa in its attempt to force Lesotho into the recognition of the Transkei, as well as other homelands. We are told that if we want to deal with the LLA bandits we must deal with the bantustans where they are based.

Additional techniques have been used to blackmail us into recognizing the homelands and adopting a more favourable attitude towards South Africa's plans for a Constellation of Southern African States. Lesotho has long tried to get South Africa to consider our legitimate historical claims to the conquered or ceded territories that we lost in the wars against

the Orange Free State in the 1860s. These included the territory of East Griqualand. When the Transkei received its so-called independence, East Griqualand was attached to it by Pretoria. We voiced our protest, but Pretoria rudely retorted that Lesotho could negotiate the issue with the Transkei. This was, of course, absolutely unacceptable as it was a clear attempt by South Africa to force Lesotho to recognize apartheid and separate development.

Another example of South African blackmail has been Pretoria's attempt to tie long needed reforms of the 1969 Customs Union Agreement to the recognition of the bantustans. If Lesotho recognizes them we will get a better deal from the Customs Union. Otherwise we will not. The whole rationale is again to make South Africa's neighbours accept apartheid and its creations, the bantustans.

An important factor in explaining South Africa's increasing reliance on the stick rather than carrot option is what I would refer to as the "herrenvolk" syndrome, or "super white racism." The racial superiority that characterizes the attitudes of the Afrikaner ruling class in its dealings with South Africa's black population is matched by an equally contemptuous attitude towards Pretoria's black neighbours. When such foreign "natives" refuse to cower to Pretoria's wishes, their viewpoint is not taken seriously. Instead South Africa resorts to its usual policy - instant punishment - to bring them into line. Shoot first and talk later becomes the order of the day, as the Maseru raid and many other tragic incidents in recent years have clearly shown.

If the black majority-ruled states of Southern Africa are to contain and off-set the effects of destabilization they must strive, as his Majesty has eloquently argued, for greater regional and national unity. Perhaps I might dwell a little on the latter point, that of national unity. One reason why destabilization is such a danger is that it can exploit and magnify the internal divisions that exist within our societies. This has been the case in Lesotho with South Africa's support for Ntsu Mokhehle and the LLA. But other groups in Lesotho, perhaps unwittingly, have helped to make the ground more fertile for Pretoria's schemes. This has been particularly and very unfortunately the case with the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho, which through its fear of Communism finds itself in harmony with South African

policy. This is not of course the position of the Catholic Church in global terms. I am not even sure whether it is the position of locals within the local Church. But it is very much the position of external members of our local Catholic Church who are a very important influence within it, not least because they control the purse strings to a considerable extent. These members are drawn largely from an order based in Quebec which is well-known for its conservatism and paranoiac fear of Communism. And the storm of criticism that they have unleashed recently at the Lesotho Government's attempt to broaden its international links to include members of the Communist bloc has seriously undermined the national unity the Government is trying to foster in order to counter Pretoria's campaign of destabilization.

Finally, if destabilization is to be defeated, and South Africa itself is to be liberated, much more understanding, sympathy and support for our cause will have to be forthcoming from the Western world, and particularly from the United States. Whilst we can appreciate the rationale behind the American policy of constructive engagement, we nevertheless feel that South Africa will take advantage of this to continue to oppress its own black majority and to harass and intimidate its neighbours, free from the fear of Western, and especially American, pressure. The West has major investments in South Africa which not unnaturally it is keen to protect. And this is undoubtedly why the Western reaction to the evils of apartheid and more recently to the dangers of destabilization has frequently been less strenuous than it might otherwise have been. But if the Western countries wish to continue to profit from their investments in the long-run then it is in their economic as well as moral interests to put all the pressure at their disposal to secure rapid and peaceful change towards majority rule in South Africa and an end to Pretoria's campaign of destabilization. Otherwise the level of insecurity and instability in the region will inevitably escalate, as undoubtedly will violence, a situation which will not only have damaging consequences for the states of the subcontinent but for Western investment as well.

To conclude, if we are to understand destabilization in all its forms, and if we are to attain the national, regional, and international

solidarity to counteract it effectively, then much more research needs to be done. It is for this reason that I and the Government of Lesotho warmly welcome the establishment of the Southern African Development Research Association, and hope that this inaugural workshop on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa will be the first of many attempts to grapple seriously and realistically with the problems that beset our region.

SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara*

It is obvious even to the casual observer of the struggle in the Southern African region that the South African apartheid state is engaged in various actions against independent states in the region. It has been involved in numerous large scale invasions of Angolan territory; it has carried out more limited but nevertheless brutal raids against Mozambique and Lesotho; it has organized and sponsored armed puppet movements acting against the governments of a number of independent states; and it has applied economic and other pressures - all in an attempt to destabilize these states. South Africa has also offered various incentives - including economic aid and the cession of territory - to states willing to collaborate with it.

These actions are generally seen as the desperate response of the apartheid system and state to the deepening crisis confronting it both internally and externally. More specifically, it is widely recognized that through such actions the apartheid regime is attempting to thwart the advancing liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, and to undermine attempts by the independent states to challenge the stranglehold of South African capitalism in the region. It is less widely understood, however, that these actions are also elements or tactics of a broader regional strategy. And the aim of this paper is to offer a preliminary analysis of this strategy as a basis for discussion and further research.

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The Historical Roots of Current South African Regional Strategy

South Africa's current regional strategy has to be understood primarily as an aspect of the so-called "Total National Strategy" of the Botha regime.¹ Total Strategy has served as the basic strategic and ideological framework within which both the internal and external policy of the apartheid state has been organized since Botha's accession to the premiership in September 1978. However, since Total Strategy was formulated in a particular historical conjuncture in response to specific concrete conditions of struggle, an analysis of the regime's current regional strategy has also to be located in the context of the history of previous regional strategies and struggles.

It is not the intention of this paper to present a lengthy account of the history of South Africa's regional policy.² Nevertheless, a number of aspects of this policy in the period since the Second World War are important. Historically the development of capitalism in Southern Africa led to the formation of a regional sub-system in which the principal poles of accumulation were located in South Africa, while the other territories in the region were subordinated to serve the needs of capital accumulation in South Africa. Among other things neighbouring territories were subordinated as labour reserves (supplying 300,000 migrant workers for the mining industry alone in 1973); as suppliers of cheap raw materials and/or specific services such as transport; and as markets for South African commodities. One longstanding objective of South Africa's regional policy has thus been to ensure that neighbouring territories continue to serve South African capitalism in these ways. Another increasingly important objective has been to thwart the advancing liberation struggles of the peoples of the region.

Until the mid-1970s the fundamental bedrock on which the apartheid state based its attempts to achieve these objectives was the existence of a number of buffer states surrounding it. To the west was the Portuguese colony of Angola and the South African occupied territory of Namibia; to the north was the settler-ruled colony of Rhodesia; and to the east was the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The principal focus of regional policy was that of reinforcing these buffer states to serve as a protective barrier for South Africa itself. This involved the formation of alliances

with the colonial regimes in these territories and the rendering to them of various forms of support, including military assistance.

With respect to other countries in the region, until the mid-1960s South Africa sought the direct incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These three territories were administered from South Africa by the British High Commissioner who also served as Britain's ambassador to South Africa. The absorption of these territories by South Africa would have had the advantage of placing them under its own control. It would also have had the additional ideological advantage of enabling the racial division of land in an enlarged South Africa to be presented as a fair 50:50, instead of the existing and clearly unfair division of 87 percent white and 13 percent black.

When it became clear that Britain would not accede to the demands for incorporation and that the territories would eventually become independent the Verwoerd regime proposed in 1963 the establishment of a common market/commonwealth in Southern Africa. This forerunner of Botha's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) envisaged as a first step the establishment of a free trade zone in the region. Once this was established it was felt that the economic links between territories would be so strong that the basis would be laid for the establishment of a regional political institution - a commonwealth of associated black and white states with South Africa as the mother country.

The commonwealth project failed to materialise. Nevertheless, increasingly close links were forged throughout the 1960s and early 1970s with the colonial regimes of the buffer states, while none of the independent states which came into existence at this time were able or willing to mount an effective challenge to South African hegemony.

With its base in the region thus apparently secure, a new offensive was launched by the Vorster regime in the late 1960s in direct response to the process of rapid decolonisation then underway and the increasing international condemnation of apartheid. This offensive, known as the outward looking policy or dialogue initiative, had as its objective the search for allies within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). And it scored some initial success. In 1971, for example, six OAU members (Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Madagascar and Lesotho) voted

against a motion condemning Pretoria's dialogue proposals as a manoeuvre designed to "divide African states and confuse public opinion in order to end the isolation of South Africa, and thus to maintain the status quo in South Africa."³ Five other states (Dahomey, Niger, Swaziland, Upper Volta and Togo) abstained. The Vorster regime also achieved its biggest diplomatic coup in the same year with the state visit to South Africa of Banda, followed by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Malawi.

Although these developments gave the impression that things in the region were going Pretoria's way, in reality the balance of forces were being dramatically altered by the advancing liberation struggles in territories still under colonial rule. This became strikingly clear in April 1974 when the Portuguese regime was overthrown as a direct result of the heightening of contradictions in Portugal through the impact of the colonial wars. This was followed by the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 under governments formed by the liberation movements - FRELIMO and the MPLA. This changed the balance of forces in the region dramatically and undermined the basis on which South African policy had hitherto been built. Two key buffers had fallen. Furthermore it was becoming clear at the same time that the Smith regime in Zimbabwe had been forced onto the defensive, in large measure due to the facilities made available to Zimbabwean freedom fighters by FRELIMO. South African forces in Namibia were also placed under increasing pressure by SWAPO guerillas who were now able to operate along the entire 1,000 kilometre northern border. The situation in the region had changed dramatically. The bedrock on which South Africa's regional policy had up to this point been built - the buffer states - had finally proved to be sandstone rather than granite.

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism gave rise to a hasty reformulation of regional strategy by the Vorster regime in 1974. One aspect of this involved a further expansion of military forces. The military budget for 1974-75 was one-and-a-half times that of the previous year. By 1977-78 it had risen to three-and-a-half times that of 1973-74. Another aspect was the launching of a new diplomatic initiative, known as detente. Orchestrated and conceived by the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), detente

had as its objective the desperate search for allies within the OAU. Bribery, secret diplomatic contacts (often arranged through BOSS's connections with Western intelligence services), and ultimately a visit by Vorster to a number of countries in West Africa, as well as a meeting with President Kaunda of Zambia, were all means used in the attempt to achieve this end. At the same time some minor internal changes were made, such as the scrapping of some forms of "petty apartheid." These were clearly intended to suggest that detente was a much more viable alternative than confrontation.

Despite some initial success, however, the detente initiative began to crumble as a result of the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 and more especially as a result of the brutal repression of the Soweto uprising in 1976. Not even the most conservative African regime could now afford to be seen to be collaborating with a regime that slaughtered school children in the streets.

By the end of 1976, therefore, the apartheid regime faced both an internal crisis and the collapse of its regional policies. At the same time, top military strategists, allied to monopoly capitalist class forces, had become stridently critical of the bases on which regional as well as other aspects of state security policy had hitherto been conducted. This critique covered important aspects of the organization of military interventions in the region, as well as of an approach towards winning allies that relied on influencing individual decision-makers rather than the objective environment in which decisions were made. In the 1977 Defence White Paper (the document in which top military commanders first publicly called for the adoption of a Total Strategy) it was argued that the mobilization of economic, political, and psycho-social resources, as well as military resources, was necessary to defend and advance the interests of South Africa at the internal and regional levels. More specifically, the White Paper identified the need "to maintain a solid military balance relative to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa." It also called for "economic action" and "action in relation to transport services, distribution and telecommunications" to promote "political and economic collaboration among the states of Southern Africa." ⁴

Total Strategy at the Regional Level

The period following the rise to power of the Botha regime in September 1978 and the subsequent adoption of Total Strategy has seen a number of steps being taken to restructure regional policy. First, the objectives of regional policy have been reformulated. The ultimate objective has been identified as the establishment of a constellation of anti-Marxist states, tied to apartheid South Africa through a range of joint economic projects. In some ways this represents a resurrection of the Verwoerdian commonwealth proposals. But there are some notable differences. Terminology has been modernized to exclude some of the cruder formulations of the Verwoerdian era, such as South Africa acting as the "mother country" in the region. More importantly the constellation proposals represented a new departure in that they clearly sought to influence the objective environment within which decisions were made rather than influencing individual decision-makers directly which was the policy adopted during the detente phase. In other words the CONSAS proposals envisaged extending economic links with neighbouring states as a means of entrapping them politically.

In addition to this ultimate objective, a number of more immediate and limited objectives have also been defined. With CONSAS so far failing to attract any interest in the neighbouring states, these have come to assume a particularly important role. A clear statement of these immediate regional policy objectives appears in a paper by Deon Geldenhuys - one of Botha's leading academic consultants on foreign policy issues - which was commissioned by the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria early in 1981.⁵ Geldenhuys defined the first of these objectives as ensuring that:

Neighbouring states are not used as springboards for a guerilla or terrorist attacks on South Africa. South Africa clearly not only wants neighbouring governments to give an undertaking to this effect but also wants to implement it effectively, thus ensuring that unauthorised incursions do not take place. Furthermore, South Africa would wish that black states in the region (not merely neighbouring countries) would not provide training facilities for anti-South African liberation movements and, ideally, would not allow the fighters transit facilities or allow the movements to establish offices in their countries.

What is clearly being demanded here is not only that independent states in the region refrain from providing active support to the armed liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, but also that they act as police agents for Pretoria and prohibit any form of political organization and expression by refugees resident in their territories.

The second objective, reflecting the Botha regime's definition of the crisis confronting it as a product of Soviet orchestrated "total onslaught", is to ensure that "Soviet bloc powers do not gain a political and least of all a military foothold in Southern African states."

The third and fourth objectives are directly aimed at thwarting any attempts by independent states to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. According to Geldenhuys, South Africa wants to see that:

Existing economic ties with states in the region are maintained and indeed strengthened. An obvious precondition for the strategic application of economic relations (exertion of economic pressure - RD/DOM) is that these links have to exist in a meaningful way.

Pretoria also wants:

Black states in the region not to support calls for mandatory trade sanctions against South Africa. For some of them, implementation of sanctions would have devastating results; others may be prepared to run the risks, as in the case of sanctions against Rhodesia. The stronger the economic ties with South Africa, perhaps the lesser the chances of their supporting sanctions. Black states could, in other words, shield South Africa from mandatory sanctions.

Finally, according again to Geldenhuys, the apartheid regime wants:

Black states in Southern Africa (to) display some moderation in expressing their customary criticism of the Republic's domestic policy and in suggesting solutions. To try to induce some moderation in the heady anti-South African rhetoric is however a secondary objective and its limits are obvious: it simply cannot be expected of OAU member states to refrain from denouncing apartheid; at issue is the manner in which it is done.

In addition to the reformulation of strategic objectives, new instruments have been developed to achieve these objectives. Of crucial importance has been the rapid mobilisation of military resources. The period since 1978 has seen a considerable expansion of the armed forces, with defence expenditure nearly doubling between 1977-78 and 1983-84 to

reach R3,050 million (an amount greater than the GDP of Zimbabwe). In addition, the period has also seen the development or reinforcement of particular military capabilities for aggression against neighbouring states, most of which have been well tested in practice. These include reconnaissance commandos, ethnic battalions, and puppet groups. The reconnaissance commandos are specialist units containing a high proportion of mercenaries for use in hit and run operations, such as those against Matola in 1981 and Maseru in 1982. Ethnic battalions are units stationed near the borders of neighbouring states and composed of black soldiers of the same language and cultural group as the people of the neighbouring state. These are ready for raids into these territories to support puppet groups, such as UNITA, the MNR and the LLA, purporting to be indigenous resistance movements and indeed drawing recruits from the country concerned, but supplied, led and directed by the South African Defence Force.

Since Total Strategy envisages the mobilisation of economic, political and psycho-social as well as military resources, the period has also seen considerable efforts being devoted to examining ways in which economic links can be used as a means of furthering the apartheid state's strategic objectives in the region. In the terminology of the apartheid strategists, these can be used either as "incentive levers" or "techniques of persuasion" on the one hand, or as "disincentive levers" or "techniques of coercion" on the other. Among the possible incentive levers are the offer of aid and co-operation in joint infrastructural projects. This was originally to have been channeled through the institutions of CONSAS, and in particular through the proposed Southern African Development Bank. Other institutional forms have also been used, particularly the Southern African Customs Union, as well as straight bilateral channels.

With respect to the levers of disincentive, or the techniques of coercion, it is worth citing Geldenhuys again. In his 1981 paper, referred to earlier, he recommends ways in which "South Africa (can) use its economic links for strategic purposes."⁶ Among the measures he recommends for consideration are the following, all of which have been applied or threatened since 1981:

- 1) Limiting or prohibiting the use of South Africa's railways and

harbour facilities for the export of goods from black states. There are, needless to say, numerous ways of limiting the use of these facilities, by manipulating the availability of railway trucks or berthing facilities in harbours, or harsher measures such as imposing surcharges on goods transported, or officially announcing restrictions on the amount of goods that may be exported via South Africa.

(In 1981 Zimbabwean exports were subjected to just such a manipulation of the availability of trucks and berthing facilities).

2) Limiting or banning the importation of labour from the black states. (While the reasons for the reduction in the numbers and proportion of foreign migrant workers in the South African mining industry are complex, it is no accident that the country most affected has been Mozambique. Moreover, the threat of a reduction in the numbers recruited from countries like Lesotho, for example, has been made on a number of occasions).

3) Regulating the access to and movement through South Africa of nationals from black states. Without going to the extreme of prohibiting entry into the Republic, the authorities have various means open to them to make access difficult, e.g. by deliberate delays at border posts.

(This was applied against Lesotho in 1983).

4) Placing curbs on the imports of goods from black states...(or) regulating the export of goods to black states. The two most crucial items are undoubtedly food and oil, but machinery, spares and various other goods could also be added.

(Zambia was subjected to precisely such action in respect of maize imports in the period immediately prior to the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, and Zimbabwe in respect of oil imports in a crude attempt to force it into negotiations following the sabotage of the Beira-Mutare pipeline in 1982).

5) Curtailing or terminating the provision of technical expertise to these states, e.g. in the operation of Maputo harbour.

(Technicians were withdrawn in 1981 shortly after the Matola raid).

One important point stressed by Geldenhuys is that if South Africa were to be seen to be openly applying economic coercion against other states, it might be more vulnerable to calls for sanctions against it. For this reason some explanation or justification is needed in terms other than attempts to exert pressure. In practice, some such explanation has been proffered on each occasion that these techniques have

been applied.

How then has the application of this strategy proceeded in practice and what have been the results to date? Here it seems to us that three phases can usefully be identified. The first ran from the end of 1978 to mid-1980. This phase saw the launching and promotion of the Constellation of States proposal. It was during this phase (in November 1979) that the first of several meetings took place between officials of the Botha regime and leading capitalists. At this November meeting Botha called for support from the private sector to launch a proposed Southern African Development Bank to finance the infrastructural projects which would be the key to the establishment of the constellation.

According to press reports at this time,⁸ apartheid strategists had drawn up a schedule for incorporating independent states in the region into the proposed constellation. The key was to have been Zimbabwe. If Zimbabwe could be brought to an internationally recognised independence under a government led by Muzorewa, it was calculated that it would be a ready adherent. With Zimbabwe secured, it was felt that Malawi and Swaziland - the two most conservative states in the region with strong existing economic links with South Africa - could easily be attracted. This would almost certainly compel Lesotho and Botswana to join. It was then felt that Zaire could be persuaded to affiliate, and that this would put strong pressure on Zambia to associate as well. Apart from Namibia, which Pretoria hoped to bring to a Muzorewa type independence under the puppet Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, this left Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. These three countries were not considered as candidates for membership of the constellation under their existing governments, but apartheid strategists were reasonable hopeful that these governments might be changed in due course.

In the event, the constellation project failed to materialise. Two main factors were responsible. First, ZANU(PF)'s defeat of Muzorewa put paid to any hopes that Zimbabwe would provide the key to the whole plan. Instead, independent Zimbabwe became a member of the Front Line States.

The second factor, which sealed the fate of any hopes for an early establishment of CONSAS, was the formation of the Southern African

Development Coordination Conference(SADCC). SADCC was officially established in April 1980, although the proposal had been discussed at a meeting of the Front Line States in Arusha in 1979. SADCC defined its principal strategic objective as "a reduction of external dependence and in particular dependence on the Republic of South Africa." ⁹ SADDCC documents identify three levels of transformation that will be necessary in order to achieve this: a transformation at the level of the economies of the individual member states; a transformation in the relationships between member states; and a transformation in the relationship between the nine member states and the outside world. To bring about these transformations SADCC has launched a multi-lateral development programme, concentrating on infrastructural development and food security, but also focussing on semi-arid agricultural development, energy, industrial co-operation, and training.

It is quite clear that SADDCC was not established merely to frustrate South African regional policy. A reduction in external dependence and a radical change in the historical pattern of accumulation in Southern Africa are vital for the implementation of any development programme capable of satisfying the needs of the masses of the region. But one important consequence of SADDCC has been the challenge it poses not only to CONSAS but also to one of the more immediate objectives of South African regional policy - the maintenance and even deepening of economic ties with the independent states.

One immediate effect of this was that when the apartheid regime eventually established the various apparatuses of CONSAS it had to confine itself to a so-called inner constellation of white South Africa and the "independent bantustans." Any wider constellation was relegated to the realm of a dream for the future.

Perhaps the most important effect of the stalling of the CONSAS initiative was that it inaugurated a new phase of South African action in the region, which lasted roughly from mid-1980 to the end of 1981. This second phase saw the apartheid regime applying destabilizing tactics in a fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. The period saw a rapid escalation of military aggression against neighbouring states. There were numerous large-scale invasions of Angoland territory; a raid against

ANC residences in Matola; a substantial increase in the level of activity by puppet movements (the MNR and LLA in particular); and threats to turn Swaziland into a "second front", backed by a number of operations by South African agents against refugees.

In addition, the period saw the first major attempts to apply economic techniques of coercion. South African Transport Services withdrew a number of locomotives on hire to Zimbabwean railways, and created blockages for Zimbabwean exports passing through South African ports. Pretoria also threatened to cancel a longstanding trade preference agreement under which Zimbabwean manufactured goods were admitted to the South African market on favourable terms.

Mozambique too found itself subjected to the same kind of action. Shortly after the Matola raid, South African technicians were withdrawn from Maputo harbour and for some time South African Transport Services refused to send railway wagons into Mozambique. Various justifications were offered by the South African authorities in a thinly veiled attempt to conceal from the outside world that these actions were in reality a means of putting further pressure on Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as on other countries in the region.

This period of generalised destabilization was followed by the third period, beginning in 1982, in which the apartheid regime seems to have acted more selectively in the region. This has particularly been the case with South African objectives. The apartheid regime appears to have identified two immediate objectives and has concentrated on trying to achieve them. The first has been its demand that states in the region limit both the numbers and activities of ANC members in their countries. This has largely been the result of the deepening crisis in South Africa itself, particularly the advances made in the armed struggle since 1977. And this has led to an attempt to internationalise this crisis. For some time the regime has sought to present social struggles and conflicts that arise out of contradictions internal to South African capitalism as the product of external, and particularly Soviet, intervention. By doing so it has clearly hoped to draw the Western powers into a more active defence of apartheid. More recently, a further dimension to such attempts to

internationalise the South African struggle has surfaced. The regime now appears to want to compel states in the region to place such pressure on the ANC that the organization is forced to reduce the scale of its political and military activities.

The second objective pursued in this third phase has been the maintenance of economic links and the frustration of efforts by its neighbours to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa.

In addition to greater selectivity at the level of objectives, it also appears that some attempt has been made to discriminate between states in the region in the application of particular tactics. The apartheid strategists seem to have divided the states in the region into three broad categories: the conservative states who are seen as real or potential collaborators; those states considered to be the most vulnerable to pressure; and those states whose political systems and development strategies are deemed to constitute the most fundamental challenge to South African capitalism and apartheid.

The states in the first category have been offered various concessions with the aim of either encouraging them to deepen their economic links with the Republic or of rewarding them for good behaviour. The most striking example perhaps has been the case of Swaziland. Among the incentives offered and accepted by the Swazi regime have been assistance in building a railway line through Swazi territory, linking the Eastern Transvaal with the port of Richards Bay, and a supplementary R50 million payment under the customs union agreement. The controversial offer to cede the KaNgwane bantustan and part of the KwaZulu bantustan to Swaziland has been enthusiastically embraced by the dominant political faction in Swaziland, and remains under negotiation. In return the Swazi regime has clamped down severely on the ANC. It has also indicated that a considerable part of its sugar and other exports will be diverted from the port at Maputo to that at Richards Bay. Apart from their impact on the ANC and the weakening of Swaziland's commitment to the SADCC principle of reducing links with South African capitalism, these measures have also had a major political impact within Swaziland itself. The conservative Swazi ruling class has been split into two violently squabbling factions. The most reactionary of these now appears to have established its dominance through

drastic measures which seem to have undermined the very ideological framework of Swazi traditionalism on which its rule has hitherto rested.

In contrast, states in the second and third categories have been identified and subjected to an intensified assault. This has now become the principal and most visible form of South African action in the region. The three states which have borne the brunt of these assaults are Lesotho, Angola and Mozambique.

South African aggression against Lesotho has been directed at trying to force the Lesotho Government to crack down on South African refugees, to expel ANC members, and to reverse its policy of non-recognition of the Transkei and other bantustans. In addition, there is some evidence that Pretoria believes that by destabilizing the Government (through a combination of LLA attacks, SADF action, and economic pressure such as border closures) Premier Jonathan could well be toppled from power and his regime replaced by one which was more accomodating to Pretoria's demands.

In the case of Angola and Mozambique, further considerations are clearly involved. Apart from the considerable support which these states give to the ANC and SWAPO, they are the only states in the region that are ruled by Marxist-Leninist parties, committed to a process of socialist transformation. As such they pose a direct ideological challenge and potential alternative to apartheid capitalism. Moreover, as well as being one of the prime movers of SADCC, Mozambique is also of considerable strategic importance to the realisation of SADCC's objectives. The country's ports and harbours offer the only realistic alternative to continued dependence on South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC states.

It is no surprising, therefore, that Angola and Mozambique have been the major victims of South African aggression. In Angola's case this has involved repeated invasions of the southern provinces by South African forces, together with an attempt to foist a UNITA presence onto the population of these provinces. In the case of Mozambique it has involved an intensification of activity by the Pretoria-sponsored MNR, numerous incidents of sabotage against strategic transport installations by members of SADF, and the May 1983 air attack on Matola/Liberdade.

Conclusions

In assessing the results of the application of the above measures to date, it should be noted at the outset that they have achieved a number of successful results from the standpoint of the South African ruling class. Swaziland has been persuaded to act as a South African policing agent against ANC refugees, and more recently Lesotho has been forced to expel refugees from its territory. Pretoria's policies have also succeeded in causing considerable disruption in Angola and Mozambique.

Although Total Strategy originally envisaged the application of a sophisticated package of incentives and threats, in practice these successes have been increasingly achieved through what the Economist described as a "flexible and amoral" application of "military and economic power."¹⁰ This points to both the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's regional policy. The apartheid state has at its disposal vastly superior economic and military resources to those of the independent states in the region. According to World Bank figures, South Africa's GDP of \$52,920 million in 1979 was three times that of the nine SADCC countries combined (\$17,679 million). South Africa's military budget is greater than the GDP of Zimbabwe. Its capacity to exert considerable pressure on neighbouring states thus cannot be in doubt.

It is important to note, however, that with a few significant exceptions South African successes have not been achieved through winning the ideological consent of the states in the region. The CONSAS proposals have failed to attract even the most conservative pro-capitalist regimes. Moreover, while incentives have been a factor in some cases (notably that of Swaziland), Pretoria's regional policy objectives have been pursued primarily through the application of coercion or threats of coercion. Pretoria has failed, therefore, to build up a ring of allies or collaborators to replace the lost buffer states.

This point has been recognised by a number of leading academics with close links to the Botha regime. Several of these (including Geldenhuys

who was referred to earlier) have now become critical of the recent direction of regional policy. They argue that the sophisticated approach envisaged in the original Total Strategy (with which they agree) has given way to a tendency to resort to "military quick fix solutions", not located within a broader strategy. The broader strategic vision has become blurred while the application of diplomatic techniques and incentives has, by and large, been a failure. A continuation of this trend they argue will lead to an escalation of conflict in the region and an even more widespread resort to destabilization tactics. In the long-run this could easily prove counterproductive and pose "formidable risks" for the apartheid state. "Outside forces" may be drawn in and "a wider conflict would severely affect foreign investment and destroy South Africa's vision of a Constellation of Southern African States." To avoid such an outcome, these academic critics advocate a more effective use of diplomacy and economic action, as called for in the original formulations of Total Strategy. ¹¹

What the impact of such criticisms from within the heart of the South African foreign policy establishment might be is at present a matter for speculation. However, it is important to note that these views are by no means shared by all strategic studies experts who support the regime. A number of counter-insurgency specialists have in fact argued a contrary position. This has been formulated most coherently by a senior member of the South African Institute of International Affairs at the University of the Witwatersrand, who argued in the official journal of the South African Defence Force as follows:

All terrorist concentrations threatening peace and security in SWA/Namibia or South Africa regardless of where they are located must be attacked and destroyed. So-called diplomatic considerations must not be allowed to interfere - that is the road to defeat... Standing on the defensive is not enough. The ANC must be attacked abroad. Attacks like that on the ANC headquarters in Maputo (sic) and Maseru must be repeated ¹² - again and again... Containment is not the aim. Destruction is.

