

COMMON INTERESTS BEYOND COMMON MARKETS
Household To Macro Security In Southern African Regionalism

By Reginald Herbold Green

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as a branch of applied international trade theory
or as an extension of applied national development theory

- Philip Ndegwa
1985

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I.

PROLEGOMENON: BACK TO BEDROCK

Regionalism in Africa - and more specifically seriously institutionalised regionalism with explicit goals beyond communiqués - has **not to date been one of the continent's consistent success stories**. The catalogue of defunct and moribund groupings; the continuing crises of the three continental institutional fora - OAU, ECA, ADB; the parlous condition of all but two (PTA/COMESA and SADCC/SADC) of the full sub-regional groups and the ritualistic gestures without substance - not least the incantatory 'treaties' toward a continental common market - are not inspiring to review.

However, to say only that would be perversely pessimistic. Economists, intellectuals and politicians (and those who are all three) **remain committed to the vision** of regionalism and there is little challenge of the premises that, **if attainable, it offers dynamic economies of scale, of establishment and of greater weight** with which to respond to exogenous shocks or challenges (whether the blind gods of drought the unfavourable evolution of institutional aspects of the global economy or the security challenges of war and crime).

Further SADC and - perhaps less clearly and confidently - COMESA do exist, operate, move ahead. Despite their problems OAU, ECA and ADB are not insubstantial and in certain aspects at least the first and last are more intellectually alert and innovative than a decade ago.

Both the successes and the failures raise questions as to the necessary and sufficient conditions for launching and sustaining a regional dynamic. They raise questions as to whether - quite apart from attainability - a free trade area is either necessary or sufficient especially in a context tending toward global (not just regional) trade liberalisation. More generally they suggest the need to address the question of whether effective regional forward dynamics can be/are likely to be built on purely economic foundations.

1. are common markets enough, or is focusing on common markets rather than common interests a confusion of modalities and objectives?
2. what patterns of common interests are likely to be adequate to ensure political priority for regionalism among a state's decision takers?
3. are these interests limited to - or even dominated by - those whose attainment requires simple removal of regulatory and fiscal barriers to trade?
4. in particular is security - from household to state and from food to external defence a key sector for regionalism in at least much of SSA?

The focus of this paper is on the final question with particular attention to the Southern African sub-region.

II.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMIC REGIONALISM

The case for economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Southern Africa has been repetitively rehearsed at academic, governmental, inter-governmental institution and conference levels for at least four decades. (Indeed the time span is rather longer including the cross territorial colonial era variants and the South African drive for outward looking regional pre-eminence from 1920 onward). Regionalism is not an area of left-right, state-enterprise, black-white divides nor of clear distinctions among economic, political economic and political. Enterprise approaches to the issues are narrower and more micro specific, but South African enterprises and enterprise groups do see regional and continental exports, investments and - perhaps - sources as crucial. The Lusaka Declaration attack on the existing economic integration pattern was an attack on hegemonic domination - especially when used as part of a total strategy to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid - and the regionalist goals it spelled out in no way excluded participation by a transformed South Africa any more than by an independent Namibia. Nor did either South Africa's Carleton House Conference call to enterprises to join in making Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid nor the Lusaka Declarations for genuinely mutually beneficial structures for pursuing common interests focus solely on states - enterprises (private and public) were perceived as major actors within regional frameworks. As it happens neither the Carleton nor the Lusaka initiative was much welcomed by their business audiences, but not because they were excluded

The case for integration has - up to a point - been accepted politically: declarations, treaties and organisations have proliferated for over thirty years, or counting colonial predecessors for about seventy five. Real resources - not least political decision taker and high level public servant time - have been devoted to negotiating, running, reviewing and reviving regional and sub-regional cooperation, coordination and integration.

However, overall results are meagre. **Regionalism is -with limited exceptions - not at the centre of national or of enterprise strategic planning, policy formulation or day to day decision taking.** Its disappearance from the press between conferences (except to a degree in Southern and parts of Eastern Africa) is in large measure a reflection of its low profile in the ongoing work of governments and businesses. Why?

The argument that **imported, unadapted theories and applications** - including treaties - have often been inappropriate is valid. ECA's love affair with the EEC/EU model and - slightly inconsistently - free trade areas has hindered the effectiveness of its heroic efforts over three decades to make economic integration a rallying cry leading into a movement and thence to a reality. But the problems of inappropriate imports and of ill-adapted technologies are hardly unique to economic or political economic regionalism nor do they appear to be a cause rather than a manifestation of its domestic peripherality.

The failure to analyse **two inherent areas of tension - state/regional and state/enterprise** - which may be creative or, especially when not directly examined, destructive, has been more damaging. A *laissez faire* common market and even moderately interventionist national policies will come into conflict. If no mechanisms are set up to manage these conflicts they will inevitably sap the vitality of regionalism - no African integration group secretariat can take on its member states on a we/they basis and win, even if some have tried. Similarly, many attempted integration processes have paid scant attention to enterprise - private or public - views, concerns and knowledge. Given that most economic relationships - and especially trade and production of tradables - are in the enterprise sector, this is a serious gap. Filling it is not helped by the tendency of enterprises to treat regional fora as opportunities to promote common tax and regulatory concessions rather more than to provide contributions toward strengthening regional economic dynamics and on reflecting what state actions would facilitate enterprise participation in them.

In addition, **tensions exist within governments and poor two way communication among ministries and with both public and private enterprises is endemic.** They are more serious on the multi-country scene, but are only rarely the chief cause of failure or stagnation.

Unrealistic goals and nominal programmes which have limited relation to reality have much more typical regionally than nationally with the partial, but noteworthy, exception of SADC/SADCC. Unrealism here includes adding so many areas (perhaps because core ones are stagnant) that prioritisation is lost amid the plethora of papers. It also includes constructing totally artificial time tables (as in the 1980 Act of Lagos and 1990 Abuja Common Market Treaty) with no mechanisms for stage by stage monitoring and review, let alone actual articulation of implementation ways and means.

This weakness is an aspect of a deeper one - **inadequate operational involvement of states in integration attempts**, again with SADCC/SADC an exception. One aspect is a plethora of secretariat policy, project and resolution proposals drawn up with little consultation with member states, distributed too late for domestic analysis and review, approved too rapidly with too little opportunity for revision and - predictably - thereafter more prone to collecting dust than to generating dynamic, concerted implementation. The former East African Community and - even more acutely - ECOWAS and COMESA/EAPTA - have been hamstrung by these patterns of operation.

State patterns of handling regionalism frequently reinforce weaknesses of operational involvements. At worst there is no ongoing focus point anywhere in government - only an intermittent conference preparation function. At best, participation in inter ministerial committees to prepare, report back, monitor progress is spotty and often poorly linked to key ministry planning and operational functions. This is compounded when there are few or no regional sectoral technical and programming meetings providing a focus, an output and an incentive for domestic ministerial attention. If only the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pay substantial attention to regionalism domestic operational activity will in practice be quite inadequately related to regional potential, and requirements.

To argue for a **regional impact assessment on all major policies, programmes and projects *ex ante* and *ex post*** sounds grandiose and is impracticable if a full scale consultancy type study is envisaged. However, if it means regional impact like environmental, fiscal, gender, external balance, poverty, food security should be on a check list for explicit attention within known national policy guideline parameters, it is **basic to making the most of regional opportunities reducing needless frictions with partners and avoiding agreeing without thought and resiling without dignity.**

History is a further embrangling factor. This is not primarily because economic coordination was in some cases practised by colonial powers. In West Africa that history has - together with ECOWAS' weakness - perpetuated a Francophone sub-grouping and led to Anglophone suspicions as to its role. In both Eastern and Southern Africa the imbalances in East, Central and South African centralised pre-independence structures in favour of the

central territory have led to grave suspicions that centralising tendencies in regionalism (whether 'natural' or manipulated) weaken poorer members absolutely. *Per contra* they have at the same time resulted in a belief by richer members that their treasuries are overburdened by partial compensatory measures, even if the limited empirical analyses done to date suggest that the former (draining) proposition can readily be overstated and that the latter (subsidising) is incorrect.

Three specific **historic problems** confront Southern Africa, the area in which the regional dynamic has been strongest over the past decade and a half. First, the South Africa centred *de facto* sub-region and its more formal customs and monetary unions have historically been **unequally beneficial in favour of South Africa** (a situation white ruled Rhodesia objected to as much as does Zimbabwe). The goodwill arising from cooperation in achieving the new South Africa and the clear statement that regionalism must be based on mutual interest of the present South African government have gone some way toward eroding this barrier, but the overly short term national gain and cost avoidance approach of the South African Ministry of Trade could rebuild it. This is a case in which overtly political intervention from the top to force less self and short term centred approaches by an operational ministry appear to make long term economic sense. Second, the perceived **history of Rhodesias-Nyasaland and East African economic cooperation as centralised, hegemonic and periphery draining** has made several SADC members ultra cautious in respect to strong supranational or even transnational structures and especially to joint ventures, joint borrowing and fiscal transfers as modalities of cooperation. To date, SADC's success using other modalities has helped erode this historical barrier.

EAPTA/COMESA-SADC/SADCC animosity is a more serious problem. ECA and its child PTA, felt SADCC was a distraction or a foreign dominated spoiler and for some years said so in no uncertain terms. SADCC - up to and including Heads of State level - became incensed and suspicious, embranching attempts at coordination and division of labour. COMESA/PTA's ill-advised efforts to take over SADCC/SADC and to denigrate it, while in many areas having far less achievements to show, has further complicated matters and embittered individuals. With South Africa opting for SADC and Mauritius rapidly hedging by joining, it is fairly clear that COMESA cannot win a war of attrition but all member states and economies will be net losers if hostilities drag on. The case for either a merger (not a take over) or an agreed division of labour is logically strong but struggles against institutional and personal suspicions and bitterness inherited from the past.

All of the above factors - and especially the **inadequate national integration of regionalism into domestic priority pursuit on an ongoing basis and the historic conflicts** - have weakened regional initiatives and processes. But **even together they do not explain its poor record**. National sectors facing similar challenges have more frequently overcome them. Why?

The answers appear to be political (economic and - occasionally - pure political) rather than technical economic:

1. **domestic policy and programme decisions are unavoidable - regional ones can usually be deferred almost *ad infinitum*;**
2. **governments are unlikely to be overthrown or to lose (or win) elections on regional policy results;**
3. **free trade areas have no political sex appeal** - employment, food security, exports, poverty reduction, livelihoods (and projects seen to create them) do - and if regional free trade is presented in ways apparently conflicting with, or irrelevant to, these more concrete goals it is sure to lose out or to be given low priority;
4. **a multitude of inter country conflicts** (even totally beyond economic regionalism) **will be a severe obstacle to dynamic economic regionalism** and in extreme cases (Apartheid South Africa/SADC and Idi Amin's Uganda/Tanzania) make serious economic regional dialogue and practice nearly or totally impracticable;
5. **abstract formulations** of economic regionalism limited to free trade and excluding political economy **both hide the opportunities and cloud the requirements** of operating on the basis of **mutually perceived common interests best or only pursued in common** and embracing - e.g. - food security, regional security broadly defined, power production and distribution, animal agricultural research and disease control just as much as customs and exchange control barrier reduction and regulation harmonisation and simplification. Only states can select the necessary minimum and maximum scope for dynamic regionalism - professionals can at best advise - and the way to add crucial but initially difficult areas (e.g. cross-border water rights allocation in the case of the SADC region) is usually to set them to one side until a habit of cooperation and of finding mutually beneficial policies and programmes in 'easier' areas has been built up (e.g. transport, communication, crop research, food security in SADC) rather than to see their initial inclusion as a make or break issue and thus to stall or break the forward dynamic..

