




THE AFRICAN CAPACITY
BUILDING FOUNDATION

FONDATION POUR LE RENFORCEMENT
DES CAPACITES EN AFRIQUE

AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2011

Capacity Development in Fragile States



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This publication, the inaugural edition of the African Capacity Building Foundation's annual Africa Capacity Indicators Report, examines not only these countries' visible capacity development needs, but also the underlying historical, political, economic, cultural, and societal elements that contributed to their current fragility and complicate efforts to address the problem.

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Foreword

Africa's recent development performance has generated optimistic talk that the Continent will soon join the league of “emerging markets.” While Africa has in fact, over the past decade, achieved significant gains in restoring macroeconomic stability and robust economic growth, thereby breaking with and starting to tackle the economic stagnation, debt crisis and severe poverty of the previous three decades, these developments are uneven and they need to be sustained.

Key challenges for the Continent are her exposure to external development policies and practices that do not take into consideration the cultural heritage, knowledge systems and institutions of its people, an inability to produce adequate food for its population, which gets worse with global climate change, and political instability and conflict in some countries. This is further accentuated by the limited participation of its people in decision-making, which has resulted in weak governance institutions in many African countries. Inadequate capacity also remains one of the critical missing links to Africa's development. It is therefore common cause that Africa needs to implement more bold economic reforms, build critical infrastructure, improve governance, wealth redistribution and healthcare, and enhance human capital formation through education, research and training. Africa must shape and take ownership of its development agenda and improve governance to engage all its citizens, in order to attain greater traction toward the achievement of the MDGs by 2015 and sustainable development beyond 2015.

Our ongoing dialogue on capacity development tends to center on practical considerations and quantifiable performance benchmarks. Managing for Development Results (MfDR) is paramount in how Africans themselves measure progress in development. Indeed, when we interrogate capacity development, and particularly when we focus on the impact capacity development can have in Africa, we're really talking about sustainable development and the imperative to meet the needs for the living as well as future generations. Years after the Millennium Development Goals were recognized; results reported at the September 2010 MDG Summit confirmed that Africa currently has the highest incidence of extreme poverty in the

developing world, and is widely adjudged to be off-course to meeting the full battery of MDGs by 2015 despite some noteworthy success stories in some better-governed countries that include Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal.

Capacity development seeks to enlarge people's choices by empowering individuals, groups, organizations, and societies to fully participate and deliver on their specified mandates. It is thus a commitment to all citizens that there is room for them in their country's decision-making and economy; that there is room for them at the table as productive, self-supporting, economically self-sufficient members of society; and that


they have a right to share in the universal hope of a better life for themselves and for their children. But the challenges remain enormous.

The African Capacity Building Foundation's Flagship publication – Africa Capacity Indicators Report (ACIR) is a timely addition to ACBF's growing list of knowledge products, and a testimony of its leadership in the field of Capacity Development. ACIR provides an authoritative characterization of the state and evolution of African capacity across space and time. ACIR also provides an invaluable tool for country benchmarking; and, monitoring-and-evaluation of capacity development interventions.

Indeed, this inaugural edition of ACIR provides an important baseline and insights on capacity development landscape in Africa with respect to the specific capacity clusters that have guided the underlying inquiry. While most countries have made strategic choices and improved the policy environments for capacity development as proxied by the existence of national development strategies, effective dialogue mechanisms and growing partnerships, there is however concern that overall capacity remains inadequate and generally underfunded to meet the challenge of achieving the MDGs, sustaining them and achieving further development. In addition, capacity development is weakly anchored in national development strategies, a weakness that can be strengthened through the conscientious installation of national coordination units for capacity development, and greater attention to country capacity profiling and capacity needs assessments as important upstream activities in capacity development. That said, the ACI Report indicates that capacity development is generally well targeted across countries.

I therefore regard this first edition of ACIR as a bold and veritable attempt at conceptualizing and measuring the state of African capacity. The emerging results will excite vigorous debate on African capacity development more generally. However, any transformation effected by enhanced capacity needs to be tracked. This is most easily done when the number of dimensions being tracked is limited, which is a key reason for creating the Africa Capacity Index (ACI). The point of the index is to measure as a whole all the relevant factors that make a successful and thriving society due to enhanced capacity. Africa requires a common denominator for all countries that serves as a starting point of capacity development such that one can track progress over time. Further, the Report interrogates not only surveyed countries' visible capacity development gaps, but also the underlying historical, political, socio-economic, and essentials that contributed to their current fragility and complicate efforts to address the problem. Its premise is that it's not enough for development organizations to assess fragile/post-conflict African countries' capacity development needs in terms of those traditional, quantifiable performance benchmarks.

