

**MAKING WHOLE AGAIN: Human Development
Consequences of Hosting Refugees in Kagera Region, Tanzania**

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We could not understand people
who were so violent to each other.
We had to call out the sungu-sungu
every night.

- Ngara Village Leader

The refugees ate all the maize while it
was still green. There was no seed. I have
gotten 10 tonnes from the Council of Churches.
Today I go to one village to see how Village
Executive Officer's distribution of 10 kilos
to each household is going.

- Diocese of Kagera,
Development Canon

To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

I.

HOSTING HOARDS ON THE FAR PERIPHERY: AN OVERVIEW

Ngara and Karagwe Districts in Tanzania's Kagera Region bordering Rwanda and Burundi are the far periphery - not only from Europe but also from Dar es Salaam. They are among Tanzania's most isolated, least known and lowest cash income districts although on nutrition and other social parameters they may rank in the middle third. Ngara in particular has had rapid population growth since the late 1960s because of the availability of relatively fertile land, less drought risk than for most of the Lake zone and improving access to water, sanitation, primary education and health care.

Since late 1993 the 500,000 odd residents of these two districts have hosted on the order of 900,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees. The first Burundian wave returned home when conditions became less fraught at home but were almost instantly succeeded by the Rwandan

tidal wave following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, the politico-ethnic genocide which ensued and the inexorable advance of the invading (since 1990) forces of the Rwanda Patriotic Front who became the country's rulers by July. As of Lent 1995, the Rwandan and renewed Burundian refugee total was well over 600,000 with arrivals over the last six months of 50 to 2,000 a day (many wounded) outstripping voluntary official and unofficial returns averaging perhaps 25 a day. In late March, Tanzania felt compelled to shut its borders against up to 200,000 more Rwandan refugees seeking to flee from refugee camps in Burundi because it had no assurances food would be forthcoming even for those already in Tanzania.

The refugees are housed in several huge camps - the largest, Bonaco, near the Rusomo Falls bridge to Rwanda, nearly 250,000. One very small (1,400) camp attests to the intense ethnic cleavage in Rwanda. All members of 'mixed' Hutu-Tutsi refugee families are there. Both the number - under one-quarter per cent of all refugees - and the need to isolate (and guard - not always 100% successfully) them, speak for themselves.

This paper's central concern is not the camps nor the refugees but the impact on Ngarans (outnumbered two to one by refugees) and Karagweans (with about the inverse ratio).

The impact falls into three groupings: the initial tidal wave influx; the cash income access nexus and the environmental costs. The first and last are virtually totally negative; the second with large (relative to District cash income) plusses and minuses probably cross-cancelling at macro level but in ways shifting and increasing inequality of income distribution.

The initial impact was one of terror, death stalked Rwanda and until the deployment of Tanzanian troops and reinforcement of police, there was great fear it would cross the corpse-clogged Kagera River, the scrub field land boundary with Rwanda, or the road median and hill crest line with Burundi.

Beyond terror (and terrorising by their violent behaviour to each other, though rarely to Tanzanians), the refugees acted in ways analogous to a horde of locusts. Hungry, they bought, bartered or took maize, plantains, beans and cassava. Needing to cook, they swept up text books, school furniture and church benches. Camping in huge numbers, they damaged tree and field crops. With a different sanitary tradition, they filled village latrines (near universal in most of Ngara) and fouled hillsides and water sources. Ill and suffering from exhaustion, they used up dispensaries' modest drug stocks.

The total costs look low - slightly over \$1 million (see Table 1) for 100 border and transit villages or \$10,000 per village. Set against perhaps \$500 to \$750 weekly total combined cash incomes of residents of most villages and the slender resources of local government and of

both the local and the national social sector (in these Districts primarily Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran Churches, co-operative societies and the women's groups relating to the child nutrition-health-local initiatives programme) those sums acquire Kilimanjaroese dimensions.

The cash income loss/gain in 1994-5 is of the order of \$5 million probably with a small net positive balance. Those hired by and those selling to refugee support bodies and those selling to refugees (especially plantains, banana beer, poles and firewood) may have earned \$5,500,000. Market access loss (transport system damage/delay, loss of Kigali market) were at least \$3,500,000. Added to initial costs and medical services diversion the 'cash' cost appears to have been about \$5,000,000.

The most serious - and hardest to estimate - cost cluster is environmental degradation. Its initial form is added workload (on women and girls) to go further to collect food and water. While concentrated around camps, this was probably running at 20,000 odd woman years per annum by the end of 1994 (an average of an hour and a half per household per day). It will worsen so long as refugees remain (and the circles of tree-bush stripped land around the camps grows). Only five years after their departure - the probable time to restore wood balance - can it be abated significantly. The longer the period of stress the greater the erosion and other land degradation refugee related costs, which despite rapid population growth after 1961 were still low in 1994-5.

How to make whole again is conceptually simple. Modest resource injections would complement village, local government, domestic social sector initiatives to reverse initial damage. The market access renewal basically requires District and Regional trunk road renewal and completion of the Burundi border-Rusomo Falls link highway (delayed by contractor diversion to refugee camps). The ecological/environmental issues require at least five year tree establishment/farm systems strengthening programmes. In sum, the five year cost would be likely to be under \$35 million (\$70 per resident but under one-fifth of the estimated 1994-95 refugee support bill).

Until late 1994 when initiatives by the Tanzania Prime Minister's Office, the Dutch Government and UNICEF, began to analyse and present the 'host district problem' little attention and less resources had gone to Ngarans and Karagweans beyond up to \$10 million Tanzanian security spending and \$1 million replacement drug and medical personnel support. The March 1994 special Consultative Group expressed understanding of the problem - as presented to it along the lines set out here - but what follow-up flows there may be is unclear especially in respect to roads.

TABLE 1
REFUGEE COSTS - 1994
(\$ - 1994 prices)

1. Initial Village Impact	1,170,000
2. Transport Cost - Lost Sales and Higher Haulage	3,500,000
3. Medical Services Diversion	125,000
4. Fuel and Water Additional Workload	4,875,000
5. Agriculture: Land Loss and Degradation	250,000
Total Costs	\$9,920,000
6. Employment by/Sales to Refugee Servers	2,000,000
7. Sales to Refugees	3,500,000
Total Gains	\$5,500,000

(Summarised from Table 4)

TABLE 2
PROGRAMME COST: 1995-1999
(\$000 at 1994 Prices)

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
A	Initial Village Impact Reversal	750	-	-	-	-	750
B	Transport Rehabilitation	7,800	6,000	4,750	1,500	-	20,050
C	Health	375	225	200	200	200	1,200
D	Water	275	475	350	-	-	1,100
E	Forestry/Agro-Forestry	870	1,775	1,750	1,000	250	5,645
F	Agricultural Sustainability and Enhancement	145	315	315	325	325	1,425
G	Local Governance and Police	1,630	120	115	10	-	1,875
	Total	11,845	8,910	7,480	3,035	775	32,045

(Summarised from Table 5)

II.

PRELUDE TO NEAR DISASTER

Burundi, Rwanda, Kagera and Ankole (in Uganda) were, from the end of the 15th Century, kingdoms ruled by an invading pastoral minority from the north exercising broadly feudal rule over a cultivating majority whom they had conquered. The dominant Tutsi tended to be tall and thin; the majority Hutu short and stocky. Relations among the communities varied and by the end of the 19th Century the sharpness of cleavages had probably begun to decline, as had the Norman-Saxon cleavage in England by 1450. After 1915, Belgian rule in Burundi and Rwanda - for complex reasons - greatly exacerbated division and conflict, while British - and even more independent Tanzanian - virtually remade Kagera society in the sense of creating both national and regional identities outweighing Hutu/Tutsi cleavages. Ankole was and is intermediate with highly ethnic social and political dynamics but not violence.

