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THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
THE CASE OF THABA TSEKA, LESOTHO

Peter van Tilburg, Planning Advisor
Ministry of Interior, Chieftainship
Affairs and Rural Development, and
Project Member

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District Level Planning and
Rural Development Project
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Studies, National University
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| 4 | Ha 'Makhotse | 12 | Ha Lephol |
| 5 | Tlokoeng | 13 | Ha Letuka |
| 6 | Ha Rantsimane | 14 | Ha Lerontj |
| 7 | Mohlakeng | 15 | Ha Toka |
| 8 | Mantšonyane | 16 | Ha Matsumunyane |



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

a. Background of the present research

The present research on the role of local institutions in Thaba Tseka is a logical result of two related activities. On the one hand the activities of the District Level Planning and Rural Development Project, aiming , among other things, at supplying policy makers with the necessary information for decision making purposes in the field of district level planning. On the other hand, it resulted from the activities of the present author, who was a member of the project, though he worked within the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Interior, Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development, advising the Ministry in the field of District Development Planning. A model on District Development Planning (DDP) has been prepared [1], and this model has been thoroughly discussed by all planning staff of ministries concerned, as well as District Secretaries at a seminar in 1986. A revised model, resulting from this seminar is intended to become implemented in some districts as a planning experiment at district level. The model includes a comprehensive structure of the National Planning Cadre, as well as the complete planning process.

The overall proposed process of District Development Planning [2] focusses on a system whereby the first phase of the planning process, ie. the assessment of needs, is handled by the rural people themselves. These villagers will have to be the ones to initiate regional plans and projects. This means that development planning should really be based on a "bottom-up" approach: planning with rather than for the rural population. Though the overall planning structure has been accepted in principle, however, the precise way has still to be defined, as to how to stimulate as much as possible the rural people to participate, and how best local institutions can be organised in order to make participation effective. To find answers to these questions the present research has been executed in Thaba Tseka. The aim of the research is to comprehend which institutions could best participate and which roles these institutions could fulfil in order to guarantee, at least a certain level of motivation and consequently of local participation, in accordance with the District Development Planning model. Although the Village Development Councils will have to play a viable role in the planning activities, other institutions could, and actually should, participate as well.

The present report, as well as the mentioned model on District Development Planning, have taken into consideration the recently issued Development Councils Order.[3] This Order establishes Village Development Councils, Ward Development Councils, District Development Councils and District Secretaries, and it provides for their functions and activities. It is clear that this Order in certain ways overtook possible recommendations regarding the role of local institutions. However, in that document only general tasks are indicated, and it is uncertain if the Development Councils will ever be able to fulfil all those tasks. Furthermore, the Order engages itself only with the Development Councils and not with other formal and informal local institutions.

Although the present report is mainly based on field research in Thaba Tseka the conclusions are also based on cases taken from literature. [4] The present research does not, however, restrict itself to the analysis of the functioning and progress of the Village Development Councils, it also intends to analyse how best all existing local institutions can be utilised within the proposed District Development Planning activities. Chapter 2 will present a more general theoretical exposé of the role of local institutions, and will serve as a framework for analysis. The chapters 3 upto 6 will display and analyse the collected field data. Based on the analysed data the conclusions and recommendations are presented in the chapters 7 and 8 respectively.

b. Methodology

The Thaba Tseka district was selected as research area, because of the fact that in addition to the already executed research by the DLPRD Project in the lowlands and foothills, research was also to be done in the mountain areas. Furthermore, it was envisaged that Thaba Tseka was going to become one of the pilot districts for the planning experiment. [5] There was a danger, however, of getting information on a district which is not representative for the whole of Lesotho, since Thaba Tseka has experienced the Thaba Tseka Development Project. It will have effected the present level of participation. This effect could be

interpreted positively but also negatively. However, this paper is not a mere statistical analysis, and also the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the research data and literature are general enough to refer to other districts as well.

Two different types of surveys were being executed. Although they were ultimately aiming at the same object (ie. providing information for district planning purposes), they differed in content as well as approach. The Household survey collected purely statistical information by means of a fully pre-coded questionnaire. The Local Institutions research collected indepth information with two different, fully open questionnaires.

The sampling of the villages was done as follows. The district was divided into four regions, ie. mountain valleys, because of population concentration in those areas. The number of selected households (for the Household survey) was calculated by taking a 2.5% sample of the number of households per region. Doing so, we arrived at a total of 450 households for the whole district. As sampling unit the existing unit of Enumeration Areas (EA) was used. It was then decided to select a standard number of 30 households to be interviewed per Enumeration Area. The total number of Enumeration Areas per mountain valley was then calculated by deviding the number of sampled households per region by 30, in which way we were allowed to select 15 Enumeration Areas for the district as a whole. In each of the four regions (mountain valleys) one Enumeration Area was randomly selected and for the additional Enumeration Areas we selected bordering ones in order to avoid impossible transport situations. In each Enumeration Area one village was randomly selected, so that finally 15 villages were surveyed (see map).

The research on Local Institutions took place in all 15 villages, where different members of different institutions were interviewed. The selection of institutions had to be based on the importance given to them by the villagers themselves. It was often very difficult to find, in the course of one or two days, members of certain institutions, except those of the Village Development Councils. Therefore, the majority of the interviewees was a member of these Councils. Other unforeseen logistical and managerial problems during the fieldwork were responsible for a smaller number of interviews than was envisaged. The intention was that enumerators would not just ask for "yes" and "no", but would continue to ask for "why's". Two different questionnaires were used: one for the functioning of the institutions concerned and one for the analysis of possible projects in the village. Both questionnaires are attached in the Appendix. A total of ninety questionnaires were collected (see Table 1).

Table 1

Number of collected questionnaires)*

Village Number	Total	VDC	LAC	Health Inst's	Credit Unions	Burial Soc's	Agric. Inst's	Vill. Proj's
1	13	3	1	1	-	1	3	4
2	6	2	-	1	-	-	1	2
3	7	3	1	-	-	-	-	3
4	9	4	1	-	1	-	-	3
5	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
6	6	2	2	1	-	-	-	1
7	7	2	1	1	-	1	-	2
8	8	3	-	-	1	1	2	1
9	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	6	3	-	-	-	1	1	1
11	6	1	1	-	1	1	-	2
12	6	1	1	1	-	1	1	1
13	5	1	1	-	-	2	1	-
14	4	1	1	-	-	2	-	-
15	4	2	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	90	30	11	5	3	11	9	21

)*VDC: Village Development Council;
LAC: Land Allocation Committee.


The difference in number of questionnaires per village resulted from the fact that in some places information could be collected during several days, while in others all had to be done in a very limited period of time; sometimes even in one day. In order to get some supporting statistical data, the questionnaires on local institutions have been coded afterwards and computed and analysed by means of the SPSS programme. Since interviewees could give to many questions several answers (ranging from none at all, upto seven) the percentages being indicated in the following tables are related to the total number of the surveyed institutions concerned (the "Total"-line at the bottom of Table 1). These percentages therefore do not add up to hundred percent. The mentioned Agricultural Institutions include Agricultural Development Organizations, Farmer Development Organizations and Life-stock Security Institutions.

CHAPTER 2

LOCAL INSTITUTIONS; A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In analysing the role of local institutions in the development of their own rural areas, it has to be recognised which functions are to be expected from these institutions. Since this report is directed towards District Development Planning and not towards the broader concept of rural development, we will concentrate here on the different functions local institutions can perform in the process of planning. [6]

The planning functions and the way these are interconnected can schematically be summarised as follows:



Looking at the steps to be taken in the process of District Development Planning, as indicated above, it could easily be understood that local institutions in Lesotho will presently not be able to satisfactorily comply with all these activities. Even with proper training programmes it would be very unlikely that village institutions will ever be able to fulfil the full scala of mentioned functions. They will be able to assess their own needs (step 1a) and to mobilize local resources and services (step 5a). Implementation of projects and their monitoring and evaluation (steps 6 and 7) can only be tackled with the help of technically educated staff (like the Village Extension Team). All the other activities will have to be dealt with by formal and qualified institutions, most likely at district level, such as the District Development Committee and the District Planning Unit.

