

**THE FOUR HORSEMEN RIDE TOGETHER:
SCORCHED FIELDS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

By Reginald Herbold Green

**The Summer is over
The harvest is gathered
And we are not saved**

- Jeremiah

**Blessed are the peacemakers
For they shall be called
The children of God**

- Beatitudes

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I.

War, Drought, Disease and Death

Drought alone rarely kills large numbers of people. In Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1920s, massive droughts have led to massive famine outside Ethiopia and Somalia only when superimposed on war. Southern Africa in the 1980s and today is no exception.

War kills primarily through the interaction of malnutrition, forced migration and illnesses which would otherwise not be life extinguishing. That of course is also true of the silent emergencies confronting many African absolutely poor and destitute households in non-war, non-drought contexts, but war and drought reduce access to food; enforce arduous treks for safety, food and/or water; reduce access to preventative and simple curative health care and to water (pure or otherwise); and cram human beings into cramped, unhygienic camps with inadequate shelter.

In Southern Africa, 1991-92 rains (more accurately lack thereof) have produced the apocalypse drought and threatened to lead to apocalypse famine in 1992-3. But it is worth remembering that the Apocalypse has four horsemen: war, disease and famine ride together to support death. Therefore the massive threats to life - after real, if flawed, domestic and substantial, if tardy and insufficient, international response - are in the war as well as drought scorched fields of Mozambique and those of Angola, most of which are not drought scorched. Threats to life in states which have not had sustained war within their territories - with the possible exception of Malawi - are relatively low, as are those to transborder refugees who are internationally supported and, indeed, most of those assisted by host communities.

In Angola and Mozambique the nature of their 1980s wars has been such as to maximise the general threat to civilian life. The UNITA strategy in Angola sought to starve towns and government forces by preventing cultivation - including through the dragon's teeth approach of planting anti-personnel

mines in fields - in both government controlled and disputed areas. While perhaps 40% of the resulting forced migration was to towns, 40% to government controlled rural and peri urban areas, 10% to Zaire, Zambia and Namibia and at most 10% to UNITA controlled areas, the destruction of food production goal was achieved.

Both UNITA and RENAMO in Mozambique targeted transport and health, education and water facilities (and personnel). In the latter three cases the motivation appears to have been to destroy government credibility and support through obliterating the main benefits rural Mozambicans and Angolans perceived themselves as having received from independence. In most of rural Angola and perhaps a half of rural Mozambique access to primary health services and to improved water supplies ceased to exist and ability to deliver food to limit malnutrition/avert famine was either crippled or destroyed.

In Mozambique field mining was much less prevalent and RENAMO's strategy was more directed to producing a climate of terror in which rural life became impossible than with halting food production per se, but the results in terms of household ability to self-provision, let alone supply urban populations, were similar. In terms of enforcing migration they were even more effective - up to 7,000,000 people fled (70% to government controlled rural and peri urban areas, over 20% across frontiers, up to 10% to cities and virtually none to RENAMO controlled areas) while another 1,000,000 were pauperised in place hiding out among the ruins of their homes and farms.

The food procurement tactics of the insurgent movements also differed in degree and in impact on the rural sector familial. RENAMO fed itself almost totally by raids (usually murderous) on households in disputed or government controlled areas, forced 'donations' in "tribute" areas and de facto slave labour colonies in "controlled" zones. The results were disastrous for the robbed, taxed or enslaved households' nutrition. UNITA's basic source of food appears to have been households in zones it controlled, most of whom did (judging by the geographic pattern of election returns) support it. While the procurement tactics - especially in poor crop years - almost certainly increased malnutrition, the impact was not in general, as dire as in the case of RENAMO.

The differences relate in large part to the nature of the insurgencies. UNITA was a pre-existing political movement with a geographic base in a

region which (at elite as well as mass level) has historically resented and distrusted Luanda. It had objectives of its own from the start and, while at times de facto primarily an instrument of South African and/or US geopolitical strategy, related to and retained credibility with its core constituency (vide the parliamentary election results). RENAMO was created by Rhodesian Intelligence and taken over by the South African special forces - by their own admission/claims and on the evidence of captured records - and has never achieved a coherent class or geographic base, enunciated a coherent programme or paid much attention to winning hearts and minds.

The costs of war to Mozambique and Angola (as well as to Southern Africa more broadly) have been estimated in some detail for UNICEF and UNECA. A summary here may be useful to show the sheer horror that has been inflicted on the people of these two countries:

- a. 1980-1990 excess deaths related to war. Angola 660,000 (453,000 under 5), Mozambique 1,100,000 (666,000 under 5),;
- b. lost Gross Domestic Product (national output) 1980-1990. Angola \$42,250 million (1990 actual output one-half probable level had there been no war), Mozambique \$22,800 (1990 actual output 44% of probable non-war level);
- c. destruction or forced closure of over half the rural health and primary education facilities in both countries;
- d. reducing half of all Angolans and Mozambicans to the state of forced migrants. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Table 1

War related excess deaths 1980-1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>Under 5</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
Mozambique	666,000	434,000	1,100,000
Angola	453,000	207,000	660,000
Namibia	35,000	22,500	57,500
Zambia	52,500	2,500	55,000
Malawi	27,000	100	27,100
Tanzania	25,000	250	25,250
Zimbabwe	-	500	500
Lesotho	-	500	500
Swaziland	-	250	250
Botswana	-	50	50
SADCC 10	1,258,500	667,650	1,926,150

Table 2

Economic Output Losses Due to War
(US\$ '000,000)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Loss in 1988 Prices</u>		<u>Loss in 1990 Prices</u>		
	1980-88	1989-90	1980-90	1990	1990 as % of achvd GDP
Angola	30,000	8,400	42,250	4,500	100
Mozambique	15,000	5,700	22,800	3,200	130
Zimbabwe	8,000	2,500	11,600	1,320	25
Zambia	5,000	700	6,300	330	15
Namibia	2,500	1,800	4,750	1,000	60
Malawi	2,150	1,000	3,500	550	30
Tanzania	1,300	700	2,200	330	7
Botswana	500	250	825	138	7
Lesotho	300	100	440	50	6
Swaziland	200	50	275	22	5
SADCC 10	64,950	21,200	94,940	11,440	45

Sources: UNICEF, Signs of Hope, Towards Rehabilitation and Renewed Development for the Children of Southern Africa (R. H. Green, R. Morgan, C. Davids, authors), 1992, Windhoek/New York.

The first two cost categories are war related; the second two are direct results of war, in large part causing the first two. Deaths from combat or even massacre and crossfire are a small proportion of the total. Forced migration-malnutrition-collapse of health and transport services are the fatal nexus with the very young and the old the main 'target' categories. Similarly, loss of output flows primarily from inability to produce in rural areas interacting with defence expenditure and destruction of fixed capital to crowd out human and social as well as fixed investment spending. Both government revenue and exports (except for petroleum in Angola and prawns in Mozambique) were badly mauled. Angola was somewhat less affected because its half off-shore oil enclaves were much larger absolutely and relative to the economy than were Mozambique's off-shore prawn fisheries.

These costs do not end or even stop accumulating with peace. The appalling 275-300 under five mortality rates (clawed back from over 325 in the late 1980s) will not be reversed until health services are restored and the road to the 100 to 150 once reasonably projectable for the early 1990s on 1975-80 trends will now be a long one - Mozambique has set a 1998 target of 150. To wipe out the past GDP loss in a decade would require quite implausible growth rates - even to prevent its rising will require 8% to 10% annual growth (to achieve 4% to 5% on what would have been the non-war base).

Nor can the forced migrants simply return home and resume life where it was before the war interrupted it. That is not simply a matter of human and social loss and trauma or of lost years. For the overwhelming rural majority of forced migrants their fields are grown up to bush; their homes collapsed even if not burnt; their access to health-water-education and transport weak to negligible; their ability to participate in markets blocked by collapse of rural commercial networks; their civil societies at best wounded with fractured limbs; their local governance shattered by war and consequent lack of finance and by the way donors have chosen to programme survival support.

This sketch suggests that the core destitution, famine, disease and death problems of Angola and Mozambique are the result of war and at human level confront primarily refugees.

That proposition may appear both surprising and inconsistent with the way in which Mozambique focuses its "national reconstruction", "livelihood rehabilitation" and "absolute poverty reduction" strategic initiatives.

However - especially in respect to rural areas - this is in large part a semantic confusion arising from the narrow interpretation frequently put on the term refugee.

Who Are Refugees/Forced Migrants?

There is a fairly precise international law definition of refugee turning on crossing an international frontier. Only fairly precise because:

- a. war and post war situations may leave frontiers in flux, e.g. Eritrea is clearly about to regain its independence so ex-residents currently in Ethiopia while not now legally refugees are arguably likely to become so in 1993. Similarly, it would be rash to predict that Somalia will be reborn as a single state which has implications for the status of those who have fled to - e.g. - the Northwest (ex, and perhaps to be, Somaliland). However this particular issue is not relevant in Southern Africa and (with the conceivable but unlikely exception of Cabinda) is unlikely to become so;
- b. persons fleeing across borders for 'economic' reasons (including fleeing death by starvation or dehydration) are not refugees for international law purposes. In Southern Africa mixed cases of fleeing insecurity and starvation have in practice been considered to be refugees. 1992 has posed the issue more acutely - almost all 1992 transborder migrants from Mozambique have been fleeing starvation/dehydration. However, among them are two significant sub-groups, RENAMO combatants' households and ex-RENAMO controlled civilian households whose flight was in one case caused and in the other made possible by drought but does have a significant political element;
- c. international refugee law and UNHCR procedure, at least implicitly, assume refugees to be fleeing from their home state government's oppression not from its inability to protect them from insurgency. This may make a limited difference while they remain in exile (clashes between insurgent and other refugees have not been unknown in Southern Africa but nor have they been frequent or high profile).

It does have major implications in terms of post-return support. Separate programmes and monitoring for signs of oppressive state action make good sense if refugees from a government are returning while it or

a lineal successor is in power. However, in Mozambique at least they are logically inappropriate because the international refugees fled not from the government but from its inability to protect them and because counterproductive they comprise a minority of forced migrants distinguishable from the minority who did not cross frontiers only in having on balance enjoyed rather more food and distinctly less insecurity and in - sometimes - being in more need of long distance transport home not in what support they need to enable them to restore their livelihoods. Setting up one enabling programme for all returnees will be hard enough; seeking to have two or more parallel ones is close to madness given institutional, personnel and resource constraints.

International refugee law is useful. Protection and international support for transfrontier forced migrants is important. It does have unique aspects resulting from the host government neither being the government of citizenship nor of probable final residence and - in the African context - usually being both unwilling and unable to divert substantial resources from its own citizens to meet refugee needs. However, to view Southern Africa forced migration and - a fortiori - post war national reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation solely (or even primarily) through the international refugee law prism is to confuse a grove or copse with the entire, larger wood.

In Mozambique and Angola slightly over half the total population have been afflicted with forced migration since 1980 (see Table 3). Of this, international forced migration (refugees) comprise perhaps a fifth in the case of Mozambique and a tenth in that of Angola. The main categories are:

1. international refugees;
2. domestic refugees (deslocados) in camps with at least minimal emergency programme assistance;
3. rural and peri urban located displaced persons not in camps but not perceived as satisfactorily resettled in terms of livelihood rehabilitation (afectados). The probably permanent population shift into the rural portions of the Beira Corridor is taken account of in the Mozambique figure. These households may or may not have more bits of livelihood than deslocados; most unambiguously receive much less (a

majority none at all) emergency support through government or external NGO channels;

4. urban residents who are forced migrants because of war not economic drift. These households fall outside the scope of emergency programme assistance. This group is much larger in Angola partly because of a different war pattern and, probably, partly because of narrower urban area definition in Mozambique;
5. rural households pauperised in place who live in or near their home areas but under conditions of insecurity and destitution precluding their rehabilitating their livelihoods or lives. Like *affectados* they receive very patchy and limited assistance.

Arguably the last category are not migrants. Certainly that is literally true. However, in seeking to design rural reconstruction strategies to enable households to rehabilitate lives and livelihoods their requirements diverge only in respect to not needing transport home.

On the other hand, an arguable addition are demobilised ex-combatants from rural areas - and their immediate families. These may number 275,000 persons in Mozambique (if the latest estimates of 10,000 RENAMO and 75,000 government combatants less a 30,000 new armed forces are correct) and 500,000 in Angola (including personnel who demobilised themselves pre-empting or deserting from the official process). Since the rural combatants were largely conscripted or kidnapped (RENAMO's main recruiting method) and, in general, their immediate families receive negligible support they are forced migration afflicted even during and especially after the war.

Mozambique has viewed reconstruction as encompassing refugees, *deslocados*, *affectados*, *demobilisados* and those pauperised in place. The distinguishing characteristics are having been directly afflicted by war, being destitute or absolutely poor and requiring state supporting action to rehabilitate their livelihoods. Therefore it is distinctly unenthusiastic about separate programmes for refugees (after return to home districts) or, indeed, for rural *demobilisados*.