From independence in 1960 both Rwanda and Burundi have been wracked by ethnic conflict up to and including the level of genocide. In Rwanda a Hutu (85%) jacquerie ousted the Tutsi elite (and kingship) in 1960-61 with over 300,000 fleeing to Tanzania and Uganda where by 1990 their numbers had grown to the order of at least 750,000. Further, refugee waves probably raised the total external Rwanda Tutsi population as of 1994 to significantly over 1,000,000. Most not in Tanzania returned after July 1994 - up to 750,000 projecting late 1994 Rwanda government statements. Until 1990, Rwanda was a relatively stable state with mild to moderate repression of Tutsi plus occasional pogroms. In Burundi, the Tutsi minority (15%) held on to power until 1993. It did so at the price of iron repression and smashing of risings or purported risings - with at least one period of genocide in the early 1970s and a total 1970s loss of the order of 750,000 lives.

Rwandan refugees in Tanzania were largely integrated into villages of their own - mostly outside Kagera Region for security reasons - and secondarily in urban society. By naturalisation and by birth in Tanzania the vast majority are now citizens and only about 6% seem to have returned to Rwanda since the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) restored Tutsi hegemony.

Rwandan refugees in Uganda were largely penned in camps and denied citizenship growing hatred, not food and building plots, and not new lives. Repeated re-invasion threats destabilised Rwanda to a point and worsened the position of Tutsi's there but were never near succeeding. In early 1980 up to 15,000 Rwandans rallied to the cause of Yuweri Museveni (by descent of the Rwandan blood royal) and were the core of the army that won the Uganda civil war for him in 1986. Regrouped as the RPF they invaded their sometime homeland in 1990. French intervention then and two subsequent, Tanzanian, led compromise peace

initiatives had by March 1994 led to either the verge of an agreed coalition of Hutu mainline parties - Hutu minority (or moderate) and mixed parties - the RPF, or alternatively to a hard-line Hutu backlash. When the presidential plane was shot down when landing at Kigali after an - apparently successful - peace negotiating meeting violence was rapidly succeeded by systematic hard-line Hutu leadership genocide against 'moderate' Hutu (perhaps 150,000) and Tutsi (perhaps 350,000). Present Rwanda population estimates of up to 6,000,000 strongly suggest the 1,000,000 headline estimate of death, is not (or not yet) correct but in no way mitigate the horror of the 1994 Rwanda holocaust. Inevitably, the RPF responded by completing its delayed conquest. While the UN transitional force - the strongest in Kigali - could probably have averted both, it chose to see to its own security and passively stood by. This scenario of disaster led to the April-June refugee tidal wave and subsequent flows as well as to the continued insecurity plus numerous acts of Tutsi vengeance and 'repossession' of 1959-60 'lost property' (by no means self-evidently even covert let alone overt RPF policy) have guaranteed its continuation to date.

The record of the RPF administration in Rwanda during its first year and the continued training of Interahamwe and ex-Army Tutsi exiles in Zaire and elsewhere do not auger well for a transition to peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, to stability in Burundi or to voluntary return of refugees. With official and unofficial detainees already over 50,000 and rising; deaths from disease of detainees about 100 a week; no rapid "truth" or trial process probable; returned displaced Hutu subject to abuse and 'disappearance' and the government closing displaced camps by force (including a near-genocidal sustained killing spree in one case), Rwanda is neither peaceful nor stable despite partial economic and government service restoration. This interacts with the grim message of the hard line Hutu who control the refugees - "Gun in hand we left our country. Gun in hand we shall return." - to make large scale voluntary return in the currently foreseeable future totally impracticable as well as totally implausible.

Burundi's last Tutsi dominated military government moved toward reconciliation and free and fair elections over 1991-92. The elections were won by a Hutu party and the Tutsi elite supported the installation of its elected presidential candidate early in 1993. A lower level officer coup murdered him, touched off cross killings and created total disorder for several months leading to the 1993 Burundian exodus to Ngara (and also Kigoma) reversed early in 1994 when a new president took office. His death in the 1994 Kigali plane shooting down seriously destabilised Burundi but, to date, a desire to live together rather than die at each others' hands has - barely - averted full scale inter communal warfare though not recurrent bloody clashes in areas including the governorship adjacent to Ngara.

Tanzania - and Ngarans in particular - fear new rounds of conflict in Rwanda and a descent into anarchic violence in Burundi. They believe TPDF, about 5,000 in late 1994 but probably reinforced in March 1995 to upgrade Burundi border security troops can continue to deter spillover fighting and prevent 'return' raids by refugees but know any full scale war with mass killing would bring uncontrollable tidal waves of refugees and radically reduce already problematic prospects of return for those now in Kagera Region.

III.

Tanzania by June 1995 was hosting up to 750,000 Rwandan refugees - almost all in Ngara and Karagwe Districts. From March, the always potential danger of the international food pipeline running dry had become alarmingly high. For both humanitarian and security reasons Tanzania banned ration cuts from 400 to 160 grams (literally starvation rations). But while it could probably physically supply 300 tonnes of grain and beans a day it could not cover the \$75,000 plus per day cost if the pipeline to WFP ran dry.

Further, promises made in 1994 to hold camps to 25,000 and to move the bulk of the refugees outside Kagera Region were not being met. Bonaco had risen to 250,000 while nobody had been relocated. The Tanzanian proposals to the March 1995 Consultative Group in Paris (along the lines of those in this paper) had been sympathetically received, and a laudatory statement on Tanzania as host inserted in its communiqué; but, how many funds would flow when, remained unclear.

Further, as the likelihood of return dimmed, the need to relocate became ever more urgent if ecological (and potentially security) catastrophes were to be averted. As a result, in March 1995 Tanzania temporarily closed its border to Rwandan refugees in Burundi seeking to flee again in the face of rising conflict there. The prospect of up to 150,000 more refugees with no bankable guarantees of receiving international food support and no foreseeable timetable for their return had become unacceptable.

IV.

APRIL-JUNE 1995 FEAR AND DISORDER

Rather luckily, late 1993 had seen a build-up of Tanzanian and international refugee support (and security) capacity in respect to Burundian refugees. Literally on the eve of this being

wound down, the vedettes of the Hutu exodus poured across the Rusomo Falls bridge, river crossing points and the land frontier.

Despite the partial preparation the first weeks were marked by fear, insecurity (at least as to property) and chaos for Tanzanians - as well as for refugees. It was over this period that virtually the entire maize crop of up to 100 villages was eaten green (leaving no seed to plant) and substantial inroads made into plantains (luckily renewable) and root crops (much less so). In addition, school and church furniture and textbooks went to light cooking fires, latrines were prematurely filled up, hillsides and water supplies fouled. Camps damaged some crops and buildings and herds did the same (until mostly sold to Tanzanians). Initially medical posts had their shelves swept bare of drugs.

However, the greatest impact was fear. Refugees did not - with rare individual exceptions - attack Tanzanians. But with the Kagera River clogged with corpses and refugees chopping each other in nightly drunken brawls, the fear of the outnumbered villagers was realistic as well as real. By September the fear had receded primarily because 5,000 Tanzanian troops had been publicly though unobtrusively deployed and perhaps 500 police reinforcements sent at an initial year cost of perhaps \$10 million and a continuing one of half as much.

Effective transit camps and transport now whisk refugee arrivals to camps within 48 hours. The initial wave - with perhaps 3,000 special exceptions - are all safely (as perceived by villagers) in camps. The exceptions are close relatives. In some cases their citizenship is probably speculative and in most, Tanzanians have stayed with them in Rwanda (or Burundi) in the aftermath of general drought or particular household disasters. The villagers' distinction is clear - refugees are unwanted but these are family and by now are probably engaged in expanding kibanjas, maintaining houses, restoring latrines.