This ACIR is a 'must have' for all Government officials, policy makers, development practitioners, researchers, scholars and all who have a keen interest in Africa's development agenda.



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January 26, 2011

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Randy B. Hecht, who served as the ACI's principal editor, carried out technical and production editing. Walter Mangwende coordinated the report design and layout. All pictures courtesy of Rudo Nyangulu.

We thank all of those involved variously and collectively in guiding our efforts, while acknowledging sole responsibility for any errors, misrepresentations, and or omissions in this Report.



Kobena T. Hanson, PhD
Africa Capacity Indicators (ACI) Team Leader &
Head, Knowledge and Learning, ACBF.
January 2011

Preface

Discussions about capacity development tend to center on practical considerations and quantifiable performance benchmarks. One measures progress in achieving governance and electoral reform; increased transparency and accountability; improved security and prospects for sustained peace; enhanced healthcare and education; more reliable and extensive service delivery in the power, water, and sanitation sectors; better transportation infrastructure; and the strengthened economic platform necessary to promote long-term stability, jobs creation, and optimal competitiveness in the regional and global markets. Each of these is an essential element of human, institutional, and organizational capacity development. But the human factor's impact encompasses something more profound.

When one talks about capacity development, and particularly when one focuses on the impact capacity development can have in Africa, one is really talking about the lives envisioned for all future generations in Africa. For Africa's future sons and daughters, capacity development fulfills the commitment to establish and sustain a world in which they are not excluded from the social compact that is taken for granted by people living in developed countries.

That commitment begins before those sons and daughters are born. Twenty years after the Millennium Development Goals were established, results reported at the September 2010 MDG Summit confirmed that Africa remains home to most of the countries with the world's highest maternal mortality ratios. So the impact of capacity development begins when life itself begins, with a commitment to establishing and maintaining the healthcare infrastructure necessary to create an environment in which the vast majority of newborns and mothers survive pregnancy and childbirth.

Similarly, it fulfills the promise that the vast majority of infants will go on to survive childhood and live to adulthood protected from preventable diseases and hunger; that it will be normal to reach adulthood without being orphaned by violence or treatable illness; that they will not

face the risk of being kidnapped and conscripted as child soldiers; and that their youthful labors will take place in schools, not factories, mining sites, or war-zone battlefields. Capacity development is a commitment not only to furnishing those children with the physical structures, learning resources, and teachers necessary to pursue an education, but also to promoting the economic strength and stability necessary to ensure that after completing their studies, they can put that education to use in a productive and viable job market.

Capacity development honors a commitment to the poorest of the poor that they are not marginal, not forgotten, and not excluded from the vision of a better, more equitable, more just world. It honors a commitment to women that they are entitled to the full protection of the law against discrimination, violence, and abuse in all

forms. And it honors a commitment to religious and ethnic minorities that they will not be denied religious or cultural freedoms, economic opportunity, or a voice in the political process.

By the standards of the developed world, none of this represents anything remarkable, nothing that citizens of the developed world regard as anything more than their basic human rights. There is nothing extraordinary about these commitments other than the fact that today, they are denied to hundreds of millions of Africans. Capacity development initiatives exist, first and foremost, to make that reality a thing of the past.

The challenge is enormous on a continent where many states lack the financial, organizational, and psychological strength to move forward without support from the international community. Conditions in many of these countries, especially post-conflict countries, are so precarious—so fragile—that they require not only capacity development, but an approach to capacity development that reflects and responds to their circumstances and cultures and does not attempt to retrofit past solutions to their present needs.

This publication, the inaugural edition of the African Capacity Building Foundation's annual Africa Capacity Indicators Report, examines not

only these countries' visible capacity development needs, but also the underlying historical, political, economic, cultural, and societal elements that contributed to their current fragility and complicate efforts to address the problem. Its premise is that it's not enough for development organizations to assess fragile, post-conflict African countries' capacity development needs in terms of those traditional, quantifiable performance benchmarks.

To achieve and sustain meaningful advances toward peace, poverty reduction, and economic and political stability in fragile, post-conflict African countries, our goals must look beyond the construction of roads, rail lines, seaports and airports; beyond the building of schools, hospitals, and health clinics and the training of professionals to staff them; and beyond the creation of a reliable utility infrastructure that makes electricity, water, and sanitation service accessible by and affordable to all. Those needs are all real. But in the end, they are not only goals of capacity development, but the means by which we can move toward the ultimate goal of fulfilling our commitment to future African generations by transforming those states into safe, secure, peaceful, stable, well-governed countries with their own self-sufficient places on the international stage.

