

Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development: Toward Reconceptualisation

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To plan is to choose.

Choose to go forward.

- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

Introduction

By 1995, fourteen countries in SSA were facing the challenge of post-war reconstruction after protracted conflicts that shattered economies and disintegrated states.¹ As of mid 1998, twenty of the world's thirty-five poorest countries were either in or had recently emerged from a civil war. In Africa, armed conflict is now one of the main factors responsible for more than the estimated 250 million people, almost half of the total population, who now live in poverty.² In these countries, which are among the poorest in the world, the existing problems of natural disasters such as droughts and poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment and instability are compounded – or indeed dwarfed - by those flowing from the violence of war, creating what are now fashionably captioned 'complex political emergencies' (CPEs).

Cessation of hostilities provides an opportunity for some of these countries to rebuild their societies, economies, and politics and to start reforms and restructuring that may have previously proved unattainable. In recent years as an increasing proportion of aid is spent on emergency-related programmes, there has been a growing interest in the rehabilitation of societies emerging from war and a parallel (though not adequately financed) priority for

accountable and competent governance. While the nature and the extent of devastation faced by war-torn societies vary, they all face common issues concerning social and political rehabilitation, the macro-economic management of reconstruction, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, alternative routes to livelihood rehabilitation, and the role of different aid instruments.³ Countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Eritrea are currently in the transition period of post-conflict rehabilitation.⁴ Nevertheless, the high levels of violence still plaguing Rwanda and Uganda, the simmering border-war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the renewed civil war in Congo (ex-Zaire) and the problematic situation in Angola are testament to the fragility of the “post” in post-war states. Yet there remains little understanding of how conflict-affected societies should be helped to rebuild their countries. This is partly because the concept of rehabilitation now dominant is largely rooted in mechanisms and narratives related to natural disasters. Rehabilitation and reconstruction are also still narrowly conceived in terms of centralised infrastructural development – a legacy of Western Europe’s experience.

Conceptualising Rehabilitation - A Critical Review

Although cases of attempted rehabilitation of war-torn societies have grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, the concept of rehabilitation has not changed equally rapidly.⁵ Rehabilitation after natural disasters involves mainly reconstruction of physical infrastructure and providing interim basic needs to affected persons in peacetime. It usually entails limited (by area or by degree) physical damage and temporary livelihood curtailment, not destruction of state structures and livelihoods. In this vein, rehabilitation is more about *how* to rebuild what was destroyed in the disaster rather than *what* to rebuild. Intervention needs after natural calamities are more specific because they are clearer and “there are identifiable communities to rebuild, recognised political

authorities in the areas receiving aid, [and] a legal system in place”.⁶ In a post-war era, the situation is significantly different, as prolonged conflicts corrode the social, political and economic institutions. They involve fundamental questions not only on what to reconstruct but also how to do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that originally contributed to the conflict. Even more crucial is rehabilitation of governmental legitimacy and ability to deliver basic services including user friendly law and order.

Consideration of rehabilitation during and after CPEs requires an innovative approach. First, due to the contested nature of the state and its post war political structures as it emerges from war, it is either very weak or lacks legitimacy. Prior to initiation and throughout its life-cycle, rehabilitative intervention should involve careful analysis of the root causes and the dynamics of the conflict interpreting “humanitarian crises not primarily as material supply crises, but rather as crises of economic, political, and social systems”.⁷ Failure to recognise the importance of political reconstruction and restructuring is one of the main reasons why “successful rehabilitation is still more of a hope than a reality”.⁸

There is a need to reconsider rehabilitation by “moving beyond a relief-oriented, supply-driven approach to rehabilitation”.⁹ In countries where the state is contested such as Rwanda and Angola, or has disintegrated/collapsed such as Somalia and Afghanistan “and traditional institutions have re-emerged as an important force, there is a need to think beyond state-defined models”.¹⁰ Though previously considered¹¹ there needs to be a greater exploration of the somewhat artifactual division between state and traditional authorities resulting largely from analysis of the colonial era. Political rehabilitation in these societies might on occasion take the form of helping the rebuilding of traditional authorities rather than imposing western style state structures of the type that had collapsed.¹²

Second, complex emergencies have no clear beginning nor end and the return to “normalcy” is lengthy. There often exists a situation of uneasy peace in the post-conflict transition characterised by a highly unstable environment. In that context it may be difficult to identify whether conditions are appropriate for serious rehabilitation work. And yet the timing of rehabilitation, the seizure of a “window of opportunity” is crucial. Its weakness or robustness may make the difference between consolidation of peace or the return to war. Macrae, Zwi *et al.*¹³ identify the signing of peace accords, process of political change, increased levels of security and existence of opportunity for peace and reconstruction as the key features of a post-conflict situation, though they may not all be present at the same time. While comprehending the causes of conflict is usually a necessary condition for mastering them,¹⁴ it is neither an early warning system nor a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, full comprehension may not be needed to have early warning of conflict.¹⁵

But there is little reason to envision comprehension as an automatic cure or to contend that conflict is always irrational from the perspective of key actors. Indeed, conflicts generally arise from issues relating to self-respect (or pride), self-identity (or chauvinism), fear (whether from a guilty conscience or a neighbour perceived as evil) or greed (demand for equity). These are not inherently irrational driving forces. Further, even if key actors misperceive reality, that misperception is in itself a fact with consequences until changed.¹⁶ Somali warlords, marauding militias in war ravaged countries, and certain entrepreneurs of adversity do benefit from war. So too might certain broader groupings if speedy victory over a country with a strong economy – or at least some strong surplus generating sectors, e.g. Angola - could be achieved.