What has not happened - except for drug supply (UNICEF initiative) and, in part, maize seed (domestic church initiative) - is restoration of initial losses. Village efforts have been limited by lack of cash. The Sh 150,000 odd to dig, provide pole platforms over and build superstructures for the 10 latrines needed by a 750 to 1,250 person village may be only \$300 but it can also be more than villagers' total weekly cash income. The District Councils have no funds reallocable to replace textbooks or furniture or for cleansing springs and wells.

Why foreign NGOs (except Caritas and its supplying NGOs via the Catholic Church, to a degree the Red Cross via the new Tanzanian Red Cross Chapter in Ngara and - in future intent - Oxfam) have not responded is unclear as is the lack of bilateral donor local project funds utilisation for programmes well within their scope. Perhaps the agglomeration of these tiny 'projects' and the much larger infrastructural ones in the 1994 Prime Minister's Office *Assessment Report* resulted in the whole going into 'Head Office' baskets, a procedure starkly

ill-designed to handle urgent, small cases. Whether a UNICEF initiative for local meetings of resident foreign NGOs and bilateral donors with village, district and regional governmental and social sector bodies launched at the end of 1994 is - distressingly belatedly - yielding results remains to be seen.

V.

CASH BALANCE, WORK OVERLOAD, CAPITAL DEPLETION

Those three terms sum up the short term refugee impact. So long as the refugees remain, cash income gains are likely to equal or slightly outweigh losses. In principle the losses could be redressed, leaving net cash gains once market access had been regained.

The work overload aspect is quite different - large, negative, growing so long as the refugees remain and substantial for at least five years after they leave. It flows from the increased distance necessary to go to collect wood and water with a doubling of population. That is already of the order of one and half hours per household per day (substantially more near the refugee camps) and can be expected to rise perhaps on how a year, partly depending on whether present water table depletion is local, within a fragmented aquifer system, or more general.

Evaluating 18,500 woman years - women and girls are responsible for household fuelling and watering - in money terms is hard. \$250 a year may be reasonable. This is the minimum wage which is well below what most adults earn (in wages or own production). How it will impinge is less clear. More work? Less or lower quality food production? Less home care? Reduced child care? Loss of time for secondary earning activities? A combination of the above? Probably the last.

The capital depletion is also basically environmental even if the most immediately visible aspect is the destruction of most District roads and the Regional Kigoma-Kyaka-Karagwe-Kasulu secondary highway backbone, and delay in completion of the Kasulu-Ngara-Burundi border highway because the contractor has been diverted to camp construction. \$20 million could restore/complete (actually to a better standard than the partly run down 1993 position) and also build in District and Regional maintenance capacity. The environmental capital cost of continued water and wood balance tipping will be larger and both more costly/longer term and more problematic to reverse. However, because its success is dependent on rural household initiatives its actual cash cost can be substantially lower.

Netherlands and DTZ (German) programmes on sustainable/improved tree crop, field crop, livestock farming and tree renewal look promising but will take time. After several false starts (luckily not in Ngora so that potential user views there are not prejudiced by them) the technical side of the former seems to be sound and to require primarily use of best Tanzanian practice with limited purchased inputs. Tree planting - in fields, around homesteads as village groves is traditional. Nurseries and - for hill slopes - a WFP project (if a suitable commodity with low 'wage earner monetisation' costs such as sugar or vegetable oil can be identified or wheat sold in urban areas and cash wages paid) plus some cooking technology improvement (pioneered elsewhere in Tanzania with DTZ backing) appear to be a viable package. But the time span is five years after refugees leave for trees to reach usable branch supply stage.

Food security, nutrition and primary health care have not been stressed because - counter-intuitively - none is likely to be a major medium term cost of hosting refugees. For the staple food (of Ngarans and Rwandans) - plantains - supply is expandable (and new kibanjias are being established). For 1995, cassava-potatoes-beans and thereafter cassava-maize-beans-potatoes are adequate to bridge the no plantain period unless rains are late or bad (as appears not to be the 1995 case).

The Nutrition Centre-Agriculture-Health-Local Government-UNICEF-Community Women's Group alliance for improved child nutrition has, if anything, been stimulated by response to crisis. Primary and hospital primary health care burdens of refugees have been, and appear likely to continue to be, offset.

Two dangers exist: an epidemic exploding in and escaping from the camps (or a rainy season runoff of dried excrement with the same impact) or a substantial worsening of domestic or border security.

The first is real but - except for the sanitation side - containable. Epidemics have to date been stamped out in their early stages and the medical structures (including Rwandan in camp personnel) for averting them are strengthening. The polluted runoff problem is imponderable - heavy initial rains may have reduced risks.

Petty property crimes and, much less frequently, low level personal violence have risen outside the camps. Whether Rwandans are directly or indirectly - via the troubling context and the example of the camps by night - responsible, is unclear. Ngarans believe they are. A cross-border security problem is unlikely so long as the TPDF remains in place. Neither any neighbouring army nor the ex-rump regime leaders in the camps would wish to take it on. Similarly, violence bursting out of the camps is unlikely because the Rwandans fear the Tanzanian army and police. "But no foreigners were injured, no Tanzanians were attacked" is the revealing answer to complaints about lack of refugee personal security at night.

That said, the government shares Ngarans' security concerns. It is well aware the camp leaders are hard core Hutu chauvinists. While it has confiscated almost all guns, the same cannot be said for pangas (cutlasses) which are needed to build and to cut firewood. Further, while it can prevent large scale drilling by day, it cannot totally eliminate it at dusk and dawn. However, its greater concerns are of spill-over violence and/or of even more massive refugee flows if violence in Burundi escalates to state disintegration and/or the exiles reinvade Rwanda from Zaire. While it would wish to segregate the hard line leadership (perhaps 500) it views this as possible without a blood bath only within a concentration dynamic.

Income distribution impact (see Tables 3 and 4) is mixed and uncertain. Price rises and falls are complex (and must be seen against 30% general annual inflation in Tanzania). On the face of it government employees are clear losers and NGO/Agency hires clear gainers. The Commercial sector are clear gainers. Farmers are gainers if - and only if - loss of cash bean sales has been offset by sale of plantains, banana beer and/or wood for fuel or house poles. Women are net losers for the work overload reasons cited earlier.

Assuming that no new catastrophes occur and 90% of the refugees leave Kagera (whether home or to new village homes elsewhere in Tanzania) by the end of 1995 - a target formally endorsed by the key agencies and donors involved, but on which no progress was made through April - the expenditure of about \$33 million budgetary resources over five years (about half the loss Ngarans and Karagweans will endure over that period) should allow the people of the two Districts to make themselves whole again. Evidently pure replication of 1993 is unlikely and, if successful, the agricultural and silvicultural initiatives would create a more sustainable trend as would those in primary health care and nutrition.

TABLE 3
REFUGEES AND PRICES: NGARA 1994
(TShillings)

Item	January (Pre Refugee)	June	September
1. Beans (kilo)	200	200	350 ¹
2. Maize meal (kilo)	250	300	400
3. Plantain (plate)	350	400	400
4. Plantain (20 kg stalk)	700-900	2,000	2,500-3,000 ²
5. Potatoes (leg)	120	300	350 ²
6. Meal (guest house)	300	400	500
7. Sugar (kg)	350	500	500 ¹
8. Onions (kg)	250-300	400-450	500 ²
9. Eggs (dozen)	30	60-70	80 ²
10. Banana Beer (litre)	50	30 ³	100 ²
11. Banana Beer Kasulo Camp (20 litre)	-	4,000	4,500
12. Blankets	7,000	1,000	1,200 ¹
13. Cattle	60,000	5,000 ⁴	40,000 ¹
14. Goat	4,000	3,000 ⁴	4,000-6,500 ²
15. Beer (Primus)	350	500	600 ²
16. Firewood (3 pieces)	10	15-40	20-50 ²
17. Building Pole (piece)	110	150	150
18. Charcoal (sack)	800	1,500-1,800	1,500 ²

Notes:

- 1 Well below typical rural price.
- 2 Well above typical rural price.
- 3 Peak banana harvest season.
- 4 Peak refugee sales.