Based on these observations it can be concluded that there should be a structure in which local and district institutions are linked in a formal way. [7] The problem that arises here, as has been pointed out by several authors, is that the rural poor will only fruitfully participate in a local institution when they have built it up themselves. [8] Such an institution can also have the necessary feedback system to control its performance, which government institutions usually do not have since these are not specifically client-oriented. Therefore different types of institutions have to be identified in order to link "non-governmental" with "governmental" institutions to enable an optimal local participation and at the same time to provide the feedback on performances.

In this respect several subsidiary activities could be identified on the chart on page 7. The information necessary for the assessment on all the needs in a village could come from all different corners and sectors in that

village. Local resources and services could also be supplied by different institutions. The same applies to the implementation, and especially the evaluation, ie. the control, of projects. This means that different types of institutions, in terms of structure, aim, and of political bondage (governmental/non-governmental) can cooperate at village level within the District Development Planning process.

Different types of institutions can be identified at local level. In order to classify them, many variables could be appropriated, whereby for each variable the degree of occurrence in each institution can be identified. By doing so we will end-up with a complicated list of all institutions, emphasizing their uniqueness, rather than their universality. For purposes of analysis it is more convenient to assume a continuum for all variables, each ranging from one extreme (like: highest) to the other extreme (lowest). By grouping together all the variables at both extreme sides of the continua, two ideal-types of institution can then be identified. Ideal-type used here can then be defined as a hypothetical construction, which is made out of absolute, rather than normative components. The concept has therefore mainly a heuristic value, though its identifiable components or variables can be operationalised and quantified.

In this respect we can construct the following table, showing the two ideal-types:

type of continuum (variables)	Ideal-type A	Ideal-type B
Organization of rules and regulations	strict (written down)	free (oral)
Function	general develop- mental oriented	specific and/or ad hoc
Future orientation	long-term	short-term
Financial/Political control	governmental	non- governmental
Structure	hierarchical (institutiona- lized)	flexible (non-institu- tionalized)

One could easily conclude that formal institutions tend to have more criteria from the A-type, while voluntary institutions more from the B-type. This, combined with what has been said before, suggests that A-type institutions tends to have a relative high level of organization coupled with a low level of member motivation. The B-type, on the other hand, could be characterized as having a low level of organization and a relatively high level of member motivation. In an FAO report, based on country studies from 16 countries two types of local institutions are identified: "standard organizations" and "participatory organizations". [9] "Standard" organizations are classified as being founded and financed by government, with a top-down (trickle-down) approach, formal and official, inspired by western concepts, principles and policies, and mostly elite-oriented. "Participatory" organizations have the following characteristics: they are started by the local people themselves, they are informal and unofficial, they are flexible in their objectives and their leaders and members are mainly the poor, reaching decisions in face-to-face relationships.

For our purpose here we do not need to elaborate extensively upon all possible combinations of characteristics in order to classify the different local institutions. The above continua, however, show that in analysing the functioning of local institutions in the District Development Planning process we have to carefully consider the two mutually counterforcing core criteria: the organizational structure and level on one hand and the level of member motivation on the other hand. It appears that within the same institution these criteria are mutually exclusive. In general it can be concluded that the so-called "standard" organization has a proper organizational level and structure, while the "participatory" organization can be said to have a satisfactory level of member motivation.

Elsewhere research has shown that rural development measured by indicators of productivity, welfare and income distribution, proceeds more rapidly in countries where the people are organised in locally accountable membership organizations, than in countries without such groupings. These successful organizations seem to be not informal structures, but official institutions, deliberately sponsored and supported by public authority. [10] We, however, believe that both ideal-types of "standard" and "participatory" institutions are needed for a proper functioning of District Development Planning at village level; they are in fact mutually dependent in order to perform adequately. [11]

In Lesotho the role of local institutions, through which villagers could participate, has historically been mainly one of advising the chieftaincy. [12] The village "pitso" has been already from the start of the establishment of the Lesotho nation in the beginning of the 19th century, an institution within which participants could express themselves on important decisions in their village. It would have been in fact almost impossible for the chief to take decisions without proper consultations with his subjects.

In the course of years, the significance of the village "pitso" has declined. Several reasons can be found for this process. 1. The colonial government has tried to turn the "pitso" as a kind of local parliament, upside down and to make it a vehicle for indirect rule, using it as a channel to control the chieftaincy and to impose their ideas upon the people. 2. The chiefs obtained in 1938 statutory powers over administrative and judicial matters, which made them more a part of the modernizing government. 3. The development of modern institutions and the increasing number of educated villagers challenged the position of the chiefs who are themselves often uneducated, and consequently

decreased the status of their institutional forum. 4. The modernizing society needed more important decisions to be taken, having wider implications for which villagers or chiefs do not have an adequate insight or knowledge. 5. The overall politization of villagers, becoming more involved in national party politics, conflicted with the traditional authority system.

In this respect the establishment of new institutions, capable of handling more demanding tasks, seemed to have been a logic step. The VDC's originally were highly political bodies, supporting the ruling party. These Councils (Committees before) were supposed to send proposals for village projects to the District Development Council. However, their position is also only one of an advisory body. The same applies to the District Development Council and its relation to the Central Government.

In order to be able to realise some form of District Development Planning, involving local institutions, it is indispensable to have at least a certain level of organization in combination with a certain level of motivation. In this light it would be a logical step to try to link both types of "standard" and "participatory" institutions in a functional way. We are now able to formulate the aim of the present research more specifically: it is an attempt to compare the actual functioning of all types of local institutions with their potential activities, in the field of local participation, and to see how best the liaison between both ideal-types of institutions could be realised.

CHAPTER 3

PERFORMANCES OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

a. Roles and functioning

Of all the local institutions functioning in the village only the Village Development Council is known to be a true multi-purpose institution. By asking the villagers about which institutions are functioning in the village, only those, being mentioned in Table 1 were indicated. For other institutions in these remote villages no spokesperson was found. There were cases where local institutions were competing each other, instead of working together. It also appeared that health workers, though administratively belonging to the Village Development Council, were opposed by the chairperson or the chief, because of political, personal or family reasons. The result is that the few, small initiatives being undertaken in villages are often frustrated from the early beginning. Many local institutions are dormant or do not exist at all.

Another problem arising during the interviews is that one gets the impression that the answers given are according to how interviewees think the institution should function, and not how it actually functions. Moreover, one could argue that the answers put forward reflect the interviewee's perception of what the interviewer, ie. the Government would like to hear. In other

words the indicated functions of the institutions tend to be those which have been told to them, rather than those which they have experienced.

Crosschecking the answers of respondents sometimes indicated quite different performances of the same institution. One could even suggest that, often members are not aware of the discrepancy between the official functions of the institution and its actual performances. The used questionnaire allowed for this difference to be made. However, it appears that hardly anybody was able or willing to analyse these actual performances of her or his institution against the background of its official tasks. This indicates that villagers are at present not capable of critically evaluating institutions and projects. They need to be made aware of the difference between "official" and "actual" tasks of institutions and they need to be trained to be able to analyse discrepancies between these two. It should be mentioned here, that these observations relate to those institutions which are multi-purpose and/or are government sponsored, like the Village Development Council, Land Allocation Committee, Health Institutions and Credit Union. The activities of the Burial Society (Lipato) are clear and well understood; these institutions seem to function very well in the villages.

