

**PLANNING FOR POST CONFLICT REHABILITATION IN SSA:**

**Oxymoron or Challenge?**

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**'Economic, Social/Political and Environmental Policy-making in Sub-Saharan Africa:  
Constraints and Priorities'**

**Standing Committee on University Studies of Africa (SCUSA)  
Fourth SCUSA Inter-University Colloquium  
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia  
5-8 September 1999**

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To plan is to choose. Choose to go forward

-Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere

As Krishna to Arjuna on the field of battle not farewell but fare  
forward voyagers.

- Hindu Scriptures

Those who will not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it.

- George Santayana

### **I.**

#### **PROLEGEMONA: Planning, Conflict, Rehabilitation**

To consider whether planning for post conflict reconstruction is an oxymoron whether because it necessarily misinterprets reality and/or is inevitably impracticable requires plausible working definitions of planning, conflict and rehabilitation (or reconstruction - rehabilitation - reconciliation) in the contexts of sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>1</sup>

**Planning** can be defined as systematic, consistent allocation of resources (human, material, natural, financial and institutional) to meet specified targets within stated time periods. It is a process (of which a plan document is a snapshot just as a budget document is a snapshot in the budgetary process). Under this definition individuals, households, enterprises, civil society bodies and all levels of governmental institutions do - or at least would be well advised to - engage in planning.

Planning evidently has a technical component but unless it is intelligible to decision takers and informs the political decision making process it is nugatory or worse as an applied policy exercise (whether in a national government or an enterprise). Similarly planning which does not involve the designs of means (including institutional ones) to and built in feed back on implementation is unlikely to be more than fragmentarily operational and certain to be inefficient (in terms of goal units achieved for resource units deployed).

There are varying (sometimes overlapping) categories of planning: strategic long term, national, sectoral, issue or goal subset focussed, local or provincial, enterprise, household. The coverage and degree of precision needed<sup>2</sup> vary sharply.

Planning cannot be limited to financial items (even in constant prices), nor to resources more generally. Policies and institutions are in practice key influences on to what extent resources deployed do result in progress toward goals and achievement of targets specified.

Because planning involves tradeoffs to match limited resources with unlimited demands both reasoned tradeoffs and consistency tests are crucial. The latter are largely technical but the former are largely socio political or socio economic (e.g. to seek exact tradeoffs between marginal allocations to primary education and more effective rural policing is unlikely to be fruitful as the discounted present value of each is likely to be largely a matter of judgement and actual choices will rarely be informed primarily by that particular magnitude.)<sup>3</sup>

Planning is (by definition) in relation to a less than certain future affected by quality of initial data, implementation feedbacks and external (at least to the process) shocks e.g. drought, armed conflict, global economic and financial conditions. This requires either the use of ranges (not

very practical for one or even three year rolling budgets for planning implementation) or speedy response (semi proactive) capacity.

The criticism has been made that planning is self contradictory because it aims toward multiple objectives some of which are hard to define quantitatively with much precision (e.g. quality of primary education) and/or are at least partly non-economic (e.g. participatory local government, safety nets for aged and permanently disabled people) or to a degree conflicting (e.g. maximum safeguards against external conflict spillover and maximum rural development infrastructural creation). This criticism is often justified in particular cases but in general terms the most standard risk from multiple objectives is overcommitment - either allocating more resource inputs than are likely to be available or underestimating input/output ratios in respect to targets. Multiple goals,<sup>4</sup> non-economic targets and less than precisely quantifiable targets are inevitable in any human decision taking/choice making process.

SSA national planning in its 1960's - 1970's high noon was on balance too weakly based on data and on analysis of relationships, too inflexible, too narrowly economic and technical, too ambitious (in respect to capacities for rapid change), too little contextual and too little subjected to material balance translation checks on financial magnitude budgets and/or other projections.<sup>5</sup> Its ability to procure and to use enterprise (including public enterprise) data and planning was always shaky and often negligible.

However, none of these factors nor the general overstating of targets (which had multiple causes and created more a case for better analysis, faster feedbacks, reduction of overcommitment and more flexibility rather than for abandoning national planning) was the primary cause of the

1980's - 1990's disintegration and nearly total abandonment of comprehensive national planning.

These included:

- a. a change in global political economic climate including response to the 1970's inflation with low growth shocks and the 1980's disintegration of Eastern European economies self characterised by planning (albeit in a form very different from that in Africa);
- b. much greater vulnerability to much larger and more frequent shocks - notably drought, violent conflict and external market/finance terms and access - and consequential increases in the complexity of management (public or private, government or enterprise)
- c. increasingly uncertain (as to amount, specific allocation and institutional channelling) external resource flows (public and enterprise) which - together with "a" - made formal comprehensive medium term planning exercises ineffective and potentially counterproductive through reducing resource inflows.

The apparent rapid rise, brief high noon and rapid decline of governmental/national planning in SSA is somewhat more apparent than real.

African planning has its roots in colonialism and dates back - in strategic form - to the turn of the last century. The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo were planned as enterprises (the former inefficiently beyond the very short run, the latter much more so over almost half a century) emphasising the export sector with its related physical infrastructure and other inputs (including primary and vocational education and reliable, relatively cheap urban, mine and plantation oriented food production). In the then Gold Coast Governor Guggisberg's transport infrastructure - human investment in health and education strategic plan aimed at enabling higher

levels and more diversity of production was clearly the result of a planning process and initially probably consistent with reasonable project resource availability and relative programme allocations. While perhaps less formalised, the French 'mise en valeur' (promotion by infrastructure provision and policy intervention - including major market rigging for both domestic and French producers) strategy did constitute economic planning even if - arguably - the glory of France and the provision of livelihoods to otherwise unemployable professionals/otherwise redundant troops and to otherwise non-competitive enterprise bulked large among its aims.

The generalisation of colonial planning after 1945 largely took the form of capital project shopping lists, overall economic projections (a notably Francophone element linked to planning and plans in France) and certain sectoral goals (e.g. education and health coverage) more dependent on personnel and recurrent than on capital budget allocations. Coherent relationship building among these elements - and particularly in respect to policies to link them - was uncommon at least within the planning and associated decision taking process.

From these roots grow the national planning surge of the 1960's and 1970's. In principle the three strands were co-ordinated and policies interwoven, but the degree to which this represented reality was often low. Similarly the capital - recurrent budget iteration process was generally poor and the concept of strategic and medium term planning leading into and informing rolling three year and immediately operational one year budgets was rarely perceived and still more rarely applied.<sup>6</sup>

The decline of national comprehensive plans from the early 1980's has been paralleled by the rise of a plethora of other types of plans:

- a. Overall Strategic (e.g. Country X 2004 or 2020) with more or less clear goals, broad policy outlines, a few key projects and more or less roughly estimated resource requirements (sometimes going well beyond state fiscal into enterprise and household sectors and human investment). The objectives often include poverty reduction and universal basic service provision;
- b. Sectoral Strategic - (e.g. Education 2020) with more tightly defined goals, more precisely estimated targets, more specific policy packages and at least attempts at rolling three to five year budgets;
- c. Crisis Response - whether war, drought, terms of trade or fiscal imbalance - usually focussed on targets over a one to three year period and also focussed on unsustainable imbalance containment and reduction through varying mixes of domestic cutbacks and external resource mobilisation;<sup>7</sup>
- d. Medium Term Sectoral - (e.g. infrastructure, agriculture) with varying degrees of goal-target-policy-resource allocation integration and of realism;
- e. Social- (especially basic service generalisation and poverty reduction, but on occasion Gender or Environmental Sustainability or Child focused) again with a variety of time frames (usually medium term) and of goal-target-policy-resource allocation-budgetary process integration. These in particular suffered from non-integration into overall macroeconomic planning and - consequentially - marginal and vulnerable resource allocations at the Budgeting Process phase.

What has been conspicuously absent<sup>8</sup> are overarching medium term operational planning process informing rolling and annual budgeting and testing the individual plans for inconsistency and subjecting them to an iterative process of reconciliation with each other and with resource availability projections and outcomes. At the extreme one has the stunning mismatch of more or less parallel Strategic Comprehensive Plans, moderately wide medium term SAPs and exceedingly constraining cash balance (sometimes monthly) operational Budgeting processes.

The disastrous outcome - in some respects and some countries worse than 1985 - 1995 SSA experience in non war afflicted countries - in Central and Eastern Europe as set out in UNDP's 1999 Regional Survey strongly suggest that the costs of fragmented, uncoordinated, planning are severe.<sup>9</sup>

The long term strategic goals of any national planning process (and less uniformly of other levels of planning process) are largely exogenous to it, albeit there are consequential feedback effects. Whether it is better to plan to maximise GDP growth (total resource availability), HDI (average human welfare) or SDI (articulated human welfare with a weighting to exclusion reduction) is a socio-political decision not subject to scientific let alone econometric techniques. Nor - on less extreme assumptions - can the tradeoffs among Peace with Law and Order; Overall Resource Base Expansion; Generalisation of Basic Services, Human Investment; Livelihood Expansion - Human Capital Provision - Safety Net Supply be handled on any endogenous technical basis<sup>10</sup> let alone one uniform to all countries at all times.<sup>11</sup>

The forgoing illustrates an integral limitation of external leadership in a national (or sub-national) planning process even at the technical level. External personnel and institutions are unlikely to have (or be willing/able to organise) enough contextual (especially socio political.

political economic and socio economic) data and understanding to comprehend or relate effectively (including critically as well as supportively) to decision taker goals, targets and relative priorities. Unless they explicitly recognise this, counterproductive (even when amicable) relationships are likely.<sup>12</sup>

However this is not to argue that formal planning or planning technician/decision informers is analogous to dusting or filing – marginal in importance. How resources are allocated matters even –perhaps especially – if the goals are not primarily economic nor output targets/results readily measured quantitatively. Assuring understanding of the goals, targets and how resources are allocated matters. Technical planners have a role analogous to the ones Keynes assigned to economists as plumbers. Anyone who has seen urban epidemics related to low levels of access to pure water, pastoral livelihood destruction from derelict water systems in the face of drought or industries halted by breakdown in water availability will understand why plumbers matter (perhaps even more than Keynes in a context in which such disasters were much further away and costs of the breakdown that did occur more marginal). Checking interactions, spread and feedback effects (negative and positive), iterating among targets and allocations to present a range of feasible result packages, warning of major hard to estimate wishes are the business of the planning technician/decision informer. Their potential impact – for better or for worse – is not marginal.