Sources: District Officers, Ngara traders, rural customers - September, 1994.

TABLE 4

A. 1994-5 REFUGEE COSTS¹: NGARA PLUS KARAGWE

1. Initial Village Impact	
a. Food and Seed	\$1,050,000
b. Damages - Schools, latrines, etc.	\$100,000
c. Drugs Used	\$20,000
2. Transport Cost - Road and Market Loss	
a. Lost Sales	\$3,000,000
b. Higher Costs	\$500,000
3. Medical Services	
Net Diversion of Services	\$125,000
4. Fuel and Water	
Workload (at \$250/women, year)	\$4,875,000
5. Agricultural Production	
Land Loss and Degradation	\$250,000
Total	\$9,920,000

B. 1994-5 REFUGEE RELATED INCOME GAINS

1. Salaries from Agencies	\$500,000
2. Sales of Bananas	\$3,000,000
3. Other Sales to Refugees	\$500,000
4. Sales of Local Goods, Services Plus Trade Margins to Expatriates	\$1,500,000
Total	\$5,500,000

Note: ¹ Excludes Security expenditure, probably of the order of \$10,000,000 in 1994-5.

TABLE 5

PROGRAMME COSTS: 1994-1999
(\$000)

		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
A	<u>Initial Village Impact Reversal</u> ¹	750	-	-	-	-	750
B	<u>Transport Rehabilitation</u>						
	Emergency ²	4,800	-	-	-	-	4,800
	Highway Completion	(3)	-	-	-	-	(3)
	District Roads	2,000	3,000	3,500	-	-	8,500
	Kasulo - Kvaka	1,000	3,000	1,250	(1,500) ⁴	-	(6,750) ⁴
	Sub Total	7,800	6,000	4,750	(1,500)	(-)	(20,050) ⁴
C	<u>Health</u> ¹						
	Primary Health Care	250 ⁵	100	100	100	100	650
	CSDP	100	100	100	100	100	500
	Tanzania Red Cross	25	25	-	-	-	50
	Sub Total	375	225	200	200	200	1,200
D	<u>Water</u> ¹						
	Camp Use Offset	100	-	-	-	-	100
	Rehabilitation/Cleansing	25	125	-	-	-	150
	Additional Wells	150	350	350	-	-	850
	Sub Total	275	475	350	-	-	1,100
E	<u>Forestry/Agro-Forestry</u>						
	Initial Actions ²	95	-	-	-	-	95
	Fuel Efficiency	25	25	-	-	-	50
	Seedling/Agro-Forestry	-	250	250	250	250	1,000
	Protection Planting (e.g. WFP)	750	1,500	1,500	750	-	4,500
	Sub Total	870	1,775	1,750	1,000	250	5,645
F	<u>Agricultural Sustainability and Enhancement</u> ⁶						
	Core Programme	100	250	250	250	250	1,100
	Coffee	20	40	40	50	50	200
	Rural Technology	25	25	25	25	25	125
	Sub Total	145	315	315	325	325	1,425
G	<u>Local Government and Police</u>						
	Initial ²	675	-	-	-	-	675
	Police	700	100	100	-	-	900
	Police Post	150	-	-	-	-	150
	Allowances	50	-	-	-	-	50
	Rehabilitation/Equipment	30	-	-	-	-	30
	Recurrent	25	20	15	10	-	70
	Sub Total	1,630	120	115	10	-	1,875
	Total ⁹	11,845	8,910	7,480	3,035	775	32,045

Notes:

- 1 Includes *Assessment Report* items somewhat reorganised and expanded.
- 2 Direct from *Assessment Report*.
- 3 Presumed to be already funded by EU.
- 4 Regional Works equipment parks for maintenance if road constructed by contractor.
- 5 Includes Rural Health Centre at Kasulo.
- 6 Very hypothetical order of magnitude guidelines.
- 7 Additional officers for 1994 and 1995 in 1995.

- 8 Service allowances for 1994 and 1995 (assumes 50,000 refugees by end 1995).
- 9 Does not include salaries and related expenses of any full time expatriates. These would cost about \$150,000 - \$175,000 per person year. It is not evident that - outside of perhaps agriculture and forestry - any need for additional full time expatriates arises within the proposals.

VI.

IN THE LONG RUN ...

Whether the long run builds from a restored base or spirals downward out of control depends primarily on four factors:

1. rapid refugee resettlement outside Kagera Region;
2. adequate and sustained donor support for the funding needs outlined in Table 5 (and for refugee support which came into serious question by early 1995) and Tanzanian provision of army and police security forces indefinitely (i.e. until both Burundi and Rwanda are clearly stable);
3. general economic and public service recovery in Tanzania;
4. no massive new catastrophes in Rwanda or Burundi (which would of course prevent No. 1).

The last is beyond the scope of the present paper but seems a little better than 50-50 probability. The second will be clearer when interim and full Consultative Group pledges for 1995 are known. Barring total failure on the third front, the Tanzanian security shield provision will occur.

Everybody is agreed the refugees should leave Kagera soon. Everybody is agreed their voluntary return to Rwanda is optimal. That, however, is a dangerously Panglossian view if taken to mean the absence of very major problems.

The refugees will not return to Rwanda voluntarily under present or readily foreseeable circumstances. So long as the dead boat brings in a daily haul from the Kagera and wounded refugees continue to arrive, rumours (some at least true) of persecution of innocent Hutu and attempts to recreate 1959 social and ownership patterns flow in, the threat of unending less than impartial trials of scores of thousands for genocide remains (and over 250 suspects die each month in prison), the RPF is unable to establish law, order, or full basic service restoration as well as a credible non-communal face (to replace what seems to many to be a Tutsi returnee face ornamented with moderate Hutu), so long will voluntary repatriation be minimal. Optimistically that suggests until 1998 or 2000.

In that case resettlement elsewhere in Tanzania in villages where food can be grown and new lives built is the least bad alternative. Tanzania is not enthusiastic. Refugees in large numbers are, at least initially, not popular neighbours unless relatives, and 1995 is an election year. But Tanzania would not refuse and has virtually (if not openly to date) accepted that mass 1995

voluntary return is not on. For security reasons (and its happy experience with 1959-60 refugees) it certainly would prefer 4,000 person villages to 100,000 person camps. Indeed in 1994 it thought it had international commitment to camps of not over 25,000 each and at least four-fifths outside Kagera.

UNHCR apparently agrees early large scale voluntary return is unlikely and - at least at field level - that villages are better than camps. However, donors are certain, at best, to gulp and perhaps to balk at the roughly \$250 million bill for resettlement in villages and Tanzania to meditate on the probable permanent 'acquisition' of most of the refugees (again on 1959-60 experience) when good land is now relatively scarce in many parts of the country.

To that there are no easy answers - or rather the easy answers that more funding of prevention in Rwanda and a less self-serving UN force reaction after the assassinations would have saved hundreds of millions of dollars as well as hundreds of thousands of lives, do not help Ngarans or Karagweans (or donors) now nor offer much help in outlining how to avert future crises.