Table 3

Forced Migrants - Mozambique, Angola 1991/92

	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Angola</u> ¹
International Refugees	1,500,000 ²	500,000 ³
Internal Refugees ⁴	1,800,000	1,000,000
Internal Displaced Persons ⁵	3,000,000 ²	1,000,000
Urban War Flight ⁶	500,000	1,500,000
Pauperised In Place ⁷	<u>1,000,000</u>	<u>(750,000)</u>
Total	<u>7,800,000</u>	<u>4,750,000</u>
Probable Population Including		
International Refugees ⁸	<u>14,000,000</u>	<u>9,300,000</u>
% Forced Migrants	<u>56 (52)⁹</u>	<u>52</u>
% International Refugees	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>

Notes:

1. Most Angolan figures are much more guesstimates than the Mozambican estimates.
2. Malawi (nominally 1,000,000), Tanzania (100,000), Zambia (75,000), Zimbabwe (150,000), Swaziland (50,000), South Africa (150,000-250,000). Includes estimated non-officially registered, probably does not cover short term 1992 drought refugees.
3. Countries of residence - Zaire (over 150,000), Zambia (over 250,000), Namibia (25,000), Congo (?), Botswana (?), South Africa (?). A majority are not registered and the estimates for particular countries have been remarkably volatile, partly depending on shifts in main war zone locations.
4. Deslocados registered in camps.
5. Registered and unregistered afectados displaced and not satisfactorily resettled but not in camps.
6. In Mozambique it is arguable that the urban population of 3,000,000 (22%) is not greatly above probable non-war levels. Nor is Maputo's 10% of total population abnormally high for a middle sized country with a dominant city. Greater Luanda (perhaps defined more broadly than Maputo) is estimated at having 20% of total population and urban areas up to 40% which does suggest a much larger urban afectado population likely to return/wish to return to rural livelihoods if available.
7. Hiding or camping in or near ruins of homes in areas which are both war devastated and insecure. Angola figure virtually a pure guess or analogue to the Mozambican estimate. The Angolan simply subtracts the 1980-1991 excess death toll (projecting the UNICEF 1980-1990 estimate) from 10.0 million.
8. The official 1991 projections of 15.7 and 10 million are obvious overestimates since no account is taken of excess deaths as a result of war. The Mozambican figure used here is based on very rough estimates of 12.5 million in Mozambique and 1.5 million in exile as of late 1991.
9. (52) excludes the urban war flight category. Mozambique's 'zero base' assumption is that virtually 100% of other categories will seek to return to rural home area livelihoods but virtually 0% of those residing in urban areas. Because of the different migration patterns in Angola the latter assumption would seem implausible there.

II.

Drought Rides In: Responses and Reflections

For the forced migrants of southern and central Mozambique and of southern Angola 1992-93's food crisis flowing from the superimposition of the 1990/91 drought on the pre-existing food shortage resulting from war waged by rural terrorism by both insurgencies.

The starting point is the underlying pre-drought food position as of 1990-91. This is better estimated for Mozambique (Table 4A) than for Angola. Of a basic requirement of 4,500,000 tonnes, about 1,125,000 (25%) was not met with domestic production providing 2,750,000 (of which 2,250,000 household self-provisioning) and imports 625,000 (of which 500,000 food aid and 125,000 commercial with about 175,000 tonnes reaching forced migrants and 450,000 tonnes sold to urban and less affected rural residents). The rural position is even worse with a gap between supply and basic average requirements of 29% - a borderline famine level pre-drought.

The Angolan position was probably basically similar at national level or perhaps slightly worse. However, food aid has been massively lower and commercial imports substantially higher. Further, the urban affectedo population is very much larger. Therefore, the 29% vs 12% urban vs rural food supply gap characterising Mozambique was much narrower in Angola, perhaps 28%-20%. However, the concentration of the shortfall on forced migrants was the same.

The 1991/92 rain failure and 1992/93 famine threat did not affect Angola in the same way as Mozambique. In the south there was a drought and is a real famine danger which may also apply to parts of the west. Elsewhere rains were normal and food production modestly higher because of that and the less insecure conditions pertaining in rural Angola in 1991 and - at least until October - 1992. However, the changes were by no means enough - even outside the drought stricken zone - to end the continuing emergency.

Five of Mozambique's provinces suffered devastating crop losses (up to 100% of non-tree crops in some districts), while another two were partially affected. The output loss can be estimated (Table 4B) as of the order of 1,000,000 tonnes. To the extent food aid does not rise, this would imply a 50% shortfall on food supply - famine by any criterion.

Table 4A

'Normal' Food 'Balance' Position
(tonnes grain equivalent)

Basic Requirement ¹	4,500,000	(100%)
Domestic Production	<u>2,750,000</u>	(62%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes)	<u>150,000</u>	(3%)
Household Consumed	(50,000)	(1%)
Commercialised	(100,000)	(2%)
Rural	<u>2,600,000</u>	(59%)
Household Consumed	(2,200,000)	(48%)
Commercialised - Formal and Informal	<u>(500,000)</u>	(11%)
Imports	<u>625,000</u> ²	(13%)
Food Aid	(500,000)	(11%)
Commercial/Parallel	(125,000)	(2%)
Food Deficit	<u>1.125,000</u>	(25%)

Urban/Rural Breakdown

	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Basic Requirement ³	1,080,000	4,420,000
Domestic Production	<u>550,000</u>	<u>2,200,000</u>
Urban	(150,000)	(-)
Rural	(400,000)	
Household Consumed	(50,000)	(2,100,000)
Commercialised	<u>(500,000)</u>	<u>(100,000)</u>
Imports ²	400,000	225,000
Food Deficit	(130,000) (12%)	995,000 (29%) ⁴

¹ Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.

² Probably understates total imports. May be 125,000 tonnes additional border imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed in adjoining rural districts or nearby towns. Transborder exports to Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to 50,000 tonnes. These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor transport links with the rest of Mozambique.

³ Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural

⁴ Intuitively 29% - borderline famine level - appears slightly too high (61% of basic nutritional need average availability too low). 125,000 tonnes of underestimated border area imports consumed in rural areas or reducing the actual Mozambican sources sales to towns would lower it to the 26% level which seems plausible.

Table 4B

1991-92 Drought Losses/1992-93 Added Aid Requirementsa. Low Estimate

Urban Production ¹		40,000
Household Consumed	10,000 (20%)	
Commercialised	30,000 (40%)	
Rural Production ¹		725,000
Household Consumed	525,000 (25%)	
Commercialised	200,000 (40%)	
Total Output Loss		<u>765,000</u>

b. High Estimate

Urban Production ¹		52,500
Household Consumed	12,500 (25%)	
Commercialised	40,000 (40%)	
Rural Production ¹		955,000
Household Consumed	630,000 (30%)	
Commercialised	325,000 (65%)	
Total Output Loss		<u>1,007,500</u>

Notes

- ¹ Division between household consumed and commercialised speculative. In some districts there will be small surpluses; in Zonas Verdes commercialised vegetables are more attractive than self-consumed grain; even in deficit zones non-food basic needs (e.g. clothes, fuel and light, medical fees) will lead to some food crop sales.

The 1991-93 drought/famine crisis in Southern Africa is a case study of the problems of emergency assistance not because it was not warned of early, nor because response was unusually tardy or meagre nor because of unique logistical problems or lack of recipient/donor experience with the area. Au contraire, on all except logistical problems in Angola and Mozambique, the case is one of earlier than average announcement, less inadequate than usual donor response and greater than average national (and regional) calamity coping institutional capacity. It is precisely this situation which makes it a useful test of the weakness of calamity/catastrophe response and of means to improve future performance.

The early warning system in Southern Africa warned - amber lights were on by November 1991, red by January 1992 and flashing red with sirens by March. The early estimates (Table 5A) were largely confirmed by FAO/WFP Mission brought forward to April (Table 5B) in response to national, regional and individual/NGO highlighting of the crisis which UNDP, FAO and WFP were handling in a dangerously low key up to March.

Of the import and fiscal requirements (Table 5C) taken to the June UN-SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference - now Southern African Development Community) sponsored pledging conference, about 60% of food requirements were pledged - and about 80% of emergency (free delivery) food targets. However, the response in respect to water (10%) and to agriculture (still lower) was much poorer. The first suggests a failure to realise that lack of water - even more than of food - drove 1992 forced migration and the second a near total failure to package livelihood rehabilitation together with survival.

Mozambique as of October had pledges of about 740,000 tonnes of 1,360,000 needed - 54%. In part this related to doubts about capacity to deliver. These were in large part circular. Reduction of logistical support to Mozambican institutions and a failure to realise that providing far less food than the minimum need of severely malnourished people (including the desperately underpaid storers, transporters, distributors and guards of the food!) maximised "leakage", were among the main causes of the capacity limitations.

Table 5A
Summary Regional Data
 (February Projection)

	Drought Deficit ¹ (tonnes)	Loss of Regional Sources ⁷ (tonnes)	Additional Extra Regional Import Need (tonnes)	Entitlement Losers ⁹ (persons)	Additional Basic Food Aid Need ¹³ (tonnes)
South Africa	6,000,000	-	6,000,000	4,000,000-7,000,000 ¹⁰	800,000-1,400,000 ¹⁴
Zimbabwe	1,250,000-2,000,000 ²	-	1,250,000-2,000,000	4,000,000-5,000,000	750,000
Mozambique	875,000 ³	150,000 ⁸	1,025,000	4,500,000 ¹¹	875,000 ³
Malawi	400,000	-	400,000	3,000,000	400,000
Zambia	500,000-750,000 ⁴	100,000-150,000	600,000-900,000	2,000,000-3,000,000 ⁴	500,000
Tanzania	250,000-500,000 ⁵	-	250,000-500,000	500,000-2,000,000 ⁵	250,000-500,000
Lesotho	100,000	-	100,000	250,000	100,000
Swaziland	100,000	50,000	150,000	100,000	75,000-100,000
Botswana	100,000-150,000	25,000-100,000	125,000-250,000	300,000	50,000
Namibia	50,000	50,000-100,000	100,000-150,000	15,000-50,000 ¹²	25,000
Angola	100,000-150,000 ⁶	-	100,000-150,000	1,500,000 ⁶	200,000-250,000 ¹⁵
Total	9,725,000	375,000	10,100,000	20,165,000	4,025,000
	-	-	-	-	-
	11,175,000	550,000	11,725,000	26,700,000	4,950,000
1991/92 Base	-	-	1,600,000	-	950,000

From: R. H. Green, 'Sound The Tocsin: The Third Horseman Mounts To Ride'

Notes

Table derived from text based on mosaic of WFP, UNICEF, SADCC, National Government and press reports.

1. Additional imports required for pre drought importers and total imports required for pre drought exporters. Tonnages are grain equivalent of estimated national food deficits caused by drought.
2. See text. 1,250,000 appears more likely.
3. Midpoint of range. See Annex.
4. Uncertainty as to Western Zambia affects estimate.
5. Possible late rain impact significant.
6. Very tentative. Assumes limited drought losses outside Southeast quadrant.
7. Previous South African or Zimbabwe sourced imports unlikely to be available in 1992-93.
8. Includes 75,000-100,000 triangular food aid from Zimbabwe; 50,000-75,000 parallel market imports from South Africa and Zimbabwe.
9. Loss of household self provisioning food, agricultural cash sales, agricultural cash ('casual' or wage) employment plus loss of wage and self employment income from commercial and other urban sectors affected by drought damage to rural purchasing power. Estimate is of households whose entitlements are severely reduced and pushed well below absolute poverty line. Largely excludes second round effects of higher food prices.
10. Rural component 2,000,000-3,000,000; dorp (small town) 750,000-1,250,000; urban and peri-urban 1,250,000-2,750,000. Last figure highly approximate because urban drift and general economic stagnation trend effects almost impossible to separate fully from drought impact.
11. Includes afectados (war displaced persons not receiving food relief) and other severely war affected rural sector familial households whose limited output will be severely drought damaged as well as more stable sector familial farming households and commercial agriculture employee households.
12. Caprivanian farming households plus commercial farm/ranch and related commercial sector employees and households only.
13. Excludes import requirement other than for human consumption and - where plausible - financeable additional commercial imports.
14. Capacity constraint problem severe given unsuitability of Government channels. See text.
15. Higher than strict drought relief estimate because Angola has in the past received disproportionately low food aid and because additional flows to a UNITA controlled area without parallel expansion of flows through Government channels would appear politically impracticable (as well as undesirable).

Table 5B
FAO/WFP MISSION ESTIMATES
(April Assessment)

	<u>Grain Production</u> (tonnes)			<u>Import Requirements^u</u> (tonnes)		<u>Food Aid Requirements</u> (tonnes)			<u>Commercial Imports</u> (tonnes)	
	1987/1991 Aug. ¹	1992	% Normal	Grain	Other ^u	Grain ⁷	Other	Of Which Emergency ^u	Grain ¹⁰	Other ^u
<u>Southern Africa</u>										
Zimbabwe	2,335,000	608,000	26	1,410,000	(75,000)	660,000	38,200	509,000	750,000	(36,800)
Mozambique	550,000 ²	226,000	41	1,381,000	(150,000)	1,303,000	101,000	688,000	78,000	(49,000)
Malawi	1,485,000	683,000	46	876,000	(75,000)	740,000	38,000	438,000	136,000	(37,000)
Zambia	1,600,000	572,000	36	970,000	(30,000)	820,000	15,000	109,000 ³	150,000	(15,000)
Tanzania	3,825,000	3,250,000	85	500,000	(10,000)	280,000	1,500	16,000 ⁹	220,000	(8,500)
Lesotho	172,500	81,000	47	297,000	(20,000)	75,000	3,000	78,000	222,000	(17,000)
Swaziland	140,000	53,000	38	129,000	(15,000)	60,000	5,500	47,000	69,000	(9,500)
Botswana	59,000	15,000	24	240,000	(50,000)	15,000	1,700	17,000 ³	225,000	(48,300)
Namibia	110,000	33,000	30	125,000	(35,000)	60,000	1,350	61,000	65,000	(33,650)
Angola	317,000 ²	454,000	143	285,000 ⁴	(70,000)	125,000 ⁴	20,000	136,000	160,000	(50,000)
(Sub Total)	10,600,000 ⁵	5,975,000	56 ³	6,213,000	(530,000)	4,138,000	225,000	1,967,000	2,075,000	(305,000)
South Africa	12,150,000	3,650,000	30	5,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	22,750,000 ⁶	9,625,000	42 ³	11,713,000	(530,000)	4,138,000	225,000	1,967,000	2,075,000	(305,000)

Source: Adapted from FAO/WFP March-April 1992, Mission To Southern Africa.