6. Virtually all successful regional initiatives have had **priority political projects based on specific priority common interests of members**. The "European idea" was at base a project to transcend hostility/avert war in Europe even if the main means were economic. Of the African sub-regional bodies only SADCC/SADC appears to date to have such a nationally compelling, reasonably articulated project. ECOWAS and IGAD have sought to act as intra regional conflict mediators but with limited success and no very clear vision or overall agenda for enhancing security.

FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO THE GLOBE: SOUTH AFRICAN INTERESTS

The second question about patterns of common interests adequate to result in serious priority to regionalism can perhaps best be handled briefly by using an illustrative case. Because earlier doubts about South African's interest in regionalism have proved to be in large part wrong, a review of its perceived concerns which make regionalism a priority is a useful example.

This interests can be presented on the principle of concentric circles: South Africa, Southern Africa, Africa, The Globe. This is heuristically simple but has a substantive rationale as well.

First, successful, sustainable regional integration must rest on **perceived common interests** among members - **beginning with the national interests of each**.

Second, practicable scope for integration is likely to be greater among a **relatively limited number of relatively like-minded countries** - for South Africa, therefore, Southern Africa. Over time, any grouping may expand as has the EU, and in economic size SADC even more dramatically with SA's accession.

Third, **what is achieved nationally and sub-regionally will affect what can be achieved regionally and globally**. Africa's current low international standing rests on economic weakness, perceived mal-governance and lack of coherent, analytically defended strategic proposals. South Africa can be more effective if it speaks as a leader within SADC and if both it and the SADC states as a group have improving economic and governance records and more incisive, better argued strategic proposals and negotiating positions.

South Africa's outward concerns arise from a series of structural national goals and problems:

1. Acceptance of the basic moral economy proposition of Adam Smith that no nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable and that it is imperative for the state to create a context in which they can escape from those conditions;

2. Leading (given constraints on redistribution) to an imperative for a 6% to 8% growth trend of total available resources since redressing inequality out of added resources is very much cosier than taking away from existing allocations;
3. Which implies a need for 7% to 9% of exports of goods and services to meet the import requirements of 6% to 8% growth;
4. With the key established export market for manufactures (beyond a rather narrow traditional band) being SACUA and the broader SADC grouping, and the most promising expansion area potentially SSA more generally, because in many cases SA will not face first rate competition there and because SSA appears in general to pay 20% above standard prices for many (perhaps most) of its imports;
5. And a parallel need to expand sourcing from the region - in many cases valid on micro economic grounds and more generally needed because a sustained 10% rise in regional exports is impossible unless imports rise even faster to erode regional payment for SA exports' present dependence on migrant labour (unwanted) and hard currency from extra regional primary product sales (unavailable);
6. Leading to parallel concern with regional transport both to facilitate trade and because economic (and pre-1975 historical in the case of Maputo) logic mean that Maputo and Walvis Bay should be key regional and global trade ports for South Africa;
7. The hard reality that water and food are increasing sources of sub-regional insecurity and conflict which can be averted only by a sub-regional strategy going to causes a well as symptoms;
8. South Africa's desire to regain its potential position as a respected, influential "middle power", which for historic and avoidance of jealousy reasons is likely to be smoother and greater as a leading member of Southern African and African groupings than on a 'go it alone' trajectory;
9. A perceived vocation for furthering good governance both in the sub-region and continentally.

In general South African social sector bodies and enterprises share many of these concerns and perceptions. Outward mindedness has a relatively deep and wide base rather than being the private terrain of a handful of academicians, businessmen, public servants and rhetoricians.

These are in fact very **substantial reasons for South Africa to seek integration - especially, but not only, sub-regionally**. One **problem** is the result of South Africa's **disproportionate economic size and military strength exacerbated by its history of hegemonic aspirations**. South Africa - like Germany in the EU - always needs to be on its guard not to push too hard and above all not to be seen by its partners as coercive and domineering. Equally, it must face the realities that its partners will, in some cases at least, expect more of it than South Africa can deliver. In areas of genuine, unavoidable conflict of interests - e.g. water right allocation with Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana - it has to fight its corner and to make a reasoned case even while avoiding the perception of bullying or of refusing to accept that it too must make changes. To date it would be fair to say it has usually been well aware of these dangers and sought to limit them, though trade arrangements with Zimbabwe appear to be an exception.

The changes in perceptions and stance since 1989 are dramatic. This is not simply a matter of the end of apartheid. The ancient regime had begun a rather patchy process of change in 1990 - the "forward strategy" to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid died by 1991. Further, at the turn of the decade many of the most verbally radical South African academics appalled Southern Africans by suggesting the new South Africa should be as hegemonic and bluntly interventionist as the old - even if for different reasons and for neighbour states' peoples' "own good" - as defined in South Africa! Finally, while regional issues were on most agendas, it was not clear how high they were - an inward looking strategy focused almost entirely on domestic problems and a trade strategy looking entirely beyond Africa did seem only too likely.

The ANC - which never adumbrated a counter-hegemonic policy in respect to the region - has in fact placed African - and especially sub-regional - issues high on its agenda. In part this relates to its historic close and - on balance - cordial and useful relationships with the Front Line States and - more peripherally - SADCC. However, it also flows from participation of senior politicians and officials in a series of workshops and conferences to explore regional integration and from substantial articulated homework. Highlighting water, labour, finance, cross-border economic zones on transport corridors and a broadened definition of security (including root causes in food, water and livelihood insecurity) are not proposals flowing simply from historic friendships or emotional solidarity, important as these have been in context setting and perhaps, in the decision to opt for SADC over COMESA. Hard-headed, analysed national interests related to potential for mutual interests and potentially acceptable divisions of gains and costs are evident whether one agrees with all of the conclusions drawn or not.

III.

SECURITY: PERVASIVE BUT PROTEAN

To argue that **security, not free trade, has been central to most successful regional projects** is valid but confusing. So too is the contention that in Africa the politics of military security are a necessary basis for economic security and development. In some cases the problems of analysis arise from - not always accidental - use of economic means to security ends (even if with parallel groups for overtly security goals) and in others to a certain breezy rhetorical opacity good for rallying cheers but less well adapted for drawing up foundation blueprints. The EU illustrates the former and the military -political project proposals of President Nkrumah and the economic quasi roadmaps of political economists influenced by him (including at one stage the present author) the latter.

The European idea was to ensure that there would never be war again within Western Europe. On the face of it the means from the Iron and Steel Community through the Treaty of Rome, the Single Market Act and the Maastricht Treaty have been overwhelmingly economic. Is this a contradiction?

Not necessarily. First the ultra nationalist external economic relations of the 1930's (especially Nazi Germany's Schacht System) and the context of economic stagnation which at the least encouraged them created political conflict as well as making it harder to resolve. Integrated economies, harmonised economic policies and general advances toward prosperity were rightly perceived as means to peace.

Second both military cooperation (largely against a single outside state) and also human rights and personal security protection were in separate but family linked institutions especially NATO and Council of Europe. These were in fact perceived as part of Europeaness (correctly) and the Brussels imperium (incorrectly).

Third, the tensions raised by even delegated supranationalism in at least some states - especially in the security sector - made both focusing on coordination subject to veto as basic modality and economics as the main area of coordination prudent - at least until a broader popular base for regionalism, an intellectual and a business elite committed to it, and an internalised habit of working together over a growing range of sectors among large members of senior officials had been achieved. The problems in the EU since 1992 arising out of more overt moves toward limited confederalism (even in economic policy and personal rights) and the difficulties of fitting in 'late arrivers' who do not have the unifying processual history underlines the validity of the concerns leading to multinational and economic coordination choices of means and of focus. Arguably the EU has arrived at a stage in which

transnationalism can (and perhaps needs to be) phased down and supranationalism up and in which the social and political parameters for economic unification (and the social and political logic of economic unification) can and should be presented more overtly. However, the 1992-96 debate indicate both shifts still arouse serious concerns by people and politicians within most EU members (not only in little England). That implies even the cautious semi federalist (some would say pseudo given the dominant roles of committees of national ministers) approach of the EU is almost certainly premature in all or most SSA sub-regions.

Kwame Nkrumah's crusade for Pan Africanism focused on security - political, military and economic - at the continental level and in respect to the outside world (including for his definition African fractions or states in alliance with that world for whatever reasons). It arose directly from the early Pan African mobilisation role against colonialism - albeit much less evidently from the actual operational experience of independence fronts on a national or sub-regional (especially in francophonia) basis in West Africa. A common government, able to enforce order and to defend itself against outsiders by a common army were its basic goals - and apparently its short term objectives albeit that was much less clear. The political unity would remove barriers to African economic regionalism and create greater joint competitiveness, market and bargaining power vis a vis outsiders.

The problems with this approach were fivefold:

- a. in practice few newly independent states (or their citizens) were willing to envisage genuine union because of perceived, real problems of power and resource sharing;
- b. the apparent dash for union greatly deterred step by step and sub-regional to regional advocates - even those who, like President Nyerere, did believe in broader than national unification as a goal and substantial sub-regional coordination/integration as a practicable set of short term targets;
- c. proposals for joint armies (even before the era of coups) were probably the least likely way to attain consensus on regional first steps;
- d. especially in respect to economics, articulated targets, modalities and gains were noticeable either by their absence or by their apparent peripherality to the main thrust of Osagyefo's message which was - as domestically in Ghana - very much "seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto thee" without much indication of how or when;
- e. except at emotional level the project - perhaps oddly for one proposing their abolition - was very much state oriented. Household security or livelihood, food security or human and peoples rights were not overtly present at all.

These two quick sketches of security in a functioning regional process and in a - to date - unanswered clarion call suggest the need to seek a set of parameters for different aspects of security as it may relate to/be furthered by regionalism.

Security needs to be **unpackaged: from what? for whom? at what level?** Some of the answers include:

1. from **external military and economic threats**/'diplomatic' bullying including external creation or support of either nominally or initially genuinely domestic insurgencies;
2. from **domestic military (insurrection) dangers** and related economic sabotage;
3. from **terrorism** (albeit most cases would fall under one of the two previous headings), **arms and drug trafficking**, and large scale **organised theft and fraud** i.e. civil crime with substantial international linkages;
4. from uncovenanted bands of **migrants** (including but not limited to refugees);
5. for **stability of employment** and fair **labour practices** backed up by **safety nets**;
6. for **food security**;
7. from **violent interference - from whatever source - with daily life and livelihood**;
8. for decent unoppressive **governance** and "**Human and People's Rights**" (as in the Banjul Charter).
9. for **development**.

While the first four securities do - if achieved - benefit individuals and households and are a large part of the seventh security, they are basically state concerns and at one level are primarily concerns of defence, police and foreign ministries and their personnel. The fifth security is in the EU perceived as the necessary condition for social stability in a context of change and uncertainty. The Social Charter (except in the UK) is seen as necessary to provide the household and personal security to make the Single Market socially and politically stable. The sixth - like the fifth - security is ultimately primarily at household level but also has national aspects and can be both long term, increasing capacity to produce or to buy, and short, coping with crises "that the people may be fed". The seventh and eighth securities are personal/household/community in nature while the last is again both national and individual. It does have concrete international (e.g. trade access, debt writedown) and interstate (e.g. regional water allocation, transit rights) aspects.