Similarly, the Economist article, cited earlier, reports that "the military pragmatists" currently directing South Africa's regional policy are convinced "that no concessions should be made to an enemy until absolutely necessary." ¹³ Politicians and diplomats had in fact been giving too much

away recently, according to such military pragmatists.

The academics' critique of Pretoria's strategy faces additional problems. Whilst correctly pointing out that South Africa has succeeded "in throwing its weight around the subcontinent... but not in ruling it" (in the words of the Economist again), the fact that their analysis is located within the framework of South African ruling class perspectives places severe limitations on their capacity to explain the reasons for this state of affairs. In particular, they have failed to recognise that there is a fundamental contradiction between the interests of the masses of the Southern African region and those of South Africa's capitalist ruling class. They fail to see, therefore, that the refusal of the progressive and socialist regimes to collaborate with the apartheid state is much less a result of the failure of South African diplomacy and much more a result of the incompatibility of the advancement of the interests of the people in these states with the maintenance of the status quo in the region. It is thus unlikely that for these states the future holds anything other than increased aggression by South Africa.

This is not necessarily true, of course, for all independent states in the region. The SADCC alliance consists of states with widely differing class characters. If a more sophisticated South African regional policy were to emerge, it could be expected to take this fact into account to a greater extent than hitherto. A package of well-directed threats and incentives may succeed in making some headway with some of the more conservative and pro-capitalist regimes, as the limited experience of the Swaziland case seems to suggest. In short, the countries of Southern Africa may well be about to experience at the regional level an attempt to apply the well known techniques of divide and rule.

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THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA AND DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN

M. M. Ncube*

Introduction

The phenomenon of destabilization is nothing new in international politics. But the sophisticated form it has assumed today - one which poses a threat to peace and international order, and thus to the survival of mankind - is a direct product of monopoly or finance capital. This is the reason why Lenin described finance capital as a decisive force in all economic and international relations. It has a capacity to subdue and control even countries that have attained formal political independence.

Destabilization in the present context refers to cultural, political, economic and military measures taken by one or more governments individually or collectively against another government in order to overthrow it or to force it to do their bidding. It is the imposition of limitations on the territorial and decision-making sovereignty of a state. In the case of a colonial state which destabilizes neighbouring independent states, destabilization is the final form of resistance to decolonization and is characterised by increasing participation by imperialist forces.

Destabilization may be carried out through covert or overt acts, or through a combination of both, but it falls short of full-scale war. At times, however, the conflict may assume the proportions of a full-scale but undeclared war. As used here, the term destabilization does not include internal conflict that results from the objective social, political and economic conditions of a country which is the target of destabilization.

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But quite frequently what might appear to the casual observer to be such a purely internal conflict is revealed on closer inspection to be a conflict covertly engineered from outside. Care must be taken, therefore, to distinguish between the two types of conflict.

The desire on the part of one government to actively seek the overthrow of another stems from that government's dislike of the other's policies. South Africa's destabilization of neighbouring countries in the region has a class and ideological basis. Destabilization is a weapon for the defence of the immediate interests of the Afrikaaner dominated South African ruling class and of the international bourgeoisie in their attempt to safeguard their social privileges and property interests. At the same time, it is a weapon against the ability of independent black states in the region to assert their independence and to develop along lines they chose themselves, be they socialist, communist or whatever. Destabilization of the region by South Africa is therefore clearly an imperialist policy, designed to serve not only South Africa's political and economic interests but also those of the imperialist countries, led by the United States. We would therefore expect to find joint destabilization actions by imperialist powers and South Africa. Such joint actions are more than just a response to the challenge posed by the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. They are also an imperialist response to the whole struggle in the region for social transformation and the elimination of neo-colonial control and exploitative social and productive relations. The South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, openly confirmed this when he stated that South Africa's sphere of influence extended to all its neighbours in the region.¹

Contrary to the view put forward by Steenkamp² and Jenkins,³ the policy of destabilization was not hatched in December 1977 at Prime Minister B.J. Vorster's cottage at Oubos in discussions with the top military brass. Instead, this meeting was called to re-examine destabilization policy which had already been in operation since the days of the national liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Such a re-examination of existing policy was clearly necessary in the light of Angola's and Mozambique's independence. Zimbabwe also appeared to be well on the way to freedom. New tactics would clearly be necessary, and new arguments to

justify them.

South Africa's Destabilization Measures and International Law

In trying to justify its attacks against neighbouring states, South Africa has invoked all sorts of arguments, including the need for self-defence and hot pursuit. In this it has been tacitly supported by the United States and other Western countries, who have constantly tried to make it appear that South Africa has been legitimately responding to attacks on itself orchestrated from neighbouring states. For example, in discussions with the Mozambican authorities in December 1982 Frank Wisner, US Deputy Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, is reported as telling these authorities that South African attacks on Mozambique will have considerable justification if Mozambique continues to allow ANC refugees to live there.⁴

Chester Crocker and other American State Department officials speak of "cross-border conflict" as threatening heightened violence.⁵ In this way they subtly charge independent African states in the region of using violence against South Africa. It is obviously useful for US policy in the region if the idea can be implanted in the minds of both the American and African public that South Africa's neighbours are contributing to the violence in the region. If frontline states can be made to shoulder part of the blame for such violence, then South Africa can justify its attacks on these states as necessary for self-defence.

Such a justification, however, is hard to sustain in international law. The right of self-defence under customary international law allows a state to attack another when it is left with no choice of means and little time to deliberate on how to respond following an attack or the violation of its territorial integrity by another state.⁶ What is crucial in the present case is that no neighbouring country has attacked South Africa or violated its territorial integrity. Attacks by ANC or SWAPO freedom fighters cannot fall within the ambit of the concept of violation of territorial integrity since the attackers are nationals of the territories under attack. The most that South Africa could ever argue is that it has a rebellion or civil war on its hands. In the case of Namibia there is an additional factor that weakens Pretoria's claim that

South Africa's territorial integrity has been violated. South Africa's own occupation of Namibia has been illegal in international law since 1966, when the United Nations General Assembly terminated its mandate over Namibia. Thus to invade Angola from an illegally occupied Namibia supposedly in self-defence is absurd in the extreme.

South Africa, therefore, cannot claim the right of self-defence, because no foreign troops from any of the neighbouring states have entered and remained, even for a brief moment, on its soil. Under international law, the presence of such troops would clearly constitute a justification for attacking the country from which they originated. But what South Africa wants to persuade the world to view as "foreign troops" are in reality its own citizens, engaged in an internationally recognised struggle to regain the right of self-determination denied for so long by the apartheid authorities to the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa and Namibia.

Even if Pretoria had a stronger claim in international law to justify its attacks on neighbouring states as legitimate self-defence against the activities of anti-South African guerrillas based in them, it would still be very hard to see how many of South Africa's actual attacks could possibly be described as self-defence. For the targets of most South Africa attacks (Cassinga, Matola and Maseru are just a few of the better known examples) have not been guerrillas, about to launch raids into South African territory, but defenceless refugees and civilians.

Another international law doctrine which the apartheid regime often invokes to justify its aggression is that of hot pursuit. At the moment the bulk of the literature on the subject of hot pursuit concerns pursuit on the high seas. Nevertheless, many of the principles which govern such pursuit also apply to hot pursuit on land. This is particularly true of the stipulations that pursuit should commence immediately and should be continuous and uninterrupted, with the fugitives always in sight.⁷ In the case of South Africa, very few if any of the attacks by the South African army and airforce against targets such as private houses, schools, factories, refugee camps and other civilian centres in neighbouring states have been the culmination of a pursuit of guerrillas which commenced immediately after

a raid into South Africa and which was continuous and uninterrupted, with the fugitives (guerrillas) always in sight. So-called hot pursuit by South Africa is nothing more, therefore, than naked aggression directed against those states that provide legitimate and internationally recognised hospitality to South African and Namibian refugees. It is not directed against specific offenders against South African security. One telling point about South Africa's hot pursuit is that it almost invariably leads the South African armed forces to refugee camps where there are few if any active freedom fighters. Cassinga, Matola and Maseru are again fresh in most people's minds.

With the noted exception of the US, the UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and a handful of reactionary clients of imperialism in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, United Nations member states have consistently rejected Pretoria's claims of justified attacks against its neighbours, and have strongly denounced these attacks. They are convinced, as we are, that South Africa is using the "harbouring-of-terrorists" argument as an excuse for more sinister and wide-ranging imperialist objectives. We can now turn to a more detailed examination of these objectives, with specific reference to the common interest in them shared by South Africa and the Western imperialist nations, most notably the United States.

The Link Between the US and South Africa: The Common Interest

Ever since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, South Africa has become more and more enmeshed in the struggle for control of its wealth by the leading financiers of the different capitalist countries, and also in the political and economic strategies dictated by the needs of finance capital. Naturally, the most dominant imperialist power, the US, and its finance capital are today at the centre of the formulation of imperialist strategies in southern Africa. These strategies concern, among other things, how to roll back the gains made by the national liberation movements in the past twenty-five years. It is therefore in the formulation and implementation of these imperialist strategies in southern Africa that the US is linked to South Africa and is contributing to destabilization in the region. It is a link brought about by the mutual political and economic

needs of the ruling classes in South Africa and the US.

The United States' political position on South Africa and southern Africa was enunciated in a classified National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 39) - sometimes known as "Tar Baby" - prepared for the Nixon Administration in 1969. The memorandum presented five policy options, ranging from close association to disassociation with the various White and Black regimes in the region. Option 2 was finally chosen. This option was premised on the fact that Whites were in southern Africa (Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, and Namibia) to stay, and that no constructive change from the American point of view could be brought about without their participation and co-operation. The memorandum warned that increased political violence by Blacks would lead to chaos and an obvious opportunity for Communists to take over. And its proposed strategy against such an eventuality was two-fold. First, sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa should be lifted, and their economies tied even more closely to those in the West. This would help to foster the emergence of a pro-Western Black bourgeoisie which could be gradually brought into government. Secondly, lines of communication should be built and strengthened with the leaders of independent African states (or at least those states that were thought to be the most susceptible to American pressure), and increasing aid should be offered to them. Such leaders could then be persuaded to convince (in other words to put pressure on) the liberation movements to accept evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, leading to the establishment of typical neo-colonial states under Western economic hegemony.

Some of the objectives of NSSM 39 were implemented, causing considerable pressure to be placed on liberation movements. But NSSM 39 had to be held in abeyance when pressure by liberation movements on Portugal's military forces in Mozambique and Angola brought about a coup in Portugal which ushered in a new government amenable to granting independence to the two colonies. Nevertheless, the underlying principles of NSSM 39 continue to remain the cornerstone of US policy towards southern Africa today. Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" has essentially the same objectives as NSSM 39: standing between South Africa and the international community to ward off blows against South Africa; doing everything possible

to ensure the survival of the present South African political and economic system; working harder and harder to enmesh South Africa in the US dominated imperialist system; preventing the development of genuinely socialist states in the region; and finding ways to convince the liberation movements to give up their demands and social programs in return for a limited share in power with the apartheid regime. However, because of the advanced nature of the armed liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa, military destabilization of countries in the region seems now to be the only option left to force such countries to abandon their support for the liberation movements, and to try and persuade such movements to give up the struggle.

One of the most essential aspects in the realisation of the policy objectives contained in NSSM 39 and in Reagan's constructive engagement proposals is the presence in South Africa of massive imperialist capital. US corporate involvement in the South African economy has grown steadily since the early days of the Union. In his study of such involvement, Blyden Jackson presents a systematic account of the involvement of key US companies in the development of South African industry and infrastructure.⁸ Many other studies have revealed the same trends.⁹ US corporations were attracted to South Africa by its natural resources, some of them strategic (uranium and chromium for example) and for the most part unavailable in quantity outside the Communist bloc. They were also attracted by the existence of a vast cheap labour pool, a deliberate creation of South African capital and the state, and the resulting high yield per dollar of investment because of the cruel level of exploitation.

As long ago as 1972, Fortune, a major US business magazine, captured the essence of the attractions of apartheid South Africa for finance capital:

The Republic of South Africa has always been regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine, one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labour is cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible. Such are the market's attractions that 292 American corporations have established subsidiaries or affiliates there. Their combined direct investment is close to \$900 million, and their returns on that investment have been romping home at something like 19 per cent a year, after taxes.¹⁰

Little wonder therefore, in the words of Elizabeth Schmidt, that "American corporations rapidly expanded their investments in South Africa without remonstrance from the American government. Between 1943 and 1978, US direct investment in South Africa from \$50 million to \$2 billion - an increase of 4,000 percent." ¹¹

In all this there has of course been something for the ruling class in South Africa, particularly the Afrikaner section whose apartheid policy has helped to create these windfalls for the international bourgeoisie. The apartheid rulers have received in return much needed material and political support for apartheid and its programmes. A US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report published in January 1978 revealed, for example, that American investments and loans to South Africa have saved Pretoria from serious problems during periods of economic crisis. Moreover, the funds enabled the South African government to ward off campaigns by the international community to abolish apartheid and democratize society. In the words of the report:

International credit provided the margin of funds needed by South Africa in the 1974-76 period to finance its military build-up, its stockpiling of oil, and its major infrastructure projects in strategic sectors such as transportation, communications, energy, and steel production, all of which are related to security needs... The net effect of American investment has been to strengthen the economic self-sufficiency of South Africa's apartheid regime. ¹²

South Africa's nuclear technology has also been fostered by Western assistance, particularly from the US and West Germany. ¹³ All of this has taken place in violation of the UN Security Council's mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and also in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of which those assisting South Africa are signatories.

There are other technological benefits that have accrued to the apartheid state machinery and those in control of it by reason of the presence of US transnational corporations. Mobility and communication - two capabilities essential for the creation and maintenance of the apartheid state - have been greatly enhanced by the sale of American vehicles to strategic South African government departments on an ever increasing basis.

Figures for 1973 to 1978 show that the sales of Ford vehicles to non-strategic departments, such as the railways, have fallen progressively since 1973, whereas sales to the Ministry of Defence and to the Police increased between 100 and 400 percent.¹⁴

Similarly, the US computer industry, which controls 70 percent of the market in South Africa, has also served to bolster the regime's oppressive stance towards its own people and its aggressive stance towards its neighbours. Companies involved include Sperry Rand, NCR, IBM, Control Data, Burroughs, Honeywell, and ICL. ICL produced a system specifically designed for use by the South African police. The increasing spread of computers has been of vital importance to the realization of Pretoria's Total Strategy policy, adopted in 1977. This prescribed a militarized national security system, integrating all branches and levels of the state machinery, industry, business, the educational system, and all other institutions to ensure that political control continues to remain in White hands, and more specifically in the hands of the Afrikaner section of the ruling class. The US computer industry obliged by providing all types of systems for storing information on such matters as fingerprints, racial classification, pass details, marital status, work and work place, and so on. They also provided storage and retrieval systems for advanced military technology.¹⁵ In addition, advanced computer equipment and other war related equipment has come from NATO, of which the US is the leading member, to assist South Africa's military build-up against her neighbours and her own oppressed population. NATO supplied sophisticated computers for Project Advokaat, an advanced system for monitoring air traffic and ocean going vessels.¹⁶

It is clear, therefore, that US capitalists have not only been able to reap enormous profits for themselves; they have also made a major contribution to strengthening the apartheid system. At the same time, their capital has helped to secure the political and economic position of the Afrikaner ruling group. This ruling group, under pressure as it is from its own internal contradictions and from the armed struggle of the oppressed majority, has therefore come increasingly to see that its very survival lies in greater identification and collaboration with the international bourgeoisie, politically, economically and militarily. The

interests of the Afrikaner ruling group and the international bourgeoisie inevitably coincide. They must protect apartheid together. They must plan together and fight together. Despite attempts to camouflage the truth, US involvement in destabilization in southern Africa is therefore an open secret. It is carried out in support of the apartheid regime, against the liberation movements, and defended as a necessary step to thwart Communist expansion in the sub-continent.

Destabilizing Actions by the US and South Africa

The efforts by the United States to ensure world imperialist domination in general and US domination in particular has led to a long and well-documented history of American subversion in Africa, from the intervention in the Congo in the early 1960s to the equally sinister and damaging intervention in Angola in the mid and late 1970s. American subversion has been orchestrated by the CIA which far from being a mere "spook factory" is an institution which in varying degrees and through different tactics "has had and continues to have a largely negative effect on the process of development of Third World countries."¹⁷ In addition to its now famous or infamous "dirty tricks", the CIA has used more subtle means to destabilize African countries, and especially those that have attempted to attain genuine political and economic independence and posed a challenge to continuing US imperialist domination and exploitation (such countries are usually labelled "Communist" in the oversimplistic and distorted logic of Washington foreign policy makers). One particularly effective technique has been the attempt to divide such African countries on ethnic, religious, or other lines in order to prevent the achievement of social cohesion and national unity.

Of the US sponsored military destabilization activities in southern Africa the operations against Angola head the list for their callousness and brutality. Descriptions of how children in attacked refugee camps ran naked to show they were unarmed but were nevertheless summarily gunned down by South African soldiers are little different from the descriptions of the horrors of Auschwitz. "To the CIA, the South Africans were the ideal solution for central Angola,"¹⁸ says Stockwell, who was one of the CIA operatives in the invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975. The CIA flew

in the arms which were used by the South African troops and UNITA in their quest to overthrow the MPLA government. Willem Steenkamp, a South African journalist and a soldier in several operations in Angola, including "Operation Savannah", says that the South Africans went into Angola at the "instigation...of Dr Henry Kissinger himself." ¹⁹

Operation Savannah began on 14 October 1975 and was carried out by combined South African and UNITA forces, as well as by CIA military logistics personnel and mercenaries from North America and Europe. The operation was designed to prevent the MPLA government from formally receiving independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975. The US and South Africa feared that an MPLA government, if allowed to legally receive and consolidate independence, would not only set an example for independent development in Africa but would also provide moral and material support for the liberation movements, SWAPO especially. It was during this attempted invasion that the Angolan government invited Cuba to send military assistance.

The counter-offensive by FAPLA and Cuban forces stopped the invaders at the River Kwevi on about 8 November and began to push back the enemy. Thousands of people lost their lives in this Kissinger inspired invasion. But with the assistance of their friends the Angolan people stood firm. When the South African and UNITA forces withdrew to Namibia they began to plan more invasions of Angola. The objective was to give the MPLA no chance to consolidate independence and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed in Operation Savannah. Aggression against Angola has persisted since then. The South African army and UNITA have carried out numerous daily acts of sabotage and destabilization in which many innocent people have died. In addition to such daily harassment, the South Africans, UNITA, and the Americans have launched a number of major military operations against Angola. ²⁰

In September 1977 the CIA planned "Operation Cobra" against Angola's oilfields in Cabinda. The goal was to set up an independent state in Cabinda. "US army personnel were heavily involved, along with the South African Defence Force." ²¹ The plot was foiled, however, by the Angolan security forces. Shortly afterwards, the CIA armed the FLNA, FLEC and UNITA and unleashed a terror campaign against civilians in Cabinda, Huambo

and Bie, hundreds of whom were slaughtered. Meanwhile the South Africans had been training more members of the Mushala gang in Namibia, together with UNITA, to commit similar acts of destabilization in Zambia. In 1978 the South African army, together with UNITA and mercenaries, invaded Angola once more, slaughtering villagers and carrying out the massacre at Cassinga in which almost 800 defenceless Namibian refugees were killed, most of them women and children. In 1981 "Operation Protea" was launched. The objective was for South African troops to invade and permanently occupy the southern part of Angola. During this occupation they have murdered civilians and destroyed roads, railways, bridges, hospitals, clinics, schools, and anything else of economic value - all in an attempt to prevent SWAPO from coming to power in Namibia.

In a similar way the CIA and South Africa have built up the so-called Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR) which in reality is a special unit of the South African Defence Force, made up of Mozambicans and elements of the South African Special forces, known as Recces. In Zimbabwe there have been several military attacks by South African Defence Force, including the sabotage of air force planes. South Africa is still holding an estimated 5,000 former Rhodesian soldiers in camps in the northern Transvaal in readiness for acts of destabilization. In Lesotho South Africa has used three forms of destabilization: direct intervention, as in the Maseru raid; sponsorship of the so-called Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA); and sporadic economic embargoes. South African security forces have also infiltrated into Botswana on occasion.

In all these operations, and many more, South Africa receives invaluable military intelligence from high-flying US spy planes and satellites. The same intelligence is of course useful to the CIA and Africa policy formulat-ors in the US State Department.

It is also a well-known fact that since 1982 members of Pretoria's powerful State Security Council (and especially General van der Westhuizen, Chief of South African Military Intelligence) have frequently visited America for consultations with the CIA. It is also known that at a time when Pretoria's destabilization activities were being intensified, William Casey, head of the CIA, visited South Africa amid utmost secrecy to help co-ordinate US-South African policy in the region.

Besides covert and overt military actions carried out in conjunction with its local friends, the US has also attempted to destabilize the region through the political decisions it takes, especially those decisions that have had the effect of postponing the implementation of UN Resolution 435 on Namibian independence. First, the US opposed the franchise and electoral procedures; then came the linking of Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Now there is the issue of "regional security" which will be discussed shortly.

Considerable information about the objectives and tactics of the United States' policy towards southern Africa was revealed in secret US State Department documents that were leaked to the American press in 1981. These documents confirmed what those struggling for freedom and independence in southern Africa have long suspected - that America's real policy is at complete variance with its publicly stated policy. Grandiloquent speeches are made, proclaiming the US's respect for the independence and self-determination of nations, whilst at the same time the US is actually engaged in actions with the opposite effect. While George Bush, the US Vice-President, was making such a speech in Nairobi in November 1982,²² his Administration was colluding with South Africa to prevent the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and therefore to deny the Namibian people the very self-determination he had glibly been referring to.²³

One of the many tactics for delaying Namibian independence was the formation of the Western Contact Group in 1976. This comprised the US, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada. Ostensibly, the main objective of the Contact Group was to get South Africa to the negotiating table as soon as possible. In reality the objective was the opposite - to delay Namibian independence until such time as it could be stage-managed effectively in the interests of South Africa and the West. No sooner was the Contact Group operational than the world saw one reversal after another of what had been achieved by the UN. For example, the Contact Group soon scuttled UN Resolution 385 which called for the withdrawal from Namibia of South Africa's illegal administration and military presence before elections were held. Now the Americans and their allies amended the plan to require only a phased withdrawal, with the South African administration in charge in Namibia until the time of the elections.

Given its lack of legitimacy and popular support in Namibia, South Africa has used these delaying tactics by the Contact Group to try and create a Black petty bourgeois leadership to defend a neo-colonial state against SWAPO. Hence the frantic attempt to create such bodies as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. This particular attempt collapsed, however, in January 1983 because the DTA had no real roots amongst the people of Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria has not given up. After the collapse of Turnhalle Namibia reverted to direct control by South Africa through the Administrator General. The South Africans are now hoping that they might use the newly created Council of State as a nucleus for a new neo-colonial machinery.

The importance to the US and South Africa of creating an alternative to SWAPO cannot be over-emphasised. They see this as the surest way to remain in control of Namibia's resources and to use Namibia as a springboard in their anti-socialist and anti-Communist crusade in the region. Such advantages would be lost if SWAPO came to power. With this in mind, the US clearly considers that any form of political subversion of the UN plan will put off the day of defeat and hold out the hope, however distant, that something can still be done to save the situation for imperialism.

The linking of Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has no validity in either logic or history. It should be remembered that the linkage issue only arose recently, long after South Africa's first invasion of Angola in 1975 which gave rise to the MPLA's call for Cuban assistance. The US and South Africa had originally thought that the MPLA government, even with the support of Cuba, would easily crumble, thus opening the way for a UNITA government. When the Angolan people proved much more resolute in their support for the MPLA, then and only then did the Americans and South Africans begin to argue that Namibian independence could only come after the withdrawal of the Cuban forces. In this way they were able to buy time and to mount more and larger offensives against Angola.

The latest political tactic in US-South African strategy is the call for so-called "over-all regional security arrangements." In effect, what the Americans are saying here is that the lack of security in the region arises largely because South Africa's neighbours have failed to guarantee

the Republic's security from attacks by guerrillas, and that "if there is to be security in southern Africa, South Africa must be involved in shaping it."²⁴ In practical terms the US is saying that the armed liberation struggle should be stopped, and frontline states should enter into non-aggression treaties with South Africa. The effect of this would be that the ANC and SWAPO would have to give up the struggle. Frontline states would have to refuse asylum and refugee status to Namibians and South Africans. By so doing they would implicitly be recognizing apartheid and turning their backs on support for the internationally recognized right of self-determination for the peoples of Namibia and South Africa.

The US and its allies in the Contact Group are known to have floated the idea of non-aggression pacts between frontline states and South Africa in a document they called the "Non-Paper" which they gave to frontline states and SWAPO. This Non-Paper suggests that South Africa and its neighbours should "provide reciprocal assurances of non-interference and non-resort to force."²⁵ These assurances would "contribute to the stability of the region."²⁶ In making such a proposal the US and its Western friends effectively accept the legitimacy of the South African government in both South Africa and Namibia. They also conveniently ignore the fact that the main danger to peace and security in southern Africa is the apartheid regime and its aggressive and oppressive policies.

Briefly, therefore, the call for overall security arrangements is a call for the frontline states to surrender and submit to the dictates of the US and South Africa. Non-aggression pacts would represent a victory for apartheid and South Africa's Constellation of Southern African States concept, which is based naturally on South Africa being the dominant state in the constellation. This is essentially what the Americans mean when they say that there will be no security in southern Africa if South Africa's legitimate security concerns are not addressed.

A Response to Destabilization

It has been shown that the destabilization of southern African states

by South Africa and its allies is a policy rooted in the interests of the international bourgeoisie to protect their investments in the region. It is also rooted in the interests of the South African ruling class. The imperatives for destabilization are built into the US and South African political and economic systems. It goes without saying that any real or perceived support by South Africa's neighbours for the national liberation movements will attract destabilization from South Africa and its allies in the West. There has been extensive collaboration between the US and South Africa to counter the growing movement for national liberation and independence. These two countries have employed every possible measure, from subtle persuasion to brutal violence, to prevent genuine growth and development in the region in an effort to maintain their political and economic stranglehold on southern Africa.

An effective response to destabilization ought to begin with a recognition that the US and South Africa will not stop their programme of destabilization until they have either subdued the region in their own interests or have been faced with overwhelming resistance. Because of their commitment to liberation, we can state here without doubt that the peoples of South Africa and Namibia will in fact resist. But the more they do so the greater will be the repression from South Africa, and the larger will be the numbers that will have to flee to seek asylum in the neighbouring countries. South Africa will of course continue to "punish" those states that grant asylum. This will increasingly place the leaders of such states in a terrible moral dilemma. Should they send the refugees back to almost certain death or should they subject their own citizens to the well-known dangers of South African reprisals? Many leaders may ultimately be tempted to place national survival ahead of the interests of the liberation movements. This would be an understandable choice, but in my opinion it would be the wrong one. For the basic problems in southern Africa would still remain; in fact they are bound to until the machinery of apartheid is dismantled. The African states in the region, placed as they are at the frontier of right and wrong in southern Africa, have no real choice, therefore, but to stand on the side of justice and history. They have to confront reality for what it is.

Frontline states must concentrate on educating the masses about the

fact that history and imperialism have imposed on the people of southern Africa an onerous but heroic task of having to continue the struggle, even after their countries are independent, because of the dangers of the apartheid state in South Africa. I believe strongly that if people were informed much more clearly of the choices and why they should struggle, they will be better able to understand the inevitable hardships they will have to suffer to ensure economic independence and social justice throughout southern Africa. Without the support of the masses, the frontline states will never be able to counter South Africa's destabilization.

Public power in these countries as yet does not coincide with the population organizing itself as an armed force. Armies are still basically instruments of individual rulers or strata. Only when a whole population is ready to take up arms can we speak of a population ready to stand up to any enemy, however formidable. The critical factor that has so far prevented the US from launching an all out invasion of Cuba is the fact that American foreign policy makers are well aware (despite their public utterances to the contrary) that this would involve them in a fight to the death with almost the entire population of Cuba.

Because of the historical forces confronting each other in the region we cannot see room for peaceful co-existence with the present South African regime, irrespective of the theoretical desirability of this position for some leaders and states in southern Africa. With respect to the question of Namibia, the US and South Africa want to roll back the gains of the struggle for freedom and to overthrow the MPLA government, which will mean denying SWAPO vital support and to force it to sue for a neo-colonial settlement. There is also a belief in some circles that Angola has no way out other than by entering into a deal with UNITA and sending the Cubans home. In my opinion this is wishful thinking rather than a likely possibility.

