

## **DEMOBILISATION FOR RECONSTRUCTION: Parameters For Progress**

### **THE PROBLEM**

Since the collapse of the Barre Regime and the expulsion of its troops in 1991 Somaliland has regained peace, law and order. The National Army of about 17,500 men has consolidated most sub-clan militias, the liberation forces from the SNM which were not demobilised in 1991, as well as Somalilanders who served in the Barre army elsewhere in the then United Republic of Somalia.

The army is responsible to a civilian Minister of Defence who is responsible to the President and to the Somaliland Houses of Assembly and of Elders. A 5,000 person civilian police force is accountable to and through the Minister of the Interior and a 1,000 person custodial (prison) service to and through the Minister for Justice.

The three uniformed services number 23,500 (non uniformed public servants are somewhat under 6,000). Their quarters, meals, uniforms and pay engross about \$18 million of \$25 million central government expenditure. For the army the reality is room and board, uniform and pocket money and the other uniformed services are only slightly better paid. The police, and especially the army, are inadequately equipped not least in relation to mobility and communication.

The initial demobilisation of about 20,000 personnel who had fought to expel the Barre regime, the creation of a national, cross sub-clan civilian police force and the gradual gathering of almost all sub-clan militias (perhaps 1,000 to 1,500 remain outside) into the national army have been crucial to restoring peace, stability and law throughout almost all parts of Somaliland. In contrast to Somalia the armed forces are responsible to a territorial civilian government not to sub clan units, still less to self appointed warlords. This both enables them to enforce peace/mediate disputes among persons of different sub clans before they escalate and also reduces the risk of resort to clans - acting as the House of Elders - to resolve disagreements and tensions which do arise between sub-Klans.

The initial demobilisation process has been substantially - but not wholly - successful. Merchants in 1991-2 contributed resources to assist demobilisees while they rehabilitated

civilian livelihoods. An inclusive (SNM, other militias, Somalilanders who served in Barre's army - in other parts of the URS as part of his manipulation of relational loyalties - and ex British and Italian soldiers) exists and serves to represent, counsel and - to the extent it can raise resources - provide vocational training, physical rehabilitation for handicapped and opportunities for socialisation.

The government has created a National Veterans' Commission to assist in the process of reintegration and rehabilitation of livelihoods. It secured advice from Zimbabweans on the process in their country but has been gravely limited by lack of resources.

Of about 20,000 demobilised combatants perhaps 15,000 have regained civilian livelihoods. Regained because those who had established occupations and households before going to the liberation war largely returned to them so that most present soldiers are young men with little or no civilian livelihood training or experience. At least 5,000 veterans have not satisfactorily re-established civilian livelihoods whether because of inadequate training, access to initial capital (whether for commerce, pastoralism or agro pastoralism) or physical and mental damage from the war years.

The psychological and/or social isolation problems of Somaliland demobilisees are, in general, less severe than in many other countries. The Somali National Movement's forces perceive themselves and are perceived by most Somalilanders, as having won a liberation struggle. That has created generally positive self and societal images - except for those who have failed to establish livelihoods and are trapped in severe poverty.

Further demobilisation is crucial for three reasons:

1. only about 5,000 men are needed in the army - but with better training, mobility, communications and equipment as well as less derisory cash pay;
2. the police and custodial services are at or near requisite levels and provide no outlet for army dischargees;

3. the budgetary burden of 12,500 surplus soldiers - potentially rising to 14,000 with the incorporation of the remaining militias - is now crippling and will remain severe even when tax collection is improved.

Rehabilitation for the 5,000 or more non reintegrated demobilised veterans is also needed to strengthen society and to reduce threats to law and order.

Demobilisation, however, requires substantial resources:

1. to demobilise men with, and trained in the use of, guns but with little other occupational training or experience without providing for their economic rehabilitation through training is virtually certain to lead directly to the recreation of sub clan, or self proclaimed, militias and/or to outbreaks of freelance banditry;
2. the President has expressed the national sentiment that it is unjust as well as most imprudent to throw veterans into poverty or into temporary, low pay, dead end unskilled labour;
3. the cost of systematic vocational training and initial work experience (on infrastructure and building renewal and mine raising) over five to six years would total on the order for \$20 to \$25 million a year, of the order of \$9 to \$12 per Somalilander per year;
4. even assuming substantial rehabilitation and enhanced coverage in the tax system the need to restore basic public services and of living wages to those providing them mean that this sum - like that for renewing main national and interstate commercial (port, highway, airport) infrastructure is beyond the capacity of the Government of Somaliland.