Third, CPEs undermine or destroy the social fabric of the society, weakening the capacities of the communities and their chances of recovery to the extent that even after the conflict they remain extremely vulnerable.¹⁷ Wars do not affect all groups equally. Vulnerable groups, including ethnic minorities, women and children usually bear the brunt of conflict.¹⁸ Rebuilding social capital and livelihood systems in such circumstances is therefore more complex and difficult than restoring physical infrastructure in natural disasters. It involves, among other things, “redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority and the citizenry, revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social groups, creating a civil society in its broadest sense, promoting psychosocial healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic policies and institutions”.¹⁹ Reconceptualising rehabilitation is also based on the recognition of “a failure of existing models of development to provide the conditions required for political and economic stability” and the need to re-evaluate development goals in fragile, insecure and highly unstable environments.²⁰

Fourth, intervention aid in complex emergencies is often highly politicised as are domestic rehabilitation resource allocations. Reconceptualising rehabilitation “requires acknowledging that neither relief, rehabilitation, nor development assistance is politically neutral”.²¹ It is also important to rethink through whom rehabilitation aid is channeled. International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and local NGOs (LNGOs), while relatively successful in rehabilitation initiatives in the aftermath of natural disasters, are less so in post-conflict rehabilitation due to their limited conceptual grasp of the situation, legitimacy, and efforts to promote sustainability. Yet a significant proportion of rehabilitation aid to war-torn societies (other than major infrastructure projects and financial sector restructuring) is still disbursed through NGOs.

Finally, gender considerations are – or should be - central to post-conflict rehabilitation modeling. One of the consequences of war has always been significant changes in women's role as pre-war gender inequalities and traditions perforce change during war situations.²² In Rwanda since a substantial majority of those killed in the war were men, women - who in some parts of the country are up to 80 per cent of the adult population - became responsible for rebuilding livelihoods.²³ In other countries such as Eritrea, Tigray and Somalia it appears that the social dislocation in these societies has empowered women.²⁴ From a gender perspective, post-conflict rehabilitation needs to take into account the new roles of women.

What exactly constitutes rehabilitation or how this concept is linked to relief and development is also a subject of continuing debate. Most definitions of rehabilitation used by agencies describe it as activities of limited duration started soon after disaster.²⁵ The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) limits rehabilitation to programmes carried out under emergency relief with a particular emphasis on meeting basic needs. It defines rehabilitation assistance as “the provision of aid designed to help restore emergency-affected populations to self-reliance in meeting basic needs, and to reduce their vulnerability to future emergencies”²⁶. In an attempt to link rehabilitation to relief and development, Harvey and Cambell²⁷ suggest that:

rehabilitation ... is part of a process of protecting and promoting the livelihoods of people enduring or recovering from emergencies. It aims to provide short-term income transfers, rebuild household and community assets, and rebuild institutions. Its key task is to help reinforce developmental objectives, notably livelihood security, participation, sustainability, gender equity, and local institutional capacity.

These definitions are narrow considering the range of activities that rehabilitation after war should cover, but they are somewhat broader than those used by most agencies. In practice they reflect the operational definitions of NGOs which normally do not include macro-economic and political components of rehabilitation. This partly explains why most rehabilitation interventions in post-crisis situations - especially as perceived by external aid agencies and NGO's - consist of individual programmes that are implemented mainly at local level and with few links with other reconstruction interventions. Rehabilitation initiatives have often focused on specific operations that lacked the kind of coherent, integrated framework needed for realistic sustainable macro-economic and household livelihood rehabilitation. Part of the problem is "the absence of mechanisms to link donors with a national policy framework, combined with the high degree of donor dependence on NGOs for project design and implementation, [which] tends to reinforce the inclination of rehabilitation programmes to adopt the highly decentralised, unintegrated approaches of relief rather than those of development".²⁸

Equally, the short-term nature of donor funding of rehabilitation programmes does not easily lead to achieving sustainable rehabilitation efforts. Because of lack of long-term resource commitments by the international community, many rehabilitation programmes are little more than crisis management interventions. These activities "are neither conceived nor implemented as sustainable programmes".²⁹ Separate budget lines and a lack of clarity as to what type of projects and programmes should fall under rehabilitation further complicate the problem. For instance, rehabilitation aid in most international agencies comes under emergency relief departments and follows procedures similar to those used for emergency aid. It often has no macro framework, no link to long term development strategy and little or no interaction with development allocations to the same country. A further problem of this type of approach to rehabilitation is to do with the pace with which programmes are identified and implemented.

Consequently, they are not subjected to stringent criteria used in the appraisal of development programmes. Well-intentioned though they may be, such interventions may even exacerbate existing problems.

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Until recently rehabilitation has been viewed as almost uniquely a transitional activity on the relief-development continuum. This is not surprising given the nature of contemporary emergencies. In SSA internal wars, for example, there may be no clear end to the conflict and therefore rehabilitation may be carried out while the conflict is still going on in parts of the country. Indeed, relief, rehabilitation and development may all take place simultaneously within a state – emergency relief or post conflict rehabilitation in some regions and development in others. These three concepts are now generally recognised as separate but overlapping and complementary.

The rationale behind the conceptual and strategic linking of relief, rehabilitation and development is the belief that relief and rehabilitation programmes can and should include development objectives. Development can limit the need for subsequent emergency relief; ‘relief’ can contribute to development and especially reduction of future vulnerability to certain types of catastrophe; and ‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two. However, the concept of divisions between and interrelationships among emergency, non-emergency, relief and non-relief assistance no longer exists in the contemporary complex emergencies in Africa.⁵⁰

The crisis in Rwanda “does not represent a linear ‘continuum’ from relief-to-rehabilitation-to-development. Rehabilitation efforts necessarily began soon after the new government assumed

power in July 1994. Massive relief operations continue, 18 months later, in refugee camps on Rwandese borders".³¹

In a linear sequence model, rehabilitation is seen as the link between relief and renewed development and it is assumed that the two concepts are sufficiently compatible to allow for this continuum. However, the linearity of the continuum is for some authors *conceptual* not one of time sequences. For example in many African countries - notably Somalia and Somaliland - severe droughts are cyclically recurring facts making one-off approaches based on uniqueness fatuous.³² But rehabilitation cannot reconcile what are sometimes asserted to be two entirely different concepts. These distinctions mainly reflect the organisation of aid agencies rather than the reality of affected people.³³ However, they may sometimes also reflect realities on the ground. If a zone is temporarily at peace, local governmental, infrastructural and basic service provision rehabilitation is feasible but can be swept away in (literally) a day if the underlying conflict remains and areas of violence shift rapidly and unpredictably. Only straight relief has clear dividends if there is an acute risk of renewed hostilities.