A close examination of the policies of the MPLA government since it took over power makes it unlikely that it will give in to American and South African pressure. The MPLA's ideological stance also makes it highly unlikely that it will be forced into sharing power with

agents of imperialism such as UNITA. Angola was one of the few African states that right from the beginning made no secret of its strong socialist orientation. It is also interesting to observe that it is in Angola alone in the region that one cannot find South African goods.

To say all this is not to suggest that Angola is not facing serious economic difficulties, that make it vulnerable to pressure. But I nevertheless feel that there is a realization in Angola that a country cannot rely for its economic and political survival on its enemies. I am convinced that other countries in the region would like to take the same position but have not as yet been able to bring themselves to do so. However, with the certainty of intensified destabilization from South Africa it is difficult to see how neighbouring states can continue to import South African goods. Denying South Africa markets should become a fundamental imperative of SADCC. Such a position could only be successfully maintained if SADCC is able to generate a surplus of all vital commodities. This view may be dismissed as an "ultra left" solution. But let us hear what others propose as realistic solutions to these very serious problems.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY OF REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION

Yash Tandon*

The Washington-Pretoria Axis and the Conceptualization of Destabilization

There are a variety of interpretations of the destabilization taking place in southern Africa today. One view, put forward by Pretoria and some Western apologists for apartheid, sees the liberation movements, the frontline states, and international Communism as the main forces of destabilization in the subcontinent. South Africa, in contrast, is viewed as a stabilizing force in the region. None of us at this workshop would accept this view. But amongst those who correctly see the apartheid regime as the main agent of destabilization in southern Africa there are important differences of opinion as to whether Pretoria is the sole author of the crisis or whether its actions are merely part of a wider strategy of global imperialism, orchestrated by the US.

The dominant view at present, not only amongst most frontline states but also among liberal critics of apartheid in the West, is that South Africa is the sole or principal architect of destabilization, although it clearly draws support from West and particularly from the US. The strategic implications of this view are clear. American and other Western leaders must be persuaded to stop their support for South Africa. The situation in southern Africa would then hopefully change. This was the underlying assumption behind the statement issued after a meeting in Nampula in January 1983 of the Politburo of FRELIMO and Mozambican governors and military commanders. While explaining why Maputo was taking the initiative to improve relations with the US (the first

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US aid team had then just visited Mozambique), the statement said... "these initiatives are intended to denounce and isolate our enemy (South Africa), making it easier to neutralize it." ¹ Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano went on to explain that relations with the US "would be improved immediately if, instead of remaining silent, the United States condemned South African aggression against our country." ²

The same sort of assumptions are shared by a number of well-meaning Americans. The mayor of Atlanta, Andrew Young, and US Congressman, Howard Wolpe, for example, are among those who think the US can be persuaded to de-link itself from South Africa, for in their view it is politically immoral to support apartheid. This was the theme underlying the thirteenth African-American Conference that took place in Harare in January 1983. One of the participants at the Conference, the veteran American academic, Gwendolen Carter, said the US policy on South Africa was "misguided." ³

The second view, which sees destabilization not as a South African initiative but as part of a much wider strategy of international imperialism, has been argued forcibly by people such as Paulo Jorge, the Angolan Foreign Minister. Addressing the inaugural session of the International Conference of Solidarity with the Frontline States in Lisbon in March 1983, he said that..."It must be understood that the struggle in Southern Africa is the struggle against the plans of international imperialism and the global strategy of the United States." ⁴ This conceptualization of the southern African situation has a radically different strategic implication from the first view. For if destabilization and other actions by South Africa are the initiatives not just of South Africa but of global imperialist strategy, it would be an illusion to think that the US can disassociate itself from South Africa simply because it finds apartheid morally repugnant. It would therefore be wrong to personalize US foreign policy as if it were the brainchild of a "reactionary" Reagan or a "misguided" Chester Crocker. Strategically, the liberation movements and the frontline states, according to this view, would have to stop counting on the US and concentrate instead on ways in which the liberation struggle could be waged by the people themselves.

I would argue that it is this second view that is the most realistic. This is not to say, of course, that every act of banditry or sabotage by South Africa must have the prior approval of the US State Department. Within the broad US global strategy, South Africa, like Israel and other countries, has a degree of relative autonomy. But the broad dimensions of Pretoria's policy in southern Africa cannot, I believe, be determined by South Africa on its own. Consultations go on all the time between the US and South Africa at various levels, official and unofficial, at intergovernmental meetings and in the boardrooms of corporations. It is at such meetings that the broad outlines of South Africa's southern African strategy are fashioned. One important aspect of this strategy is that the US is not about to trade the certainty of profits, strategic raw materials, and opposition to the Soviet Union that the present apartheid regime guarantees for a regime that may well jeopardize all these things. It does not really matter, therefore, who is in power in Washington. Whether the Democrats or Republicans, Carter or Reagan, the compulsions of international politics and the interests of finance capital must necessarily impose strategic constraints that no American administration can afford to ignore.

Destabilization and the Preservation of the Status Quo in Southern Africa

What do South Africa and the United States hope to achieve by a policy of destabilization in southern Africa? Basically the answer is very simple. They hope to preserve the status quo for as long as it is possible. Simple as it sounds, this has been the basis of all regimes in history that were opposed to revolutionary change. The Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, kept the German states weak and disunited for thirty years in order to preserve the status quo under the hegemony of the Austrian empire. Of course, such a policy has inherent contradictions, and never lasts forever. Eventually the forces of change take command. But the status quo powers must resist as much as they can the pressures for change, whether by diverting them, transforming them into something controllable, or postponing them for as long as possible. An example of such tactics is provided by the Western Contact Group's policy towards Namibia, which has been compared by one commentator to a footballer

keeping the ball in the air with his feet and head:

The Guinness Book of Records says that Irish football player Adrian Walsh kept the ball in the air with his feet and head for more than two hours...Walsh looks like a dabbler and his achievement pales into insignificance in comparison to the record of this group (the Western Contact Group), which has contrived to keep hanging in the air the destiny of a whole nation for more than five years. ⁵

To prolong the status quo in southern Africa for as long as possible, South Africa and US imperialism must do at least the following:

- 1) Build South Africa's economic and military power.
- 2) Institute a programme of reforms within South Africa which would remove "petty apartheid" and polish the rough edges of segregationist social policy.
- 3) Maintain a total control over the movement of the black population.
- 4) Isolate the more extreme elements among the white population to prevent them from unnecessarily provoking the black majority.
- 5) Isolate the black population by integrating the other communities - the Coloureds and Indians - into decision-making structures, admittedly as junior partners.
- 6) Keep the liberation movements weak, divided, and suppressed.
- 7) Prevent the liberation movements from operating freely from neighbouring independent African states.
- 8) Infiltrate the military and security organizations of the frontline states.
- 9) Encourage opposition to the governments of frontline states by giving support to dissidents.
- 10) Intimidate neighbouring countries through acts of sabotage and other actions so that they recognize the reality of South African power and are afraid to give support to southern African liberation movements.
- 11) Prevent neighbouring countries from uniting into a common front against South Africa.
- 12) Keep neighbouring states (and especially Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) economically weak and dependent on South Africa, and ensure that SADCC does not become a viable economic grouping.
- 13) Prevent Namibia's independence for as long as possible. If

independence becomes unavoidable, steps should be taken to ensure that the government that takes over power is either politically weak and divided, or economically so dependent on South Africa that it would be difficult for it to give support to South African liberation movements.

- 14) Keep in overall control of the situation, so that should change within South Africa become unavoidable the US can step in as an "honest broker" to work out a settlement that would preserve white settler interests in South Africa and protect the wider economic and strategic interests of Western imperialism.

Destabilization, narrowly conceived, would refer to objectives 7 to 13 above. But these cannot really be isolated from the rest, especially when it comes to evaluating the capacity and will of South Africa to sustain a policy of destabilization. For to destabilize an enemy, one must be internally stable oneself. And this is where perhaps the biggest contradiction lies in South Africa's destabilization policy. The more difficult South Africa makes it for the liberation movements to operate from neighbouring countries, the more necessary it will be for the liberation movements to build resistance from within South Africa itself. This may prove a long and difficult task, but as Soweto showed in 1976 when the spirit of the people is aroused no battery of armaments can stop the forces of change.

We can now examine and evaluate each of the above fourteen objectives in slightly more detail.

Objective 1

Those who want to separate South Africa from Western imperialism should examine in some detail the tremendous extent to which the South Africa economy is penetrated by multinational capital. This penetration has been conclusively demonstrated in other papers presented at this workshop. Here I will focus briefly on the cases of oil and armaments.

Oil is one resource South Africa does not possess. The oil-from-coal plant (SASOL) is very costly and, in any case, supplies only a fraction of South Africa's needs. Most of South Africa's oil therefore comes from Western oil companies, in total defiance of the UN oil embargo. Big companies like Shell and BP deny of course that they ship oil to South Africa.

But the same denials were made during the UN embargo against Smith's Rhodesia. Ultimately they were found to be lies.

The two major sources of oil supply to South Africa are Brunei and the Netherlands Antilles. Brunei, a small enclave in the Indonesian island of Borneo, has plenty of oil to sell. The Antilles has no oil itself, but acts as a conduit for oil from other countries, especially Mexico and Venezuela, to be stored there for later shipment to South Africa. Thus, by using intermediate storing and camouflaged shipping networks, the big oil companies continue to supply South Africa with as much oil as it needs, while maintaining "official" compliance with the UN embargo.

It is the same story on the armaments side. To get around the 1963 Security Council resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo, Western corporations, with tacit official approval from their governments, have sold arms and nuclear technology to South Africa to enable it to build its own defence capability. In 1965 South Africa established the National Institute of Rocket Research, which has already tested its own ground-to-air missiles. In 1968, with assistance from Western arms manufacturers, it set up a massive state-owned arms industry - ARMSCOR - which by 1981 had assets of R1,200 million and was listed as the third largest industrial group in the country. This has made South Africa almost self-sufficient in weapons production, from jet fighters to napalm bombs and computer-controlled military technology. In addition, in September 1983 the US State Department approved an application by seven US firms to provide "non-sensitive" maintenance and consultative services to South Africa for a nuclear power facility near Cape Town. ⁶ South Africa, it should be remembered, is the world's largest producer of uranium, and has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. US surrogates, such as Israel, have also provided South Africa with military hardware, including Reschef naval missile crafts, Gabriel anti-ship missiles, Shafir air-to-air missiles, and American M113 armoured personnel carriers. ⁷

This Western assisted military power of South Africa forms the backbone of the regime's destabilization strategy. During Operation Protea in Angola in 1981 the South African Defence Force (SADF) undertook

161 bombing and strafing attacks, 95 ground operations, 61 landings of heliported troops, and 1651 reconnaissance flights.⁸ None of this would have been possible without Western oil and Western-backed arms technology,

Objective 2

The removal of "petty apartheid" is also a policy that South Africa pursues at least partly at the behest of US imperialism. It is hardly an accident, therefore, that the US should become excited about the limited reforms that have taken place in South Africa in recent years. This forms the basis of the American argument to African states that they should not support a violent solution to South Africa's problems, since by gradual evolution South Africa will change through internal reform. The liberation movements and many African states know better of course. For it would take South Africa as many years to change through "evolution" as for the leopard to change its spots.

Objective 3

The control of the black population in white areas and Pretoria's whole bantustan policy is part of a wider strategy of ensuring a cheap, docile and divided labour force, from which multinational corporations can reap enormous superprofits. The bantustans also provide a recruiting ground for dissidents and mercenaries who are trained by South Africa to carry out acts of sabotage and violence against the frontline states. For example, the north-eastern bantustan of Venda, which shares common borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, formed the Venda National Force in 1979 with 450 volunteer recruits. 90 per cent of the budget comes from South Africa, and the force's commander, Brigadier T.R. Malaudzi, spent 20 years in South Africa's Special Branch of the Intelligence Service. In February 1981 Venda was the first bantustan to start arms production, through a company called Paramex International, which manufactures 9mm firearms. President Patrick Mphahlele of Venda has also been persuaded by the SADF to create "buffer zones" along Venda's borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and to set up counter insurgency units to fight against infiltration by liberation forces.

Another new development in the bantustans is that they are beginning to charge their own "citizens" for engaging in "terrorist" activities. In 1982 four people appeared in a Ciskei court for being members of the ANC and possessing banned literature, and six people were charged in the Transkei for inciting blacks to undergo military training outside the country.⁹

Objective 4

Like the removal of "petty apartheid", the isolation of the more extreme elements among the white population is designed by those in power to help to present themselves as a group of sophisticated and moderate leaders who are always prepared to listen to reason. In reality, they continue to represent the interests of the South African ruling class and those of international capital. To carry on doing this, however, it is essential to avoid unnecessary provocation of the black majority. This is why the more reactionary elements in the white population, and particularly those associated with Andries Treurnicht, the former National Party leader in the Transvaal, and his recently formed Conservative Party, have been pretty much isolated from the mainstream of South African political life. The success of this policy can be gauged in part from the fact that the recent plan of Prime Minister Botha to create ethnic chambers in parliament for Coloureds and Indians received massive support from whites in the Transvaal, despite the fact that this is the place where Treurnicht's strength really lies.

Objective 5

The Coloureds and Indians have always occupied an ambiguous middle ground between the ruling class and the oppressed masses in South Africa. By offering them representation in parliament through their own ethnic chambers, the government has very clearly exploited this ambiguity. In the process it has divided them further and attempted to isolate them from the major movement of resistance and struggle. Despite some success in this attempt, it still seems likely, however, that important sections of the Coloured and Indian communities will refuse to be taken-in by Pretoria's schemes.

Objective 6

The methods used by Pretoria to keep the liberation movements weak, divided and suppressed are too well-known to require elaboration here. A point that can be mentioned, however, is that the apartheid regime's oppressive machinery is now being used more frequently to hit an increasing number of white sympathisers.

Objective 7

South Africa has for years operated freely in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi (and before the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia in these countries as well) to keep South African liberation fighters as far from South African borders as possible. With the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and with the increasingly bold initiatives taken by Botswana, Lesotho and to a lesser extent Swaziland, the freedom fighters have come too close to these borders for South Africa's comfort.

Pretoria has become paranoid with fear, and in desperation has increased its military activities against these states. According to one political commentator there was a 200 per cent increase in the number of sabotage incidents orchestrated by Pretoria in the first six months of 1981, compared to the last six months of 1980.¹⁰ In December 1982 South Africa launched a brutal and unprovoked raid on Maseru, killing 42 Lesotho citizens and refugees. In Swaziland, under the late King Sobhuza II, the ANC was allowed a relatively peaceful presence in the country. Following the raid on Maseru, however, and no doubt inspired by South Africa, the Swazi police swooped on known residences of ANC refugees. About 300 ANC members were believed to be living in Swaziland at this time. The authorities arrested an unknown number of them, and withdrew the passports of about 30 refugees. The rest were either evacuated from the country by plane, or escaped through various routes.

Very little noise was made in the Western media about the happenings in Lesotho and Swaziland, especially when compared to the very loud noises which were made when Zimbabwe arrested white officers accused

of having taken part in the blowing-up of airforce planes at the Thornhill base in Gweru. In general, the unstated official line in the US seems to be that the ANC members get what they deserve.

Objective 8

South Africa has infiltrated the military and security establishments of frontline states with spies and agent provocateurs. The actual extent of this infiltration is not known, but periodic revelations indicate that it is extensive. In June 1982, for example, Jorge Costa, a high-ranking official of the Mozambique security service defected to South Africa. Zimbabwe has a special problem, for it has inherited the entire Central Intelligence Organization from the Smith regime. Many of its members have since left, but of those that remain some are undoubtedly South Africa spies and informers. In 1981 the chief security officer responsible for investigating the death of ANC representative Joe Gqabi used his authority to help a South African spy suspected of murdering Gqabi to slip out of the country. Later he too followed the suspect.

In July 1982 two men appeared before a Harare court charged with contravening the Official Secrets Act. The two, Philip Edward Hartleybury and Colin David Evans, were former members of CIO and were recruited into the South African spy network by Geoffrey Burton Price, who had earlier defected to South Africa in connection with the Gqabi case. The Director of Public Prosecutions said that the two accused passed on to South Africa security information they had obtained in the course of their duties, including the movements of the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet.¹¹

Finally, the destruction of military hardware at Inkomo Barracks in 1981, and airforce plains at Thornhill in 1982 (both of which considerably reduced the strength of the armed forces in Zimbabwe) could hardly have been carried out without the complicity of some of the high-ranking white Zimbabwean officers connected with the army and airforce.

Objective 9

One of the major techniques of destabilization employed by South Africa

is the support it gives to dissident elements, opposed to the governments of neighbouring states. The internal dissention which exists within such states provides South Africa and imperialism with fertile ground for their policy of divide and rule.

In Zimbabwe this policy began before independence. South Africa created a special "slush fund" out of which it supported politicians who were believed to be favourably disposed towards Pretoria. Enormous amounts of money were given to Muzorewa and his supporters during the independence elections of 1980, in the hope of putting into power a government like that of Banda's in Malawi that would accept South African sovereignty as a legal fact on which an acceptable state-to-state relationship could be built.¹² The election results disappointed Pretoria, but within less than two years problems developed between ZANU(PF) and Nkomo's ZAPU. Pretoria saw this as a good opportunity to intervene once again. In January 1983 the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Security) in Harare, Emmerson Munangagwa, revealed that South Africa had formed a "Matebele Brigade", headed by Colonel Brightenberg, to infiltrate bandits into Zimbabwe. The brigade recruited Zimbabweans working in the South African mines, and trained them at Spencer, Madhibo, Phalaborwa and Ntabeni camps.¹³ At the same time, South Africa beams hostile propaganda against the Mugabe government over "Radio Truth", which was launched in March 1983. Programmes are targeted at Ndebele-speaking people, and its broadcasts are in English and Sindebele. Furthermore, it was reported that South Africa is planning to create a fifth bantustan, KwaNdebele, as a way of attracting the Ndebeles of Zimbabwe to defect to South Africa.¹⁴

Even if the veracity of these reports is not always easy to confirm, from the actual evidence we have of South African activities in Zimbabwe, as well as in Mozambique and Angola, it would surprise nobody if Pretoria was indeed involved in fanning the fires of dissidence and discord in Matabeleland. After their capture in October 1983, two young Zimbabwean dissidents, Watson Sibanda and Spar Mapula, gave graphic accounts on Zimbabwe Television of South Africa's complicity in encouraging and training dissident activity in the south of the country.¹⁵

The perimeter of South Africa's destabilization activities does not stop at neighbouring or frontline states. The revelations by the mercenary force which was sent by Pretoria to topple the Rene government in the Seychelles in 1981 were interesting not only in bringing to light the extent of South Africa's activities in southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, but also and more importantly in making a mockery of Pretoria's official denial of complicity in an adventure that turned out to be a total fiasco for South Africa and imperialism.

Objective 10

South Africa, of course, is prepared to go much further than mere support for opposition movements in the neighbouring states. It is also prepared, when necessary, to send its own troops into these countries. We have already given examples of raids into Angola and Lesotho. Raids on that scale have not as yet taken place in Zimbabwe, but cannot be ruled out in the future. Prime Minister Mugabe has repeatedly alleged that since independence Pretoria has been training 5,000 former auxiliaries in a secret Transvaal bush camp for sabotage work in Zimbabwe. In September 1982 a group of 17 men (13 blacks and 4 whites) crossed into Zimbabwe, wearing SADF fatigues, in an eight-day operation of sabotage and reconnaissance. They were engaged by the Zimbabwean army, and four of them were killed. ¹⁶

The objective of these raids into the frontline states is to intimidate them so that they refuse to allow South African and Namibian liberation movements to operate from their countries. This policy has achieved some success. The Swazi Foreign Minister, R.V. Dlamini, at the same time as throwing ANC refugees out of Swaziland is reported to have said..."We will no longer tolerate people who come here under the guise of refugees and then abuse our hospitality and set about spoiling the country's name and reputation purely for their own ends." ¹⁷ In Lesotho it has been the leader of the opposition United Democratic Party, C.D. Mofeli, who has been the most vocal advocate of the removal of all South African political refugees from Lesotho. He is reported to have said..."the question of granting political asylum to South African refugees who might harm Lesotho's national security is a concept

we do not endorse at all." 18

Objective 11

Through a combination of intimidation and economic inducement, South Africa has tried to keep the frontline states divided, so that they cannot present a united front. As in Palestine where Israel has for years pursued a policy of separate negotiations with each of the Arab states, South Africa has also tried to persuade frontline states to agree to separate non-aggression pacts with it.

In general the frontline states have so far turned this offer down. They have argued that since there is no intent of aggression on their part, there is no basis for such bilateral agreements. In particular cases, however, the ranks have been broken. Mozambique and Angola, for example, have met separately with South African officials in the neutral territory of the Cape Verde Islands to see if bilateral agreements could be arrived at on problems of specific concern to them. Nevertheless, the frontline states, at least so far, have managed to present a more solid front than their Arab brothers on the question of Palestine.

Objective 12

An important element of South African strategy has been the attempt to prevent neighbouring states from forming a common economic bloc against it. The frontline states' answer to this has been the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed in 1979 with the avowed aim of jointly reducing the collective dependence of the member states on South Africa. South Africa has a vested interest, therefore, in trying to ensure that SADCC does not get off the ground. In pursuing this objective it has employed a variety of means.

On the eve of the SADCC meeting in Maseru in January 1983, Pretoria sabotaged the second biggest dam in Angola, the Lomaum Dam in Benguela Province, killing 10 people, causing widespread flooding of nearby agricultural land, and cutting off the power supply to three provinces. At the same time, South Africa and the LLA also sabotaged the pumping station at the new abattoir near Maseru. The timing of these attacks was

clearly no accident.

The MNR in Mozambique, supported by South Africa, has repeatedly sabotaged the railway line linking Zimbabwe's export and import trade to the ports of Maputo and Beira. Much of Zimbabwe's trade is therefore forced to pass through the South African port of Durban, which is a third dearer than if it was able to pass through the Mozambican ports. Transport is of such strategic importance to international trade that the effects of railway sabotage are far-reaching. Taking Zimbabwe as an example, its import-export trade becomes much more expensive when freighted through Durban, thus increasing the country's balance of payments deficits. In addition, Zimbabwe's exports become more expensive and less competitive than South African exports of the same commodities. Moreover, because the goods have to pass through Durban and are carried on South African Railways, Zimbabwe is at the mercy of the South African port and railway authorities. Delays in the import of essential commodities can cause serious bottlenecks in production, and delays in exports could lose Zimbabwe valuable export markets.

It is for this reason that SADCC has placed a very high priority on the development of a viable system of transport and communication. With the help of foreign capital, such a system might be set up in a few years. But as long as South Africa is able, almost at will, to sabotage the transport systems of Mozambique and Angola, the viability of such a scheme will continue to remain in question.

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are in some ways special cases. As well as being members of SADCC, they are also members of the Southern African Customs Union, and depend for an important part of their revenue on customs dues collected by South Africa. Pretoria has offered these three states a larger share of customs revenue as an inducement to leave SADCC, but this offer was refused and subsequently withdrawn. But weaker governments in these countries, especially in times of severe economic crisis, might still in future succumb to the temptation. The Swaziland government, in addition, has been offered land by South Africa in the neighbouring areas of Ingwavuma and Kangwane as a further inducement to distance itself from the politics of the SADCC countries. This

controversial land deal, first proposed in 1982, led to the first major breach between the Swazi government and the ANC. The ANC tried to persuade the Swazis to postpone territorial adjustments until majority rule had been achieved in South Africa, but the Swazis obviously thought that this would be too long to wait.

Objective 13

The US-South African strategy towards Namibia is well-known. The Namibian economy is largely in the hands of South African and Western multinational corporations, such as Amax and Newmont (US), Rio Tinto Zinc and Consolidated Goldfields (UK), and Falconbridge (Canada). In April 1977 five Western powers (the US, UK, France, West Germany and Canada) formed a so-called Contact Group and staged a diplomatic coup against the UN by taking the initiative into their own hands and pushing UN Resolution 435 on Namibian independence into the background. Gradually, however, the initiative has passed from the Contact Group almost exclusively to the US and South Africa. Since then the Namibian question has been put into cold storage. South Africa and the US have linked any progress on Namibia to the essentially irrelevant **side** issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

In the meantime South Africa has built-up its military presence in Namibia dramatically (to 90,000 men), and has started a massive "passification" drive against the population, which is suspected of harbouring SWAPO supporters. Pretoria and Washington have tried to buy time, therefore, both to try and eliminate SWAPO from the political scene, and to try and build counterweights against it, most notably the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. They have failed on both counts. SWAPO could not be crushed. And serious contradictions developed between South Africa and the DTA, leading to the collapse of the Alliance in 1982 and the return of direct South African administration of the territory. Not able to move forward since then, the US and South Africa have decided to place the whole Namibian issue in limbo until they are able to think of new strategies.

Objective 14

Overall, therefore, South Africa and the US have tried to keep the

situation in Southern Africa pretty much under their control. They have tried to either forestall change or to divert and direct it in directions that will preserve their long-term interests in the region. In so doing, the US has tried to cultivate the posture of an "honest broker", much as it has in Palestine. All the dirty deeds that have taken place are laid at the doorstep of South Africa, and some of Pretoria's "excesses" are censored in appropriate diplomatic forums. This has been designed to provide the US with a degree of credibility so that when change in southern Africa is no longer avoidable, the US can step in as a mediator to reconcile conflicting interests between South Africans and African nationalists, while still preserving its broader imperialist interests in the subcontinent.

Conclusion

Destabilization and stabilization are relative concepts. What for us are acts of destabilization are for the United States and South Africa measures designed to stabilize the region. For them the most dangerous sources of instability (actual or potential) are the presence of the Soviet Union in the region, and the emergence of governments in southern Africa that could threaten imperialist economic and strategic interests.

From their point of view, therefore, everything possible must be done to forestall such developments. This requires, among other things, that the agencies of revolutionary change (and particularly the ANC in South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia) are frustrated in their operations for as long as possible. In addition, South Africa and the US would also like to see the emergence of alternative agencies of gradual and moderate change in the region. So far they have been largely disappointed in this respect. Hence they have had little choice but to carry on with their negative policy of frustrating the development of more radical and revolutionary forces in the region. For them, these are measures of stabilization. For us, in contrast, they are negative measures taken in a futile attempt to forestall developments that are historically inevitable.

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THE FOOD WEAPON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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At the end of 1979 President Jimmy Carter implemented a grain embargo against the Soviet Union in an attempt to pressurise it into reversing its intervention into Afghanistan. This American action was widely interpreted as an attempt to use food as a political or diplomatic weapon.¹ Less than two years later Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reversed this policy by authorizing renewed grain sales to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that Soviet troops still remained in Afghanistan. This change in policy was primarily a response to domestic demands from American farmers for export sales in view of increased stockpiling of grain harvest surpluses which had tended to depress the world market price. A recent study by the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment concludes that the grain embargo may have hurt the American economy more than that of the Soviet Union.²

The use of food as a weapon that can change the behaviour of nation-states has therefore generally been discounted, although it may have certain utility in a wartime situation. It has in fact been described as a "singularly ineffective" instrument of foreign policy.³ There are a number of reasons for this. First, a food embargo as an act of economic warfare against a foreign country would also have financial and social costs for the exporting country, in terms of lost foreign exchange earnings from its exported products. Second, since no country is one hundred per cent dependent on imported food, and certainly not from a single food exporting country, a denial of food imports would not have an immediate impact, necessitating a change in state behaviour or policy. Third, other food

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exporting countries may be only too willing to fill the gap and supply the required food imports for reasons of additional foreign exchange, a larger share of the world market, additional global influence, increased international prestige, and so on. Fourth, food production and storage are far more subject to natural conditions and world economic forces than other forms of production, especially petroleum (the "oil weapon"). And finally, there is the question of whether it would be morally fair to withhold food supplies from a foreign population who may not necessarily influence or even endorse their government's policies. Undoubtedly such a policy would be seen as anti-humanitarian and would draw a considerable amount of international condemnation.⁴

Although it is difficult, therefore, to see how food exports, food aid, and "food power" could be used as a realistic weapon of economic or political warfare, these techniques could still be used, however, as a source of influence and pressure in inter-state relations. This, I would argue, is the case in southern Africa today. The white minority South African government is currently pursuing a regional policy of political destabilization by economic and military means against its neighbours. This is largely the result of the support by neighbouring countries for the struggle of the black populations in South Africa and Namibia for majority rule. Within this destabilization policy South Africa has launched land and air attacks against Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, and supplied material support and training to dissident groups in these countries. Similarly, South Africa has utilized economic pressures against neighbouring countries. For example, it has delayed the re-signing of the preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe which expired in March 1982; it has failed to renew the work permits of Zimbabwean workers in South Africa; and it has recalled twenty locomotives on loan to Zimbabwe Railways.