Security can be seen as **against episodic events** or for **reducing deeper causes/redirecting negative dynamics**. In that sense regional water use right negotiation backed by water conservation in each riparian state is a pre-emptive measure to avert subsequent military clashes, food insecurity and/or mass migration. Migration can be seen as the result of the absence of security of livelihoods/safety nets even if it also has short term police aspects.

It is tempting to say Regionalism in practice usually focuses on state securities at the level of episodic symptoms avoidance/control. That is, however, potentially misleading. While the particular evolution of EU's social side (not least regional funds, particular CAP provisions and parameters for enterprise subsidies) has responded to episodic pressures, the concept of a compact of individual security from massive risk of livelihood loss/total destitution in return for acceptance of rapid structural economic change within a single market frame does operate on a long term strategic perspective and at the level of basic human causes of socio political discontent. In the same sense SADCC's food security initiatives and their development in SADC went beyond scrambling for food aid after the event. That was a last resort from which they worked back through early warning to drought resistant, small farming household friendly supplied research on millet, sorghum, peanuts and other crops of special interest to poor households in drought prone areas. Indeed, the research and early warning programmes substantially preceded food aid coordination efforts.

IV.

SECURITY AND SADCC: IN THE BEGINNING

SADCC always had a political economic development project including macro economic security from outside forces and household economic security from - especially - drought. The compression of its initial stated goals from four into one half of one - "...reduction of unilateral economic dependence, especially but not only on South Africa..." is a misleading misreading, but it is valid to say that **security from South African economic aggression was a prime goal** and that the rehabilitation and coordination of direct transport and communications links to the outside world was seen - in large part - in that context.

SADCC was decided upon and founded over 1989-90 - i.e. prior to South Africa's massive use of direct and proxy military aggression and sabotage to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid. Thus the need to fight a war of catch up against transport route destruction and to mobilise military as well as economic forces to do so was not initially envisaged. There was another reason for isolating SADCC from the military and diplomatic aspects of security. SADCC was the child of the Front Line States and perceived as their

economic arm (including but not limited to external economic security against a powerful, aggressive and hostile neighbour). As such it was seen by the FLS as optimally inclusive of the three non FLS independent states - Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho on the grounds that economic regionalism (especially its non-security aspects) was hardly sensibly pursued by excluding three countries on the grounds that two were ambivalent about, and one totally dependent on, South Africa. Therefore both division of labour and effectiveness of diplomatic/military security meant that the overtly security operations stayed wholly within the FLS until, with the emergence of the New South Africa the process leading to COSAS (Southern Africa State council for security) became possible.

The separate institutional frames did not prevent coordination of different aspects of security. This is best illustrated by what was in the mid to late 1980's both SADCC's and the FLS's most effective political mobilising rallying call - "The fight to hold the Beira Corridor". The Beira Corridor was important in itself - and central to the strategic programming of SADCC's autonomous Transport and Communications Commission - but it is also necessary to realise that it was a symbol of wider security priorities:

- maintaining Zimbabwe's access to the sea via FLS states;
- preventing South Africa using Renamo to cut Mozambique in half;
- turning back the 1982-1986 advance of Renamo seen as both teleguided by South Africa and - in 1986/87 - backed by South African Special Forces officers and troops;
- proving that the assassination of President Samora Machel would not mean defeat of, nor accommodation by, Mozambique.

On the **military security** front, Zimbabwe stepped up its support force, Tanzania sent a substantial contingent and even Malawi deployed a militarily irrelevant but politically significant force in the parallel Nacala Corridor. On **transport**, Mozambique Railways and Harbours and SATCC stepped up rehabilitation and renovation and on the **economic** front the Beira Corridor Authority bringing in the enterprise sectors of Zimbabwe and Mozambique was established. The Renamo/Special Forces troops were pushed back from the gates of Quelimane (capital Zambesia Province) and from their bridgehead south of the Zambesia, never again to appear as a real threat to a major city or to the preservation of territorial unity. The trains ran, the highway stayed open, the pipeline flowed, the port of Beira improved capacity and operations. Just as the Battle of Cuito Canavalhe marked the turning of the tide on the Atlantic Front so did the 1986-87 defence of the Beira Corridor on the Indian Ocean Front.

The second main security area was that of **food**. Here household and national security in the face of drought was the dominant initial concern, albeit overlapping with the South African threat to block transit of overseas aid shipments and actual apparent delay of famine relief cargoes. Initially early warning research, storage and exchange of information were stressed, but by the mid 1980's coordinating data to present a consolidated case to international agencies and donors was added. While not particularly successful at the time, these laid the foundation for much more effective alarm raising, mobilisation guiding and logistical coordination in the 1990's.

Both livestock disease control (tse tse plus rinderpest) and household fuel concerns did include family and national security issues. Both also related to environmental security. The first illustrated SADCC's slightly isolated self definition of goals in that environmental groups were up in arms over aerial spraying while donors and their contractors were amazed (and in the latter case dismayed) as to how tight the regulations on sprays used, wind conditions and altitude allowable, etc. intended to limit human and other environmental damage were. SADCC's veterinary officers and senior officials were somewhat startled by both sets of responses. As some of the environmentalists openly advocated using the tse tse fly (and human sleeping sickness) to roll back long established pastoral frontiers, there was a growing lack of sympathy for environmental critics more generally.

Water did not at this stage become an operational security issue largely because all of the rivers in question had South Africa or occupied Namibia as a riparian partner and SADCC as such had no relations with South Africa let alone its Viceroy in Windhoek.. However, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and SWAPO all came to recognise that, with the end of apartheid, water use right negotiation in several key river basins would be essential for future peace and security.

SADCC was always concerned with **standards of decent governance and human rights beyond opposition to apartheid**. Indeed the debate on six (FLS) or nine (plus Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho) initial members turned in part on that issue as did the rejection of Zaire's attempts to join. However, the nature (and limitations) of the concern and of means to acting on it became clear only in the 1990's and especially at the time of the attempted Lesotho 'military coup with a royal face up front' in 1994. The late 1996 phantom election in Zambia is likely to raise them even more acutely because, unlike the coup case, the Zambian government has, at least in letter pursued a legally correct course.

SADCC's security concerns are perhaps among the most convincing evidence it was not externally teleguided. Those claims themselves suffer from a division between proponents of the Soviet Embassy in Lusaka and the EU Secretariat in Brussels as the puppetmasters. As the USSR never supported SADCC - or even attended annual conferences at senior level - the

first proposition is clearly absurd. The language of the founding Lusaka Declaration - a rather forceful but austere analytical case for a set of strategic regional areas of action backed by an annotated programme list strongly suggests origins far from standard diplomatic or bureaucratic - or for that matter from either Marxian or 'free' market ideologues.

The EEC involvement and support was real - EEC has always tended to work on the adage "birds of a feather flock together" in respect to serious southern regional groupings. But the only period it was institutionally involved was in the 1977-78 tentative preparations for a one off conference on aid coordination to be co-sponsored with UNECA - the origin of the second C in SADCC. When UNECA withdrew, the provisional secretariat turned to the FLS via Presidents Nyerere and Khama (and slightly later Machel and Kaunda). Overall direction came from the Botswana Vice President and senior officials, the Tanzania High Commissioner in London and senior Mozambican officers and Ministers. It was at this stage that a permanent coordination framework (not a one off conference) was decided upon, as well as the inclusion of food security and the tacit coordination/division of labour with the FLS on military, as separate from economic and logistical, security.

SADCC became the only recipient convened annual aid coordination conference - with a Member State (via the Chairman) drafted communiqué - and the first regional body in ACP to negotiate an agreed allocation of EEC regional finance (previously unilaterally handled by Brussels). It is therefore somewhat ironic SADCC should have been seen by some to be an externally dominated body - an assertion which distinctly irritated its Summit (including as it did all six FLS heads of state: Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, Mugabe, Masire and Dos Santos).

It has also been argued that the special features of SADCC/SADC are the accidental, surface results of particular foreign advisors. That is in some cases superficially true, but also deeply misleading. The founding Lusaka Declaration's specific priority for drought resistant grain research did in a literal sense result from one expatriate expert's advice to an advisor to SADCC's founding meetings. But to suppose its continued existence - let alone the dogged persistence in getting none too willing technical agencies and donors to back it - can be so explained is facetious. As a Mozambican official said to an external (to the sub-region) critic "We always thought one gain of independence was the right to pick our own advisors. And to fire them if they do not produce to our satisfaction". Only in a climate of genuine political concern with food security and poor, small farming households could the drought resistant grain research and the broader food security project, of which it was a part and a symbol, have become - let alone remained - an operational priority as opposed to a forgotten phrase.

V.

THE BROADENING REGION: ROADS TO COSAS

The shift toward setting up a more overt security wing to regional organisation in Southern Africa has its roots in the SADCC period sketched above. While the shift to SADC did not in itself mark any great change on this front, two extended events of 1990-94 did:

1. the **great Southern Africa drought of 1991-92 and consequent dearth of 1992-93 - and SADC's highly effective response;**
2. the **movement toward a New South Africa**, from early 1990 which was perceived as irreversible as early as 1992.

The Great Drought brought the Food Security Unit's work to international attention and, more to the point domestically, demonstrated its capacity to reduce food insecurity. It was - and is - based on the regional (interlocking national) early warning systems built up over 1981-1990 and on consolidation and analysis of their data. SADC FS was crucial in early (from November 1991) highlighting of the food security crisis of 1992-93 and in bringing forward international response culminating in co-sponsoring (with UN Humanitarian) a June 1992 pledging conference. The result - even if just adequate and not quite in time - was that of over 3,000,000 lives at risk in Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) under 1,000 were lost outside war wrecked Angola and Mozambique in which perhaps 150,000 died largely as a result of delivery barriers raised by war. In addition to the Food Security Unit, the transport Ministers and senior officials provided regional logistical coordination - effectively enough that the only port and rail corridor to clog during the peak shipment period was Durban route via South Africa.

The imminent ending of apartheid opened up new opportunities and risks. SADCC had always taken the view that South Africa (like Namibia before it) would be a welcome member as soon as apartheid ended. However, there were doubts as to how interested South Africa would be - especially its military and political security decision takers and professionals - and how to handle the problem of disparate size. South Africa's military capacity - like its GDP - is between three and four times that of the 10 pre South African accession SADC Member States taken together. Further both FLS and South African post-apartheid security strategy would need to refocus since South Africa's old priority problem had been isolation abroad because of apartheid and increasing ungovernability at home for the same reason, while the FLS' had been the 'forward' attack to defend apartheid strategy of the Old South Africa.

During the 1990-94 period concern about **transborder crime** - especially drug trafficking (largely transit to South Africa) - also entered on the security agenda. Even earlier several SADCC states had devoted substantial scarce police investigatory capacity to seeking to halt the trade - partly because it was seen as abhorrent whoever were the ultimate victims and partly from the well founded fear substantial transit trade would inevitably spill over into their domestic markets. With the emergence of transition in South Africa, it became possible - at first tentatively and demi officially on both sides - to cooperate on exchange of information on drug smuggling which led to some similar exchange on the associated financial flows which did nothing for the stability or legitimacy of currency markets and commerce.