Nevertheless, the distinction between pure survival and development assistance is an important one both in terms of scale and eligibility. Donors are generally cautious in granting recognition to transition authorities before a legitimate government is formed. Access to international development assistance depends on the existence of an internationally recognised government, whereas humanitarian assistance (relief and to some extent rehabilitation) are delivered to authorities that do not have international recognition or are viewed as unstable or dubiously based. Thus, "if rehabilitation is seen primarily as a development activity, rather than as a relief intervention, the presence and recognition of a legitimate national government will be a necessary condition for international finance".³⁴ Moreover, some of the criteria used for

determining eligibility for development aid such as political conditionality reinforce the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance. For instance, aid given to countries such as Sudan which do not meet the criteria for development aid is mainly humanitarian. In Rwanda the issue of legitimacy of the new government is one of the reasons why provision of financial assistance to the government remains slow.³⁵ There is also a related distinction as to sustainability - rehabilitation, if successful should become self-sustaining, survival support by definition depends on outside (external or domestic) funding.

Strategic Approaches to Reconstruction

What strategic approaches and policies can be adopted to promote realistic rehabilitation and provide a basis for sustainable peace and development? There is widespread consensus³⁶ over the importance of understanding how local people rebuild their livelihoods, the importance of extending local level reconstruction programmes to regional and national levels, addressing the underlying causes of conflict, and looking at mechanisms for the promotion of local governance. These issues are explored in the following section under the three main components of social rehabilitation, political rehabilitation and economic rehabilitation.

Social Rehabilitation - Rebuilding Livelihoods and Civil Institutions

Violent conflicts undermine social networks and often leave a legacy of divided societies at all levels from family outwards.³⁷ Rehabilitation assistance should provide the framework for reviving livelihoods and civil institutions previously suppressed, eroded or rendered powerless by war, with the aim of strengthening local capacities to participate in the reconstruction process. Effective civil society structures ensure that local people are

represented and have voice in setting reconstruction priorities and that central authorities are more informed and responsive to their needs and priorities. This is particularly important in post-conflict situations in which political participation allows groups to articulate their diverse interests in the elaboration of reconstruction strategies. Civil society can make important contributions by providing counter balance to the power of central authorities or by providing basic essential services at the local and national levels.

Frustratingly, the basic Christian, Muslim, women's, trade union and peasant civil society bodies are usually not defined as NGOs. Those which are so defined usually have very narrow membership bases and are (even when genuine) more like professional consulting co-ops than people's social bodies. Relatedly, in conflict situations, it is particularly important to rebuild and strengthen the indigenous dispute resolution systems that may have been undermined by the breakdown of community networks. This involves "recognising and revitalising the elders council, the role of the traditional peacemaker, the justice circle, the tribal court, representative committees, or the mediating role of women's organisations".³⁸

At the same time, it is important to avoid naiveté and not cast civil society as composed solely of "angelic groups". Civil society bodies reflect and embody the tensions in their communities: seeking to manipulate as often as to transcend them. The Interahamwe in Rwanda was a civil society body responsive to one set of community fears and concerns. The extreme polarisation into violence - indeed genocide - it exemplified was also present within religious and other civil society groups. Similarly the South African Broederbund was in origin an 'oppressed majority' (within the white community) people's body seeking cultural, social, economic and political security. Equally lineage, sub-clan, clan and clan family groupings are all civil society groups, both in Somalia and Somaliland as are similar groups and tribes in many other African

countries. But their objective impacts on issues of violent or peaceful dispute resolution and ability to perceive ways to transcend armed conflict vary sharply at each level, lead to tension within civil society arenas and appear to have divergent overall balances among groups and over time.

Rebuilding trust and re-establishing community-wide interactions may be a first step in helping conflict-affected societies to rebuild their social capital. Rebuilding social capital helps local institutions to take on a more positive, less narrowly communal and more politically influential role in reconciliation, reconstruction and sustainable development aimed at transcending, not exploiting or exacerbating, conflict.

Demobilisation, Reintegration and Resettlement

Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries emerging from wars is a critical step in the process of social rehabilitation and a major challenge for authorities and donor agencies supporting rehabilitation efforts. The process of demobilisation is mainly concerned with the disarming of former soldiers and other armed groups and the facilitation of voluntary return of ex-combatants and their families, whereas reintegration involves supporting their re-entry into productive civilian life. Generally up to 90 % of combatants - though not necessarily displaced persons including refugees - lack transferable skills and have little or no formal education since most of them are often recruited in the rural areas.³⁹ Reintegration of child soldiers, women fighters and young people also poses particular problems. The priority accorded to such programmes and how the whole issue is perceived tend to depend on how the war ended. If in a negotiated settlement, then high priority is likely to be given to some measures in support of all demobilised combatants. But where a total military victory has been

won there may be little or no direct targeting of defeated ex-combatants beyond whatever general programmes exist for rural returnees.