Neither “expert” refusal to operate in a decision taker set goal framework (especially if the domestic decision takers involved have substantial legitimacy, consistency and rationally) nor a passive “Yes, Minister” approach (with or without attempts at passive or not so passive sub rosa altering of goals) is likely to be particularly productive. E.g. to say “no” to security force proposals in a context of real external security threats is likely to be ineffective – and makes little

economic sense given the costs of war and probabilities of effective deterrence.<sup>13</sup> Similarly to fail to warn that security spending above some limit would cripple state and economy (and thus future resource availability for security forces) and that certain types of spending (e.g. main battle tanks and supersonic jets – as opposed say to armoured personnel carriers/field artillery and heli gunships) seemed relatively cost inefficient in delivering deterrence and (especially) response capacity is neither efficient planning nor efficient security provision.<sup>14</sup>

What is needed is an iterative process in which the planning technician/decision informer's prime roles are:

- a) to point to case of general overdetermination (targets whose resource requirements clearly exceed resources likely to be available);
- b) targets which at operational level contradict each other;
- c) proposed allocations seriously inadequate for target achievement;
- d) positive and negative interactions and feedbacks which imply that different allocations could ensure a package of practicable targets likely to be more desirable from a decision taker point of view;
- e) “no through road” warnings in respect to proposed programmes policies and projects most unlikely to achieve significant progress toward targets and to have negative side effects actually moving results away from them;
- f) combined with reasoned – preferably costed – suggestions as to alternative means of moving toward the goals/targets.

This is perhaps not very scientific, model friendly or econometrician compatible (especially with bad, limited data and apparently rapidly changing structural relationships). However, it is attuned to the realities of informing a decision taking process, avoiding egregious waste of resources and making results at least incrementally – and often more substantially – consistent with targets and goals (not least moving in the intended direction).

To play this type of role, a planning process and its technicians/decision informers and its technico/political decision takers need to understand both the decision making process and the goals of main decision takers and to accept them as parameters. To seek to use technical expertise and hidden agendas to alter goals and take over decision taking is most unlikely to succeed and – assuming any governmental and social sector institution legitimacy and accountability – deeply problematic ethically.<sup>15</sup>

**Conflict** is defined for purposes of this paper as widespread armed conflict (perhaps as a rule of thumb directly afflicting at least half the territory and 40% of the population). Conflict of interest or non-violently managed/mediated tensions even if there are local outbreaks of violence are not included. Neither are military coups with no widespread, continuing violence.

Borderline cases include regionalised violence (e.g. the eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region) which at regional, but not national, level have analogous results and an identical need for reconstruction - rehabilitation reconciliation. Cases in which an oppressive regime, widely perceived as illegitimate and facing rising - but still largely suppressed - opposition moving toward violence have been removed rapidly and basically non-violently are also borderline (e.g. Nigeria. Mali perhaps illustrates both sets of characteristics as the northern regional especially in respect to the Delta states- so called Touareg-insurgency led to the relatively peaceful, if military, overthrow of the regime and major strategic policy shifts). In these cases there are

certainly differences of degree and usually of kind in respect to the robustness of state administration and service delivery capacity, of the economy and of the financial system and a basic absence of the return home and need for r-r-r of large numbers of internally displaced/international refugee households.<sup>16</sup>

It may be argued that "failed states" - in the sense of entities which have lost the capacity to administer, enforce law and reasonably just order to deliver either basic services and to create a setting consistent with growth or even stability in production and are viewed as illegitimate by most of their subjects - result in a situation confronting the new government analogous to that on armed conflict's termination. In practice the distinction rarely arises since total state failure, as in Sierra Leone from the 1970's, the then United Republic of Somalia from the mid 1980's and then Zaire from at the latest the early 1980's, almost always leads either to civil war (whether largely domestic or, as is usual, partly externally manipulated) or to a highly oppressive regime which somewhat increases state capacity but with a high risk of future armed conflict (some would cite Burkina Faso as an example albeit its characterisation as a "failed state" under President Sankara is problematic). State failure can precede and lead into or be caused by<sup>17</sup> civil war; in practice it is usually associated with it.

Post-conflict is a fuzzy term. It is clear when a full scale civil war exists e.g. Angola, Sudan. Equally clear are some post war r-r-r contexts e.g. Somaliland, Mozambique. But in other cases a significant level of widespread armed conflict remains and threatens to erupt into a new war period e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, post Mobutu Congo before the 1998 invasion/insurgency, Sierra Leone, probably Liberia.. No turnpike theorem is appropriate to describing the path toward established peace. Initial post conflict situations usually incorporate pockets of violence and real possibilities of renewed war. The opposite side of that coin is that even in clearly civil war

conditions there are likely to be areas (geographic and programmatic) in which even an enfeebled state can carry on significant basic service delivery, law and order and administration functions (e.g. Mozambique in main towns and some rural areas).

**How a conflict** ends as well as its prior causes has a major impact on priorities for rehabilitation as well as the probabilities of success. In general it can be said that the shorter the conflict, the less the cost (especially in lives, livelihoods, human capital and social capital including state legitimacy), the greater degree to which the war is perceived<sup>18</sup> as either a liberation struggle (e.g. Somaliland) or as one instigated and manipulated by external actors (e.g. one broadly perceived strand in Mozambique) and the less deep and systemically entrenched the divisive or corrosive forces which led to the violence (e.g. Rwanda and Burundi as examples of extreme difficulty the less difficult and faster rehabilitation can be). Physical damage seems to matter less as more surprisingly, does brutality - short of systemic genocide - (e.g. Renamo in Mozambique behaved brutally as a strategy as did Barre forces in Somaliland - luckily they were not from Somaliland - but both are cases of relatively rapid, sustained and rooted rehabilitation). Similarly the survival (or inheritance) of a state with some legitimacy, institutional structure, revenue raising capacity and capacity to deliver desired services (all of which were absent in post Mobutu Congo but all, to a degree, present in the Uganda state inherited by President Museveni and in some respects the Ethiopian one taken over, albeit radically restructured socio-politically, by the present Ethiopian government).

The reality and the perception of permanence in respect to cessation of conflict of general (including elite) opposition (or otherwise) to its renewal or of apparent prizes of victory (or their absence) encouraging key actors to revert to violence, and the presence or absence of external bases/allies/sources of supply for continued attempts to destabilise/vanquish the new regime are

also crucial. Even in pure material resource terms planning is hampered if pure security allocations must be massive relative to resources for state revival and any reconstructed infrastructure, restored public service programme or rehabilitated livelihood is at risk of being destroyed again (e.g. contrasting Mozambique vs. Rwanda, Somaliland vs. Sierra Leone, Mali vs. Liberia).<sup>19</sup>

**Rehabilitation** after conflict (or return - reconstruction - rehabilitation - reconciliation) is a process of restoring livelihoods, infrastructure, institutions, human capital, basic services, social capital (especially across groups on opposite sides of the clash) and a political culture of pre conflict resolution of differences. Not all aspects are equally suitable for formal planning techniques but the components interact and - up to a point - resource costings and probable levels of direct and indirect benefits can be estimated.<sup>20</sup>

Four points should be made to avoid misunderstandings. First rehabilitation does not imply return to the prewar status quo (or *modus vivendi*) for at least four reasons:

1. The causes of the conflict are likely, in large part, to lie in the previous structures and relationships;
2. in many cases a radical political restructuring has occurred which necessarily informs all or almost all aspects of rehabilitation;
3. both overall and in specific cases either more or less will be a necessary minimum - e.g. in respect to a failed in the sense of imploded state on the one hand or a corrupt, oppressive state based on force on the other. Very often the nature of relationships as well as orders of

magnitude will require alteration e.g. state farm - plantation - small farming family balance, purposes and patterns of economic intervention;<sup>21</sup>

4. the costs and destructions of war may create analogues to 'greenfield sites' economically, socially and politically. Restoration of production may be most efficient if the products are altered e.g. it is doubtful whether Mozambique should rebuild its heavily damaged sugar plantation sector given the global price patterns and trends for sugar and the plantations' historic need for subsidies.<sup>22</sup>

Second, post conflict rehabilitation execution as such cannot take place nationally until the war has ceased or at least formally halted in respect to areas including most of the population, physical capital and national resources and both is - and is widely perceived to be<sup>23</sup> - unlikely to reignite.