Notes:

- In general 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 were good crop years with 1989/90 and 1990/91 poor. However, there has been substantial inter and intra country divergence within this trend. Country figures computed from Mission 1992 crop and % of normal data.
- War has both depressed output and hampered estimation of volume grown. Total production estimates appear to be too low but changes may be less so.
- Sum total of country data from, or computed from, Mission Report. Mission implicit regional total crop figures are higher and, therefore, % of normal presented in report is lower than the total of their country data.
- Implausibly low. Angola's recent past crop levels like Mozambique have been war (and insurgent tactics) devastated. Institutional and transport barriers - as well as financial - have limited past emergency assistance distribution to very low levels and imposed severe hunger constraints on isolated inland cities and towns. With the relaxation of the war, transport and to a degree institutional constraints the needed (for minimally adequate nutrition) imports required are probably on the order of 450,000 to 500,000 tonnes of food aid 275,000 to 350,000 tonnes and of emergency programme distribution 125,000 to 175,000 tonnes.
- Net national territorial requirement (including resident refugees) excluding imports to replace regional exports (South Africa) and transit traffic to landlocked states (Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa).
- Rough estimate. Only direct emergency food aid requirement directly available from Mission Report.
- In principle includes all amounts already pledged. In practice appears to exclude wheat imports which are de facto aid financed in Tanzania, Zambia Zimbabwe totalling perhaps 250,000 tonnes and up to 25,000 tonnes similarly financed rice imports in Tanzania.
- For free ration, food for work, work for food and/or special project distribution. Includes grain and other.
- Implausibly low. At least in cases of Tanzania and Botswana appears to exclude nationally organised free food ration distribution to severely drought (or flood) affected districts. Given the number of displaced persons in Angola a more plausible estimate would be of the order of 150,000 tonnes.
- By subtraction Food Aid Requirement from Import Requirement. Inadequate estimates of local cross border imports and exports except for Zambia to Zaire.

Table 5C

IMPORT AND FISCAL REQUIREMENTS '1992/1993': FOOD AND DROUGHT
(Tonnes / \$)¹

	FOOD ^a (tonnes)						OTHER REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES ^b (\$)				
	Imports		Food Aid ^c				Transport/ Distribution ⁷	Water/Camps/ Work Programmes ⁸	Pledged Pre-Drought	Additional Monetisation ⁹	Gap ¹⁰
	Grain	Other Staple	Emergency ³	Other	Pledged ⁵ Pre-Drought	Gap ⁶					
Zimbabwe ¹¹	1,410,000	75,000	509,000	300,000	75,000	734,000	60,000,000	60,000,000	5,000,000	15,000,000	100,000,000
Mozambique	1,381,000	150,000	688,000	615,000	600,000	703,000	100,000,000	60,000,000	30,000,000	5,000,000	125,000,000
Malawi	376,000	75,000	438,000	337,000	350,000	425,000	60,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	10,000,000	50,000,000
Zambia ¹²	970,000	30,000	209,000	670,000	100,000	779,000	40,000,000	20,000,000	5,000,000	20,000,000	35,000,000
Tanzania ¹²	500,000	10,000	116,000	300,000	50,000	366,000	25,000,000	15,000,000	5,000,000	7,500,000	27,500,000
Lesotho	297,000	20,000	78,000	100,000	30,000	148,000	7,500,000	10,000,000	7,500,000	2,500,000	7,500,000
Swaziland	129,000	15,000	47,000	19,000	5,000	61,000	3,000,000	2,500,000	1,000,000	500,000	4,000,000
Botswana ¹³	240,000	50,000	17,000	-	2,000	15,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	negl.	negl.	4,000,000
Namibia	125,000	35,000	61,000	39,000	15,000	85,000	7,000,000	8,000,000	2,500,000	500,000	12,000,000
Angola ¹⁴	500,000	70,000	150,000	50,000	50,000	250,000	35,000,000	35,000,000	5,000,000	8,000,000	57,000,000
Total											
Southern Africa	6,428,000	530,000	2,313,000	2,530,000	1,277,000	3,566,000	339,500,000	232,500,000	81,000,000	54,000,000	437,000,000

Sources: FAO/WFP Mission Report, "Tucsin", National Data

Notes:

- Totals include baseline (pre-drought) and drought requirements.
- Adjusted from Mission data for Angola and by Inclusion of Other Staple Food (beans, legumes, vegetable, oil, sugar) in Imports as well as Emergency Food Aid Totals.
- Adjusted to include estimates of all national free and food for work/work for food programming, except in the case of Botswana where part will be covered by commercial imports.
- Includes food financed from general balance of payments support and concessional loan arrangements (especially for wheat and, secondarily rice) apparently excluded in Report. Adjusted upward in cases in which commercial import residual in Report's Table 1 (Table 2 above) appears unattainably high.
- Rough estimate - broadly similar to 1990/91 deliveries.
- Stated in tonnes because donor accounting prices for food and transport tend to be on average 25% to 50% above commercial import parity.
- Average of \$100 tonne for emergency and \$25 tonne for non-emergency (basically monetised) food aid. Substantially higher in Mozambique and Angola.
- Rough estimates because water shortage alleviation costs are not fully articulated and importance of drought displaced person camps (i.e. inability to meet food and water needs in home area), food for work/work for food and water supply security enhancing needs vary sharply by country.
- Calculated on non-emergency portion of gap (assuming pre-drought pledged aid counterpart elements have already been allocated). Rough estimate of \$50 per tonne on account of built in 180 day lag in most states because credit ceilings prevent wholesaler using overdraft increase to buy on a cash basis. Given collection experience (lags and leakages) this may an overestimate.
- Fiscal gap arising from enhanced drought impact mitigation programme.
- Zimbabwe's national 2,200,000 import requirement estimate covers 18 months with, of the order of 150,000 tonnes prior to and some 450,000 outside the 1992/93 period. The remaining apparent 200,000 tonne divergence seems to relate to divergence on minimum acceptable stocks to cover the time to a delayed harvest (or the time to mobilise aid) in drought disaster years. Increased aid estimate because Zimbabwe's external account and fiscal position are far too fragile to carry projected level of commercial imports and domestic financing.
- Emergency requirement adjusted upward (within unchanged total). Mission figures below minimum Zambian rural relief requirements and 'normal' Tanzanian drought year District ration distribution levels.
- Emergency figure may be correct in terms of external assistance sought. However, in that case it would seem that 50% or more of food will be provided by government out of commercial imports and general budget revenues. In the Botswana case this is perfectly practicable.
- Import, aid, emergency figures all adjusted upward. Conclusion of war and some reallocation of personnel plus transport make much larger rural food distribution possible. Inability to deliver not lack of need has explained very low Angola imports relative to Mozambique.

Angola on the face of it fared better with 78% pledged; but 65,000 of 84,000 tonnes. This is a farcically low estimate given Angola's limited commercial import capacity. It appears to result from under-recognition of the pre-drought food crisis on the part of FAO/WFP and Angola's belief - on past experience - it could not secure truly large international food aid commitments no matter how energetically it produced and presented a case, and so gave far less priority to doing so than did Mozambique. Further, the drought focus of the Mission did disadvantage Angola because its rural food deficit/forced migration crisis was, admittedly, not the result of 1991/92 rain failure - indeed had been slightly alleviated by rain and security improvement and there was an implicit baseline assumption that 1991 levels of output-imports-aid were - if not adequate - at least acceptable.

However, as of October the most serious threat of famine turned on delivery. Even 1992/93 eating year (or harvest year) pledges made before June had in large part not arrived and to a not insignificant extent had not even been scheduled. Overall about 10% of total food aid needs had actually been landed. The impact is disproportionately high for countries with poor transport, low commercial import capacity and severe fiscal constraints. Mozambique fares disastrously on each count and Angola only somewhat better on the second and third and perhaps worse on the first. Further, in the run up to the long rains (whose immediate effect is to worsen delivery and distribution problems), the security situation in Angola has taken a sharp turn for the worse.

The argument that neither Mozambique nor Angola - with exceptions in the most isolated rural areas and some formerly Renamo controlled enclaves - resembles Somalia or, indeed, much of the central and southern Sudan in picture of famine dying and dead is accurate so far as it goes. It is to the credit of Angolans and Mozambicans (including the governments) that this is the case. But to use this fact to argue that there is no real crisis or no urgent necessity for more support is not merely obscene but quite false. The reasons for the difference are quite different:

1. in both Mozambique and Angola there are functioning governments with a substantial degree of international and domestic legitimacy - a condition not existing in Somalia;

2. civil governance - however debilitated - does exist not only in cities but in respect to refugee camps and to the rural areas in which most of the forced migrants and sector familial live (90% in Mozambique even before the General Accord) which cannot be said of central and southern Somalia nor (with the possible exception of a few towns) of central and southern Sudan;
3. the governments of Mozambique and Angola have given - respectively - very high and relatively high priority to emergency assistance to prevent the death or total pauperisation of forced migrant people even if their capacity to do so is very much less than adequate. That is certainly not the case with the government of the Sudan nor with the central and south Somalian war-lords masquerading as governments;
4. however debilitated and fragmentary, both Angola and Mozambique possess functioning calamity and catastrophe coping institutions with some ability to collect and access data, posit needs, mobilise resources and distribute survival assistance either directly or via donors and both external and domestic NGOs;
5. with the partial exception of RENAMO no major actor in Angola or Mozambique has taken the position that it was willing to use the starvation of the civilian population under its enemy's control as a tactic to win its war and certainly not that it preferred to starve its own civilians rather than allow food aid to civilians under hostile control (because of the inevitable leakage to combatants). That is the reverse of the Sudanese governmental and insurgency stance and of that of at least some Somali war-lords;
6. as a result the 1992-93 impending famine was documented earlier, put to the international community sooner and channels (including on the ground institutional capacity) for response existed.

To argue this is not to oppose humanitarian assistance to the people of the Sudan and Somalia nor to argue against cooperation with whatever civil governance units showing interest in their people's survival exist. Far from it. It is to condemn the view that "things aren't so bad" in Angola and Mozambique and to assert that more, more sensitive support is unnecessary. Lives have been saved because of the joint actions of Angolans and Mozambicans, their governments and the international

community. To reduce that support now (or rather to continue falling short of the conservative targets set by FAO/WFP and the inadequate pledges made in June) will hurl almost saved lives back into the graves from which they were being rescued.

The 'lessons' derivable from reflection on the 1991-1993 drought/famine 'exercise' in Southern Africa are not solely related to forced migrants. They apply to the general problems confronting emergency assistance whose practitioners (domestic and, especially, international) have been slow to learn from the experience of the past sixty years.

The means to mitigating the short run human costs of natural calamities and man-made (women are rarely among the main authors even though they are over 25% of the victims and children over 50%) catastrophes and of achieving national reconstruction enabling household livelihood rehabilitation are basically domestic and international political economic. However - perhaps fortunately in terms of making a start toward positive change - they interact with a series of more technical failings.

The political economic focus actually serves rather well to propose technical changes since many technical weaknesses are, at the least, intertwined with broader conceptual issues:

1. calamities (natural disasters) should be perceived as recurrent, not one-off, events both globally and nationally;
2. therefore, both at donor and (even more crucial) national level, permanent institutional structures able to expand to large scale activity within two to four months are needed;
3. allowing forward planning of useful work for food based small scale infrastructure schemes both to enable calamity stricken households to sustain self-respect and self-reliance and to add some material output to the overriding survival priority;
4. planning calamity offsetting programmes in a way conducive to sustaining rural transport and market mechanisms, e.g. paying cash to buy food and - if food transport under Calamity Commission auspices is necessary - contracting out haulage to domestic enterprises in ways encouraging back haul of whatever the rural area has to sell;

5. accepting the imperative of a single, nationally-led coordinating institution (and of enough harmonisation of donor procedures to allow both coordination and transparency) while avoiding creating external enclaves and parallel systems or using technical assistance to co-opt previously national mechanisms;
6. recognising that after most calamities (single year droughts with limited livestock losses are often exceptions) livelihood rehabilitation (replacement of working capital in seeds, tools, livestock and repair of fixed capital in land clearing and homes) is virtually always needed and that after catastrophes (human caused disasters - basically war) broader infrastructure, human and social investment services and market network reconstruction are likely to be needed;
7. and, therefore, linking the emergency survival and livelihood rehabilitation phases of calamity/catastrophe alleviation and reversal;
8. implying both a longer time horizon and one related to contextual reality not dogma or rules of thumb;
9. plus a recognition that avoiding the need to move away from home (achievable in most droughts albeit not in wars) greatly reduces the cost and time required for rehabilitation so that early response to warnings of impending disaster is crucial;
10. and that future vulnerability reduction elements (e.g. drought resistant seed, rehabilitation/augmentation of water supplies, veterinary as well as human basic drug reserves, basic national inter-year food reserves adequate to ride out the lag before commercial or aid import flows arrive in crisis years) are part of Emergency/Rehabilitation operations;
11. paralleled by a less paternalistic perception of calamity/catastrophe afflicted households (and countries) based on a treble realisation that they usually know their own circumstances better than outsiders, have developed substantial (if fragile and subject to overloading) capacities to cope and - however generous external (whether to household or to country) support - bear the main financial, social and burdens of the calamity/catastrophe and of the ways in which it is

faced (or fudged). (International "boredom" and "fatigue" over Mozambique's decade-long emergency are real enough but the very terms are rather obscene when set against the anguish of the 7,000,000 afflicted Mozambicans who are alive, let alone the fate of over a million and a quarter of their compatriots who are dead.);

12. Strongly suggesting that austere, precise national or household means testing is inappropriate because it runs down working capital which is needed for rehabilitation and also normatively objectionable since substantial emergency programmes are virtually always to households and countries who - at least in the presence of calamity - are at socially unacceptable standards of poverty and misery. (If resources are inadequate 'rationing' may be necessary but the target should be related to true need and the shortfall visible not concealed by trimming the need to meet some idea of what "funders will bear".);
13. and a recognition that if survival and livelihood restoration are political economic priorities ("moral economy" in Adam Smith's perhaps more apt terminology) then conditioning support for them (as relatively broadly defined above) to external economic, domestic political or geopolitical objectives of donors is inappropriate (to use the mildest plausible term).