ANNEX

NGARA: ECONOMY, POLITY, GOVERNANCE ON THE PERIPHERY

Ngara District is literally on the periphery of Tanzania adjoining both Burundi and Rwanda but with very difficult access to the Regional city of Bukoba and the rest of West Lake Region, to the Lake Zone metropolis of Mwanza and especially to the capital Dar es Salaam which is two days hard drive away. Until 25 years ago it was almost unpopulated. Even rapid growth from the 1970s has left the estimated 1993 population under 200,000 (at least 85% rural in villages and perhaps 15% in small towns - Ngara and Rulenge). Distance and lack of access have made it a poor district, at least in terms of cash income. Physical and psychological distance from the capital mean it is less well provided with public services than average. While Christian medical services are relatively strong, Christian secondary schools are not.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

Agriculturally Ngara has no absolute land shortage, albeit much of the land is of medium to low potential and/or subject to erosion because of the pattern of high hills and relatively steep valley slopes. It has above typical Tanzanian rainfall in normal years (over one metre) but is subject to droughts with 1993-94 having been a moderate drought year but 1994-95 relatively good. The core of agriculture is the banana (especially plantain) crop grown in arduously prepared kibanjas, followed by root crops (sweet and Irish potatoes with cassava as a drought security fallback), beans and - at some distance - coffee. There is a substantial livestock component - basically cattle - in the agricultural sector; a component which is symbiotic with crops because manure is integral to kibanja establishment and maintenance.

Agricultural sustainability problems have been growing over the past decade. Continuous use of kibanjas (combined with burning leaves not using them as mulch as - e.g. - in the Kilimanjaro/Arusha zone) has reduced soil fertility and resistance to nematodes and weevils. Increased herds and continued grass and post harvest stalk burning have increased erosion as has the gradual reduction of tree and bush cover in the face of rising fuel and building material needs and the absence of systematic replanting. However, attainable shifts in farming systems would appear adequate to restore balance in both soil fertility and land cover.

Except in drought years food security is probably relatively good. It appears likely that at least 90% of households can and do grow their own basic food supply and most of the others engage in some food growing and/or have close family links with those who do. As a result local staple food sales are very low even in Ngara town. Under Five malnutrition has been moderately above the national average but not among the highest. It is now declining under

the influence of the nutrition-health-women's initiative programme. Growing population and increasing erosion/soil degradation may have been putting this relatively satisfactory position at risk; continued presence of 350,000 to 400,000 refugees certainly will have that result.

A low proportion of agricultural output is commercialised because of limited district demand and poor access to more distant markets - except Kigali. Ngara market is notable for the limited amount of district produced food (except for the adjacent butcher's shop) even though it is relatively well supplied with basic consumer goods (e.g. textiles, shoes, pots-pans-jars) as well as spices-cooking oil-sugar-tea. The two main cash crops are coffee (declining at least until very recently) and beans. Coffee procurement by the Kagera Cooperative Union was late and desultory resulting in smuggling to Rwanda and Burundi and, with low prices in much of the 1980s and 1990s, falling production. Beans came to be the dominant cash crop (in addition to their long-standing role as a basic food crop) in the 1980s (perhaps 2,500-4,000 tonnes and \$2.5 to \$4 million by early 1990s) with sales primarily to Rwanda and secondarily to Burundi. As of 1994 the coffee price had improved and a District Co-operative had been formed, selling - initially - direct to Tanica (the Bukoba instant coffee company). Beans sales - and prices - had collapsed with the loss of the Rwanda and crippling of the Burundi markets plus a local glut from refugees trading beans for plantations, banana beer and potatoes which raised markets and prices for these crops. Only completion of the Ngara-Kasulo highway link can make more distant bean sales in Tanzania in normal years viable despite the relatively strong national urban market demand. It would also improve access to the Burundi market.

Reinforcement of food security and overall sustainable agricultural output will take time - both knowledge and personnel are currently limited - but appear practicable. As noted in the case of mulching, district practices (both in respect to banana and coffee) are well below best Tanzanian rural practice. Systematic household and village tree replanting, like use of banana leaves and other agricultural by-products for supplementing grazing for cattle in more densely populated areas, have yet to be promoted.

POVERTY - EXTREME OR OVERSTATED?

Kagera Region is poor but how poor is controversial. On some studies it ranks 19 of 20 mainland Tanzania and in some at the bottom of the top third. In part this may reflect the relative absence of upper middle or high income households, which lowers the average but also the share of the population in absolute poverty. Comparisons are difficult because household self-provisioning is valued at local prices which are perhaps a third of those in main urban areas which distorts any welfare test (a kilo of beans or plantains is worth as much for

food security or basic needs satisfaction if consumed in a Ngara village as in Kariakoo ward of Dar es Salaam!).

Ngara villages and Ngara town are poor but do not appear notably so by rural Tanzanian or rural African standards. Malnutrition does not stare the observer in the face; the town market has supplies (and customers) suggesting that goods beyond food are affordable to many; the houses (basically pole plastered with mud and thatched) are not hovels, albeit local brick production to date appears to be limited and technologically weak by rural Tanzanian standards. In the town and at the market most adults wear sandals or plastic shoes although in villages and among children the proportion decline sharply (20% at a village primary school) - about the same as suburban Blantyre and above rural Malawian or peripheral rural Ghanaian levels.

PUBLIC SERVICES - COPING AND CUTTING

Public services exist at levels above those typical in peripheral (and some not so peripheral) rural African districts. However, they are clearly under severe pressure. That is a general Tanzanian phenomenon because the 1979-1983 decline in output per capita fell mainly on savings and public services while personal consumption per capita stagnated but - especially in most rural areas - did not fall dramatically and the 1984-93 recovery has gone largely to personal consumption and only secondarily to restoring public services (or savings).

Primary schools, hospitals (3) and dispensaries exist and function. District technical posts are filled - most with competent, hard working officers. However, agricultural extension, water and works (roads/public buildings) are not funded to levels adequate to maintain existing levels, let alone snap back after crises. The weakness of government services has been escalated by the low cash income (limiting community contributions) and the relative absence of other outside support (the Catholic Diocese and Caritas, the Anglican Diocese and the Tanzanian Christian Council plus UNICEF, and, more recently, AMREF, GTZ and Netherlands aid being the exceptions cited).

As with agriculture and food security the pre-refugee situation was unsatisfactory. It was not or not yet at crisis point but under increasing stress and, in the services case, probably gradually deteriorating. The mystery of a relatively dynamic District government despite most staff receiving (as of late 1994) salaries of \$20-50 a month appears to be threefold:

- a. most public service employees (or more accurately their wives) do grow most of their own food and build/maintain their own houses;

- b. there is an expectation of public service delivery both by public servants and by communities resulting in both community and internalised pressure to fulfil it,
- c. communities do 'top up' salaries of public servants seen to deliver desired services with food, house building and some cash.

POLITICAL - THE MEANINGFUL FLAG AND BORDER

The most startling fact about Ngara District is likely to escape any observer without local historical background. It was part of the old Kagera Kingdom which like Rwanda, Burundi (and Ankole) was one of the Tutsi ruler/Hutu majority Interlake kingdoms. Until 1915 it was part of German East Africa administered together with Rwanda and Burundi from which it was not then seen as radically different.