Evidently there is a blurred area as to extent and probable tenacity of peace - or at least non-war. Somaliland has been a case of rehabilitation since 1991 but in 1993, 1995 and contingently until the Berao insurgency was mediated in 1996, in one province until 1998 and, perhaps, in another even today peace has been neither total nor fully secure. Over time the trend in breadth and depth of peace and the falling number, scope and durations of interruptions allows a positive judgement. By this standard Sierra Leone is not yet past conflict and Liberia is very much borderline.

In such cases - as in all public or private policy - risk needs both to be taken into account and to be managed. The cost of waiting for certain, stable peace before beginning rehabilitation is likely to be never to attain the starting point.<sup>24</sup> The cost of ignoring risk is likely to be a large volume of wasted (destroyed, damaged, unusable) capital spending and, less uniformly, serious

loss of personnel. In high risk situations/areas an economic case exists for concentrating on visible, quick, priority need related programmes with low capital costs. Primary and educational/preventative health and some aspects of agricultural extension meet that test as do seed and tool distribution, vocational training and some rural and small town water supply rehabilitation. Main highways, bridge and dams do not, though ports may.

But some discussions of rehabilitation include countries like the Sudan which are very clearly not in any sense post conflict - despite occasional broader or narrower truces. These are cases in which only survival support can be provided except in some cases (not the Sudan) for isolated, stable peaceful areas. Indeed in the Sudan even forward planning toward post conflict rehabilitation (beyond a broad list of strategic objectives and targets) is very difficult because whether one is to posit two states or a confederation with what types of state and at what dates is significant but exceedingly unclear.<sup>25</sup>

Third, however, how survival assistance is organised and -to a lesser extent - its content do feed into initial rehabilitation potential. Keeping people alive turns on access to food, medical services (probably particularly health, education, vaccination and 'first aid') and water. Except in secure refugee settlements with good fortune as to funding, little more is likely to be possible (or, as in the Sudan, even much less).

However, with whom external actors work and how seriously they seek to build up recipient participation in programme design and in operation (including operational management) does matter because it is an investment in sustaining or rebuilding social capital. Similarly attempting to support productive activity (whether in places of refuge or the field) matters not only because own output enhances survival chances, but because return to livelihoods after the conflict is

likely to be faster and more effective. How much beyond seeds and hand tools is possible beyond especially favourable camp or living with kin in peaceful transborder contexts is, however, doubtful.<sup>26</sup>

Fourth, neither rehabilitation nor rehabilitation planning is likely to be effective if perceived as a marginal social service or safety net add on outside main macro economic planning and programming. There are two very simple but very compelling reasons for this: in the absence of real opportunities to regain livelihoods and service access displaced persons, refugees and demobilised combatants will lose hope and quite probably go back to conflict (the old war, a new insurgency or banditry and the output, export, food supply and (as - serving a viable indirect tax system) payoffs of rehabilitation can often be as high and rapid or higher and speedier than of those sectors on which macro economic programming usually focuses. Risking return to violence and overlooking/underinvesting in high, early growth potential opportunities are not good macro economic planning.<sup>27</sup>

To identify tradeoffs and interactions - and to avoid overdetermination - requires either explicit incorporation of rehabilitation into strategic through budgeting process comprehensive macro economic planning or an iterative interaction among sectoral planning processes to achieve a viable overall macro planning resolution.

## II.

### **POST CONFLICT REHABILITATION: Niche or Main Theme**

Evidently post conflict rehabilitation is not a major theme in countries which have not experienced armed conflict. Therefore, it is not a universal element applicable to all

development planning processes in SSA or elsewhere. Neither, however, is it a niche concern relevant to a limited handful of small countries.

At least 50 countries either have national or substantial regional conflicts today or have recently achieved cessation of these conflicts but not yet achieved any state reasonably describable as full rehabilitation. The population of the countries (or afflicted areas in ones in which the conflict is zonal) is of the order of 500,000,000 persons. It is possible to challenge a few of the inclusions but rather easier to suggest plausible additions and to identify countries likely to tip into conflict.

The list is not limited to Africa, indeed a majority are non African. Nor to it confined to very small ones, the average is about 10,000,000 with several over 20,000,000 and some near or over 50,000,000

Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), East Timor, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, two or more CIS Asian Republics, Turkey (Kurdish zone), Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Mexico (Chiapas plus), Haiti, Colombia, Peru (Andean Plateau), El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Algeria, Western Sahara, Mali (Saharan Zone), Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo (Brazzaville), Tchad, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic), Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia, Comoros, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan.

The costs of war – and therefore the starting point for reconstruction - are high in terms of lives lost, physical condition (ability to rebuild) of survivors, Gross Domestic Product, livelihoods, physical damage, institutions, human capital, social capital and residual instability. The relative weights – to each other and overall by country – vary widely.

The total of deaths of people who would have lived in the absence of war in SSA almost certainly exceeds 10 million.<sup>28</sup> In Mozambique it was of the order of 2 million over 1980-1992 and the Sudanese death toll may be higher. In Angola and probably Rwanda it is 1 million or

more as it is in Ethiopia if one assumes the 1984-85 famine would have been contained at low death levels in the absence of war.<sup>29</sup> Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria (during the Biafra war) and Congo (Democratic) have probably each lost at least 200,000 lives each to war and 500,000 in the last two cases.

The loss of life is predominantly civilian (probably 95 per cent) and on average over half indirect resulting from lack of access to medical services, food and water, and to exhaustion from freed flight. Probably over two-fifths are infants and young who are the most vulnerable to these shocks.<sup>30</sup> The old who are almost equally vulnerable may account for only two per cent because in most of SSA only about five per cent of pre-war populations were over 60. Famine deaths are up to a third.<sup>31</sup> Genocide (narrowly defined so that only Rwanda and Burundi are included)<sup>32</sup> is over a tenth and other civilian deaths at the hands of combatants – dominantly by massacres<sup>33</sup> not incidental to combat – about a tenth.

The impact on survivors is also often desperate and in part irreversible. Sustained malnutrition and lack of access to health services is permanently mentally, emotionally and physically damaging even if less evident than mine and terrorist victims, lacking limbs, eyes, ears and/or noses.<sup>34</sup> Equally hard to estimate without in-depth studies are cases of traumatising and desocialisation as a result of being combatants outside normal social structures or mores and of repeated forced migration and harassment. In Mozambique UNICEF/SCF estimates suggest 250,000 traumatised children.

Gross Domestic Product losses in SSA probably exceed \$100,000,000,000<sup>35</sup> - about half in Southern Africa (excluding South Africa)<sup>36</sup> and the rest concentrated in Central Africa, the Sudan and the Horn albeit the current output level and cumulative losses relative to territorial

output are also very high in Liberia and Sierra Leone and were so over much of 1979-81 and 1981-86 in Uganda. In Mozambique, 1992 output was less than half what it would have been in the absence of war, a situation probably pertaining to the Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone today.

The largest source of output loss – and one continuing after the cessation of war – is lack of maintenance and investment exacerbated by destruction of existing capital stock. Military expenditure is largely damaging in this way – it eats up resources otherwise available for directly productive, infrastructural and human investment capital.<sup>37</sup> The same applies to destruction or immobilisation of existing physical capital (and to repair bills to repair and replace it).

Loss of livelihoods is frequently higher (as a proportion of pre-war livelihoods significantly damaged or wiped out by war than that of GDP. This is hardly surprising because almost all SSA wars have been fought predominantly in rural areas and in extreme cases (Mozambique, Angola, Southern Sudan) over half of all rural households have become refugees or internally displaced persons with low to negligible new livelihoods. Serious livelihood attrition is consistent with lower than average (Angola) or very low (Namibia) GDP loss if most rural households are – even initially – very poor and relatively small (under 10 per cent in Angola and perhaps a quarter of that in Namibia) contributors to GDP.

Physical damage – especially to transport infrastructure, all rural and small town infrastructure and housing and power transmission – is probably of the same order of magnitude as GDP but is hard to calculate because the present value of older portions of the capital stock is exceedingly hard to estimate and the cost of repairing or catching up with undone maintenance in contrast to replacement are equally subject to widely varying estimates.

In some cases war has severely intensified pre-existing failure of (especially governmental) institutions while in others it has eroded ones which were becoming stronger in the pre war period (e.g. Sierra Leone, Zaire/Congo in the first case and Mozambique in the second). In either case the cost is substantial. Lengthening time from breakdown to reconstruction increases the time and resources needed for recovery and restoring institutional capacity requires more than replacing capital stock, budgetary flows and personnel.

Human capital loss results from loss of life, gaps in or reductions of flows of newly qualified personnel and forced or semi- voluntary emigration. e.g. There has been no functioning University in Somalia or Somaliland for a decade and few who obtained higher education abroad since then are now in Somalia or Somaliland; as a result most senior public servants in Somaliland are aged 55-65 with a very limited number of highly qualified 30-40 year old professionals to be their successors, let alone expand the service to achieve at least moderately adequate basic service delivery capacity. Similarly Rwanda lost over half of its central and over three quarters of its local government servants - dead or fled.

Social capital (including political culture) costs are widespread and high albeit unequal both as to present impact and post/present/future potential for rebuilding. Trust - especially among civilian, supporters in opposite sides and among the very large numbers (sometimes majorities) who were disenchanted with both (or all in the case of multi-sided conflicts) - has frequently been eroded toward the point of non-existence. How lasting that situation is, is much harder to evaluate and may be highly contextual. Both mediation and reconciliation have positive - and surprisingly fast - track records in Mozambique and Somaliland but not in Angola or Somalia. Similarly social networks have frequently become narrower - e.g. mixed villages and neighbourhoods were common in pre war Rwanda and Burundi but are not since 1994.