This agenda is certainly applicable in the North and in Southern African countries which do give significant priority to calamity coping by/for poor households. In a sense it is also valid for domestic advocates of major domestic political priority change. In a sense - the danger to an advocate in the North is a dusty answer but in - e.g. - Malawi, that to a domestic advocate may be a dusty prison cell... or worse. Therefore, for the external advocates and especially those with state backing, respect for domestic priorities and leadership objective can, at least in principle, clash with the priority for human survival and livelihood rehabilitation.

To this dilemma there are no easy answers and those there are can only be applied within realistic appraisals of contexts:

1. if there is a substantially accountable government which does give some priority to emergency survival/poverty reduction outside intervention by means of "sticks" is unlikely to be appropriate (and intervention by

using technical assistance to try to change basic priorities is likely to be quite ineffective);

2. but in those circumstances substantial emergency programmes will in practice be accepted and can usually be tied to provision of national institutional and personnel inputs. Even if that "carrot" may well not be the government's first choice, it is likely to be accepted;
3. with the side result of building up the domestic base for emergency survival and reconstruction/poverty reduction prioritisation;
4. while withholding or underfunding emergency support is usually quite unlikely to cause basic domestic political economic change and certainly does not help afflicted people survive;
5. but contexts do exist (though not in Mozambique or Angola) in which national governing group priorities are totally inimical to survival, let alone rehabilitation, support and mass diversion of resources to elite uses with little left for intended beneficiaries is quite predictable (e.g. Somalia, Sudan);
6. in these cases tightly externally supervised programmes (with the maximum feasible involvement of domestic civil society and - if appropriate - local governance bodies) is likely to be the least bad attainable option with the "stick" not usually a threat to halt emergency support but to review and reduce other economic and political support;
7. with the possible exception of de facto international 'trusteeship' emergency operations if and when both near total lack of both civil governance and very limited capacity to resist armed protection of operations (e.g. Somalia) or a global context which renders the government a pariah (e.g. in respect to Iraqi Kurdistan) make them possible.

The argument that some governments behave in ways forfeiting their claim to sovereignty because violation of basic human rights is integral, not incidental, to their governance is valid. However, there is little reason to believe effective international intervention to reform or to replace such regimes is generally practicable (vide Sudan, Serbia, Croatia, or, indeed, so far as the North went, Idi Amin's Uganda regime). Further,

whether such intervention could quickly lead to a peaceful context or to a transition toward a better national regime is problematic. It is, however unfortunately, clear that the use of an international trustee force to topple the last Ethiopian emperor of the House of Menelik (Mengistu) was never on any realistic agenda and that - however unsatisfactory - the external support that was injected did save lives (and could have saved more had low income household livelihood rehabilitation been included) while at the same time it is doubtful that it delayed the overthrow of the regime.

These conclusions in respect to domestic priorities may appear pessimistic but more by comparison with utopia than with present reality. No Southern African regime - and certainly not Mozambique or Angola - will reject emergency assistance targeted to severely affected people (even if at least one regime is very reticent about admitting to crises and Angola - partly from bitter experience - does not set much stock in refining and promoting international appeals). Even in the low domestic political economic priority cases substantial progress on the thirteen point agenda is practicable and would save lives and rehabilitate livelihoods quite literally in their thousands.

As noted, the Angolan and, especially, Mozambican contexts are among the more - not less - promising. The political economic logic, economic recovery potential perceptions and electoral imperatives of the Mozambican government and leading party require it to place Reconstruction/Livelihood Rehabilitation at the top of its priority list. Its divergences with the international community are about ways and means and especially about that community's predilection with injecting multiple, expatriate run, non-accountable Platonic guardianships which objectively fragment and decapacitate Mozambican governance (at all levels) and civil society.

III.

What Prospects? When?

To discuss transition from Emergency Survival to Reconstruction Livelihood Rehabilitation requires taking a view on:

- a. when war will end with what degree of residual insecurity;

- b. where war afflicted households will go;
- c. how fast and how much via 'official channels' the return to rural homes will be.

In Mozambique full scale war is probably over. RENAMO's military (albeit not terror or killing) capacity has ebbed dramatically since 1988. Ironically the final coffin crafting was done by the drought. "Control zone" civilian populations became a short term liability unable to feed themselves, let alone the combatants. Further, because up to 90% of combatant missions were raids to secure food, it was no longer possible to hold coerced households in place. But in the longer term the loss of its food growing base threatened RENAMO's survival just as the decline of population in areas it controlled to (probably) under 5% would erode what credibility it had.

At least half the estimated 10,000 RENAMO combatants are in units which have whole heartedly accepted the cease-fire and sought reconciliation (including food and medical services for ex-combatants and household members) while up to a tenth were removed from the ranks of effective combatants in the abortive mid-October offensive in violation of the cease-fire. Mr. Dhlakama and his closest lieutenants and external advisers (who appear to have a rather poor grasp of on the ground realities) do not have the means to restart a full scale war.

A real question is the level of residual banditry. In the late 1980s a US State Department study showed over 90% of attacks on households who became refugees involved RENAMO and under 5% each government forces and 'others' (free-lance bandits and unidentified). The weakening of RENAMO has led to a rise of freelance banditry as have weak logistics in feeding government units who (understandably) desert and may become bandits. If demobilisation is into penury, ex-combatants (from both armed forces) will swell bandit ranks. This is a point which is perfectly evident to the government and on which tentative indications of external support for rehabilitation of ex-combatant livelihoods give grounds for cautious optimism.

The Angola prospects are less clear. UNITA - now deserted by both its RSA and USA former backers - cannot win a renewed war. However, it most certainly can renew the war and destroy security in a high proportion of rural Angola.

Whether it will do so or use the threat of doing so to bargain for central and provincial government posts is unclear. So is whether it would view such power sharing as a government of national unity or a new means to pursue its struggle for total dominance by non-electoral methods.

Therefore it is hard to describe Angolan prospects for peace in the short term as better than problematic and even harder to express full confidence that an initial peaceful solution will lead to a stable reconciliation process. Given the large number of ex-combatants (up to 50,000) who have demobilised themselves - presumably with guns - and the weakness of programmes to reintegrate demobilised, the prospects for banditry (or rather for its limitation) are probably poorer than Mozambique. On the other hand, the Angolan state has the experienced personnel, arms and resources to build up a stronger paramilitary police force than does Mozambique.

Mozambique's baseline assumptions of 100% return home by non-urban war afflicted households and 0% for those resident in cimentos (centre cities) and canisas ('townships' - suburbs) are not literally realistic. However, fragmentary data from asking deslocados, afectados and refugees does suggest 90% do wish, and intend, to go home as soon as it is safe in security terms. The 300,000 to 400,000 returnados (from transborder refugee camps or informal residence with community members) bear out these statements. They have returned - particularly to Tete Province - in large numbers, 90% with no official assistance, as soon as they perceived it as relatively safe to resume cultivation and to do at least temporary home reconstruction. Virtually none have migrated to cities or large towns.

Very few rural and ex-urban afectados perceive themselves as satisfactorily resettled. For most this is self-evident - crammed into the ex-urban perimeters of canisas, on coastal sand dunes and into overcrowded areas with on average less than a hectare of usually sub-standard land. Even most of the minority on formal resettlement schemes express a desire to return home - partly because security has prevented opening up adequate land and partly from a desire to recreate known local civil society structures. The limited exceptions are afectados who are fairly near their old homes, in areas with adequate access to good land and within the home area of people of the same or a closely linked cultural group. The only large group in this category - the residents of the self-established

new villages in the Beira Corridor north of Dond and south of ex-urban Chimoio - are in fact usually not counted as afectados.

Officially deslocados are camp residents and afectados are displaced persons outside core urban areas. However, it is realised part of the massive 1980-91 urban influx are deslocados - a perception confirmed by the 1992 Maputo Household Survey. With even present urbanisation under 25% (comparable to Tanzania and well below Zimbabwe or Zambia although above Malawi) a question arises as to how many are general urban drift migrants rather than temporarily war displaced households. Those who are destitute with no real foothold in the urban economy may go home, but for the others moves would mean the immediate loss of present - even if inadequate - urban livelihoods for a problematic future recovery of rural ones.

Urban livelihood rehabilitation - at least in Angola and Mozambique - poses rather different issues than rural. About 50% of urban residents (based on household studies in Mozambique and fragmentary evidence in Angola) are either destitute or absolutely poor. At least in Mozambique most of this group are not forced migrants. Employment enabling, direct employment, basic service access, small scale infrastructure and supplementary income transfer schemes would appear to be best organised to empower the total absolutely poor/destitute group not divided into urban born-voluntary migrant-forced migrant parallel slices.

In Angola no comparable coordination of data to arrive at overall estimates appears to have taken place. Demobilisado data on future occupations - especially for former government troops - appear to represent aspirations not operational intentions. (Even ex-UNITA troops 80% rural preferences included an unattainably high proportion of merchants.) The much higher numbers and proportions of urban resident forced migrants suggest both: a.) a likelihood of significant return home flows from towns (the apparent 40% urbanisation is unsustainably high for a country with Angola's economic structure) and b.) even more daunting urban employment/real income/service access/infrastructural/safety net problems than those confronting Mozambique. Certainly Luanda - even in the core cement city - already functions less well than Maputo.

The question of how soon forced migrants plan to return home receives fairly uniform and both reassuring and alarming answers. They can be summed up as: the moment we consider it safe. This is reassuring in the

sense that it indicates a firm desire to regain lost livelihoods and to end dependence on inadequate and uncertain handouts. In many camps the tenacity and ingenuity with which income earning activities have been attempted goes to confirm the reality of this commitment to self-reconstruction of livelihoods. So does the experience - particularly in Tete Province - of large scale return from exile as soon as minimum security had been restored.

The absence of any caveat as to availability of emergency programme transport, seed, tools or food until harvest strongly suggests many returns will be (in Mozambique now are) before any significant "official channels" to monitor, much less provide logistical support for, them can be created.

That raises the alarming side. Few deslocados, afectados or refugees can hope to take adequate seeds, tools and food home with them. For those returning to bush covered fields and collapsed (even if not burnt) homes in the midst of the worst drought in over 100 years when the emergency network is constructed to deliver to camps in districts of refuge not villages in districts of exodus/return a rush home is all too likely to be life threatening.

The Tete precedent is not as reassuring as it might appear. Most returnados had limited distances to travel, many had raised food in Malawi, 1988-89-90 were good harvest years in Tete, many households phased their move with a "transborder period" keeping one foot safely in Malawi until their Mozambican livelihood was substantially reconstructed and relative security was perceived as likely to continue. These factors are not generalisable albeit they may apply to many refugees and deslocados in Tanzania, Cabo Delgado, Niassa and - after the 1992/93 rains if they are good - parts of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Southern Malawi, Zambesia and Nampula. In Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo (rural) the aftermath of the 1991/92 drought and the extreme 1992 seed shortage will still make self help one stage return very problematic.

There is little reason to suppose the Angolan situation is radically different - except that the absence of peace clearly deters return home at the present time. In both cases reconstruction/rehabilitation programming will inevitably be in the anomalous position of the leader who says: "Oh, there go my people. I must run after them to catch up because I am their leader". The situation is unfortunately not facetious - if emergency and

refugee programmes are not shifted to supporting actual (not administratively or technically desired) population movements and worse yet, if they are wound down rather than converted to support reconstruction, then peace and return home may kill almost as many people as did war and forced migration.

The constraints on speedy official/domestic NGO action - largely created by the disastrous decapitation of Mozambican institutions and civil society bodies by the way external actors have insisted on addressing the continuing emergency - mean that priority attention needs to be given to identifying and supporting returnee household coping mechanisms - for example:

- a. temporary return of one or more adults and juveniles to clear, rebuild and plant with periods back in camp and a permanent return home only at the time of the first substantial harvest:
- b. unofficial permanent return home of one or more members of the household with the others remaining in camp or on affectado assisting NGO or local governance lists and drawing rations for the pioneer returnees until a harvest is won;
- c. reconnaissance mission followed by return if conditions appear unpropitious.