## **THE PROPOSAL**

The proposal is to:

1. demobilise 12,500 to 14,000 army personnel via an 18 month secondment to vocational education and on the job training followed by discharge;
2. in parallel to provide vocational training (and where necessary physical/mental rehabilitation) to 5,000 past demobilisees who have not successfully reintegrated into the civilian economy;

3. to do so primarily through construction (civil engineering and building) vocational education, on the job training and provision of basic tools and secondarily, through an enhanced mine raising operation over a period of 5 - 6 years;
4. to use the ILO - because of its vocational training, labour intensive construction and Horn of Africa experience - as the central external contractor with resource providers and with the National Veterans Commission and Association, the National Mines Commission and the Ministries of Planning and of Finance who would be put in funds for food, shelter, clothing and allowances paid to demobilisees in training by the ILO;
5. To seek funds from the EU (ECHO), Norway - Denmark - Sweden - Finland (Nordic Group), Switzerland, UK, USA. For the training/work experience construction programme the cost (assuming 14,000 army demobilizees and 6,000 already demobilised veterans) would be of the order of \$100-110 million over a five year phased programme with six months' training and 12 months' work experience for each demobilisee;
6. The mines programme - for which cost parameters are much vaguer because of data limitations - would probably cost \$30-35 million over five years assuming 500 additional Somaliland demobilizees. That would imply raising of the order of 100,000 mines per year. For the enhanced mines raising component (which is desirable but not essential to overall demobilisation and reintegration) the present Mines Commission together with UNDP would seem the preferred channel to maintain continuity. The main potential funders are the same.
7. The outputs of the programme would include:
  - a) Reintegration into the civilian economy of 20,000 persons (in the medium term heads of households of - say - 100,000 plus persons);
  - b) substantially increasing trained construction personnel numbers and thus both civil engineering and construction capacity (whether as self-employed, small firm or employees of larger contractors);

- c) consolidating economic and social stability by meeting the needs of actually or potentially marginalised young men by interim training and permanent relevant human capital/livelihood opportunity provision;
- d) rehabilitation, renewing and extending Somaliland's transport, water, public buildings (e.g. Schools, clinics, water service - veterinary - extension facilities and other works as well as enhanced mines clearance;
- e) removing the fiscal drag of maintaining a large number of uniformed personnel in excess of military requirements to avoid the results of demobilising young men with guns into severe immediate poverty and poor long term prospects.

At a probable cost over five years of the order of \$120,000,000 (\$12 per Somalilander per year) this appears highly cost efficient.

8. What to include requires preliminary study, cataloguing and estimation of vocationally trained personnel, professional and experienced artisanal staff, equipment/tools and materials prior to final financing proposals. The pre repair/construction studies and final scheduling can be done during the first six months' training of the first tranche of entrants.
  - a) the Berbera-Hargeisa - Djijiga - Addis Ababa corridor renewal and expansion is not very suitable for a labour intensive approach and should be financed/ implemented separately as an EU Horn Regional Fund programme jointly with Ethiopia.
  - b) the Hargeisa-Berbera - Djibouti route could perhaps be financed similarly but - because of much lower traffic volume - could be a labour intensive, engineered gravel project, with wells/boreholes at 25 or 50 km intervals to end present loss of life from breakdowns on waterless stretches;
  - c) the replacement (assuming it is cheaper than demining and repair of pre-war highway) of Hargeisa - Burao highway is a priority as are other secondary highways (including back and preventative maintenance on Erigavo-Los Anard-Somalia border routes) are priorities;