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Acronyms And Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ACI	African Capacity Index
ACIR	Africa Capacity Indicators Report
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific nations
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ALC	Authority-legitimacy-capacity
ANSI	African Network of Scientific and Technical Institutions
AU	African Union
AUF	Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
BEAC	Banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale
CAP	Common Appeal Process
CDF	Country Development Framework
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Women
CEIP	Community Education Investment Programme
CEMAC	Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale
CERC	China Railway Engineering Corporation
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIEREA	Conférence des Institutions d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Economie en Afrique
CIFP	Canada's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CREA/AERC	Consortium pour la Recherche Economique en Afrique/ <i>African Economic Research Consortium</i>
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAC	Development Aid Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ERG	External Reference Group
FSF	Fragile State Facility
GCRAI	Groupe Consultatif pour la Recherche Agricole Internationale

GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GOPAC	Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption
GPEC	Gestion Prévisionnelle des Emplois et des Compétences
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IMATT	International Military Assistance Team
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRAI	IDA Resource Allocation Index
JAI	Joint Africa Institute
LICUS	Low-income Countries Under Stress
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRD	Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
MFIs	Micro-Finance Institutions
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NSPs	Non-state Providers
OAU	Organization of the African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
OSFU	Fragile State Unit
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PNoWB	The Parliamentary Network on the World Bank
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PTCI	Programme de Troisième Cycle Interafricain en Economie
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMARTRAC	Programme d'assistance technique sur la gestion de risque et publication des résultats obtenus en matière de performance social
TEP	Training and Employment
UAP	The Union of African Parliaments
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'Education, la Science et la Culture

UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAIFEM	West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management

Executive Summary

Prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, Africa had made significant progress toward sustainable economic development. It had achieved five years of growth at an annual average of six percent, an indicator of success seen in many nations across the continent, not just in oil-producing and commodity-exporting countries. Structural economic reforms, an increased commitment to fighting inflation, and promotion of a more favorable international business environment contributed to producing measurable results seen in such benchmarks as foreign currency reserve growth and inflation rate drops to single digits.

Countries in Africa made social gains, as well. Though only Tanzania is on track to meet most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Mali and Burkina Faso are well positioned to meet several of the goals, and at least ten states are on track to achieve the primary education target. Projections suggest that Mozambique is likely to achieve the child mortality and infant mortality goals, and Senegal is expected to achieve the eighth goal, which relates to a global partnership for development with a special focus on ensuring that sufficient investment goes into development.

The global recession, rising poverty, the food and fuel crises, and the impact of climate change jeopardize ongoing progress in Africa, which also continues to be threatened by political instability and the risk of conflict. Further success toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable peace in the region will depend in part on the implementation of effective capacity development initiatives that reflect and respond to the particular realities and challenges present in fragile, post-conflict African states. Effective capacity development must begin, then, with comprehension of the root causes of

Africa's fragility and conflict; the lingering impact of a colonial legacy of weak, inappropriate institutions; and the tremendous challenge of creating workable solutions on a continent grappling with such a profound diversity of political, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities.

As many development partners have discovered, failure to understand the aforementioned factors goes hand in hand with failure to understand post-colonial state building efforts in Africa. Too often, state building and capacity development have been carried out as technocratic exercises in which fragile states import and institutionalize inflexible formulae.

The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), was founded on February 9, 1991 with a mission to build human and institutional capacity for sustainable growth and poverty reduction in Africa. ACBF is publishing this inaugural edition of its annual Africa Capacity Indicators Report (ACIR) to further its goal of building sustainable, effective institutions and policies to deliver development results for poverty reduction. This Flagship Publication draws on a combination of ACBF's two decades of work, the results of the

Africa Capacity Indicators field studies completed during 2010, and technical background papers.

This Report introduces a unique and unprecedented series of data on the state of capacity in Africa. It also examines key issues and challenges confronting in-country and cross-border capacity development. The ACIR will serve as a major diagnostic tool and guide the development of priority actions by providing practical insights and recommendations where necessary. To this end, the ACIR will form the basis for advocacy on major capacity development issues and bring to the attention of policy makers and other stakeholders the thematic and sectoral factors that might be affecting state and societal effectiveness in the delivery of specified mandates. It will serve as a tool to galvanize capacity development and poverty reduction actions in Africa by providing research-informed data on capacity development from across the continent.

