

THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES OF DEVELOPMENT:

Some Reflections On Orientation, Scope and Method

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We must look our mistakes squarely in the face
lest we fall into repeating them.

- Rui Balthasar Santos
Rector, Eduardo Mondlane University

To plan is to choose
Choose to go forward.

- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere

From Where? By Whom?

In reviewing ideologies, theories, discourse, actual policy and performance in respect to development in Africa and/or African development a basic question is whose perceptions, goals and actions are to be central and from what vantage point (of location, commitment and concern) they are to be reviewed.

One approach - that used by a majority of non-African writers including Professor Murteira - adopts a global (or external) vantage point and does not seek to distinguish African from in or in respect to Africa. This is a perfectly plausible choice but it is quite different from an Africa centred perspective reviewing African thought, discourse, pronouncement and action from the context of African (or alternative sets of African) historic and contextual goals, opportunities and constraints. The present author should perhaps put his position squarely at the outset. At a recent conference at which he was commentator on an international financial institution lead paper its author (himself an African) commented that the paper was sound and its criticisms valid but added "but the trouble is, he is on the Africans' side".

Evidently the African position on issues such as those under discussion does not exist. Mimeticism and other neo-european approaches are very common. That Professor Murteira uses a very mimetic, self expatriated African scholar

and UNESCO whose period of African leadership was very much mimetic of the previous French leadership² as African criticism of mimeticism illustrates the depth of the problem. Africans with European or European worldview training can be plus europeene que les europeenes as can their own African students.³ Moreover, the dominant power configurations, intellectual concerns, historical records and present contexts vary greatly among and within states. Just as Portuguese and British thought on the whole evaluates the consequences of the Treaty of Methuen rather differently - with Portuguese enthusiasm rather understandably far less marked than British! - so too African perspectives on the same events (or goals) can diverge widely. The divergences can be with Europeans - Portuguese claims to four hundred years of cooperative human interchange with Africans ring rather oddly in Lusophone African ears. But it can be among African of different backgrounds. For Coastal Ghanaian historians the 19th Century Fanti Confederacy was their defensive alliance to roll back Ashanti imperialism; for Ashanti historians it was a British pre-colonial neo-colonial ploy to break Ashanti's legitimate suzerainty over the coast. For Marxist and Schumpeterian African economists to the same dynamics look quite different as to social and economic consequences and normative acceptability even if they can agree on the empirical data and events. Nonetheless, almost any Africa based and African centred approach is qualitatively, not marginally, different from most global or any Eurocentric ones.⁴

At what level?

Another question is the level on which attention is concentrated. One common choice especially in relation to ideology and theory is to concentrate on the intellectual (academic and institutional research pronunciamento) level. This again is a plausible choice but not the only reasonable one and one requiring complementary studies at different levels to give a holistic perspective.

There is no simple interaction between on the one hand global, imported or import substitution academic writing and discourse and on the other, actual operational goals (or for that matter Utopias), strategies, policies and results. This remains true even of major political figures who are also major intellectuals, e.g. Leopold Sedar Senghor, Robert Mugabe, Julius Nyerere. Therefore one alternative or complementary frame is to examine the statements,

operational documents and actions of African leaders and political groupings as well as of their main official, technical and managerial cadres (and, where this is relevant, of the African business community).

Clearly any such approach is problematic. Pronouncements or even pronouncements and operational documents do - taken by themselves - give a romanticised and incomplete picture as Aquino da Braganza argued cogently in his last work. To rely on them alone leads first to an uncritical adoration of instant utopias the Africans idealised by their largely expatriate analysts either never aspired to or never claimed were attainable in the short run and, later in reaction, to root and branch condemnations with an equal lack of perspective.⁵

What any such exercise in examining applied statements does do is to cast overwhelming doubt on the assertion that either maximum economic growth or industrialisation as such have been central to African development strategy or ideology and to raise questions about what "modernisation" and "tradition" mean in specific contexts.⁶ Incidentally, it also warns against assuming that internationally oriented statements on - e.g. liberalisation - can be interpreted in policy and action terms without reference to parallel national actions and statements.⁷

A yet broader stance - and one very rarely adopted because of its difficulty - would be a systematic examination of elite, counter-elite and 'popular' ideologies, concepts, goals and interests in respect to development. Initially these would need to be national, both because the patterns are unlikely to be the same - or even very similar - in different states and because without them no comparative study on a regional or a continental basis is practicable.

Economics: Master or Means?