The last major cost category is residual/consequential violence. Demobilised combatants - especially in the absence of well designed adequately resourced programmes into livelihoods above the absolute poverty level - are likely in numerous cases to return to the only skill and tools they know - those of violence and weaponry. Residual pockets of violence - whether of banditry or bitter enders - are common. The two greatest potential costs, however are:

- a. reignition of war (whether on the old or on new lines) because of an inadequate (including seriously differently interpreted) peace settlements or inadequate rehabilitation;
- b. continuation of the war from nearby external bases by the vanquished party (interahamwe against of Rwanda and its analysis - against Burundi).

Perhaps surprisingly revenge killings after the cessation of war have not been a substantial factor. In some cases - e.g. Rwanda - this has required sustained government pressure including draconic action against some offenders. In others - e.g. Mozambique - while the government has certainly opposed retaliation there appears to have been limited need for action to enforce that opposition. It is argued that revenge killings in Sierra Leone are likely to be a serious problem - a belief apparently shared by many ex army and Revolutionary United Front cadres - but logic and pre-settlement speculation in Mozambique ran on the same lines.<sup>38</sup>

Relative levels of loss - to each other and relative to pre war - vary widely. No generalisation - beyond appallingly high levels - appear likely to be sustainable. This would suggest that entry points and priorities for rehabilitation planning also may need to be substantially different in different countries.

Globally it is just possible to argue that the epidemic of wars have marginal costs - the countries afflicted probably account for less than 2% of global GDP and (even in the absence of war probably at most 5%) have very limited military capacity relative to large economy armed forces<sup>39</sup> and - except in the Balkans - are not next door to OECD or EU club members.

That is a rather inhuman approach given that up to one human being in ten is afflicted by war or the consequences of recent war in her/his country. In any event it is less than accurate because of very real regional spill over effects. These are perhaps most severe in SSA but clearly apply also to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasuses and the Himalayan periphery.

Spread and spill-over costs include:

- a. deterrent (or border repellent) military spending;<sup>40</sup>
- b. military spending and participation in conflict in support of neighbours;<sup>41</sup>
- c. regional peace maintaining, restoring or enforcing involvement;<sup>42</sup>
- d. loss of sources and markets;
- e. costs of hosting refugees;
- f. external image regionally and globally not least in relation to external official and enterprise sources of finance.

Tanzania and Zimbabwe have had military budgets primarily related to external threats and successful in keeping conflict on their own soil to a minimum. Similarly, both (as well as Angola) have deployed troops into combat in support of neighbours they perceived as in danger of being overwhelmed by external or externally-backed aggression with consequential threats to

their own security. Nigeria has incurred heavy costs in seeking to avert, reduce, end war in Liberia and Sierra Leone.<sup>43</sup>

The Central African conflict triggered by the RPF invasion/Interahamwe genocide in Rwanda has spread to involve at least eight states (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (Democratic), Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and – perhaps – the Sudan) in combat and imposed heavy deterrence costs on Tanzania. It has led to two externally catalysed civil wars in Congo and is – despite the Lusaka Peace Accord – by no means in sight of resolution either in its transborder or, especially, its internal aspects. Nor has it resolved the initial problem – the red thread of Interahamwe genocide (and pre-emptive anti wa Hutu violence in Burundi) which has woven itself into both Congo (Democratic) wars as well as those in Congo (Brazzaville) and the CAR (in both cases IH have fought as mercenaries). IH remains in the north-east quadrant of Congo (Democratic) and (now) in the Kabila army and – while crippled through base point constriction – in the analogous Burundian external armed opposition.<sup>44</sup>

Trade losses, while not comparable to military costs, can be significant especially zonally. Before 1994 Ngara District in Tanzania's largest markets (for beans and coffee) were in Rwanda and Burundi and they were important manufactured goods (e.g. beer, textiles, cigarette) suppliers while transit traffic revenues were arguably its most dynamic sector. That ended abruptly in 1994 and impacted sectors have recovered slowly and partially.

Refugee costs are a contentious issue. A study in Ngara in 1994 suggests that on current household account Ngara may have been in a break even position with commercial sector and banana gains offsetting bean grower losses. But the ecological impact including demands on women and girls' time – to go further to secure water and fuel – were very significant as were

the security costs on the border and in/around the camps incurred by the Tanzanian government.<sup>45</sup>

Countries in what are perceived as war zones – even if they are not significantly unstable and involved in neighbours' wars, pay a high price because both tourists and investors are often vague on distances, actual locations of conflict, and how rapidly conflicts are likely to spread. They avoid risk and stay out of the whole zone.

For a country – however at peace domestically – to be in a zone in which wars exist is to live in a high cost and dangerous neighbourhood.

### III.

The review to this print supports seven propositions:

1. Planning as a means of informing the decision taking process to allocate resources toward a set of goals and targets is neither an oxymoron nor a process only rarely applicable (whether at government, local government, enterprise or 'household level');
2. What type of planning can be effective in context related - the weaker the data base (and the less suitable for projections), the greater the degree of structural change sought, the more limited the analytical capacity and the greater the uncertainty as to resource availability and/or the impact of external shocks, the greater the case for strategic planning focussed on a limited number of priority targets with flexibility focussing on achieving movement in the right direction rather than literal attainment of quantified targets by specified dates;<sup>46</sup>

3. Strategic and sectoral planning linked directly to budgets, via policies, programmes and projects is usually easier to formulate in SSA than comprehensive plans. The drawback is that this approach does make it harder to estimate linkages and positive or negative side effects and - especially - for decision takers (or planning technicians) to understand tradeoffs among goals, targets and - especially - budgetary allocations/probable short term results;
4. Therefore the case for a comprehensive one year policy - budget package and a strategic inter-relationship/trade off overarching formulation remain;<sup>47</sup>
5. The uses of a planning process are not limited to the economic (or even the readily quantifiable material) aspects of decision taking. All goals and targets require allocation of scarce resources and almost all meaningful targets can be compared with results - at least in respect to direction and frequently order of magnitude of change;<sup>48</sup>
6. Wars have particular, identifiable costs and leave contexts distinctly different from those of economic, public service and governance decline without war. That suggests that either different overall planning processes or sectoral strategic to operational to budgetary processes within an overall frame will be appropriate for post war rehabilitation.
7. If the sectoral approach is used then it must feed into whatever overarching analysis (preferably on a larger and deeper than annual budget basis) is used to determine resource allocation. Any sector not treated as of major macro economic significance and linked directly to macro economic analysis and programming will - in practice - be marginalised and under allocated.<sup>49</sup>

Those propositions create a basis justifying attempting systematic post war rehabilitation planning. They suggest some of the parametric constraints and, perhaps, possible approaches. They provide neither a checklist of probable elements, a system for prioritisation nor much indication how many useful generalisations (beyond very overarching resource allocation procedures) can be identified and how they interact with contextual specificities and varying - but usually high - degrees of uncertainty/risk.

The checklist is perhaps the easiest to formulate. It can also be encapsulated. One of the clearest formulations is that of a very senior, very old, very peace and order oriented (albeit willing to fight for those ends) Somali elder at Baidoa in 1995. He set out three goals within an overarch (or built on a foundation);<sup>50</sup>

1. water, without which people, livestock and crops cannot survive;
2. food, also essential to survival and ability to produce;
3. health and education without which ability to learn and to produce are stunted and full human life (as contrasted with mere survival) is unattainable.

The overarch stated was a frame of peace and order within which people could set about achieving the other goals/targets.

At first glance this formulation may seem notably non economic. In part that is typical of non-economists' (whether ministers' or village women's) formulations - financial magnitudes and production are to them vital means or intermediate goals to other ends. In fact the focus is on production of water, food, health and education services and on a law/order context in which that can be done. The goal set is adequate to carry out a strategic planning exercise and, in principle,

can be elaborated for targets and then iteratively programmed toward rolling and around operational budgeting.

Beneath and within the generality does lie contextuality. Somalia is a water scarce zone and war has devastated urban and rural, human and livestock access with only the urban even reasonably adequately restored (as of fall 1995 in Baidoa). Food supplies had returned to adequacy only in 1994 and were at risk from bad weather in 1995 even before the rise in violence. Over 1992-1995 there had been a certain local/provincial law, order, mediation framework which had (until then) kept the peace and contained small outbreaks of violence - thus his positing of continuing/improving peace and order as an overarch.

A schematic checklist by cluster includes:

### **1. Security-Law-Order**

- Border defense to keep war out (or repel)
- Insurgency defense
- Day to day security from violent interference normal life by anyone (including army, police, politicians, officials, 'big men') by a user friendly civilian police force
- Operational, accessible magisterial courts with intelligible laws, consistency, impartiality, speed and honesty

### **2. Basic Service Access**

- Water (human and livestock/crops)

- Health Services (especially preventive, educational, primary curative)
- Education (especially primary and vocational/adult)

### 3. **Livelihood Rehabilitation/Strengthening**

- Facilitating return home/re-establishing farm (or trade)
- Ensuring access to inputs/knowledge (e.g. extension services/markets)
- Avoidance needless/complex regulation

### 4. **Provision Infrastructure**

- Physical (e.g. rural roads, buildings and equipment for heads 1-2-3-5)
- Institutional and Procedural (to operate 1-2-3-5)
- Market (ensuring there are commercial, transport, financial operators - preferably not governmental)

### 5. **Provision Safety Nets**

- Initial return home /demobilisation
- Calamity (e.g. drought) response
- Absolute poverty alleviation (aged, disabled, mother and child, epidemic e.g. HIV)

These are relatively similar to a strategic checklist for absolute poverty reduction planning, programming, budgeting in any African (probably any low average output per capita) country.