Another factor of confusion regarding the evaluation of the functioning of the institutions, is the mixture of moralities (seemingly of a christian origin) and basic human mentalities. Expressions like "the institution works for the people", is often to be heard. However, it appears that those institutions from which local people can derive personal profit are most in favour. It indicates that the villagers regard those institutions, as the Village Development Council and Land Allocation Committee, as not specifically meant for them, but "for the people", of which category they do not seem to form a part. It is even worse

when villagers indicate that "the Village Development Council is there to protect the interest of the Government in the village". The Government seems to exist for its own sake. This sadly shows that there are villagers who do not only have a wrong conception of their village level institution, but of their Government as well. These expressions may have come out of fear for the then powerful ruling party. In order to enjoy the confidence of the rural people, it should be the task of the Government to reduce its own image as the "Almighty Father" to realistic proportions.

Though, this misconception may be found in all strata of society, it nevertheless needs attention when we analyse the role of village level institutions in District Development Planning. We should not be confused by the contradiction between abstract philosophies about how one should act and concrete attitudes about how one really acts. This warning not only applies to planners and government personnel, but also to the villagers themselves. It should be made clear that the institutions are there for the benefit of the villagers and not the villagers for the benefit of the institutions. Similarly it has to be clarified that the Government of Lesotho exists for the sake of the Basotho and not the other way round. The present research indicates that the only solution towards a proper analysis of the performance of local institutions is to apply clear-cut indicators. This, however, would necessitate more detailed case studies on a very small scale.

Also in relation to the functioning of the chief, there are misleading perceptions, resulting in confusion. For example, when the Village Development Council is seen as an advisory body to the chief only, it is not clear in what position the institution stands towards the villagers. The chief was called by one respondent even "Our Almighty Father who governs us". Again, it is

necessary that villagers become aware of their real position in the village, not only in relation to their local institutions and their government, but also in relation to their chief. Certainly, since the present Government and the Chieftaincy are constitutionally integrated, this becomes even more a necessity. Local people have to become conscious citizens.

As far as respondents claim active involvement in certain institutions (especially the Village Development Council), there was sometimes confusion as to how she or he saw oneself acting in the institution. Answers like "doing development activities", "advising the villagers", "participating in development activities", or "looking after the welfare of the people", may relate to inconsistent translations of certain expressions from Sesotho into English. They are, however, too general and often conceal the respondent's ignorance regarding his or her actual terms of reference.

Villagers clearly made the distinction between their own institution and government institutions; however, this was related to the involvement of party politics. Their own institutions were considered politically "clean". Party politics contributed its own intricacy to the lack of clarity between fantasy and reality. It was said that opposition members "would spoil the position of institutions". One feared that this may lead to less support for projects in the village. Many other prodigious ideas about opposition party members were vented: they would let animals go to ranges unlawfully; they do not like to follow government laws; even: they are not devoted to work. It appears as if they are people coming from a completely different social and cultural background. Whereas in a proper democracy party politics is an ordinary phenomenon, in the situation, however, where only one party is allowed to operate, one could consider a hierarchical structure based on a traditional power system a better alternative. It is hoped that the Government will be able to abolish the extremely one-sided party politics at village level.

Regarding the actual field of activities of the local institutions, it is obvious that the Land Allocation Committee deals with land matters (though some informants indicated that tree planting and improvement of agricultural production formed part of its activities); health institutions with health, hygiene and nutritional matters; Credit Unions with loans, and the Burial Societies with helping the villagers in bearing the costs of funerals. It is remarkable that of the last three institutions only these functions were brought forward. It nevertheless appears that these institutions, especially the Burial Societies, also play an important social role in the sense that members discuss different village topics. For such multi-purpose institutions as the Village Development Council and agricultural institutions, the answers given regarding their functions were much more abstract. Table 2 indicates the roles designated to the Village Development Councils and agricultural institutions.

Table 2

Functions of VDC's and Agricultural Institutions
(% of total number of respective institutions)

	V D C		AGRIC. INST.	
	Nr.	%	Nr.	%
For development in village	14	46.7	2	22.2
Water supply/dams	13	43.3	-	-
Helping/advising the chief and/or villagers	9	30.0	6	66.7
Building latrines	9	30.0	-	-
Soil conservation	8	26.7	2	22.2
Building roads/paths	8	26.7	-	-
Protect village/keep discipline	6	20.0	2	22.2
Development grazing land	4	13.3	-	-
"Protect" Government in village	3	10.0	-	-
Improve agricultural production	3	10.0	5	55.6
Development of vegetable gardens	3	10.0	-	-
Health care	2	6.7	-	-
Job creation	1	3.3	-	-
Digging rubbish pits	1	3.3	-	-
Improve housing	1	3.3	-	-
Tree planting	1	3.3	-	-
Total number of institutions			30	9

When asked if one was satisfied with the indicated roles 81.2 % of all respondents answered in the affirmative, and 18.2 % said "no". When, furthermore those who answered in the negative were asked why they were not satisfied, more than half of them replied that the institution had not fulfilled their duties. Only two respondents understood the question properly, ie. whether or not they were content with the indicated roles, rather than with the fulfilment of these roles (see Table 3).

Table 3

Explanations for not being satisfied
of functioning institutions

	number	%
Institution has not done its job properly	7	53.8
Institution should have dif- ferent/more duties	2	15.4
Members are not paid	2	15.4
Lack of equipment	1	7.7
"What else can we do?"	1	7.7
Total	13	100.0

General problems referred to as causing mal-functioning of Village Development Councils are: lack of funds, lack of transport and accommodation when visiting the District Development Council in Thaba Tseka town, stagnated communication between the Village Development Council and the Community, and slow communication with the Government.

It has become clear as well that even Village Development Council members do not always understand the difference between the functions the institution supposes to have and those which it actually has. It appears as if each Village Development Council operates according to its own interpretation of its functions, since upto now no general

guide exists. The new Development Councils Order only provides for very general tasks. It guarantees at least legalization and regulation, and a certain level of common understanding regarding these tasks. This is very relevant not only for formal institutions like the Village Development Councils, Land Allocation Committees, etc., but also for voluntary institutions when they, in one way or another, become involved in District Development Planning. It was indicated that some institutions started out of nothing, without any knowledge as to how to go about.

Regarding the agricultural institutions, like Farmer's Associations (mainly for livestock), Agricultural Development Committees (for crop production) and Wool Growers Associations, it was very difficult to assess how far they have fulfilled their associated functions. The same applies to Laboeloa (collecting stray cattle), though not directly an institution, and Pathisiso ea Liphofolo (type of local police).

In some villages it was indicated that occasionally decisions regarding grazing land were taken by richer members of the community for their own advantage. Also land issues were reported which conflicted with development ideas for the village as a whole. The Land Allocation Committee's activities and those of the Village Development Councils sometimes conflicted, impeding both of them from functioning properly.

b. Financial management

For all the different types of institutions it holds that they all wish to be financially independent. Village Development Councils are supposed to collect money in order to finance certain local projects. It was furthermore frequently suggested that committee members of the Village Development Councils and especially the Land Allocation Committees should get financial compensation for attending meetings. None of the Land Allocation Committees, however, was reported to handle funds; the same applied to the health institutions. All Credit Unions and Burial Societies were obviously dealing with finances. Of the Village Development Councils, 70 % handled funds; of the agricultural institutions the percentage is 77.8. Of all those institutions which handled funds in 66 % of the cases finances were looked after by the treasurer (see Table 4).