Very few people other than professional economists equate economics or even material growth with development. In his lead paper Professor Murteira is quite careful to underline the limitations of economics as a total explanation of, or format for achieving development and does cite at length a neo-Rousseaian modeller⁸ and at least three political economists⁹ who are, in

different ways, deeply concerned about overly narrow economic frames for conceptualisation, analysis and - especially goal and policy formulation and implementation. But despite this the bulk of his paper is a presentation and commentary on economic - and nominally non-political economic - ideology and analysis. That is telling evidence on the imperial pretensions of economics and political economy both over policy and over other disciplines and ways of discourse and, in particular, so-called 'value free', 'scientific' economics.

That is indeed a global problem - not merely an African one. Oddly it results in part from the fact that applied political economists are often by no means as triumphalist as is sometime supposed. It was John Maynard Keynes who suggested that the ideal analogue to an economist's role was that of a plumber or a dentist - a useful handyman who identified and fixed a problem to allow (not to cause nor to define) better living conditions. And on that analogue an economist, while a skilled artisan with autonomy as to defining a number of aspects of problem solving, worked to goals and within constraints set by his employer. Most economic advisers and operational specialists - between bouts of folle de grandeur when they try on the role of Platonic Guardians - do see their work that way.

One problem is that many other disciplines do not. They, in practice, decline to address their minds to finding the best (least bad) practicable answer to a set question within a set time frame. Economists are ready (sometimes too ready) to do precisely that even in fields in respect to which their discipline and experience are not very enlightening. And so one has economists advising on politics, sociology, history and psychology not necessarily from arrogance (and quite possibly on a "fools rush in where angels fear to tread" basis) but to fill vacuums.

An equal problem is that the analogy is not quite right. By and large a plumber's or a dentist's value judgements do not greatly influence what he does and there are few value debates concerning the specific goals/tasks set for him. This is simply not true in economics. To choose an end very often is, in large part, to choose a means and vice versa. If economics is a means, albeit a necessary means, not an end in itself, than it is especially important to recognise this fact not to overlook nor to suppress it. There is a very good reason why Adam Smith and John Stewart Mill, just as much as Karl Marx, viewed themselves as political economists. If economics is to be a

servant discipline and a means, within an historic and objective context, to attaining basically normative "human dimension" (social and political) ends set by a political (or political economic and socio economic) process, it is essential for its value laden nature (not only as to 'economic' ends but also as to many economic means and policies) to be identified and understood. It is failure to do so which leads to economics (purportedly value free as in neo-liberalism¹⁰) as an imperial discipline and to a development discourse which is overly economistic, or even economystic, in content and terminology.

This problem is distinctly more real at intellectual than at operational level. The terms of a discourse may conceal its content (with or without distorting it) e.g. up to the 1970s virtually all Francophone African political discourse was conducted in Marxist terminology (or jargon) whatever the content, in the Cote d'Ivoire or Guinea, Senegal or Mali. Similarly political decision takers do not in fact operate as technical economic maximisers even when available (and external funder acceptable) discourse makes them sound as if they do. That point is largely independent of whether they are accountable (and to whom) and/or genuinely seeking to implement aspirations of some constituency (of whatever nature) to whom they feel responsible. This is still more true at movement and mass level - the students who defiantly cried out "Sankara or nothing" after his murder were making a development ideology statement but hardly an economic centred one. Nonetheless, the triumphalist march of economic terminology and - to a lesser extent - conceptualisation and goal setting is a real problem especially at the intellectual discourse level and not merely (or even most severely) in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Development And Economic Growth

Development is not adequately or accurately equated with growth. Africans are, with few exceptions (and those few usually victims of intellectual neo-colonialism or over exposure to economistic triumphalism) in no need of being told that. It is a sermon better preached from Africa to Europe than vice versa.

Professor Adelman as cited by Professor Murteira¹¹ is fully in accord with viewing development as about people and their welfare/attainment of potential

(however defined) but, as a result, does not seek to define development only its economic supporting structure. Professor Perroux¹² goes further but in part in a very special Western way. Like Schumpeter he argues that an economic centred system erodes values and basic goals without creating replacements and is therefore ultimately historically unsustainable. But he does so in a context of assumed linear progress and of a degree of priority to individual autonomy over social group solidarity and order which is quite un-African - indeed quite unusual historically globally, though not in the West since the philosophes.