Each of these improves survival and rehabilitation chances. Each makes creative use of refugee or deslocado camp or affectado support list as a base from which to make forays to attack the livelihood restoration challenge. (Such base camp use is relatively common, e.g. Somali refugee camp demographic data over time demonstrated that most working age refugees were only intermittently present and normally were working elsewhere in Somalia or abroad.) However, each violates UNHCR and normal Emergency Programme procedures and can be misread as fraudulent distribution to ghosts or as failure to encourage rapid return.

IV.

Toward Reconstruction and Rehabilitation - Rural

The requirements to enable forced migrants returning to rural areas to rehabilitate their livelihoods are relatively straightforward to sketch out:

1. access to adequate, appropriate land on secure, hereditary use tenure basis;
2. transport home - especially in cases in which their present residence of refuge is over 50 km away;
3. provision of tool kits (to clear bush, to rebuild homes, to plant and to till crops);
4. parallel provision of basic household kits (not least pails to reduce water collection time and where destitution is near total - e.g. deslocados from RENAMO controlled zones - clothing);
5. initial seeds for planting, core smallstock and poultry (and to the extent possible cattle and oxen) as well as simple fishing gear to fishing village returnees;
6. food for the returnees to survive until they can win a harvest (effectively circulating capital in the Smithian/Marxian sense of that term);
7. restoration of basic human and social investment services - primary and adult education primary health care, water, agricultural extension;
8. rebuilding of local infrastructure - roads, bridges, culverts, the fixed capital of basic services (especially houses for personnel), administrative and market structures;
9. restoration of market access, e.g. through (commercial) loans to produce buyer-transporter-goods seller enterprises (private or cooperative) to recreate the rural commercial network;
10. augmentation of household sector cash incomes - especially until crop, livestock and fish production becomes adequate to allow significant

sales - e.g. by using labour intensive seasonal approaches to infrastructure restoration.

To articulate these into operational programmes at national level is not particularly difficult (if political priority for doing so exists, as it does in Mozambique). The problem of identifying numbers to be served and particular elements (e.g. number of health posts where) is unmanageable nationally. Ideally it should be decentralised to district level. Given the appalling weakness of District level personnel in Mozambique and Angola (not only absolutely but in comparison with - e.g. - Zimbabwe or Tanzania where District staff levels and capacities are almost comparable to Mozambican Provincial capacity), the interim approach almost has to be Provincial (except for information flow and routine operations) coordinated by Provincial Planning Commissions. Preliminary Mozambique results (which also entail restoring CPP capacity and sense of direction) suggest this is possible.

Institutional and temporal problems however are daunting. Emergency networks are oriented to deliveries to camps in areas of refuge - not to sub-district level in areas of return. Further, their basic operations have been food delivery focused (backed by some seed and a fairly negligible volume of other items), in a survival context not a rehabilitation package providing a reconstruction context. However, they have the only available delivery and logistical coordination mechanisms so need to handle items 2 through 6 on the list. Their involvement with 7 and 8, however, should switch at once to Provincial and Ministerial directorates (possible with an interim funds collection and automatic transfer residual role until clear Reconstruction Plan financial mobilisation modalities are up and running) because parallel health, education, water, works and transport plans and budgets are not efficient.

Luckily, decentralisation - more accurately as much formalising the wide range of de facto autonomies Provinces have but often fail to use, and of backing them by capital budget allocations comparable to recurrent, as of making new allocations of responsibility/authority - is already on the Mozambican agenda. Whether it is on the Angolan is less clear. But to work decentralisation requires:

- a. increased personnel capacity (including massive upgrading and remedial training) first at Provincial and then at District levels;

- b. parallel broadening of participation of sector familial members particularly in programme component identification and prioritisation (e.g. through participatory rapid rural appraisal) and review (perhaps via District and Provincial Assemblies);
- c. building up domestic civil society/NGO (churches, mosques, women's groups, Red Cross chapters, co-ops, village associations) capacity to act (including making external NGOs accountable to them and generalising the Christian Aid pattern of operating through its domestic analogue and the Action Aid one of very close coordination with/action through local governance units).

Land allocation is a key example of the necessity for participatory decentralisation. In most Districts of return there is no absolute land shortage and forced migrants (and neighbours) know whose land is where. Nobody else does. The Portuguese viewed African sector familial land as a residual they had not yet had occasion to steal for settlers, plantation companies or concessionaires. The independence Land Act is based on total non-knowledge of sector familial land tenure practices (or holdings) and central allocation (however unintentionally) has followed Portuguese practice.

The only evident prompt way to achieve speedy, adequate, secure allocations to returning households is to use village/sub-district elder's committees and local mediation in the case of conflicts with initial registration at District level. Abandoned plantations and commercial farms should be allocable as well as previous sector familial land and no land allocations (except of ex-plantation or ex-settler land known to be unoccupied) should be made to outsiders (corporate or individual; citizen or foreigner) until return is reasonably complete and genuinely vacant (not including long rotation reserve) land can be identified and allocated at Provincial level. This approach sounds simple and can be at local level. Central allocation would be totally impracticable. There is a growing body of Provincial and - in some institutions - Central government opinion in support of this approach. In general - judging from experience elsewhere, including Tanzania - evolving historic African secure, hereditary, use tenure systems with local allocations to households work reasonably well in conditions other than severe scarcity of good land.

The one reform probably needing immediate implementation (by a national guide-line directive) is equal access for female headed households. Traditionally some adult male was responsible for any female so a female headed household could not, by definition, exist. The responsibility leg of this approach no longer functions uniformly and at least 25% of returning households will be female headed, so this is one area in which local diversity should be avoided.

The worst problems are perceptual and temporal. The temporal one is appallingly simple:

- a. most refugees, deslocados and afectados will move home as soon as they believe it to be safe;
- b. while their judgement of physical security is - on past evidence - good, that of food availability - also on past evidence - is uneven;
- c. in the present context of drought (with water and food scarce) returning home is likely over wide ranges of Mozambique to be life threatening unless and until sub-district registration and food-tool-seed kit distribution centres are set up;
- d. because of bush clearing and home rebuilding requirements the optimal 'window of return' is April/August 1993 which would allow time to re-focus Emergencia's logistics network and for 1992/93 rains and the main 1993 harvest to reduce water and food constraints;
- e. but although the official government (and many NGOs) position advocates such delayed return it is unlikely their appeals will have much weight;
- f. and, unfortunately, national coping mechanisms keeping some family members in camp (at least part of the time) to draw rations while others restore the livelihood base are likely to be perceived by at least some aid agencies and NGOs as fraud, not as sensible household survival and recovery strategies which reduce the present risks to life and enhance the future livelihood regaining prospect of forced migrants.

The last point is one of the areas in which a radical change in perspective is needed. Except for short distance returnees able to build up a food reserve in their place of refuge (significant numbers of Malawi and

Tanzania based refugees but virtually no deslocados and few afectados) a food as working capital supply until crops are won is a necessary input into rehabilitation.

A second necessary perception change is acceptance that the practicable must dominate the preferable (or under different circumstances even operationally desirable). A neat five year Reconstrucao exercise is heuristically useful but only if modified to take account of the uncertainties of how many will return where, when, of how many resources can be mobilised from which sources for what uses, how fast. Interim measures will be needed: e.g. 1992 and 1993 financing of the food and kit package via Emergencia and indeed using it to distribute them because other funding and distributing channels cannot be set up in time.

The third reformulation is that of shifting from an emergency survival to a reconstruction through rehabilitation of livelihoods mode. Emergencia is a particular problem in this respect (as a fortiori are its 'advisors' CARE).

Broad access, low unit cost, minimum necessary administration as key criteria also represent a change of vision - less perhaps for emergency operations than for others. Donors and their technical advisers tend to 'gold plate' proposed projects in ways raising unit costs, limiting access and multiplying high level (in practice expatriate) personnel requirements - and take 18 months to send back their 'improved' (mutant?) counterproposals. For supporting and enabling the 50% of Mozambicans who are forced migrants that is a disastrous optic.

Similarly, whether to give initial food rations and kits or provide them on term loan and whether to needs test returnees are not ultimately issues of ideology or theory but of realism. 1,000,000 \$100 household kit loans repayable over five years would cost more to administer than could be collected and would prevent any sane priorities for financial sector rehabilitation - unlike 3,000 to 5,000 commercial rate loans to rural commercial enterprises which would be manageable and could contribute to financial sector capacity building. Similarly, 80% of returning forced migrants will be destitute and 19% "absolutely poor but not destitute". To suppose it is worth spending scarce time trying to identify the 1% or that grant support in the year of return will hamper market recovery is absurd.

Related is the need to have approximately correct numbers soon enough to use - not precisely wrong projections or highly sophisticated surveys processed three years after the event. Subsidiarity applies - detailed data on numbers are needed at district level and less detailed aggregations at provincial and national. For refugees this is urgent. If one adds Malawi data on registered refugees from Tete and Mozambique Red Cross data on present Tete residents the total is 1,400,000 whereas the highest plausible population total is 1,000,000. One cannot do even draft logistical or financial planning on that margin of error. The deus ex machina of households partly or largely returned to Mozambique but keeping a foothold (rationhold in Malawi camps) could (if widespread) reduce the gap but hardly eliminate it.

A special conceptual problem can be put as limiting leakage without creating non-functional absurdity. Schools for farmer forced migrants alone make no sense; but nor does criticising rural road deconstruction or agricultural extension because others will benefit too. More controversially is one believes access to - preferably competitive - markets if crucial to livelihood rehabilitation there is a need to identify the capital requirements (basically lorries and stocks of goods) of small scale rural merchant/transporters and whether loan finance is in fact available to meet them. Commercial rate loans to such entrepreneurs (private or co-operational) and their use as haulage subcontractors for other programme elements of absolutely poor, returning forced migrants. To argue the reverse is remarkably pure reductionism - even Chairman Mao's avowed rural goal was "all boats float higher".

The final two perception changes needed relate to coordination and wholeness. If one accepts the proposition that the core requirements - after divergent transport and demobilisation allowance elements - of rural refugees, deslocados, afectados, demobilizados and pauperised in place households are basically the same with variety within more than between groups then it follows there should be a common set of programmes operated at District and Provincial levels and largely designed and budgeted at Provincial within a common national strategic framework. Doubtless numerous institutions need to be involved - one hardly wants a super urgency muddling up agricultural extension, village health worker training, labour intensive works etc. at detailed design or operational level. But

they are not divided among categories of war afflicted absolutely poor rural households.

In practice UNHCR, UNDP and Emergencia bodies do not perceive the problem that way. Each looks at its piece of the problem and stakes out territory by proposing separate programme (all of them totally outside mainline ministerial and territorial administrative or legislative structures). This is not in the interests of forced migrants not of national, governmental and civil society recapacitation. Au contraire!

There are no inherent barriers to a single strategic approach: a) UNHCR's mandate does allow it to expend funds on former refugee livelihood rehabilitation via agents. Thus it could fund a proportion of agreed programme cost equal to the proportion of ex-refugees among programme beneficiaries; b) UNDP's purpose is providing support for government strategic goals and coordinating that of other UN family bodies (excluding in practice the IMF and World Bank) not of creating or maintaining parallel national logistical or planning mechanisms for itself and WFP; c) the permanent role of Emergencia bodies is in respect to calamities and their expertise in the logistics of distribution of a limited range of goods not parallel government operations fragmenting water, health, education and works programming.

Finally, external bodies (well beyond UNHCR and UNDP) need to consider whether they intend to operate reconstruction as independent Platonic guardians. With the best will in the world - which is not always present - that approach fragments and decapitates host government and domestic NGOs/civil society bodies. Also it makes a mockery of external preaching of participation and accountability - e.g. how USAID and CARE operate speaks much more loudly than how they enjoin others to operate.

If a strategic priority for reconstruction in support of rural forced migrant household livelihood rehabilitation is to function effectively and to contribute to participatory governance it must be "locally owned" (as the World Bank says, and to a growing extent practices in respect to Structural Adjustment Policy Framework Papers - especially ones on poverty vide the Mozambique PFP). That does require much more operation within national, provincial and regional frameworks; more agreed division of labour; greater accountability to domestic actors (including accepting the validity of their basic goals and approaches unless they are demonstrably

wrong or impracticable); less 'independent' external operations; more secondment of staff to serve as temporary Angolan or Mozambican civil (or civil society agency) servants. It is a challenge just as much to most NGOs as to bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.

How far either Mozambique or Angola has proceeded on this list of perception changes is unclear. Mozambique has made a unified, Mozambican led, decentralised Reconstrucao strategy a top priority. The other perception/conceptualisation issues are certainly under debate - heated debate at times. But in respect to the foreign agency issues Mozambique is so heavily trapped into dependence on their resources as to fear to speak as strongly as many Mozambicans feel. Objectively it does not have the degrees of freedom to "call the shots" which Botswana - or even Tanzania - has and exercises. Angola does not appear (at least from outside the government structure) to have gone as far in prioritising either Reconstrucao or poverty reduction, decentralisation or livelihood rehabilitation so Mozambique, partly because of its difficult historic war-survival-groping towards peace process. On the other hand, precisely because it has received far less financial, food or personnel support it is better placed to act on its own priorities and perspectives using external actors in complementary roles and effectively resisting their efforts to dominate.

V.

Absolute Poverty Reduction - Urban Aspects

The question of how to enable urban resident afectados who choose not to return to rural areas to rise out of absolute poverty or destitution is harder to reconceptualise at strategic level than is the rural. In fact the forced migrant focus may be - in Mozambique almost certainly is - a poor entry point to reducing urban poverty.

