

To: JT, MR, SM, CH, CS

From: Reg Green

TRIP REPORT  
GHANA  
NOVEMBER 21-27, 1995

1. In Ghana for

- a. African Leadership Forum Public Service Conference
- b. See Ghanaian side on Study Seminar
- c. Explore possible consultancy to Ghana Min Fin and also Ghana economy/economic good (or nae sae guid) housekeeping.

Relatively successful all heads (2:1 consultancy will happen and, if so, interesting intellectually). ALF paid except for minor SS contribution.

2. ALF. Genl. Obesanjo's forum still in business. Last minute move to exile of conference didn't help it but still 30 plus and rather interesting/potentially useful. Their financial backer Friedrich-Naumann Foundation sticking by them. Probably moving to Addis (ECA) or Jo'burg (RSA).
- Ironically no public statement re the judicial assassinations or Obesanjo's imprisonment. Mix of Friedrich-Naumann's worries, general heads down, odd Ghana situation (public anti Nigeria; Ghana on C'wealth monitors; President J. J. Rawlings on good terms with Abacha. ALF interim head (Ayo Adinerawale) rather wanted a statement as did I. Sent rather strong letter of support to General O. personally.

3. **Public Service Rebuilding for African Rebuilding.**

Interesting. Clearly on African lines both in that not on (nor much dwelling on) World Bank lines and only one non-African participant.

- a. numbers of public servants not much discussed - in principle felt too few for tasks but that was seen as issue to follow purification and removing useless personnel;
- b. purposes view rather LTPS - i.e. core public services, public policy, infrastructure, **not** production of goods/marketable services *per se*. **But** added moral/ethical example and

- example in particular to entrepreneurs and including rational thinking in ethics. This actually tended to class professional politicians as 'oughting to be' public servants;
- c. accepted view productivity and probity are impossible without decent pay (don't necessarily follow from it), i.e. Adedeji-Jolly-Magid Osman-Green focus.
  - d. very unclear (or rather conflictual clarities) whether ethics of public service were professional ethics alone (clearly included), ethics of service by public servants **or** grounded in society ethics and, if the latter, how public servants-political leaders-state interacted with society ethics. Broad agreement:
    - i. monistic religion = ethics unsound even if ethical position most Africans has religious base. (This related in part to potential for perverted capture of religion - e.g. the "apostate" Al Turabi's purported "jihad" in Sudan.);
    - ii. professional ethics largely application general ethics to particular contexts;
    - iii. state an unsuitable source for genuine ethical system even if - by example - it can strengthen or erode one;
    - iv. some asserted ethical principles need to be changed (on the whole meeting was distinctly anti chauvinist even if 65% male - in itself a shift from higher male %'s in past).
  - e. on the whole relatively optimistic - despite seeing systems of corruption, e.g. Nigeria, post Keita Mali (not clear whether suspended judgement on current regime), Uganda (See Annex) as on rise.
  - f. in general, "economic good housekeeping" was seen as a necessity (a rather boring one) but the IMF and Bank were also seen as unable to be of much use beyond that because they were obsessed with short term macro monetary aggregates inadequate either to give an in-depth picture of reality or to generate a forward dynamic. Ironically, the flag bearer for this theme - Uganda and Mali cited as examples - was the retired deputy head of IMF's Africa Division now running a domestic NGO in Mali!
  - g. while agreeing public service reform had to begin with deciding what state (including local government) should do how and when before proceeding to how many public servants with what kind of training on what remuneration scales and operating procedures were needed, most participants saw - the very good - presentation of Ghana's exercise on those lines as boring (perhaps because it is 8 years old and has 3 more to go before report may in part be implemented assuming it appears early 1997);