If development is primarily oriented toward human (in social relations and as individual persons) goals and toward relaxing constraints on human potential fulfillment, it cannot be universal at the levels of articulation and - especially - operation. Historic and objective contexts do shape such goals - a decent burial in ones home area is seen as a basic human need in Africa (as in China and rural Portugal) but not in most of Northern Europe or North America; the crippling and limiting aspects of the traditional extended family systems - as perceived by growing numbers of Africans - both cause their erosion/force their transformation and also affect normative goals and appropriate economic policies. The quest for universal packages - as opposed to widely useable guideposts - is a quest for El Dorado (or Prester John)¹³ and, as the examples cited may suggest, an export not an import substitute industry.

But to say with Mwalimu Nyerere that the only justification, measure and yardstick of development is human beings is not to deny that productive forces - and therefore economics - are of great importance as a means. Indeed he goes on to stress this and to warn that therefore it may be necessary to adopt economic organisational forms which are unattractive or even undesirable in themselves to win material resources to further non-economic ends. Similarly doubt as to linear (let alone steady) economic growth does not reduce the importance of economic resources nor of political economy, especially in the very poor countries of Africa. It was precisely in that context that Nyerere remarked that in low income socialist countries waste is a cardinal sin.¹⁴

Utopia: Guiding Vision, Ignis Fatuis or Police State?

Broadly coherent normative mobilising worldviews are crucial to development - indeed to operational nationhood and to state or party ability to carry out programmes; to retain credibility when times are bad and secure acceptance of sacrifices. This is a fact which is very much outside the scope of technical economics or of simplistic output/modernisation maximisation discussion. Such worldviews are variously termed: weltanchaung, paradigm; but the commonest and most recurrent term is probably Utopia. Unfortunately in recent years applied development thinking has tended to use that term either perjoratively ("a mere Utopia", "unrealistic Utopianism" or without any serious attention to the uses and abuses, benefits and costs of Utopias in general and - especially - of particular Utopias in particular contexts.

The importance and explicit consideration given to the concept and use of Utopia by Professor Murteira is welcome but may not go far enough. Utopia indeed means "no place" but usually in the sense of not yet or not here and now but to be sought - the New Jerusalem in the early Church and the stage of Communism in Marx are both Utopias but both are ones which it was devoutly believed would presently (sooner rather than later) be achieved. Plato may have felt the Republic to be unattainable - and so wrote other treatises for application (in an inversion of Machiavelli's applicable Prince and desired Laws) - but he did believe it should be sought and could serve as a benchmark against which to test real systems. This is even more true of guideline to action Utopias such as What Now? Another Development (which would have better been titled "Other Developments"¹⁵) or the ILO's Employment, Growth and Basic Needs (a utopia manque but the nearest a UN agency has ever been able to get!¹⁶).

But Utopias can be used in three ways: as long range visions to which to lift ones eyes for reinspiration from short term drudgery; as distant landmarks against which to measure and in the direction of which to orient short and medium term directly operational strategy and policy and as detailed rule books to be imposed - to the maximum extent possible here and now.

The last can be disposed of - intellectually - quickly. It is the road to counter utopia. Plato's Guardians - if one is less unlucky than most - become in reality Antonio Salazaar and Plato's Warriors the PIDE. The first is

perhaps exemplified by the African (Banjul Declaration) human and peoples' rights charter and can be of genuine inspirational, symbolic and hortatory use - not least in the Banjul Declaration case because it is clearly African and contextual (e.g. in terms of the articulation of peoples' rights) not European and global.

However, the most important case is probably the second. Here results vary - in Tanzania the Arusha Declaration and in SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) the Lusaka Declaration have been of continuing value in giving a sense of direction, a platform for mobilisation, a test of results and a base for formulating next steps. In other cases, while the initial results have been similar, they tended to falter or halt with an apparent loss of sense of direction and a rise in cynicism or an erosion of continued belief in ultimate attainability as to the Utopia. Aquino da Braganza saw Mozambique as such a case in large part because when the first - articulated - stage of national political liberation had been won no equally seriously analysed, politically tested and politically mobilising second stage had even been begun to be formulated. That applies to many independence coalitions and is additional to the fact that different stages may require different sub-class coalitions. One final question arises as to whether the Utopia itself remains unchanged. Probably not but in the sense that, e.g., Mount Kilimanjaro 'changes' as seen and perceived as one approaches it. That of course is an added argument against the "street plan for the New Jerusalem" detailed Utopia and in favour of the principle and guideline or signpost style.