Table 4

Handling of funds and who keeps accounts
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Does not handle funds	9	30.0	-	-	-	-	2	22.2
Handles funds	21	70.0	3	100.0	11	100.0	7	77.8
<u>Funds handled by:</u>								
Treasurer	20	66.7	1	33.3	9	81.8	5	55.6
Secretary	-	-	-	-	1	9.1	-	-
Chairperson	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	-	-
Chief	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	22.2
Member	1	3.3	-	-	1	9.1	-	-
Outsider	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	-	-

There were many complaints about mismanagement of funds. This may have resulted in a transfer of responsibility for the accounts towards the chairperson or secretary of the institution. It was even suggested in some cases to let the government handle the funds. The only institution which seemed to fulfil its financial tasks satisfactorily is the Burial Society, to which an entrance fee and monthly fees are paid.

c. Meetings

One of the best subjects from which one could elicit how ideas about the functioning of the institution and its actual performance often contradict each other, is the one of meetings. According to the received answers from committee members, in 48 cases (69.6 %) meetings were held more than once a month (see Table 5), and in 63.8 % of the cases it was said there were normally more than half of the members present (see Table 6).

This nice picture seems to contradict the many complaints about the lack of meetings (especially of the Village Development Councils). Another complaint was the manipulation of meetings by few members, though everyone statutory has the right to say anything he or she wants.

Table 5

Indicated frequency of meetings
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
1/week	3	10.0	2	18.2	2	40.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
3/month	2	6.7	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2/month	5	16.7	-	-	-	-	1	33.3	1	9.1	-	-
1/month	16	53.3	3	27.3	1	20.0	1	33.3	7	63.6	3	33.3
4/year	-	-	1	9.1	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	-	-
Occasionally	3	10.0	2	18.2	-	-	-	-	3	27.3	1	11.1
Never	-	-	1	9.1	2	40.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Not known	1	3.3	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	55.6

Table 6

Indicated average number of participants

	ALL INSTITUTIONS	
	nr.	%
All	14	20.3
Almost all	2	3.0
Three quarter	14	20.3
Two third	3	4.4
Half	7	10.1
One quarter	2	3.0
Just enough	4	5.8
Unknown	23	33.3

Furthermore, members wish to be paid for attending meetings and spending their time for the community. It is significant that this was not heard from the side of the Burial Societies and agricultural institutions.

The main topics discussed in the last couple of meetings reflect the activities the institution normally deals with. Besides the institution's specific topics, more general items were indicated, as is shown in Table 7, for all institutions.

Table 7

Items discussed on meetings
(% of all institutions)

	number	perc.
Construction activities	29	42.0
Improvement performance instit.	10	14.5
Financial matters	8	11.6
Allocation of land	6	8.7
Health matters	6	8.7
Agricultural matters	6	8.7
Behaviour of members	4	5.8
Range management	4	5.8
Draught problems	3	4.3
Material matters	2	2.9
Recruitment matters	1	1.5
Training members	1	1.5
Administrative matters	1	1.5

About these discussions it was said that members were often reluctant to come up with other, more critical issues. Links with the Village Development Councils should be established with other institutions, in order to discuss other relevant items of interest to both. It was said that not all urgent matters in the village were being taken up. The institutions were also sometimes considered too small for holding meetings and certainly for raising their voices in the village.

d. Village projects

The most important conclusion which could be drawn from the analysis of village projects is the fact that there has been hardly any involvement of local people in the management of these projects. Local participation in the implementation and execution of projects usually did not go beyond supplying labour or contributing material. The projects to be found in the surveyed villages were: construction of roads, construction of wells or of dams for collecting drinking water for livestock, laying out of vegetable gardens and different types of self-help projects (mainly handicraft). About 50 % of the analysed projects were reported to have failed, due mainly to a lack of cooperation among villagers, a lack of material, construction mistakes, or shortage of funds.

It appears that the Village Development Council is seen as a governmental organization which has been given too many tasks, covering too wide a spectrum of activities. It is seen as the "vehicle for development". All surveyed Village Development Councils were far behind in their targets; not one Village Development Council could indicate clear future plans. If a project had failed, it was this Council which was to be blamed or otherwise even its chairperson.

Local people don't seem to be in a position to set up a project. Even when asked who should be responsible for the management of village projects, in almost all cases the Village Development Council or the Government was pointed at. The self-help mentality, as being expressed in the "Letsolo-la-iketsetse" concept seems to have been overruled by the "food-for-work" mentality. It is difficult for villagers to comprehend why projects have failed, although they complain

about a thousand things. Villagers (including the Village Development Council members) should be made aware of which their responsibilities are.

It has become clear that villagers can easily identify their own needs, however it seems that their involvement ends here. Unless an outsider (the government) or well-to-do villagers take the initiative. If villagers would know that their ideas are somehow being realised, their motivation would let them go beyond the docile attitude of "wait-and-see". The concept of cooperation should no longer be an abstraction. It should be clarified which roles the Village Development Council and the chief are going to play and which the villagers and their voluntary institutions. Good management of any project is one of the most important conditions for success. It should no longer happen that the local population does not understand why a particular project is proposed in the village. All project ideas should come from the village. Under the Thaba Tseka Development Project it had happened that the expatriate management gradually took over projects in certain villages from the Village Development Council, who had actually proposed those projects. The Village Development Council became powerless and everyone pulled out.

From the analysed institutions at village level only the Village Development Council, health institutions and some agricultural institutions have been involved in village projects; the last two though, only in the proposing-stage. Asked about their priority projects in the village, many different answers were given (see Table 8).

Table 8

Priority projects wished for in village
(% of all institutions)

	number	perc.
Roads	16	23.2
Water supply	15	21.7
Latrines	9	13.0
Increase agricultural production	9	13.0
Improve health facilities	6	8.7
Schools	5	7.2
Generation of employment	4	5.8
Dipping place	3	4.3
Shops	3	4.3
Better management institution	3	4.3
Credit facilities	2	2.9
Education and training programmes	2	2.9
Improve livestock	2	2.9
School uniforms	2	2.9
Self-help projects	2	2.9
Handicraft; better transport; woolsheds; fair prices for wool; soil conservation; bridges; septic tank; fences,	<u>each: 1</u>	1.1
Total number of institutions		69

CHAPTER 4

MEMBERSHIP PATTERNS

a. Election of members

Criteria for membership for the same type of institution are not universally applied. Anyone asked about these criteria gave his or her personal opinion on the most important characteristics being attached to the post of committee member. Some institutions select their members through a form of "election" (Village Development Council, Land Allocation Committee, agricultural institutions), others became member based on their merits (health), or based on the law (the chairperson of the Land Allocation Committee); others again became member by subscription in combination with seniority (Burial Society). It was difficult to establish a clear picture of committee members vis-a-vis rank-and-file members. Furthermore, the distinction between "official" criteria and those being applied "in the village", for which the questionnaire had made allowances, was never given.

Each institution has a different target group: the Village Development Council and health institutions support the whole village, and all villagers are basically rank-and -file members; the Land Allocation Committee

works only for certain villagers on ad hoc basis; Credit Unions and Burial Societies only support those who are members; and agricultural institutions supply services to only those villagers for which these are relevant. It should be noted that Burial Societies often operate on the basis of family or lineage considerations, leaving out even the chief. Since this last type of institution deals with caring for the dead, rank-and-file members are usually the older people.

Indicated criteria for membership referred to a wide scala of variables: to moralities (good, honest), to absolute conditions (resident in the village, young), to learned qualifications (literate, trained), or to personal qualities (powerful, charismatic). Only a few indicated that sex is relevant; ie. that committee members should be males. It has happened that the chief did not want to cooperate with female committee members. If we look at the division of sexes among members of some institutions, we come to the conclusion that for the Village Development Councils almost three quarters of the committee members are women (see Table 9).