The Africa Capacity Indicators Report is designed to:

- **Examine the key issues and challenges facing countries in cross-border capacity development and cooperation in Africa.**

The publication draws on empirical case studies and examples of best practices identified by African practitioners to lead the discourse on capacity development in Africa. The scope of this discussion encompasses the full breadth of issues that affect capacity as well as regional cooperation, including legal, regulatory, procedural, and other supporting policy frameworks; human and institutional capacities; and the physical infrastructural components that facilitate physical connectivity or proximity.

- **Develop better theoretical underpinnings to the various capacity development interventions being undertaken on the continent.**

As ACBF Executive Secretary Frannie Léautier noted in 2009, assessing “capacity development requires the use of numerous theoretical frameworks as the efforts undertaken to address issues related to capacity typically stretch across multiple disciplines, are applied in various sectors, have influence in different spheres, and have a scope of application that is quite varied.” The ACIR provides a search for a framework that evolves over time to become more applicable to the African context and to the work of the Foundation.

- **Serve as a definitive knowledge product targeting policymakers, public sector officials, private sector people, civil society, and other experts involved in capacity development on the continent.**


The Flagship Publication's goal is to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on capacity development and regional economic cooperation in Africa and to make that dialogue as inclusive as possible. The Report, like ACBF itself, advocates for the inclusion of women's organizations or organizations focusing on promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in all discussions about capacity development in Africa. Similarly, it advocates for the inclusion of minorities and other marginalized groups and their representatives in the process.

This new, Africa-centered research also creates a framework in which to re-examine the extent to which African state institutions' fragility has

been caused or exacerbated by the neo-liberal doctrine, a point of view supported by a growing body of literature. This appraisal extends beyond poverty reduction policy to the neo-liberal peace model's focus on wealthy countries' concerns. Too often, that perspective centers not on genuine efforts to promote peace and development in poor countries, but rather on the impact of political disorder in poor developing countries on threats such as terrorism, use of weapons of mass destruction, floods of refugees, rising drug traffic, and the spread of deadly diseases. This reversal of priorities ignores the reality that the developed world's security is equally threatened by the structural inequality between rich and poor countries' power and wealth. Research continues to mount in support of the thesis that the neo-liberal reduction of states' social and economic capacities is, in combination with the

donor community's conditionalities, among the predominant explanations of state failure in Africa. The ACIR offers new insights on capacity development in Africa.

The question, however, is how does one build capacity for development? Increasing attention is focused on institutions' crucial role in development; the issues of state building and state capacity have become central. This in turn means that the authorities must make several strategic policy choices to build the required state capacity. Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessments are upstream activities that countries should conduct to inform the development and implementation of projects and programs intended to develop capacity. The ACIR reveals that most countries need to place more emphasis on these activities (see fig. A).




Source: ACI field survey data

The ACIR also highlights the fact that capacity development interventions in fragile states need to be more focused on how resources, skills, and knowledge are used in order to optimize benefit and achieve desired results. According to the ACIR, fragile states are distinct from non-fragile states in their achievements in capacity in the critical areas of resources, skills, and knowledge; they show no difference in the capacities related to politics and power and incentives, and little

difference in capacity dimensions related to organizational capabilities (figure B). This finding is supported by the fact that fragile states maintain the capacity to wage war and sustain conflict, but lack the capacity to deliver critical services (like education, health, and water supply) due to internal weaknesses and suffer from brain drain (which impacts on the use of skills and knowledge). Inability to deliver services is mostly due to weak organizational

capacity in fragile states and the lack of sufficient stability for skills and knowledge to be deployed effectively. Poor allocation of resources and

distributional inequalities would also explain the low ratings with respect to resources in general.



Source: ACI field survey data

As one moves from the policy environment (Cluster 1) to capacity development outcomes (Cluster 4), the majority of the countries shift from the highest category (very high) to the lowest (very low). The environment is conducive for policy development, as reflected by the high score in the policy environment (88 percent scored very high). However, while some efforts

are being made on the processes for implementation of capacity development programs, results are yet to follow. Majority of the countries score very low or low for development results at the country level (62 percent), and almost all the countries with regard to capacity development outcomes (97 percent) as shown in table A.

Table A Percentage of countries by clusters

Level of capacity development	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
Very Low	0.0	0.0	2.9	61.8
Low	0.0	2.9	58.8	35.3
Medium	2.9	29.4	26.5	2.9
High	8.8	50.0	11.8	0.0
Very High	88.2	17.6	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: ACI field survey data

Capacity at the individual levels is low (table B) compared with the organizational and institutional levels, where achievements is relatively higher across all countries. Not a single country scored very low on the enabling environment or institutional level of capacity, which indicates

that the building blocks for development results are in place. Only 5.9 percent of countries scored very low in the aspect of capacity related to organizational capabilities, compared with 44.1percent of countries at the individual capacity level.