Interactions

The five topics sketched above interact. If development is primarily a set of human oriented ends with political economy as a set of means no universal - or even all African¹⁷ - detailed development ideology or strategy is practicable. If peoples, leaders and their states operate on that presumption (however intuitive its formulation) then development ideology, strategy, policy as well as results and evaluation of results¹⁸ will necessarily diverge. And, perhaps most crucially, any attempt to view development in a global, economic, intellectual oriented paradigm will fail either to identify actual evolving African development ideologies and strategies or their very real divergences in results.

What African states are most nearly alike in - since 1979 though not before - is economic unsuccess, albeit even there the record is much more and much more complexly divergent than realised. For example, how many realise that Tanzania going into its "externally approved" rehabilitation phase of adjustment in late 1986 had three years of rising real Gross Domestic Product and a 3.5% annual food output growth rate (with 1986 on or above the trend line) behind it? In depth and strength of nationhood, resilience in the face of crises and disasters, priority to and progress toward certain human condition aspects (e.g. immunisation, rural primary health care, universal functional literacy) the divergences are immense. It is not quite whimsical to argue that on national unity aspects Zaire is closer to Belgium than either is to Tanzania and on human condition Botswana is nearer to - say - Sweden than is Portugal.

Amilcar Cabral stresses that however rich and fine the realities of others might be, African reality could only be constructed by Africans. By the same token African development ideology, strategy and results can - however rich - global or European constructs may be - can only be fully comprehended by including (the present author would argue starting from) actual African and Africa (or African state) centred perspectives.¹⁹

What Is To Be Done? The Human Condition

The pressing issues from this perspective relate to sustaining development ideologies and Utopias which retain credibility and mobilising power and to do so by tackling key challenges at once. One is the human condition - roughly what social indicators attempt to measure. If development is about people this cannot wait until after several years of rapid growth. If human resource economics (or Nobel Laureate Robert Solow's growth causal decomposition models or for that matter common sense are right) mass illiteracy, penury, malnutrition, illness and exclusion/invisibility of women are major barriers to rapid growth. Adam Smith emphasised that no nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable. Nor is there any absolute need to have rapid growth nor massive new (as opposed to reallocated) resources to make progress on this front²⁰ as exemplified by

divergences in African (and global) results rather uncorrelated to the depth of economic crises.²¹

Nationhood and Participation

Ability to hang together in adversity and to claw back from disaster depends on a sense of community, at national level nationhood. That requires not rhetoric but a Utopia that is broadly shared, a belief that the state is struggling toward achieving that dream and at least some faith that it can avert the killing of the dream. These are unlikely to be achieved without at least some broadly based participation systems - economic, social and political.

In this sense Mozambique has shown itself to have a strong sense of nationhood. It is no accident that its video on the bandidos armados is entitled "Killing The Dream" or that the defiant answer (mass as well as elite) is "The Dream Lives!". The weight of successive catastrophes has endangered credibility as to state capacity and threatened to destroy participation. Again the emphasis on getting food relief out to every area even conceivably accessible and - last year - on continuing the multi-stage electoral crisis throughout the high tide of the South African/bandidos "final solution to the Mozambique problem" campaign were not accidental nor peripheral but integrally logical and central.

One major threat to nationhood - and to participation - is external aggression. This is most true in Southern Africa and in the Moroccan occupied Saharan Democratic Republic.

External Aggression: Apartheid or Liberation

The dominant locus of external aggression is Southern Africa (including occupied Namibia) and its main arena for action Southern Africa. The aggressor is the South African state (doubtless with external allies but shaping the broad nature as well as the details of that aggression).

For up to ten countries that aggression is the major constraint on economic progress (and therefore productive force augmentation to serve other aspects of development. In Angola and Mozambique it is the dominant fact in every aspect of survival as well as of development. By the end of 1988 1,500,000 souls who would otherwise have been alive were dead and over \$50,000 million of national output (two years actual output) had been lost to the SADCC states as the price of Pretoria.²²

The clash is between African liberation and development defined by Africans and creating a safe and profitable regional context for apartheid. Regional aggression cannot, in fact, make South Africa safe for apartheid is true but so long as the South African apartheid leadership's false consciousness that it can remains the effects on the region are the same. In this struggle - and here I disagree totally with Professor Murteira - there is no "viable compromise" on the basic issue. There is no middle ground and no room for neutrals - the choice is between liberation and apartheid.

What comes after apartheid? How are changes in the Republic phased once the basic transfer of power takes place?²³ What regional tactics and sequences are optional? Those are questions open to debate and, in some respect, "viable compromise" is possible. However, the utter failure of white reformism in South Africa from Schriener and Hofmeyer to Botha²⁴ and the grim road from the Nkomati Accord to the end of Samora's plane in the hills above Nkomati should be answer enough for those who think there is either an easy way to transfer of power or much room for slower and softer regional tactics. Indeed the dramatic military and transport turn-around over the past year with South Africa losing the battle of the Limpopo Valley rail line in Mozambique and the battle for Kuito Canavale in Angola, suggests precisely the opposite.