The differences are contextual relating to the starting point. Priorities and sequences relating to action turn on initial gaps and on which elements of each priority are crucial in allowing progress on other aspects of that priority and, especially, on other priority clusters.

In particular, law-order-security have higher priority - in resource allocations and timing - than in non-war contexts. It is quite true that law and order are never enough. It is, however, equally true that without some achieved levels of law, order and security there cannot be much else.<sup>51</sup>

'Resettlement' does not appear as a separate cluster. It is an initial stage of livelihood and rehabilitation, usually means 'return home and is frequently so rapid that 'planned' support is overtaken by events. However, one aspect - demobilisation with economic/social reintegration is usually under-prioritised (at least in terms of resources deployed in articulated, relevant programmes). If young men with, and trained in the use of, guns (and often little else) with limited social/human capital are demobilised into absolute poverty with neither hope for themselves nor respect by others there will - or at least is very likely to be - insecurity and violence. This applies to all ex-combatants not only to 'victors' or to formal government troops.

The list is specifically intended to apply to R-R-R planning as sectoral planning - not to deny that overall fiscal and financial institutions and flows, arterial infrastructure, higher education, large nodal or growth pole projects/enterprises (whether the spin-offs are employment, input markets, foreign exchange earning and/or fiscal flows) are crucial. They are. But it is probably more practicable to pursue them in one or more sectoral planning process with systematic attention to linkages/feedbacks within a simple, overarching, macro strategic plan frame and iterative incorporation and reconciliation at programming and budgetary process stages.

The perception of all causes of conditions leading to violence - and of formulating them in ways facilitating specific means to reducing/reversing them - is important probably to any results and certainly to efficient resource allocations.

To argue that the removal of a lid (in the African case colonialism) allows unresolved tensions to re-emerge and to intensify (the 'Balkan Model') is not wholly invalid. Nor is the statement that 'ethnicity matters' albeit ethnicity/nationalism are frequently manipulated and used to deflect wrath<sup>52</sup> and can be (and are) used to build states and reduce tensions as well as the reverse. A somewhat different set of propositions (points to study for operational implications) may be more useful to R-R-R planning:

1. Lawless and violent governments lead to lawless and violent people;
2. inclusion (or gaining power) at the centre not secession is the usual central demand of insurgency supporters;
3. cross border violence is usually the result, not the cause, of domestic war;
4. territorial identity/loyalty neither requires a central historical 'national culture and societal pattern nor automatically flows from it. Botswana and Tanzania (and particularly Somaliland) are nation states in the territorial loyalty and social capital sense but Tanzania is very diverse in 'historic nations' and none has irridentist ambitions in respect to the numbers of its 'historic nationals' living across present frontiers;
5. if a territorial state ceases to function (e.g. Sierra Leone, Zaire) territorial loyalty may persist but violence is likely to emerge -especially if the failed state makes spasmodic violent attempts to reassert its authority;

6. perceived inequity - by exclusion or drawing off of resources with few, if any, flowing back - is much more likely to lead to intense alienation and violence than poverty and relatively low inward resource allocations. Bayelsa as the largest contributor to Nigeria's exports and fiscal flows believes it is robbed; Ngara in Tanzania is poor, at least until recently under-allocated but sees some central concern and results (most notably 1994 on preservation of law, order and security) and knows it is not being robbed to support Dar es Salaam.

Each proposition does lead to priority actions. e.g. In Nigeria the automatic allocation of shares of oil revenues to producing and (at lower levels) other states and to the Federal Government was a unifying means. Its partial reinstatement is a move in the right direction but given the intervening period no longer enough by itself.

Similarly malgovernance can be broken down into components facilitating identification of actions to reverse them and to testing packages of measures for joint feasibility and (ordinal) efficiency:

1. the most pervasive form of malgovernance is non-governance i.e. failure to provide acceptable levels of services in the five clusters cited relatively and increasingly broadly which are equitably accessible (people cannot live by participation, competitive elections and prudential financial sector regulation alone);
2. the most general lawlessness and resort to violence promoting aspects of malgovernance - after systemic violence - is systemic theft at upper and middle levels;<sup>53</sup>
3. waste matters because resources are scarce and because when gross it brings the government both political figures and public servants - into contempt;

4. non-participation matters by reducing the perception of belonging, of having control over a range of meaningful 'local' decisions and of being able to hold accountable. The forms of participation matter less than that they are seen as real and, to a degree at least, effective.<sup>54</sup>

In respect to perceptions of participation and of territorial national identity symbols and mixed symbolic/functional unifying means do matter - on occasion negatively as well as positively.

Here a planning technician can usually do little more than inform on costs and potential negative feedbacks.

Somaliland has invested very heavily in decision taker time for reconciliation conferences of guurti (elders who, in Somaliland, are close to and legitimate for most people), in electing a House of Elders (strategic politics and political economy) and of Assembly (to oversee government operations) and a draft constitution with a pre finalisation/referendum consultation/dialogue process as well as in re-establishing a functioning magisterial to supreme court system, a civil police force, and a national army. All have functional roles but in addition (especially except for the courts and the army) they create a perception of participation (even if indirect) from household to country and of a state which is, but is also more than, a federation of sub clans.

Indigenous national - in the sense of non European - languages are an example of instruments with different impacts in different contexts. The ideal is an indigenous language which is fairly broadly understood (even if imperfectly), easy to learn and the home language of a relatively weak group. In such a case - notably Swahili in Tanzania - the gains are real and the costs can be reduced by developing the language and by wide teaching of a secondary international language. Unfortunately the conditions are rarely met. If one region or elite would gain, the 'national'

language can prove more devisive than moving toward universal access to the colonial one - thus Mozambique's option for Portuguese over Swahili (or English) which was feared would disadvantage the Centre and North versus the South (or vica versa).<sup>55</sup>

What can be said about elaborating from the guidelines and checklists in particular countries at particular times? At case level a good deal but at that of generalisations either rather less or with so many sets of alternatives as to be neither portable, digestible nor printable.

Two sketches may illustrate what is likely to be practicable: one starting from a long collapsed state and severe damage to livelihoods and commerce as well as initial near total breakdown of law and order - Somaliland. The other is the context of a functioning state and institutions with order and livelihood existing (even before the end of the war), albeit if attenuated, for perhaps half the population - Mozambique. Differences in professional personnel and data complementarity are almost as marked.<sup>56</sup>

In the first case the starting point for a planning process to identify goals, results to date and a limited number of key actions/programmes which would solidify what has been achieved and have major, fairly rapid (2 to 4) year spillover in making possible a broader range of targets.

Somaliland has law, order, security and a broadly shared sense of being a state. Basic institutions (central and local) including a public service are in place, but very weak because of exiguous resources including limited external official, personnel and invesiment flows because of non-recognition.

Three priorities (paralleling incremental strengthening on other fronts) are identifiable:

1. Restoration of government - including local - revenue collection from the order of \$25 million to \$150 million (about an eighth of GNP) through import (not export and remittance) taxes for the central government and urban rates and service charges for the municipal ones. Devising simple systems and standard procedures plus training staff (requiring perhaps up to a dozen expatriate specialist professionals) should be attainable over 18 to 36 months with build-up to the goal ratio to GDP at - say - 60 months.
2. Restoration of the key Berbera-Harqisa - Djijiga - Addis Ababa trade and transport backbone building from present UNCTAD channelled work at Berbera via an EU Horn Regional programme with Ethiopia. The \$50-75 million cost (and related specialist personnel) over 3 to 5 years are not out of line with EU major regional project funding and require only Ethiopian involvement and EU acceptance of Somaliland as a 'Region' in EU sense not formal recognition.
3. Demobilisation and reintegration into civilian livelihoods of the 12,500 'surplus' army personnel enlisted to place sub-clan militias in a disciplined national institution plus and livelihood training for the 5,000 (of 20,000) 1991 demobilisees who have not successfully built civilian livelihoods. Because skilled workers and artisans are in demand - in civil engineering and building construction - an eighteen month programme of training and labour intensive reconstruction (secondary infrastructure) would be feasible e.g. under ILO auspices. As it could be classed as humanitarian - even though underpinning security, social stability, poverty reduction and economic growth (and lightening the budget burden of food - shelter - clothing and pocket money for the 'extra' troops) EU, Nordic and Swiss plus

perhaps Japanese, UK and US should be attainable. Phased over five years the annual external cost would be of the order of \$20 million (under \$10 per Somalilander).

If these three strategic programmes could be done the domestic revenue, the trunk infrastructure rehabilitation and the reconstruction of secondary infrastructure and boosting of human capital and livelihoods would facilitate progress on basic services provision, sustained domestic growth, return of some diaspora professionals and - in practice - an extension to *de facto* and toward *de jure* recognition.

Mozambique's planning process could be and was more formal. The approach suggested has been prepared for/presented to Somaliland decision takers *ad hoc* and may or may not be internalised and used in part - the Mozambican was part of an ongoing domestic planning process.

Because state institutions and decision takers existed during the war with substantial pre to post war continuity, a pre peace strategic plan could usefully be set out in 1992 drawing on experience with survival support during the war. It was explicitly a strategic sectoral plan intended to be iteratively integrated into the comprehensive macro economic planning process.