- d) secondary airport/airstrip major maintenance and renewal is appropriate. Hargeisa and perhaps Berbera airport equipment aspects could best be handled as part of the corridor programme with Ethiopia but runway renewal and extension and building repairs and extension are probably suitable for a labour intensive approach;
  - e) some aspects of urban and rural, human and livestock water provision including dry wells, spring to use point trenched wells, birkets and check dams and perhaps (especially as to training) drilled wells plus water service warehouses and offices are an important part of social and economic infrastructure renewal;
  - f) while schools and clinics (up to secondary and 100 bed hospitals) can be repaired by labour intensive methods;
  - g) as can courts, police stations and general administrative offices (both urban and rural).
9. In respect to basic services, and to water in particular, construction for urban government and community projects should be included subject to provision of evidence on financial and personnel capacity to operate and to maintain. However, the programme should not build for the private housing and commercial establishment markets because to do so would be to compete with the opportunities for its graduates to establish livelihoods.
10. Enhanced demining is somewhat separate from other programme aspects. There are 22 or 23 known minefields - of very divergent geographic extent, density of mining, mine numbers and types, detailed data on configuration and cost in terms of deaths, disabling accidents and sterilisation of otherwise useful land, water, or works (by much of Buraa-Hargeisa highway and part of Buraa urban infrastructure). There are no accurate estimates of mines laid, lifted, or degraded to innocuousness - 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 is the apparent plausible range for remaining live mines. The National Mines Commission (supported by UNDP) has a relatively small, but effective, demining and mine avoidance education programme. Mine lifting is - correctly in terms of urgency - focussed on Burao. At its present pace it would probably take a third of a century to raise or demobilise all existing mines.
11. More funding and more labour intensive methods (including for identifying and posting off minefields and for community - especially mother and child-education) are both a priority

need and practical. About 1,000 surviving Somalilanders were trained in mine raising during the demining operated by Rimfire (under UNDP/UNOSOM contract) in the early 1990s.

Both because they have not been working on demining for five years and because their methods and training were inadequate they would need six months' training (and subsequent professional leadership) for effective and safe (especially to themselves) demining, delineation and community education. About 500 are probably available as some have reintegrated into other livelihoods and have no desire to return to a specialised and highly dangerous occupation.

12. In this sub-programme a special risk allowance, field medical capacity, and compensation for injury or death (to survivors of dependants, heirs) would need to be included in costings (as was not the case in the Rimfire era).

## **MODALITIES**

13. The first stage should be a Government of Somaliland exercise to establish desired enrolment numbers, phasing, project components, livelihood market and skills requirements and therefore curriculum, professional and artisanal personnel requirements and rough financing mobilisation targets. This could be led by the Ministry of Planning/National Veterans Commission in association with Defence, Veterans Association, Finance and the project providing departments (especially Transport, Water, Veterinary, Agricultural Extension, Education, Health, Police and Justice) and other potential beneficiaries (urban councils, voluntary organisations). It would be helpful if a small technical assistance financial unit could serve as a secretariat:

- a) a general economic policy economist with African planning experience and prior knowledge of Somaliland;
- b) two experienced Zimbabwe demobilisation and training officers (preferably including at least one from the earlier mission);
- c) two ILO staff with African vocational and labour intensive construction experience;

- d) ten degree or comparable level professionally trained Somalilanders probably recruited from the diaspora and - assuming the project goes ahead - to form the core staff for the National Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission.
14. The cost over six months (including emoluments, travel, office equipment, communications, etc.) would be of the order of \$500,000. Two possible sources are the ILO (either from its own funds or seeking special support from Nordic countries, Netherlands, Canada and/or Japan) and - in respect to the Zimbabweans and their Somalilander counterparts - the Commonwealth Secretariat.
15. One issue to be decided is the number of centres and the practicability of using existing barracks for army personnel during vocational training and work experience. Presumably discipline and order as well as logistical considerations point to army personnel being under discipline (as, presumably, many non commissioned and junior commissioned officers will be demobilised this could be achieved within the education and work units) until completion of the 18 months and continue during that time to be provided with room, meals and clothing by the army (as sub-contracted to the ILO).
16. Effective training unit size suggests not less than 500 students per vocational unit which probably implies three initial centres and a further three to four later. Logical locations - subject to barrack availability would be: Hargeisa, Boramo, Burao, Berbera, Sheikh, Erigavo and Las Anod. In general buildings for the training as well as works depots will need to be built. A scatter - six provincial capitals plus Sheikh - would facilitate use of barracks during construction work and limit the amount of time in field tent camps. Previous demobilisees should be offered the option of room, clothes, meals or an equivalent stipend in lieu - especially for urban residents with households.
17. At the time of the technical assistance request all potential funders identified should be informed of the intent to develop and submit a programme proposal. By the end of three months enough information should be available for the National Demobilisation and Veterans Commission together with ILO to begin formal programme funding negotiations.