A Southern African regional alternative to dependence on apartheid South Africa is a necessary defensive and developmental objective. The existence, statements and actions of the Front Line States and SADCC underline that fact as well as going some distance toward its attainment. But they do so in the face of antagonistic contradiction (as Samora Machel termed it even in his address at the signing of the Nkomati Agreement) not of an arena for pragmatic compromises.

External Economic Environment: Riding The Hurricane²⁵

Given the divergence of African economic results before 1979 and the divergence of policies then and since it is fairly clear - as even the World Bank agrees - that Sub-Saharan Africa's economic crises are very largely caused by a worsening external economic climate. But - as retired President Obasanjo of Nigeria has warned - African logic, passion and rhetoric cannot significantly alter this environment or its evolution. That is the bitter reality underlying the words unilateral external economic dependence.

Therefore, Africa and African states must seek to adjust to the international economic hurricane beating on them by sailing to smoother waters ("delinking", "regional economic cooperation", etc.), putting out sea anchors (e.g. collecting on the international commitments to Africa's Priority Programme For Economic Recovery - APPER - made at the 1986 UN Special Session) and battening down the hatches and steering into the gale ("stabilisation" and "structural adjustment") to claw off the rocks of a lee shore.

That does mean some form of stabilisation and adjustment - concepts over which the IMF and World Bank (contrary to popular perception) hold neither any intellectual property rights nor unique wisdom.²⁶ To say most African states are seeking to stabilise and to adjust and that all these programmes have some common features is true - and trite. There are only so many ways to respond to losses of total real resources. Therefore the 1986 Algerian stabilisation programme which is totally indigenous is almost more draconic in external balance and fiscal deficit compression than the IMF would have advocated. What is in the present context more interesting are the divergences: Algeria's (and basically Tanzania's) "liberalisation" has more in common with Lenin's New Economic Policy than with neo-liberalism; "human dimension" advocates are steadily gaining ground in Ghana adjustment formulations²⁷; Zimbabwe won through its 1982-84 crisis without the IMF because it thought its own formulation better.²⁸ The differences relate to the natures and historic contexts of the states and to their development ideologies and strategies.

The operational dilemma of delinking approaches to date (as Professor Murteira very clearly and cogently stresses) is their failure to give viable short term answers to the question of method. As Chairman Mao said, it is not useful to talk of crossing a river without identifying and/or constructing a ford, a

bridge, a boat or a tunnel. That is precisely the weakest point of Samir Amin's or Ajit Singh's or A. M. Babu's economic Utopias - their lack of identifying practicable first steps on the long journey. Delinking from exports first - as has been widely, if not always deliberately, practiced - is not a practicable way to self-reliance. Au contraire, as Amir Jamal of Tanzania warned in 1970; it runs a high risk of delivering a country bound hand and foot into the hands of its creditors and/or donors.

Structural adjustment toward greater national and regional integration (in an input/output or circuit of production sense) is a practicable means. It does include selective industrialisation (and selective export promotion, possibly but not necessarily of manufactures) as well as priority to food and energy import substitution. But it is a partial and - more important - dominantly a medium term answer. Smoother waters are not readily reachable, sea anchors (external resource transfers) and beating into the hurricane (stabilisation) are the only practicable dominant short term answers for most African economies.

Rehabilitation And Reconstruction: Clawing Back²⁹

But riding out a gale - surviving - is a minimum necessary goal, not an adequate one. Most Africans and African societies, economies and states have passed that test - though not all, millions of human beings are prematurely dead and for them there can be no rehabilitation, reconstruction and renewed development. At a national level the combination of contradictory development ideologies (or sub-class interests) and too rigid, too rapid pursuit of a Utopia most Burkinabe did believe in has killed Thomas Sankara and - at least for a time - that Utopia is buried with him. Even if not enough, survival (like economic growth) matters.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction cannot mean simply restoring 1978 in Tanzania, 1958 in Ghana, 1973 in Zambia. Subsequent events have cruelly exposed structural, institutional and productive forces pattern flaws. Even had they not, the past external economic environment cannot be reconstructed (most certainly not by African states severally or jointly). What changes are necessary and possible is a contextual question: what existed historically? How badly is it debilitated? In what ways is it flawed and how? For what