The components were livelihood rehabilitation (including supporting activities including rural trade and transport), basic services return to war ravaged areas and local level infrastructure (including municipal and provincial decentralised governance and market access institutions).

Security (except demobilisation into livelihood rehabilitation) was in a separate exercise.

Linkages, multipliers (estimated at about 1 i.e. total GDP impact 2 times direct household production) and impact on external and fiscal balance were estimated as were progress toward food security (including household production for own use) and absolute poverty reduction.

The projected results were positive - over five years 50% output gain over early 1990's GDP, basic food balance in non-drought years except for wheat and vegetable oil, self sustaining on fiscal and external account (for the results of the strategic planning exercise, not the economy as a whole) by year six.

The external cost of perhaps \$1,500 million over five years (\$20 per Mozambican per year) was proposed to be met by shifting survival support (Emergencia was \$350 to \$500 million a year), UNHCR support of refugees (\$150 million a year) and the committed demobilisation/reintegration component of UNOMOZ (\$200 million) to the Reconstruction Sector phasing down over five years as domestic feedback payoff rose.

The planning process - except in cases such as food production and to a lesser extent rural household consumption poverty reduction turning largely on peace and order and on removal of restrictions - was a failure. The proposed funding sources were transferred to other countries (or donor budget tightening). External official financial sources - especially the Bank and the Fund - did not so much criticise Reconstrucao as treat it as peripheral (perhaps as component of safety nets) not integral to overall macro economic strategy. In particular basic services restoration was constrained even when initial period non-inflationary external finance was to hand while main roads were overfinanced at levels engrossing almost all rural capital expenditure..

The Mozambican experience calls attention to the external actors' role. R-R-R is more national and contextual than - say - dams or prudential regulation of banks. Therefore the necessary level of national parameter setting should be higher and the involvement in specific permutations greater. This is especially true because external financial sources appear to give much lower priority to R-R-R than to either survival support or 'standard development' and also to focus on

those aspects of governance of special relevance to macro economic frameworks and to foreign enterprises with much less attention to the aspects of direct concern to the vast majority of households.

Unfortunately countries in which R-R-R is a central strategic priority are typified by low levels of domestic resource availability and weak human, physical and institutional infrastructures as well as governance capabilities. They cannot proceed with the more financial resource intensive aspects of R-R-R very rapidly without significant external resources, human as well as financial.

The apparent sectoral and territorial exceptions appear to be special cases. Mozambique has met the target of being basically food self sufficient (except for wheat and vegetable oil) in non-drought years. Peace, return home, removal of state barriers to trade were sufficient to achieve that goal - seen as laughable when formulated in 1992. But donor conditionality (even more than resource commitments) has blocked generalisation of basic services and 'low' level infrastructure.

In Somaliland massive remittances (of the order of 75% of GDP and over 40% of GNP) have facilitated rapid advance in some aspects of R-R-R but not fiscal rehabilitation so that basic services and infrastructural rehabilitation lag badly. The paucity of technical assistance/conditionality flowing from non-recognition has enabled (forced) Somalilanders to set their own strategic priorities, but the parallel absence of specialised professional inputs and revenue for large programmes limit implementation.

Similarly with external NGOs - New Government Options to donors, New Governance Overarches for themselves, National Growth Obstacles to many recipients. Integration into national strategies is practicable together with catalytic perception - priority - programming

impact which becomes internalised e.g. UNICEF, which is widely seen as akin to an ideal NGO even if it clearly is UN family agency. So is cooperation within - local governmental and community frames, e.g. ActionAid in Mozambique. Even basically anti state bodies, if competent, may be ideal for survival support channelling during war and in other non-governance settings - e.g. Medecins Sans Frontières in contested rural areas in Mozambique to 1993. But the generalised use of semi anarchically autonomous NGOs accountable to external donors and to their own lenders' consciences and visions to deliver R-R-R (and basic services) fragments and erodes both governmental and civil society capacity and rehabilitation. Domestically designed and driven, partly donor funded and programmed is a fairly easy overarching goal to prescribe but one much harder to get official donors, NGOs and many African governments to internalise and act upon consistently.

#### IV

#### WHAT WAYS FORWARD? (OR NOT)

The case for the usefulness and practicability of Post War Rehabilitation Planning appears to be fairly robust as does actual or potential interest on the part of several African governments. The examples of Somaliland and Mozambique suggest that adaptation to different contexts/starting points is feasible. The most immediate constraint on post war rehabilitation planning is its marginalisation outside main resource allocation processes. The first step toward loosening that constraint is to enter into wider dialogue and debate on potential and observed positive and negative factors. Assuming that the process has something to offer, being ignored or treated to minor handouts as a form of safety net or survival support is much more damaging than serious open controversy.

The analytical aspects of the dialogue and debate would serve a second function - exploring certain key relationships/aspects not adequately incorporated (except by assumption) into rehabilitation planning - notably gender.<sup>57</sup>

In parallel both because of present value and to broaden the base of available experience for analysis and dialogue, rehabilitation planning processes should be continued as, where and to the extent possible. This is probably useful even if in the end particular components are removed and fitted into a more comprehensive and macro economic planning exercise *ad hoc*. At least in that case their relative importance and linkages would be more fully understood.

To plan is to choose and to choose necessarily includes to choose not to do or to give very low priority (which with very scarce resources as in most post war contexts comes to the same thing). In the case of Post-war Rehabilitation Planning however the evidence supports choosing to go forward on the analytical, operational and feedback/evaluation fronts.

*Ref: RHG/lab/br/scusa.doc 03/09/99*

## **AUTHOR NOTE**

Reg Green has been a student of the applied political economy of Africa for 40 years and has studied, taught, researched, advised and/or served as a public servant in 37 African countries. He has taken part in planning processes (as public servant or advisor) since 1965 with particular reference to national planning, regional coordination/integrations, poverty reduction - basic services generalisation - livelihood expansion, structural adjustment, wartime emergency/survival programming, and post-war rehabilitation. He is currently involved in the COPE (Complex Political Emergencies) Project of IDS (Sussex), Leeds, Bradford and ACCORD and the Conflict Comprehension and Master Project of ACDESS (African Center for Economic, Social and Strategic Studies). He is associated with IDS (Sussex) and ACDESS (Ijebo-Ode, Nigeria).

## NOTE

A bibliography will be appended to the final (abridged) text and references inserted in it.

## ENDNOTES

1. There is no standard definition of any of these concepts. Therefore, for transparency (to the author as well as the audience) studies do require working definitions. While some basic terms and elements are broadly global others are contextual. The limitation of the present study to SSA relates to the author's field and operational experience.
2. A strategic 20 year plan toward universal literacy, universal access to primary and basic vocational education, 33% to tertiary (broadly defined) education does have goals, resource requirement estimates, a time frame, paths forward and interim targets and, logically, much more precise three and one year components which could also be termed rolling and annual budgets.
3. This example illustrates the importance of context. In post war Somaliland most Somalilanders, the liberation movement and the subsequent government viewed reestablishment of a civilian, user friendly police force and a functioning, honest judicial system as immediate strategic priorities (and ones only the state could provide). Therefore relatively large institutional and policy - as well as finance and personnel - allocations were made to them relative to health, water and education. The nature of probable desired tradeoffs in - say - Tanzania or (even more) Botswana is quite different.
4. Seeking to unify goals may be much more damaging than keeping them separate. In Nigeria during General Obasanjo's first presidency the quite plausible strategic goal of an integrated iron and steel industry and of building up development poles in all or most states sabotaged each other with disastrous effects for both. Failure to focus on low cost (including transport), iron ore, limestone, natural gas inputs and on transport friendly (for external and domestic markets) location patterns in order to scatter large but ill related (and sometimes utterly ill chosen substantively - e.g. Enugu, coal resuscitation), bits among many states doomed the steel project to high costs, delays and poor productivity and created rather more dead-weight than growth pole objects. Certainly a substantial economic focal point (public or private) was needed at or near Enugu both economically and as a credible embodiment of post civil war reconciliation. But to seek to revive the failed coal mine lumbered the steel industry with excess costs and brought little in the way of jobs or input purchases to Enugu. The base failing in this case was largely technical. Professional opponents of the Enugu and Jebba portions of the steel industry plaster man failed to make intelligible the fact that they were not opposing regional growth centres but to destroying steel industry viability by a plethora of unviable units which would be regional drag not growth points. Their credibility was further damaged by not proposing a regional economic stimulus programme of - at least potentially - viable projects.
5. Even the Mozambican, Angolan and Ethiopian 1990's planning processes were dominantly financial with national targets weakly (if at all) related to policy or resource inputs.
6. Institutional territorial struggles between Planning and Finance Ministries (or among wings of combined Planning-Economic Affairs -Finance ministries) do not provide an adequate explanation. For example in Tanzania in the 1960's and 1970's the curious division of labour was that Planning handled capital planning and annual capital budgets while the Treasury

handled recurrent and overall. On policy, Planning handled medium term strategic priorities (often very vaguely) and Finance operationalisation and operation and on analysis Planning long term macro and Finance short and medium term analysis at macro through micro levels and feedback to policy. Not surprisingly with the non trivial exception of the strategic formulation process leading to a plan, the Ministry of Finance/Treasury (and especially its analysis and policy wings) dominated. In practice relationships were not so much bad - at least as perceived from Finance which had a significant role in the process of plan formation and a dominant one at other times - as unlikely to be particularly efficient. The capital budgeting should have moved to the Treasury and much more the analysis, policy development and monitoring roles to Planning.