The manipulation of South Africa's food exports has also been contemplated as part of the destabilization plan. In 1980 the South African Minister of Agriculture, Hendrik Schoeman, said:

full grain silos will mean that we (the South African government) can talk and negotiate from a position of strength. With rising

populations all around us, more and more black states will depend to some extent on this country (South Africa) for basic foods. It is strongly in our interests that we should be able to meet the demand. ⁵

Similarly, a recent study of the strategic implications of regional economic relations noted that one way South Africa could exercise its economic power was by "placing curbs on the imports of goods from black states...(or) regulating the export of goods to black states. The most crucial items are undoubtedly food and oil." ⁶

While South Africa is implementing a policy of destabilization against its neighbours, the use of food as a political weapon, in the view of this writer, would not be adequate by itself to overthrow the governments of these countries. Instead, I believe that South Africa will continue to use food exports, and primarily maize, as a foreign policy instrument to influence and pressure neighbouring countries into maintaining the status quo in regional inter-state relations. In other words, regional political opposition (but not military opposition) to apartheid would be acceptable to the Pretoria regime, provided that pragmatic trading relations and the regional status quo were maintained. Such pragmatic relations 'act as an external support for the South African economy, and by implication the South African internal political status quo.

Because of the crisis in African food production,⁷ and the supposed existence of a "food weapon" in southern Africa,⁸ it would still be useful, therefore, to consider the view that South Africa's food exports to the SADCC countries⁹ could be used as a foreign policy instrument to destabilize the governments of neighbouring states and to force them to stop supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. In doing this it will be necessary to examine a number of factors, including the level of food production in South Africa and the SADCC countries, the level of South Africa's maize exports to the SADCC countries, the internal and external limitations on South Africa's use of the "food weapon," and SADCC's regional efforts towards food security. Finally, the extent to which the SADCC member states will continue to have to rely on South African grain exports will be assessed.

Food Production in Southern Africa

According to official figures, South Africa's physical volume of agricultural production (including non-food production) has doubled in the past twenty years. In the past ten years the average rate of increase was 3.42 per cent, compared with a population growth of 2.3 per cent. Agricultural exports are reported to be worth about R1,500 million a year, approximately one-fifth of total South African exports, excluding gold.¹⁰ Using FAO indices on food production and per capita food production (see Tables 1 and 2), South Africa has generally increased its food production ahead of its domestic population growth. In both of these categories it is above the average for all African countries. Since 1970 at least, South Africa has produced maize crops above the six million tons needed for internal consumption,¹¹ thus generating grain surpluses for export.

In comparison, and using the same FAO indices, the SADCC countries have been unable to increase their food production ahead of, or even parallel to, their population increase. Only Malawi and Swaziland have consistently increased their food production, and only Swaziland has kept food production ahead of domestic population growth. In addition, according to the US Agency for Development's indices for 1976-78 (see Table 3), only Zimbabwe, or Rhodesia as it then was under the UDI regime, had an average daily per capita calories intake sufficient to meet the full daily requirement. And only Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia had a calorie intake of more than 90 per cent of the daily requirement. But neither the FAO or the US Aid indices show the degree to which agricultural production in the SADCC countries has been in turmoil as a result of poor weather conditions, colonial liberation struggles, and recent economic and military destabilization actions by the Pretoria regime.

South African Maize Exports to African Countries

With the exception of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (the BLS countries) and Namibia, maize export figures for sales to black African countries from 1977 onwards have been treated as a strategic secret by the South African government (see Table 4). As such, all other maize exports to Africa

are listed in the "destinations unknown" category of the South African monthly trade statistics. In 1981-82 South Africa reported an export of 4.9 million metric tons of coarse grain, including maize, the majority of which went to Japan. The "destination unknown" category was second and accounted for about 30 per cent of the total. ¹² The South African Foreign Trade Organization has claimed that 47 of Africa's 53 countries bought maize and wheat from South Africa in 1981, though no figures were produced to substantiate this claim.

According to the London Economist, ¹³ some South African statistics "may be a bit fishy, since it has an obvious interest in exaggerating Black Africa's keenness to trade with it." Those published statistics show that South Africa's total exports to black Africa increased 52 per cent to US\$1.4 billion in 1980, after a 74 per cent rise in 1979. This would tend to indicate that 10 per cent of South Africa's non-gold exports were shipped to black Africa, in contrast to only 3 per cent in 1976. South Africa's imports from black Africa were only US\$350 million in 1980, nearly all of which were from Zimbabwe. ¹⁴ Despite South Africa's dubious statistics, it is clear, therefore, that South Africa enjoys a very favourable trade balance with black Africa.

This favourable trade balance raises the question of South Africa's market price for the sale of its surplus grain, and whether credit facilities are offered for such sales. According to the general manager of the South African Maize Board, Hendrik Nel:

We (the Maize Board) do not disclose our prices. Not because we are ashamed of them but from tactical considerations. The countries concerned would not like it. But I deny categorically that we have sold at a discount. ¹⁵

Up until 1977 South Africa maintained an internal subsidy on maize to keep consumer prices down. The subsidy also reduced the price of imported maize and maize products into the BLS countries and Namibia, since they were members of the Southern African Customs Union. ¹⁶ The subsequent abolition of the subsidy sharply increased the price of maize to these countries. There have been unconfirmed reports that South Africa has sold maize below world market prices to neighbouring African countries

in an effort to exert additional economic pressure upon them. At the present time, however, the government-set South African maize board prices are higher than the world market price. This government-imposed constraint on the South African economy is discussed below.

One of the main boosts for South Africa's favourable trade balance with black Africa came in 1978 when Prime Minister P.W. Botha authorized the government's Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation to give full insurance cover for all South African exports to black Africa. Export credit insurance was upto this time normally only offered for exports of South African capital goods. Payment for these exports was usually prompt since the neighbouring African countries, though generally lacking in foreign exchange, often had a surplus of South African rand which had been remitted by migrant workers in South Africa. Even so, the lack of foreign exchange or surplus rand acts as an economic rather than political constraint on increased maize imports from South Africa.

Zimbabwe has often been cited as an alternative regional grain supplier for SADCC countries, due to its normally substantial grain harvests (of both maize and wheat). But Zimbabwe's grain production is of course susceptible to varying climatic conditions, such as the current drought in southern Africa. And for the first time it has had to request food aid (approximately 15,000 tons of vegetable oil and 150,000 tons of wheat) from Western donor countries.¹⁷ In addition, South Africa is in a much better position financially than Zimbabwe to offer credit facilities.

Limitations on South Africa's Use of the "Food Weapon"

There are three general types of limitation in relation to South Africa's use of the "food weapon": the effects of South African government policy; natural processes such as the weather conditions and population growth; and external factors, particularly the actions and policies taken by foreign actors. In the first category, one important factor has been the South African government's decision to create a national Maize Marketing Board with the responsibility for establishing the local producers' selling price for maize. This government-established price has consistently ensured that South African maize producers (almost all

of them white farmers with large agricultural units, who form a strong constituency for Botha's National Party government) are guaranteed a good profit on their grain production. This consistent level of profit has encouraged the farmers to produce even more grain, resulting in even larger grain surpluses for export. This was one of the major contributing factors in the rise of the net income of South African farmers to R3,150 million in 1981, an increase of more than 25 per cent over the 1980 level.¹⁸ The current local selling price within South Africa is considered to be the highest of all the major maize exporting countries (the US, Canada, the EEC, Argentina, Australia, and Thailand). Even so, given the present abundance of maize on the world market, South Africa is forced to sell exported maize at a price considerably below what the local maize farmers are guaranteed by the Maize Board. In fact, locally produced maize is only cheaper in South Africa than imported maize due to transportation costs. The South African government, in effect, is covering the substantial losses that result from the difference between the guaranteed high local selling price and the comparatively lower foreign buying price. Thus, at present, South African maize cannot be sold at a profit on the world market. The Financial Mail estimated in 1981 that the Maize Board would lose up to R40 on every ton it marketed abroad.¹⁹

Part of the reason for the government-determined high price for maize is the fact that farmers, in turn, are required to pay high government-determined prices for many of their locally manufactured inputs - fertilisers, weed-killers, insecticides, diesel fuel, tractors, farm machinery, and so on.²⁰ Farmers are thus obliged to pay inflated prices for these items produced by local manufacturing concerns (many of which are subsidiaries of overseas multinational corporations), since they have been designated as "protected strategic industries" with government-determined prices for their products. These higher prices act as a consumer subsidy for government designated strategic industries and raise the domestic inflation rate by decreasing the purchasing power of down-stream industrial and public consumers. This government policy of guaranteeing the economic viability (guaranteed high sale prices) of specific strategic industries to ensure national self-sufficiency prevents the operation of competitive market forces. Instead, it encourages inefficient production, especially in relation to imported foreign

products.

Recently the South African government proposed a new quota scheme for maize farmers, under which the Maize Board would determine a production quota for each maize farmer. For this quota the farmer would receive the higher home market price set by the government. Any maize grown by the farmer in excess of his quota would be sold by the Maize Board on the world market, and the farmer would receive the average price realized from such sales. The National Maize Producers Organization (NAMPO) has strongly argued that this scheme would lead to a reduction in maize surpluses for export, and perhaps even to increased domestic consumption.

In the second category of limitations on the use of the "food weapon" by South Africa, the uncertainty of the weather is particularly important. At the present time southern Africa is experiencing its worst drought for at least ten years, and in some parts the worst for fifty years.²¹ As a result the Maize Board in South Africa is importing 1.5 million tons of yellowmaize, primarily for feeding stock. This is the first time since the early 1960s that South Africa has had to import maize.²² Another factor is the growth of South Africa's population, especially in relation to the increase in total agricultural production. A recent study by the Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch has pointed out that "conservative estimates show that 2.9 million children under the age of 15, mostly black and coloured, suffer from or show signs of malnutrition in South Africa."²³ This study goes on to note that in 1977 one-third of South Africa's maize crop was exported. In view of the high level of mass removals conducted by the government, and the high level of unemployment among black and coloured families, it is important to note that malnutrition and other problems associated with poverty in South Africa are not a result of the non-availability of food supplies but of the non-availability of money with which to pay for food.

The third category of limitations on the use of the "food weapon" includes the current trend for the Maize Board to enter into barter-trade agreements to exchange bulk consignments of maize for goods necessary for the "protected strategic industries." Such barter arrangements help to offset the decreasing purchasing power of the rand in the world market,

as well as to counter worldwide inflationary pressures. One such barter agreement was the exchange through a European intermediary of 1 million tons of South African maize for 208,000 tons of dry-bagged fertilizer from Eastern Europe. Both the South African Foreign Trade Organization and the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce have backed calls for South African exporting industries to make use of barter-trade arrangements, as well as to make further efforts to develop trading relations with Eastern Europe, using middlemen for this purpose. ²⁴

Despite these internal and external limitations on the use of the "food weapon," there would still appear to be some short-term benefits (in terms of inter-state pressure) that South African could obtain from the manipulation of its food supplies. Indeed, the strategic value of food is increasingly being recognized in South Africa. ²⁵ According to a high government source, the prevailing view in Pretoria is not to use food "aggressively as a weapon" to extract immediate political concessions from African countries, if that were possible. Instead:

the real potential is more long term. If you have an ongoing programme like this, it tends to undermine efforts to fragment the subcontinent (efforts of SADCC countries to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa)." ²⁶

This reported government position does not appear to be supported, however, by all those groups that have access to key government decision-makers. Within the South African business community, for example, there has been support for a more aggressive use of South Africa's agricultural exports to support South Africa's foreign policy in the subcontinent. According to the chief executive of the giant Premier Group of grain milling companies, Tony Bloom, South Africa's political and economic reserves, particularly within Africa, are powerfully based for production against a worldwide food shortage. He goes on to say that:

I am a very firm believer that South Africa should produce agricultural surpluses because they give a lot of political leverage...agricultural supplies are more important than oil (in the coming decades)." ²⁷

SADCC's Regional Programme Towards Food Security

At the Blantyre SADCC summit in November 1981, Zimbabwe was delegated the responsibility for developing regional programmes for food security for SADCC member states. An initial and detailed programme was prepared. This identified nine projects, covering early warning systems, crop storage, strategic reserves, processing, and the exchange of information. Contact was also made with potential donors. Within the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture a small administrative unit was set up to co-ordinate the programme with the various national projects that were being undertaken.

Nationally, greater efforts are being made to improve the transport infrastructure to assist in emergency grain distribution during times of disaster or drought, to create more grain storage facilities as an insurance against poor harvests and price increases, and to pursue programmes of national food self-sufficiency. But in the short run, the less-developed countries of southern Africa, like other countries in the Third World, lack the foreign exchange to purchase the necessary foodstuffs to cover the short-fall in national production, despite the current surplus on the world grain market. This has become especially true for southern African countries in the past few years, due to drought and the resulting poor harvests.

A number of SADCC member states are increasingly relying on foreign food aid to make up the deficit between national food production and consumption. Most of this food aid has come from the US, the EEC, and some individual European countries, though considerable food aid has been provided through multilateral organizations such as the World Food Council. Two SADCC countries (Botswana and Tanzania) were in fact elected to the World Food Council in 1982, and attended the eighth WFC Ministerial session in Mexico in June of that year. In addition, under its regional programme for Africa for 1982-86, the UN Development Programme has allocated US\$33.08 million for various food self-sufficiency projects in Africa as a whole. This represents about 17.2 per cent of the total funding for the programme. A significant portion of this allocation will be used in the SADCC countries.

In addition to direct food aid through bilateral relations and indirect food aid through multilateral relations, the United States and Australia have also entered into a "swap" agreement with Zimbabwe, under which consignments of wheat will be shipped to Zimbabwe in exchange for Zimbabwe distributing part of its maize reserves to neighbouring countries. Zimbabwe has also agreed to provide direct food aid itself in the form of 25,000 tons of maize to both Mozambique and Tanzania.²⁸

International Factors Affecting Regional Food Security

Perhaps the most crucial factor affecting regional food security is the constant fluctuation in the world market price for grain over the past two years. Early in 1983 the US Department of Agriculture projected that there would be a marginal fall in world supplies of wheat and maize, despite an estimated 1.7 billion bushels in the American farmer-owned maize reserve, and 1.22 billion bushels in the US Federal Commodity Credit Corporation. The recent heat-wave over the midwest grain producing regions in the United States damaged a significant proportion of this year's crop, and the world market price has gone up to a contract high of US\$3.2375 a bushel. Most predictions suggest that the price will continue to fluctuate, though in an upward direction.²⁹

Another major international factor that must be considered is the possible impact on regional food security of the implementation of economic sanctions against South Africa. According to a 1981 study,³⁰ both the short and long-term effects of trade sanctions on the South African agricultural sector would be substantial, "even if only applied by the industrialised countries of the world." Due to the high degree of economic dependence (including dependence on food imports) of most of the SADCC member states upon South Africa, any implementation of economic sanctions would have immediate and adverse effects upon their own economies. At the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris in May 1981, it was agreed to call for a programme of assistance to those countries in the southern African region that would be most seriously affected by the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Such assistance would include the provision of supplies of food, oil and other essential commodities, the establishment of facilities for their stockpiling, and the

necessary financial assistance.³¹ Donor countries are currently being approached through SADCC for financial assistance for the construction of storage facilities for national strategic grain reserves in Lesotho and Mozambique, and a regional strategic grain reserve in Zimbabwe.

Prospects for the Southern African Region

Basically this paper has argued that there are few grounds for predicting the utilization of a "food weapon" as such in southern Africa. Instead, South Africa has used and will continue to use food exports as a foreign policy instrument for influencing the behaviour of its neighbours towards it. Viewed even in this weaker sense, the use of food is still an imprecise instrument which will take time to have an impact. It may also well be seen by the international community as an anti-humanitarian instrument in inter-state relations.

In times of grain harvests that are in excess of domestic needs, South Africa will be able to export grain to neighbouring countries, though possibly at a loss given the its farmers' high input and production costs. This would boost South Africa's image of itself as maintaining co-operative economic relations with its neighbours. While exporting grain shipments, South Africa could subtly exert pressure by increasing or decreasing the amount of grain available, or by speeding up or slowing down the transport time, especially if the grain shipments were sent by rail within the region. Nevertheless, such actions by themselves are unlikely to destabilize any of the SADCC economies in a major way, or to result in a fundamental change in the policies of the governments of the SADCC countries.

In times of grain harvests that are below the level of domestic consumption, South Africa may not have any surplus grain to sell to its neighbours. If South Africa has to import grain, as it is currently doing, it may or may not have imported grain to re-export, or it may chose simply not to import grain in excess of its domestic needs. Further, if the new South African government proposals for fixing maize quotas are implemented, this could well result in less grain being grown, thus making less or even no grain available for export within the region. Any of these possibilities would reduce the level of dependence of the SADCC countries on imported foodstuffs from South Africa. At the same time, they

would obviously reduce South Africa's ability to use the export of food as a means of exerting influence and pressure on neighbouring states. Although the dependence of the SADCC countries on South Africa for grain might well be reduced under such circumstances, this dependence could of course be simply transferred to other overseas suppliers, possibly at higher prices given the extra transportation costs involved. Alternatively, this dependence might be replaced by a greater level of dependence on food aid from overseas.

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TABLES

Table 1: Food Production Index for Southern African Countries, 1976-81.
(1969-71 = 100)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
WORLD	116	119	124	125	125	129
AFRICA	112	111	115	117	121	129
ANGOLA	102	100	101	101	102	102
BOTSWANA	114	106	90	105	92	117
LESOTHO	91	112	119	107	103	116
MALAWI	118	122	133	127	128	147
MOZAMBIQUE	96	94	92	93	94	92
SWAZILAND	127	117	136	130	154	167
TANZANIA	116	118	121	122	121	124
ZAMBIA	135	130	130	117	123	135
ZIMBABWE	132	138	134	112	116	161
SOUTH AFRICA	116	126	131	128	130	144
NAMIBIA	108	100	105	104	106	105

Source: FAO Production Yearbook 1981. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, Vol. 35, 1982, p.75.

Table 2: Per Capita Food Production Index for
Southern African Countries, 1976-81

(1969-71 = 100)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
WORLD	104	104	107	106	105	106
AFRICA	95	92	92	91	91	92
ANGOLA	89	85	84	82	81	79
BOTSWANA	99	90	74	83	71	88
LESOTHO	79	95	99	86	82	90
MALAWI	99	98	104	96	94	105
MOZAMBIQUE	83	79	76	74	73	70
SWAZILAND	110	99	112	103	119	126
TANZANIA	97	96	95	93	90	89
ZAMBIA	113	106	102	89	91	96
ZIMBABWE	109	110	103	83	84	111
SOUTH AFRICA	99	104	106	100	99	107
NAMIBIA	92	83	84	82	81	77

Source: FAO Production Yearbook 1981. Rome: Food and
Agricultural Organization, Vol. 35, 1982, p.79.

Table 3: Food Supplies of Southern African Countries, 1976-78

	Average daily per capita calorie intake as percentage of daily requirement, 1976-78	Index of per capita food production, annual average 1976-78 (1961-65 = 100)	Per cent of self-sufficiency, annual average 1976-78
ANGOLA	69	59	NA
BOTSWANA	73	111	71a
LESOTHO	95	100	78a
MALAWI	93	101	100
MOZAMBIQUE	73	82	89
NAMIBIA	95	NA	NA
SWAZILAND	94	103	89a
TANZANIA	81	106	93
ZAMBIA	95	141	NA
ZIMBABWE	109	NA	NA

Source: Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Food Production in Africa: The International Challenge. The Senate, 97th Congress, Second Session, Hearing, 6 August 1982. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1982, p.20.

a = 1976-77 average

NA = Not Available

Table 4: South African Maize Exports to African Countries, 1969/70 - 1980/81

(In Tons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>BLS and Namibia (1)</u>	<u>Other African Countries (2)</u>
1969/70	103,675	37,185
1970/71	201,797	166,098
1971/72	69,604	65,286
1972/73	82,984	34,643
1973/74	139,274	18,844
1974/75	60,000	106,109
1975/76	73,000	53,851
1976/77	131,000	55,943
1977/78	171,000	NA (3)
1978/79	248,000	NA (3)
1979/80	250,000	NA (3)
1980/81	347,000	NA (3)

Source: South African Maize Board Annual Reports, 1969/70 - 1980/81. Reprinted in Africa Insight, Pretoria, 13, No. 1, 1983, p.77.

- (1) Maize and maize products.
- (2) Whole maize.
- (3) Not Available.

DESTABILIZATION, POLITICAL STABILITY AND TRADE UNIONS

Chris Allen*

Trade unions will not be an effective instrument of participatory democracy if they are manipulated by government, or by a political party, or by an external agency (President Seretse Khama, 1971).

Introduction

The most visible and vicious aspect of contemporary South African destabilization is military intervention, direct and indirect. I understand by destabilization, however, something much broader than military intervention in neighbouring states. Important as this is, it is only part of a longstanding and multi-faceted attempt by South Africa to achieve a deep cordon of states between it and the rest of Africa - states which are aligned to it economically and politically. Even where it has proved impossible to install its own choice of regime - as in Zimbabwe - the South African government has engaged as much in the promotion of opposition and the manipulation of conflict as it has in military intervention. The concept of destabilization should include both military and non-military forms of intervention. The goal is the same and the transition from one form of intervention to another is easy and commonplace.

Outright military intervention is in fact a relatively recent move by South Africa, although collaboration with the Portuguese and Rhodesian armies occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Before the mid-1970s it was far

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more common for the South African state to use non-military means, playing upon internal conflicts or cleavages in an attempt to achieve compliant regimes. Thus in the early 1960s there was the bizarre plot to split the Lozi areas from Zambia to prevent UNIP interfering with labour recruitment to South Africa. Even earlier than this the South African government had attempted to secure the incorporation of the then High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland/Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) as bantustans, to ensure future control over labour supply and the development of nationalism in these territories. This longstanding reliance on political intervention continues today, and should not be neglected at the expense of military intervention, even though the latter has become so intense and widespread of late as to indicate a strategic rather than merely tactical switch in policy.

South Africa, therefore, does not only send its own troops into neighbouring states, and train military units made up of the latter's nationals. It also sustains and directs opposition groupings such as UNITA, the MNR and the LLA; it backs factions competing for power, as in the recent events in Swaziland; and it manipulates internal conflicts in order to embarrass, divert and pressurize frontline governments, as may well have happened with the events in Matebeleland in 1982-83.

The reason that such intervention is so widespread and takes place with so much apparent ease is not simply the relative military, diplomatic or economic weaknesses of the states concerned. Equally significant are political weaknesses, stemming from the nature of the political systems in these states, and in particular the relationships between state and citizen and between the state and the major class forces. Thus, although the MNR's origins appear to lie first in the activities of the Portuguese secret police and then those of the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, making it a wholly illegitimate organization, it was later able to achieve a measure of local acquiescence and support in certain areas of Mozambique in the early 1980s. The reasons for this lie in the weak legitimacy of FRELIMO in these areas, itself the product of economic problems on the one hand and of increasingly authoritarian government on the other. FRELIMO's initial response to MNR incursions was one which served in some ways to make matters worse, because it was based on the assumption that mass

participation, so much a part of the guerrilla war against the Portuguese, had little or no part to play in eradicating the MNR. Regular troops were deployed erratically against it, but the peasants were not protected from it. Recent successes against the MNR have been based on a changed political strategy rather than on greater military efficiency, with the use of veteran guerrilla commanders and mass mobilization at the local level. Combined with this has been a greater awareness of the dangers of the development of an authoritarian state at the national level.

Similar arguments have been made in the Angolan case. UNITA has been more "successful" than the MNR, while the MPLA has faced a far greater level and frequency of external intervention than has FRELIMO. The MPLA has also suffered from a far weaker degree of popular mobilization, which has forced it to rely even more on bureaucracy and coercion than FRELIMO.

Thus destabilization may be seen in terms of how the nature of the political system permits and shapes South African (and other) intervention, both in the current period and in the preceding two decades.¹ Intervention is easiest and can take the most varied forms when a regime lacks popular support and when competition within and conflict between classes is met by repression rather than accommodation. As is clear from the most obvious cases of intervention elsewhere in Africa - Chad, Zaire, and the Horn, for example - such basic weaknesses in political systems are usually manifested in a high degree of political instability, though this is by no means necessary. What is important in the longer term is not how stable or unstable a regime appears to be but the means through which stability is sought and achieved. The Swazi political system, for example, may ultimately be less securely founded than those in Mozambique or Zimbabwe, despite the ease with which the Swazi royal family has gained, exercised, and retained political power from the 1960s onwards. The reason why the South African government has always found it easy to intervene in Swazi politics, from the days of Van Wyk de Vries to the present succession crisis (Fransman 1978; Daniel 1983), lies in this insecure foundation of political power as much as it does in the role of South African capital within the economy, or the place of migrant labour within the Swazi social formation.

I propose to discuss the question of the domestic political system and destabilization from a perspective with which I am particularly familiar, that of the place of the working class and its organizations within the political system. Working class political activity has had an important influence on African political movements and systems since the late 1930s. At the same time, the relationship between the state and the working class, revealed in the treatment of trade unions, wage determination and strikes, is a reasonably accurate indication of the nature of the political system at any given time. The role and treatment of workers, and particularly of trade unions, is of direct relevance to an understanding and critique of governments and of the underlying political systems in southern Africa, and thus of their response to South African destabilization strategies.

Trade Unions and Domestic Political Stability

Most African governments regard the working class in general and trade unions in particular as sources of political instability. Like their colonial precursors they have argued that unions are too politicised and pursue damaging sectional goals. Legislative and administrative controls are necessary, therefore, to ensure "responsible" behaviour. Such arguments have centred around three claims: that unions are politically partisan, and thus that union activity has political rather than economic goals; that unions are channels for external influences; and that wage claims injure the peasantry by increasing already wide urban-rural income differentials, and injure economic development by discouraging investment, notably foreign investment, thereby also undermining political order. What sort of case can be made to support such claims?

Partisanship

During the colonial period it was common for the colonial authorities and their apologists to argue that the trade union movements were controlled by nationalist parties, and in the case of the French colonies by the French Communist Party (Allen 1970). Similar claims were advanced in the period immediately before and after independence in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland by what are now the governing parties or authorities. Thus

in Swaziland the King and other leaders of the Imbokodvo National Movement, together with their allies among local capital, presented the early trade unions as creations of Dr Ambrose Zwane's Ngwane National Liberty Congress (or before its formation, his wing of the Swaziland Progressive Party). The strikes of 1962-64 were seen as an attempt by the NNLC to bring about by industrial action what it had failed to achieve by electoral means: to dislodge the King and the INM from power. There is some weight to these claims, for the leadership of the trade union movement was drawn almost entirely from supporters of the NNLC or of the earliest Swaziland nationalist party, the Democratic Party. Leaders of these essentially petty bourgeois parties came to play an important role in the organization of the Swazi working class and in the articulation of its demands. Macdonald Maseko and Dumisa Dlamini of the NNLC are two examples of such leaders.

In Lesotho the bulk of the labour movement supported the Basutoland Congress Party of Ntsu Mokhehle during the 1960s. As part of an early factional struggle, Mokhehle "engineered the formation of the Basutoland Federation of Labour" with his brother Shakane becoming its secretary (Halpern 1965, p.177). The BFL included nearly all of the main unions and was affiliated to the BCP until 1970. Thereafter, according to Strom, it became "more difficult to distinguish the work of the BFL from that of the BCP," at least until 1975 (Strom 1978, p.69). Chief Jonathan's government clearly believed this at the time, since in the repression that followed the 1970 coup large numbers of trade unionists were detained, while the government refused to recognize the BFL or its affiliates. Instead it encouraged the creation in 1970 of a rival trade union centre, the Lesotho Council of Workers, and attempted to ensure that it had a monopoly of external resources and the sole right to represent workers. Despite such advantages, the LCW gained very little support (Ananaba 1979, pp.89-101).

The pattern in Botswana differed in detail. Initially, "the urbanised working class...largely supported the then Bechuanaland People's Party" (Parson 1980, p.46). But by 1965 the governing Democratic Party of Seretse Khama had succeeded in gaining the support of several leading trade unionists, one of whom, Gabriel Mmusi, founded the Botswana Federation of Labour. As in Lesotho, an alternative centre aligned with a rival party came into existence. This was the Botswana Trade Union Congress of K.K.

Motshidisi, linked to the Botswana National Front. Both centres were dissolved in 1969 under the Trade Union Act of that year. A new centre was not created until 1977. Its chairman and general secretary were both BDP supporters, the former being secretary of the BDP Youth Wing (Ananaba 1979, pp.64-65; Matlhabaphiri 1980).

External Links

The significance of external links is seen as twofold. They permit unions and union centres or federations to survive, even when there is little popular support for them; and they act as channels for external influences which affect both the trade union movement and the political system as a whole. Thus affiliation to one of the three international trade union centres - the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the World Confederation of Labour - provides access to information, training, materials and funds. It also helps to make the union leadership less reliant on membership or affiliates for active support and thus for finance. The combination of competition for affiliates between the three international bodies and the search for resources by union leaders quite frequently leads to the creation of bogus unions and centres, to divisions within the national trade union movement, and to corruption within the union leadership (see, for example, Allen 1975).

Thus in Botswana the BTUC promptly affiliated to the All-African Trade Union Federation, while the BFL remained aligned with the ICFTU and its African regional organization. In Lesotho the main union centre or federation, the BFL, was also affiliated to the AATUF in the 1960s, while the pro-BNP Lesotho Council of Workers was linked with the Catholic Pan-African Workers Council. A third centre, aligned with the small royalist party, the Marematlou Freedom Party, and lacking almost totally in popular support, became a WFTU affiliate, despite having no socialist inclinations (Ananaba 1979). The pro-NNLC unions in Swaziland had links with the AATUF, and with WFTU through the South African Council of Trade Unions. This led almost automatically to ICFTU support for their rivals, in the form of an attempt by the local ICFTU representative to create a national centre in 1963, combining unions whose leaders had sympathies with

the Democratic Party. This later gained the support of Imbokodvo, and a centre was formed with M.Z. Thabede, an INM supporter, as president. Within a year this had collapsed due to lack of support for either the SDP or INM among workers, as opposed to individual union leaders. The ICFTU then ceased attempts to create an affiliate (Lynd 1968, chap. 3).