measures and projects can domestic and other resources be mobilised? What is the present mobilising Utopia and what changes, priorities and sequences does it require? Different aspects pose different degrees of difficulty in answering operationally and also different degrees of urgency in answering in different countries. In Mozambique it is a bitter reality that armed aggression has in one sense strengthened the immediate mobilising power of the Utopia - it was at its strongest during the political liberation war and this is a second (and harsher) one. In Tanzania with restored growth, major aspects of the Arusha Utopia regaining mobilising capacity as their current and recent past weakness has been credibility not desiredness. Per contra in Ghana the interim ideological crazy guilt which is fourth hand Nkrumahite plus participatory populist plus neo-Platonic Utopia badly needs reforging into a new synthesis. That is all the more the case because recovery of productive forces is proceeding moderately rapidly and - perhaps - sustainably in purely economic terms.

And Thus To Renewed Development

Rehabilitation and reconstruction (unless literally rebuilding exactly as before politically and socially as well as economically) are partly and form part of renewed development. The joint Tanzanian-UNICEF-Danish rural health reconstruction initiative of 1984, in fact, increases the capacity and dynamic potential in that system beyond any previous high point even though overall Tanzania is - as it explicitly states - in a recovery and reconstruction phase.

But rehabilitation and recovery priorities may not be identical to those of renewed development proper. For one thing economic necessity is likely to bind more tightly and economic growth (not least in productivity of and production by poor people) to be more often an overriding priority. But again the dynamics - and especially the productive participation and political economic power distribution - set in motion by rehabilitation and reconstruction will influence the possible courses of subsequent development so that the latter (at least in broad outline) needs to be partially (strategically?) articulated early on in rehabilitating and reconstructing if expensive backtracking, permanent distortions or high cost contradictions are to be averted.

One has reason to hope - and to believe - at least a number of the renewed developments will be more strongly based on contextually related Utopias (ideologies) and strategies which are both consistent with them and practicable to implement. The lessons of experience and the time to learn are - often though not always - likely to survive and to help divert the avalanche of neo-liberal, Eurocentric preaching backed by conditionality.

In respect to this process as well as to rehabilitation and reconstruction the immediate and necessary conceptual and ideological base is contextual and applicable more than intellectual and global. This is relevant to Professor Murteira's point that structuralism has never evolved a rigorous, global level theoretical model and Cardoso's that dependency writing - at its best - analyses case studies and sets out tool kits of guidelines. Indeed so, but as indigenous - initially nationally oriented - antitheses to economistic, global development ideologies these comments do suggest structuralists did tackle their own top priorities first, even if structuralism could (and probably should) have been more rigorously, systematically and generally developed by some of its major intellectual architects (including Cardoso) than has been the case to date.

Knowledge, Technology And Relative Autonomy³⁰

Africa was colonised and has remained externally dependent primarily because of specialised knowledge and technology (including soft institutional and hard physical technology) gaps. From the astralobe to the Gatling gun the record of conquest is one of applied technological domination.

Initially the keys to conquest were margins in long distance navigation technologies and in military technologies to 'protect' the incursions made possible by navigation. At that point Lagos and Prince Henry were at the cutting edge of imperial and technological expansion even if that position was soon to be seized by more northerly powers and the demise of Portugal's global knowledge leadership sealed and symbolised by the Treaty of Methuen.

Technology, and applicable knowlege more generally, are not the same as 'pure' knowledge nor as totally 'new' knowledge. It is perfectly true that the Portuguese navigators did not discover the inhabited territories they explored nor even the sea routes across the Indian Ocean and on to China. The residents knew where they lived, the sea routes had been (at least cumulatively by stages) trade routes for centuries. But the navigators did put together a whole cartographic picture from Europe to the Far East (and Brazil) by sea which had not existed before. Even more important they fitted that knowledge into their maritime applied technology and their political and economic system in a way which created Portugal's trading wealth and its far flung mercantile empire. Pure science in large part no, totally knew knowledge in many cases no; but new applications of knowledge based on fitting separate pieces together - very much yes. In that sense the navigators and their sponsors were very much the predecessors of today's TWCs in their approach to collection, fitting together and application of knowledge.

With colonisation the gaps became more general partly by conscious action but partly because colonies - as James Mill put it - were viewed as useful places to carry on certain metropolitan economic activities not as countries or territories in their own right and knowledge/technology creation was rarely and limitedly perceived to be such an activity. And so to use Walter Rodney's words "Europe underdeveloped Africa".