In 1990/91 South Africa's official 'politically directed' arms shipments to its neighbours created a common interest in curbing the growing illicit **trade in arms** - largely, but not wholly, to South Africa at retail but wholesale largely, but not wholly, from South Africa by former official practitioners who now carried on their business on their own account. The common interest emerged slowly because the previous false South African assertions as to abandoning Renamo and Unita combined with the same covert arms operators shifting over time from official to rear guard political to private criminal status made it hard to be sure the South African State really had changed its role. Further, the elaborate sanctions avoidance penumbra of Armscor and the New South Africa's desire to maintain legitimate arms exports led to very substantial non transparency - not least in respect of the Interlake Zone abutting Tanzania, Angola and Zambia.

Migration also became a common security concern. South Africa of course had always feared large flows of unsought African immigrants driven by poverty and drawn by the hope of chances to earn. The fear was only at one level related to the politics of apartheid - large numbers of poor foreigners likely to fail to gain legitimate incomes and to be sucked into crime are welcome nowhere. The peeling off of the overtly racist layer and the desires of certain South African politicians - largely, but not wholly, in Inkatha - and officials - largely, but not wholly, Afrikaner ex-securocrats - to play the xenophobic card relaunching the old Boer "black peril" image in terms of migrant crime and scarce job taking made migration control, if anything, a hotter issue in the New South Africa than in the Old. Significantly it was also one on which neighbour states were no longer totally unsympathetic.

Paralleling this emergence of a new police-crime-migration cluster of security issues was a - perhaps vague and ill defined - feeling that these somehow stand in the middle of a continuum of which food security was one end and macro military the other. This was especially true because poor households - especially in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia - are the most

numerous and most deeply afflicted victims of crime. With apartheid off the political map concern for law and order was by no means necessarily anti poor or anti black even if subject to manipulation by securocrat and populist political elements.

What emerged was an insistence that **security needed to include people's security** as well as states' and had to deal with **causes as well as symptoms**. This had the consequence of putting several areas on the SADC agenda marked for urgent attention as soon as the New South Africa joined:

- a. **migrant labour** management including protection and gradual (not sudden) phasing out (a priority of South Africa's trade unions who have stood up very firmly for their migrant members);
- b. **water use rights** allocation by treaty to preempt conflict certainly at local level and possibly at national levels of tension upto and including war by 2010 in one of the world's most water scarce regions;
- c. parallel concern with development that **created jobs** (including in cross border corridors of trade, transport and manufacturing) and **used water more efficiently** (e.g. agreed limitations on water hungry exotic tree plantations and forests and cooperation in shifting from open channel through sprinkler to drip irrigation) to reduce the deep poverty seen to lie behind the 'criminal' elements in migration, the violence based on the perception of life (including ones own) as short, risky, and of low value as well as the crime-drugs-tainted money trafficking triad.

A clear - if usually camouflaged - strand was the **concern of military leaders in keeping a justification for high resource allocations in being**. This has been most clearly illustrated by the South African navy. Very early on it collaborated with Namibia in arresting pirate Spanish trawlers - to create a credible basis for asserting it was the key to regional smuggling and fishing regulation control and no longer the enemy of its neighbours but, rather, their technically advanced friend. At the time of the last Comoros Coup it stressed that the old (initially to blockade Angolan or Mozambican ports or land arms, carry out raids for Unito/Renamo) corvette strategy needed to be revived to protect Southern Africa from coups (not that Comoros is a member, the island member - Mauritius - to be very concerned nor the mainland members inclined to put maritime based coups high on their security risks lists or perceive corvettes as very suitable for smuggling prevention or fishery policing).

Thus as soon as the shape of the new South African government became broadly evident (rather before the actual elections), SADC and the ANC (not yet the government) set in motion the process leading to the 1995 creation of COSAS (Council of Southern African

states)/ASAS (Association of Southern African States) as the *de facto* security face of regionalism (or security wing of SADC depending how the exact relation between two bodies formally joined only at Heads of State Summit level evolves).

SADC/SADCC has always been **concerned with being seen and understood**. For an African regional body it has been remarkably successful in attracting press coverage outside the time of its annual conference with donors and beyond set speeches or press releases. Similarly it has consistently sought dialogue with the domestic and foreign enterprise sectors, with trade unions and with domestic social sector and external NGO's. However these initiatives - clearly intended to achieve a "Southern African idea" going beyond states and deeper than organisations - have faced problems, some at least partly of SADC/SADCC's own making:

- a. the **enterprise groups** have tended to make demands for measures narrowly useful to themselves without much interest in discussing in greater depth or breadth - frustrating SADCC/SADC's desire to get broader inputs into its policy process;
- b. the desire for a **broader community not a flotilla of front organisations** (or non-governmental 'members' of an intergovernmental body) has led to mutual puzzlement as to how SADC and other regional bodies - with the partial exception of business federations - should interact on an ongoing basis;
- c. because SADCC/SADC **working sessions** (at official, official/ministerial, ministerial, ministerial/heads of state and heads of state levels) are quite **frank and open to exploring ideas and ways and means as well as bargains**, there has been **great reluctance to open these to anyone beyond delegation and SADC unit members** while the formal (and available to the public though with a lag and little effort to distribute) records of main meetings are fairly terse lists of decisions and actions shorn of debate and of discussions not leading to immediate decisions. While very few intergovernmental bodies are all that much more open in respect to working meetings, this approach clearly has upset domestic social sector bodies as well as external NGO's.

SADC sought to address some of these problems by relating organisations more closely to sectors e.g. Trade Unions to Labour and Migration when - under the basic foundations for security rubric - it became an official SADC sector in 1995. In the case of COSAS crafting, the first main step was the 1994 Windhoek Conference with social and enterprise sectors participating. This meeting was an undoubted success in terms of exploring interlocking aspects of security from causes to consequences and from household economic to regional macro military. It fairly clearly did influence substantially the subsequent intergovernmental process.

But it also aroused a belief by non-government actors that they would be consulted on a series of drafts before COSAS was created and in some cases a belief there would be more or less formal advisory groups appended to COSAS and its Committees. Neither was ever envisaged by SADCC and - largely because somewhat arcane structuring differences emerged requiring sustained diplomacy to mollify - the process was, in fact, more opaque than usual up to COSAS' creation.

This was despite the fact that in the 1944 rollback of the attempted coup in Lesotho interstate trade union coordination of action was crucial. Similarly, in the ongoing process of quasi peaceful but intense confrontation/almost negotiation on how Swaziland is to become a constitutional monarchy with a less opaque and more accountable political process, trade unions are among the major Swati actors and trade unions from other regional states (especially SA) among their more effective allies.

This somewhat distrustful pattern of interactions combined with a learning process - at least as to complexities and limits - was very marked in the area of **good governance/human rights**. What is interesting is not that no Regional tribunal or ombudsperson came into being, but that governments clearly continued to accept that good governance was a legitimate and necessary concern of intergovernmental regionalism.

SADCC was always concerned with good governance, a concern SADC inherited. On the face of it the concern might have been taken to be simply root and branch opposition to apartheid which was clearly a key common interest, and one on which clear and forceful statements were possible. In that respect the ability of a regional group to raise standards was apparent - in SADCC Swaziland (when the *de facto* coup by the Gang of Three swung it toward South Africa) and, especially, Malawi were willing to speak and - up to a point - act in ways distinctly more forceful in regional fora than they were as individual states.

GOVERNANCE: CONCERNS IN QUEST OF MODALITIES?

However, governance concerns went further:

- a. a clear **distaste for military governments and coups** - notable in respect to relations with Lesotho in the cases of both coups;
- b. a **general objection to bullying** - let alone occupation and annexation - of small, weak states by large and (regionally or globally) powerful neighbours, a concern strongly influencing response to Argentina's invasion of the Malvinhas/Falklands and Iraq's of Kuwait;

- c. not very clear but nonetheless real belief that **providing some minimum levels of due process and of human rights were necessary functions of states** - again Malawi and Lesotho were abiding cases of concern with Swaziland's management of clashes of 'modernity' and 'feudalism' and Zambia's latest electoral law and the resulting mockery of a free and fair competitive election also causing disquiet. The non acceptability of Zaire as a member turned in substantial part on this concern. In that context SADCC showed considerable insight and foresight - over 1979/85 the international perception of President Mobutu was much less uniformly negative than it had become a decade later.

To say that SADC/SADCC has been a human rights crusading body, beyond the anti apartheid struggle, would be absurd. Its commitment to achieving cumulative radical change by the accumulation of manageable chunks precluded that as did the very different national styles and standards of governance and of human rights establishment as well as the divergent military-political security risk contexts. It is rather more surprising that the concern existed and survived at all - certainly it does not appear to in ASEAN in Asian or - except in the extreme no state case of Liberia - in ECOWAS in West Africa.

Here the question has been and remains how to achieve a **working consensus** on goals and on ways to advance them. The past highlight case - but such a special one it may provide little detailed guidance - is that of Lesotho in 1994 when a military coup fronted by a questionably legitimate King was thwarted and reversed. While SADC - with one key exception - did not figure as such, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana (and less visibly Mozambique and Tanzania as well) acted together. SADC refused to seat representatives of the coup regime and continued to seat the pre-coup government's representatives. This reinforced the credibility of the formal international law position that economic sanctions and implicit threat of armed intervention were in support of a continuing recognised government not against a new hostile one. The need for joint action was to avoid the appearance of unilateral South African dictation. The sanctions worked - the coup was reversed with the previous legitimate King restored and the Prime Minister and Parliament regaining control of governance - all with no actual use of force nor serious violence in Lesotho.

The only evident simple lesson is that had ECOWAS chosen to act similarly the government with the longest history of democratic, competitive elections in Africa - Gambia - would rapidly have been rescued from its coupsters. The problems of transition to a constitutional monarch in Swaziland are much less amenable to pressure and its ill considered use would lead to domestic violence. No SADC/COSAS Member State would deny the legitimacy of the Royal Government. All would wish to see an evolution to a constitutional monarchy with more open political processes and electoral systems. The means open - persuasive diplomacy, quiet warnings of non-support against domestic disorder or regional trade union pressures and

a general frost on relations - may or may not be effective. In respect to a larger state - e.g. Zambia's special legislation to protect the incumbent predecessor from facing his predecessor in the election - those tools in their present form seem less than likely to have much cutting edge.

Human rights as such have not been a SADCC/SADC sector or theme. Blatant violation - South Africa, Malawi - has been a concern but one raised under other rubrics. Nobody on the governmental side has proposed a Southern African analogue to the European (Human Rights) Court albeit most SADC state courts do have - and at times use - powers to find governments in violation of human rights embodied in state laws and in most cases have respected court judgements - at least in some measure.

The range of **economic issues related to security** was recognised albeit there was no uniformity in the end on how and how closely they were linked to the diplomatic-military-police core in COSAS. **Food security** remained fully embedded in SADC's Food and Agriculture Sector - presumably on the not irrelevant grounds that it worked, had little to learn from police chiefs and generals and, beyond reducing causes of mass flight and the body of persons so desperate as to be likely to be drawn into crime, had limited specific input into police-army-foreign office issues. **Water** was treated slightly differently. The real danger of escalating clashes was recognised and the road to a protocol plus river basin use treaties marked down. As the goals were to optimise water use and keep the police/army out of the picture, there is no direct COSAS link. There is a recognition that coordination will be needed in efficient water use management. Irrigation both in Zimbabwe and in South Africa (the main present users) is highly inefficient. Eucalyptus and evergreen groves/forests suck up water (and transpire it away) raising questions not only about much South African river basin planting but also about Swaziland's large, planted coniferous forests.