Demobilisation and re-integration issues need to be addressed at the earliest opportunity in the transition from war to peace. The timeliness of this is important because demilitarisation and reintegration are preconditions for reviving civil society, reducing fear and social tension and restoring confidence and a sense of security. Reducing the risks of renewed conflict depends to a large extent on the success of efforts aimed at demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants and the leaders of organisations commanding their trust. By making ex-combatants productive members of the society, reintegration and demobilisation programmes also promote economic recovery.

Political Rehabilitation

This is arguably the most critical of all rehabilitation efforts. The cessation of formal hostilities or the signing – and even formal implementation - of peace accords does not mean a return to normalcy. In war-torn societies political rehabilitation takes place in highly polarised settings where there are deep suspicions between warring factions. In many cases, “extremist factions of warring parties constantly strive to undermine the peace accords. The case is even worse in countries where one party emerges victorious and sees little need for making significant political concessions”.⁴⁰ The latter point does not always hold – a militarily victorious coalition or party may perceive itself as having the short-term capacity to seek political reconstruction aimed at transcending past causes of conflict, in addition to the incentive to reduce simmering violence and avert its full-scale re-emergence.

A major weakness in political rehabilitation initiatives is that there is a lack of a “well-defined framework for political reform and reconstruction that informs its interventions”**Error! Reference source not found.**⁴¹ Social rehabilitation programmes such as repatriation and resettlement, educational, and health services have been more successful than political reconstruction. This may be partly due to the long involvement of NGOs in particular development programmes in these sectors or their immediacy. However, if this leads to substitution of NGOs for government actors, short term results may be bought at the cost of delaying or blocking political rehabilitation which cannot go far if the state is unable to build a significant capacity to deliver real services to real people. In reflecting on the international community’s apparent dearth of insight into political rehabilitation, Kumar⁴² argues that:

those charged with designing and implementing political rehabilitation interventions lack appropriate conceptual frameworks, intervention models, concepts, policy instruments, and methodologies for assistance programmes to rebuild civil society, establish and nurture democratic institutions, promote a culture favourable to the protection of human rights, reconstruct law enforcement systems, or facilitate ethnic reconciliation in a highly unstable political and social environment.

Crucially, there is also the question over the appropriate balance of channels for rehabilitative aid. Who should be the recipient partners: civil society, local authorities, regional or central authorities, existing government, transitional authority, or unrecognised authorities. Macrae⁴³ argues that while the importance of rebuilding public administration capable of delivering public services is recognised, rehabilitation aid in the post-conflict period mostly by-passes central authorities so the recognition is more rhetorical than operational. This reflects the reluctance of the international community to engage directly with new regimes or transition

authorities or with domestic civil society actors other than those analogous to Northern NGOs. A further problem with NGOs is that their priorities may conflict with those of local authorities. Reconstruction processes may be delayed by major gaps that appear as some sectors are completely ignored. Moreover, too many uncoordinated actors can lead to fragmentation of institutions and the irregular provision of services, leading to differential access to public services.

Economic Rehabilitation: From War And Survival Economy To Market Economy

Depending on the nature and length of the conflict and the conditions of the pre-war situation, internal wars usually have very high human and economic costs. The primary task of post-conflict economic rehabilitation is therefore to understand the costs of the war and to establish priorities for economic, and especially livelihood, recovery. At the macro level, priorities for economic rehabilitation will include macro-economic stability and economic reform in order to reverse the extreme macro-economic disequilibria inherited from the economic policies followed (often necessarily) during the war. This is important for reviving savings and investment, containing inflation and removing regulations and controls that are often introduced during the conflict. At the micro level, it means providing support to households to rebuild their livelihood systems, and paying greater attention to the new role of women in the aftermath of war. Unsurprisingly, the macro and micro interact. Small farming (or herding) households are historically central not simply to their own subsistence but to urban food and raw material supplies, urban goods and services markets, indirect tax revenue and exports. Their revival is, therefore, strategically and macro economically as well as socially and politically important - e.g. in Mozambique, Somaliland, Somalia and Rwanda.

It is now recognised “that rebuilding institutional infrastructure shattered during conflict is as important as physical infrastructure - if not more important ... unfortunately, this is an area that has been largely overlooked”.⁴⁴ For example rural households need market access to rehabilitate livelihoods. While road rehabilitation is central, access also hinges on the restoration of ‘user friendly’ civil police to achieve law and order and of financial institutions that lend to rural/small town oriented produce buyers, traders, transporters for vehicles and working capital (stocks of goods).

Macroeconomic Rehabilitation

Achieving macro-economic stability is essential for the transition from a highly distorted, survival oriented war economy to a more household friendly and market economy. Stability is also integral for sustainable economic recovery and growth. Governments engaged in post-conflict rehabilitation often inherit bloated military and/or excruciatingly understaffed civil bureaucracies together with serious fiscal and balance of payments problems. In conflict situations, authorities also expand their nominal controls and regulations over all sectors of the economy while also rapidly losing ability to influence actual transactions or to collect revenue.

Economic reforms in the aftermath of conflicts should involve a set of measures aimed at achieving manageable balance-of-payments and public sector deficits and achieving structural change to prevent future payments and stabilisation crises. The first set of measures should involve stabilisation programmes that combine fiscal and monetary reform coupled with a currency devaluation. (The likelihood of an undervalued currency or low levels of inflation at the end of a civil war is negligible.) In the post-crisis period, it is argued that governments may not be able to increase their revenue by raising taxes as this might damage economic revival

resulting in an increased reliance on cutting public expenditure to achieve macro-economic stability. This is a valid argument for cutting military spending (which Ethiopia appears to have done by well over 50%) and, where present, massive expenditure on 'air' (to use the evocative Ugandan term for official corruption or total non-transparency). However, in virtually all post-war contexts, radically increased government spending on health, education, water, transport and communications and paying real public service wages compatible with enhancing productivity and professionalism are necessary conditions for sustainable state capacity and legitimacy and household livelihood and human capital restoration and development. If these cannot be initially financed by improved collection of taxes (usually very poor in war periods in Sub Saharan Africa), reallocation of external fund flows is crucial to rapid, sustainable rehabilitation.