Table 9

Average number of members and percentage of women

	average nr. of members	women	
		nr.	perc.
V D C	7.1	5.2	73.2
L A C	7.0	2.8	40.0
HEALTH	2.8	2.8	100.0

Another complication as to who is going to be selected, related to the party politics at that time. In

one breath one could hear that "BNP members are selected.." and "everyone is given a chance.....". A great difficulty was that the Village Development Councils, the Land Allocation Committees, the cooperatives (like Credit Unions) were seen as governmental institutions, and consequently its members as government people or a kind of unpaid civil servants. In this respect it is very difficult to understand how the criteria "he /she should be interested in the development of the village" has to be interpreted. Table 10 shows how the indicated criteria for committee membership are divided among the different institutions.

Table 10

Criteria for membership
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Literate/ qualified	19	63.3	8	72.7	1	20.0	3	100.0	6	54.5	5	55.6
BNP member	14	46.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	9.1	1	11.1
Resident village	12	40.0	6	54.5	4	80.0	-	-	2	18.2	1	11.1
Powerful/ active	7	23.3	2	18.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	22.2
Interested in dev. of village	6	20.0	-	-	3	60.0	2	66.6	3	27.3	5	55.6
Reliable	5	16.7	3	27.3	1	20.0	1	33.3	1	9.1	5	55.6
Patient	1	3.3	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	1	9.1	-	-
Loyal to chief	1	3.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total nr. of inst.	30		11		5		3		11		9	

The next Table 11 indicates that most members are being chosen at "pitsos". However, sometimes it was indicated that before this was to happen, members were to be proposed

by the ruling party, the existing Village Development Council members, or even the minister. The "pitso" procedure was considered democratic, or a system whereby members who are working for the people, should be elected by the people.

Table 11

Procedure for membership
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Pitso elected	22	73.3	11	100.0	5	100.0	2	66.7	10	90.9	6	66.7
Chief elected	1	3.3	1	9.1	1	20.0	-	-	-	-	4	44.4
BNP elected	6	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre- elected	6	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	9.1	4	44.4

b. Removal of members

The subject of removal of committee members is a delicate one. It is therefore not likely that the information reflects the real situation. In 27 % of the cases it was literally said that a removal of any kind had never happened so far. Criteria indicated for a (possible) removal were also those related to moralities or political and personal

variables. "Not working for the people" was an often heard complaint. Notwithstanding complaints and clear ideas about when a member is to be removed, it is impossible to identify how often this actually has happened. When asked if members have been efficient, most respondents replied in the affirmative, though the results of the institution's activities proved the opposite.

Different aims of the institutions with different member tasks, resulted in different criteria for possible removal. From Credit Unions it was difficult to get information on actual dismissals, though in some cases it was said that warnings have been given by the community. Their committee members are supposed to stay on till the end of their term, unlike other institutions, where members can step out at any time. Also for the Land Allocation Committee it can be concluded that in most cases the members have only changed in case of decease. Some members seem to occupy this position already since independence. The different indicated criteria for possible removal of committee members, manifested by the members themselves, are shown in Table 12.

Table 12

Criteria for removal
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Failing in tasks	21	70.0	9	81.8	5	100.0	2	66.6	10	90.0	9	100.0
Unreliable	15	50.0	6	54.5	4	80.0	1	33.3	2	18.2	2	22.2
Not accepting orders	7	23.3	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Physically disabled	6	20.0	1	9.1	1	20.0	2	66.6	-	-	2	22.2
In bad terms with community	3	10.0	-	-	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	1	11.1
In bad terms with committee	1	3.3	1	9.1	1	20.0	-	-	-	-	1	11.1
End of assignment	1	3.3	-	-	-	-	1	33.3	1	9.1	-	-

Also here explanations were given, for example: he/she should satisfy the community; if the person concerned is not being replaced he will become an obstacle for the institution; and: it will show good functioning of the institution when it perseveres in such a case of removal. Table 13 shows the different indicated procedures for removal of committee members.

Table 13

Procedure for removal
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Committee proposes	19	63.3	3	27.3	-	-	1	33.3	6	54.6	5	55.6
Warning first	6	20.0	-	-	1	20.0	1	33.3	1	9.1	1	11.1
Pitso voting	5	16.7	7	63.6	1	20.0	-	-	4	36.4	3	33.3
BNP decides	3	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community proposes	1	3.3	1	9.1	1	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Report to minister	-	-	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Many interviewees indicated that those nominated for removal should get another chance first. The confrontation of those members with their own community or rank-and-file members was considered as too embarrassing. On the other hand it was heard that in those cases where members were "working for the community" (like in the Village Development Councils and Land Allocation Committees) the community should also be the one sending these members away if they do not fulfil their duties. It was also suggested that the other

committee members should vote a colleague out, since the community will not be able to do so, as a result of family ties, etc. in the village.

A final question regarding the membership of the chief to the institution, gave the answers as displayed in Table 14.

Table 14

Is chief member of institution?

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Yes	10	33.3	-	-	2	40.0	1	33.3	7	63.6	4	44.5
No	6	20.0	-	-	-	-	2	66.7	2	18.2	3	33.3
No answer	14	46.7	11	100.0	3	60.0	-	-	2	18.2	2	22.2
Total	30	100.0	11	100.0	5	100.0	3	100.0	11	100.0	9	100.0

CHAPTER 5

MUTUAL RELATIONS

The answers given on questions about mutual relations, as well as on the relations of the institution with the chieftaincy, community, extension service, etc. indicated that those relations are generally very poor, and certainly unclear. Nobody could extensively explain or clarify what type of relation exists between the different institutions. General remarks like: "exchange of ideas...", "exchange of information...", or "just cooperation..." and "seeing each other..." were given. Table 15 gives some indication of the purport interviewees gave to certain relations.

Type 15a indicates the percentage distribution of members who see the relation as "just a form of cooperation"; type 15b indicates these percentages related to "mutual control"; type 15c to "functional relation on an ad hoc basis"; while type 15d indicates the percentage distribution of members, regarding the relations between the different institutions as "fully independent". Table 16 shows the percentages of institutions explaining that they are in conflict with each other, while Table 17 indicates the percentages of members stating that more contact should take place.

Table 15

Types of mutual relations)*
 (% of total nr. of resp. institutions)

	V D C %	L A C %	HEALTH %	CREDIT %	BURIAL %	AGRIC. %
<u>Community</u>						
type a	50.0	18.2	20.0	-	18.2	33.3
type b	3.3	-	20.0	-	9.1	-
type c	6.7	9.1	-	66.6	9.1	-
type d	6.7	-	20.0	-	-	-
<u>Chief</u>						
type a	23.3	27.3	-	66.6	27.3	11.1
type b	10.0	-	-	-	9.1	11.1
type c	6.7	18.2	20.0	-	9.1	-
type d	6.7	-	60.0	33.3	9.1	33.3
<u>V D C</u>						
type a	*	27.3	60.0	33.3	18.2	33.3
type b	*	-	-	33.3	18.2	-
type c	*	18.2	-	33.3	9.1	-
type d	*	9.1	-	-	18.2	33.3
<u>L A C</u>						
type a	13.3	*	-	-	-	-
type c	16.7	*	-	-	9.1	-
type d	3.3	*	-	-	9.1	-
<u>Health inst.</u>						
type a	6.7	-	*	-	-	-
type c	10.0	-	*	-	-	-
type d	6.7	-	*	-	-	-
<u>Burial Societies</u>						
type a	13.3	9.1	20.0	-	*	-
<u>Religious inst.</u>						
type a	-	-	-	33.3	-	-
type b	-	-	-	33.3	-	-
type c	-	9.1	-	33.3	27.3	-
type d	13.3	-	40.0	-	-	-
<u>Business</u>						
type a	3.3	9.1	-	-	-	-
type c	3.3	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Extension service</u>						
type a	23.3	-	-	33.3	-	22.2
type b	-	-	20.0	33.3	-	-
type c	6.7	9.1	-	-	9.1	-
type d	3.3	36.4	-	-	9.1	11.1
<u>Civil service</u>						
type a	16.7	9.1	-	-	-	11.1
type c	6.7	9.1	-	-	-	-
type d	10.0	27.3	-	-	18.2	22.2
<u>D D C</u>						
type a	23.3	18.2	-	-	9.1	22.2
type d	13.3	27.3	-	-	18.2	22.2

)* type a: "some form of cooperation"; type b: "control each other"; type c: "ad hoc functions"; type d: "fully independent"

It should be realised that each interviewee was able to reply on the relation with each institution. This means for example that only 10 out of 30 (33.3 %) of the Village Development Council members had something to say about their relation with the extension service. Of these 10 only 8 indicated that this relation will have to be improved. This did not necessarily mean that the rest of the members of the Village Development Councils were under the impression that the relations were fine and without problems.