Other areas also resist neat categorisation. An interesting example in the overlap zone among **level playing field competition, good governance human rights and environmental/economic sustainability is setting environmental and labour standards (not including wage rates) criteria for trade access**. SADC/COSAS have not reached a decision, much less a set of standards and/or method for adjudication of disputes as to compliance. At WTO level its members deeply suspect that both are being used by some Northern interests as cover for protectionism and that environmental standard and labour rights proposals are too influenced by preservationist and protectionist movements at the expense of rational sustainable development and fair competition. Thus they fairly uniformly oppose their inscription on WTO's agenda. But the trend in discussion is toward accepting that such standards can be appropriate regionally (among the less dissimilar economies and

ecologies within SADC as distinct from those of SADC in contrast to those of the EU). While basically a **Trade** issue presumably cooptation of some **labour** and **natural resources** professionals will be required as the dialogue evolves toward operationality.

COSAS/ASAS agreed on in late 1995 and ratified over 1995/96, is a **council** of foreign, home affairs (police/immigration) and armed forces ministers with a supporting committee of senior officials. Like SATCC (Transport and Communications which also has a separate treaty) it is to **report direct to heads of state** but - probably - via the general SADC Council of Ministers (for transmission and perhaps comment but not amendment, rejection or referral back). Whether it is to have a fully separate secretariat (most SADC sectoral areas in fact do) or share the central SADC one is less than crystal clear as is the interaction between its sectoral secretariat, those of other sectors and SADC's central one.

The unclarity is not the result of secrecy so much as of SADC/COSAS' desire to begin work, to handle several specific cases as well as possible and then to review the record critically to rearticulate future guidelines and modalities. That has been SADCC/SADC's hallmark approach and what it (if not necessarily all outside commentators) means by pragmatism.

VI.

WIDER ASPECTS AND PROBLEMATIC: SECURITY AND REGIONALISM IN SSA

Concern with security issues is not unique to the Southern African sub-region nor is concern with both macro military security from war and household food security from drought driven dearth. ECOWAS has - admittedly with limited results to date - sought to grapple with the Liberian catastrophe and has done so at diplomatic and military/police levels, albeit perhaps without enough attention to resocialisation of child and livelihood of rehabilitation of adult ex-combatants to make peace less threatening to them and the likely of war being privatised to brigandage not ended reduced.

IGAD (Kenya-Horn anti drought group) was intended to act on drought related food security issues (early warning vulnerability reduction, support mobilisation) but - partly because the greatest threat to food security and especially food relief supply in the Horn was war - has never been directly effective on those issues and turned its focus to crisis coping peace mediation and refugee management. Like ECOWAS its results to date have been meagre, but it persists in its efforts.

Tanzania - partly because it has always faced a security threat of one type or another across at least one of its Western frontiers - has been consistently active in seeking to restore security by conflict avoidance and mediation stretching down to small group elements. In the case of Rwanda it might have achieved a breakthrough had the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi not been assassinated by the missing down of their plane, triggering the 1994 genocide and the completion of the 1990-1994 invasion which resulted in the present government of Rwanda. While nominally the current Burundi mediation/reconciliation/pressuring group led by retired President Nyerere is *ad hoc* and neighbour state, its initial tentative proposals for an interstate combatant separation/crawling reconciliation facilitating an international military cum police force and the Burundi blockade group *de facto* at least includes Ethiopia, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa which have no boundaries with Rwanda or Burundi. The last quartet suggests that COSAS sees Tanzania's security (reducing the costs of protective forces deployed on the border against spillover of non SADC state catastrophes) as a COSAS issue. External threats leading to domestic macroeconomic insecurity and border and potential household insecurity are a more or less direct translation of the initial SADCC/FLS concerns vis-à-vis the Old South Africa to the new context with washover violence from the successor states to the Belgian colonial zone the dominant current threat.

The OAU's mediation intervention record is long, low key and with a still lower results profile. However, it has tried to become more active and effective especially in respect to Rwanda and Burundi. It has also addressed at least one non-military aspect of security - child security - in its Dakar Workshop and approach to national child plans following the Child Summit and Declaration of the Rights of the Child. The OAU's problem is that with very limited financial and analytical - and no direct, ready on call military - resources it is very hard for it to be taken seriously.

The USA 1996 initiative for an African ready reaction force of 10,000-15,000 designated troops in half a dozen states (implicitly South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal, Mali and perhaps Ethiopia) to be activated by the OAU via the UN and financed (at least in respect of standby costs and a share of UN mandated operational ones) by the USA is problematic because of its clumsiness and origin even though its OAU initiative - designated forces - external financial support elements are positive. An initial OAU or COSAS or Nyerere Group proposal would have been much more prudent (and given private intimation of USA support would probably have been forthcoming). As it is both President Mandela's response - in summary, good idea perhaps but up to us not you to take the lead - and that of several East African states - in summary, yes indeed, we need help to ensure force on call to back up our mediatory initiatives - represent genuine COSAS/ASAS and broader SSA strands of thought.

OAU and Regional concerns interlock because there are shadowy but real links among African arenas of conflict (and between them and identifiable European capitals). Ethiopia and Eritrea are concerned with the Interlake conflict zone not only because they see conflict anywhere in SSA as a threat everywhere - after all they have not taken up engagee positions in respect to Zambia, Gambia, Sierra Leone or Liberia. Rather they Burundian counterpart to Rwanda's genocidal Interahamwe is perceived as jointly backed by Khartoum and Paris. Khartoum by its actions - directly and through proxies - has come to be seen as a dangerous, aggressive threat by both Addis and Asmara. Thus the two core Horn states' concern in the Interlake Zone arises from their concern with their own safety and the achievement of decent governance in the Sudan.

The problems likely to face efforts at sub-regional security initiatives are fairly readily generalisable from those confronting COSAS/SADC:

1. the **largest member syndromes** - disproportionately too strong in Southern Africa and part of the problem in both West and Central Africa whereas in the Horn the main problem country (Sudan) is the joint largest;
2. the problem of achieving a **holistic vision** of the socio economic household, the macro political economic and the macro diplomatic, military, police aspects of security;
3. the **limits on governance/human rights influencing** which are severe for any intergovernmental body especially if several key states have a very poor record (one reason SADC/COSAS prospects in this area may be the best of any subregion and not replicable in any other unless there is a change of regime in Khartoum and progress toward peace in Somalia which might add the Horn to the 'promising' list);
4. **pre-emptive power** (diplomacy backed by present military capacity) is usually low since the threat of recourse to force does not necessarily lead to a rethink by the sanctioned government and only South Africa/Zimbabwe, Nigeria and - perhaps - Ethiopia have the military strength to be the backbone of sub-regional resort to force;
5. **police and household** perceptions of how to reduce insecurity from crime and from socio economic conditions conduce to crime are by no means identical. Nor are the divisions of labour among short term, prevention or pursuit of cases, medium term control of events and longer term reduction of causes;
6. **immigration** is even more complicated than crime (especially if seen as including refugees) because its criminalisation does have a potential popular base if there is no effective government and social sector leadership against xenophobia in recipient, and against crushing poverty (or other causes of household insecurity) in source countries;

7. Government alone cannot create a **regional movement** even if it can launch a regional idea. SADC and Comesa have, to a degree at least, succeeded in doing so over broader areas than previously perceived as Southern or Eastern in any operational sense, but further advance depends not so much on public relations as on **perceptible results** from - and attributed to - interstate regionalism and **parallel contact-organisational-operational growth of regionalism in the enterprise and social sectors**. That growth is nearly absent in the Horn and Central Africa, weak in greater East Africa, divided by language in West Africa but rather more apparent in Southern Africa;
8. **Enterprise-social sector-government interactions** are a source of, at least, confusion. Captive organisations (of states) are of no particular use; subsidised ones are rarely practicable for fiscal reasons; totally unrelated ones may not add up to a critical mass and result in official sub-regional political economic and security projects not being perceived as crucial nor even critically supported as well - perhaps more crucially - not forming a set of parameters for focused, action oriented, regional dialogue.

VII.

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CONUNDRUMS: 1996

The second half of 1996 has presented SADCC/COSAS with two serious challenges in the areas of decent minimal standards of good governance and of external military security - Zambia and the Interlake Zone respectively. The nature of the challenges is fairly clear; the practicable modalities toward meeting them less so and the means to act - *de facto* if not *de jure* - regionally even more opaque.

The incumbent government of Zambia's revisions of electoral legislation disqualified the main opposition party's Presidential and lead Parliamentary candidates. It did so with intent and was perceived to do so as a response to fears of defeat. Seven opposition parties boycotted the election leaving four parties (rather more akin to tea parties than to serious alternatives) to 'contest' with the incumbents. This performance is not within the parameters of the regional quasi consensus on minimal elements of decent governance. But because the incumbent government has acted legally correctly (at least in respect to the legislation) it is not clear how COSAS could be seized of the issue. Instead South Africa and Botswana (backed in a lower key by Tanzania, Namibia, Mozambique and - presumably - Zimbabwe) have attempted to use diplomatic channels to convey disquiet and - consequent on their failure - spoken out increasingly bluntly.

What can be achieved is most uncertain. An electoral rerun allowing UNIP to field its chosen slate of candidates (in particular Past President Kaunda) would be a very major and very public admission of error for President Chiluba and - given the series of events - create a probability (not a certainty) of defeat. Acquiescence in the *de facto* exclusion of the substantial (quite conceivably plurality) opposition from the electoral process would massively set back efforts to establish regional standards of good governance. Cold, formally correct but distinctly unfriendly, relations with Zambia under its incumbents by its neighbours would seriously hamper all aspects of the regional dynamic.

Since 1994 the main external military threat confronting a COSAS member has been that of Rwanda and/or Burundi and/or Zaire internal conflict spilling across the borders of Tanzania and the crippling cost to Tanzania of deploying up to 20,000 troops in border zones to avert (or at worst to be ready to contain and to reverse) such an eventuality.

By mid 1996 the burden on/risk to Tanzania showed signs of escalating not ebbing. Late 1996 implosions and explosions in Zaire (especially zones historically part of or tributary states to the pre-colonial Rwanda Kingdom) have altered the immediate foci of the challenge but, if anything, increased it by completing the interweaving of the problem of genocidal, ravanchist refugee based fighters backed by President Mobutu (and certain external actors) with the broader issues of "whether Zaire?" and "after Mobutu what?" for COSAS to be credible it must - as such or via either the OAU or *ad hoc* groups - enable Tanzania to preserve domestic tranquillity (including averting being crushed by precautionary or deterrent military spending) and make at least a marginal contribution to positive evolution of governance in Rwanda and Burundi.

To prognosticate on what COSAS' Member States will do in response to these two challenges and with what results would be a case of self inflicted foot in mouth disease. What is valid is:

- a. both are security/governance issues affecting COSAS' states, and both
- b. broadly analogous to ones SADCC/FLS grappled with in the past, and
- c. perceived as such by at least a substantial fraction of Southern Africa's leaders, so that
- d. what is - or is not - accomplished and how will it have an impact - positive or negative, or both - on the course of Southern African Regionalism.

VIII.