Independence did not redress that dependence nor even halt the processes widening the gap. Africa is still grappling with them with unequal, but on average distressingly limited, success. This is in part because of a mistaken view that all or almost all applicable knowledge is value free and context mobile and an equally mistaken mirror image view that none or almost none is either.³¹

Here, if anywhere, contextual specificity, unpacking and priorities need attention. Utopias, strategies and socio-political institutions travel very badly as, intriguingly, do universities. Pure bits and pieces of hard technology (if the importer has the capacity to operate and to maintain and can speedily develop that to replicate and to adapt) often travel rather well. Most knowledge/technology is in between and the ways in which this is so and why are rarely either simple or intuitively obvious. In respect to applied Utopia and strategy (but not their intellectual levels) and, on the whole, to

mass and skill creating education many African countries have made substantial progress. Institutional innovation and hard technology adaptation and replication has - unevenly - also gone further than is usually realised (perhaps especially than realised by "high" technology focussed Africans trained in the Western technology policy research weltanschauung or its "intermediate technology" mutant).

But knowledge/technology adaptation and innovation remain weak areas and ones inadequately conceptualised or built into Utopias or strategies despite the brave attempt in the OAU's 1980 Lagos Plan. Until that is achieved selective importation and adaptation synthesised with indigenous innovation (the Japanese and Korean processes on the open, and the Indian and Chao en Lai's contribution to the Chinese strategy on the less open end of the spectrum) will remain error prone, inefficient, problematic, partial and badly understood in ways which hamper either structurally or incrementally improving the transfer-mastery-incorporation process.

In Process

From a European perspective - as Professor Murteira's lead paper ably demonstrates - Africa looks distressingly uniformly unsuccessful. From the opposite (African) end of the telescope there is a great deal more diversity, complexity and evidence of positive changes. Both of us of course may suffer the fate of that first futurologist on Africa - Pliny - who in consternation at how new facts upset his models exclaimed "Out of Africa there is always something new!"

That Africans confront major obstacles and live in a harsh set of interacting environments is only too true. But for many - and in many countries - "The Dream Lives", "a luta continua". "Vitoria e certa" may seem much more problematic but in the context of Utopias it is an essential faith because without it mobilisation (in any sense including economic resources) becomes impossible. For that matter to Africans - if not to outsiders - it is literally necessary. Failure to develop will sooner or later mean failure to survive, as it already has for millions of souls prematurely dead in the past decade.

The appropriate envoi may be a Tanzanian Lake Zone proverb which was cited by Chairman Nyerere opening the South Commission in reference to the related struggle for autonomous, self-defined South-South interaction:

Rabbit, where are you going?

I am going out to kill the elephant.

Can you really do that?

Well, I'll try. And try again.

Notes

1. Reginald Herbold Green, now a Professorial Fellow of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex has been a student of the political economy of Africa for almost 30 years. He has served on the staff of, or as consultant to, several African universities, governments, liberation movements and interstate organisations as well as to UNICEF, WFP, ILO, the World Council of Churches, the International Center on Law in Development, UNCTAD and the Catholic Institute for International Relations.
2. Professor Mazrui's film on Africa was criticised in Europe/North America as anti-Western but in Africa (especially West Africa) as the superficial distorted view of an outsider who was neither very wise nor sympathetic. In the case of UNESCO the overconcentration on headquarters and pomp and on intellectual vogue conferences like the sloppiness of administration and the systematic, demoralising use of favouritism to control staff and of project allocations to silence critics were the hallmarks of Renee Mahev's UNESCO. His successor was as identifiably a certain type of French intellectual as he and followed the same paths.
3. Ironically this may be most true when the state trend is otherwise - the sudden upsurge of Tanzanian neo-liberal economists at the University of Dar es Salaam appears to be an example. Academicians often like to be enfants terribles and to swim against the tide, a characteristic with its uses - and limitations or abuses.
4. Eurocentric as used in this paper includes Central and Eastern Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. For some purposes the USSR and Japan might need to be excluded or qualified but probably not for the present ones.
5. The history of self-styled "left" writing on Nkrumahism in theory and practice in Ghana and on Ujamaa villages and the Arusha Declaration process in Tanzania are clearcut examples.
6. For example, in Zaire it is not unfair to say indigenoussness is a fig leaf to cover the naked realities of national disintegration and rampant external dependence. In the later stages of Sekov Toure's Guinea it was a mobilising slogan against the necessary (whether real or no) external enemy. In the work of Senghor it is a cultural and human identity affirmation.
7. In both Algeria and Tanzania the balance of all statements and actions suggests Lenin on the New Economic Policy more than Berg or von Hayek on the magic of the market. In Zimbabwe better use of the private sector to complement the public and state acquisition of control over the largest industrial combine are (correctly in their strategy) seen as wholly consistent.
8. i.e. Galtung.
9. Perroux, Adelman, Amin.