Table 16

Relations in conflict
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C %	HEALTH %	CREDIT %	BURIAL %	AGRIC. %
WITH: Community	10.0	-	33.3	9.1	11.1
Chief	16.7	-	-	-	-
L A C	3.3	-	-	-	-
Religious inst.	3.3	20.0	-	-	-

Table 17

More frequent contact desired
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C %	L A C %	HEALTH %	CREDIT %	BURIAL %	AGRIC. %
WITH:						
Community	6.7	-	-	-	9.1	11.1
Chief	3.3	-	20.0	-	-	-
V D C	*	27.3	20.0	33.3	9.1	-
L A C	6.7	*	-	-	-	-
Health inst.	-	9.1	*	-	-	-
Credit Union	3.3	-	-	*	-	-
Religious in.	3.3	-	20.0	-	18.2	-
Extension	26.7	36.4	20.0	33.3	27.3	11.1
Civil serv.	10.0	36.4	20.0	33.3	9.1	-
D D C	33.3	18.2	-	33.3	9.1	-

CHAPTER 6

CHIEFTAINCY

Committee members were very reluctant to give information on the role of the chief in their institution. The role of the chief in the Village Development Council has in the meantime been overruled by the new Development Councils Order, making the chief the chairman. [13] Information on the position of the chief in the villages is nevertheless given here, since legalization of certain positions alone does not necessarily make the institution work.

In some villages the relationship between the chief and the Village Development Council was very poor. This resulted from the fact that the chief, who traditionally occupies a neutral position, as far as politics is concerned, supported the party which was not the one dominating the Council. It also happened that chiefs did not want to cooperate with women, who were in many cases occupying the chair of the Village Development Council. The future still has to reveal how, in such cases, the chief could effectively function as a chairman of that Council. In the situation in which the chief is highly respected by the community, he should participate as much as possible in village affairs, and therefore in local institutions.

It appears that villagers do not respect the Village Development Council if the chief is not somehow involved in its activities.

The answers to the question which roles the chief fulfils in the different institutions are compiled in Table 18. It is significant that not all Land Allocation Committees have indicated that the chief is their chairman, which he officially is.

Table 18

Role of the chief
(% of total nr. of resp. inst.'s)

	V D C		L A C		HEALTH		CREDIT		BURIAL		AGRIC.	
	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%	nr.	%
Chairperson	1	3.3	3	27.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Patron/ advisor	21	70.0	7	63.6	3	60.0	-	-	8	72.7	3	33.3
Being advised	8	26.7	3	27.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	11.1
Ordinary member	-	-	1	9.1	-	-	-	-	5	45.5	1	11.1
Controls institut.	5	16.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	9.1	7	77.7
Convenes pitsos only	5	16.7	-	-	3	60.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Not involved	2	6.7	-	-	-	-	3	100.0	1	9.1	1	11.1
Total number of inst.'s	30		11		5		3		11		9	

When asked for reasons of the indicated roles of the chief, various answers were given, covering a wide spectrum of values:

- "Almighty Father who governs us"
- He is the leader in all matters
- He needs help from others
- He gives respectability to the institution
- He is always in the village
- He has no position; he is an ordinary person
- He does not participate at all
- He has no knowledge
- If he had more power, the institution did not need to exist
- He gives troubles; he is anti-government

Also in land matters the authority of the chief (and of the Land Allocation Committee) is not universally accepted. 13.1 % of the respondents wished to leave the chief out of all the land matters, and even 26.1 % did not know who officially was responsible for the allocation of land (see Table 19).

Table 19

Who should deal with land?

	number	percentage
V D C only	5	7.3
V D C and the chief	2	2.9
L A C only	4	5.8
L A C and the chief	33	47.8
V D C and L A C and the chief	7	10.1
Not known	18	26.1
Total number of institutions	69	100.0

The history of decentralization in Lesotho, changing in the beginning of this century, from the

tendency to move powers to the district, towards a policy of centralization after independence, shows one general trend: a slow crumbling of the powers of the chieftaincy. The present government, in trying to re-establish the position of the local chiefs, has declared the new District Councils Order, giving this traditional authority important positions in the modern institutions. The majority of the members of the institutions interviewed (54 or 87.2 %) did not want to, or were not in a position to indicate if the power of the chieftaincy had declined. Only one indicated that this was not the case. Reasons given by the remainder of the interviewees for the declining power were: lack of cooperation between the chief and community; the fact that the chief became increasingly overruled by the Village Development Council; and the existing conflicts between the chiefs and the government.

The present government attempts to solve the last two problems by formally neutralizing party politics at village level, and giving the local chiefs new statutory powers. It seems that villagers in general felt that their chief was not supposed to be a political person; he should stay above the parties. The position of the chief was often a conflicting one: on one hand he is traditionally a political neutral authority, and on the other hand he was a party political figure (especially in supporting the opposition party). This has caused a lot of confusion among his local subjects. In many cases his political activities had overshadowed his traditional ones.

Tables 20 and 21 show the quality of relationship between the chief and the community, and between the

chief and the Village Development Council. Only little more than half of the respondents indicated a good relationship in both cases. Suggestions for improving these relationships (in bad, but also in good cases) are given in Table 22. A total of 39.1 % indicated that the government should in one way or another interfere with the chief's role in the community, and 11.6 % said that the chief should listen more often to the community members. The future has to reveal if and how the new policy is able to solve these problems.

Table 20

Relation chief-community

	number	percentage
Good	44	63.8
Reasonable	3	4.3
Poor	14	20.3
Not known	8	11.6
Total	69	100.0

Table 21

Relation chief-VDC

	number	percentage
Good	41	59.4
Reasonable	1	1.5
Poor	13	18.8
Not known	14	20.3
Total	69	100.0

Table 22

How to improve the relation with the chief?

	number	percentage
Community should take chief's "advice"	24	34.9
Government should communicate via the chief	12	17.4
Chief should take community's "advice"	8	11.6
Government should stress mutual respect (chief-community)	8	11.6
Government should correct (and/or replace) chief	7	10.1
V D C and chief should be trained	5	7.2
Community should be better informed	3	4.3
Not known	2	2.9
Total	69	100.0

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

If we look at the continua on page 9, and combine these with the actual data on local institutions, we can say that the A-type of institution corresponds with the Village Development Council, Land Allocation Committee, Credit Union and most other cooperatives [14]; and the B-type of institution with the Burial Society and agricultural institutions. Health institutions come somewhere in between. [15] The data clearly shows that the organizational level of the A-type institution ("standard" institution) tends to be high; the level of member motivation, however, low. The opposite applies to the B-type institution ("participatory" institution). [16] The "standard" institutions are seen as extensions of the arm of the government. If government fails in satisfying the needs of the villagers, so does the Village Development Council and vice versa. The only institution which seemed to work properly was the Burial Society; a fact that shows how important motivation is. It is significant that an institution caring for the deceased, arouses such stimulating attitudes.