Table B Capacity dimensions/levels in surveyed countries

Level of Capacity development	The three dimensions of capacity		
	Enabling environment/Institutional level	Organizational level	Individual level
Very Low	0.0	5.9	44.1
Low	2.9	23.5	47.1
Medium	67.6	20.6	5.9
High	29.4	17.6	2.9
Very High	0.0	32.4	0.0
TOTAL	100	100	100


Source: ACI field survey data

All 34 countries surveyed for the ACI have a national development plan, vision, or strategy. Most have had at least two such plans since 2000, and 10 (29.4 percent) adopted their plans in 2006, which suggests that most African countries have five year planning cycles. Of the countries surveyed, 70.6 percent have mainstreamed capacity development into their national development strategies, plans, and visions, and 54.5

percent had specific national programs for capacity development.

Most of the countries surveyed indicated that they have developed strategic policy document that guides capacity development. However, save for a handful success stories, the rate of progress is widely inadequate to be on course to meeting the MDGs. Strengthening capacity to achieving the MDGs remains a priority.


Figure C Strategic policy choices for capacity development



Source: ACI field survey data


Similarly, the majority of countries have designed a national strategy for the development of statistics. Despite the seeming importance put on statistical development, 65% of these countries have not ratified the African Charter on Statistics. A possible

explanation for this state of affair is that, in addition to the fact that the Charter was adopted recently (February 2009) by the African Union, most of the statistical development initiatives are driven from outside “donor” agencies.




Source: ACI field survey data

The ACIR further indicates that most of the countries have an enabling policy environment as well as relatively efficient planning instruments. The policy environment is thus conducive to capacity development (figure E).




Source: ACI field survey data

The overall assessment of agricultural policy in the surveyed countries is moderate. Almost all the countries have developed a strategy for the agricultural sector. However, the quality of the agricultural policy and the influence of local organizations on the process of agricultural and rural development were judged moderate. Further, the level of creativity and innovation was considered moderate by the majority of countries.

Figure F Agricultural policy

Source: ACI field survey data


Financial resources are one of the critical constraints to effective and sustainable capacity development in Africa. It is therefore essential to align stakeholders' commitment to the needed resources. Of the 34 countries surveyed, financial commitment to capacity development was identified to be low (figure G). This observation mirrors other such findings which submit that capacity development requires 'patient capital' because the outcomes of investments in capacity, perhaps even more so in a fragile environment, tend to come to fruition over the medium to long term. Governments thus need to appreciate these facts about capacity development to allow for the allocation of adequate resources.

Figure G Financial commitment for capacity development

Source: ACI field survey data


Equally important is the political commitment to capacity development, and here, it is essential that countries need not rely solely on the Executive, but on a system of checks and balances of power in which the legislature plays a prominent role. As the primary representative of the citizenry, parliamentary bodies in fragile environments must maintain continuous communication with the public, promote dialogue on critical national development issues, and provide an understanding of parliamentary actions.

While the promotion of dialogue is one of the most difficult of areas in which to demonstrate results, it is heartening to note that most of the countries surveyed have established mechanisms for dialogue on capacity development. The majority of the countries have a rating of high or very high in the establishment of dialogue mechanisms for capacity development.




Source: ACI field survey data

Across all the countries surveyed, the policy environment for gender equality is enabling (figure I). Majority of the countries have made strong commitment to gender equality. However the survey revealed that 62% of the countries do not have clear guide on engendering statistics.




Source: ACI field survey data

The quantity and quality of human and financial resources devoted to capacity development needs to be increased in developing countries. From the survey, resources for capacity development was identified to be unevenly distributed across the countries.



Source: ACI field survey data


As reported by countries surveyed, partnering for capacity development is moderate, save for a handful success stories. The majority of the countries have not established a clear national assistance coordination unit for capacity development.



Source: ACI field survey data


Of the 34 African countries surveyed, (50 percent) have an institutionalized mechanism for engaging with domestic institutions while 10 countries (29 percent) have an informal mechanism for engaging with domestic institutions. The remaining (21 percent) have no mechanism (fig. L).

Furthermore, it was identified that most of the countries do not have an effective mechanism for engaging development partners on capacity development. These countries do not have specific mechanisms for engaging the development community; accordingly dialogue is carried out as part of the broader engagement for development support. Only 10 countries have formalized institutionalized dialogue mechanisms for capacity development.