7. World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes - at least in their initial segments - were a clear example of this variety of planning. As the time frame extended by accretion from three to five to over 20 years they became less focussed as to targets, more concerned with strategic goals and arguably less appropriate than more clearly defined interacting Sustainable (Im) Balance restoration and Strategic Objective planning integrated via three year rolling and one year operational Budgeting processes.

8. Arguably Botswana is an exception. It still has comprehensive national planning exercises into which poverty reduction and drought response components are integrated and which do inform the Budgetary Process. It is no aspersion on this achievement to note that the relatively rapid sustained growth of output, the structural factors that cause this growth to generate export and fiscal buoyancy, the success of regional efforts (in which Botswana participated) to make its region safer and less security intensive (e.g. the 'new' South Africa, independent Namibia, Mozambique at peace) and the high levels of international official resources providing time and space for adjustment are so atypically favourable (globally as well as in respect to SSA) as to create massive obstacles to applying 'lessons of experience from Botswana' elsewhere in SSA.

9. This is not to ignore other causal factors on the political culture and armed conflict fronts but to suggest that - especially in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - more co-ordinated initial planning could have reduced early costs and brought forward recovery gains and in others - e.g. Romania, Bulgaria - reduced costs in ways conclusive to creating socio political gains consistent with sustainable restructuring and recovery.

10 There is no contention here that these clusters of goals are largely competitive. They are in large measure complementary and to reduce any to negligible planning allocations is likely, by feedback, to block others. But at the marginal/incremental resource allocation face there are trade offs.

11 The law and order priority in rehabilitation contexts as opposed to more "normal" ones is an example. This may not relate as much to the absolute levels (targets) of law and order or resources allocated toward achieving them as to the degree and speed of change required and, consequentially, share of total resources allocated to it. Just arguably Somalilands police force is more effective and user friendly than Tanzania but the most notable differences are that it is over two officers per 1000 persons versus under one and accounts for about half of non-army public

servants as under a tenth because of greater need to reintroduce and to consolidate (as opposed to sustain) law and order and much more limited state resources relative to population or GNP.

12 The external NGO debate is an example. Whatever external NGO's can do they cannot be user accountable, nationally integrative, (with exceptions) state legitimacy building, or generalised basic service providing even if they can be valuable emergency gap fillers and useful supporters to governmental and civil society led programmes perhaps particularly at local government and domestic social organisation levels. Unleashing hundreds of them in a rehabilitation context – and redirecting the largest share of non infrastructure and macro economic policy support resources through them - fairly inevitably erodes, corrodes, fragments and risks dissolving state and government (at local and regional/provincial/state as well as national levels) no matter what the intentions. To paraphrase Socrates as paraphrased by Plato – the unexamined plan is not worth planning.

13 Tanzania since 1994 has had up to 10,000 troops on or near its Congo-Rwanda-Burundi borders and another 10,000 forward deployed for quick movement paralleled by a disproportionate allocation of police to these areas. Their purposes are to ensure that wars are effectively prohibited/deterred immigrants and refugees do not covertly subvert domestic law and order by external wars. This is not a cheap exercise – arguably it engrosses 10 % of Tanzania's non-debt service recurrent budget. But is it a bad allocation in either socio-political or economic terms? What would the costs to Tanzania of Central African wars spilling onto Tanzanian soil or their refugees remaining (as they did in then Zaire) directly involved in the wars they had fled have been?

14 This is not a mindlessly optimistic view of the potential of technicians/decision informers and technico/political decision taker participation in an iterative goals – targets – means – allocations planning process. The Tanzania and Zimbabwean ministries of finance in the 1970's and 1980's respectively and the Mozambican after 1988 followed that type of critical response within the overall security goal framework with significant impact. Since the Portuguese never invaded Tanzania nor the South Africans Zimbabwe and the Amin's invasion of Tanzania and the Renamo-South African 1986-7 campaign to deconstruct Mozambique and isolate Zimbabwe were decisively repulsed, it is hard to argue that the “Treasury hands” interactions seriously weakened national security.

15 There are contexts in which participating in planning either as a technician/decision informer or as a semi technocratic/semi political decision taker may be humanly unacceptable because of the goals the process seeks to further and the probable results of the more efficient allocation of resources to further them. If the key decision taking elite are committed only to survival and personal accumulation and aggrandisement, intermediate strata to survival and lucrative or semi lucrative niche procurement, most people to survival, passive resistance and avoidance – Mobuto's Zaire for a third of a century – a planning process (even if little related to formal plan and even budget documents and pronouncements) is possible. Judging by the amounts engrossed and the length of survival, Mobuto's planning process was relatively efficient. As the costs included deconstruction of the state and the economy erosion of human and social capital – not least order, law and justice – and immiserisation of a very large majority of Zairois the inevitable

end consequence was either implosion or explosion and the effect of greater allocative efficiency in prolonging the process negative. But for a Zairois the choice of participating to mitigate or (optimistically) to broaden and humanise goals, of standing by to await implosion and of moving to active resistance was never easy. In Malawi (under Kamuzu Banda) and Nigeria (under General Abacha) many able, decent people chose the second course waiting for Banda to die and some event to fracture the Abacha regime (in the event an Act of God) as opposed to either participating or revolting and, in the event, were probably justified in doing so.

16. This definition does not imply that high levels of tension and/or coup d'etats are benign nor that transitions like that in Nigeria are non-problematic and benign (especially as a civil war in two or three key oil producing states is a real risk). It simply argues that they are different in kind to the aftermaths of war in e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Somaliland, Sierra Leone or Liberia (assuming in the last two cases war is ended not merely temporarily suspended).

17. Not all civil wars result in state failure as sketched. The Mozambican one certainly limited the geographic area in which the state was effective and its operational capability even there but a perfectly recognisable state existed. The same has, to date, characterised Angola and the post genocide Rwanda state

18. Perception, as linked to and as independent from reality matters. Somaliland - then independent - voted against union with Somalia and was annexed by force. Thus the perception that 1985-91 was a liberation struggle even though during the pre-Barre civilian era Somalilanders had become more integrated into the then United Republic and the restored Republic of Somaliland's President Egal was the Prime Minister of the United Republic ousted by General Barre.

19. The external context factor is one which affects the likelihood of the conflict spreading. Had the Interahamwe not been given the time and resources to consolidate, reorganise and strike back from then Eastern Zaire not only would rehabilitation in Rwanda had a far more propitious context but the expansion of the war to both Congos, Uganda, the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe would have been averted (possibly at the cost of delaying the implosion of the Mobutu regime by a few years). This incidentally illustrates bad international humanitarian and peacekeeping planning. The failure to allocate resources to prevent IH from using the Zaire camps as rehabilitation centres and bases has been costly (even to the Security Council member states) out of proportion to money/lives 'saved'. That the exercise would have been possible is illustrated by the fact that Tanzania - which planned and prioritised more effectively with less resources - largely succeeded in preventing any such consolidation and resurgence of IH in its territory.

20. In general this is not a one instrument per target case. e.g. Reestablishment (or establishment) of a competent, user friendly civilian police force contributes to social reconstruction by creating peace/law/order and to enhanced production by reducing risk, damage or theft and transport costs. The police force needs to be complemented by a just, intelligible legal code and an impartial, honest, accessible primary court system.

21. The last point is consistent with IMF and World Bank positions. They are not opponents of all regulation or market intervention but against types they believe place serious constraints on production and do little to further level playing field competition or prevent enterprise or public servant abuses. For example, they - like many large financial enterprises - advocate more prudential scrutiny and regulation of banks.

22. This question is independent of the public - private one. Private sugar industry rebuilding would require infrastructural reconstruction, probably domestic guaranteed prices/purchase levels and other open or camouflaged subsidies.

23. A good test may be the proportion of refugees and internally displaced persons who choose to 'return home'. In Mozambique (like Kosovo) it has been very high and rapid while in Angola (like Sri Lanka) it has been limited and slow.

24. The needs for livelihood rehabilitation, access to basic services and to infrastructure (including markets) and civil law, order, policing are immediate. Failure to act toward at least most of them will rapidly erode support for/suspension of disbelief in the new governmental structures and processes. External donors in this context are very risk averse in a perverse way - they make substantial rehabilitation support to bankrupt governments in devastated economies conditional on prior achievement of the targets for which the resources are needed.

25. Because the SPLA has created an alliance with the two main (75% of vote in North in past reasonably free and fair elections) Northern democratic parties (Umma, NDP), agreed a Confederal/Federal (within each region) Constitution to be confirmed (or not) by referendum after five years, trained 5,000 Umma military cadres and co-operated with them on the North-eastern front, the least unlikely result would appear to be the fall of the Khartoum (military/minority fraction of Sudanese Islam) regime and a relatively decentralised, quasi participatory governance structure for the whole of the Sudan. The date depends on the degree of external support SPLA-Umma-NDP can muster relative to that which Khartoum can acquire and on a stable Ethiopian-Eritrean peace to allow fuller access to the Northeast and East. Five to ten years may be a reasonable estimate. Therefore any detailed rehabilitation planning exercise today would be unlikely to have much value - unless conducted by the SPLA-Umma-NDP for symbolic and mobilisation purposes.

26. Most refugees in camps do want to take part in education, basic service provision and/or production. However, in few instances have a majority been able to do so. (SWAPO of Namibia's Angolan settlement camps were exceptions). A higher proportion are able to do so when living 'unofficially' with kinsfolk as in the case of Mozambican refugees in Northern Malawi and South-eastern Tanzania.