The second set of reforms is medium-term adjustment that aims to reorient the structure of the economy to encourage greater efficiency in resource allocation and investment. This is concerned with "measures including trade and price liberalisation, and institutional and sectoral reforms [with] ... aims to remove a wide range of distortions in production and factor markets".⁴⁵ Adjustment in post-conflict periods will aim to reverse the switch from tradables to non-tradables and from production for market exchange to production for subsistence.

Even so, there is little agreement on how adjustment programmes should proceed during the period of transition. Azam and Bevan⁴⁶ maintain that speedy, radical reforms can be undertaken during the post-conflict period. But this is disputed by others⁴⁷ who point out that models of economic reform used in peacetime may be inappropriate and even counter-productive in post-conflict reconstruction. According to Fitzgerald and Stewart "it is necessary to specify the way in which civil society - firms and households - responds to the shocks and uncertainties of war

in order to understand the macro-economic behaviour under conflict conditions".⁴⁸ They advocate an alternative economic reform that considers the changes in a war-economy's economic performance. A related point is how perceptions and responses alter as conflict levels decline. Experience in both Mozambique and Somaliland suggests rapid transformation is possible even during periods before conflict is fully contained let alone eliminated.

Irrespective of the model of reform, adjustment policies entail social costs that need to be recognised. For example, the removal of subsidies and reduced expenditure on public services may negatively affect the most vulnerable groups who, as a result, are forced to pay more for food while enduring with fewer public services. Similarly, privatisation and the dismantling of parastatals may result in increased unemployment and further fragmentation of essential services. In this manner, the goals of economic policy should not be limited to macro-economic stabilisation and standard structural adjustment but should also aim to bolster peace efforts. A flexible approach is required in post conflict situations to avoid past mistakes. For instance, the World Bank has been accused of having "overlook[ed] ... potentially explosive social and political consequences when designing and imposing economic conditions for support to Rwanda's economic recovery"⁴⁹ before the genocide.⁵⁰ Boyce and Pastor⁵¹ contend that unless peace building and political rehabilitation are allowed to reshape macro-economic policies, then both the peace process and economic policy are likely fail.

Rehabilitation assistance can accelerate the transition from a war economy to a livelihood and development friendly economy. But the issue is how best to provide economic rehabilitation assistance. International financial institutions, for example, concentrate on macro-economic reform processes typified by the Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP) in Ethiopia - introduced in large part to reach a *modus vivendi* with the World Bank in 1991.

NGOs, on the other hand, concentrate on smaller scale rehabilitation activities carried out at household, village, or community level. In practice the Bank's approaches to macro-rehabilitation are little adapted from non-war macro adjustment programmes which, however necessary, are not adequately articulated to sectoral and household rehabilitation needs nor to restoration of basic public services. With the partial exception of the few cases such as Ethiopia and Rwanda where the World Bank was involved in their design, rehabilitation programmes are carried largely in partnership with NGOs that often exclude macroeconomic rehabilitation from their programmes. Yet the success and sustainability of these programmes depend to a large extent on the macro-economic environment in which they are implemented. Concentrating attention on IFIs and NGOs can be deceptive. Overall rehabilitation strategies are necessarily domestically driven or doomed to failure.

Notes Toward a Processual Reconceptualisation of Rehabilitation

From the existing literature, its gaps and country experiences, which have been analysed above, it is possible to identify a set of potential building blocks toward reconceptualising rehabilitation during, and especially after, war as a strategic process. These fall into three clusters: conceptual perceptions, stages in rehabilitation and programmatic elements within rehabilitation processes. Due to empirical deficiencies these are set out as a tentative checklist. Conceptually more coherence and holism are needed. In practice most literature – and most projects – concentrate on the political, social, (micro) economic aspects of early post-conflict resettlement. There is frequently a move toward rebuilding a renewed development dynamic well after the end of overt conflict. Nevertheless, holism is rarely articulated in either the conceptual or de facto arena.

To describe that period as “renewed development” is in practice misleading. The period prior to war has usually been one of severe tensions, political and economic unsustainability and of severe economic stagnation and regression. Semantically rehabilitation need not mean restoring as before nor return to some hypothetical long-term development turnpike. In practice any such attempt is almost sure to fail unless it is a symbolic political appeal to a pre-war golden (at least in fading memory) age which does not involve seeking to recreate specific policies, institutions or resource allocations. A second and related conceptual weakness is failure to be country centered. This is true in two senses: rehabilitation programming is often written and attempted to be applied as if it were identical across conflicts and countries or, at least, easily adaptable by fairly secondary changes. The second is that the bulk of the writing – both conceptual and operational – is from an outsider not a domestic perspective.

This is a somewhat peculiar imbalance. Reconciliation and therefore the aspects of rehabilitation which contribute to it, is inherently domestic. It cannot in any deep or lasting sense be externally imposed. The now general perception that structural adjustment programmes must be “owned” – and therefore to a substantial extent designed and product differentiated – by SSA (or other) states is logically even more relevant to post-war rehabilitation and reconciliation.

Clearly some aspects of both war and clawing back from its results are general both in respect to causes and their interaction and as to programmes/policy instruments and their implementation/phasing. But the value of comparative analysis and of toolkits of policies, programmes and analysis is likely to depend in large part on their grounding in case study analysis recognising divergences as well as commonalities. Somaliland’s history and dynamics are very unlike those of Burundi and Rwanda (or Ethiopia and Eritrea) and significantly

divergent from those of Somalia. Making use of analytical or programmatic insights from other experiences productively depends on understanding these differences.