Figure L Stakeholder participation in setting country capacity development agenda

Source: ACI field survey data

In terms of the expected results from capacity development, the ACIR reveals a low level of outputs in capacity development in majority of the countries surveyed: not a single country scored in the high or very high category (figure M). Given the importance of capacity to guarantee peace, stability, and sustainable development results, this finding indicates that there is a higher than expected risk that even stable countries today could fall into fragility, unless the general question of capacity is resolved. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of countries are in the “very low” category, indicates that a lot of work needs to be done to ensure that the development results achieved to date in Africa are maintained and that reversals are minimized. This underscores the importance of investing further in capacity development.

Figure M Outputs in Capacity Development

Source: ACI field survey data

Out of the 16 areas of intervention targeted by the study, it was identified that in 79 percent of the countries, development partners cover at least 10 of these intervention areas.

Development partners can play a key role in ensuring that capacity development planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation strategies be keyed to the good governance agenda and support bringing it to fruition. By collecting current data on these measures of capacity development preparedness in the countries surveyed, the ACIR creates a more complete and contemporary snapshot

of the particular strengths and challenges that characterize fragile, post-conflict African countries. This, in turn, creates a new foundation of knowledge against which proposed capacity solutions for the region can be tested and benchmarked.

In addition to delivering this overdue and much-needed challenge to the international community's decades-old perspective on sustainable peace and development in fragile, post-conflict African states, this Report provides prescriptive for practical action and a way forward. It addresses current ambiguity in development partners' sense of the timeframe and depth of commitment required to achieve capacity development in fragile environments and the types of institutions and activities that are most conducive to attaining sustainable peace and development goals. Similarly, greater clarity on the criteria for donor exit would open up new objective criteria for the selection and sequencing of interventions. Equally important is creating a basis for external partners to develop and maintain the political will necessary to invest a substantial amount of political and financial resources. This factor lies at the core of poor capacity development performance in Africa.

Although capacity development is envisioned in terms of long-term goals and transformations to peace and development, it must also address post-conflict societies' immediate humanitarian needs in areas such as conflict-related emergency relief and related social services. Among these is the immediate need to thwart the possibility of relapse to conflict for both the post-conflict state and its neighbors. A development framework is unlikely to exist in the early stages of post-war recovery, but development partners can assist governments in elaborating strategies for such key sectors as education, health,

agriculture, and housing. Similarly, meeting humanitarian needs such as resettlement and demobilization of combatants is a prerequisite for vulnerable households' ultimate economic recovery. Reintegration is the bridge between emergency relief and development and so should be conceived and implemented with an eye to moving toward an explicit strategy for community development programs to strengthen social capital.

Another challenge, of course, is balancing the urgency of immediate needs of post-conflict societies against the limited capacity available in fragile states. For this reason, development partners should choose targets selectively, sequence capacity development assistance, determine which agency or agencies to target, and decide which target(s) to prioritize within those organizations. This is more easily expressed as a principle than carried out in practice, as there are no definitive guidelines to follow. This lack of universal, concrete answers to ever-present questions underscores the value of consultative approaches. Rather than rely on a prescriptive template, it is essential to solicit feedback regarding priorities specific to the individual communities affected by conflict and then use that local input to make the best, most locally appropriate decisions about how to balance service provision across different groups. Equally important are flexible instruments that can adjust to shifting priorities on the ground and emerging champions.

Support from development agencies constitutes one of the most important sources of funding for capacity development to African countries. Developing and developed partner countries agreed in the 2003 Rome Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that there was an urgent need to make aid effective to win the fight against

poverty and achieve the MDGs. The Rome Declaration outlined good practices and principles for effective development cooperation:

- Aligning development intervention with national priorities, strategies, and systems;
- Strengthening local ownership and leadership of the development agenda;
- Improving coordination and harmonization of interventions to avoid, among other things, duplication and overburdening of institutions in developing countries;
- Improving transparency, accountability, and predictability of disbursements and aid flows; and
- Strengthening the capacity of aid recipient countries.

The World Bank initiated the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) methodology in the late 1970s to assess the effectiveness of its lending to poor countries. The assessment consists of a set of criteria that represents the different policy and institutional dimensions of an effective poverty reduction and growth strategy (including quality of budgetary and financial management, debt policy, and gender equality) and is intended to guide the allocation of International Development Association (IDA) lending resources. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high).


The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) aims to assess the quality of a country's

present policy and institutional framework in terms of how conducive it is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. CPIA ratings are used to inform country assistance strategies and World Bank loaning activities. Many agencies, such as the African Development Bank, UNDP, and DfID have followed the World Bank methodology for the sake of greater harmonization and consistency. The CPIA is based on the analytical work done in the Bank as well as information coming from other sources produced by in-country, regional, and international organizations. Data are also collected from consultations with national stakeholders within the countries being assessed. The IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) provides an overview of key features of a country's institutional and policy framework.