1. the largest single contribution to reviving urban employment and incomes would be revival of rural production (providing food and raw materials which create through their sale effective demand for urban goods and services). This is particularly true of Mozambique but also

relevant to Angola whose oil enclave is much more a revenue focus than a major source of demand for domestic production;

2. the main mechanism for reducing absolute poverty is increasing real wages (currently - after an increase fought through in the teeth of external opposition - about \$20 a month versus a \$75 per month household absolute poverty line in Mozambique) both to reduce poverty and to increase economic efficiency (which turns on labour cost per unit of output not per day);
3. with the second key mechanism increasing both recorded and unrecorded (so called "informal sector") wage employment;
4. plus some form of safety net income transfers to destitute households (which in Maputo include these of up to 30% of civil servants!);
5. in a context in which absolute poverty is of the order of 50% and within it destitution (under \$50 a month household expenditure) up to 30%;
6. and in which the typical household above the destitution line has more than one source of income and more than one earner - including at least one recorded wage earner;
7. while most destitute and absolutely poor households suffer from low real wages and too many mouths per economically active pair of hands, not unemployment nor literal underemployment in the sense of unused time.

This model is based on the Maputo Household Survey and its analysis in the context of Mozambique's strategic priority to absolute poverty reduction. It may be less applicable to Luanda (assuming its up to 500,000 clear war pushed residents seek to remain there after peace is restored). There creating more recorded or "informal" (micro enterprise, construction team, artisanal and petty commercial "day credit", i.e. or putting out or day labour) employment might logically take pride of place but real wage increases and safety nets would be important complements in any holistic approach.

The model suggests that while in rural areas livelihood rehabilitation for forced migrants and other war afflicted (pauperised in place, demobilisado)

households is the appropriate strategic organising focus in urban areas it is absolutely poor/destitute household livelihood rehabilitation which provided the best focus. In Mozambique under 5% of forced migrants are urban residents and they constitute under 15% of the urban absolutely poor with not very evident special characteristics differentiating them from other absolutely poor households in ways either justifying or requiring separate programmes.

There is another problem at strategic level - urban poverty reduction programming in SSA has had little systematic attention and less success, partly because until the 1980s urban absolutely poor were a very small proportion of all absolutely poor households and also were - or at least were believed to be - a small proportion of all urban households. A check list of component measures toward a strategy can be identified but even in Mozambique (and even more in Angola) most are not clearly articulated nor is there capacity for more than broad "testing" type operations:

1. protecting real minimum wages and pushing them up within five years to 50% to 60% of the households absolute poverty line;
2. operating within a macro economic policy framework and with a complementary rural Reconstrucao strategy enabling and fuelling revival of urban purchases from and production/sales to the countryside to boost employment (recorded and "informal") and real wages;
3. providing technical assistance, training and (commercial rate) credit to micro enterprises and to artisans/household enterprises;
4. restoring and expanding small scale peri urban (canisa) infrastructure (e.g. roads, drainage, zonas verdes infrastructure as well as that for primary health, education and water supply services);
5. expanding basic human and social investment services (health-education-water-sanitation-extension) toward universal access;
6. creating income transfer safety nets for destitute households.

In each area there are working examples in Mozambique (the income transfer safety net now reaches 100,000 people rising at 7,500 to 10,000 per month toward a nominal eligibility estimate of 900,000) but there is not to date, broad access (even on basic services beyond health and the first three

years of education) nor an integrated strategic approach. Angola - partly because of a tendency to favour the large scale and capital intensive, i.e. "modern" which is much stronger and, up to a point, more financeable than in Mozambique - has not moved as far except for primary education and, perhaps, primary health care.

VI.

Is Reconstrucao Financeable? Sustainable? Efficient?

No strategic option in Sub-Saharan Africa is saleable unless it can demonstrate some claim to be financeable, financially sustainable once initial resource injections are completed and at least moderately output value/input cost efficient. That is particularly true of countries whose budgets, import capacity and senior technical personnel cadres are heavily dependent on external transfers. The "particularly" certainly applies to Mozambique but much less to Angola. The basic point does apply to Angola which has had a somewhat higher production, technical potential, export/revenue focus in its allocation policy than Mozambique which has (not always very effectively) given high priority to Adam Smith's interlocked dictums that no nation could be great and prosperous so long as the majority of its citizens were poor and miserable; that empowering them to climb out of that condition was a "moral economic" priority and that ensuring or creating an enabling climate for such empowerment was a prime duty of the state.

To attempt detailed macro economic costings and output generation impact, export/import and revenue generation vs costs of continuing (basic service/infrastructure/safety net) operations after Reconstrucao proper as well as potential contributions to national food balance and reduction of the proportion of households in absolute poverty in either Angola or Mozambique has, at present, a certain resemblance to trying to make a brick wall from a handful of straws.

However, fairly rough orders of magnitude projections which have some claim to being attainable can be made. To do so is necessary to validate the strategy as potentially feasible (and thereby to mobilise resources for it) and to create a workable overall framework for articulating, phasing,

financing and acting. Mozambique has carried out such an exercise. Tables showing some of the main parameters - but having in themselves no official standing - appear as the Annex to this paper. No similar exercise - and especially quantification - appears to have been attempted in Angola.

One point not clearly stressed in the Tables is very important. The total annual cost to the international community of Emergency Programme support to Mozambique and to Mozambican refugees is of the order of \$500 million a year. Therefore, over a nominal (and for institutional, personnel and knowledge reasons, probably actual) five year Reconstrucao/Rehabilitacao Programme a total of \$2,500 million (less continuing survival support especially in the first two years) can be made available without additional overall external transfers. The total programme cost is estimated at \$2,000 million (Annex - Tables 2, 3 and 4).

More detailed implications from the projections are:

- a. a cost of \$1,750 per household whose livelihood rehabilitation is made possible (plus about \$1,500 of its own labour and time investment in clearing, rebuilding and training) including services, infrastructure, loans for employment and commercial network restoration and expansion;
- b. with an overall GDP payoff by the year after the 5 Year Programme (nominally 1998/99) of the order of \$900 million;
- c. a "1998/99" net budgeting improvement of \$20 million plus (including a \$50 million reduction of defence costs);
- d. a broadly neutral (\$140 million each way) external balance impact;
- e. on the order of 3,000,000 tonnes grain equivalent additional food production allowing a national food deficit reduction to about 7% (10% urban/6% rural) consistent with a reduction in food aid from 500,000 to 200,000 tonnes;
- f. absolute poverty reduction from 65% of all households in 1990/91 to 24% in 1998/99 (and from 90% to 25% for the 1,000,000 households requiring livelihood rehabilitation empowerment);

- g. significant increases in total external resource transfers in the first half of the programme period (against a base excluding refugee support) but lower ones by the end of the programme.

These results appear to be attainable (assuming the strategy is sold and funded) even if they are clearly order of magnitude not econometric projections. In one sense they are very modest - restoring Mozambique's overall household social and economic position as of 1998/99 to slightly better than Tanzania's today. But for absolutely poor Mozambicans that would be a massive achievement and would lay a base (not least in restored confidence in the possibility of forward progress) for a positive dynamic from the achieved base.

Prolegomenon

The main conclusions which may - however tentatively - be drawn from available evidence are:

1. rehabilitation of the livelihoods of forced migrants is central to the rural economic, food balance and human restoration of both Angola and of Mozambique;
2. in the case of Angola, it is not central to overall macroeconomic growth but in Mozambique it is;
3. to carry out such an absolute poverty reduction focused Reconstruction strategy is technically feasible and - at least in Mozambique - has the firm backing of some of the political and institutional big battalions;
4. but the reconceptualisation (including that of Emergencia optics from survival to rehabilitation) and the technical difficulties are daunting;
5. and - for Mozambique at least - so is mobilisation of required levels of donor conviction to secure crucial external resource transfers;
6. even though reasonable projections suggest macroeconomic viability and sustainability conditions can be met and substantial progress toward food sufficiency and absolute poverty reduction goals made over five years.

That is a set of conclusions which - if accepted - are a prolegomenon to action. To advocate them as a basis for action is akin to the Sukuma proverb:

Rabbit, rabbit where are you going?
I'm going out to kill the elephant.
Rabbit, rabbit can you really do that?
Well, I'll try and try again.

Perhaps unfortunately, while the tale indicates that the rabbit did achieve his goal it does not enlighten us as to how!

Annex

Rural and Urban Livelihood Rehabilitation:

Pro Forma Macroeconomic and Social

Pro Forma for Mozambique

(Demi-official thinkpiece and heuristic exercise
in context of Reconstrucao planning - June 1992)

Table 1

Rural livelihood Rehabilitation 1993/4 - 1997/8
Numbers of Households¹ and Possible Phasing

Category	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6	1996/7	1997/8	Total
Refugees (Externally Displaced) ²	40,000	70,000	50,000	40,000	15,000	215,000
Displaced (Internal Refugees)	40,000	70,000	50,000	40,000	15,000	215,000
Affected (Forced To Move) ³	100,000	150,000	100,000	50,000	30,000	430,000
Pauperised In Place ⁴	25,000	50,000	40,000	20,000	5,000	140,000
Demobilised Ex-Combatants ⁵	40,000	50,000	10,000	-	-	100,000
Total⁶	245,000	390,000	250,000	150,000	65,000	1,100,000

Notes:

1. Average household size estimated at 7 persons except for ex-Combatants estimated at 5. Approximately 55% children under 15, 25% adult women, 20% adult men. One household in 4 female headed.
2. Official UNHCR estimates of 1.3 million persons exclude non-registered refugees in Zambia and also Swaziland and South Africa. On the other hand, they overstate Malawi where registering new arrivals is prompt and efficient but deleting returnees is neither, understandably from a Malawian perspective.
3. Households not in camps (effective distinctive characteristic of deslocados) forced to move by war and neither incorporated in urban life nor satisfactorily resettled from their own perspective (Many of new Beira Corridor residents are satisfactorily resettled but relatively few elsewhere).
4. Living in or near ruins of homes but with total or near total loss of residences, seeds, tools, food stocks, livestock.
5. Rural background households (20,000 in urban reconstruction estimates for urban background households).
6. Phasing highly approximate. Constraints are drought, security, capacity of agencies and state to assist. Larger 1994/5 targets would be desirable but financial, personnel and institutional limitations would make them dangerous because unassisted returnees are likely to fail to re-establish themselves and to flee again or even - as has happened - die.

Table 2

Rural Reconstruction: Toward Costing
(000 1991 Price \$)

Category	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6	1996/7	1997/8	Total ^{1,3}
<u>A. Household Re-</u>						
<u>establishment</u>	117,500	187,500	122,500	77,500	36,500	540,000
Internal Transport ¹	(12,500)	(20,000)	(12,500)	(7,500)	(3,000)	(55,000)
Food ²	(75,000)	(120,000)	(80,000)	(50,000)	(25,000)	(350,000)
Tools/Seeds/House-						
hold Equipment ³	(25,000)	(40,000)	(25,000)	(15,000)	(6,000)	(110,000)
Construction						
Materials/						
Simple Equipment ⁴	(5,000)	(7,500)	(5,000)	(5,000)	(2,500)	(25,000)
<u>B. Physical Infra-</u>						
<u>structure Rehabil-</u>						
<u>itation⁵</u>	25,000	50,000	75,000	50,000	50,000	250,000
<u>C. Basic Service Rest-</u>						
<u>oration/Extension⁶</u>	50,000	75,000	125,000	125,000	75,000	450,000
<u>D. Market Revival</u>	32,500	65,000	67,500	97,500	37,500	300,000
Retail Enterprise						
Infrastructure						
(Vehicles/Working						
Capital) ⁷	(25,000)	(50,000)	(50,000)	(75,000)	(25,000)	(225,000)
Ditto Wholesale						
Enterprise ⁸	(5,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(15,000)	(10,000)	(50,000)
Associated Public						
Infrastructure ⁹	(2,500)	(5,000)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(2,500)	(25,000)
<u>E. Associated Items</u>	19,000	26,250	14,750	7,500	5,000	72,500
Refugee Return ¹⁰	(5,000)	(7,500)	(5,000)	(5,000)	(2,500)	(25,000)
Demobilisation						
Allowances ¹¹	(9,000)	(11,250)	(2,250)	-	-	(22,500)
Planning/Coordination						
(DNP, CCPs, Prov.						
Works) ¹²	(5,000)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(2,500)	(2,500)	(25,000)
TOTAL	244,000	303,750	404,750	357,500	304,000	1,612,500

Notes:

1. From present location to home area. \$50/household.
2. 9 to 15 months to first main crop. \$300-325/household including transport.