FORWARD? IN RESUME

Security has been a central theme in most successful regionalisms from EU to ASEAN. On analysis it appears to be central to the Southern African, taking COSAS and SADC to be *de facto* a common project. Security is not a simple concept because it ranges from household to macro and from food to military. The particular foci and priorities in different regions in SSA vary as does the potential for acting on them.

To set security concerns up as an alternative to economic ones in regionalism is misleading. Resources are necessary for security as for other goals and one purpose of economic regionalism is to enhance their growth rate. Similarly war, crime, mass migration and starvation are highly inconsistent with economic advance. **To pose the question a "Common Market" or "Common Army" first is therefore a double confusion.** Each is a modality not a self validating goal in itself. Economic and security goals are interactive and mutually complementary in results (even if competitive in resource input requirements).

Whether the more substantial - and both more overt and more diverse - security content to Southern African regionalism is a cause of its relatively greater success, a consequence of its strength or a benign iterative interaction among the two is unclear. The originating context of SADC did enforce both the necessity of a political big idea including security and of relating the economic and the military/diplomatic aspects of security. However, that certainly did not guarantee a successful initial project nor the transformation to incorporate the New South Africa in the project. Both internalised initiatives (and belief that regionalism really was relevant and therefore had to receive priority attention and resource allocations) and using external inputs within regionally determined frames have been evident and probably crucial. Neither the "Defence of the Beira Corridor" nor "The People Shall Be Fed" is either standard regionalism nor what either most academic specialists or donors would have envisaged before the event to be central, practicable or - perhaps - even desirable. On the other hand, on some of the apparently easier economic issues - especially fiscal barrier reduction toward standard freer trade - SADC has been less forceful and less able to make breakthroughs than COMESA. Whether this is a matter of sequencing or a deeper weakness remains to be seen.

How other sub-regions in CA can benefit from reflection on and use of elements from the Southern African experience is a question primarily for their people. Certainly more in depth research and review of forces, principles, and dynamics (beyond modalities, the narrowly economic and state centrism) could contribute. Unconventional and innovative research by African universities and institutes (perhaps three or four cooperating to pose experiences and

perspectives from different historical, geographic and regional project perspectives - say - Legon-Addis Ababa-Dar es Salaam-Western Cape) could be a potentially catalytic point of entry assuming it had both applied and communicational aspects.

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**REGIONALISM:
University Research Roles In Retreat And Recovery**

By Reginald Herbold Green

**Workshop on Regionalism University of Ghana
Association of African Universities
"Meeting The Challenges of Regionalism in Africa"
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REGIONALISM: University Research Roles In Retreat And Recovery

By Reginald Herbold Green

Do not go quiet into that good night
But rage rage against the dying of the light.

- Dylan Thomas

Natura non facit saltum.
(Nature does not make haste.)

- Alfred Marshal

Aye but a man's reach must exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?

- William Barrett-Browning

I.

RETROSPECT: FROM DECLINE TO RENEWAL

Research on regionalism in Africa has shared the weaknesses, and strengths, of Pan-Africanism and of regional organisations. The bright happy morning of the first half of the 1960's proved a false dawn with a steady decline in the 1970's and - at least in West Africa - in the 1980's.

That is a challenge to African universities for two reasons: because regionalism is an enduring theme in African politics, economics and social concerns it should be an area of serious research and teaching and because - at least in respect to economics and security - there is both a logical case for, and fragmentary evidences of the attainability of, major gains from acting together in a formal way on selected areas of common interest; there is need for research and analysis to inform decision taking.

African¹ research on regionalism in Africa is very feeble. In the first place the **quantity** is - or appears to be - very low. This is exacerbated by the large proportion in highly inaccessible and transient mimeod papers not even desk top published nor available on diskette nor via electronic data banks.

In the second place the **quality** is low. This applies both to a frequent analytical and empirical casualness suggesting that the hypothesis and conclusions were written first and the logic and data dashed off to fit or to totally unprofessional levels of carelessness.

Third, very little university research is **applied** in the sense of arising out of detailed exposure to the process (or attempted processes) of regionalism, relating to questions which actors in that process must answer however little information they have or readily usable by decision takers to inform evaluation of alternatives, potential initiatives or ongoing results.

Fourth, a low proportion of research is **genuinely multi country** let alone **cross sub-regional**. Most research on sub-regional processes and results is very much based on real knowledge of only one country and the number of serious African studies genuinely seeking to compare, contrast and draws conclusions from divergent regionalism processes in Northern, Western (and francophone within West Africa), Central, Eastern, Horn, Eastern and Southern and Southern African regionalism is as low they can surely be counted on one hand. Certainly nationally focused studies can be and are essential building blocks but, by definition, regionalism is a field requiring regionally conceptualised and grounded research.

Finally, the proportion of **lazy rhetorical research** (or 'research?') is far too high. A set of global propositions and conclusions is often set out with numerous non African and a few African cases and empirical observations tossed between. The amount of systematic analysis linking propositions via African data to conclusions in such work is frequently nil. Even if both propositions and conclusions are correct such work neither demonstrates that proposition nor adds to knowledge about regionalism in Africa.

The bitter reality is that **African research on African regionalism is in general weaker today than in the 1960's** - certainly in Legon and the successors to the then University of East Africa. Until 1985, or even 1990, the trend was down. Stabilisation at a low level may have taken place and there are - as the current University of Ghana initiative illustrates - signs of recovery. To these generalisations Southern Africa is a partial exception; perhaps one not unrelated to the reality that SADCC/SADC² is at the centre of the most dynamic and (for reasons of areas - including security - covered and of style) the most high profile of sub-regional³ processes and dynamics.

Regress in research on regionalism is not isolated - it stands (or sinks) within a broader pattern of weakening of research. In the early 1960's much of the basic work for a Nobel Prize in Physics was carried out at Legon. The first continental, analytical, applied political economic study of Pan Africanism was written by members of the University of Ghana economics

department encouraged actively by the government of Ghana, while the first institutional and processual sub-regional analytico empirical volumes appeared from within the University of East Africa as it then was.

No realistic person would expect a Nobel Laureate in physics to be won from Legon based work in the foreseeable future. There has been no Legon based building on or transcending, **Unity or Poverty: The Economics of Pan-Africanism**. Two successor volumes (and related articles) have appeared in East Africa but largely by the initial Kenyan author long after he had left the university (plus in one case one of the co-authors of the pioneering Legon volume). That is an even sadder record - Nobel class theoretical work in physics will always be carried on somewhere in the world; if boundary extending research on African regionalism has no forward dynamic in SSA's premier universities it is unlikely to have much anywhere else.

True, it can be said that the Nobel Laureate was Dorothy Hodgkin of Cambridge and the authors of **Unity or Poverty?** both US subjects. But in the former case at least twenty five second or third degree Ghanaians in the University and at the national reactor took part, while in the second both co-authors were members of Legon's Department of Economics (while the main East African contributors included Philip Ndegwa and Darham Ghai of Kenya). In the 1960's history meant that there were few African academicians. The blame for that cannot fairly be laid on the University of Ghana or the expatriates who chose to work in it.

Today the situation is different. Faculties - in large measure because of the pioneering work of the 1960's - are largely Ghanaian. While research is constrained by limited time and funds, and Northern research funded in Africa may too often be by non-Africans with little empowering of Africans by involvement or making available data and even results, there is no blockage to African research from the global, intellectually community. The **primary responsibility for restoring and advancing research capacity and momentum is and should be African**. To concentrate on external causes and constraints rather than identifying ones own weaknesses, areas of opportunity to do better and strategic agenda and only then seeking external cooperation is - however justified the complaints - self marginalisation, self decapacitation and self entrenchment of dependency.⁴ Until Africans and African universities place a priority on research, demonstrate their commitment by allocating time and finance and create an enabling climate (including respect for and use of results) nobody else can restore it, let alone secure an innovative momentum.

That does mean prioretisation. It can be argued that Ghanaian research focused on physics and the reactor should not primarily be at theoretical frontiers but on applied agricultural and health science topics of more unique and direct importance to Ghana and to West or Sub-Saharan Africa. Such research is important, adds to knowledge, can be intellectually exciting,

is more likely to attract scarce national (and external) resources and if not carried on in Africa is often unlikely to be done anywhere, indeed in the case of some types of applied research cannot be because context is integral to it.

Regionalism in Africa clearly falls in that category of research. It relates to issues of immediate concern to Africans and to Africa, best researched in Africa and unlikely to be fully explored anywhere else. While there are theoretical issues which have global resonance the main body of work is - or ought to be - contextual and either applied or applicable. This is not to limit it to the purely descriptive or programme proscriptive. Without analysis the former tends to sterility and the latter to error. But the some token without an empirical analytical and applied research, to attempt to address broader theoretical issues is very often to seek to make bricks without straw producing elegant artefacts that crumble into dust when set to use in respect to any actual case.⁵ The main concern today is to recognise this history both to draw strength from realising what has been achieved as evidence it can be again and to be alert to the dangers of unsustainable starts (or restarts) followed by decline.

II.

FINANCE AND FAILURE

Finance alone cannot produce quality research. Lack of finance - both directly and indirectly - can come near to being a sufficient condition for an absence of research.

Lack of adequate finance for research in SSA has led to **low research output**. Further it has led to a **bias toward low cost, desk research**. In the absence of adequate primary data that is a dangerous bias. In the context of applied cross country research - including that on regionalism - it is virtually by definition a crippling one. In particular what has been termed **lazy rhetorical research is made very attractive**. To acquire a couple of volumes on globalisation - pro or con - a World Bank Development Report with statistical annex, some domestic casual observations and a national statistical abstract (however dated and however incomplete or dubious much of the contents) is easy. From the first two a set of general propositions and conclusions can be derived with a middle cobbled together from random use of the second two.⁶ To carry out field observations of regional processes, programmes, institutions and results is much harder - and more expensive. Also it rarely leads to equally sweeping or unproblematic conclusions. Arguably however it is both intellectually and practically more valuable.

Heavy to near total **dependence on external finance for research** - especially for externally chosen topics - has its own set of dangers and biases even if it can reduce constraints. First

the African influence on the **agenda** is often low not simply in respect to topics but even more in articulation and posing of questions. Second the degree of **involvement and empowerment of African researchers** - and especially institutions - both directly by personnel involvement and status and indirectly by feedback of data and even results. Third, there is a real risk of **loss of integrity** by agreeing, whether overtly or not (or even intentionally at all) to results of as well as of topics to research, a risk to which even quite respectable Northern academic research institutions have at times fallen victim. Fourth there is another risk to integrity in accepting contracts, getting initial and progress money and then - for whatever reasons - **not delivering** a complete or serious (or any) set of results timeously (or at all) - a pattern all too common at Legon in the 1980's.

General university funding constraints also have impacted negatively on research. The fewer the faculty relative to students, the heavier the teaching load and the grater the risk of crowding out research. The problem is exacerbated where research has not been fully integrated into departments, but largely concentrated in institutes doing little or no teaching and largely composed of full time, non-departmental staff. The lower faculty emoluments - and the less the funding for research - the more coping, whether to survive or to maintain modest amenity standards of life, requires outside work which, whatever its value, is competitive with research. For example, in the mid 1980's one Legon lecturer reckoned he earned housing and clothes from the university, basic household needs from his sign painting and his wife's cosmetic selling and gasoline and vehicle repairs plus a few amenities from research for UNICEF.

III.

RESEARCH WEAKNESSES: A QUADRILATERAL

To blame everything on finance - or its absence - is unrealistic. Without more finance a new flowering of African research on African regionalism will not happen. But other weaknesses need to be overcome for more funding to be used more efficiently.