A third need is for deep, empirical analysis devoted to comprehension of the causes and dynamics of conflicts leading to (and remaining) after wars in order to have a basis for mastering them.⁵² The externally mandated crisis containment approach to war and (apparent) post-war situations is usually deeply deficient in comprehension. Perhaps the most serious general gaps are comprehension of history. Ahistoricism invariably leads to the substitution of misleading labels – ethnicity, religion, genocide, and land pressure – to structure current affairs. Externally and self ascribed ethnic identities are often – though by no means always – the result of conflict and a tool in manipulating, mobilizing for, and sustaining it as much as a pre-existing cause. Ascribed ethnic identities, once ossified, are however, real. The process of self-ascription and the strategic aims and policies giving it shape, as illustrated in Rwanda and Kagera, can both accentuate or transcend armed conflict.

The ‘resource scarcity’ label is of a similar genre. There is a paucity of land in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Horn and resource scarcities instigate tensions that can lead to war. It is no surprise, then, that wars are usually generated over conflicts relating to material resources and that the dynamics of war benefit certain actors. The Somali pattern of ‘peace lords’ (accountable elders and merchants) and ‘warlords’ (younger military specialists superseding the ‘peacelords’ during wartime) sheds light on the war process there – and on the limited utility of UN Peace Conferences that excluded elders. Paradoxically, conflict can induce both positive and negative shifts – prominent ‘war lord’ merchants who have used war to further primitive accumulation have by their success, and in their own present self interest, become advocates and potent backers of peace.

The Four Stages of Rehabilitation

Four stages of rehabilitation can be identified and distinguished conceptually. These are *comprehension*, *survival support*, *initial post war rehabilitation* and *sustained rehabilitation* toward renewed development . The time frame is from full-scale war to a situation in which post-war is no longer the principally defining characteristic. The stages can rarely be fully consecutive for action cannot be postponed until achieving full comprehension or full peace. Similarly, peace is frequently geographically and temporally partial.

Despite the fact that *comprehension* can begin prior to the rest of the rehabilitation process, conflicts are rarely sufficiently understood. This is because genuinely held perceptions - even if inaccurate - are contextual facts with results flowing from them but unlike objective exogenous realities are subject to rapid change for better or for worse. In addition, the interaction of various groups during the negotiation and reconciliation process often alters the reality being comprehended. Finally, there is less availability and access to the insights of operational actors in the context of on-going conflict. As a result, judgments are predicated, due to time and financial constraints, on narrowly conceived studies.

The overriding mission of the second phase, *survival support*, is to save lives - and thereby encourage future rehabilitation from the individual through to the national level. The principal means are through access to basic needs, including education. In the rehabilitation context, the focus is on delivery, and more specifically, on self-organization. But caveats in the self-organization model exist. Groups mobilizing in Rwandan refugee camps (the RPF and Interahamwe) often self-organized to preserve and enhance their capacities to make war.

Namibia's SWAPO had effective civil governance structures in its main camps in Angola and Zambia, acceptable because its aim of forcing South Africa to disgorge Namibia had wide donor support.

Though careful self-organisation of refugees is conceived widely, as a step away from dependence and toward rehabilitation of civil society and local government, it rarely happens. In the interest of the promotion of gender relations, women's involvement in camp organisation and the food system should be encouraged. Indeed, most displaced persons/refugees do not wish to be idle but to engage in livelihood activities - not least because refugee/displaced person support is almost never adequate in quantity and always (by reason of technically insurmountable obstacles) non optimal in makeup. This tendency is often actively discouraged. While the viable opportunities vary from context to context, there are significant alternatives to confinement and restrictive policies. Alternatives include the hiring fewer expatriates and promoting larger infrastructural and household production components into relief efforts. These options are of increasing importance as the duration of their stay becomes increasingly longer-term.

Early post war rehabilitation includes a very substantial survival support component. Demobilisation, reintegration, and livelihood rebuilding requires both food and a minimum of rehabilitation of health, water and education facilities. To deliver in this new context requires both dispersed local (community, civil society and/or local governmental) and national (logistical, strategic, coordinating) domestic capacity. While a donor-NGO approach appears at first logical, it is likely to result in incoherence, gaps and cost inefficiency. Due in part to its complexity, the conceptualization and articulation of urban livelihood rehabilitation strategies are often less rigorous than for their rural counterparts. Indeed, in SSA urban livelihoods are

dominated by both formal and informal wages, whereas rural are dominated by small farming (or herding) household enterprises. The packages of peace and security (law and order) tools plus the food, basic services, infrastructure and market access needed are at least in broad outline fairly well identified and agreed. In the urban case, self employment, small enterprise employment and large enterprise-led macro growth, sometimes with supporting interim jobs from infrastructure and housing reconstruction, tend to be argued for almost as if they were alternatives and with relatively limited articulation or relevant (successful) cases of implementation.

The early post war rehabilitation phase's economic and political aspects interact in domestic governmental (and usually civil society) thinking but less so in that of external actors. National capital perspectives often outweigh coherence, coordination, and centralisation over local-level participation, flexibility and pragmatic identification of alternative ways forward. External actors often prioritize immediate elections, procedural transformations, and governmental service capacity than do domestic actors. Evidence suggests, however, that despite their symbolic value (from bullets to ballots) and their reconciliatory payoffs, instant elections and superficial procedural reforms are no panacea. For citizens, the emphasis often tends to be on the creation of a civilian police force and magistrates' court system to deal with internal issues of peace and security rather than constitutional and commercial law and the higher judiciary.⁵³

Finally, *sustained rehabilitation* is marked by a more experientially and empirically grounded holistic strategy. It is characterised by the conversion of survival support inputs (e.g. food aid) to infrastructural finance/second (wage) income and livelihood support/commercial system supply stabiliser flows. Taking a household perspective, its primary foci are toward universal access to basic services, the provision of local infrastructure, and safety nets. Entry into this

phase generally occurs a few years following the war and after the mobilisation of substantial resources. The best test of when rehabilitation ends is probably the point at which reversing war damage - to livelihoods, basic services, infrastructure, markets and institutions is of limited utility as an organizing theme for more than a small proportion of public sector and household sector resource allocations.