Today matters are very different. Few people in Ngara or Karagwe (or Kagera Region in general) identify primarily as Tutsi or Hutu. "Tanzanian", (and secondarily "Wahaya") are the typical responses and attitudes. Tensions and conflicts exist but, on wealth, access to officials, incomer/old resident lines and at levels which are very low by African standards and a world away from Burundi, let alone Rwanda. Ngara District is very peaceful - one of the villagers' most intense feelings about refugees was amazed horror at how violent they were to each other. They could not conceive why quarrels after drinking should lead to regular resort to pangas (machetes) and promptly called out the Sungu-Sungu (village voluntary militia cum police) even though the refugees were careful not to attack Tanzanians. Crimes of theft and violence in Ngara have risen in 1994 (quite apart from night violence in Benaco Camp leading to 4 to 10 murders most nights, some but not all political) - at least double the rate for the whole of Tanzania. This is universally attributed to refugees or their disturbing impact on Tanzanian youths. (Karagwe has rather more crime than Ngara, in particular road banditry. While usually attributed to Ugandan influences because violent rural banditry has been endemic there for at least half a century, this feature of Karagwe long predates 1994.)

In part that change was an achievement of British colonial policy, but it has been greatly consolidated and deepened by independent Tanzania and solidified by the Amin invasion and the visions of horror across the borders.

Ngarans have relatives in Burundi and Rwanda and in that sense the borders are artificial. But in political and social terms the borders are very real indeed and - like their flag flapping at the border posts, both to reassure and to warn off - are meaningful to Ngarans and Karagweans. Tanzania is a nation state and on the north-west periphery that fact is, as of 1994, an especially relevant and reassuring one to its citizens.

Politics in more conventional senses is not prominent. One or two opposition parties have members with offices in their houses in Ngara, but on the whole multi partyism is not an issue. The disasters across the border have probably reinforced that - the police and troops they needed came from the government, as did the increased presence of the Regional Commissioner and the selective strengthening of key District posts. At rural or small town level the government and the majority party tend to be seen as one. The opposition is perceived as a set of critics of what the government as such does, not simply of the majority party; a perception not notably adding to other parties' appeal in Ngara or Karagwe in 1994 when they appear to have polled under 5% with no seats in local government elections (versus 20% to 25% and 4% respectively nationally).

SOURCE NOTE

This paper is based primarily on the 1994 Tanzania Prime Minister's Office *Assessment Report* and 1994 study by the author in Dar es Salaam and Ngara. The latter led to UNICEF's *That They May Be Whole Again: Offsetting Refugee Influx Burdens On Ngara And Karagwe Districts*. General sources on Ngara-Karagwe and references to them on country-wide studies are limited. Special note should be made of the background data on Kagera Region's rural economy in several works by Professor Anna Tibaijuka of the University of Dar es Salaam. The proposals and analysis of this paper are the author's responsibility and are not necessarily identical to those of UNICEF or of the United Republic of Tanzania.

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**MAKING WHOLE AGAIN: Human Development
Consequences of Hosting Refugees in Kagera Region, Tanzania**

By Reginald Herbold Green

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May 1995

MAKING WHOLE AGAIN: Human Development Consequences of Hosting Refugees in Kagera Region, Tanzania

By Reginald Herbold Green

We could not understand people
who were so violent to each other
We had to call out the sungu-sungu
every night

- Ngara Village Leader

The refugees ate all the maize while it
was still green. There was no seed. I have
gotten 10 tonnes from the Council of Churches.
Today I go to one village to see how Village
Executive Officer's distribution of 10 kilos
to each household is going.

- Diocese of Kagera,
Development Canon

To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

I.

HOSTING HOARDS ON THE FAR PERIPHERY: AN OVERVIEW

Ngara and Karagwe Districts in Tanzania's Kagera Region on the borders of Rwanda and Burundi are far periphery - not only from Europe but also from Dar es Salaam. They are among Tanzania's most isolated, least known and lowest cash income districts although on nutrition and other social parameters they may rank in the middle third. Ngara in particular has had rapid population growth since the late 1960s because of the availability of relatively fertile land, less drought risk than for most of the Lake zone and improving access to water, sanitation, primary education and health care.

Since late 1993 the 500,000 odd residents of these two districts have hosted of the order of 800,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees. The first Burundian wave returned home when conditions became less fraught at home but were almost instantly succeeded by the Rwandan

tidal wave following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, the politico-ethnic genocide which ensued and the inexorable advance of the invading (since 1990) forces of the Rwanda Patriotic Front who became the country's rulers by July. As of Lent 1995, the Rwandan and renewed Burundian refugee total was nearing 600,000 with arrivals over the last six months of 50 to 2,000 a day (many wounded) outstripping voluntary official and unofficial returns averaging perhaps 25 a day.

The refugees are housed in several huge camps - the largest, Bonaco, near the Rusomo Falls bridge to Rwanda, nearly 200,000. One very small (1,400) camp attests to the intense ethnic cleavage in Rwanda. All members of 'mixed' Hutu-Tutsi refugee families are there. Both the number - barely one-quarter per cent of all refugees - and the need to isolate (and guard - not always 100% successfully) them, speak for themselves.

This paper's central concern is not the camps nor the refugees but the impact on Ngarans (outnumbered two to one by refugees) and Karagweans (with about the inverse ratio).

The impact falls into three groupings: the initial tidal wave influx; the cash income access nexus and the environmental costs. The first and last are virtually totally negative; the second with large (relative to District cash income) pluses and minuses probably cross-cancelling at macro level but in ways shifting and increasing inequality of income distribution.

The initial impact was one of terror, death stalked Rwanda and until the deployment of Tanzanian troops and reinforcement of police, there was great fear it would cross the corpse-clogged Rusomo River, the scrub field land boundary with Rwanda, or the road median and hill crest line with Burundi.

Beyond terror (and terrorising by their violent behaviour to each other, though rarely to Tanzanians), the refugees acted in ways analogous to a horde of locusts. Hungry, they bought, bartered or took maize, plantains, beans and cassava. Needing to cook, they swept up text books, school furniture and church benches. Camping in huge numbers, they damaged tree and field crops. With a different sanitary tradition, they filled village latrines (near universal in most of Ngara) and fouled hillsides and water sources. Ill and suffering from exhaustion, they used up dispensaries' modest drug stocks.

The total costs look low - slightly over \$1 million (see Table 1) for 100 border and transit villages or \$10,000 per village. Set against perhaps \$500 to \$750 weekly total cash incomes of residents of most villages and the slender resources of local government and both local and national social sector (in these Districts primarily Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran Churches, co-operative societies and the women's groups relating to child nutrition-health-local initiatives programme) those sums acquire Kilimanjaro-esque dimensions.

TABLE 2
PROGRAMME COST: 1995-1999
 (\$000 at 1994 Prices)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
A Initial Village Impact Reversal	750	-	-	-	-	750
B Transport Rehabilitation	7,800	6,000	4,750	1,500	-	20,000
C Health	375	225	200	200	200	1,200
D Water	275	475	350	-	-	1,100
E Forestry/Agro-Forestry	870	1,775	1,750	1,000	250	5,645
F Agricultural Sustainability and Enhancement	145	315	315	315	315	1,405
G Local Governance and Police	1,630	120	115	10	-	1,875
Total	11,845	8,910	7,480	3,025	765	32,025

(Summarised from Table 5)

II.

PRELUDE TO NEAR DISASTER

Burundi, Rwanda, Kagera and Ankole (in Uganda) were, from the end of the 15th Century, kingdoms ruled by an invading pastoral minority from the north exercising broadly feudal rule over a cultivating majority. The dominant Tutsi tended to be tall and thin, the majority Hutu short and stocky. Relations among the communities varied and by the end of the 19th Century the sharpness of cleavages had probably begun to decline. After 1915, Belgian rule in Burundi and Rwanda - for complex reasons - greatly exacerbated division and conflict, while British - and even more independent Tanzanian - virtually remade Kagera society in the sense of creating both national and regional identities outweighing Hutu/Tutsi cleavages.