The ACI Team also supported field assessments of capacity in 12 sample countries in which it is working to ground-truth the assessments done under the CPIA. The survey was based on the same set of questions employed by World Bank experts in generating the indicators in the CPIA.

In comparing the World Bank's 2009 CPIA ratings and the ACBF field-based survey results, it is found that the ratings by ACBF are higher than those of the Bank for most countries surveyed save for Benin, Burundi, and Zambia. The reported "global" strength for Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Zimbabwe have the widest margin of difference, with those for Zimbabwe almost twice as high in the ACBF findings as compared with those of the Bank (see fig. N).

Figure N Comparison of ACBF and World Bank CPIA indices




Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

Considering the nature of fragility, putting capacity development at the forefront of Africa's development agenda is crucial for achieving the MDGs. Many countries have undertaken reforms to enhance their governance frameworks. But in Africa, these targets and other benchmarks of real progress toward reducing poverty, sustaining peace, and promoting economic growth and development can be met only if development partners act decisively and forcefully to build fragile states' capacity.

ACBF's vision for Africa is that of a continent recognized by its global partners for its socio-political and economic capabilities and its

endowment. A continent that has effective institutions and policies acquired through sustained investment in people and institutions to deliver development results for poverty reduction. The Foundation respectfully submits this Flagship publication to the international community as a tool that builds on the body of knowledge already amassed by development partners and other key stakeholders in Africa's future. By augmenting that body of knowledge, ACBF hopes to contribute to optimizing the use of capacity development strategies to aid fragile, post-conflict African states in their advance from poverty to prosperity.

Why Assess Capacity In Africa?





1

Why Assess Capacity in Africa?

1.1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, several instruments have been developed to make poverty reduction efforts operational and strengthen in-country capacity across Africa. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide a framework under which countries agreed to be benchmarked to achieve quantifiable development targets. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) provide domestic stakeholders and development partners with a way to assess the impact of a country's macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs on plans for growth and poverty reduction. Many of the instruments have made poverty reduction more prominent in policy debates and facilitated more open dialogues. New participatory processes have enabled governments, domestic stakeholders, and external development partners to develop frameworks that describe the macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs that a country requires to achieve broad-based growth, reduce poverty, and identify external financing needs and associated sources of financing. In addition, the consideration of gender in some countries' budgets has triggered more transparent processes for gender responsiveness in public expenditures.

While all these processes and instruments have focused political leaders' and policy makers' attention on development results, they have also made transparent what is needed to achieve results at scale. Success factors and key risks facing the continent have also raised the visibility of capacity development's role and increased understanding of the need to address capacity development challenges and create the ability to grow, develop, and rise above poverty. The main problem, however, is that across the continent, states' and societies' capacities to deliver their respective mandates remain weak and therefore require greater attention and galvanized actions (UNDP, 2009). Capacity development in support of good socio-economic governance thus remains essential. However, for this to occur, African countries must promote transparency in all financial transactions in the budget, the central bank, and the public sector at large. In doing so, they further should be guided by international standards and codes of good practice and take strong measures to combat and stamp out corruption and management inadequacies.

The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programs is therefore critical for achieving development objectives. So, too, is the need to integrate capacity development objectives into African development strategies and agendas, particularly as they relate to managing service delivery. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that the results of policies and programs are gender sensitive. Countries also need capacity to engage effectively in trade in the context of globalization and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Being able to function under extreme uncertainty and put in place measures to deal with the effects of climate change—which some scholars agree will have a severe impact on Africa—is an area of added concern. Attention to the political economy and its implications for development has also raised the profile of capacity for

political and social stability. Therefore, it is essential to be able to measure capacity changes and their contribution to overall development.

Regional cooperation can play a crucial role in meeting the future needs for capacity at various levels in African countries through formulating, financing and implementing regional capacity building projects and maintaining existing ones as well as encouraging a regional approach to capacity retrieval and utilization.