First **cross-country** work - of which research on regionalism is inherently a part - is weak in SSA both absolutely and in its continuing high dependence on expatriates. The reason is that relatively few Africans - though the number is now increasing - have worked or researched in more than one or at most two African countries. Prestige is involved as well as the greater ease of securing finance for Northern visiting work or sabbaticals. "Been to" does not mean to another African country or university. Networking among African universities and scholars is uneven and in regionalism to date virtually non-existent.

Second, **links** between **research** institutes and **university** departments and African regional or sub-regional bodies are low - especially in respect to two way flows of personnel and to joint research projects. That has an impact on access to data and especially to close up views of process and also limits the base of multi country experience e.g. personnel who have gained a multi country base whether in ADB or UNECA, in SADC or ECOWAS rarely return or retire to universities - a pattern quite different from that in the North. The errors lie on both sides - the organisations are often too exclusivist about their own data and operations and too prone to treat researchers as cheap data compilers, but the universities are inadequately oriented to collaborating in applied research and to building up sabbatical/secondment/advanced degree enrolment/exchanges of personnel.

Third, **multi disciplinary**⁷ approaches to research utilising insights from personnel grounded in different disciplines and their particular data bases, analytical tools and insights into reality are relatively rare. This is hardly unique to Africa but is, at least apparently, particularly severe.

Fourth, studies of **regionalism** have tended to become almost synonymous with studies of **economic regionalism** especially, though not only, in SSA. That is economistic sometimes to the point of **economystic**. Further it ignores the insights of the founding fathers of African regionalism and the experience of dynamic regionalism in Africa and elsewhere.

George Padmore saw Pan-Africanism as cultural and political as much as economic; as a mobilising force and a movement more than as a set of institutions and Gross Domestic Product calculations. Kwame Nkrumah put political and security regionalism at the top of the agenda, not because economics was unimportant but because he believed economic regionalism to be both inherently incomplete and practicably unattainable among a congeries of politically divided mini states. Leopold Sedar Senghor argued that common social and cultural perceptions were essential to regionalism or continentalism and focused much more on francophone African than West African regionalism because "negritude" appeared to have no cultural/intellectual parallel in Anglophone West Africa. Julius Nyerere - sometimes seen as representing a polar opposite position to that of Nkrumah - was so deeply concerned about political and security aspects of (sub) regionalism that he sought East African political unity even at the price of offering delaying Tanzanian independence as a means to it and achieved a union with Zanzibar on grounds certainly not even significantly economic.

No successful regionalism has ever been focused solely on a Common Market. The EU⁸ was born from the "European Movement" propagated by the "European Idea" whose basic aim was social, political, scarcity and economic regionalism to ensure the absence of future European works. Its initial form was sectoral, not macro, and production, not trade, in nature - the iron, coal and steel community. ASEAN⁹ has only recently made significant progress

toward becoming a common market. Acting as a regional unit in respect to the world community and major states within it, including but by no means limited to economic diplomacy, has been its abiding bread and butter operational field.

In Africa SADC has been the most dynamic as well as most unconventional sub regional institution. It has always had a **political economy agenda**, but for its first (SADCC) decade regional free trade was not part of it. And the agenda was very much **political economic and security economic** both in respect to **households** (e.g. Food Security) and to **Member States** (e.g. keeping non-South African truck transport routes open and operational). The commitment of Botswana and especially of Presidents Seretse Khama and Ketumile Masire to SADC did not turn on narrow, short, or even medium term economic interests. Those would have been served best by accommodation with South Africa even if a long term political economic project for a broader regionalism required a - then unattainable - South African/Southern African non-hegemonic framework. Botswana's concerns turned on security within a regional grouping of like minded states pursuing common interests and flowed from ultimately ideological (and none the worse for that) choices for interdependence and national accountability and therefore against South African hegemony, especially - but not only - in the context of apartheid. Nor would maximisation of transit traffic, tourism and labour remittance increase and minimisation of the risks/costs of armed conflict have led Mozambique and Presidents Samora Machel and Joaquim Alberto Chissana to the FLS and its *de facto* economic wing SADCC as opposed to toward dependent economic cooperation with and political acquiescence toward, South Africa. Further, within SADCC Mozambique's key concerns were both financial and diplomatic protection and rehabilitation of its vital transport corridors (and thus territorial integrity) and of international support for food security not intra state trade. The commitment to African liberation - and thus against apartheid - and, to African regionalism for far broader than economic reasons informed President Julius Nyerere's and Tanzania's role in the founding of SADCC, since while positive its short term economic impact on Tanzania was very marginal indeed.

To make this plea for a broader and more historically grounded approach to research on regionalism is not to argue that the founding leaders of regionalism were wholly correct nor even if they were that their insights and - especially - prescriptions would still be fully relevant up to four decades later. George Padmore was a diaspora based mobiliser for independence including economic independence. While Kwame Nkrumah's fear of relations among West African states grounded wholly on economic links have been borne out - not least by the trajectory of ECOWAS - his leaps toward broad political unification and a continental military command were, at the best, premature. Julius Nyerere would be the first to admit - and regret - the inherent weaknesses that destroyed the East African Community and have plagued the

Tanzanyika-Zanzibar union. "Negritude" has not proven a satisfactory base for unity even within francophone West Africa - as President Senghor himself decided in the case of the Mali Federation.

Nor is SADC perfect - not even if it were would it be directly replicable elsewhere. The security against South African economic and military aggression theme necessarily dominated from 1982 through 1990 and the perfectly national placing of tariff reductions and trade in goods more generally as a secondary or second stage priority was probably pushed too far for too long.

But not to know and learn from history is both to place on oneself the burden of constantly reinventing the wheel and to run a great risk of repeating errors (though probably not successes). Similarly, while economic gains are by themselves almost never sufficient, nor always initially necessary, they are increasingly necessary over time if momentum is to be maintained and integration deepened. Persons do not live by bread alone but they assuredly cannot continue to live without it (as indeed the biblical reference case makes quite plain).

IV.

THE WAY BACK: SOME BASIC STEPS

The road back toward a healthier, broader, more incisive body of African work on regionalism cannot literally seek to return to the 1960's. That would be neither practicable nor desirable. But formulating a strategic road map should take account of the weaknesses and gaps sketched above in order to overcome and to close them.

The first priority is to **increase the volume, coverage and quality** of research and to do so at **more institutions by more scholars** within the context of networking relationships.

The case for several - even if initially the practicable goal may well be one - **centres of excellence** with the numbers of personnel and quantity of finance both to carry out research themselves and to provide support and encouragement to smaller programme and individual scholars is strong. Ideally Legon, Abidjan or Cotonou, Western Cape, Eduardo Mondlane, Harare, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa¹⁰ would seek to move toward substantial centres by building on existing bases. Smaller programmes - e.g. within diplomatic, foreign affairs, and international economic relation units - could complement them and individual scholars elsewhere could break out of their present isolated position by link ups and visits/visiting fellowships.

Networking should go beyond **data exchange** and **publication distribution** albeit those two elements would by themselves be highly beneficial. The present familiarity of Western, Southern and Eastern, and Francophone/Anglophone within West Africa scholars with work from other sub regions or in other languages is very low, partly because it is hard to find out what is available and harder still to lay hands on it. Increasing **physical meeting and dialogue** is also important. Given the **cost** (to sponsors or institutions and/or individual participants) of large continental meetings, perhaps a programme of larger **regional** ones combined with smaller special topic and general work in progress exchange **workshops at continental level** would be most sustainable.

Second **outreach and networking** should go **beyond SSA**. A high proportion of African scholars are in the diaspora and the shock of exchanging northern for SSA academic salaries is a major barrier to early return for most no matter how committed they are to Africans and Africa. Further a substantial proportion of scholars of African regionalism are expatriates and that source of input should be tapped. It is distressing to see how little reference to work done in Africa appears in that written abroad and vice versa. Distressing, but not surprising given tracking and retrieval barriers.

Further, extending networking beyond Africa will bring in more knowledge of other regionalisms and more concepts developed in those contexts which may, directly or in adapted form, be useful in informing research and understanding in Africa. Apart from cross regional exchange programmes funded by the UN Regional Commissions or UNDP (which should be sought) it is highly unlikely substantial African research will be done in the Caribbean, Asia or Latin America or that many Southern regionalism scholars will set foot in (much less work in) SSA. Networking in respect to work in progress and publication's can help avoid the constraints such provincialism threatens to impose.

Third closer researcher links are needed to **African regional and sub-regional organisations** (ICIPE¹¹ as much as UNECA and Tropical Road Crops Institute as much as COMESA) but also to **national units** relating to them.¹² There is little argument about this - the question is how.

Systematic **collection of data** from the organisations and **visits** to them and their sub-units (the latter rather daunting in the case of the highly decentralised SADC which has nearly a score) and contacts with national and regional officials and ministers on the occasion of conferences and visits is a start - a start that has yet to be made systematically.

However, that start may, by itself, not go very far. African official bodies (unless non-functional) have little time to provide assistance to researchers unless they can expect feedback and past experience has made them sceptical both of feedback and the relevance of much of

what passes as research. Further they share the general, unwise governmental tendency to operate on a "need to know" rather than "a clear and pressing need to keep secret" basis.

One way forward is **contract research/consultancy**. A large volume of such research is contracted - at least by SADC, COMESA and ADB. To date most - with the increasing exception of SADC - goes to non-African scholars or firms. Greater African scholars/institutions readiness to seek such work - and to accept that such contracts require prompt, reasoned, supported answers to questions important to the commissioning body - would serve several purposes. They would provide additional research funding for African scholars and institutions at no net cost to their clients.¹³ They would help build domestic consultancy/applied research capacity. They should help break down barriers to data access (whether of time, suspicion or habit). The data from such studies can be - and on occasion has been - the base for broader, deeper research which - in general - the organisations have welcomed so long as it neither betrayed confidences nor set out to be systematically derogatory of the organisation.¹⁴

Fourth, **research on regionalism should be broader**. Politics, political economy, security (from household food security and the livelihood deficits underlying most illegal migration and cross border crime problems, through interstate water allocation and minimum acceptable standards of governance to macro military-political security), sociology and culture are important. Applied and theoretical economics are crucial, but not in themselves sufficient. The bulk of outside analysis of SADC for example focuses entirely on short term economic gains and often on trade.¹⁵ While in many cases unduly negative, even on these, the basic failing is to overlook the strategic vision and dynamics which are - by its own assertion and self evidently in practice as well - central to SADCC's/SADC's survival, expansion and relatively high profile with other organisations in and the publics of Member States. If it is argued that some regional organisations are solely short term economic, and especially trade, focused and have no public profile beyond major conferences (and only speeches at them) in conjunction with no clear, articulated strategic vision or dynamics toward advancing it, then that is itself a subject for research and it is not an implausible hypothesis that it may, at least in part, explain limited results in the trade and short term economic gain areas.

Finally **more finance** and **personnel** are needed. The two are linked. Without finance research cannot be done and absence of opportunities to do research hardly attracts scholars to a field. However, the correlation is not a simple one. The prestige - or otherwise - of a topic and the importance and effectiveness - or otherwise - of the institutions and programmes in that field also encourage - or discourage - scholars' study of it. Status is a topic substantially within university control but - except for positive results of consultancy and training inputs which are unlikely to be dominant - the overall stature and impact of

regionalism is not. That may help explain the somewhat greater interest in many countries of Eastern and Southern Africa than in the Horn, Central Africa or - with exceptions - West Africa.