From independence in 1960 both Rwanda and Burundi have been wracked by ethnic conflict up to and including the level of genocide. In Rwanda a Hutu (85%) jacquerie ousted the Tutsi elite (and kingship) in 1960-61 with over 300,000 fleeing to Tanzania and Uganda where by 1990 their numbers had grown to the order of 750,000. Until 1990, Rwanda was a relatively stable state with mild to moderate repression of Tutsi plus occasional pogroms. In Burundi, the Tutsi minority (15%) held on to power until 1993. It did so at the price of iron repression and smashing of risings or purported risings - with at least one period of genocide in the early 1970s and a total 1970s loss of the order of 750,000 lives.

Rwandan refugees in Tanzania were largely integrated into villages of their own - mostly outside Kagera Region for security reasons - and secondarily in urban society. By naturalisation and by birth in Tanzania the vast majority are now citizens and only about 6% seem to have returned to Rwanda since the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) restored Tutsi hegemony.

Rwandan refugees in Uganda were largely penned in camps and denied citizenship growing hatred, not food and building plots, and not new lives. Repeated re-invasion threats destabilised Rwanda to a point and worsened the position of Tutsi's there but were never near succeeding. In early 1980 up to 15,000 Rwandans rallied to the cause of Yuwiri Museveni (by descent of the Rwandan blood royal) and were the core of the army that won the Uganda civil war for him in 1986. Regrouped as the RPF they invaded their sometime homeland in 1990. French intervention then and two subsequent Tanzanian, led compromise peace initiatives, had by March 1994 led to either the verge of an agreed coalition of Hutu mainline parties - Hutu minority (or moderate) and mixed parties - the RPF, or to a hard-line Hutu backlash. When the presidential plane was shot down when landing at Kigali after an, apparently successful, peace negotiating meeting violence was rapidly succeeded by systematic hard-line Hutu leadership genocide against 'moderate' Hutu (perhaps 150,000) and Tutsi

IV.

CASH BALANCE, WORK OVERLOAD, CAPITAL DEPLETION

Those three terms sum up the short term refugee impact. So long as the refugees remain, cash income gains are likely to equal or slightly outweigh losses. In principle the losses could be redressed, leaving net cash gains once market access had been regained.

The work overload aspect is quite different - large, negative, growing so long as the refugees remain and substantial for at least five years after they leave. It flows from the increased distance necessary to go to collect wood and water with a doubling of population. That is already of the order of one and half hours per household per day (substantially more near the refugee camps) and can be expected to rise perhaps on how a year, partly depending on whether present water table depletion is local, within a fragmented aquifer system, or more general.

Evaluating 18,500 woman years - women and girls are responsible for household fuelling and watering - in many terms is hard. \$250 a year may be reasonable. This is the minimum wage which is well below what most adults earn (in wages or own production). How it will impinge is less clear. More work? Less or lower quality food production? Less home care? Reduced child care? Loss of time for secondary earning activities? A combination of the above?

The capital depletion is also basically environmental even if the most immediately visible aspect is the destruction of most District roads and the Regional Kigoma-Kyaka-Karagwe-Kasulu secondary highway backbone, and delay in completion of the Kasulu-Ngara-Burundi highway because the contractor has been diverted to camp construction. \$20 million could restore/complete (actually to a better standard than the partly run down 1993 position) and build in District and Regional maintenance capacity. The environmental capital cost of continued water and wood balance tipping will be larger and both more costly/longer term and more problematic to reverse.

Netherlands and DTZ (German) programmes on sustainable/improved tree crop, field crop, livestock farming and tree renewal look promising but will take time. After several false starts (luckily not in Ngara so that potential user views there are not prejudiced by them) the technical side of the former seems to be sound and to require primarily use of best Tanzanian practice with limited purchased inputs. Tree planting - in fields, around homesteads as village groves is traditional. Nurseries and - for hill slopes - a WFP project (if a suitable commodity with low 'wage earner monetisation' costs such as sugar or vegetable oil can be identified or wheat sold in urban areas and cash wages paid) plus some cooking technology improvement

(pioneered elsewhere in Tanzania with DTZ backing) appear to be a viable package. But the time span is five years after refugees leave for trees to reach usable branch supply stage.

Food security, nutrition and primary health care have not been stressed because - counter-intuitively - none is likely to be a major medium term cost of hosting refugees. For the staple food (of Ngarans and Rwandans), supply is expandable (and new kibanjias are being established). For 1995, cassava-potatoes-beans and thereafter cassava-maize-beans-potatoes are adequate to bridge the no plantain period unless rains are late or bad (as appears not to be the 1995 case).

The Nutrition Centre-Agriculture-Health-Local Government-UNICEF-Community Women's Group alliance for improved child nutrition has, if anything, been stimulated by response to crisis. Primary and hospital primary health care burdens of refugees have been and appear likely to continue to be offset.

Two dangers exist: an epidemic exploding in escaping from the camps (or a rainy season runoff of dried excrement with the same impact) or a substantial worsening of domestic or border security.

The first is real but - except for the sanitation side - containable. Epidemics have to date been stamped out in their early stages and the medical structures (including Rwandan in camp personnel) for averting them are strengthening. The polluted runoff problem is imponderable - heavy initial rains would reduce risks.

Petty property crimes and, much less frequently, low level personal violence have risen outside the camps. Whether Rwandans are directly or indirectly - via the troubling context and the example of the camps by night - responsible, is unclear. Ngarans believe they are. A cross-border security problem is unlikely so long as the TPDF remains in place. Neither neighbouring army nor the rump ex-regime leaders in the camps would wish to take it on. Similarly, violence bursting out of the camps is unlikely because the Rwandans fear the Tanzanian army and police. "But no foreigners were injured, no Tanzanians were attacked" is the revealing answer to complaints about lack of refugee personal security at night.

Income distribution impact (see Tables 3 and 4) is mixed and uncertain. Price rises and falls are complex (and must be seen against 30% general annual inflation in Tanzania). On the face of it government employees are clear losers and NGO/Agency hires clear gainers. The Commercial sector are clear gainers. Farmers are gainers if - and only if - loss of cash bean sales has been offset by sale of plantains, banana beer and/or wood for fuel or house poles. Women are net losers for the work overload reasons cited earlier.

TABLE 4

A. 1994-5 REFUGEE COSTS¹: NGARA PLUS KARAGWE

1	Initial Village Impact	
	a Food and Seed	\$1,050,000
	b Damages - Schools, latrines, etc.	\$100,000
	c Drugs Used	\$20,000
2.	Transport Cost - Road and Market Loss	
	a. Lost Sales	\$3,000,000
	b Higher Costs	\$500,000
3.	Medical Services	
	Net Diversion of Services	\$125,000
4	Fuel and Water	
	Workload (at \$250/women, year)	\$4,875,000
5.	Agricultural Production	
	Land Loss and Degradation	\$250,000
Total		\$9,920,000

B. 1994-5 REFUGEE RELATED INCOME GAINS

1	Salaries from Agencies	\$500,000
2	Sales of Bananas	\$3,000,000
3	Other Sales to Refugees	\$500,000
4	Sales of Local Goods, Services Plus Trade Margins to Expatriates	\$1,500,000
Total		\$5,500,000

Note: ¹ Excludes Security expenditure.