18. An analogous procedure - involving the National Mines Commission, Planning Finance, UNDP and UNICEF (because of the particular vulnerability of children - and of mothers seeking to retrieve them from dangerous areas - to mines). Two specialists would be needed - probably for six to twelve weeks: one on techniques of mine location identification and raising, exploding or otherwise deactivating and the second on delineation, fencing and community education to reduce casualties from unraised mines. They should be backed up by and work with four Somalilanders who would then become Commission staff for the operational programme. The cost might be \$125,000 which would appear to be within the range of possible UNICEF (\$50,000) and UNDP (\$75,000) funding from their own budgets or special funds.
19. The second phase leading up to the implementation - also of the order of six months - would conclude funding negotiations and include ILO-National Demobilisation and Veterans Commission, Veterans Association, Finance, Planning and Defense personnel, equipment and building mobilisation as well as more identification of particular projects and their requirements.
20. The operational phase would be for 60 months with intakes in months 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36 and 42, and completion of the last intake's training and supervised work experience in month 60. Assuming the mines programme is for three years, its Somaliland personnel (say 500) should begin training in month 36 or 42 because mine raising embodies skills which are not readily transferable to other livelihoods. (For purposes of this paper a three year mine raising programme reviewed late in the second year to determine whether an extension is needed is envisaged). Ideally finance for the entire five years should be committed in advance. A possible alternative would be a three year definitive commitment and a more tentative one for the final two years subject to a review at the end of the second year.

21. Tentative schedule.

		Enrolment		Total Programme Members	
		Army	Demobilisees	Training	Work Experience
Month	0	1000	500	1500	-
	6	1500	500	2000	1500
	12	1500	500	2000	3500
	18	2000	750	2750	4000
	24	2000	750	2750	4750
	30	2000	750	2750	5500
	36	2000	750	2750	5500
	42	2500	500	2000	5500
	48	-	-	-	4750
	54	-	-	-	2000
	60	-	-	-	-
		<b>14000</b>	<b>5000</b>		

**PRELIMINARY DRAFT BUDGET (\$ USA)**

## 22. Main Programme

Planning and Initial Negotiation	500,000
Final Negotiation and Mobilisation	1,500,000
Room-Meals-Clothing Costs 19,000 x 18 months x \$60	20,520,000
Allowances (Vocational Training) 19,000 x 6 months x \$25	2,850,000
Wages (Work Experience) 19,000 x 12 months x \$100	21,800,000
Professional Personnel <sup>a, b</sup> 20 x \$70,000 x 5 years	7,000,000
Experienced Artisanal Personnel <sup>a, b</sup> 150 x \$10,000 x 5 years	7,500,000
Accommodation Repair and Expansion <sup>c</sup>	5,000,000
Training Buildings and Equipment	5,000,000
Depots and Construction Tools/Equipment	20,000,000
Transport Vehicles	5,000,000
Construction Materials <sup>d</sup>	10,000,000
Graduate Tool Kits (\$500 x 19,000) <sup>e</sup>	9,500,000
ILO Costs <sup>f</sup>	2,500,000
Demobilisation and Veterans Commission Costs <sup>f</sup>	1,250,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$120,000,000</b>

## NOTES

- a. Assumes half of professionals and 80% to 90% of experienced artisans are recruited from Somali diaspora at emoluments levels similar to their present earnings **not** international (Northern technical assistance) scales. Non Somali African as well as other expatriates would be on ta scales.
- b. Assumes half training and half construction team leadership.
- c. Assumes substantial use of existing barracks.
- d. Very rough estimate.
- e. To enable graduates to operate in areas of training/experience.
- f. Administration, Accounting, Review, Planning and Programming.