- h. repeated references to "decolonisation" and cultural/ethical conflicts in mailing suggested - wrongly as it turned out - a reversion to authenticity themes. In fact the view that state and ruler flying of authenticity/unique African values flag was "the last resort of a rogue" was a commoner perception and the idea of a separate conclusion on "decolonising public service" was rejected as redundant. Apart from a belief that seeing rights/responsibilities as inexorably interlocked twins was universal (which is not the classic European 'enlightenment' stance), the ethics/values as universal but in specific contexts and thus priorities/forms content of discussions must vary was quite different from 1960s Africanism (or cultural relativity thinking). The objection to importing doctrines and structures unadapted or keeping colonial models unexamined was pragmatic (if at times impassioned). This may have been because the 'foreign presence' was so low and while sharply critical of certain Africans and African contexts argued that Abacha and Rwanda no more defined African culture and polity than Adreotti and Bosnia did European. With no need to be defensive, the focus of how to go forward was often on what to uproot first.
- i. despite being critical of colonial (and pre-colonial) public services as elitist servants of rulers much of discussion envisaged highly elitist (in attitude) public services with public service to be the ethical leadership role and elected political leaders held to ethical principles and rational action by civil servants. (Elitist public servants as masters of rulers on behalf of participating broad strata of peoples).
4. **Study Seminar** preparations in hand (separate report to CS/SO).
5. **Ghana** is now a clear case of end of the line for structural adjustment as well as of fragility of gains unless a successor strategy (and a politically sexier one) building from it is crafted and sold convincingly. It is also an example of how hard it is to nurture viable multi party systems in soils where past efforts (3 in Ghana) have failed. The two **may** be interrelated.
6. The **political** scene in the pre-run-up to 1996 elections is moderately clear in broad lines if not in detail. The governing party and President Rawlings are likely to win again albeit not with broad enthusiasm by their voters. 1982-1995 has been better than any period since 1951-60 and is so perceived. The opposition parties (now including the junior pro-government party of 1992 election which - including inconveniently the Vice President - has gone into *de facto* opposition beside the lone independent elected in 1992 when opposition boycotted and the one by-election opposition winner). There is a desperate struggle to unify the three to five main opposition parties (2 heirs to the populist and public position for private gain elements of Nkrumahism and 1 or 2 to the elitist, business oriented, 'intellectual' traditions of the coastal elites and the - then - quasi feudal Akan opposition to Nkrumah). They are as substantively incompatible as ever - assuming any

substance beyond seeking power-post-profit. That all five can agree on a single Presidential candidate and non-competition sharing of parliamentary candidacies is unlikely. If it does not happen and no new leader emerges (present lot are rather shop-worn or pre-shelf soiled) Rawlings and Co. will win barring an economic debacle.

7. The press is free enough but as a communications marketplace it has limits. The two state owned papers are moderately sound, rather boring, not into investigative journalism (even of opponents) and moderately civil in language even if running one or two rather simplistic pro-government columns/features daily. The opposition press is hopelessly uncivil, inaccurate and - for different reasons - boring except to a true believer. Nothing in it can be taken as fact without checking and the separation of news from views is alien to it. This is in a sense ironic - the organs of supposedly intellectual and cultural elites being palpably a sewer drain press (and Accra's drainage sewers are very pungent indeed!).
8. The **registration** exercise for elections has been bungled. The commission seems independent enough but independently incompetent. The opposition is re-running the (almost certainly false) claim of 2 million "ghost" registrations from 1992 **and** claiming incompetence has thwarted large numbers of genuine voters citing **low** numbers registered and failure to extend deadline.
9. The **Constitution** is a well intentioned mess confusing basic rights, timing of achieving certain of them (universal access to basic services, livelihood, etc.) and plumbing (e.g. % allocations of budget by service which appear to add up to eliminate debt service and general administration/regulation plus perhaps police and defence!). This is hardly conducive to implementation. For example, access to airwaves is provided to be "on demand" for any frequency, location and power on payment of 80p. The Independent Media body set up to 'administer' (?) this is existing but non-functional. A Broadcasting Frequencies Board (set up under a probably repealed decree of General Acheampong's drafted to allow both favouritism and repression) is operating moderately intelligently with, a) allocation of stated frequencies, locations and power, b) some test of seriousness of applicant (not transparent) and, c) a £1,000 licence fee. To date private broadcasting and (re) televising is primarily by hiring Ghana Broadcasting Corporation transmission facilities. The access to GBC radio and TV provisions for electoral fairness will pose similar problems. The governing party will presumably propose 60% of time to itself and 40% divided among opposition on basis 1992 presidential vote. The opposition will pretty surely call for equal time for all parties (or perhaps divide with core 5 wanting 83.1/3rd% for them and 16.2/3rds% for government with newcomers and fringes frozen out). Equally if there is an opposition alliance (just possible) doubtless there will be claim that as parties remain each should have equal time. (If they merged - incredible - they might, just,

ask for 50-50 with all others frozen out.) How is this to be resolved is unclear in sense Constitution is at that point not detailed as to what constitutes fairness.