Research data revealed that the Village Development Council, as a multi-purpose, developmental institution, often

competed with other institutions; even with the villagers. Having been related to government, that is: to the ruling party, all failures of village projects were addressed to this institution. It became much more a "they-institution" (for the "elite"), rather than an "us-institution" (for the "poor"). This institution should be de-politicized. In this respect the Development Councils Order, whereby the traditional structure of the chieftaincy and the modern structure of developmental institutions are formally and legally combined, could be a right step in this direction. This new statutory power of the chief makes proper offices and equipment essential. However, in converting the chief to a civil servant, representing the government in the village, great care should be taken not to turn him into a modern bureaucrat at the cost of his traditional authority.

Within the context of the District Development Planning model, the tasks suggested for the Village Development Council are the following [17]:

- To bring forward the real needs in its area and convey these to the District Development Council,
- To monitor and to evaluate the ongoing projects and to try to solve as much as possible existing problems in the village with the help of the Village Extension Team,
- To identify extra needs to make ongoing projects more successful (in terms of education, finances, materials); if funds cannot be raised and problems not be solved locally, to send requests concerned to the District Development Council,
- To re-assess the priorities of local development, based on monitoring of ongoing projects,
- To assess new projects in the area for the next Annual District Development Plan, as much as possible of the self-help type,
- To stimulate mobilization of local resources and services for the fulfilment of these local projects.

The suggested tasks of the Land Allocation Committee can be summarised as follows [18]:

- Allocation of land,
- Identification of development activities,
- Cooperation with agricultural institutions in technical and administrative matters,
- Advising the Village Development Council in environmental and all land matters.

As the Village Development Councils are aiming at proposing and implementing local development programmes and projects, and Credit Unions at financing small-scale local projects, it is suggested, in order to effectuate the activities of both types of institutions, to incorporate the Credit Union into the Village Development Council. This could stimulate production and/or marketing oriented projects, either as cooperatives or private enterprises.

We could conclude that all existing institutions at village level can have their input in the process of District Development Planning. The Village Development Council and the Land Allocation Committee could function as formal institutions which deal with the government (via the District Development Council, District Secretary, etc.), while the voluntary institutions could fulfil the role of specific informants, when it comes to need assessment and project evaluation. These last institutions could support the District Development Planning activities in general, and project implementation activities specifically. [19] As a meeting place for both types of institutions it is recommended to use the institution of the "pitso". In doing so the village "pitso" has to be re-activated so that it could serve as "intermediate" institution where both "standard" and "participatory" institutions could discuss all relevant matters. [20] These meetings could be held

regularly as well as ad hoc (with specific institutions) when the need arises.

In the situation that an increase in relevance of District Development Planning at village level is taking place, the decision making process will become the most important phenomenon. A consensus should exist as to where and how important decisions for the village are being taken. This not only necessitates the establishment of an overall structure at village level, where "standard" institutions, "participatory" institutions and "intermediate" institutions play a part, but also a process of emancipation of local participants.

Emancipation is here defined as a process whereby people free themselves from certain (often the dominant) political and moral restraints, and become conscious citizens, being aware of their responsibilities towards the community as a whole. By making villagers more community oriented, rather than family oriented, it could as well solve problems of embezzlement of funds.

The mentioned structure development is the institution building component of the District Development Planning model; the emancipation process the learning component. Villagers have to be trained technically, in order to understand the principles of the planning process itself, so that they will be able to properly articulate their needs. But they will also have to be trained emancipatorily, in order to understand the rights and obligations of a free and politically conscious villager within the planning process.

It should be realised, that where training is made mention of, reference is made to a type of bi-lateral training, whereby trainers continuously will attune their

programmes upon specific local requirements, as these are to be expressed by the trainees. Training programmes should never be imposed upon local participants.

Research data clearly indicate that villagers are very well aware of their needs and that they can formulate them. Also, when finally asked about any further comments on what has been discussed during the interview, almost all informants brought forward several missing requirements in their village. Villagers' thinking is more project oriented, rather than problem oriented. [21] They can often identify reasons for the failure of the fulfilment of these needs, although these may not always be the real ones.

One other main obstacle is a lack of a proper structure at village level; ie. channels to be followed in order to express these needs and complaints. But there is also a lack of freedom (or at least an assumed one) to express one's ideas and critics. This formal channel can be secured through the "standard" institutions, while the "participatory" institutions can be used for enhancing emancipation. [22] The village "pitso" can serve as an "intermediate" institution, where both other types of institutions will meet. All this would make it possible to effectively combine the relative high level of organization in the "standard" institutions, with the relative high level of member motivation in the "participatory" institution.

This does not mean that villagers will ever be able to clearly and scientifically evaluate the reasons for project failures and how this could be prevented. It does mean that they will certainly be able to go a step further than just formulating those missing necessities in

their village. They have to feel self-confident enough to think in terms of solutions. The emphasis should fall on a realistic problem-solving attitude, rather than on a wishful-thinking attitude. There is still a strong tendency to "wait-and-see-what-government-does". No doubt, the well-intended "food for work programme" has certainly stimulated this docile attitude. One should bear in mind that this problem-solving attitude should be translated into small-scale, village-oriented projects.

At the same time, however, one other very important change has to take place: the biased attitude of government officials towards rural areas has to alter. Rural people should be allowed, or better still: be stimulated, to become emancipated and politically aware citizens. They should be respected for this by civil servants at district, as well as central level. [23]

The here suggested processes and developments will most likely only take-off very slowly, and will not yield important results in the very near future. Although the government has taken a very important step by issuing the Development Council Order, committing itself to mobilise the local population, it still has a long way to go, when a system of bottom-up planning is fully established. Political pep-talks do not substitute a learning and emancipation process. Therefore, if these proposals presented here are being realised, the implementation should be done carefully and should be properly planned. Short-term results will likely be disappointing; therefore policy makers will have to focus on long-term developments.

CHAPTER 8

RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations form a systematic summary of the conclusions presented in Chapter 7.

1. The need for projects should only come from villagers.
No project should be imposed upon rural people, as the case was with most Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP), Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP), Cooperative Crop Production Project (CCPP) and Food Self Sufficiency Project (FSSP).
2. In order to make District Development Planning effective, establish a formal structure. in which each "standard" institution will play an official role, which role is fully clarified.
3. Establish the ground for emancipation of villagers through "participatory" institutions, so that villagers will be stimulated and activated to participate in planning.
4. Train villagers technically, so that they understand their role in the process of District Development Planning, and they know how to fulfil their specific tasks.

5. Train villagers emancipatorily, so that they become politically and socially conscious citizens.
6. Re-establish and strengthen the institution of the "pitso" as "intermediate" institution, to function as a meeting place for both "standard" and "participatory" institutions. This will also support and stimulate village union.
7. Combine Village Development Councils and Credit Unions, so that they support each other and both can function more effectively.
8. Change the biased attitude of civil servants (ie. the government) towards supporting emancipation of the local population, rather than their submission.
9. As all these recommendations will not yield results in a short time, embark on long-term and well planned processes.