3. Tools to clear and till land and to rebuild home, tools, small stock, fishing equipment, seeds, basic household equipment - e.g. water pails. \$100/household including transport.
 4. Beams, poles, bricks, carpentry tools, block making machines, cement. Say \$1,000 per village of 400 households.
 5. Roads, culverts, ditches, small scale irrigation, ponds, other public buildings.
Rough breakdown:

Wages Seasonal Local Labour	125,000,000
Other Wages and Salaries	25,000,000
Hand Tools	10,000,000
Other Equipment	25,000,000
Construction Inputs (Pipe/Pumps/ Bitumen/Cement/Wood/etc.)	65,000,000
 6. Primary Health, Education, Agricultural Extension, Water.
Rough breakdown:

Wages, Salaries, Training	150,000,000
Operating Materials (Drugs/ Texts/Chalk/etc.)	100,000,000
Equipment (Blackboards, Furniture, Vehicles, etc.)	75,000,000
Buildings, Other Fixed Plant	100,000,000
- (Rural service expansion/rehabilitation recurrent and capital cumulative over five years.)
7. Loans to 2,500 newly re-established rural merchants/transporters at \$40,000 each - lorry, stock in trade finance. Loans to 500-750 co-operatives (expansion of capital base or new activity) at comparable capital input. \$100 million subsequent finance (loan) of vehicle-warehouse-working capital expansion in addition to reinvested enterprise earnings.
 8. Analogous to Note 7 for wholesale sector-private enterprises, co-ops and (as guarantor of minimum prices and of competition) Agricon.
 9. Warehouses, markets, selected medium scale works.
 10. \$100-125 per person. Presumptively UNHCR financed. Subsequent expenses for refugees incorporated in main programme heads. About 20% of totals.
 11. Initial allowance of \$150 per person at time of turning in gun and equipment. Plus 50% addition for 'surplus' guns from Mozambique or South Africa turned in. Subsequent expenses incorporated in main programme heads (about 9% of totals).
 12. Training, equipment, staff gap filling in coordination units - DNP, Provincial Planning Directorates - and crucial operating units especially Provincial Works Directorates (engineers, draughtsmen, artisans, foremen) to design/operate small fixed capital unit components of programme.
 13. Rounded especially in "A" so line totals may not add exactly.

Table 3

Urban Reconstruction: Toward Costing
(000 1991 Price \$)

Category	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6	1996/7	1997/8	Total ^{1,3}
A. Household						
<u>Re-establishment</u>	13,000	20,500	19,500	18,000	13,000	84,000
Demobilisation ⁷	(8,500)	(10,000)	(1,500)	-	-	(19,500)
Interim Food Security ²	(3,000)	(8,000)	(15,000)	(15,000)	(11,000)	(52,000)
Artisanal Tools ³	(500)	(500)	(500)	(500)	-	(2,000)
Construction Materials/ Simple Equipment ⁴	(1,000)	(2,000)	(2,500)	(2,500)	(2,000)	(10,000)
B. Secondary Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation⁵	5,000	10,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	60,000
C. Basic Service Rehabilitation/Extension⁶	10,000	15,000	25,000	25,000	15,000	90,000
D. Market Revival⁷	12,750	13,250	24,500	32,250	32,250	115,000
Small/Medium Enterprise ⁸	(7,500)	(7,500)	(15,000)	(22,500)	(22,500)	(75,000)
Micro/Artisanal Enterprise ⁹	(3,750)	(3,750)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(30,000)
Labour Intensive Technology ¹⁰	(500)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,250)	(1,250)	(5,000)
Financial System Training ¹¹	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(5,000)
E. Associated Items	3,000	3,500	1,250	1,250	1,000	10,000
Refugee Return ¹²	(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)	(N/A)
Demobilisation Planning/Coordination	(2,000)	(2,500)	-	-	-	(4,500)
	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,250)	(1,250)	(1,000)	(5,500)
TOTAL	43,750	62,250	82,250	91,500	76,250	358,000

Notes:

1. Assumes 20,000 households. If over one-sixth of estimated demobilised are urban in origin this figure would be higher and analogous rural one lower. Divided into interim employment/training/household equipment and allowance on turning in arms and equipment.
2. Approximately 80,000 waged urban households are below the absolute poverty line because the minimum monthly salario is well below \$30. In principle a food supplement (to minimum wage for large households) and food subsidy programme do cover them as well as

the 120,000 who are in absolute poverty because of low household labour power. In fact both administrative and funding problems limit coverage. By 1996/97 the real minimum salario should - with recovery - have risen above \$30 per month after which general economic development will be relevant to the 120,000 and to a degree the 80,000 (though to few of the 120,000). Interim coverage of 10,000 households in 1993/4, 25,000 in 1994/5, 45,000 in 1996/7 and 35,000 in 1997/8 could reduce interim absolute poverty at \$250 to \$350 per year per household (including administration).

3. Many urban artisans (ex-artisans) cannot restore their livelihoods because they lack some or all of basic toolkit. Assumes 10,000 tool kits (tailors, builders, woodworkers, etc.) at average cost of \$200.
4. For self-help housing including neighbourhood block, brick making in canisas. Perhaps contributions - in kind - to 50,000 houses at \$100 each and 500 neighbourhood simple equipment sets at \$500 plus \$2.5 million training in simple construction/construction material skills
5. Excludes centre city main works and all main roads. Primarily ditches, drainage, levelling, minor public buildings, markets, etc., in canisas and some similar supporting work in poorer concreto areas. To be organised on labour intensive basis.
6. Rough estimate. Urban basic services are quantitatively less inadequate than rural but have significant quality problems. Figure excludes secondary/tertiary education and main hospitals but includes primary service worker (re)training and some secondary unit (e.g. small town hospital) rehabilitation or construction.
7. Market revival. While medium and large urban enterprises have more access to credit, present profit flows and foreign exchange than do rural this does not apply to artisanal, micro, small and newer medium scale ones other than urban transport. Employment, availability of goods/services, rehabilitation of two way urban-rural economic links all point to credit-training-technical services (e.g. accounting) packages accessible to these enterprises building on the Ministry of Labour and other body's experience.
8. 1,000 enterprises at \$50,000 average credit plus \$25 million applied skill and managerial training, services (especially accounting), administration and research. Probable employment 10,000 to 15,000.
9. 2,000 enterprises at \$10,000 average credit plus \$10 million related training, services, administration. Probable employment 10,00 to 15,000.
10. Pilot projects, adaptation/training, popularisation with special reference to construction (including mainline Urban Rehabilitation and large building construction not itself included as part of Reconstrucao).
11. The medium through artisanal loan scheme's sustained success depends on training/retraining commercial bank (public and private) personnel to allow an adequate capacity to process and to evaluate loan applications promptly.
12. Very few refugees are from cities or large towns. Small town and rural wage earning households usually also engage (of necessity) in sector familial production. Therefore all refugees are treated as wage earners. Persons who chose to enter urban areas during war - rather than entering deslocado camps or afectado resettlement - are among intended beneficiaries of main Urban Reconstrucao programmes but are not targeted as a separate category.
13. Some totals may not add exactly because of rounding.

Table 4

National Reconstruction: Possible Funding Projections
(\$000 1991 Prices)

Category	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6	1996/7	1997/8	Total
A. <u>Reallocation</u> ¹	40,000	190,000	290,000	345,000	325,000	1,190,000
From Emergencia ²	-	(50,000)	(125,000)	(200,000)	(200,000)	(575,000)
From Large Capital Projects ³	(25,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)	(75,000)	(50,000)	(350,000)
From Technical Assistance ⁴	(5,000)	(10,000)	(15,000)	(20,000)	(25,000)	(75,000)
From Military Expenditure ⁵	(10,000)	(30,000)	(50,000)	(50,000)	(50,000)	(190,000)
From Other Recurrent ⁶	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	(-)
B. <u>Special</u>	79,500	121,500	95,000	73,500	44,500	414,000
Refugees ⁷	(40,000)	(64,000)	(56,500)	(42,500)	(26,500)	229,500
Demobilisation ⁸	(39,500)	(57,500)	(38,500)	(31,000)	(18,000)	184,500
C. <u>Domestic</u>	1,000	8,000	21,000	45,000	80,000	155,000
Fiscal Gain From Programme ⁹	(-)	(5,000)	(15,000)	(35,000)	(65,000)	(120,000)
User Contributions ¹⁰	(1,000)	(3,000)	(5,000)	(10,000)	(15,000)	(35,000)
D. <u>Sub-total</u> ¹	120,500	319,500	406,000	463,500	449,500	1,759,000
E. <u>Additional External Flow Needed</u> ¹¹	166,500	46,500	84,000	(14,500)	(69,250)	214,000
TOTAL ¹²	287,750	366,000	490,000	449,000	380,250	1,973,000

Notes:

1. Reallocation from 1991/2 levels of expenditure. In 1991/2 prices except for minimum salario rise to \$40. Does not include reduction of UNHCR, host government, local community contribution to refugees which now probably exceeds \$250,000,000 a year.
2. Excludes additional (to 1991/2 based) drought related costs.
3. Existing projects and successors. Assumes some new large capital intensive projects late in period with shift to developmento. Excludes new enterprise related, financially and externally self-liquidating enterprise investment, e.g. natural gas export, electricity production/transmission linked to exports (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland) and to direct import substitution (Maputo).

4. Substitution of domestic training (in this programme) for overseas training and of support for qualified Mozambican for provision of expatriates.
5. Wages, arms, vehicles, equipment, ammunition, fuel, spares, rations. Calculations speculative until trend of security makes possible detailed military spending reduction programme.
6. Total non Reconstrucao Recurrent spending is too low to provide basic minima of governance, services. Savings on some heads will be needed for increases on others.
7. UNHCR plus bilateral donors with peace promotion linked aid programmes (e.g. Japan). Calculated at external travel plus 20% of household rehabilitation and 10% of related service and infrastructure costs set out in Table 2. Refugees are 20% of total households covered.
8. Separate funding from bilaterals specifically concerned with restoration of peace, e.g. Switzerland, Italy Japan. Includes direct demob payment plus 9% rural household plus related services/infrastructure costs from Table 2. Demobilised households are estimated at 9% of all covered. Table 3 programme for domobilisados includes year's interim employment plus retraining.
9. Roughly estimated at 20% of programme generated additions to commercialised Gross Domestic Production. See Table 5 for fuller estimation for 1998/99.
10. Very rough estimate. Includes labour, materials, food as well as cash contributions.
11. Requirement for grants, very soft loans or reductions in actual external debt service payments (excluding arrears write-off or non-serviceable portion of amounts nominally due). Numbers in () are negative (i.e. reduction in external resource transfer requirement).
12. Equal To Costs from Tables 2, 3.

Table 5

1998/99 Reconstrucao GDP Impact
(\$000 at 1991 prices)

A. Additional Rural GDP Related To Reconstrucao

1. <u>Sector Familiar</u> ¹ (Programme Households)	<u>Provisioning</u>	<u>Sold</u>	<u>Total</u>
▪ Food (including animals, fish) ²	185,000	65,000	250,00
▪ Non-Food Crops (including Forest Products) ³	5,000	100,000	105,000
▪ Artisanal Products ⁴	35,000	15,000	50,000
▪ Home Farm Construction ⁵	55,000	-	55,000
▪ Basic Services In Kind ⁶	5,000	-	5,000
▪ Wages From Infrastructure Rehabilitation ⁷	-	25,000	25,000
TOTAL	285,000	205,000	490,000
Per Household (\$) ⁸	\$260	\$190	\$450
Rural Absolute Poverty Line ⁹		\$470 - \$520	
2. <u>Sector Familiar</u> ¹⁰ (Other Households)	30,000	20,000	50,000
	<u>Wages</u>	<u>Other Value Added</u>	<u>Total</u>
3. <u>Public Services</u> ¹¹	30,000 ⁷	10,000	40,000
a) Basic Services	30,000	-	30,000
b) Infrastructure Rehabilitation	(7)	10,000	10,000 (35,000)
4. <u>Commerce/Transport</u> ^{11, 13}	All	Sold	107,500
a) Commerce ¹²			60,000
b) Transport ¹³			47,500
5. <u>Multiplier Effect</u> ¹⁵	Not Estimated		
TOTAL Reconstrucao Augmentation			
To Rural GDP ¹⁶	687,500		
Of Which Household Self Provisioning	(315,000)		

B. Additional Urban GDP Related To Reconstrucao

	<u>Provisioning</u>	<u>Sold</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Enterprise Added In Sales To: ¹⁷	-	175,000	175,000
▪ Rural Sector Familiar	-	(90,000)	(90,000)
▪ Commerce/Transport	-	(40,000)	(40,000)
▪ Micro-Small Industry	-	(15,000)	(15,000)
▪ Urban Sector Familiar	-	(7,500)	(7,500)
▪ Public Service Wage Earners	-	(7,500)	(7,500)
▪ Exports	-	(15,000)	(15,000)
2. Urban Sector Familiar ("Informal")	2,000	12,000	14,000
Agriculture (Zonas Verdes) ¹⁸	(1,000)	(7,000)	(8,000)
Artisanal	(1,000)	(5,000)	(6,000)
3. Public Services	1,500	13,500	15,000
▪ Basic Services	(1,500) ¹⁹	(7,500)	(4,000)
▪ Infrastructure	(-)	(6,000)	(6,000)
4. TOTAL Direct Impact	3,500	201,500	205,000

5. Multiplier (25%) ²⁰	-	50,000	50,000
TOTAL - Urban GDP Increase Related To Reconstrucao ²¹	3,500	251,500	255,000
TOTAL - GDP Increase Related To Reconstrucao ^{16, 21, 22}	318,500	624,000	942,500

Notes:

1. Production for sale and household self-provisioning by the 1,100,000 households included in programme. Gross. Some households have low levels of present output not transferable on relocation. However, as this affects only 425,000 deslocado households and their production is (as valued) perhaps \$100 per household the difference is under 10%. All items valued at value added level.
2. Estimate 2,750,000 tonnes grain equivalent food of which 2,000,000 consumed by producers and 750,000 tonnes sold. Value at \$100/tonne farmgate less \$9.33/tonne purchased new labour inputs (\$25,000,000 total purchases). Relatively low as grain equivalent tonne of vegetables, fruits, livestock, fish fetches substantially more. (In the other crops cases also weighs substantially more.)
3. Includes both inputs into domestic industry and exports as well as household self-provisioning (especially in fuel). Probable leading crops cotton, cashew.
4. Furniture, clothing, metal products, etc. Assumed purchased input content \$10 million.
5. Assumed 1,100,000 homes lasting five years at value of \$250. No estimate of land improvements, tree crop stands, additions to livestock herds made.
6. Largely labour for construction materials, food, furnishings.
7. Labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation as cited in Table 2.
8. Relates to 1,100,000 households in programme.
9. Rough Estimation/Family of 7:

	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	
Food	\$500	\$225	¹⁻⁾
Housing	100	50	²⁻⁾
Transport/Water			
Fuel	75	25	³⁻⁾
Other Goods/Services	175	220	⁴⁻⁾ (170) ⁵⁻⁾
Total	\$850	\$520	(470)

- 1-) Farmgate prices plus limited purchases.
- 2-) Maintenance/Rebuilding Cost Valuation
- 3-) Fuel perhaps \$2.5 and Water \$5 on basis rural prices/User Fees in kind and cash. Commuter transport urban phenomenon.
- 4-) Same basket - urban prices plus 25%.
- 5-) Altered basket relating artisanal to product for household use and different tastes.