### 23. Mine Raising-Delineation-Education Sub Programme

(For Three years - \$) <sup>a</sup>

Planning and Initial Negotiations	125,000
Final Negotiations and Mobilisation	250,000
Pay - 500 x 36 x \$250 <sup>b</sup>	4,500,000
Room - Meals - Clothing 500x36x60	1,080,000
Injury and Death Compensation <sup>c</sup>	2,750,000
Professional Personnel 10+15x3 years x 150,000 (including insurance) <sup>d</sup>	5,500,000
Field Medical Facilities <sup>e</sup>	2,500,000
Equipment and Supplies <sup>e</sup>	12,500,000
Transport Vehicles	2,500,000
Delineation and Education <sup>f</sup>	2,000,000
UNDP Costs <sup>g</sup>	750,000
National Mines Commission <sup>h</sup>	1,250,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$36,000,000</b>

## NOTES

- a. Vocational/Work Experience costs for post mining livelihood included in main programme.
- b. \$250/month because of much higher risk and non-transferability of skills.
- c. It is blind optimism to assume no casualties and unjustifiable not to provide for compensation. 10 deaths at \$50,000 and 150 serious injuries at \$15,000 very rough guesstimate.
- d. It appears doubtful Somaliland professional exist to be hired beyond any now in service on the ongoing smaller programme.
- e. Rough guesstimate.
- f. Personnel included above.
- g. Supervision, review, audit.
- h. Administration, accounting, review and planning.

24. **Combined Programme Costs \$156,000,000** (\$15 per Somalilander per year over five years.)

## ANNEX

### NOTE FOR REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND SENIOR PERSONNEL ONLY

This proposal does not require *de jure* external recognition, but - if achieved - will strengthen the case for it.

To finance even substantial reconstruction aid - (which can if a donor so chooses be categorised as humanitarian) does not require formal recognition of a state but rather:

1. a body of lenders and an institutional structure with which it can work;
2. a context of peace, order, rule of law;
3. willingness to accept that the authorities do at the least represent a 'regional' (EU sense) or 'provincial' authority and/or governmental/societal bodies commanding substantial legitimacy.

Both common sense examination on the ground and some existing external agency practice (e.g. UNDP in respect to Mines Commission, UNCTAD in respect to port of Berbera, UNICEF in respect to Ministries of Health and of Water, UNHCR) demonstrate that these three conditions are - and can be seen to be - met.

The Veterans Association, National Veterans' Commission and National Mines Authority can be used as domestic partners if donors prefer not to deal directly and formally with the Ministry of Defence. It would be preferable if they did deal directly with Finance and Planning but, if necessary, this can be done via those Ministries' representatives on the Mines and Veterans bodies.

The use of ILO as a lead external agency is fully justified on its training and works experience - not least in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also convenient for two other reasons:

1. The Somaliland public service is not now capable of handling a large scale project cluster and - if possible - should focus on services which are permanent and not suitable for external sub-contracting e.g. health, education, water, veterinary, agricultural extension;

2. the ILO intermediary role as main contractor/auditor will reassure donors. It can - however organised - see that the participants are fed, housed, clothed and paid allowances and any decision by it to use the Ministry of Defence for part of this will be much easier for donors to accept than direct payment by them to the Ministry.

Thus recognition can be side-stepped and the pretence of reserving judgement maintained by foreign governments.

However:

1. the success of the programme will strengthen Somaliland's economy, governmental and civil society capacity and national unity increasingly the implausibility of denying that it is a state;
2. the more agencies, governments and persons have worked with Somaliland, the more the habit of co-operation will slide into informal **de facto** recognition and thence toward recognition;
3. if - as appears likely - no unified government/state emerges in Somalia (indeed no sub-national analogue to Somaliland either) the contrast between that and a stable polity providing a growing level of basic public services to its people in a relatively buoyant economy and possessing substantial domestic legitimacy in Somaliland will make a 'wait for reunion' approach increasingly hard to justify and a preference for a future Confederal Somalia' consistent with recognising the Republic of Somaliland as a first step.

The direct recognition case is of course that the URS never legally united Somaliland and Somalia linked to the fact that the OAU's 1964 'boundaries at independence' was in large part aimed at the URS' 5 Star Flag which to its neighbours was a flag of armed aggression. The Republic of Somaliland became independent from the UK in 1960 within the boundaries it now claims. It was illegally annexed by force into the URS after voting 'No' on unification. It regained its independence by force of arms in 1991. That case needs to be put clearly and repeatedly to the OAU (asking Salim Salim to check on background to 1964 OAU declaration) and to African states. To this end the more African Ambassadors to

OAU who can be brought to Somaliland to see for themselves, the better. If the OAU can be convinced, the USA and UK and, probably EU will follow rapidly. In the meantime the approach of seeking useful practical relationships which in practice - though not formally - reinforce the recognition case should be carried on in parallel.

*RHG/br/dfs/demob.doc 12/10/99*