The problem of external influence arises because the divisions within the international trade union movement mirror those within global politics. The WFTU has increasingly aligned with the Soviet bloc, especially since 1949 when its Western affiliates left the organization and formed the ICFTU which has since become aligned closely with the US and its NATO partners (Busch 1980; Windmuller 1980). Thus the activities of these bodies become part of the foreign policy of the major powers. Similar problems arise with regional organizations such as the AATUF (once a rather ineffective vehicle for Ghanaian foreign policy and Pan-African ambitions), and with individual national centres, notably the American AFL-CIO which operates through the African-American Labour Centre, 90 per cent of whose funds come from the US government. These bodies have had an important impact on the workings of individual African unions, many of which have reason to be grateful for the training, office equipment, cars, or funds that have allowed them to function on their members behalf. Their dependence on external aid, however, makes it possible for African unions to become vehicles for external intervention. All these external bodies are deeply involved in training, which includes a substantial ideological component, and each of them has been involved in the gathering of intelligence, the supply of funds to political leaders, and the cultivation of potential leaders.² Colonial governments were well aware of this, and allowed the anti-Communist (and mildly anti-colonial) ICFTU free access, while banning or restricting WFTU activity. A similar pattern can be seen in southern Africa, where the Lesotho and Botswana governments have allowed the virulently anti-Communist AALC to operate while restricting other links and affiliations.

Sectional Claims

The general substance of the argument that unions pursue unfair sectional claims is well summarised by Jack Parson. Writing on incomes

policy in Botswana, he says:

Domination of the working class is quite comprehensive and this domination is materially reproduced in the operation of laws, policies and administrative activity. Ideologically this domination is represented by the specifically petty-bourgeois idea of the 'labour aristocracy' in Botswana. The urban manual worker is told he/she is 'privileged' to have a job at all, regardless of the wage, in comparison with the rural farmer. If the worker is so ungrateful for the job he/she can easily be replaced by someone from the labour reserve hinterland. This is reproduced as well in the intellectual gymnastics accompanying the political act of setting working class wages. The so-called legal minimum wage for the unskilled... 'is that it should equal the average rural income of the farmers with an allowance for any differential in the overall costs of urban living'. (Parson 1980, p.51)

The argument that wage claims discourage investment can be illustrated from Swazi sources. Fransman (1982, p.75) quotes the Swazi National Council as saying:

The Swazi National Council believes in the encouragement of industry and commerce and the investment of outside capital in the territory leading to full local employment. The Swazi National Council likens capital investment to a bird sitting in a tree. If you make threats... the bird will fly away and the Council cannot afford to lose capital investors for the sake of self seekers who use the trade unions for their political ends.

Similar arguments have been advanced in Botswana (Massey 1980, pp.19-20). Their significance lies not only in their use to justify low wages but also in their linkage with arguments about economic growth and political instability. Thus King Sobhuza was reported in 1972 to have:

condemned the methods and philosophy of the trade unions and said they were causes of industrial unrest through strikes...thus bringing the national industrial growth to a standstill. He (the King) said those who suffered most from leaders who organised industrial strikes are the poor men in the street. (Fransman 1982, p.79)

One year later the Swazi Constitution was suspended a week after a strike had begun at the Havelock Asbestos mine over a demand for a 30 per cent wage increase. The then Finance Minister justified the suspension by "arguing that Swaziland was on the brink of severe industrial strife as a result of the activities of politicians, political parties and outside influences."

All of these arguments are weak, and conceal desires to maximize profits, weaken the trade union movement, and prevent political alliances between workers and other classes. Not only is it empirically false to argue that workers are a privileged group (Allen 1972), but as Jack Parson has pointed out:

It means that minimum working class wages are more or less unrelated to the value produced by that working class, which means that exploitation of the working class is almost certainly increased. Secondly it is the case that historically the 'average rural income of farmers' has been one of marginal subsistence. Agriculture has historically paid part of the cost of reproducing the 'urban' or 'formal sector' working class. Thus urban and rural 'wages' are not comparable and separate things. They are closely tied together. (Parson 1980, pp.51-52)

The result of such policies is low wages. In Botswana in 1976 88 per cent of public sector workers in the industrial class, and 87 per cent of private sector workers, received wages below the Poverty Datum Line (Parson 1980, p.47). Similarly in Swaziland, "the real living standards of the majority of workers in the private sector declined somewhat during the first four years of independence," helping the multinational sector to record profits which a 1976 ILO report estimated as exceeding 20 per cent of gross domestic product. The bulk of the profits were expatriated from Swaziland (Fransman 1982, p.81). The 1976-81 Botswana National Development Plan also "estimates that no less than 41 per cent of gross domestic product is appropriated by non-citizens (Massey 1980, p.20). It is hard to see any threat to multinational profits arising from modest real wage increases in such economies.

The arguments I have been presenting have within them an implicit and simple model for understanding African trade unionism. While unions should be apolitical, concerned with economic and welfare issues, and neither industrially militant nor actively opposed to government (in other words they should be "moderate" or "responsible" trade unions), they are prone under external influences to become politicised, partisan, actively anti-government, and industrially militant. The implication of such "irresponsible" trade unionism is the fermenting of political dissent and conflict, directly or indirectly, and thus the creation of the conditions for destabilization. The conclusion normally drawn is that legal and other controls

over trade unions, as well as over labour more generally, are essential if "responsible" trade unions are to be encouraged.

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have all adopted highly restrictive legal and political frameworks within which trade unions can operate. In Swaziland the 1973 suspension of the Constitution included a ban on "all political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and ill feelings within the Nation." This was applied to unions as well as to opposition political organizations. Furthermore, the government at the insistence of the Swazi National Council (and against the advice of employers who were sensible enough to see the importance of active trade unions in achieving good industrial relations) tried to eliminate trade unions as workers' representatives at the work-place. In their place were to be works councils, together with officials appointed by the SNC and answerable to the King. These works councils were to mediate between workers and management, and represent the King to both parties. As a result there exists very little negotiating machinery in Swaziland, and until very recently there was only one registered trade union. Meanwhile, the works councils have not only proved ineffective as worker representatives, but have not even been appointed in many places of work (Fransman 1978; Simelane 1983).

In Lesotho the 1970 suspension of the Constitution heralded a drive against the BCP and trade unions. Most unions were excluded from recognition and bargaining, at least until 1975. No attempts were made, however, to strengthen the 1964 legislation referring to unions, essentially based on British legislation (Maema 1981).

Finally, while Botswana retains a multiparty system and some degree of representation, and has no real history of repression of the trade union movement as a whole, there is nevertheless some evidence that a punitive attitude exists towards active unions and unionists. The Trade Union Act of 1969 dissolved the rival union centres (and thus their external affiliations), and the new centre that was created in their place is affiliated only to the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, which is controlled by governments not unions. The 1969 act also makes union formation and activity difficult, and prescribes severe penalties for minor infractions

(Moyo 1978; Parson 1980). Strikes at the Selebi-Phikwe mine in 1975 were met with intervention by troops and led to mass sackings of union members and leaders. Such actions, together with subsequent government accusations about the subversive role of unions reflected "government perceptions that these strike eruptions have the potential to threaten the delicate balance of class forces in the society...(by) mobilising general, antigovernmental feeling throughout the country among other groups who feel relatively deprived by the rapid and distorted development over the past decade"(Cooper 1978, pp.270-72).

Unions and Politics: A Reinterpretation

To assess the arguments outlined in the previous section, it is necessary to examine postwar political history in the rest of Africa. From this it might be possible to derive a general account that sets out the relationship between the political role of labour, the state's strategy towards organized labour, and political stability. Clearly it will not be possible in a conference paper of this kind to set out the argument in detail, nor to mention more than a few of the sources used. ³

The development of postwar politics in Africa has passed through three stages. Although there are broad regional patterns, these stages occurred at different times and with different durations and intensities in different African countries. The three stages are those of the development of nationalist activity before the decolonization period; decolonization and the immediate post-independence period; and the current period. Each period has involved a different pattern of relationships between the party (or the state) and the people, and a linked set of relationships between unions and parties (or the state). The key factor in determining the nature of each of these periods and the transition from one period to another is the development of classes within society and of the conflict between them.

Nationalism Before Decolonization

In the 1940s in West Africa, and in the 1950s in East and Central Africa, the colonial powers adopted a policy of gradual decolonization, based on increased economic and social development, Africanisation of middle-

level posts, and "training in citizenship" through the devolution of power to Africans at local government level, together with limited representation and still more limited power at central level. The nationalist organizations at this stage were small, and their leaders were drawn from the educated elite and the petty bourgeoisie. Their strategies were based on petitioning the colonial governments for greater elite representation and influence on government.

Increasingly, however, three factors made for rising nationalist militancy: the absence of major political reforms; growth in the size and organization of the working class, peasantry, and in some cases migrant labour; and increasing intervention by the colonial state in production, with a consequent increase in exploitation. This led to the mobilization of the urban and rural poor (women included) around broad socio-economic rather than class issues, to the simultaneous growth of the nationalist movement, and to the development of a radical wing within it. While the leaders of the radical wing were still largely drawn from the same social categories as before, they drew support from the newly mobilized poor, and organizational strength from their national and local organizations, notably trade unions. This radical wing frequently contested for the leadership of the entire nationalist movement, either within the main nationalist party, as with the Zikist wing of the Nigerian NCNC, or as a distinct party, such as the CPP in Ghana or the Camerounian UPC (Olusanya 1973; Kraus 1971; Joseph 1977). In addition, it directly confronted the colonial powers in an attempt to force the abandonment of colonial rule, using in the process the tactics of its social base - strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and even rural revolt in the case of Kenya and to a lesser extent in Zambia (Buijtenhuis 1982; Bratton 1978).

Trade unions were a crucial element in the development of radical nationalism. Workers were the most mobilized group among the urban populations, and were frequently involved in strikes with an increasingly anti-colonial content. The union leaderships that grew out of this period of militancy in the late 1940s and early 1950s were active nationalists, and they came to form a significant proportion of the leadership of the radical nationalist parties or wings. They were also an important radicalizing force at the level of ideas and in the strategy of political action adopted

(Jeffries 1978). Workers also seem to have provided a high proportion of the active supporters of radical nationalist movements, though this is more difficult to prove (Joseph 1977).

Decolonization and Independence

Both the colonial government and the conservative wing of the nationalist movement were opposed to the radical nationalists, and joined in attempts to eradicate them. In this they were sometimes aided by errors on the part of the radicals. To secure the support of the conservative nationalists (and in some cases of the less committed leaders of the radical wing), while also undermining the basis of support for the radicals, the colonial government crushed the radical wing and abandoned gradual decolonization in favour of "electoral decolonization." This was the relatively rapid devolution of central power and authority over public spending to African governments, with electoral competition between rival claimants for office. The main implication of this was the need for the rival nationalist leaderships to mobilize politically the entire electorate rather than specific and already socially mobilized groups. Mobilizing the largely rural electorate had to be achieved in a very short period of time - in some cases only a few months - and in the absence in most cases of any widespread party organization. The party leadership had little or no choice, therefore, but to rely on the existing bases of support at local level, and on local leaders. They therefore built their parties around communal groupings (ethnic, religious, regional, and so on), around communal and traditional leaders, and around other local notables such as traders and wealthier farmers. They held their parties together not by ideology or even nationalism, but through clientelism - the gaining of political support by the actual or promised allocation of public resources, such as schools, wells, or jobs, to particular localities or groups through their own leaders. Such local leaders, therefore, came to control local spending and were judged on their ability to obtain resources for their areas or groupings. Political competition under such circumstances was competition for resources, and took place between local or communal groupings rather than class groupings.

This strategy was initially effective, as nationalist parties came to enjoy control over increasingly large resources, a pattern which

continued and expanded after independence. There were, however, a number of crippling contradictions in clientelist politics. Some of these were evident before independence; others emerged more clearly in the post-independence period. The following are some of the main contradictions:

- (a) Clientelism depends on being able to allocate resources to voters and their leaders - not only to supporters but also to a limited degree to opposing factions - because clientelism is most effective when no group is permanently excluded from success in competition. This leads to increasing demands on limited resources, which can only be satisfied by drawing more and more resources into the pool. Public policy, and especially development policy, increasingly becomes determined by clientelist competition and not by development needs or administrative rationality.
- (b) Since electoral recruitment depends also on communal divisions, these become politicized by the increasingly intense competition for resources, leading to "tribalism" and related phenomena. In turn this intensifies political conflict, and leads to a tendency for local and central conflicts to enhance each other and to become more and more difficult to control.
- (c) The class basis of the nationalist party alters, from the class alliance of the radical nationalist period to a consortium of local notables and national elites (often called the petty bourgeoisie, though this remains in many ways an unsatisfactory term). Given the role of this class in allocating resources, and the weakness of its economic base and social cohesion, there emerges a pattern of individual, and to a lesser extent collective, enrichment through legal and illegal means. The concomitants are endemic corruption, the strengthening of the "petty bourgeoisie" as a class, and the repression of rival class institutions such as trade unions.
- (d) Access to resources depends primarily on the control of the machinery of government. Competition for power, therefore, becomes more intense at all levels. In response, the governing party or

faction attempts to prevent its removal from office by using undemocratic and increasingly violent means, such as the repression or banning of opposition parties and organizations, the rigging of elections, and the assassination or exiling of opposition leaders.

- (e) This intense competition for power leads to a tendency for the dominant faction to monopolize resources and resource allocation (a "winner takes all" situation). The losing factions tend to turn increasingly to undemocratic and violent means to unseat the ruling group. This quite frequently involves the mobilization of ethnic sentiments, and the use of assistance from outside powers.

Thus clientelist regimes tend to become the scene of increasingly intense conflict, both ethnic and class, and of increasingly violent repression in which rival parties are banned. Meanwhile governing parties abandon their mobilizing and representative functions in favour of policing the electorate. As the underdevelopment of the economies of these countries leads to growing economic crises and a sharp squeeze on resource allocation, such regimes very often lose control of public order and cease to have any popular legitimacy and consent. The stage is ultimately set for the military coup (though the reasons for military intervention do not lie simply in the problems of the political system).

The trade union movement goes through a related transformation, from accommodation to the colonial authority, through adaptation to clientelist politics, to response to the contradictions of clientelism and the resulting repressive conduct by the state. The repression of the radical nationalists involves repression of their trade union supporters (through such things as the jailing of union leaders, and the dismissal of both leaders and members). This allows a more conservative leadership to take control of the union organization, or to build a new organization altogether, often with government or ICFTU assistance. Sometimes it was not necessary to repress individual union leaders. The more compliant ones could be bought instead. Resources could be allocated to them, which they could use to enrich themselves and to increase their political control

over the union organization by distributing benefits such as scholarships, trips abroad, materials and money to lower level leaders and their followers.

Union leaderships thus became part of clientelistic politics, but at a cost. This cost was the increasing financial and structural detachment of the leadership from their members (matching the governing party's loss of active popular support). For as long as real wages rose, or at least did not fall, the workers were often prepared to consent to such leaders remaining in office. The internal contradictions of clientelism, however, involve an increasing redistribution of resources away from the poor and underprivileged towards the petty bourgeoisie. This leads to declining real wages and a parallel decline in the level of rank and file support for both government and union leaderships. In turn, this gives rise to increasingly frequent and large scale strikes, over which the union leaders have little control. The government's initial response is very often to concede wage increases. But the effects of these are very often quickly eroded, and repression becomes a far more common response. Unofficial strikes become part, and in some cases the crucial part, of the breakdown of civil order and the crisis of governmental legitimacy that frequently ushers in the coup.

Contemporary Regimes

The military will normally ban any surviving political parties. But the regimes that emerge from coups, whether military or civilian, tend to conform to the decaying clientelist type outlined above. What development there is will in most cases be towards an exaggeration of the features that led to military intervention in the first place - lack of participation and legitimacy, repressive state politics, intense competition for spoils within the petty bourgeoisie, and so on. Such regimes are therefore no more stable than their predecessors, and a series of coups, attempted coups, and counter coups is often the result, as in Nigeria and Ghana.

Some regimes, however, have not suffered this fate. Examples are Egypt, Somalia, Zaire, Togo, and eventually Dahomey (now Benin). The reason for this lies in the adoption by such regimes of a different

political system, one that was capable of resolving the contradictions of clientelism, though not those of class. At the root of this transformation were two key structural changes: the confinement of clientelist competition to local political arenas; and the replacement in whole or in part of the governing party by a centralised bureaucratic structure that controls resource allocation. The best examples are not the military regimes mentioned above, as a brief examination of recent Zairean history will show, but those states that have avoided coups by introducing these changes before the clientelist system had decayed too far - Senegal, Tanzania, Guinea, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, and to a lesser extent Kenya, Zambia and Botswana. The methods used to bring about the transformation differ, of course, but the basic strategy and its effects are the same.

The commonest structural changes introduced were those in the Presidency, national representative institutions, and local or sectional representative institutions. An executive presidency is usually created, with substantial formal powers. These include the transfer of certain ministerial functions and funds to the Office of the President, and the expansion of that part of the civil service which reports to the President. This allows the President to stand apart from factional conflict, and to some degree to regulate it, whereas under the clientelist system the President or Prime Minister was no more than the leader of the dominant faction, in competition with all other factions.

Control of national representative institutions from the centre is achieved by replacing the party - or more accurately displacing it - by a centralised bureaucratic structure responsible to the President. Alternatively, the party itself may be transformed into such a structure, as in Tanzania where party and state were merged at the local level. A single party state is usually declared, with the national officers appointed by the President. At local level, competition for party posts is usually allowed. Parliament may continue to exist, but is emptied of its original functions. Where legislation is concerned, parliament will rubber-stamp executive decisions, and only rarely criticise their content. Elected members are increasingly selected by the President, as in Malawi, or joined by presidential appointees. The Cabinet is drawn less

from MPs and more from party and state officials. Local government, where it consisted of elected institutions, is replaced by systems of appointed councils or committees made up of local officials, answering to the regional level of administration and ultimately to the President.

Sectional organizations like trade unions and co-operatives quite frequently remain in existence, but their activities are strictly controlled by the local and national administration. Increasingly trade unions and other voluntary organizations come to implement government policy rather than representing the interests of their members.

Despite the control of representative institutions in this system, some degree of participation and representation is still possible within it, and in fact is essential to its stability. At local level, parties or in some cases sectional organizations continue to be involved in political competition. This is organized along clientelist lines, and is for control of resources allocated to the party or sectional organization by the central administration. This permits the representation of local interests and demands, without allowing the national centre to become the focus of clientelist conflict. That this representative function is important is shown by the level and intensity of competition, and by the high turnover of those who fail to be effective local patrons. Those who are effective contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the regime.

National elections, when and where they occur, perform similar functions. They also serve to recruit powerful local figures into the party and state structure. Those who are able to get themselves elected several times, and especially those who can influence the election of others, are clearly important local political bosses. And these are best placed inside the central ruling group rather than outside and in competition with it.

The following are some of the main differences between the decaying clientelist and the centralised-bureaucratic systems:

- (a) Resource allocation in the clientelist system is the key prize in political competition, giving rise to intense conflict, corruption, and the determination of resource allocation by what

is largely communal conflict and personal greed. In the centralised-bureaucratic system resource allocation is determined at the centre by the President and the party or state bureaucracy. Central competition is thereby reduced to manageable proportions, while local competition and conflict continues, though around a limited amount and range of resources.

- (b) Ethnic, religious, regional and other forms of conflict are intensified by the clientelist system, especially at the centre, but they are reduced in the centralised-bureaucratic system. Only at the local level is such conflict permitted to thrive to any degree.
- (c) Participation is first reduced and then eliminated in the clientelist system. In the centralised-bureaucratic system it is limited and confined essentially to local arenas. But far from being eliminated it continues to play an important part in reproducing the regime's legitimacy.
- (d) Communal competition undermines elite cohesion in the clientelist system. Although in economic terms the petty bourgeoisie is able to accumulate rapidly in such a system (indeed this rapid accumulation is a major cause of the system's problems), it cannot achieve class cohesion. This reduces its political authority and capacity. In the centralised-bureaucratic system the central management of competition makes it somewhat easier (but not that easy) to achieve elite and class cohesion.

The position of the trade union movement in decaying clientelist regimes differs sharply from that in centralised-bureaucratic ones. In the former we find a strong tendency for the earlier patterns of union-state relations to be repeated, although the nature of the trade union movement itself undergoes some change. Thus unions may be banned altogether, or they may be allowed to function only under highly restrictive conditions. Where they do function, governments attempt to co-opt union leaderships through a combination of clientelism and coercion, and try to manipulate union elections or intervene in factional conflicts within the unions.

Militant leaders and rank and file activists are severely repressed. Sometimes they are detained and even killed. While the regime may at first try to gain the support of the workers by raising wages, the erosion of real incomes by inflation very often leads to large sectoral or national strikes which threaten political order. The strikes may easily threaten the regime's stability and lead to its collapse. The new regime, however, is quite likely to repeat the whole cycle again, as in Ghana (Crisp 1979, 1980, 1981).

The reason for this lies in the regime's failure to control labour politically, and to ensure the preservation of real wages. Co-optation of union leaderships alienates them from their members, leading to unofficial strikes and to the emergence of rival leaderships at lower levels, over which the official leaders have little or no control. This process is hastened by the increasing level of class consciousness on the part of the workers, and especially by their belief that rulers, management, and the union leaders increasingly come to share a common interest that is opposed to that of the workers (Peace 1979; Burawoy 1972, 1982; Sandbrook and Arn 1977). Under such conditions, the only options open to government are to concede real wage increases (which its own class interest will not allow to occur all the time), or to repress workers' organizations and activity, which leads to the erosion of public order and government legitimacy.

In contrast, centralised-bureaucratic systems have been much more successful in coming to terms with organized labour. The trade union structure and leadership become part of the state, involved in implementing policy, especially on incomes and industrial action. At the same time there are fewer and politically less threatening strikes. In addition, relations between workers and employers, and between workers and government, are regulated in ways that help to minimize conflict and allow it to be routinely and readily resolved.

This pattern is made possible by three features of union-state relations in such systems. First, there is a high degree of central control over union organization and leadership. Government determines the union structure and conditions of membership, and appoints the top union officials (or arranges their "election"). Competition for union posts continues at lower

levels, allowing participation and representation to occur. Second, an elaborate and effective industrial relations system is created (usually based on the colonial systems of the 1950s), which while prohibiting or restricting strike action, does recognize the unions' right to bargain, and provides machinery to allow such bargaining to proceed relatively smoothly and routinely. Third, the outcome of bargaining and other forms of union pressure is seen in material gains for the membership. Such gains are not simply in terms of wages, for real minimum wages may decline, but more in terms of real incomes, through the impact of social security provisions, job security, promotions and increments for experienced workers, and so on. The system is centralised and authoritarian, therefore, but it does not suppress unions and it does allow regular and to some degree predictable gains. The effectiveness of the system should not be exaggerated, however. Since the class interest of the petty bourgeoisie and that of the working class cannot be permanently reconciled, the system will be unable to control labour effectively in the long run.

Conclusion

Trade unions, and labour more generally, have thus been deeply involved in African politics. They have often functioned as a radicalizing influence, usually in opposition to government and sometimes participating in its demise. They are not responsible, however, for political instability; nor are they creatures of political parties and outside agencies, though individual union leaders have often been both. The supposedly malignant effects of trade unionism which were outlined earlier in this paper can now be seen to be features of the political system within which unions operate, or products of party or state action directed against them. It is not the trade union movement that needs reform, but the political system. And it is not the unions that cause instability, but the system's internal contradictions.

Interaction between the political system and the trade union movement, especially in its effects on union leaderships, has been equally damaging to unions as repression by the state. It is common to find a pattern of declining support for unions in the clientelist period of the 1950s and 1960s, which manifested itself in falling

membership and dues, and later in the alienation of members from the union leaderships. In Lesotho and Swaziland the unions were so badly repressed in the 1970s that it is difficult to find any trace of these effects, as opposed to that of repression. It is interesting to contrast, however, the relative vitality of the BFL in the years 1970-75, when it had to struggle for recognition and its members interests, with its relative decline since recognition was granted in 1975.

In Botswana the trade union movement has not been repressed on a regular basis, yet it is none the less ailing. According to its chairman, the Federation of Trade Unions - the new centre set up in 1977 with AALC assistance - is still "heavily dependent" on the AALC and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a West German counterpart of the AALC (Matlhabaphiri 1980). Its leadership is drawn largely from the governing party, and from "unions which represent petty bourgeois interests in alliance with the local governing class" (Parson 1980, p.50). Its membership has stagnated from 7,000 members in 8 unions in 1977 to 6,000 in 11 unions in 1978 (Parson 1980, p.51), despite an increase in the work force.⁴

Thus in none of these three states has the trade union movement been able to play a full part in the political system. This has largely been a result of the nature of that system and the regimes in power. A greater role for unions as representatives of workers, and as part of a general move to increase mass participation and representation, would strengthen these systems considerably. A greater political role for labour would lead to more radical politics and to popularly based regimes. And both of these would make for states that were more resistant to destabilization.

NOTES

1. I do not argue, however, that it is only political and local factors that underlie destabilization.
2. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to document these statements. They are based on materials I have examined in the ICFTU and WFTU files, and those of the Ghanaian TUC and Bureau of African Affairs, together with conversations with trade unionists, especially in West Africa.

See, however, Busch (1980,1983), Ray (1980), and Counter-Spy (1975).

3. I hope eventually to publish a fuller version. Neither version, however, can apply to South Africa, Namibia or the former Portuguese territories, as the starting point is peaceful decolonization. For a useful survey of material on African labour and trade unions, see Copans (1981).
4. Matlhabaphiri (1980) gives a much larger figure (16,000) for membership in 1980. Parson's figures come from the Labour Department and are probably more accurate.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY OF DESTABILIZATION THE CASE OF LESOTHO

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The imperialist onslaught in the sub-continent has today turned southern Africa into a battlefield. The mass of the populations of South Africa and Namibia, led by their national liberation movements, are ranged against apartheid South Africa and its imperialist backers. The issues at stake are clear. Pretoria is fighting to preserve apartheid, capitalist domination, and imperialist hegemony in the sub-continent. The people of southern Africa are fighting to extricate themselves from capitalist exploitation and racial oppression. Confronted by a deep seated crisis since the early 1970s, the racist minority regime has decided to regionalize apartheid and turn southern Africa into a battlefield. It is within this broad framework that Pretoria's strategy of regional destabilization can best be understood.

This paper attempts a brief analysis of Pretoria's strategy of regional destabilization, with particular emphasis on Lesotho. The first section of the paper attempts to situate the origins of destabilization within the crisis of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa from the early 1970s onwards. The second section examines the origins and nature of South Africa's destabilization of Lesotho. A final and very brief section poses the question of the way forward for Lesotho.

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The Origins of Regional Destabilization

The Shift in the Balance of Forces - the external dimension

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s, and of the Smith regime in Rhodesia in 1980, created a new strategic situation in the sub-continent and shifted the balance of forces in favour of the national liberation movements. Gone now was the cordon of vital buffer states on South Africa's vulnerable northern frontier. In its place was a new cordon of hostile states, committed to the support of the liberation forces in Namibia and South Africa. In a historic show of solidarity and internationalism, the MPLA offered bases to SWAPO and the ANC, thus facilitating the advance of liberatory forces to the very frontier of the last bastion of colonialism in the sub-continent. These developments struck panic in the ranks of the white minority ruling class in South Africa, while at the same time giving encouragement to the forces of resistance inside South Africa. New avenues for the intensification of mass resistance against apartheid were therefore opened up.

The Shift in the Balance of Forces - the internal dimension

After nearly a decade of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, the 1970s witnessed the beginning of a crisis of capitalism in South Africa. This was manifested at several levels: high rates of unemployment, predominantly among the black population; high rates of inflation; serious balance of payments problems; shortages of skilled manpower; and many more. The pressure was greatest on the black workers. Thus the 1970s saw the rapid growth of black working class organizations. The increasing militancy of such organizations revealed itself in a spate of strikes which hit South African industry very hard. Of particular importance were the Durban strikes of 1972-73, which at their height involved more than 100,000 workers and literally paralysed the manufacturing sector in the whole of Durban. Between 1973 and 1976 no less than 800 strikes were recorded throughout the Republic, involving hundreds of thousands of African workers.

Out of the Durban strikes emerged a number of unregistered trade union bodies committed to the organization of the black working class. The

battle against capital and the state was fought at two levels: the struggle for higher wages and better working conditions; and the struggle for the right of the black working class to organize trade unions independently. Hot on the heels of the Durban and post-Durban strikes came the Soweto student uprising of 1976. By October 1977, when the uprising subsided, it had become nationwide, involving not only students but also elements of the working class. In the aftermath of the uprising, many students left the country to swell the ranks of the liberation movements and to prepare for the liberation of their country. By the end of 1977 many of these "Soweto graduates" were beginning to return home after guerrilla training overseas. This marked the beginning of the present phase of armed struggle.