None of these actions can be achieved fully in the short run. But initial action in respect to each is possible for at least some universities and institutes. As CEPA in Ghana and ACDESS in Nigeria¹⁶ demonstrate, clearly focused programmes backed by quality staff and sustained by convincing output can be floated and moved forward.

V.

THE LEGON INITIATIVE: VISION AND TACTICS

Set against the steps toward recovery and renewed advance outlined above, the Legon Initiative for an African Centre for Regional Economic Integration is clearly a major positive proposal. This is doubly true because of its concern to involve the Association of African Universities and UNECA. However, a number of strategic and processual issues arise, resolution of which might strengthen the proposal and increase both its impact (and support) in the SSA academic and regional organisation community, and its ability to mobilise financial and personnel resources.

The basic **strategic question** is that of **scope**. As proposed, the Institute would focus on political economy and on the economic aspects of regionalism. Given the political and security aspects of most successful regional visions, dynamics and organisations (and by the "founding fathers" of regionalism in Africa) that focus appears too **narrow**.

The major institutional question turns on **relationships with other SSA universities, research institutions and scholars**. Present proposals do include networking but - at least as written - appear to envisage a hegemonic relationship. That is inherently unsound - both intellectually and in terms of securing and maintaining broad African university support. A number of "centres of excellence" should be envisaged with Legon as the first but not the last. Single channel marketing has disadvantages in research just as pronounced as in agricultural purchasing. Relations with network members - institutional and individual - should be supportive not directive. For example funds should be sought for visiting fellows from other African academic institutions and Institute fellows seconded to them. A journal and discussion paper series at the Institute serving all network members and with a broad editorial committee could also be useful as could 'representation' of other SSA academic (as well as that of regional institution bodies already proposed) on the Institute's governing and technical/advisory councils.

Similar questions and possibilities arise in respect to **overseas institutions and scholars** - diaspora and expatriate, Northern and Southern. Again exchange in both directions and pooling of information (including on work in progress) could be valuable to the Institute and the SSA network it services and leads - particularly in their early years. Similar considerations apply to technical and advisory boards (and even the editorial committee) though probably not to the Governing Council.

The stress on **links to operational regional bodies** is clear in the proposals. But there may be value in articulating more clearly two way secondment of personnel, training programmes and contract research/consultancy. These all have financial implications which should on balance be positive - earned income for the Institute and substitution of African for external sources for the institutions.

In addition links are needed with **national governments** in respect to their **structure and processes of participation** in regionalism. Indeed, as this area is often cited as one of regionalism's greatest weaknesses in Africa, and is one in which contract research and training could strengthen regionalism, it should arguably be almost co-equal with regional institution links during the first few years.

Finance and personnel requirements for five years should doubtless be based on a full operation year/full programme agenda and budget. Reality will necessarily entail gradual build-up so a phased projection perhaps beginning at half speed in year one and moving to full scale in year three or four would be more convincing to potential supporters. A number of the issues raised above have financial implications - on the revenue as well as the expenditure side.

The salary scales proposed for **academic staff** seem to be reasonably successful in trying both to take account of African exigencies and to provide adequate incentives to secure and hold committed scholars.¹⁷ A problem exists at **supportive staff** levels. The absolute poverty line budget for a household of six in Accra is in the \$80-\$100 a month range. The proposed pay levels begin at \$25 a month which is ethically unsettling and operationally inefficient. Competent, dedicated staff working full time on their jobs are most unlikely to be secured at under - say - \$50 a month with a real prospect of progress to \$75. That there are other employers - especially government - who pay no more than \$25 provides neither a moral nor an efficiency justification - especially since successful medium and large scale private enterprises in fact usually pay (transparently or via allowances) rather more than what is proposed here.¹⁸

The nature of the questions posed is such as to indicate that a strong case can be made in support of the Legon proposal. Only the querying of a purely economic focus is strategic and intellectually central. The other points relate to operational patterns on a level above fine tuning but well below total reformulation.

The need now is arguably **speed and breadth** - articulating the proposals in light of views received and arguments put and ensuring broader audiences - university, regional organisational and potential donor; African, Northern and other Southern - know of them and are enlisted in their support and subsequent operation.

"Even the largest journey begins with the first step" Similarly "it is useless to talk of ends without identifying means"¹⁹. **The Legon proposals do represent several first steps and do identify means.**

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NOTES

- 1 African for this purpose includes the immediate SSA diaspora Non-African research on African regionalism is very limited in extent being a concern of an almost literal handful of expatriates whose intellectual - and often human - concerns have been centred on Africa and Africans for many years. It is not - and is exceedingly unlikely to become - a prestigious or widely followed field even as an outrider of regionalism studies more generally.
- 2 Southern African Development Conference (1980-91) and its successor Development Community, initially grouping the six Front Line States plus Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi and now expanded by the accession of Namibia, South Africa and Mauritius.
- 3 Sub-regional here refers to a substantial grouping smaller than SSA (or logically but perhaps not very realistically in the foreseeable future continental Africa) whether or not it constitutes one of the ECA defined sub-regions. SADC, COMESA (the Community of Eastern and Southern African States which in fact includes Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Sudan - though not South Africa or Botswana), ECOWAS and UEMOA (Union Economique et Monetaire d'Occidentale Afrique) are the functioning sub-regional groupings today; albeit Africa is thickly littered with smaller, overlapping, dead or moribund bodies aspiring or purporting to that status.
- 4 That proposition is applicable more generally. One of the most depressing, damaging and - if care is not taken to reverse it - potentially long lasting consequences of the economic disasters of the late 1970's and early 1980's is the retreat of many Africans and most African states into a mode of reactive responsiveness to external events and external agendas. This is equally true of criticisms focused on the events or agendas as of their unquestioned acceptance. Until African agendas for transformation - as well as positive and protective responses - are set and become again (as in the 1960's and 1970's) the main starting point for dialogue and negotiation, African recovery is likely to be limited and the attainment of new development dynamics even more so. To argue in this way is neither to reject the importance of external events, the need for external resources nor the contributions expatriates can - and sometimes do - make, but to state the proposition that only Africa and Africans can reasonably be expected to be primarily and contextually concerned about African development in economic, politics, security or knowledge.
- 5 The issue is not that theoretical and empirical models need to, or can, include every aspect of detailed, divergent contextual realities. Their purpose is to single out major causal and dependent elements and to plot their relationships under specified parametric conditions. Without contextual information the parameters are likely to be largely erroneous, the identification of key elements incomplete and the formulation of relationships rather hit or miss.
- 6 The defence of what has been termed lazy rhetorical research as a mobilising force has something to it. However, mobilisation and extending the frontiers of knowledge are not the same thing. There is no reason more serious research cannot be translated into mobilisational terms and some to suppose it might then be a safer guide to informing

action. For example, UNICEF's **Children On The Front Line** painstakingly builds up an empirical and analytical presentation of the costs of South Africa's war to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid and their impact on children, on social conditions and on output in a style which in part may seem unduly clinical. But its conclusions have been proof against rhetorical assault and the 200,000 odd copies distributed in three languages were an effective mobilising tool against the apartheid state. While the authors were very careful not to use the words the message many readers - correctly - drew from the data and analysis was "Botha butchers babies", not a message in the least helpful to South African efforts to win 'understanding' or even passive support in the North. To have asserted that message directly without the empirical and analytical work would not have carried the same conviction and would have been open to counter rhetorical assertions in a way COTFL as written was not. In addition, COTFL was also able to identify and articulate strategies for war period survival and post conflict rehabilitation which have on the whole stood the test of time and praxis which could not have been done without the data and analysis.

- 7 Multi disciplinary is deliberately used in preference to inter or cross disciplinary. While it is desirable for researchers to have some familiarity with other disciplines and there are successful cases of researchers grounded in more than one, the quest for polymaths expert in theoretical and applied economics, political economy, political theory, management and administration, theoretical and applied sociology, law, medicine and theoretical and applied technology is unlikely to be either fruitful or necessary. Scholars well grounded in their own disciplines and with a respectful understanding of what other disciplines have to offer can work fruitfully together producing wholes greater than the sum of their parts.
- 8 European Union, ex-EEC.
- 9 Association of Southeast Asian States now comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesian, the Philippines and Vietnam with Cambodia and Burma associates.
- 10 This list is based on work known to the author - it is not intended to be definitive. The geographic spread is, however, deliberate to include each major sub-region and each of the three major international language clusters.
- 11 International Centre for Insect Pathology and Environment (Nairobi) whose often high quality work is endangered by lack of national knowledge and use.
- 12 Many governments appear to have weak or no coordinating units for regional involvement and many logically concerned ministries no clear allocation of responsibility to a specified senior officer. Few better ways to achieve incoherence, lack of preparation and failure to exploit ongoing opportunities could be devised. However, these gaps are not uniform and research on the reasons for and results of more structured relationships to regional and continental bodies could be fruitful both intellectually and practically.
- 13 African research is unlikely to cost more than expatriate - whether by academics or consultancy firms. And in general external funding is available to organisations to commission domestic/regional based research and consultancy. That is not a plea for parsimony - offering \$100 for case studies (as one regional body did) guarantees that

neither new research nor a serious reordering of existing material will happen. \$100 a day and 25 days for a serious desk study based on existing data seriously restructured and reanalyzed might be a better norm.

- 14 Most of the present author's publications are clearly based on data secured as a civil servant or consultant and probably available on no other basis. Moderate care in avoiding use of truly secret data (in practice very little especially after a few years have elapsed), personal confidences or citing sources which (as opposed to their contents) are secret has led to virtually no criticism being registered by governments or organisations even if much of the analysis and many of the conclusions are not uncritical. That experience is not unique.
- 15 This is not to argue that SADC has not been concerned to deliver gains to each member state as perceived by it. It has, and its success or failure in that endeavour whether in transport and communications or in food security poses a perfectly valid set of research topics. Its perception - until 1990 - that tariff reduction and commercial clearing were not priority topics and until 1994 that water allocation was not yet gettable (because most cases involved South Africa) are also subjects for research and quite possibly critical conclusions. But standing alone such research and its findings are so incomplete as to distort. SADC's own in house and commissioned research has been somewhat broader. Food security has been prominent from its founding as has organisation and management (including interacting - or otherwise - national units). From 1994 substantial African research on security, broadly defined has built up but - interestingly - at least in part because SADC sought it and organised a consultative conference of academics and social sector organisations early in the process leading to COSAS (*de facto* the security wing of SADC and successor to the Front Line States).
- 16 Centre for Policy Analysis (Dr Joseph Abbey, director) and African Centre for Development Economics and Strategic Studies (Adebayo Adedeji, director).
- 17 The Institute cannot hope to outbid the North, international organisations or even some Southern Institutions. Salaries of \$50,000 are not unusual and - including consultancy earnings - run up to \$100,000. On the other hand many African (and at least for a year or two diaspora and expatriate) scholars might well be happy to work at the Institute at \$20,000 if they could be sure that the work and access to data environments would be positive.
- 18 Evidently there are practical problems if one Institute pays its supporting staff well above the University scale. One answer is that the University should as a priority seek to move to efficient and decent pay structures for all staff - not only academic and administrative.
- 19 While both quotations are now associated with Mao Tzedong, both have a much longer intellectual history being derived from Confucius' **Analects**.