10. In fact the operative word is purportedly. Von Hayek, Friedman and many other neo-liberals do have a normative creed. It can be summed up as "free markets make free men" or, to be less flattering, the magic emancipation of the mystical market mechanism.
11. Page p 35.
12. Page pp 35-37.
13. Both did have objective correlatives but hardly ones congruent with the mythical figures sought.
14. A terminology presumably reflecting a synthesis of Marxian socialist and Catholic intellectual influences.
15. As one of the authors and of those responsible for the title my recollection is that its wording related to catching reader potential and its consistency with the content which inherently denies the desirability of a single development paradigm (or indeed its validity) was not really considered.
16. Governmental, employer and trade union clearance excised almost all of the political infrastructure of the drafting group (including the present author) text - but even so the coherence and force of the balance is far beyond what normally can survive such a least common denominator, neutering process.
17. The contexts of the 51 American states (plus Namibia and South Africa) vary immensely.
18. That is the same objective result will be valued differently in different cases.
19. Which does not deny the contribution more abstract, formal intellectual and general approaches can make, especially at comparative and trajectory plotting levels. Not incidentally there is a resurgence of nationalism in Europe parallel to that of supranationalism while its emergence in Southern Africa is not merely parallel to that of firmly backed regional coordination but a driving force behind the latter.
20. cf. "The Broken Pot: The Social Fabric, Economic Disaster And Adjustment In Africa", paper presented at the Institute For African Alternatives (IFFA) 1987 Conference, The Impact Of IMF And World Bank Policies On The People Of Africa, London, September 1987, and "The Human Dimension As The Test Of And A Means To Achieving Africa's Economic Recovery And Development: Reweaving The Social Fabric, Restoring The Broken Pot", paper presented at the International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development for United Nations Economic Commission For Africa (UNECA), Khartoum, Sudan, 5-8 March 1988, ECA/ICHHD/88/3 and ECA/ICHHD/88/3/Add.1, by the present author for fuller articulations.

21. cf., e.g. G. A. Cornia, A. R. Jolly and F. Stewart, Adjustment With A Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, A Study by UNICEF, Oxford, 1987.
22. cf., e.g. Children On The Front Line, UNICEF, New York, 1987 (authors R. H. Green, M. Mauras, D. Asrat, R. Morgan) and 1989 revised edition.
23. Incidentally to evaluate South Africa as a neo-classical state in economic terms (as does Potter cited by Professor Murteira) is rather less plausible than to make the same assertion as to Salazaar's "New Order". South Africa has been from its birth in the Zuid Afrikaans Republiek (the original Transvaal Republic) economically interventionist for political economic strategic reasons and marked by intra-European tribal (and - to a large degree until recently coterminus - class conflicts) conflicts, plus a manipulated, administratively regulated exploitation of a black sub-proletariat, not faith in market magic, have shaped the dominant development ideology there.
24. This is in one sense deeply unfair to the memories of Oliver Schreiner and Jan Hofmeyer. But in dynamic and systemic terms "Piet Wapen" (Pete the Gun) Botha is the heir of the Cape liberal Afrikaaner tradition and, as such, the evidence of its tragic failure to cope with, or prioritise within, reality (especially the reality of Black South Africans).
25. For fuller accounts see "Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward economic recovery or oblivion?", Journal of Development Planning, No. 15, 1985.
26. For a series of analyses and case studies see C. Colclough and R. H. Green (editors) "Stabilisation - For Growth or Decay? Short Run Costs and Long Run Uncertainties in Africa", IDS Bulletin, 19-1, January 1988.
27. See Ghana article in ibid.
28. For a fuller account see X. Kadhani and R. H. Green, "Parameters as warnings and guide posts: the case of Zimbabwe", JDP, op cit.
29. See T. Rose (editor), Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1985 for a series of papers around this set of topics.
30. See World Council of Churches Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development, Transnational Corporations, Technology And Human Development, Geneva, 1981, for a fuller articulation.
31. That is in itself a somewhat reductionist formulation. It is quite possible, for example, to hold the former position in respect to hard technology and - apparently - technical institutions and the second in respect to ideologies and socio-political institutions and technologies.