Conclusions

One can also explore rehabilitation through a cross-sectional political, economic and social framework. Though they are all interdependent, it is useful to differentiate the three sectors conceptually. The elements of *political reconciliation* and transformation particularly related to rehabilitation include:

1. General provision of finance - elections, parliaments, and public services all cost money and must be sufficiently financed to be efficient and credible.
2. Rebuilding basic service delivery capacity (including law and order). Capacity to deliver basic public services is a key to perceived legitimacy.
3. Sufficient accountability/transparency to limit opportunities for misallocation or arbitrary allocation of resources and to create a recognition of the value of the state and its government.
4. Decentralization of decision making which includes direct household and community participation in information provision, project design and prioritisation, outcome review and consequential programme adjustment.
5. Creation of a relevant progressive dynamic of household livelihoods and infrastructure. Introduce food security measures against calamities to create a climate of perceived state legitimacy and of macro-economic growth.

The *macro-economic* importance of rehabilitation emerges in cases where local infrastructure, and basic services have been eroded or destroyed for communities who, prior to war, made significant contributions to national output, government revenue, domestic food supply (including that to urban areas), domestic enterprise markets, and to exports. Restoring these contributions is crucial not to mention cost efficient in contrast to massive infrastructural investments. Macro economic rehabilitation will need to be articulated not only sectorally but also provincially/regionally and at local governance unit level. In this sense rehabilitation requires institutional changes which represent reform of, not return to, the past which was rarely marked by either effective coordination or participatory decentralisation. Tools related to such rehabilitation include:

1. Restoration and improvement of basic infrastructure with special emphasis on neighbourhood and rural levels.
2. Restoration and extension of access to basic public services.
3. Restoration of law and order/peace and security for ordinary households and for medium and small-scale business people.
4. Enhancing market access for household, small producers, and small/medium enterprises by removing counterproductive regulation and improving access to credit.
5. Enabling rapid recovery of household livelihoods through intensive infrastructure (re)building by waged labour as a means of restoring the outside income component (crucial for households in pre-war contexts).

6. Creating functional safety nets against calamities (linked to the first instrument - via work for food) to both maximize return on scarce resource allocations and to encourage morale.
7. Develop cooperative and co-financing arrangements with domestic civil society/social sector bodies engaged in similar endeavours.

Social rehabilitative programming is aimed to ensure equity and social cohesion (or limited animosity). As mentioned above, rehabilitation in this respect must not be restricted to merely reconstituting the pre-war situation because economic (and social) inequities as perceived within and among sectors of society are among the causes of conflict. Similarly, social and economic norms, such as the increase in female-headed households, often change during the course of war. Indeed two overlapping concerns within social rehabilitation are gender relations and land. War has often indirectly reversed discriminatory policies against female-headed households and almost always both affects land rights and creates new controversies over them.

However, much of the social sector impact of rehabilitation is spill-over. People who are better fed, clothed, educated with better access to food security and health services are likely to be less hostile to each other and to be willing to work together to expand these gains. Greater security - including prevention of all types of violence - clearly eases living together and makes for civil society bodies geared more for cooperation and communication and less for power struggles aimed at domination.

Notes

- ¹ R H Green, "UNICEF and Somali Survival and development, 1996-99: through shifting prisms with missing pieces.", Nairobi, A Report for UNICEF Somalia Office, 1995.
- ² N J Colleta and M Kostner, *et al.* "Transition from war to peace in sub-Saharan Africa", *Findings Africa Region*, Washington, World Bank, 1997, p 81.
- ³ Green, *ibid.*
- ⁴ J Macrae and A Zwi, *et al.*, "A healthy peace?: Rehabilitation and development of the health sector in a 'post' - conflict situation - the Case of Uganda", London, London School of Hygiene and Tropical, Medicine, Health Policy Unit, 1994.
- ⁵ P Harvey and W Campbell, *et al.*, "Rehabilitation in the Greater Horn: Towards a Strategy for CARE", Falmer, Sussex, IDS, 1997.
- ⁶ P Fagen , "After the conflict: a review of selected sources on rebuilding war-torn societies", *War-torn Societies Project, Occasional Paper No 1.* 1995.
- ⁷ J Macrae "Dilemmas of legitimacy, sustainability and coherence: Rehabilitating the health sector", *Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Paper 12*, 1997, p 192.
- ⁸ M Buchanan-Smith and S Maxwell, "Linking Relief and Development: An introduction and an overview", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 25-4, 1994.
- ⁹ Macrae, 1997, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ J Swift, "War and Rural Development in Africa: An Introduction", *IDS Bulletin* 27-3, 1996, pp 1-5; J Macrae, "Conflict Conditionalities and the Continuum: Key Issues emerging from the Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan", *Relief and Rehabilitation Newsletter*, 6, 1996.
- ¹² In Somaliland a mix of accountable historic political structures via councils of elders and of governmental service delivery systems accountable to more a western style assembly appear to

have some capacity to provide law and order, legitimacy and economic recovery.

¹³ Macrae, Zwi *et al.*, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ A Adedeji and R H Green *Comprehending and Mastering Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria, African Centre for Development Economic and Security Studies, 1997.