NOTES

1. See: Van Tilburg, P., 1986.
2. See page 7 for the general planning functions.
3. Lesotho Government, 1986.
4. See an earlier DLPRD publication: Thoahlane, T., 1984.
5. In the earlier mentioned seminar it was decided that one lowland and one mountain district are to be selected as pilot-project areas, though excluding Thaba Tseka and Maseru.
6. The difference between District Development Planning (DDP) and Integrated Rural Development (IRD) is explained elsewhere: Van Tilburg, P., 1986: Chapter 1a & 1b.
7. See: Van Tilburg, P., 1986: Chapter 3a.
8. See: FAO, 1979: p. 25; Cheema, G.S., 1983: p. 203; and FAO, 1983: p. 11.
9. FAO, 1979: p. 24.
10. See: Van der Geer, R., 1979: p. 37.
11. It should be noted here that we refer to both "standard" and "participatory" institutions as modern. Traditional institutions are those which have their roots already far back in the history of Lesotho, such as the chieftaincy.
12. See: Van der Geer, R. and M. Wallis, 1982: p. 44.
13. Lesotho Government, 1986, point 3(3).
14. This view is supported by the Management Survey Report on Cooperatives (unpublished), conducted by the Cooperatives Division, at that time still under the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development.
15. Cheema, G.S., 1983, uses a different classification (not a continuum), classifying institutions in such a way that it will not be of use for the present analysis (p. 210).
16. See: FAO, 1979: the conclusion that "rural poor, unless compelled, only participate in rural organizations of their own making" (p. 25), is based on research in 16 different countries.

17. Van Tilburg, P., 1986: p. 39.
18. See also: FAO (WCARRD), 1985, Vol. II: p. 63.
19. See: Cheema, G.S., 1983; he indicates six different roles of voluntary institutions: 1. to act as vehicle for popular participation and mobilization; 2. to set local plans and goals; 3. to provide services; 4. to mobilise local resources; 5. to define and express local needs; 6. to create political awareness (p. 205).
20. Van der Geer, R. and M. Wallis, 1982, refer to an "intermediate" institution as "one which facilitates the transfer of information from government to the people, which is instrumental in the formulation of claims for governmental services on behalf of its members and which is intended to promote mutual assistance among members" (p. 44).
21. See also: Thoahlane, T., 1984, where in the Appendix A per surveyed village a list of problems and needs is compiled. Certain frustrated needs are related to certain rational or structural problems in the village.
22. Regarding the Burial Societies it should be realised that, though these institutions function rather well at village level, the participants are usually the village elderly.
23. A World Bank report on the subject of decentralization emphasises this point as well: "the most important factors include: the willingness of local officers to support and perform decentralized management functions, the quality of local leadership, the attitude of rural people towards government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behavior are compatible with decentralized procedure for planning, decision making and management", World Bank, 1984: p. 52.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRES
ON
LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
AND
VILLAGE PROJECTS

THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN THABA TSEKA

name survey area:.....
 name of village:.....
 name of enumerator:.....
 date:

registration code
 (not to be filled)

|_|-|_|_|-|_|_|-|_|
 survey vill. inter- .Nr.
 area nr. viewee questionn
 nr. (PER
 also 1=indiv. INTER-
 proj.quest.|_| 2=group VIEWEE)

• If: INDIVIDUAL; what is his/her position in the village:

member of which institutions/organizations	period	position

educ. level:
 extra training:

 age:years
 sex: M / F

name:

• If: GROUP DISCUSSION; what is name of the institution:

On which institution is the following information given?

How many members does that institution have?; of whichare women.

Number of questionnaire (PER INTERVIEWEE):

NOTE: ONE QUESTIONNAIRE PER INSTITUTION !!.

suitable for projects quest.|_|
 (tick)

UNDERLINED QUESTIONS TO BE FILLED IN ALWAYS; THE OTHERS ONLY FOR EACH INTERVIEWEE!

	OFFICIALLY	IN THIS VILLAGE	SATISFIED?/ALTERNATIVES	EXPLAIN!
" E N T R A N C E "	what are the <u>criteria</u> for membership?			
	how does one become a member? (<u>procedure</u>)			
	why is one removed? (<u>reasons</u>)			
" E X I T "	how is one removed? (<u>procedure</u>)			
Are present members efficient?				
Should they continue?				
Extra training needed? What kind?				

MEMBERSHIP (RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS)

NAME INSTITUTION:

		OFFICALLY	IN THIS VILLAGE	SATISFIED?/ALTERNATIVES!	EXPLAIN !
"ENTRANCE"	what are the <u>criteria</u> for membership?				
	how does one become a member? (<u>procedure</u>)				
	how freq. new members?				
	is chief a member? are prom.cit. members?				
"EXIT"	why is one removed? (<u>reasons</u>)				
	how is one removed? (<u>procedure</u>)				
Extra training needed?What kind?					

ROLES / FUNCTIONS

NAME INSTITUTION:

	OFFICIALLY	IN THIS VILLAGE	SATISFIED? / ALTERNATIVES!	EXPLAIN !
role / function of the instit- ution				
role of the <u>chief</u> in this instit- ution				
does instit. handle funds?				
<u>who</u> handles the funds?				
future plans and priorities!!				

MEETINGS

NAME INSTITUTION:

	OFFICIALLY	IN THIS VILLAGE	SATISFIED? / ALTERNATIVES!	EXPLAIN !
frequency?				
average nr. of particip.				
main items discussed during last year				
do all members participate?				
are all members' opinion taken into account?				

RELATIONS

NAME INSTITUTION:

<u>W I T H :</u>		<u>IN THIS VILLAGE</u>		<u>SATISFIED? / ALTERNATIVES !</u>		<u>EXPLAIN !</u>
		<u>TYPE & QUALITY</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TYPE & QUALITY</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	
the community						
other instit- ution in the village	1. chief					
	2. VDC					
	3.					
extension service						
religious organiz.'s						
other signifi- cant villagers	1.					
	2.					
District Development Committee (DDC)						
(central & district) government officers						

CHIEFTANCY & COMMENTS

[ONLY TO BE FILLED IN ONCE PER INTERVIEWEE]

how would you describe the relation between:		how could these be improved by:	
		the community ?	the government ?
the <u>chief</u> and the <u>community</u> ?			
the <u>chief</u> and the <u>V D C</u> ?			
WHO should be dealing with LAND: VDC / chief and the LAC ? (circle); <u>EXPLAIN !</u>			
Is the power of the chieftancy declining ? YES / NO ? (circle);			
If "YES"	1. why/how:		
	2. does chieftancy stand in the way of development?		
WHAT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS DO YOU HAVE TO MAKE?			

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES - NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO, 1985

RESEARCH ON LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THABA TSEKA

=====

[ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS FROM 1981 ONWARDS]

name survey area: name of enumerator:
name of village: date:

* If: INDIVIDUAL;

has taken/takes part in which projects?	function/position in that project?

name:

*If: GROUP DISCUSSION; what is name of the institution:.....

On which project is the following information
given:

Number of questionnaire (PER INTERVIEWEE):

NOTE: ONE QUESTIONNAIRE PER PROJECT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

=====

registration code (not to be filled):

<u> </u>	-	<u> </u> <u> </u>	-	<u> </u> <u> </u> <u> </u>	-	<u> </u>
survey area		village number		interviewee number 1= individual 2= group		number questionnaire (PER INTERVIEWEE)

=====

Name of the project: Starting year:

Aims of the project:
.....
.....

Year of completion:...../ if abandoned, when:...../still contin.
(tick)

Results of the project:
.....
.....

Did/does the project face problems?
.....
.....

What would you say, what has been/is the SUCCESS / FAILURE (circle) of the project?
Why?:

How ~~should it~~ have been/be improved?
.....
.....

Who has proposed the project:.....

Has project cooperated with other institutions/organizations? YES/NO (circle)
If "YES", which:

Have other institutions influenced the project? YES / NO (circle)
If "YES", which:.....

Was/is the VDC involved in this project? YES / NO (circle);
Should the VDC have been/be involved? YES / NO (circle)
If "YES", why:
how:
If "NO", why not:

Was/is the chief involved in this project? YES / NO (circle);
Should the chief have been/be involved? YES / NO (circle)
If "YES", why:
how:
If "NO", why not:

Should other institutions/agencies have been/be involved? YES / NO (circle)
If "YES", which ones?.....
why those?
How:



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