At another level, the 1970s also witnessed the emergence and consolidation of monopoly capitalism in South Africa. Particularly important was the rise to prominence of Afrikaner monopolies, such as Sanlam, Santam, Rembrandt and Volkskas, and the development of closer unity between English and Afrikaner capital. These developments ushered in a realignment of class forces within the dominant Nationalist Party. Formerly an alliance of agricultural capital, the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, commercial and financial interest, and the white working class, the Nationalist Party began to disintegrate at the edges. Monopoly capital, and Afrikaner monopolies in particular, no longer needed the narrow national chauvinism of its traditional Afrikaner base. The new conditions of capital accumulation demanded a relaxation of certain aspects of "petty apartheid." On the labour front, this involved the relaxation of influx control and job reservation, as well as the training of blacks to meet the critical shortage of skilled labour and to increase productivity. Such measures were of course opposed to the interests of white labour, and provoked retaliatory action, most notably in the white mine workers strikes of 1979. This had its origins in the demand by the white Mine Workers Union that no skilled Coloured workers be employed at NababEEP mine in Namaqualand, a demand which the mine owners found unacceptable (South African Labour Bulletin, 5,3, 1979: 4-11). The MWU was also opposed to the reforms recommended by the Wiehahn Commission. These conditions led to a realignment of class forces and to a rift within the Nationalist Party, which finally revealed itself in the defection of Andries Treurnicht and his supporters within the NP to

form the new and extremely right-wing Conservative Party.

By the late 1970s, therefore, the apartheid state was confronted with an unprecedented crisis. Not only was it suffering from economic recession; it was also faced with serious ideological and military problems. In short the South African state could no longer rule in the old way. If capital accumulation was going to continue, and if the hegemony of the dominant classes was to be guaranteed, the state would have to be restructured. This was not long in coming.

The South African State Responds

It was in these circumstances that a quiet coup took place in South Africa. Following the Angolan adventure and the information scandal ("Muldergate"), the Vorster-van den Bergh clique was pushed into the background, and the military elite, symbolized by P.W. Botha and General Malan, entered the political arena. This elite saw the defence of apartheid and the response to the crisis facing South Africa in a new way. General Malan, the Minister of Defence, who has emerged as the ideologue of the new regime, consistently emphasised that "the problem is 80 per cent political and only 20 per cent military." The apartheid defences were drawn around a plan that has come to be known as Total Strategy. Its architects, and General Malan in particular, defined it as a:

comprehensive plan to utilise all means available to the state according to an integrated pattern...A Total strategy is therefore not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure... Total strategy should encompass the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry, and organisations like Armscor, The Council for Scientific Research (CSIR), and the Human Science Research Council (HSRC). (South African Government, Defence White Paper, 1977: 5-7).

Thus total strategy - a plan to utilize all the resources available to the state in the defence of apartheid - emerged at a specific conjuncture in South Africa, as a response to deep seated crisis. It must be emphasised that total strategy is by no means a purely military strategy. It has many separate components dealing with specific areas of the crisis. These include labour and reforms (the Wiehahn and Riekert

Reports); the Constellation of Southern African States proposal, and the general question of economic co-operation with neighbouring states; the destabilization of neighbouring states; and the militarization of the South African political economy.

It is within this broad framework of total strategy that we can now begin to understand Pretoria's strategy of regional destabilization. While pursuing a policy of so-called internal "reforms" (restructuring new conditions of capital accumulation and the hegemony of racial domination), Botha's regime has since 1979 pursued a policy of carrot and stick towards its neighbours. Within the government's new plan the enemy has been redefined in class terms. According to Prime Minister Botha, the enemy is no longer the black danger (Swartgaaver), but the Marxist onslaught on free enterprise in the sub-continent. Addressing a Nationalist Party conference in Durban in 1979, he warned his white audience that "there existed a threat of Soviet-inspired Marxist onslaught against South Africa". He concluded that the best strategy for tackling this was by taking the fight beyond the borders of South Africa. Since this time, Pretoria has arrogated to itself the duty of policing the entire region of southern Africa.

The initial strategy was to woo moderate southern African states to Pretoria's side, with promises of economic co-operation and aid, while isolating those states perceived as hostile and/or "puppets of Moscow." It was the failure of this strategy, and especially of the Constellation of States proposal, that led South Africa to intensify regional destabilization. Since 1980, Pretoria's flagrant interference in the affairs of its neighbours has taken the form of sponsoring bandit organizations, such as UNITA, the MNR, and the LLA, as extensions of the South African Defence Force. The coming to power of Reagan in the US, with his policy of "constructive engagement", also helped to give Botha a relatively free hand in pursuing his destabilization objectives.

Lesotho: A Case Study

The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small mountainous country, completely surrounded by South Africa. Only 13 per cent of the land area is arable;

the rest is too mountainous to be suitable for agriculture. The result is that the country's structural dependence on South Africa, which originated in the late nineteenth century with the advent of colonial rule, has become deeply entrenched. Over half the adult male population is absent at any given time, working in the mines and industries of South Africa. Over 70 per cent of rural household income is made up of remittances from migrant workers. Only 6 per cent of the labour force is engaged in formal employment in Lesotho. Half of the country's food requirements are imported, the vast majority from South Africa. Finally, Lesotho runs a rapidly growing balance of payments deficit, which is largely financed through revenue from the Southern African Customs Union and through migrant remittances under the deferred pay scheme (Kingdom of Lesotho, Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1980-85, Maseru: Central Planning and Development Office, 1981).

Since 1970 this precarious economic situation has been exacerbated by acute political polarization. The para-military coup, through which the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) usurped power after its defeat in the 1970 general election, consolidated the division of the country into two camps - those supporting the BNP, and those supporting the opposition Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) of Ntsu Mokhehle. (See B.M. Khaketla, Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under the Microscope, London: Hurst, 1971). The repression that followed the aborted elections of 1970 hardened feelings further in both camps. Because of its narrow class base, and its lack of a popular mandate from the people, the BNP government has had a difficult time in establishing its legitimacy. In Lesotho, therefore, foreign interference that is directed against the government has had a receptive ear from opposition elements.

In the period up to the mid-1970s, the government had little reason to fear such foreign interference, and certainly not from South Africa. The staunchly pro-South African stance of Chief Jonathan and the ruling BNP ensured good relations between the two countries. The Lesotho government also received substantial support from Pretoria in the period before and after the 1970 coup. By the mid-1970s, however, the BNP began to champion a more independent and progressive foreign policy, and moved gradually to a position of positive non-alignment. By 1975,

Lesotho had severed its political proximity to South Africa. That same year, Lesotho was one of the African countries present at the independence celebrations of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique. The following year, Lesotho and Mozambique entered into diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. The ruling BNP was thus gradually distancing itself from Pretoria's orbit, where it had once firmly belonged. In 1976, Lesotho was one of the first African countries to refuse to recognize the "independence" of the Transkei, and when the Transkei retaliated by closing the Lesotho-Transkei (i.e. South African) border, Chief Jonathan took Lesotho's case to the UN, accusing South Africa of intimidation. In 1978, Lesotho hosted a UN Symposium on Apartheid and Prison Conditions in South Africa, at which many of the delegates, and particularly those from the South African liberation movements, condemned South Africa. And at the beginning of 1979, Lesotho was one of the first countries to reject P.W. Botha's proposal for a Constellation of Southern African States. In the meantime, relations between the BNP and the ANC, both at party and government level, had improved considerably.

Within a period of less than five years, therefore, the BNP government had made a complete about-turn, usurping in the process the mantle of radicalism in foreign policy that had once belonged almost exclusively to the opposition BCP. By so doing, the government was able to improve its own image, both internally and especially externally. Foreign donors, impressed by the brave and radical stance taken by the government, poured increasing amounts of aid into the country. This enthusiasm was not shared by Pretoria, of course. And by the late 1970s it was clear that South Africa had decided that Lesotho would have to be "persuaded" back into the fold.

By this time, the evidence suggests that Pretoria was in contact with the exiled opposition leader Ntsu Mokhehle.¹ It would also seem that Mokhehle and his externally based faction of the BCP,² outmanoeuvred by the BNP and believing that the only road to political power in Lesotho was through Pretoria, were prepared to collaborate with South Africa. This willingness to collaborate was an important element in Pretoria's arsenal of strategies. The exiled faction of the BCP had a legitimate power base in Lesotho and Mokhehle still commanded considerable popular

support, making him and his faction an ideal instrument for Pretoria's destabilization strategy. In mid-1979, South Africa helped to launch the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) on to the political scene. This was the military wing of Mokhehle's BCP faction. Three distinct phases can be identified in Pretoria's use of the LLA and related tactics to destabilize Lesotho. Let us consider them briefly.

1. 1979-80: Attempts to Intimidate the Lesotho Government and to Woo it back into the South African Fold

Early in May 1979, two bombs exploded in Maseru, causing extensive damage to the central post office and to two high-tension electricity pylons, as well as to the headquarters of the Lesotho Electricity Corporation. These were followed by a spate of bombing across the country. For some time no-one claimed responsibility; but finally Mokhehle's external wing of the BCP did so. A spokesman for the organization announced through the South African news media that the LLA had been established with the aim of toppling the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan from power. Later in 1979, the main centre of LLA activities shifted to the Butha-Buthe district in the northeastern part of Lesotho. The South African press, and the Rand Daily Mail in particular, carried reports of hundreds of Basotho crossing into South Africa after heavy fighting between LLA insurgents and the government's paramilitary forces (the PMU).

The Lesotho government reacted by blaming Pretoria. Addressing a number of rallies in Butha-Buthe in November 1979, the Prime Minister accused South Africa of aiding Mokhehle to topple his government from power by "providing Mokhehle with bases from which to attack Lesotho." (Lesotho Weekly, Maseru, 14/11/79).

Apart from the extensive damage to the central post office, the bulk of the LLA's activities were fairly amateurish at this stage. No really serious confrontation between the LLA and the PMU took place between 1979 and early 1980. If anything, this first phase was calculated to cause panic, to create chaos, and to undermine confidence in the BNP regime, thus forcing it to seek talks and rapprochement with Pretoria.

Pretoria undoubtedly hoped by these actions to create divisions within the ruling BNP, and to force it to abandon its independent foreign relations, particularly its support for Mozambique and other socialist inclined states in southern Africa.

As sporadic LLA attacks continued, relations between Lesotho and South Africa inevitably soured. Finally, a meeting was arranged between the two Prime Ministers, Jonathan and Botha, at Peka Bridge in August 1980. The outcome of this meeting was never revealed to the press, but diplomatic hostilities between the two countries were certainly reduced in the period following it. Some observers believe that a quid pro quo must have been agreed (see The Vanguard, Roma, December 1980). The major differences between the two countries remained, however. For as Chief Jonathan has recently explained,..."The principal problem is over the philosophy of apartheid; it is this that stands in the way of peaceful coexistence or good neighbourliness between ourselves and South Africa." (Interview with New African, April 1983).

2. 1980-82: Intensification of Destabilization and Attacks on ANC Refugees

By the end of 1980, LLA attacks had resumed on a much wider scale. The reason is not difficult to find. 1980 witnessed the intensification of the struggle inside South Africa by cadres of the ANC; the rejection of Botha's labour reforms by the majority of South Africa's black trade unions; and a chain of industrial strikes that shook the manufacturing and mining industries to the core. From 1981, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, was beginning to hit at will inside South Africa. Botha and his generals were obliged to restore confidence in the white population, and to show that they were capable of stemming the tide of the imminent onslaught. The war had to be taken increasingly into the neighbouring countries. Pretoria's belligerence in the sub-continent was reinforced by the growing support of the Reagan administration. Witness, for example, the Matola raid into Mozambique in January 1981. In Lesotho, far from being intimidated, the government was pushed closer to the ANC and the frontline states. This second phase therefore marks the beginning

of attacks on so-called ANC bases inside Lesotho. The pattern of attacks also changed. Through the LLA, Pretoria embarked on the attempted assassination of leading members of the BNP, as well as on members of internal factions of the BCP opposed to Mokhehle's collaboration with South Africa. The most prominent figures to have been murdered in this campaign of assassination, both in mid-1982, were the BNP Minister of Works, Joba Rampeta, and the BCP Secretary-General, Koenyama Chakela, who had earlier returned to Lesotho under the government's 1980 amnesty offer. At the same time, an orchestrated campaign was initiated by Pretoria and its local agents to discredit the ANC and isolate it from its local support in Lesotho.

It would seem that during this second phase Pretoria still hoped to win over the BNP. For while concentrating the bulk of its fire on the ANC community in Lesotho, the assassination of selected targets within the BNP was seen as an attempt to further intimidate the government and the party. Chief Jonathan refused to be intimidated, however, and in what was seen as a final rupture with Pretoria he now turned for support to the Communist bloc. This not surprisingly provoked Pretoria, and by the end of 1982 a form of undeclared war was being waged on Lesotho by South Africa. This culminated finally in the brutal raid by the South African Defence Force on Maseru on 9 December, in which thirty ANC refugees and twelve Basotho citizens were murdered in cold blood. Although a military success, the raid was a political disaster for Pretoria. It provoked a storm of international condemnation, even from its closest allies such as the UK and the US (though perhaps not surprisingly the American censure was relatively muted).

3. December 1982 to the Present: Co-ordinated Attempts to Overthrow the Lesotho Government

Following the December 1982 raid, Pretoria has stepped up the pressure on Lesotho. This third phase of destabilization has seen the selective use of economic intimidation as well military incursions. Militarily, the last six months has witnessed a series of co-ordinated incursions into Lesotho, the bulk of them carried out by SADF personnel together with LLA bandits. The pattern of these latest attacks has clearly demonstrated a well

co-ordinated strategy, designed to stretch Chief Jonathan's security forces to the limit. Several attacks have often taken place at the same time but in different places frequently hundreds of kilometres apart, putting increasing pressure on the already over-stretched resources of the security forces. At the same time, Pretoria has refused to guarantee the safe passage through the Republic of Lesotho's military hardware stranded in South African ports. The involvement of SADF personnel in the latest attacks on Lesotho suggests that Pretoria is convinced that the LLA can no longer do the job properly by themselves.

Military incursions have been accompanied by economic threats and pressures. The economic embargo imposed on Lesotho early in May 1983, through go-slows and closures at the South African border gates, was only lifted when concessions, particularly on the ANC's presence in Lesotho, were extracted from Chief Jonathan's government. In addition, since June 1983, Lesotho had complained bitterly about South Africa's delay in meeting its customs union payments.

This combination of military and economic muscle has had a telling effect on the Lesotho government. And in the last month or so, Chief Jonathan appears to have given in, at least partially, to Pretoria's demands, by accepting what has been euphemistically described as the "voluntary" deportation of ANC refugees from the country. What is clear, however, is that Pretoria is no longer interested solely in the removal of ANC refugees from Lesotho. Since Chief Jonathan's tour of the Communist bloc early in 1983, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea, Communist China, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union at ambassadorial level, Pretoria seems intent on stopping any possible consummation of these diplomatic relations. With encouragement from Britain and America, Pretoria would quite clearly like to force Lesotho to reverse its new policy of diplomatic ties with the East. As Chief Jonathan seems likely to resist such pressure, Pretoria may well work towards his replacement by a more acceptable candidate, probably from the extreme right wing of the BNP. Rumours of a possible palace coup within the ruling party have circulated freely in Lesotho for some time now, and so have rumours of South African involvement. This in brief is the position Lesotho finds itself in today.

What is the Alternative?

The problems for Lesotho arising out of South Africa's destabilization strategy are twofold. First, Lesotho's territorial sovereignty is at stake. Second, and related to the first problem, Lesotho's right as an independent nation to determine her own destiny is being called into question by Pretoria. In short, Pretoria wishes to reduce Lesotho to the status of a bantustan. Unfortunately, Lesotho, like most other small states in the region, lacks the military capability to counter Pretoria's offensive.

Should the Lesotho government seek accommodation with Pretoria, therefore? The answer is no. If present trends are anything to go by, one concession will merely lead to another, until finally Lesotho's independence and national sovereignty will disappear. The only effective answer to the present crisis, I would suggest, is the formation of a broadly based democratic government of all shades of opinion in Lesotho, or rather all shades of opinion that are united in at least one crucial respect, and that is their opposition to South African destabilization and US imperialism in southern Africa. Central to this strategy is the recognition that the battle for South Africa has begun. As the ANC intensifies the armed struggle inside the Republic, Pretoria will dispense with all diplomatic niceties. Instead, it will seek to intensify destabilization on an unprecedented scale. To resist this, it is imperative that a broad democratic front is mobilized within Lesotho, and that the agents and sympathizers of South Africa and imperialism must be identified and isolated. This will be a most difficult task. But unless it is attempted, the prospects for Lesotho's future look very bleak indeed.

In concluding, I must emphasize that the future of the people of Lesotho cannot be divorced from that of the mass of the people of South Africa. Their battles are our battles. Such battles will be difficult ones, involving many sacrifices. But they will have to be fought if all the peoples of southern Africa, and especially those of South Africa and Namibia, are to enjoy genuine freedom. It is our duty as intellectuals to teach our people that we shall have to

sacrifice now so that peace may come in our lifetime. In so doing, we must strive to give the maximum support to the national liberation movements. This is the only way that we can make a meaningful contribution to the battle that is now raging in southern Africa.

NOTES

1. See the interview with Chakela in The Vanguard, June-September 1980, Roma, Lesotho.
2. The opposition BCP has undergone several splits since 1973, when the Deputy Party Leader, G. Ramoreboli, led a group into the Interim National Assembly in defiance of Mokhehle and the Executive Committee of the party. Perhaps the most serious split occurred in 1977, when the Secretary-General of the party, the late Koenyama Chakela, broke from Mokhehle's external wing of the party. At the time of this break, Chakela accused Mokhehle of working closely with the then Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Thus the term BCP (Mokhehle) is used here to denote the faction loyal to Mokhehle and closely allied to Pretoria. See, for example, the interview with Chakela, ibid.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN-SWAZI STATE RELATIONSHIP
IDEOLOGICAL HARMONY AND STRUCTURAL DOMINATION

John Daniel*

Shortly after the Maseru raid of 9 December 1982, Die Transvaler described all of southern Africa as an "operational area," highlighting thereby the dramatic change that has come over southern Africa in the 1980s. The struggle for political change in South Africa has become a regional war.

In the last two years, South African military forces and their armed surrogates, as well as hired security agents, have undertaken aggressive acts in at least seven neighbouring or nearby states, in the Seychelles, and in places as far away as London where the offices of the ANC and SWAPO were blown up in 1982.

This campaign, described by Stanley Uys as one of "segmental destabilisation" (Rand Daily Mail, 18/12/82), is the South African government's response to three major political developments that in the last decade have so altered the balance of political forces in the region that South Africa's regional hegemony has been seriously threatened. These events were:

- (a) the collapse of Portugal's African empire in 1974, and the

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overthrow of white rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, which brought into the region radical governments sympathetic to the South African liberation movements;

- (b) the emergence of a powerful black trade union movement in South Africa; and
- (c) the growing frequency and effectiveness of ANC operations inside South Africa.

Faced with this new situation, South Africa found it could no longer rely for domination on its economic power alone, and has thus had to resort increasingly to military means not only to impose its will on the whole region but also to protect the apartheid system itself. The many and varied military methods employed can be classified into the following categories:

- (a) direct military occupation, as in the case of 50,000 square kilometres of southern Angolan territory;
- (b) the arming, training, and other forms of sponsorship of so-called dissident groups in the neighbouring states, and especially UNITA in Angola, the MNR in Mozambique, and the LLA in Lesotho. In Zimbabwe the MNR has also reportedly been in action, and there is evidence of infiltration by soldiers based in the northern Transvaal;
- (c) cross-border raids on alleged ANC targets;
- (d) the killing, attempted killing, or kidnapping of ANC officials and sympathisers;
- (e) the attempted overthrow of legitimate governments, as in the case of the Seychelles where the mercenary group involved included members of South Africa's intelligence services; and
- (f) acts of economic sabotage, such as the blowing up of the Beira pipeline and the Luanda oil refinery, as well as countless numbers of bridges, roads, railways, water systems, and power lines.

The immediate aim of this campaign has been to punish those who give assistance to the ANC and to dissuade those governments that might be tempted to do so. The ultimate objective seems to be to so pressurize the governments of the region, or to so cripple their economies, that their very survival will require the expulsion of the ANC and other liberation movements from their territories. By so doing, the pre-1974 "cordon sanitaire" can be re-created.

It must be admitted that this South African offensive has so far been successful. South Africa seems able to strike at will whenever and wherever it chooses, and it seems as though there is no-one with the will or capacity to halt its aggression. The evaluation of the State Security Council in Pretoria appears to be that, if the Israelis can destroy West Beirut and get away with it, then who will prevent its more limited operations in Maputo and Maseru? But the fact is that the states of southern Africa, already suffering from the effects of drought and the international economic recession, are being forced to their economic knees by the effectiveness and ferocity of the South African offensive. ANC elements have already had to leave Lesotho and Swaziland, and the Mozambiquan government is under severe pressure to withdraw ANC operational units from the south of the country as the price for South African assistance in clamping a leash on MNR operations. To the spectacle of the PLO's withdrawal from its frontline in 1982, could soon be added that of the ANC.

In the context of the increasing conflict and political polarization in southern Africa, this paper attempts to analyse Swaziland's position and the role it can be expected to play as events unfold. The proposed land deal will also be considered to see where this fits into South Africa's political masterplan. To deal with these questions, an analysis of the Swazi state and political economy will first be provided by way of background.¹

Swaziland under colonial rule is all too often depicted as having been a neglected backwater of the British empire. Acquired for the strategic reason of protecting the eastern flank of British capital on the Witwatersrand, the argument is that capital had no essential interest

in Swaziland itself and that colonial capitalism had only the most minimal effect on the Swazi social formation. In this regard the suggestion is that the Swazi experience was not fundamentally dissimilar to that of Botswana or Lesotho.

This view is a serious distortion of the reality of the Swazi colonial experience (and of course of the experiences of Botswana and Lesotho as well). Albeit on a smaller scale, the Swazi experience was similar to that of Southern Rhodesia in that it involved amongst other things:

- (a) wholesale land alienation - the 1907 Land Proclamation stripped the Swazis of their occupancy rights to 67 per cent of the land and confined them to 32 so-called "native areas";
- (b) the imposition of a crippling tax burden - Alan Booth has argued elsewhere² that the level of taxation of the Swazis was the highest in Anglophone Africa;
- (c) penetration by both settler and multinational capital, the former of British and South African origin, and the latter overwhelmingly British, at least in the period up to independence in 1968; and
- (d) large scale proletarianization of the Swazi peasantry, involving both out-migration to the mines of the Rand and the farms of the eastern Transvaal, and in-migration to local centres of capital.

The net effect of all this was Swaziland's complete integration into the world capitalist system.

These developments naturally undermined the position and authority of the Swazi traditional rulers. Nevertheless, the colonial state took care to ensure that this erosion did not go too far. At crucial stages the state intervened to bolster the hegemony of the traditionalists over the non-capitalist sector. In the early 1940s, for example, the British government gave the King a large cash grant to accelerate his programme of buying back the land of which the Swazis had been dispossessed. Through such initiatives and their own efforts, the traditional strata retained coherence and entered the immediate pre-independence period as the single

most powerful indigenous group and the natural claimants to state power. In this period King Sobhuza formed a political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), and in an alliance with settler and multinational capital this party captured all the seats in the first post-independence legislature.

Constitutionally, Swaziland inherited the usual Westminster parliamentary framework, with the King as a figurehead monarch and real power vested in a bi-cameral legislature. The reality, however, was different. Effective legislative power was in the King's hands and the legislature did nothing without his stamp of approval. The one area over which he lacked control was the judiciary, and it was the decision of the Swazi High Court to declare null and void a constitutional amendment enacted by the legislature that precipitated the 1973 constitutional crisis. The King's response to the Court's decision was to revoke the constitution, dissolve parliament, ban all political parties including his own INM, introduce a state of emergency which included a provision for detention without trial for 60 day periods, announce the formation of a national army, and assume all executive, legislative and judicial powers. Some years of personal rule ensued (through a Council of Ministers). This gave way in 1979 to a new state form under which real power remained vested in the King and the Liqoqo (an inner council or executive of the Swazi National Council, a body to which all adult Swazi males belong). But their decisions were now to be enacted as legislation by a resuscitated parliament comprised of carefully chosen traditionalists. A cabinet headed by a prime minister exists, but it has never been a powerful policy-making body. Its primary function is to administer through the civil service decisions made by others in the traditional power structure.

King Sobhuza's death in August 1982 removed a towering and revered figure from the political arena. It also created a major power vacuum. This was filled by a three-part collective structure. The first part is the Regency, headed by Queen Regent Dzelibe and including the new office of Authorised Person. This innovation within the traditional institutional framework is perhaps best described as a special advisory position to the Queen Regent. Its incumbent is Prince Sozisa, for years one of Sobhuza's

closest advisors and a major figure in the ranks of the traditional politicians. The second part is the Liqoqo with 16 male members, the great majority of whom are princes, chiefs, councillors or ndvunas, with actual or close ties to the Royal Family. The handful of commoner members are all longstanding allies of the late King. Under Sobhuza the Liqoqo functioned in near anonymity but today it is a highly visible body. Its members were sworn in by the Chief Justice, they are salaried, they feature prominently in the local media, and without question they constitute the centre of state power in the post-Sobhuza era. It is not for nothing that the local press frequently describes the Liqoqo as "The Supreme Council of State." The third part of the new triangular power structure are Parliament and the Cabinet, whose functions remain essentially as they were under Sobhuza. Despite a remarkable independence of expression by some of its backbench members, parliament essentially rubberstamps into law the Liqoqo's decisions, with the Cabinet seeing to their implementation. The recent political crisis in Swaziland was largely prompted by former Prime Minister Mabandla's attempts to alter this subordinate position of the Cabinet. His abrupt dismissal has served to confirm that the Cabinet and Parliament will remain excluded from the arena of effective policy-making.

Basically this new Swazi state form amounts to the imposition over the whole society of the longstanding traditional structures of power, which under colonialism were restricted to the non-capitalist sector. Coexistent with this spread of traditional political power has been a second important change - the development by the traditional rulers of a material base in the capitalist sector of the economy. Under colonialism they had no such base, as the capitalist mode was kept under exclusive foreign domination and control. The most important reason for this change was Sobhuza's skilful use of a power given to him at independence, namely the control over Swaziland's mineral wealth. Shortly before independence he established the Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund as the depository for all monies from mineral royalties. As capital accumulated in the fund, he nominated a committee to manage it. Amongst the uses made of Tibiyo's capital have been:

- (a) the purchasing of freehold land as part of the programme to restore

the land to Swazi control. Much of this land has been used for agricultural schemes, the most notable being the Simunye project which has vastly increased the acreage under sugar cultivation. This project is managed by the British multinational, Tate and Lyle;

- (b) the acquiring of shares to establish joint ventures in a range of businesses, including most of the major multinational corporations operating in Swaziland (such as the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Lonhro, Anglo-American, Cortaulds, Turner and Newall, and Rennies); and
- (c) the launching of new business ventures such as Tibiyo Insurance Brokers (in conjunction with Hill Samuel), the Royal Swazi National Airline (originally in conjunction with Alitalia and Fokker), and brick manufacturing (in conjunction with a major British concern.

Tibiyo has thus emerged as the major vehicle for domestic capital accumulation in Swaziland. But the point to note is that this revenue does not accrue to the Ministry of Finance but to the traditional rulers. Furthermore, Tibiyo is exempt from the payment of taxes and its operations are not publicly accountable to parliament. Its six trustees include three princes of the Royal Family (one of whom is the Prime Minister, while the other two are members of the Liqoqo), as well as the former private secretary to the late King. Its management committee is headed by Dr Sishayi Nxumalo, one time cabinet minister and roving ambassador for the King, and one of the handful of Swazi politicians to be involved in the land deal negotiations.

Another major point worth noting about Tibiyo is the close working relationship that it has developed with foreign capital. In fact, Tibiyo has grown from a bank account into a royalist-controlled capitalist corporation, operating as a junior but nevertheless important partner in a growing and spreading alliance with multinational capital. When Tibiyo first began the process of acquiring equity it concentrated on the large multinationals involved in mining and in agro-industry. More recently it

has widened its operations and is now involved in the hotel and gambling sector (with Rennies), breweries (with South African Breweries), forestry, travel, insurance, and printing and publishing (including the production of its own weekly newspaper, The Observer, which was reportedly set up with the help of personnel from Tiny Rowland's operation in Zimbabwe). Presently Tibiyo is negotiating for shares in the largest internal haulage company in Swaziland, the British owned Swaziland United Transport. It is also branching out into the manufacturing sector with a recent agreement to make both clay and straw bricks in conjunction with two British firms, while plans are afoot to manufacture guava juice and marmalade.

Clearly then Tibiyo is spreading its net into all sectors of the economy. As it does so, the traditional rulers consolidate their economic power. In classic Marxist terms, Tibiyo can be analysed as a comprador element, an intermediary between those who exercise effective state power in Swaziland and foreign capital. Put another way, Tibiyo represents the means whereby the traditional rulers have turned themselves into capitalists.