¹⁵ Rwanda's 1960-94 history of failed attempts at cross communal governments and/or efforts to co-opt majority (Hutu) leaders into minority (Tutsi) dominated governments with recurrent Tutsi preemptive violence, up to and including genocide and violent Hutu resistance gave very early warning indeed of the risk of full scale civil war. In Angola comprehension could have warned explicitly against the attempted placating of UNITA (more specifically its maximum leader Jonas Savimbi) by allocating ownership of and the right to staff and guard key northern diamond mining areas. The government had every reason to fear the mines would be no go areas and their revenues used to build up arms supplies for a new UNITA military initiative. In the Ethiopia – Eritrea case comprehension of the causes of tensions would not have given rise to an expectation that provocative action by low level military officers would lead to escalation into war. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia's present ruling coalition won sovereignty by a long, bitter war fought as allies. Both therefore are very concerned to maintain that sovereignty. As a result of Italian colonial and British military rule their boundary was in dispute. Parallel frictions – over national currencies and exchange control – did create a poor climate for agreed settlements, but there is no known case of exchange controls setting off a war. Further Italian and 1994 Ethiopian official maps are at one in showing the disputed rural areas and town as on the Eritrean side of the boundary even if partly under Ethiopian administration.

¹⁶ For example, it is true that Hutu and Tutsi need not engage in bloody conflict or be unable to build viable communities (e.g. Kagera Region in Tanzania). But Burundi's history gives rational ground for Hutu to fear Tutsi preemptive violence and to believe few of them are willing to

share power and – especially since the rise of the CDD (Burundi's Interahamwe) – for Tutsi to fear Hutu goals include a final solution (by exile and/or death) to the 'Tutsi problem of Rwanda'.

¹⁷ R H Green, "The Course of the Four Horsemen: Costs of War and Its Aftermath in Sub-Saharan Africa" in *War and Hunger: Rethinking international responses to Complex Emergencies*, A Zwi *et al.*, London and New Jersey, Zed Books, 1994.

¹⁸ Up to 60% of lives are lost flowing from high infant and under five mortality arising out of collapsed health services, poor nutrition and forced migration while perhaps 10% (except for Rwanda and Burundi) emerge from actual combat killings.

¹⁹ K Kumar, (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1997.

²⁰ Macrae, Zwi, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 680.

²¹ Macrae, 1997, *op. cit.*, p 198.

²² B Byrne and S Baden "Gender emergencies and humanitarian assistance", *BRIDGE*, Falmer, Sussex, IDS, 1995.

²³ J El-Bushra, and C Mukarubuga, "Women, War and Transition", *Gender and Development*, Vol. 3-3, 1995.

²⁴ J El-Bushra and E Piza Lopez, "Development in conflict: the gender dimension", *Discussion Paper* (Vol. 3) Oxford, Oxfam, 1994: Harvey, Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

²⁵ European Union, *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development*, Brussels, Commission of European Communities, 1996.

²⁶ W Campbell "ODA Strategy for Rehabilitation Assistance to Ethiopia", Sussex, IDS, 1996, M Korner *et al.*, "Management of Social and Institutional Rehabilitation: Perspectives from Seven African Countries", International Workshop, Debre Zeit, Ethiopia, 1995, p 5.

²⁷ Harvey *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p xv.

²⁸ Macrae, 1997, *op. cit.*, p 197.

²⁹ Kumar, 1997, *op. cit.*, p 35.

³⁰ Buchanan-Smith *et al.*, *op. cit.*; (J Eriksson *et al.*, *The International response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience*, Xerox, 1996, p 42.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

³² R H Green, and J Jamal, *Somalia: Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, Poverty Pockets, Volatile Vulnerability and Public Pauperisation*, A Report for UNICEF, Mogadishu, 1987.

³³ S Davies, "Public institutions, people and famine mitigation", *IDS Bulletin*, 25-4, 1994.

³⁴ Macrae, 1997, *op. cit.*, p 187.

³⁵ Eriksson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 34.

³⁶ Green, 1995, *op. cit.*; Macrae, Zwi *et al.* 1995, *op. cit.*, Kumar, *op. cit.*

³⁷ It is perfectly true that some social networks and local structures are remarkably resilient during and after wars. But it is necessary to avoid romanticism – they are physically and financially crippled and while often vital are rarely able by themselves to carry through rehabilitation. Substituting foreign NGOs for them and leaving them alone to get on with the job are equal, if opposite follies.

³⁸ K Maynard, "Rebuilding community", in Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, *op. cit.* 1997.

³⁹ Angola is a partial exception because it had a modern, high technology army and airforce, consuming the majority of graduates and technicians, but the generalisation holds for the bulk of its infantry.

⁴⁰ Kumar, *op. cit.*, p 34.

⁴¹ Kumar, *op. cit.*, p 4.

⁴² Kumar, *op. cit.*, p 34

⁴³ Macrae, 1997, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Kumar, *op. cit.*, p 34.

⁴⁵ I I Ahmed, "Impact of Structural Adjustment on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Review of the Literature", Falmer, Sussex, IDS, *Working Paper 62*, 1997,

⁴⁶ J Azam, and D Bevan "Some economic consequences of the transition from civil war to peace", *Policy Research Working Paper 1392*, World Bank. 1994.

⁴⁷ J Boyce, "Adjustment Toward Peace: An Introduction", *World Development*, 23-2, 1995.

⁴⁸ E V K Fitzgerald, and F Stewart "Editor's Introduction", *Oxford Development Studies*, 25-1, 1997, pp 5-10.

⁴⁹ Eriksson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 15.

⁵⁰ Equally it has been argued that significant proportions of IMF drawings and World Bank import support funding were diverted by the ruling elite into arms buildup and arms trafficking – ironically, *interalia*, to agents of the Rwanda Patriotic Front which was to overthrow them.

⁵¹ J Boyce and M Pastor, *Macroeconomic policy and peace building in El Salvador, Rebuilding societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, K Kumar, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

⁵² Adedeji and Green, *op. cit.*

⁵³ R H Green, "Bureaucracy and law and order" in J Faundez (ed.) *Good Government and Law*, Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp 51-75.