TABLE 5
PROGRAMME COSTS: 1994-1999
(\$000)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
A <u>Initial Village Impact Reversal</u> ¹	750	-	-	-	-	750
B <u>Transport Rehabilitation</u>						
Emergency ²	4,800	-	-	-	-	4,800
Highway Completion	(3)	-	-	-	-	(3)
District Roads	2,000	3,000	3,500	-	-	8,500
Kasulo - Kvakva	1,000	3,000	1,250	(1,500) ⁴	-	(6,750) ⁴
Sub Total	7,800	6,000	4,750	(1,500)	(-)	(20,050) ⁴
C <u>Health</u> ¹						
Primary Health Care	250 ⁵	100	100	100	100	650
CSDP	100	100	100	100	100	500
Tanzania Red Cross	25	25	-	-	-	50
Sub Total	375	225	200	200	200	1,200
D <u>Water</u> ¹						
Camp Use Offset	100	-	-	-	-	100
Rehabilitation/Cleansing	25	125	-	-	-	150
Additional Wells	150	350	350	-	-	850
Sub Total	275	475	350	-	-	1,100
E <u>Forestry/Agro-Forestry</u>						
Initial Actions ²	95	-	-	-	-	95
Fuel Efficiency	25	25	-	-	-	50
Seedling/Agro-Forestry	-	250	250	250	250	1,000
Protection Planting (e.g. WFP)	750	1,500	1,500	750	-	4,500
Sub Total	870	1,775	1,750	1,000	250	5,645
F <u>Agricultural Sustainability and Enhancement</u> ⁶						
Core Programme	100	250	250	250	250	1,100
Coffee	20	40	40	50	50	200
Rural Technology	25	25	25	25	25	125
Sub Total	145	315	315	325	325	1,425
G <u>Local Government and Police</u>						
Initial ²	675	-	-	-	-	675
Police	700	100	100	-	-	900
Police Post	150	-	-	-	150	300
Allowances	50	-	-	-	-	50
Rehabilitation/Equipment	30	-	-	-	-	30
Recurrent	25	20	15	10	-	70
Sub Total	1,630	120	115	10	150	2,025
Total ⁹	11,845	8,910	7,480	3,035	775	33,045

Notes:

- 1 Includes *Assessment Report* items somewhat reorganised and expanded
- 2 Direct from *Assessment Report*.
- 3 Presumed to be already funded by EU.
- 4 Regional Works equipment parks for maintenance if road constructed by contractor
- 5 Includes Rural Health Centre at Kasulo
- 6 Very hypothetical order of magnitude guidelines
- 7 Additional officers for 1994 and 1995 in 1995.

UNHCR apparently agrees early large scale voluntary return is unlikely and - at least at field level - that villages are better than camps. However, donors are certain, at best, to gulp and perhaps to balk at the roughly \$250 million bill for resettlement in villages and Tanzania to meditate on the probable permanent 'acquisition' of most of the refugees (again on 1959-60 experience) when good land is now relatively scarce in many parts of the country.

To that there are no easy answers - or rather the easy answers that more funding of prevention in Rwanda and a less self-serving UN force reaction after the assassination would have saved dollars as well as lives do not help Ngarans or Karagweans (or donors) now nor offer much help in outlining how to avert future crises.

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NGARA: ECONOMY, POLITY, GOVERNANCE ON THE PERIPHERY

Ngara District is literally on the periphery of Tanzania adjoining both Burundi and Rwanda but with very difficult access to the Regional city of Bukoba and the rest of West Lake Region, to the Lake Zone metropolis of Mwanza and to the capital Dar es Salaam, two days hard drive away. Until 25 years ago it was almost unpopulated. Even rapid growth from the 1970s has left the estimated 1993 population under 200,000 (at least 85% rural in villages and perhaps 15% in small towns - Ngara and Rulenge). Distance and lack of access have made it a poor district, at least in terms of cash income. Physical and psychological distance from the capital mean it is less well provided with public services than average, and poverty, while Christian medical services are relatively strong, Christian secondary schools are not.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

Agriculturally Ngara has no absolute land shortage, albeit much of the land is of medium to low potential and/or subject to erosion because of the pattern of high hills and relatively steep valley slopes. It has above typical Tanzanian rainfall in normal years (over one metre) but is subject to droughts with 1993-94 having been a moderate drought year. The core of agriculture is the banana (especially plantain) crop grown in arduously prepared kibanjas, followed by root crops (sweet and Irish potatoes with cassava as a drought security fallback), beans and - at some distance - coffee. There is a substantial livestock component - basically cattle - in the agricultural sector, a component which is symbiotic with crops because manure is integral to kibanja establishment and maintenance.

Agricultural sustainability problems have been growing over the past decade. Continuous use of kibanjas (combined with burning leaves not using them as mulch as - e.g. - in the Kilimanjaro/Arusha zone) has reduced soil fertility and resistance to nematodes and weevils. Increased herds and continued grass and post harvest stalk burning have increased erosion as has the gradual reduction of tree and bush cover in the face of rising fuel and building material needs and the absence of systematic replanting. However, attainable shifts in farming systems would appear adequate to restore balance in both soil fertility and land cover.

Except in drought years food security is probably relatively good. It appears likely that at least 90% of households can and do grow their own basic food supply and most of the others engage in some food growing and/or have close family links with those who do. As a result local staple food sales are very low even in Ngara town. Under five malnutrition has been moderately above the national average but not among the highest though it is now declining

- b there is an expectation of public service delivery both by public servants and by communities resulting in both community and internalised pressure to fulfil it;
- c communities do 'top up' salaries of public servants seen to deliver with food, house building and some cash

POLITICAL - THE MEANINGFUL FLAG AND BORDER

The most startling fact about Ngara District is likely to escape any observer without local historical background. It was part of the old Kagera Kingdom which like Rwanda, Burundi (and Ankole) was one of the Tutsi ruler/Hutu majority Interlake kingdoms. Until 1915 it was part of German East Africa administered together with Rwanda and Burundi from which it was not then seen as radically different.

Today matters are different. Few people in Ngara or Karagwe (or Kagera Region in general) identify primarily as Tutsi or Hutu. "Tanzanian", (and secondarily "Wahaya") are the typical responses and attitudes. Tensions and conflicts exist but, on wealth, access to officials, incomer/old resident lines and at levels which are very low by African standards and a world away from Burundi, let alone Rwanda. Ngara District is very peaceful - one of the villagers' most intense feelings about refugees was amazed horror at how violent they were to each other. They could not conceive why quarrels after drinking should lead to regular resort to pangas (machetes) and promptly called out the Sungu-Sungu (village voluntary militia cum police) even though the refugees were careful not to attack Tanzanians. Crimes of theft and violence in Ngara have risen in 1994 (quite apart from night violence in Benaco leading to 4 to 10 - at least double the rate for the whole of Tanzania - murders in most dark periods, some but not all political). This is universally attributed to refugees or their disturbing impact on Tanzanian youths. (Karagwe has rather more crime than Ngara, in particular road banditry. While usually attributed to Ugandan influences because violent rural banditry has been endemic there for at least half a century, this feature of Karagwe long predates 1994.)

In part that change was an achievement of British colonial policy, but it has been greatly consolidated and deepened by independent Tanzania and solidified by the Amin invasion and the visions of horror across the borders.

Ngarans have relatives in Burundi and Rwanda and in that sense the borders are artificial. But in political and social terms the borders are very real indeed and - like their flag flapping at the border posts, both to reassure and to warn off - are meaningful to Ngarans and Karagweans. Tanzania is a nation state and on the north-west periphery that fact is, as of 1994, an especially relevant and reassuring one to its citizens.

Politics in more conventional senses is not prominent. One or two opposition parties have members with offices in their houses in Ngara, but on the whole multi partyism is not an issue. The disasters across the border have probably reinforced that - the police and troops they needed came from the government, as did the increased presence of the Regional Commissioner and the selective strengthening of key District posts. At rural or small town level the government and the majority party tend to be seen as one. The opposition is perceived as a set of critics of what the government as such does, not simply of the majority party; a perception not notably adding to other parties' appeal in Ngara or Karagwe in 1994 when they appear to have polled under 5% with no seats in local government elections (versus 20% to 25% and 4% respectively nationally).