27. Ignoring multiplier effects (small farming families have been, and in peaceful countries usually are, major markets for urban goods, the basic suppliers of urban food and, to a degree, production inputs and the users of a substantial proportion of commerce and transport) and related linkage elements whose non incorporation is simply inefficient planning. Further because reducing macro imbalances (including food, basic service access and legitimacy) to sustainable levels rapidly is crucial any programme treated as an add on will, in practice, be

grossly underfunded - no matter what most citizens' or the states' priorities may be - because external financial sources will not take it seriously.

28. The method used is that of UNICEF's 1987 and 1989 Children on the Front Line studies of Southern Africa. In the case of Mozambique population projection data for 1994 exceeded actual population – after the vast majority of refugees had come home – by about 2,500,000, suggesting the excess mortality during war estimates were of the right order of magnitude.

29. Arguably this is to overestimate. The first drought/dearth which did not lead to mass famine in Ethiopia was 1994-95 under the present government. In 1974 massive famine deaths were a cause, not a consequence, of the overthrow of the Emperor Hailie Selassie's regime.

30. In Iraq proper, even with limited violence on the ground but with inefficient distribution and lack of access to adequate food, pure water, preventative educational and basic curative health services under five, mortality has more than doubled and risen absolutely by about 80 per 1,000.

31. In SSA since 1960 (and to an only somewhat lesser extent since 1920) droughts and dearths (major losses to food crop harvests) have not resulted in famines with substantial loss of life with the known exception of Ethiopia (and perhaps Italian Somaliland). Motorised transport and access to imported food make that possible, but war prevents distribution even in the absence of any 'starve out the enemy' strategy.

32. Genocide is defined here as a systematic strategy of eliminating an ethnic group or sub-group, not as jaquerie-type uprisings even when manipulated (as in Nigeria in 1965 and Rwanda in 1959-60). There are three clear cases. Burundi in the early 1970's and since 1994 and Rwanda from 1994 (Interahamwe still exists, is still committed to genocide and still, kills on average of at least a score of human beings a day in Rwanda).

33. Massacres have been predominantly in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda (under Amin), Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and Ethiopia (including then occupied Eritrea).

34. Mass wilful amputation is largely concentrated in Sierra Leone and Liberia, ear and nose cropping was a typical Renamo tactic in Mozambique.

35. Also broadly on the UNICEF estimation basis of reasonably projected GDP in the absence of war with actual

36. This GDP cost applies also to states e.g. Zimbabwe, Tanzania which have incurred large extra military expenditure either to deter/repulse spill-over wars or invasions with success (neither has had major war or insurgency on its own soil) and/or (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Nigeria) to provide military combat support to other states in its region to prevent their collapse and/or to seek to make peace.

37 This cost continues even once growth is restored because it resumes from a lower base.

38. If the relatives of the massacred and the mutilated - especially those in the *de facto* National Guard, the Kamajors - do seek to exact retribution (as many watuts', within and without the army were inclined in Rwanda), it is very doubtful the government will (unlike the RPA government in Rwanda) be strong enough to block them. However, the most probable short term prospect in Sierra Leone - recurrent outbreaks of violence and quite probably near full scale war because of an inherently unsound 'peace' agreement - renders such speculation at the least premature.

39. Assuming of course that full scale civil war does not break out in Russia the Kashmiri civil war lead to another full scale India-Pakistan war, neither Iran-Iraq implode and/or return to war with its neighbour nor Indonesia dissolve into a series of overlapping civil wars.

40. On occasion 'forward deterrence' has been practised. Angola's participation in the removal of the Lissouba regime in Congo (Brazzaville) and the defence of President Kabila's in Congo (Democratic) are basically forward deterrence to deny UNITA bases and links to the outside world. Ethiopia's support for Somalian forces inimical to Sergeant Aideed is consequential on seeking to destroy Ogadeni ravanchist terrorist bases in the Lugh area.

41. The cost is largely independent of the motivation. Tanzania has acted primarily because it views violence as contagious and out of solidarity and only secondarily for self protection whereas in its Mozambican involvement keeping the Beira Corridor open and a credible Mozambican state in being were vital Zimbabwean interests.

42 Integration oriented groups of states have political, social, humanitarian as well as economic reasons to try to render their neighbourhoods safe by mediating, containing, ending civil wars in member states and bordering ones. SADCC, ECOWAS and IGAD have recognised and sought to act on this principle.

43. Again the cost is largely independent of the motivation. Nigeria's early Liberian intervention in Liberia may in large part have been intended to defend Generals Babangida's and Abacha's friend, Sergeant Samuel Doe and throughout has included a will to at least regional prestige as well a genuine concern that state collapse and civil war are contagious and that there is an imperative to limit and end mass barbarism where possible.

44. The external wa Hutu opposition to the wa Tutsi military establishment in power in Burundi is not uniformly genocidal. However, some transcripts of its Radio Democracy read as virtual paraphrases of the former Radio Milles Collines - the voice that called Rwanda to genocide - with only the names of places and people changed.

45. Two studies were done at the instigation of the Tanzanian government using substantial UN agency personnel inputs. Both reached similar conclusions albeit the second (via UNICEF) examined distributional, workload and ecological issues in more depth.

46. Targets do matter but up to a point, sustained movement in the intended direction is an acceptable second best. Whether universal child vaccination and mother and child care is achieved in year 10 or year 15 is probably less important (**not** unimportant) than whether a set of

institutions, policies and allocations steadily driving up the achieved percentages are put and kept in place.

47. The overarch could be called a model but - for historic reasons - this carries overtones of data input levels, mathematical programming, linearity not usually appropriate to Africa.

48. This test is fairly good for avoiding gross error and especially its repetition. It is less so for determining efficiency i.e. avoiding allocating more resources than needed. In 1973 rapid, epidemic advance of coffee berry disease threatened 5.7 year wipe out to the main producing area in Tanzania. Copper Sulphate could slow advance (perhaps halt). Different scientific evidence on how much needed and how dangerous scattered untreated farms to treated neighbours. Therefore subsidised copper sulphate (partly clawed back in marketing process) at levels upper middle end of range studies indicated (not lowest study as Agriculture but not Coffee Research - Coffee Bound - Treasury supported) was introduced. This worked - catastrophic risk averted. But some (never all or most) was smuggled to Kenya (where not subsidised) and use continued widespread and epidemic did not recur when subsidy ended in 1980's. Weakness in lack of late 1970's follow up research on how much really was needed, learning effect, and whether protected farms loss at risk from unprotected neighbours was much lower than believed.

49. There are exceptions to that generalisation but they appear to be in contexts in which one or two committed domestic or external actors can raise initial resources, demonstrate results and win approval of main macro economic decision takers for continuation e.g. universal vaccination/immunisation as spearheaded by UNICEF with a growing number of African health ministers and officials. In practice that approach is practicable only if resources needed are relatively small (compared to total uses) and are to a significant degree non fungible and additional (carrot conditionality).

50. Set out in dialogue with author, Baidoa, September 1995. Just how high the degree of uncertainty is in many rehabilitation cases is illustrated by the fact that he was already engaged in the district's defence and Baidoa fell a week later with significant 1993-95 water, food security and (to a lesser extent) health, education and local governance gains wiped out (or at least badly damaged and put on hold) literally overnight.

51. The criticism of the nightwatchman state as inadequate of the 1950's through 1970's and - beginning slightly later - of the deformation of 'law' and order as oppression were valid if perhaps overdone. They are not inconsistent with accepting the need for law, order and security (in senses meaningful and acceptable to ordinary people/producers) as vital.

52. In Nigeria in 1965 the basic grievances of Northern and Middlebelt peoples were against the ruling Northern (Hausa/Fulani) elites. The elites skilfully refocused and manipulated their wrath against the middle tier outsiders (the Ibo) who served and profited from the elite but were not the decision takers. The result was pogroms against the Ibo and the catalyst to the Biafran war (initially of succession, later toward conquest of Southern Nigeria).

53. The 'corruption of need' engulfing lower and middle level public servants - including the two thirds who are primary school teachers, nurses, constables, agricultural extensions and rural water officers - who cannot possibly live on their pay is damaging but less so. Their need is usually comprehended and their privatised, generalised, decentralised user fees grudgingly accepted if they do provide services. That it would be much more efficient for the state to pay them living emoluments remains valid.

54. 'Traditional', *ad hoc* community based or more formally elected bodies from village to national level can be successful if listening to and seen as legitimate by those for whom they speak or work **and** also perceived to produce some useful product (not just words and aspirations).

55. Thus the regular extension of the co-official language role of English in India where not only the South but also Bengal and Bombay perceive Hindi alone as disadvantageous to them and the *de facto* (probably increasing) role of English parallel to the official Tagalog in the Philippines which may end bilingual. The opposite case is Sri Lanka where Sinhala only was - correctly - perceived as anti Tamil Chauvinism and proved deeply derisive (as well as functionally costly).

56. For simplicity, recurrence of armed conflict is excluded that assumption does characterise Mozambique from 1992 and Somaliland from 1995.

57. Given initial unequal access, generalisation of basic services should benefit women. Similarly because water collection weighs heavily on women and girls improved provision should allow reallocation of time - especially to schooling for girl children. But such premises - as in planning in respect to gender in general - require examinations both as to validity and specification and as to what complementary measures (not least in sectors which, on the face of it, have little direct gender content). This was done to some extent in the Mozambican case but not in the Somaliland one.