State power in Swaziland can therefore be analysed in the following terms. Political power rests firmly in the hands of a traditional aristocracy, headed by a monarch and an enormous royal family, and including an elaborate network of chiefs, ndvunas and headmen - a power structure not unlike those in South Africa's bantustans. Like those homeland governments, the Swazi regime is conservative, and anxious to preserve traditional custom and culture as part of the general desire to maintain the status quo. It is opposed to radical ideologies that advocate mass political participation and an alternative economic order to that of capitalism. As such it is ideologically anti-Communist; far more so than either Botswana or Lesotho where diplomatic ties exist with Cuba, China, the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Swaziland has no such radical ties beyond a necessary and diplomatically correct relationship with its neighbour, Mozambique. Its other diplomatic links are with such anti-Communist nations as Taiwan and Israel, as well as with the UK and the US.

Furthermore, the regime is committed to capitalism in a particularly

purist form. It shares the "fruits" of capital's presence in Swaziland via Tibiyo and sees the role of government as being to provide the necessary wherewithal for capital's essential task of accumulation. Recently, in a speech that could well have been written by Adam Smith, former Prime Minister Mabandla described the government's role in the economy as "largely limited to providing the physical infrastructure needed for private enterprise to flourish and it is intended to keep it that way." (Times of Swaziland, 8/12/82).

What this means is that in the ideological divide between capitalism and socialism in southern Africa, Swaziland stands firmly in the former camp. From this the assumption can be made that the present Swazi ruling order probably perceives a more serious threat to its survival from the spread of Mozambiquan-style socialism or the emergence of an ANC government in South Africa than from the continuation of the apartheid regime in South Africa. In fact, Swaziland is South Africa's most reliable partner in the whole regional network of states, and in a situation where it may have to take sides between the interests of Pretoria and those of the ANC it will undoubtedly chose the former. The critical point to understand is that this decision is prompted not only by the likely adverse consequences of siding with the ANC, or by the fact of Swaziland's structural integration into the South African economy, but also by important ideological factors. In many respects the Swazi and South African ruling classes view the world through the same eyes; between the two there is an ideological harmony of interests. This was clearly illustrated when the Swazi Commissioner of Police justified his recent banning of a meeting scheduled by the Federation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South Africa on the grounds that "these people were going to use their meeting as a platform to criticise South Africa. Also on their agenda was how they could assist the liberation movements fighting South Africa." (Times of Swaziland, 7/4/83).

This ideological factor should not be construed to mean that the Swaziland government endorses the racism that is inherent in the apartheid system. It does not. It has always abhorred racial discrimination in South Africa and is genuinely committed to the non-racial ideal. Where it sees eye-to-eye with South Africa's rulers is in a mutual conception of

how political power should be held and exercised, a mutual belief in capitalism, and a shared perception of the so-called "Soviet threat" to southern Africa.

The octopus-like grip which South Africa has on the Swazi economy serves to reinforce this ideological bond. It also gives Pretoria an array of potentially coercive mechanisms with which, should it be necessary, it could bend Swaziland to its will, or at least ensure that Swaziland does nothing to jeopardize South Africa's security. Some of the most important mechanisms can be outlined briefly.

(a) Foreign ownership and control of the economy

The Swazi economy, like most Third World capitalist economies, is overwhelmingly owned, controlled or managed by outsiders, mainly South African. Within the constellation of capitalist forces in the economy, South African capital has now eclipsed British as the most powerful. Today, British capital dominates only the banking and agricultural sectors, while South African capital virtually monopolizes manufacturing, trade, tourism, and transportation and communications, while holding a sizeable stake in the mining industry. The extent of South African involvement in the Swazi economy can be illustrated by the fact that in every year since independence South Africa has supplied Swaziland with just over 95 per cent of its imports, through the transportation monopoly held by South African railways over the haulage of freight both in and out of the country. Visitors to Swaziland often express amazement at the array of goods available to the consumer. One can buy virtually anything in towns like Mbabane (the capital) and Manzini, whilst in many African countries it is often hard to buy even basic commodities. The reason for this is that Swaziland's wholesale and retail sectors are simply extensions of the South African mercantile market. Metro monopolizes the wholesale trade, while OK Bazaars, Spar and Dee Bees are the largest retail outlets. Two consequences flow from this. One is that South African capital is a major employer in the economy, probably only second to the sugar

industry, in which South Africa is not involved. The other is that the South African presence, in a material sense, provides "the good life" in Swaziland, not to mention the considerable trade generated by Zambian and Mozambiquan residents on their frequent shopping incursions. In a situation of rapidly rising unemployment in Swaziland, any significant withdrawal by South African capital would have grave consequences, while the accompanying decline in living standards would seriously affect the urbanized and westernised classes. The Swazi rulers are anxious to avoid such developments, and this means that they can ill afford to alienate the South African government or to allow events to occur that could adversely affect the investment climate for South African capital.

(b) Transportation links

Mention has already been made of the near monopoly enjoyed by South African Railways over Swaziland's import and export traffic. The only dent in this situation has been the small flow of goods transported through Maputo harbour on what from 1964-80 was Swaziland's only railway, running from near Mbabane to Maputo. Given the relatively short distance between these two points, and the fact of Mozambique's recent decolonization, logic would have suggested an increased use of this line as a way of reducing Swaziland's dependence on the South African connection. This, after all, is an explicit goal of SADCC of which Swaziland is a member. But Swaziland in fact has moved in the opposite direction, consolidating its reliance upon South Africa. A new railway line has been constructed from the centre of the country to Richards Bay in South Africa, and a recent decision has been taken to extend this line northwards to link up with the South African rail system at Komatipoort. The costs of this project will be shared, with Swaziland and South Africa financing the stretches in their respective countries. The whole line, however, including the 80 kilometre stretch inside South Africa, will be managed by Swazi Railways. The line will carry South African

phosphate, coal, and citrus through Swaziland to Richards Bay, as well as sugar from Mhlume in Swaziland, previously exported through Maputo. One result of this link will be the increasing integration of the Swazi and South African rail systems and the diversion of Swazi exports away from Mozambique. As Swaziland's need for the Maputo link declines, it could become increasingly vulnerable to South African attacks as a means of still further depriving the Mozambiquan government of the vital foreign exchange earned by Maputo harbour.

(c) The South African Customs Union (SACU)

Swaziland has been a member of this Union since 1909, together with South Africa and the other two BLS countries (Botswana and Lesotho). It operates on the basis of unanimous consent, and the dissenting vote of one party can forestall any agreement. Analysis of the use of this veto power shows that it has been exercised more often by South Africa than by the three other members put together, a fact which is hardly surprising given the "David and Goliath" nature of the relationship between the BLS countries and the Republic. In recent years South Africa has used the veto to block the development of industries in the BLS countries that could rival established South African concerns (it blocked, at least for an initial period, construction in Swaziland of textile, fertilizer and television component plants. Ultimately, the latter two were built).³ While Pretoria's actions can be interpreted in terms of protectionist economics, it would also be equally plausible to see them as part of a design to maintain the subordination of the BLS economies. More recently, Pretoria blocked a new sharing formula that had been painstakingly negotiated over an 18 month period by an all-party group. The new formula stood to increase the BLS share of SACU's revenue. Explaining his government's actions, P.W. Botha stated that... "we see the Customs Union not in isolation, but as part of a comprehensive regional development strategy." Interestingly, this statement was made at the so-called "confederation summit"

of South Africa and its "independent" homelands, and it seems clear that the customs union agreement has become a key instrument of Pretoria's overtly interventionist foreign policy in the region. The suspicion exists that the bait of increased SACU revenue is being used (i) to pressurize the BLS countries into accepting the bantustans into SACU, thereby conferring a degree of international recognition on them, (ii) to draw the BLS states in a de facto manner into the Constellation of Southern African States framework, or (iii) to integrate them in some way into the new regional "deconcentration" strategy. This latter is perhaps the most likely. This would have the effect of increasing the degree of economic integration in the region under South African domination, which in turn would add to South Africa's political leverage over the region. Whatever the case, the BLS states clearly face an agonising dilemma, especially as their share of custom union receipts constitute huge and vital sources of domestic revenue - 71 per cent of the Lesotho government's revenue, 63 per cent of Swaziland's, and 37 per cent of Botswana's in 1981-82.⁴ Can these countries really refuse to dance to Pretoria's tune under such conditions?

(d) Electricity and fuel supplies

In 1981 Swaziland imported 68 per cent of its electricity from ESCOM in South Africa. A major hydro-electric project presently under construction will only reduce this dependence to 50 per cent. As one government official once told me..."South Africa can literally turn out the lights in Swaziland." It could also bring the country to a standstill, for South Africa is Swaziland's sole supplier of fuel. There has been talk in recent years of importing fuel through Maputo, but nothing has yet been done to diversify Swaziland's fuel dependence on the Republic.

(e) Citrus exports

Canned and citrus fruits constitute Swaziland's fourth largest

earner of export revenue, and the industry is the country's largest employer of female labour. It is an important sector of the economy, and one controlled by the Swaziland Citrus Board. By agreement between the Swazi and South African governments, this board markets its fruit through the South African Co-operative Citrus Exchange, which is responsible for marketing policy, distribution, promotion, and sale of the fruit, both in South Africa and in Swaziland's main overseas markets.

(f) Employment

In comparison with Botswana and Lesotho, the flow of migrant labour to South Africa's mines is relatively low in Swaziland. At its peak in the late 1970s, the country supplied 28,000 miners. The present figure is around 14,000. However, we must add to this figure the unknown but not insignificant number of Swazis who work as migrants on the farms in the eastern Transvaal. With the rising level of unemployment in Swaziland already causing concern, and with less than half of the country's school leavers now being absorbed into the wage economy, any cutback in the migrant flow to South Africa would exacerbate a serious problem. Swaziland cannot therefore risk South Africa's wrath and suffer the expulsion of its labour, as has been the fate of Zimbabwe and to a certain extent Mozambique.

The conclusion that follows from all the above is that Swaziland exists as a satellite of South Africa. So too, of course, do Botswana and Lesotho. But there is a difference. While there is probably little of significance that the BLS countries can do to extricate themselves from the mesh of South African economic domination, there is little evidence that Swaziland, in contrast to Botswana and Lesotho, seriously wishes to do so; a fact that is not really surprising, given the ideological bond that exists between Swaziland and South Africa. This difference was illustrated by the reaction of the BLS governments to the Maseru raid. Botswana and Lesotho were unequivocal in their condemnation of Pretoria, but from Swaziland there was not one word of explicit official criticism. The Swazi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Richard Dlamini, described the raid

as "a terribly sad and tragic example of what can result from lack of tolerance, understanding, and above all the lack of dialogue," and stressed his government's determination "not to allow people who come to our country under the camouflage of refugees and accept our hospitality to use our peaceful land to launch attacks on our neighbours with whom we wish to live in peace." (Swazi Observer, 18/12/82). It does not seem unfair to suggest that what Minister Dlamini was really saying to the ANC was..."you got what you deserved." During the recent budget debate on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Swazi Parliament, a backbench MP, Prince Maquba, asked whether the Minister had consulted the Cabinet before making these statements. He then went on to state that "the raid was particularly painful because it was a white regime attacking black people. It was, therefore, especially sad that the Minister appeared to be congratulating the South African government for that incident." (Times of Swaziland, 30/3/83).

Turning at last to the land deal, the negotiations over this deal have been shrouded in secrecy, and the South African government has not explained its motives beyond Minister Koornhof's improbable statements about "correcting history" and "uniting peoples who belong together." In the absence of official explanations one is left with speculation. Among the various theories advanced, two seem most favoured. Both relate to South Africa's foreign and strategic objectives in the region. The first sees the plan as an attempt to lure Swaziland into the Constellation of States. This would have the advantage of rejuvenating the constellation plan, as well as of weakening SADCC, which Pretoria regards "very negatively as a counter-constellation which threatens the country's traditionally firm economic grip on the sub-continent. The Government (South African) may be looking to detach Swaziland from SADCC and favour it economically, so that the alliance of black states loses credibility" (Peter Vale in The Star, 9/8/82). The second theory sees the land deal as part of Pretoria's "total strategy," and views it as a means of "persuading" Swaziland to take decisive actions against the ANC in order to close off its use of Swaziland as a conduit.

My view is that these are only the incidental and secondary objectives

of the land deal; objectives that Pretoria is already pursuing by other methods outlined earlier in this paper. It is in any case hardly necessary to take so drastic a step as the ceding of territory to persuade a pliable client like Swaziland to fall into line with South African wishes. I therefore believe that the primary motivation lies elsewhere, and is to be found in the context of apartheid's grand design to impose "independence" on its homelands, irrespective of their wishes, and thereby denationalize the majority of South Africa's population. The problem is that certain stubborn homelands refuse to play the game. Two of these are KaNgwane and KwaZulu, and Pretoria has come up with typically drastic proposals to deal with their resistance. Most drastic is the complete elimination of KaNgwane by giving it to Swaziland. In this way Pretoria's denationalization objective is realized with some 800,000 South African Swazis being removed from the citizenship role. The transfer of the Ingwavuma region will not solve South Africa's "KwaZulu" problem in the same way, but it could be an effective means of pressurizing and warning Gatsha Buthelezi of the adverse consequences of his continuing opposition to apartheid's plans. In short, the Swazi land deal is part of a scheme to further a key aspect of the Nationalist Party's domestic policies, as well as being a stick with which to beat a stubborn homeland leadership.

As well as speculating about Pretoria's motives, it is also interesting to ask what is in this deal for Swaziland? Why risk international opprobrium, including possible expulsion from the OAU and SADCC, to gain two pieces of territory that are little more than rural slums, into which hundreds and thousands of South Africa's so-called "surplus citizens" have been dumped, and in which unemployment is massive and per capita incomes pitifully low. Moreover, in both KaNgwane and KwaZulu there seems to be overwhelming opposition amongst the residents to the land transfer, opposition which in KaNgwane has been organized by an articulate, non-aristocratic politician into a political movement that embraces goals, if not methods, similar to those of the ANC. This organization and its leader would not easily be assimilated into a systematically depoliticised society like Swaziland. So why does Swaziland want it?

The answer really lies in the political ambitions of the late King Sobhuza. His three overriding goals were to regain the political independence of his kingdom, to redress the pattern of landownership inside the country in favour of the Swazis, and to reunite the Swazi people. The first two he achieved. The proposed land deal offered the chance of at least partially fulfilling the third. And such was the King's standing in the eyes of his people that he legitimated the deal and enabled them to disregard its negative implications. For the South African government and other protagonists of the deal, Sobhuza's death was particularly inopportune, as it robbed the scheme of much of its legitimacy. Given this fact, and the degree of opposition inside South Africa, the plan, as originally conceived, is now almost certainly dead, although a compromise version might still emerge from the Rumpf Commission which is studying the question.

Some observers have suggested that the recent Swazi crackdown on the ANC indicates a hidden security factor in the proposed land deal. It is impossible to know for certain if this is the case, although it would not be an unreasonable speculation. My view, however, is that this crackdown would have happened anyway, land deal or no land deal. And here again Sobhuza's death has made an important difference. Sobhuza had a long historic association with the ANC and he was known to have respected the organization's top leadership. As such, he was prepared to allow a limited ANC presence in the country, provided Swaziland was not used as a springboard for attacks on South Africa. However, as the tempo and effectiveness of ANC operations increased, and evidence mounted that Swaziland was being used as a transit route for ANC guerrillas, Pretoria increased its pressure on the Swazi authorities. The first casualty was the longstanding ANC representative in the country, Stanley Mabizela. This highly regarded official was forced to leave the country early in 1982 after direct talks between the then Swazi Prime Minister and the ANC in Lusaka. Three months later, Mabizela's deputy, Petros Nzima, was killed in a car bomb explosion together with his wife, Jabu, who was SACTU's regional chief. No replacements for these officials have been allowed to enter the country. It is known that at this time (mid-1982) the Swazi security police had wanted to round up and expel

ANC members from the country. Sobhuza prevented this. His death removed the obstacle, and the Maseru raid provided the pretext. Under the guise of "protecting" the lives of ANC members and innocent Swazi citizens, those who comprised the organized infrastructure of the ANC presence in Swaziland were rounded up, and shortly thereafter most of them agreed to leave the country "voluntarily" for Mozambique. Some of those detained remain in Swaziland, but the ANC's presence is a mere shadow of what it was 18 months ago.

The recent dismissal of Prime Minister Mabandla has weakened that faction of the Swazi political establishment who shared Sobhuza's sympathetic attitude towards the ANC, even though the power struggle that produced Mabandla's political demise was not a reflection of serious ideological differences within the Swazi power bloc. What Mabandla was trying to do was to weaken the Liqoqo's monopoly over policy-making in favour of a stronger influence for the Cabinet. Had he succeeded, the major impact would have been on domestic rather than foreign policy, with one important exception - the land deal. It appears that Mabandla was opposed to the deal, and had he prevailed in the power struggle this would undoubtedly have been the final nail in the coffin for this scheme. His eclipse will have little effect, perhaps, on the ultimate fate of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma, but it has certainly strengthened the political grip of the more conservative faction in Swazi politics. The result is likely to be a deepening of the political and economic links with South Africa, greater co-operation on security issues, and a more hostile attitude towards the ANC and political refugees in general. Swaziland will continue to claim that its attitude towards the liberation struggle in South Africa remains one of neutrality. But the fact is that in 1982 the position shifted significantly, away from neutrality and towards the interests of the status quo in South Africa. Given the ideological and structural factors in the present South African-Swazi state relationship, no other position could realistically have been expected from the Swazi rulers.

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2. See Alan Booth, "The Development of the Swazi Labour Market, 1900-1968," Ibid.
3. Referring to these incidents, the General Manager of the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland, Mr Walter Dlamini, was quoted a year ago as saying..."In my experience at the NIDCS, I have found that the present Customs Union arrangement is, to a major degree, an impediment to the desired industrial development of Swaziland." Swazi Observer, 13/3/82.
4. For further details on SACU and the new revenue-sharing formula, see "South Africa stalls on Customs Agreement." African Business, 53, January 1983, pp.16-17.

IMPERIALISM, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF ZIMBABWE

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South Africa's destabilization of her neighbours is the most serious threat so far to stable international relations, regional security, and co-operation in southern Africa. As a means of creating instability and the disruption of social and political order, destabilization is a common strategy perfected by imperialism to block the achievement of progressive socio-economic change. In this paper the role of South Africa as a sub-imperial gendarme in the region will be analysed within the broad context of contemporary patterns of imperialist intervention. In our examination of the impact of the different forms of destabilization - economic, military, political and psychological - the Zimbabwean experience will be cited for illustrative purposes. In the process an attempt will be made to reveal the interrelationship between the contemporary patterns of imperialist intervention, the surrogate sub-imperial role of Pretoria, the intensification of domestic repression within South Africa, and the growth of South African militarism and aggression.

Forms and Strategies of Imperialist Intervention

The post-Second World War era ushered in the cold war and intensified the geo-political rivalry between the imperialist and socialist powers. Whereas the latter threw their weight behind national liberation struggles against colonialism and imperialism, the imperialist powers sought to dilute the content of the independence they were forced by internal and

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international pressures to grant to their territories. Certain forms of economic, military and political relationships were retained in the post-independence period to permit imperialist-nurtured forms of dependence. And when certain states attempted to break free from such relations of dependence, the Western imperialist powers quite typically resorted to militarist strategies of destabilization. The experiences of Vietnam, Cuba, the Congo, Chile, Nicaragua, and many others spring quickly to mind.

If the cold war has generally characterised the uneasy relations between the super powers since the end of the Second World War, the use of force to block the attainment of national independence and socialism has become an intrinsic component of imperialist strategy, as the aforementioned examples of Cuba (after the revolution), Vietnam (during and after its national liberation), the Congo (under the progressive stewardship of Lumumba), Chile (under Allende), and now Nicaragua show. Imperialist destabilization has assumed military, political, economic, and even psychological dimensions. The primacy of any one of these is normally dictated by the strategic and tactical imperatives of specific situations at specific times. In instances where economic and political destabilization may well produce the desired results (for example the collapse of a particular government), the military option is obviously unnecessary. In others, where economic and political destabilization alone cannot achieve the desired objectives, the military option may well be used as a last resort. This military option can take the form of both direct and indirect intervention. As the Vietnamese, Cuban and Nicaraguan experiences demonstrate, imperialism increasingly relies on surrogates in its military manoeuvres of destabilization. These are usually anti-progressive domestic forces but sometimes mercenaries are used.

South Africa's Sub-Imperial Role

The shrinkage of colonial empires since 1945 has heightened the struggle for spheres of political, economic and military influence by the major imperialist powers. Their perspectives on global development and security revolve around their overriding objective - the consolidation of their dominance, directly or indirectly, in as many geographical spheres

of the globe as possible. The quest for strategic resources, such as oil, gold, chrome, and many others, assumes unparalleled significance.

Within the imperialist system, South Africa forms an important strategic link. As an industrializing capitalist state, it helps to serve many of the objectives of the imperialist system, its distorted and anachronistic socio-political structures notwithstanding. South Africa is a substantial producer and exporter of a number of key strategic minerals, such as uranium and chrome, for the military-industrial complexes of the Western industrialized nations. It provides extremely favourable conditions for investment by transnational corporations, which are able to reap mammoth profits from cheap black labour. And South Africa's strategic location provides bases from which the West can monitor the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. In the event of a global conflict, South Africa would clearly be a highly prized ally of the Western powers. In addition to being a major exporter and importer of goods, and a strategic regional ally, South Africa is also viewed by the Western powers as a base from which to mount economic expansion into the hinterland of the sub-continent. In sum, therefore,..."the power of white South Africa is in the final analysis the power of Western imperialism, which is its mainstay, economically, militarily and politically." ¹

Specific reference can now be made to the forms of economic and military relationships between South Africa, the Western powers, and Israel. The transnational corporations perform a key role in providing the hardware and finance for the South African arms industry. Their investments in advanced machinery and equipment has helped to create the requisite industrial infrastructure to enable Pretoria to produce 75 per cent of its own military needs. ² It is the regime's policy to offer as many arms contracts as possible to private companies. The banks, including recently the International Monetary Fund, also play a vital role in facilitating loans. It has been estimated that South Africa is the largest military-industrial complex in the southern hemisphere. As an exporter of major weapons systems, it is ranked 11th amongst the 29 leading arms exporting countries. Over 70 per cent of the investment in arms manufacturing in South Africa is from the subsidiaries of such transnational corporations as Philips, General Motors, Ford, ICL, Plessey,

Marconi, and Leyland. It emerges clearly, therefore, that:

...the bulk of military production in South Africa is done under licenses the Western monopolies grant the South African state and private companies. The French company, Marcel Dassault, for instance, sold South Africa a license to produce short-range bombers of the Mirage-Milan type. The Italian company, Atlas-Macchi sold a license to produce Impala aircraft, and the French company, Construction Mecanique de Normandie Panhard, sold a license to produce armoured vehicles. South Africa has also bought licenses for the production of helicopters, missiles, warships, small arms etc....³

It is also known that four nuclear-powered submarines are currently being constructed at a South African naval base under conditions of great secrecy. At the same time, reports have circulated that the Botha regime has provided financial assistance to Israel for its plans to build a nuclear fighter-bomber.

Relations between the two garrison states of Israel and South Africa developed throughout the 1970s, culminating in very close strategic and defence links. Their use of destabilizing tactics against their neighbours, and their close relations with the US, are common similarities between the two states. Israel has provided South Africa, amongst other things, with Reschef-class warships equipped with Gabriel surface-to-air missiles, Ramata patrol boats, aircraft computers, electronic military fences, and with help in the modernization of its Centurion tanks. Furthermore, nuclear co-operation between the two regimes is believed to have commenced immediately after the signing of their scientific co-operation agreement in 1976. South Africa is also reported to have obtained assistance in nuclear research from Israel scientists, some of whom have been spotted at the Pelindaba plant. When a Soviet satellite pinpointed a nuclear test site in the Kalahari in 1977, it was widely presumed that this was the location for a possible South African-Israeli test site. In September 1979 both US and USSR satellites over the South Atlantic registered a "double flash", characteristic of a nuclear explosion, and a joint South African-Israeli task force was known to be in the area at this time.

Defence co-operation between South Africa and Israel has also been stepped up in counter-insurgency techniques and through joint training programmes.⁴ There have consequently been reports of frequent visits to

South Africa by senior Israeli military personnel to lecture on military procedures, of South African teams being trained in counter-insurgency techniques and quick-strike tactics by the Israelis, and of Israeli advisors having been seen providing support during South African raids into Angola.

Adventurism, Militarism and Destabilization

South Africa's short-lived and ill-fated outward looking policy of the early 1970s reflected the substantial regional influence that the apartheid state possessed over regional security prior to the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and of the Smith regime in Rhodesia. The changed geo-political landscape in southern Africa following the liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe could not fail to have a profound effect on the content and orientation of black aspirations in South Africa itself.⁵ Soweto and the consequent upsurge in the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia led to a reassessment of both internal and external strategy by the apartheid state. As Mohan has observed:

...both the scale of the Soweto killings and the continual tightening of the screws of repression since then proved, if proof were needed, that black resistance is increasingly becoming harder to crush... and Pretoria will be obliged by the very 'logic' of the unfolding of armed resistance inside South Africa's boundaries to pursue an increasingly adventurist and aggressive course against its neighbours...⁶

The shift away from detente towards a much more adventurist and militaristic foreign policy was completed in 1975-76, when South Africa invaded Angola. Simon Jenkins has identified this shift in the following terms:

...the new South Africa of the 1980s refuses to apologise for anything, let alone apartheid. It spurns the "cocktail diplomacy" of the past and present foreign ministers. It is built on the reality of South Africa's military and economic power, particularly towards the frontline states... The gun and the maize train will speak louder than a hundred speeches at the United Nations. This transformation emanates, like change in the most stable and introverted oligarchies, from the armed forces; in this case an elite strengthened by the meritocracy of war...⁷

This shift in South African foreign policy reflected the increasing

ascendancy of the State Security Council (dominated by the generals) over the Department of Foreign Affairs. Following the collapse of the Constellation of Southern African States idea, armed aggression, such as that against Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia, has been an increasingly important feature of South African foreign policy in the sub-continent.

As Jenkins reminds us:

Soldiers do not have policies. They have weapons and tactics for their use. They point out that Black Africa yearns to destabilize South Africa. Black Africa must be shown the price. The armoury is formidable: raids on Matola and Maseru; backing for UNITA, ZIPRA, MNR, and LLA; sabotage of Luanda, Beira, Cabora-Bassa; the manipulation of transport links, trade agreements and migrant remittances. Sometimes the weapons fail, such as the ludicrous attempt to topple the Seychelles regime in 1981. ⁸

Logistical and material support for bandits in the neighbouring states has been aimed at destabilizing both the social and political order and economic structures. Attacks on communication lines in Angola and Mozambique, for example, have had the objective of paralysing the transport links of the landlocked nations in the region. SADCC's programmes to improve and extend the communication networks in the region have therefore been obvious targets for South African inspired sabotage. The damaging effects of these attacks on SADCC's communications infrastructure have resulted in the loss of millions of dollars, according to the organization's executive secretary. ⁹

The Destabilization of Zimbabwe

One of the major objectives of South Africa's ill-fated proposal to establish a constellation of southern African states (CONSAS) under Pretoria's hegemony was the inclusion of a pliant Rhodesia as a key member of the constellation. The victory of the Patriotic Front and the severe electoral defeat of the pro-South African parties in Zimbabwe was therefore a major blow to Pretoria's plans. Instead, it soon became clear that Zimbabwe's new government was not only anti-racist but also a committed member of the frontline states and SADCC. Zimbabwe's new stance was obviously anathema to the South African leadership which soon made facilities available for the military training of several thousand members of the renegade auxiliary forces that had previously served the Muzorewa regime. The granting of such

facilities was clearly a hostile act, but one consistent with the militaristic trend in Pretoria's foreign policy. The success, prosperity and stability of a black-ruled neighbouring state that was non-racial, non-aligned and anti-imperialist constituted an obvious threat to the apartheid regime, particularly by providing a "dangerous example" for the South African masses to follow in their struggle towards national liberation. Economic, political, psychological and military pressures were therefore brought to bear by Pretoria in an effort to destabilize a successful experiment in reconstruction and stability.

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, has succinctly analysed the objectives of South Africa's strategy in the following terms: ¹⁰

- (a) the removal or reduction in the fear of the power of example that may become a potent force in giving inspiration to the oppressed masses in Namibia and South Africa. Viable economies and stable democratic societies in neighbouring states would constitute such an example;
- (b) the relegation of the neighbouring states to the status of economic satellites in accordance with Pretoria's bantustan policy and the constellation of southern African states proposal;
- (c) the intimidation of neighbouring states so that they discontinue their support for liberation movements struggling to overthrow the apartheid regime; and
- (d) the foiling of genuine regional co-operation under the auspices of SADCC.

Quite clearly the common thread running through Pretoria's destabilization strategy towards its neighbours is the negation of their economic and political development in order to prevent them from being in a position to support the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. Destabilization is essentially a strategy to forestall domestic social and political change in South Africa by creating turbulence and chaos in neighbouring states. Zimbabwe has no illusions, therefore, that as long as apartheid

exists the struggle for liberation will intensify, as will South Africa's destabilization of those states in the region that support the struggle.