10. **Local government** consists of districts and cities (Constitutional Convention rejected concept of Regional Governments so these are branches of Ministries plus Regional Ministers only, even though they - not the local government units have personnel, experience, funds). Almost all are very weak with next to no professional personnel. Nominally they are responsible for primary health, education, roads, but in practice these are centre financed either out of Local Governments' constitutional 5% of budget or via direct central governments payments (e.g. wage bills). The post 1988 revival of local government which died in late 1960s has been slow except in a minority of rural districts where it is basically coordinated self-help campaigns. The new Principle Secretary is attempting to devise a strategy or strategic options for discussion with councils.

11. The government seems to have following 15 month economic programme:

- a. get inflation down to 20% by end of 1996 (45%-50% annual over past three months);
- b. halt vertiginous (110% annual rate last three months) fall in exchange rate - presumptively to 10% to 20% range;
- c. achieve a less disorderly round of labour negotiations and one concluded early (not as in 1995 in late November);
- d. run a tight budget (unlike 1992 when gross electoral year laxity led to restoring good housekeeping problems for at least two years and arguably to date).

Presumptively the 20:20 vision goals (an African Korea a bit marked down in per capita numbers) will be repackaged and refloated to add sex appeal to a programme which - at best - would restore a "feel good" and a "competent economic management" case to put to the electorate.

12. I **may** be doing a **consultancy** for Ministry of Finance. Basic purpose to help design/run in Economic Analysis and Policy Unit in Ministry of Finance. There is none now despite Finance being economic policy hub As key staff are overloaded (at \$90 a month competent ones tend to leave), neither medium term nor coordination are handled adequately. The initial task - assuming a February/March start-up would probably be articulating how on Para 11. (Yes - a re-election role **but** as Para 11 is re-election bid by improving economic management a proper public service role.) Have done memos on possible approach to unit and on policy packages relevant to Para 11. Slightly chaotic discussion with Junior Minister who apparently liked preliminary ideas so called in Bank

team who'd come to see him on something else to hear them. (Total deniability for him if he likes but also total ability to say he had a cautious, practicable package from a serious independent advisor.) We shall see.

RHG  
Falmer  
December 1, 1995

P.S. 1994/95 inflation triggered by low crop (with no "standby" facility from Congroup to attack supply side). Needless to say interest rate pressures did **not** help much. Probably also monetary (independent Bank of Ghana) laxity despite fiscal probity. Now expectational plus lumping of huge arrears on labour settlement. Exchange rate fall flowed from inflation but now rushing ahead of it. Basically recent post price (including \$ price) trends plus government's looking out of control (e.g. on labour negotiations especially with university where 30 week strike (on full pay and fringes!) ended in cave-in with Professor now paid 2 to 3 times Head of Civil Service - even if absolute \$300 a month is not unreasonable. Also botched VAT attempted introduction and non-transparent resignation of MF combine with run-up to election (and 1992 fiscal laxity) to create very strong inflationary/devaluatory expectations which are self-validating if widely believed in/acted upon.

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## Annex - Uganda (+ Rwanda)

Two Ugandans - one hard line Museveniite from Ankole, one senior Democratic Party member from Buganda. Interestingly first intelligently defensive but pretty subdued (quickly saw he was in setting disposed to be hostile); latter moderate but sharply critical and fairly optimistic. (He only quoted last half of Saro Wiwa's last words "...but the struggle continues".)