10. The physical infrastructure and commercial network rehabilitation plus immediate (e.g. time saved) benefits of basic services rehabilitation will enable output/income increases in other sector familial households as will enhanced provision of agricultural extension services. Roughly estimated as equal to 10% of programme households' gains. On 30,000 present households that is \$170 per household.
11. Rough estimates based on Sector Familial sales/purchases. Value added basis.
12. 10% sales plus 15% purchases.
13. 10% sales plus 10% purchases.
14. Sales (Market Prices - including inputs plus value added)

Food/Other Crops	204.5 million
Artisanal Products	<u>19.5</u> "
	224.) "

Purchases

Sales	224 million
Infrastructure Wages	<u>25</u> "
	249 "

15. Presumably some multiplier can be expected. However, because basic rural purchases from the rural sector familial are relatively low (perhaps \$35 to \$40 million) the multiplier effect would be very low. Would tend to be partial offset of overestimation cited in Note 1.
16. Rural GDP will also rise from non-Reconstrucao Cotton Authority, Cashew Authority, Commercial Farmer and provision of competent training/extension to Irrigation schemes. This could amount to \$20 to \$25 million on food crops and \$25 to \$50 Million on non-food crops at value added level and \$50 to \$87½ million at sales level. If 1,500,000 rural households in 1998/9 that is \$30 to \$50 per household.
17. Assumptions:
 - a. Additional gross sales to rural sector equal additional sector familial purchases plus Commerce/Transport value added, less \$40 million rural-rural.
 - b. Sales to Micro-Small Industry equal wages plus one half other sectoral value added. Sales to commercialised Zonas Verdes and to the artisanal sector = value added. (Wages = 25,000 X \$600 = \$15,000,000; Artisanal Value Added 10,000 X \$500 = \$5,000,000; Zonas Verdes commercialised Value Added \$7,000,000; Other Value added \$20,000,000.)
 - c. Sales to public service wage earners equal wages (\$12,500,000).
 - d. Rural sales reduced by 33¹/₃% for transport/rural commerce content; urban by 5% for inputs into urban transport/commerce.
 - e. Value added estimated at 65% of (a + b) reduced by c. Allows 20% operating and spares imports, 2½% purchases from rural sector, 12½% taxes (actual collection of turnover taxes licenses not nominal amount due).
 - f. Guesstimate of \$25 million exports (fob) at 60% value added. The GDP here is value added in all urban sectors including commerce, transport and other enterprise/household produced services.

18. Assumes small urban infrastructure (e.g. drainage, small scale irrigation, roads, canisa site and service plot preparation, latrines) and time saving from closer water and health services empowers increase of 10,000 tonnes self-provisioning food (\$100/tonne) and 25,000 tonnes commercialised food (\$200/tonne) plus \$2 million fuel, building materials, other non-food crops.
19. User contribution in labour, food, materials to service cost. (Cash payments assumed to be \$6 million.)
20. This is a relatively low estimate because first round on wage incomes has already been taken into account.
21. Does not include large enterprise, Urban Rehabilitation and other Heavy Infrastructure (e.g. Railways and Ports) projects not within Reconstrucaao.
22. Not directly comparable to present GDP estimates. These seriously underestimate current price GDP by using massively too low domestic price levels and inflation rates and very incomplete coverage of co-op, informal and private enterprise commercial agriculture and of small scale and artisanal urban production of goods and services which are only partly offset by massive overestimation of households self-provisioning (subsistence) agricultural output.

Table 6

Reconstrucao Fiscal Impact 1998/99
(\$ 000 Semi 1991 prices)¹

A. <u>Revenue</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Total</u>
Additional Tax Revenue (20% Additional Commercialised GDP) ²	50,500	74,500	125,000
Cash Contributions To Basic Service Costs	6,000	12,500	18,500
TOTAL	56,000	87,000	143,000
B. <u>Expenditure</u>			
Basic Services ³			
Wages	10,000	30,000	40,000
Other	10,000	30,000	40,000
Small Scale Infrastructure ⁴			
Wages	5,000	25,000	30,000
Other	7,500	37,500	45,000
Interim Food Security ⁵	7,500	-	7,500
Continued Artisanal/Small Ent- erprise Enabling ⁶	7,500	7,500	15,000
Gross Additional Expenditure	47,500	130,000	177,500
Less:			
User Contribution In Goods/Labour ⁷	1,500	5,000	6,500
Reduction Military Expenditure ^{8,9}	[12,500]	[37,500]	50,000
Total Offsets	14,000	42,500	56,500
Net Additional Expenditure	33,500	87,500	106,000
C. <u>Net Fiscal Gain (Cost)</u>	<u>23,000</u>	<u>(500)</u>	<u>22,500</u>

Notes:

1. 1991 Prices except assumes real minimum salario moves to \$40 minimum efficiency level.
2. Shorthand estimate roughly comparable to other serious tax effort primarily agrarian Sub-Saharan African economies, e.g. Tanzania. By definition excludes Household Self-Provisioning from tax base.
3. Assumes continued build-up beyond 1997/98 levels.
4. Assumes continued run-down from 1995/96 peak levels as rehabilitation backlog reduced.
5. Continued run-down as real minimum wage recovery reduces numbers covered.
6. Training and Services - Loan Funds assumed by 1998/99 to have become largely revolving with additional investment in them on subsequent Developmento capital account.
7. See Table 5.
8. Urban (25%), Rural (75%) arbitrary - based on projected 1998/99 population division.
9. See Table 4 - Note 5.

Table 7

Reconstrucao GDP External Balance¹ Impact 1988/89
(000 \$)

<u>Exports</u>	
Rural ²	115,500
Urban ³	<u>25,000</u>
TOTAL Additional Exports	<u>140,500</u>
 <u>Imports</u>	
Urban Goods Inputs ⁴	55,000
Rural Goods Inputs ⁵	NA
Transport ⁶	50,000
Government Services ⁷	<u>50,500</u>
Gross Additional Imports	<u>155,500</u>
 Less:	
Reduction Military Imports ⁸	<u>25,000</u>
NET Additional Imports	<u>135,000</u>
NET Balance Improvement	<u>+ 5,000</u>

Notes:

1. Excludes grant, loan items. Specifically excludes reductions in food aid which affects Import/Export sides equally. (See Table 9.)
2. \$96,250,000 farmgate plus \$19,250,000 (20%) transport/commerce to fob.
3. See Table 5 - Note 17.
4. 20% of Gross Sales. (See Table 5 - Note 17.)
5. Included in Urban Goods Sales.
6. Rough estimate fuel, spares, replacement lorries.
7. 75% Non Wage spending on Basic Services, Small Scale Infrastructure from Table 6. Dominated by drugs and other medical supplies and paper/textbooks.
8. Rough implicit assumption is that net military savings include \$25,000 on items other than wages/rations/local purchases. Gross savings on the domestic purchases rations and wages items from Demobilascao should be of the order of \$30,000 but net will be substantially lower because of improved pay/rations/uniforms needed to achieve professionalism in 20,000 to 25,000 professional army post Demobilascao.

Table 8

Food (in) Balance - Reconstrucao Impact
(000 tonnes grain equivalent)

	<u>1990/91</u>	<u>1998/99</u>		
Population In Mozambique ¹	<u>12,500,000</u>	<u>18,250,000</u>		
Food Requirement ²	4,500,000 (100%)	6,570,000 (100%)		
Domestic Production ³	<u>2,750,000 (61%)</u>	5,710,000 (87%)		
Urban (Zonas Verdes)	<u>(150,000) (3%)</u>	<u>(185,000) (1%)</u>		
Household Consumed	(50,000) (1%)	(60,000) (-)		
Commercialised	(100,000) (2%)	(125,000) (1%)		
Rural	<u>(2,600,000) (57%)</u>	<u>(5,525,000) (84%)</u>		
Household Consumed	(2,200,000) (48%)	(4,400,000) (73%)		
Commercialised ⁴	(400,000) (9%)	(1,225,000) (11%)		
Imports ⁵	<u>625,00 (14%)</u>	<u>400,000 (6%)</u>		
Food Aid	(500,000) (11%)	(200,000) (3%)		
Commercial/Parallel	<u>(125,000) (2%)</u>	<u>(200,000) (3%)</u>		
Food Deficit	<u>1,125,000 (25%)</u>	<u>460,000 (7%)</u>		
<u>Urban/Rural Breakdown⁵</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Population In Mozambique	<u>3,000,000</u>	<u>9,500,000</u>	<u>4,500,000</u>	<u>13,750,000</u>
Food Requirement ⁶	1,080,000	3,420,000	1,620,000	4,950,000
Domestic Production	<u>500,000</u>	<u>2,250,000</u>	<u>1,085,000</u>	<u>4,625,000</u>
Urban	(150,000)	(-)	(185,000)	(-)
Rural	<u>(350,000)</u>	<u>(2,250,000)</u>	<u>(900,000)</u>	<u>(4,625,000)</u>
Household Consumed	(50,000)	(2,200,000)	(60,000)	(4,300,000)
Commercialised	(450,000)	(50,000)	(1,025,000)	(325,000)
Imports ⁵	400,000	225,000	375,000	25,000
Food Deficit ^{3,7}	180,000 (17%)	945,000 (27%)	160,000 (10%)	300,000 (6%)

Notes:

1. The official United Nations/Government of Mozambique projection of 16,000,000 is clearly wrong. Subtractions include 1,500,000 refugees and 1,000,000 excess deaths resulting from war. Preliminary data in 1991 suggested a total population of 12,500,000. 1988/89 assumes return of 1,500,000 refugees plus a 30% increase on the base population of 14,000,000, or about 3% a year.
2. Production level required assumed to be 360 kilos grain equivalent per year based on 800 grammes per day consumption requirement adjusted to allow for 20% loss from harvest (or import) to consumption.
3. This figure is not a complete estimate. Additions resulting from programmes by government and enterprises outside Reconstrucao (e.g. competent training and extension in both large and small scale irrigation areas, commercial farm food output expansion) are not included. These could amount to perhaps 200,000 to 250,000 tonnes reducing the deficit by half to 3% to 4% of total requirement. That does not mean only 3% to 4% of households (7% on Table 8 figures) have less than fully adequate food supplies because of inequality in distribution.

However, it should more than halve severe malnutrition from over 20% to 8% to 10%.

4. Estimates include all marketed output-local trade, private, co-op not only officially recorded flows.
5. 1990/91 may understate commercial imports via informal (legal apart from customs/turnover tax evasion) imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi.
6. Assumes Urban population 4,500,000 in 1988/89 and Rural 13,750,000. Implicit urban population growth rate 7%.
7. 1990/91 deficit levels are plausible given known malnutrition data. 1989/90 estimate of slightly poorer urban than rural nutrition are not implausible; e.g. they probably parallel actual Tanzanian reality. They parallel estimates in Table 9 suggesting slightly higher proportions of absolute poverty (not numbers of absolutely poor people) in urban than in rural areas. Again this appears congruent with the present situation in Tanzania because while average urban household income is higher so too is inequality in food consumption and income. However, both differences are clearly within the margins of error of the projections.

Table 9

Absolute Poverty Reduction From Reconstrucao

<u>Category</u> ¹	<u>1990/91</u>	<u>1998/99</u>
Urban ²	<u>50%</u>	<u>27½%</u>
▪ Related To Low Wages ³	(20%)	(5%)
▪ Related To Low Labour Power of Household plus Unemployment ⁴	(30%)	(22½%)
Rural	<u>71%</u>	<u>22½%</u>
▪ Of Livelihood Rehab- ilitation Programme Households ⁵	(90%)	(25%)
▪ Of Other Households ⁶	(30%)	(20%)
TOTAL ⁷	<u>65%</u>	<u>24%</u>

Notes:

1. See Table 5 - Note 9 for Absolute Poverty Line Estimates.
2. The percentages are of total urban absolutely poor households not of sub-population groups absolute poverty percentages.
3. Reduction from raising minimum real salario to \$40 (at or approaching minimum efficiency level).
4. Reduction from retraining; higher productivity employment in "informal" as well as recorded sector; higher productivity employment artisanal, Zonas Verdes producers plus reduction in open unemployment (about 4% of potentially economically active persons in 1991).
5. See Table 5 - Section A and Note 9. Average income is perhaps 10% below absolute poverty line. This implies 20% to 30% of households would be below it depending on household income inequality.
6. Benefits from spin-off GDP impact noted in Table 5 - Section B and Note 10. Likely to be reduced further by rural output increases not related to Reconstrucao.
7. Because of parallel non-Reconstrucao generated economic recovery - both urban and rural - the actual 1989/90 absolute poverty outcome should be marginally to modestly better than these projections.