Forms of Destabilization against Zimbabwe

Military and Espionage Activities

Since Zimbabwe's attainment of independence, South Africa has undertaken contingency plans to launch aggression against the Zimbabwean state and its people. It has, for this purpose, trained the auxiliary forces that fled Rhodesia at independence. Several training camps have been established, particularly in the northern Transvaal. Sabotage groups, consisting of black and white mercenaries, have been trained at Letaba and in the Transkei. In order to take advantage of the difficult security situation in Matabeleland earlier this year, South Africa recruited and trained a Matabele brigade. The brigade has reportedly recruited Zimbabwean workers in the South African mines, as well as certain elements of ZIPRA.

The saboteurs and mercenaries who have infiltrated Zimbabwe have been known to co-operate with the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR). Several of them were killed in the Sengwe area in August 1982, and some in Mwenzi in October 1982. As recently as September 1983, a number of saboteurs, attempting to blow up the fuel depot at Beit Bridge, were apprehended. The targets of such saboteurs and killers have included the Inkomo Barracks near Harare, the Thornhill air base near Gweru, and the ZANU (PF) headquarters, as well as individual targets such as ANC representative, Joe Gqabi, who was assassinated in 1981. All this evidence demonstrates South African involvement, as do its spy rings, one of which (involving Philip Hartleybury and Colin Evans) was exposed in 1982. Only the vigilance of the Zimbabwean security services have prevented more South African-inspired attacks and sabotage.

Economic Sabotage

South Africa has also attempted to disrupt the Zimbabwean economy and paralyse its transport system. At the height of the bumper harvest of 1980-81, South African Railways withdrew their locomotives from

Zimbabwe, thereby severely disrupting internal and external trade flows. The sabotage of the Beira-Mutare railway disrupted the flow of trade through the port of Beira. The rail link between Zimbabwe and Maputo has also been cut. These South African-inspired attacks have been accompanied by other acts of economic sabotage, such as the calculated repatriation of Zimbabwean workers from South Africa. Together these tactics underline Pretoria's strategy of economic warfare against Zimbabwe.

The Propaganda War

An important component of South Africa's destabilization strategy against Zimbabwe has been its massive propaganda barrage against the Mugabe government. Reports in the South African media have been extremely negative, predicting doom and gloom for Zimbabwe because of its socialist oriented stance on domestic and international issues. One radio station in South Africa now beams regularly to Zimbabwe to spread alarm and despondency in the nation. The foreign press corps, based almost entirely in South Africa, have also become a vital medium in the dissemination of anti-Zimbabwe propaganda. And the fact that such propaganda has not been confined to Zimbabwe, but has also been directed against other frontline states, prompted a collective response in the form of the Kadoma Declaration. This encourages the international press corps to abandon its biased coverage of events in the region from inside South Africa, in favour of on-the-scene objective coverage from within the frontline states themselves.

Conclusion

In this paper South Africa's role in the world imperialist system has been analysed, with particular reference to the growth of militarism in South Africa and Pretoria's strategy of destabilization against her neighbours in the region. It is a role that fulfils a number of imperialist objectives, and in particular the accumulation of capital under favourable conditions in South Africa itself, the quest for strategic military bases, and the destabilization of socialist-oriented states. The attainment of these objectives by South Africa would coincide with the defence and foreign policy preoccupations of the major imperialist powers. It is fairly clear, therefore, that the strengthened links and collusion between South Africa,

Israel, Taiwan, the US, and a number of Latin American dictatorships express certain common strategic interests.

The paper has tried to demonstrate that Pretoria has pursued an adventurist and militarist policy against neighbouring states in a frantic bid to divert attention from the mounting tempo of the liberation struggle within South Africa itself. As the ANC's President, Oliver Tambo, has said, Pretoria hardly needs reminding that:

...our bases are in South Africa itself, our bases are among the people of our country, our bases are everywhere, in the mountains, near the Koeberg nuclear power station in the Cape, a thousand miles from any border, near to the SASOL petrol tanks in the heart of the country, and yes right in Pretoria itself, close to the Voortrekkerhoogte military headquarters. ¹¹

In Zimbabwe, South Africa has employed economic and military means, as well as propaganda, in an effort to create instability and chaos. Its hostile acts of aggression and provocation against the government and people of Zimbabwe are legion. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Pretoria's destabilization of the surrounding states will not cease as long as apartheid exists and the liberation struggle continues.

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SADCC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Introduction

The majority of African countries have now achieved their political independence. The last vestiges of colonialism in Africa are now found mostly in southern Africa, and specifically in Namibia and the Republic of South Africa where the last liberation struggles are still being waged under the leadership of SWAPO and the ANC respectively. The main tasks before the majority-ruled states of southern Africa today are the consolidation of their political independence and the achievement of economic independence. The latter is particularly crucial, for, as Lenin pointed out, the achievement of economic independence must always be the principal objective of the liberation movement.¹

In the struggle for economic liberation, the states of southern Africa attach great importance to regional co-operation, and the most recent and important initiative towards realizing this was the establishment in 1980 of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), commonly pronounced as "SADEC".

SADCC comprises the nine southern African states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its overall objective is the reduction of economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa, through co-ordinated regional co-operation between its

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member states.

A number of scholarly papers have already been written on SADCC. This statement merely seeks to give a brief overview of the socio-economic and political background to the emergence of SADCC; the objectives, structures, programmes and progress of the organization to date; and the problems and prospects for effective co-operation in the southern African region.

Integration and Dependency in Southern Africa: The Background to the Formation of SADCC

The integration of the indigenous African societies of southern Africa into the world capitalist system conformed in many ways to the general world pattern. But there were a number of modifications peculiar to the specific development of capital accumulation in the sub-continent. This process of integration and domination started with the colonization of southern Africa by Portuguese and Dutch settlers in the 16th and 17th centuries. It has continued upto the present time through a number of different stages, associated respectively with Dutch and British merchant capital, British finance capital, and finally Western and South African monopoly capital.

The development of capitalist integration and dependency was preceded by the usual process of primitive accumulation of capital. The process was characterized by the plunder of the African of his livestock by Dutch merchants, and his dispossession of land by the settlers. The mechanism of unequal exchange between European capitalism and African communalism, which characterized this period of primitive accumulation, resulted in the extinction of pre-colonial economic systems and in the creation of huge colonial surpluses that came to constitute one of the main financial sources for the subsequent development of capitalism in southern Africa in the second half of the 19th century.

The military subjugation of the independent political systems of the African peoples was an essential aspect of the colonization of indigenous societies, and of their integration into the mainstream of world capitalist

development and domination. At the same time, open rivalry between the British colonies and the Dutch or Boer republics was brought about by the strategic aims of British imperialism, namely the economic and political unification of South Africa under the British Crown and the crucial control of the gold mining industry in the Boer republic of the Transvaal.² These objectives were achieved with the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, following the British victory in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.

From the second half of the 19th century, British finance capital came to play a leading role not only in the development of capitalism in southern Africa but also in the early formation of the integrationist ties of the present economic complex of southern Africa. In the mines alone in 1884, British investments were 34 million pounds sterling.³ The discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley area in the 1870s, and gold in the Rand area in the 1880s, ushered in an early phase of industrial development that gave an additional boost to the integrationist processes in the region.

Capitalist development could not take place on the basis of merchant and finance capital alone, of course. A regular supply of cheap migrant labour was also needed. The alienation of the African peasant from his land helped to solve this problem by "freeing" him to provide labour power that could be bought below the value of its reproduction. The early beginnings of the integrationist processes in southern Africa came to be centred, therefore, around the recruitment of cheap African migrant labour to the mines from the so-called "native reserves" within South Africa itself and the neighbouring British and Portuguese controlled territories. One of the first acts of the Chamber of Mines, established in 1889, was to establish a monopsonist labour recruiting agency (WENELA) in the Portuguese territories. A similar agency was established in 1912 to recruit in the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. By the early decades of the 20th century, the British protectorates, the Portuguese colonies, and the South African native reserves had become in effect the labour reserves of the industrial centres in the Union of South Africa.

Other integrationist processes in southern Africa emerged as South African capitalism developed quickly on the basis of the exploitation of cheap migrant labour. The British protectorates were included as junior partners of South Africa in the 1910 Customs Union. Preferential trade arrangements were entered into by South Africa with the Portuguese colony of Mozambique as well as with the British colony of Rhodesia. These trade arrangements were clearly intended to facilitate the flow of industrial goods from South Africa to the markets of its neighbouring agrarian and labour-exporting appendages. The unhindered flow of labour and goods between the South African centre and the labour reserve peripheries was also facilitated by the South African controlled transport and communications network. The establishment of this uniform transport infrastructure, centred in South Africa, inhibited the development of independent national transport systems in the dependent countries of the region. Finally, from the beginning of the 20th century the British protectorates came to be included in an informal monetary union with South Africa. These territories came to use South African currency (originally the pound, later the rand) as their legal tender. Consequently, the South African Reserve Bank became in effect the central bank for these countries. This seriously impeded the development of independent central financial institutions in them.

After the Second World War, the development of South African capitalism into monopoly and subsequently state monopoly capitalism led to the emergence of South Africa as a "sub-imperial" power.⁴ On the one hand, South Africa remained a sphere of profitable investment for foreign capital, a market for high-technology goods and sophisticated military hardware, and a supplier of strategic raw materials to the main industrial centres in North America, Western Europe and Japan. On the other hand, South Africa increasingly began to strive to act as an autonomous force, especially through the political suppression and economic exploitation of the African people inside the country, and through the regime's neo-colonial expansion and intervention throughout the sub-continent as a whole.

In the 1960s and 1970s - the period of the disintegration and collapse of the colonial system of imperialism - South African monopoly

capital further intensified the integrationist ties between South Africa and its neighbouring states. The 1910 Customs Agreement was renewed with the conclusion of the 1969 Agreement by Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. This new Customs Agreement provides for a common external tariff, free movement of goods, and a common customs pool managed by South Africa. It purports to offer some "protection" to new industries in the BLS countries, but serves in practice to enable South Africa's manufacturing sector to monopolize the markets of its industrially underdeveloped partners. These partners import from 70 to 90 per cent of their consumer and capital goods from the Republic. Revenues accruing from customs receipts account for about 34 per cent of government revenue in Botswana, 45 per cent in Swaziland, and 60 per cent in Lesotho. An additional guaranteed market was acquired by South Africa in 1964 with the signing of a trade agreement with the Smith regime in Rhodesia.⁵ Moreover, South Africa's trade expansion has not been limited solely to the region of southern Africa. The Republic is now reported to be engaged in trade with 47 African countries, and in 1980 its trade with the rest of Africa totalled R1,024 million.⁶

In furtherance of its expansionist economic plans in the region, South Africa also concluded the South African Monetary Agreement with Lesotho and Swaziland in 1974. This formally established the Rand Monetary Zone, under which the South African rand was established as legal tender in Lesotho and Swaziland. The South African Reserve Bank became the de facto central bank for these countries, controlling their monetary policy. The subsequent creation of national central banks, and the circulation of national currencies side by side with the rand in Lesotho and Swaziland, did little to diminish South African control in the monetary sphere.

A key aspect of the integrationist processes in southern Africa has always been the movement of cheap migrant labour from neighbouring territories to South Africa. Agreements providing for this flow of migrant labour were concluded with several countries: with Malawi in 1967, with Lesotho in 1973, and with Swaziland in 1976. However, the unreliability of the South African labour market for the independent states of southern Africa has been underlined by recent political events in the region. The collapse of

Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s, and the subsequent emergence of radical socialist regimes in some of South Africa's traditional labour reserves, struck panic within the ranks of the South African ruling class, which consequently opted for a strategy of reducing dependence on foreign sources of migrant labour (see table 1).

Table 1: Foreign Workers in the Republic of South Africa

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1977</u>
Lesotho	117 000	163 000
Mozambique	161 000	69 000
Malawi	80 000	34 000
Botswana	59 000	39 000
Swaziland	39 000	15 000
Rhodesia	27 000	31 000
Angola	11 000	700
Zambia	<u>16 000</u>	<u>800</u>
	510 000	352 500

Source: K.W. Grundy, "Economic Patterns in New South African Balance." Reproduced in A Report to the Congress on Development Needs and Opportunities for Co-operation in Southern Africa. Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, March 1979.

Perhaps largely because of their geographic proximity to the Republic Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are still heavily dependent on South African transport and communications systems for outlets to the outside world. The achievement of independence by Zimbabwe in 1980 improved however the hitherto limited access of Botswana to the north through the Caprivi Strip. Swaziland's border with Mozambique has also offered since the mid-1970s an alternative to dependence upon South Africa (an alternative admittedly that the Swazi rulers have so far done little to avail themselves of). Lesotho's enclave position within South Africa continues to render it much more vulnerable than the other two countries.

Lately, South Africa has increased its capital investments in the countries of southern Africa, and especially in the BLS countries, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The establishment in the early 1970s of the Bank Edesa was an important step in facilitating this expansion. Set up by leading South African financiers and industrialists, such as Anton Rupert, with an initial capital of R20 million, the bank has proved an effective instrument of economic penetration in both the bantustans and neighbouring states.

By way of summary, it can be said that the majority-ruled states of southern Africa maintain economic relations with the Republic of South Africa that are characterized by important, though admittedly varying, degrees of economic dependence. The pattern of communications in the sub-continent is such that the majority of states are dependent on South African transport and routes for outlets to the outside world. South Africa's neighbours still to a very large extent rely on foreign trade relations with South Africa not only for the import of manufactured goods and the export of their raw materials, but also for their food supply. Several hundred thousand migrant workers from neighbouring countries depend on the South African labour market for their livelihood, however unreliable this has proved to be at times. Not only do Lesotho and Swaziland belong to a monetary agreement dominated by South Africa; their economies are also dominated by South African capital, as are the economies of most of the states in the region. In short, southern Africa has witnessed the emergence of a particularly extreme form of economic dependency; one which has resulted (as table 2 shows) in glaring disparities in economic growth and wealth between South Africa and its dependent neighbours.

The Birth of SADCC: Objectives, Structures and Progress to Date

The struggle of the independent states of southern Africa for economic liberation is an integral part of the global struggle by Third World countries for a new international economic order. After the attainment of political independence, through their own individual efforts at the national level the countries of southern Africa have attempted to disengage from the integrated regional economic complex dominated by South Africa. With the collapse of the Portuguese African empire in the mid-1970s and the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980, more favourable conditions were

Table 2: Basic Indicators for SADCC Countries and the Republic of South Africa

	Popul- ation (a)	GNP (b)	Area (c)	Adult Liter- acy (d)	GNP per Capita (e)	Average Annual Growth Rate (d)	Life Expect- ancy at Birth (f)
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1979</u>		<u>1976</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1960-79</u>	<u>1979</u>
Angola	6.9	3 036	1 247	NA	440	-2.1	42
Botswana	0.8	576	600	35	720	9.1	49
Lesotho	1.3	442	30	52	350	6.0	51
Malawi	5.8	1 160	118	25	200	2.9	47
Mozambique	10.2	2 550	783	NA	250	0.1	47
Swaziland	0.5	325	17	65	650	7.2	47
Tanzania	18.0	4 680	945	66	260	2.3	52
Zambia	5.6	2 800	753	39	500	0.8	49
Zimbabwe	7.1	3 337	391	NA	470	0.8	55
SADCC TOTAL/ AVERAGE	56.2	18 900	4 884	52	336	1.3	49
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	28.5	49 000	1 221	NA	1 720	2.3	61

Source: Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981; World Development Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981.

- (a) = Millions
 (b) = Million US Dollars
 (c) = Thousand Square Kilometres
 (d) = Percentage
 (e) = US Dollars
 (f) = Years
 NA = Not Available

created for these national efforts to be enhanced by joint struggles, aimed at reducing the collective dependence of the southern African states on South Africa, and at replacing this dependence by effective forms of regional co-operation.

The first economic summit of heads of state and representatives of the nine southern African countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe took place in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980. It was here that the historic decision was taken to form the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference as an organization of economic liberation and regional co-operation. The establishment of SADCC was a logical outcome of the development of the liberation struggle from the political to the economic phase. It was also a direct response to Pretoria's neo-colonial scheme for a constellation of southern African states under South African hegemony.

At the end of the summit meeting, representatives of the nine states present adopted a document entitled Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. Declaration by the Governments of the Independent States of Southern Africa.⁷ Now commonly known as the "Lusaka Declaration", this document laid down the strategy of economic liberation through regional co-operation in southern Africa in the following words:

In the interests of the peoples of our countries, it is necessary to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation, and to co-ordinate our efforts towards regional and national economic development. This will be as great for Namibia as it is for all the independent states of the region.⁸

The main development objectives to be pursued by co-ordinated regional action were set out clearly in the declaration. These were first, the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not solely on the Republic of South Africa; second, the forging of links to create genuine and equitable regional integration; third, the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state, and regional policies; and fourth, concerted action to secure international recognition and co-operation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation.

In order to achieve these goals, each SADCC member state was assigned the responsibility for sectoral co-ordination, in accordance with its specific interests and resources, as follows:

Angola	Energy conservation and security.
Botswana	Control of animal diseases and crop research.
Lesotho	Soil and water conservation, and land utilization.
Malawi	Fisheries, wildlife and forestry.
Mozambique	Transport and Communications.
Swaziland	Manpower development.
Tanzania	Industrial development.
Zambia	Mining, and the South African Development Fund.
Zimbabwe	Food security, and the Southern African Documentation and Information System (SADIS).

Unlike many other regional economic bodies, SADCC is characterized by quite a high degree of decentralization. There are distinct regional and national mechanisms for the co-ordination of its activities. At the regional level, the supreme consultative body is the Annual Summit Conference of Heads of State. Next in the line of authority is the meeting of the Council of Ministers, which exercises overall responsibility for the supervision of SADCC affairs in between these summit meetings. Then there is a standing committee of officials, which is responsible to the Council of Ministers and acts as an executive. A permanent secretariat headed by an executive secretary has been established in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, with the responsibility for routine administration and co-ordination of SADCC activities. Finally, with the regional secretariat still playing a relatively modest role, greater responsibility for the co-ordination of SADCC's sectoral development has fallen on the shoulders of the relevant national ministries in each of the member states.

A key feature of SADCC's activities is the Annual Conference. This is organized in three phases: first a meeting of officials; then a meeting of the Council of Ministers; and finally a donor conference, where projects approved by the Council of Ministers are presented to donors and aid agencies - financial support. The first major annual conference of Economics

Ministers of the frontline states was held at Arusha in July 1979, before the formal launching of SADCC at the Lusaka summit in 1980.

SADCC's second annual conference was held in Maputo on 27-28 November 1980. At the meeting there were representatives of the nine member states, officials from thirty other governments outside the region, and representatives of eighteen international organizations. The Maputo conference was the first major attempt to mobilize international financial and technical support for SADCC's strategy of economic liberation and regional co-operation. By the end of the conference, US\$650 million had been pledged for projects identified as priority areas.

The third annual conference was held in Blantyre, Malawi, in November 1981. Representatives of twenty-three donor nations and agencies attended. Having reviewed the progress over the past year, the conference decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Gaborone.

SADCC held its fourth and latest conference in Maeru, Lesotho, in January 1983, against a background of intensified destabilization by the Republic of South Africa, exemplified by the Maseru raid of 9 December 1982. In addition to the SADCC members, representatives of twenty-nine other governments and twenty-three international organizations and development agencies attended the conference. In the documents presented, progress was reported in the implementation of a number of SADCC's sectoral projects. This was particularly the case with respect to transport and communications, perhaps the single most important sector, regarded by SADCC as "vital to break away from subordination to the South African economy."¹⁰ This sector is co-ordinated by Southern African Transport and Communications (SATCC), based in Maputo. By January 1983, SATCC had submitted 106 projects for implementation, with an estimated total cost of \$2.538 billion. Of this amount, \$665 million had already been pledged. The main rail-port projects to have been identified so far are the Maputo, Beira, Ncala, Dar es Salaam, and Lobito port transport systems.

SADCC also attaches great importance to agricultural development in general, and food self-sufficiency and food security in particular. This priority sector is co-ordinated by Zimbabwe, through the administrative unit

of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture. Feasibility studies have already been conducted in the areas of a regional resources information system (RRIS), an early warning system for food security to monitor the food situation in SADCC countries, and a regional inventory of agricultural resources. To date, thirty agricultural projects have been identified for implementation, with an estimated total cost of \$100 million. In the area of the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Botswana has successfully developed an improved vaccine, and has achieved the capacity to supply the entire SADCC region.

At the 1983 Maseru conference, the SADCC energy sector, co-ordinated by Angola, presented a project to open and improve the Chicamba hydro-electric line in Mozambique which runs to Mutare in Zimbabwe. Angola, the only oil producing member of SADCC, has also offered to sell oil at preferential prices to SADCC members. Lesotho, which has responsibility for soil and water conservation, as well as land utilization, submitted a project for regional river basin management.

Meanwhile, Malawi has made headway in promoting the exchange of information amongst SADCC members concerning fisheries, wildlife and forestry. And in the field of manpower development, for which Swaziland is responsible, a regional training council has been established and meets regularly in Mbabane, the capital. Four studies have been commissioned by Swaziland on manpower needs in the fields of sugar production, mining, health, and teacher training.

In the mining sector, Zambia continues to gather data with a view to tabling projects at future conferences. And in the industrial development sector, co-ordinated by Tanzania, concrete proposals for feasibility studies and implementation were presented at the Maseru meeting. About fifty industrial projects, costing \$800 million, have so far been identified for implementation. According to some observers, however, SADCC's industrial programme, especially in areas such as clothing and food, has "attracted little support from donors,"¹¹ primarily because of its import substitution bias and the absence of foreign investment policy guidelines among SADCC member states. It is difficult, however, to see how an industrial strategy aimed at reducing dependence on

imported goods could be anything other than an exercise in import substitution. As for the call for investment codes, it is perhaps appropriate to mention that these already exist in most SADCC countries. The real issue here is surely that the regional strategy of industrial development envisaged by SADCC prefers state enterprise to foreign private capital investment.

Problems and Prospects for Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa

Three years have passed since SADCC was established at the Lusaka summit in April 1980, and during these three years SADCC has made impressive strides in the development of regional co-operation. But there are still problems, of course. Some of these are of a largely technical nature, and should be overcome with time. Others are of a more fundamental character.

One of the most important technical difficulties facing SADCC during its formative stage is that of manpower shortages. The national ministries responsible for co-ordinating SADCC projects are very much under-staffed. Already struggling to meet the manpower needs for their own national development goals, such organizations must now face the additional strain of meeting their SADCC commitments. The problem is complicated by the fact that the regional secretariat in Gaborone is not envisaged as an operation headquarters with the necessary infrastructure to implement or at least monitor the implementation of projects. This is an inherent feature of SADCC's decentralized structure, intended to avoid the growth of an enormous bureaucracy in Gaborone. It was confirmed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Botswana's Vice-President Mr Mmusi, in his opening statement at the Maseru conference in January 1983. He declared that the SADCC secretariat would play a "communications role in representing and projecting SADCC to our friends. Functional sectoral programme responsibility will, as I noted in Blantyre, remain with SADCC and the sectoral co-ordinating states."

Another technical problem is that, as of now, SADCC has no data base from which to co-ordinate the exchange and flow of information among the SADCC countries and sectoral ministries. So much data and material has been

generated by SADCC in its three years of existence that there is already an urgent need for storage and dissemination of this material. Luckily, awareness among both government officials and information professionals of the importance of information as a vital resource for achieving socio-economic goals gave birth to the idea of the Southern African Documentation and Information System (SADIS). In Dar es Salaam in May 1983, SADIS was approved as a priority sectoral project by the Council of Ministers of SADCC.

There are, however, a number of more fundamental problems of a socio-political nature that are likely to trouble SADCC for some time to come. First, SADCC member countries differ considerably in their levels of economic development and resource endowment. Zimbabwe, for example, is relatively advanced in its level of capitalist development, while countries like Lesotho lag far behind. Countries such as Angola, Botswana and Zimbabwe are rich in mineral resources, whereas those such as Malawi and Lesotho are much less fortunate.

Second, SADCC member states vary in the degree to which they have been integrated into the world capitalist system. Most SADCC countries are signatories of the Lome Convention, which established a neo-colonial association between the developed capitalist countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Countries like Angola and Mozambique, however, are not signatories of the Lome Convention, and have established ties with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of the socialist countries (CMEA). Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland of course are still entangled in the South African dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

Third, and perhaps most important, is the divergent paths of socio-political development being pursued by the different SADCC states. The majority are pursuing a capitalist path, while a few, most notably Angola and Mozambique, are committed to a socialist reconstruction of society. Zimbabwe too has proclaimed a socialist perspective as its future goal.

Fourth, there is growing concern, especially among academics in the

SADCC region, that SADCC's almost exclusive reliance on the West for financial support may well lead to a new form of collective neo-colonialism, under which the SADCC region is developed as a profitable reserve for exploitation by transnational corporations. It is to be hoped that SADCC will attempt to diversify its external economic relations in line with its founding principle of reducing economic dependence in any shape or form.

Finally, and of considerable importance, is the problem posed for SADCC by Pretoria's campaign of destabilization in the region. South Africa is clearly determined to frustrate the development of SADCC as a viable alternative to its own scheme for a constellation of southern African states. Directly, or through its proxies, Pretoria is engaged in a wholesale campaign of economic destabilization, involving the destruction of projects, the blowing up of railways, roads, pipelines, oil depots and hydro-electric stations, the sabotage of industrial plants, the kidnapping of foreign technicians, and many more.

Destabilization was condemned at the Blantyre conference, and it was clearly the main concern of most if not all of the participants at the Maseru conference in January 1983. To emphasise the seriousness of the matter, this latter conference issued a strongly-worded communique condemning South Africa's deliberate interference in the affairs of SADCC member states, and calling on Pretoria to immediately cease such interference. There are no signs as yet that Pretoria is likely to heed such demands. Instead, South Africa will undoubtedly continue with its destabilizing activities. In particular it will almost certainly continue to take advantage of the various opposition groups that, rightly or wrongly, question the legitimacy of their domestic regimes. In order to prevent the apartheid regime from fishing in such troubled waters, the SADCC countries should strive to normalize and democratize their political life and thus provide the best possible climate for economic liberation and the best possible defence against the destabilizing policies of their racist neighbour.

The problems outlined briefly above, daunting as they may be, should not

lead us to forget that in the long-run there are reasons for believing that SADCC stands a better chance of success than many other experiments in economic co-operation in Africa and elsewhere. What are these reasons? First, SADCC is not just another common market or customs union, concerned largely with the marketing of foreign produced goods. It is essentially a body concerned with the rational co-ordination of all aspects of production, distribution and exchange, and especially production. For the growth in production, through the infusion of science and technology, is the surest way to the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.

Second, SADCC is not a neo-colonial creation designed to integrate Europe's former colonies more effectively into the world capitalist system. It is an independent body established to realize the tasks of economic liberation and regional co-operation. Finally, according to its founding principles, SADCC is committed to economic disengagement not only from apartheid South Africa but also from international capital as a whole. It is this genuine anti-imperialist element in SADCC's philosophy that could prove one of its most effective weapons in resisting the pressures of South African destabilization and Western imperialism.

Conclusion

The achievement of political independence by the majority of southern African states by the second half of the twentieth century created favourable conditions for the birth of SADCC as an instrument of economic liberation and regional co-operation. In the past three years, SADCC has registered modest and yet significant progress in the implementation of its programme of action.

Many problems lie ahead. But the prospects for the realization of SADCC's objectives are still promising, provided all nine SADCC member states show an unflinching commitment towards the underlying philosophy of the Lusaka declaration; provided they take a common political and diplomatic stand in relation to South Africa; provided they have a similar conception as to who are their real friends and adversaries in the struggle for political and economic liberation; and provided they rely on their own resources and the international solidarity of all anti-imperialist

forces throughout the world.

In the long-run, of course, the success of the struggle for economic liberation and regional co-operation in southern Africa will depend on the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new non-racial democratic order in South Africa. International public opinion must be mobilized therefore against the apartheid regime and its destabilizing policies in the region; it must also be mobilized against any form of political, economic, diplomatic or military collaboration between South Africa and the imperialist powers, designed to suppress the forces of liberation in the region.

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APPENDIX

Additional Papers Presented at the Inaugural Workshop of
the Southern African Development Research Association
Roma, 18-20 October 1983

Micro-Economic Implications for Self-Sufficiency in Maize Production
as a Response to South Africa's Destabilization Policies

by Thambo E. Gina, University of Swaziland

Some Remarks on the Problems of Research for Development in Southern
Africa

by V.I. Kyulule, Institute of Development Studies, Dar-es-Salaam

United States Policy in Southern Africa: Geo-Strategic, Political
and Economic Considerations

by Chisepo Mphaisha, University of Zambia

Foreign Aid versus Self-Reliance: Whither Way for Countries in
Southern Africa?

by Issa Musoke, University of Swaziland

Destabilization as a Counter-Revolutionary Strategy

by B. Tsie, University of Botswana

Copies of all of these papers can be obtained from the
Institute of Southern African Studies, National University
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