- 1. Constitution.** Rights sections (nominally binding) swear at Political Parties (legal so long as no public meetings, no meetings of over 20, no political statements, no endorsements of candidates) and emergency powers (Doctors told if strike again will be "treated like Amin" as seeking to undermine state. Attempted meeting of doctors leadership to discuss how to negotiate broken up at gun point) sections. Movement man denied none of this, merely mumbled there were special problems. Didn't even deny committee on political articles packed 63 of 65 (I think - all but 2 of large number) members Movement appointees. Cabinet now all but one Movement (MF is exception. Though Mayanja-Nkangi is hardly a technocrat he may be a "Vicar of Bray"). DP furious at claim it is (now) Catholic. As 45% of its MPs at last election were Catholic, 42% Anglican/Protestant, 13% Muslim it has a case; albeit it does have hierarchy's backing and points hard at selective non-appointment of Catholics (token VP then named at once!) and retirement of Catholic army officers.
  - DP intends to take political restrictions to court. May use Indian approach: a) rights provisions even if not justiciable as such do **bind** other legislation/policy; b) class actions proper. (I provided contact address to expert on this approach and its history.) A **very** DP approach. May have been 'bought out' - see below.
- 2. Bribery/Corruption/Transparency** - probably corruption falling - except in independent, high pay revenue service! - but still seen as too high. (Oddly Movement man more corruption problem raising.) Transparency nil - Movement man mildly queries evidence RPA **was** financed via state budget up to fall Kigali. Doesn't actually deny very firmly. DP man says it was **and is**. (From my Kigali mission I'm sceptical of "is" - not very adequately at any rate.) Both agree public inquiry or dialogue in Kampala on this cluster of issues **not on**.
  - Magistrates now get \$500 a month and High Court Judges \$5,000 a month! (Most independent of latter - perhaps 2 most independent - retired by government initiative.) Curious raise as Senior State Attorneys and Doctors \$90. Seen as buying up judiciary especially on political practice/constitutional issues - challenges by DP and rather looks

like it. Constitutional Assembly members said to have been paid over \$1 million each with \$0.3 million compensation in lieu of pension to follow!

3. **Elections.** Nominally next year. State House will endorse individual candidates. No other public endorsements lawful. Museveni to run for re-election. DP very keen it happens as it believes Movement unpopular and President's popularity waning. DP-UPC-KY (heirs of Kabaka Yeka, i.e. 'Federalists') plan to run Ssemogerere for President and have agreed 'privately' endorsed joint candidates. (DP agrees latter poses problems in Buganda.) Believe will win if: a) there actually is an election; b) there is not massive vote rigging. They **expect** delay in election and massive vote rigging. Movement man very quiet on **when** elections, insists will be free and fair with no problems unless 'illegal' endorsements.
4. **Poverty** - both agree still serious and that in general less so in respect to personal consumption than in 1986 but still much worse than in 1971. DP says increasing numbers unable to pay school and health fees and pauperised trying to do so. Implies this - plus desire to choose own leaders unmanipulated from State House Entebbe - behind rapidly falling popularity of President. (Freely admits he was popular and 1986 to - say - 1992 a good thing. Fears he now is determined to be President for life and **not** to be a second Kaunda or Buyoya - of Burundi - accepting free election and defeat. Hesitant to say what then - historically DP has never had a political killer instinct figuratively or literally.)
5. **Relationships** (partly based on older K and T sources).
  - **Kenya** very hostile. Not clear why. No real Uganda backing for opposition (and Kenya has no real insurrection danger whatever it may purport.) Allowing exiles to sit, to speak, perhaps to plot (if they have money) is a Kenya characteristic (*vide* initial position re Rwanda genocide indictees) more than either Uganda (less go there) or Tanzania (which is tight on speaking let alone plotting - except against Amin - and tries to send on to far away places). Result is swing of commercial and transit transport links to Tanzania which is happy to provide as it pays. (DP Ugandan on this - sees Kenya as hostile for no valid reason unless because it objects to Kampala influence in Kigali.)
  - **Tanzania** - pro-Museveni to date a best governance since 1970 in Uganda and desire for stable neighbour, for ability to mediate re Rwanda, dislike intervening (even verbally) in neighbours' affairs unless extreme case. (Did privately press multi party elections on Kaunda and Buyoya and openly condemn earlier genocide in Burundi and later in Rwanda, backed forcing out of coupsters and puppet King in Lesotho, with Zimbabwe, Botswana, probably Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho wanted Nigeria suspended **before** Saro-Wiwa



and associates executed so cautious more than passive or one of three monkeys who see-hear-say no evil. New President very much in this tradition.)

- **Donors** - suddenly disturbed at political (non) evolution in Uganda. Timing is a puzzle as CA was so clearly rigged that only way it might have gone multi party was donor pressure on President **before** Constitution written. USA, UK taking lead but Nordics, Netherlands, Germany also have pressed. Public rejection by President fairly mild, but total, private apparently very intemperate. (French said to have been wooing State House Entebbe since their elections. If so Jacques Foccart trying to cut out the Anglos and recover 'lost' Rwanda "toutes azimuths".) Crunch comes at next Consultative Group. (Bank so far very pro-Museveni.)
- 6. **Freedom discussion.** Clearly much greater than pre-1994. (DP man here and SS participants critical in public - not so at previous SS's, other conferences). Still limits - notably Rwanda policy, Budget transparency - and **action** (e.g. doctors' strike) very much not seen as "symbolic speech". Curious slow motion dance around Kabaka (where KY-DP seems to by winning and to be allowed to accompany him abroad) and the hereditary King of Ankole (whom Museveni refuses to recognise with result he is ever more firmly in DP orbit). For avoidance of doubt Ankole is an even older Kingdom than Buganda (*pace* the Movement) and indeed Museveni's start in politics (as Grace Ibingira's hatchet boy) was under the Ankole aristocracy's aegis.
- 7. **Rwanda 'sidelights'.** Uganda very defensive on who killed President Habayamira and what Uganda tried before backing invasion. (DP low key - doesn't want to be seen to approve of genocide nor to be seen as anti-Kigali but is not pro the current government of 10% [*sic*] of Rwandans.) On former, I no longer think Uganda was involved - extreme chauvinist Hutu using French soldats, whether freelance or other, per Belgian inquiry looks most credible. On the second, certainly President Museveni sought return of 1959/60 jacquerie exiles and families (about two-thirds born in Uganda) - say 750,000. Rwanda (Habayamira) counterproposed Uganda reverse policy and offer them citizenship if they stayed. Also counterproposed world accept 100,000 odd as individuals. Oddly asked Tanzania to accept 1,000,000 Rwanda emigrants (from Rwanda). What Uganda's position on return of/compensation for property losses of 1959/60 was (Tutsi did demand) is unclear - Rwanda rejected out of hand. Also unclear whether Rwanda's idea on Rwandans to Tanzania included the Uganda exiles. Habayamira was always prone to negotiate and to deliver something, but less than he appeared to promise. At last meeting he had apparently satisfied Uganda (who had asked for that particular meeting at that time and venue which some see as sinister albeit that seems slightly too conspiratorial) and Tanzania who expected progress to peace and reconciliation. If they were correct, the

"Mille Collines" gang (Committee for Defence of Revolution) had every reason to assassinate him for building them up as bargaining catspaw and being about to discard them. Tanzania felt pre-invasion talks were marked by intransigence on both Rwandan sides and by Uganda being too partisan. They apparently wanted: a) return as individuals/no compensation for - say - 200,000; b) citizenship in Uganda for rest (as Tanzania had related to its Rwandan and Burundian exiles). Rather sympathised with both exiles and Habayamira and hoped to get Uganda to agree to a saleable balanced package. (I doubt this was realistic either as to package or getting Uganda under M. to be a neutral mediator.) T is trying again in Cairo (oddly with President Nyerere co-convening but with low or no current government participation). This is partly self interest - peaceful neighbours (Burundi cannot survive another explosion in Rwanda) and departure voluntarily of refugees (T is too principled or proud to do a Zaire and does **not** believe truly voluntary return under present conditions can be achieved) and partly principle.

[This is a mix of sources - I am unclear how much of pre invasion proposals were public at the time.]