One could argue that African economies' limited success in tackling poverty and experiencing dramatic social transformation (based on sustained economic growth) is undermined by minimal integration of capacity development as a major development policy agenda. The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) launched its Africa Capacity Indicators Report (ACIR) flagship initiative to address this deficiency. The ACIR highlights the state of capacity development and development in Africa and sharpens the focus on capacity deficits as a major development policy issue. The Flagship Report will therefore support entrenchment of capacity development in countries' development agendas. The ACIR should offer the needed inputs into decisions about what to finance in order to develop capacity. For example, whether to champion regulatory and institutional reforms to support public-private partnership in capacity development; or investment in strengthening of public administration

1.2 The state of capacity in Africa's recent development experiences

Over the past decade, Africa has made significant gains in promoting growth, itself essential for poverty reduction, and achieving macroeconomic stability. In the five years prior to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, growth had averaged over 6 percent and was widely shared beyond the oil-producing and other commodity-exporting countries; inflation had fallen to single digits before the food and fuel price shocks of 2008; and foreign currency reserves were steadily building up, particularly for the oil-rich countries. The improved economic performance was the outcome of structural economic reforms and a greater commitment to fighting inflation. Capacities to undertake policy reforms and manage inflation must have improved on the continent to obtain this result. Other factors are also responsible for Africa's growth including a favorable interna-

tional business environment, especially rising commodity prices, and the fruition of greater aid and debt relief from the international community (IMF, 2009). Countries' capacity to manage trade and engage in business would be a key requirement to tap into the benefits in the international business environment. Going forward, managing debt is a key requirement to sustain the benefits from aid and debt relief.

On the whole, African countries are not on course to meet all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, there have been some noteworthy success stories in some better-governed countries where aid works more generally and thus benefits from the implementation of the Paris Declaration and other Official Development Assistance (ODA) mechanisms. For example, at least ten countries are on track to achieve the primary education goal; Mozambique is on track to achieve the child mortality and infant mortality goals; Tanzania is

on track on most of the goals; Mali and Burkina Faso are on target to meeting several of the goals; and Senegal is expected to secure the eighth goal, which relates to a global partnership for development with a special focus on ensuring that sufficient investment goes into development. Many of these countries not only are African top performers but also stand out among the Least Developed Countries (ACBF, 2008). To achieve broad-based results in arriving at the MDG targets, other countries in Africa will need to ramp up their capacities to deliver services.

Adequate country capacity remains one of the critical missing factors hampering progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), implementing poverty reduction strategies, and optimizing aid effectiveness. This centrality of capacity to development processes is articulated in recent global compacts, particularly the Paris Declaration of March 2005 (World Bank, 2005a) and its stock-taking Accra Agenda for Action. Yet the recognition of the challenge of addressing inadequate capacity for development predates this new global compact. Except in a few countries, large resource outlays, decades of technical cooperation, and various other forms of capacity development failed to build sustainable country capacity for development. The new compact on capacity development draws on the literature's various reflections on the experiences of bilateral and multilateral development partners and academic specialists, with an overarching focus on the core public sector, but also the private sector, civil society, and other non-state actors. The global compact recognizes the importance of building an effective state that delivers public services and sustains an enabling environment for private-sector growth, and an engaged society

that articulates a demand for effective government and holds government to account (World Bank, *ibid*).

The onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the subsequent global recession has significantly complicated the regional economic outlook for Africa through three key channels: (1) a decreased international demand for, and hence earnings from, Africa's key commodity exports, (2) weakening remittance flows to African countries in spite of their crucial importance in the domestic macroeconomic balance, not least their counter-cyclical properties, and (3) a reduction in foreign-direct and portfolio investment flows as a result of the international credit crunch and the decreased international risk appetite. These factors have led to a marked economic slowdown, mounting fiscal and balance-of-payments pressures, and less favorable conditions for trade finance. While financial systems have remained resilient largely due to their initial disengagement from international capital flows, the economic slowdown is likely to increase credit risk and non-performing loans, thus weakening the balance sheets of financial institutions. African countries thus face the challenges of weathering the adverse impact of the financial crisis and global recession on economic growth and poverty reduction, while preserving the important hard-won gains of the recent years, notably macroeconomic stability, debt sustainability, and progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (IMF, 2009). Moreover, since the structural drivers of the food price shock have merely been masked by the financial crisis, African countries face the imminent challenge of reforming their national agricultural and food production systems to increase food supply against a backdrop of

limited additional land and water resources. That challenge is further exacerbated by the ominous prospect of global climate change, which by many accounts is likely to affect African countries most (The Economist, 2009). The capacities needed to manage within the uncertainties and risks in the financial sector and to put in place post-financial crisis economic policies are critical for the continent to come out effectively of the effects of the crisis and be prepared to handle future crises.

Apart from the food and fuel crisis, Africa also faces key risks that threaten to derail progress: conflict and political instability, inexorably declining terms-of-trade for primary commodity exports, weakening economic growth in the absence of further structural economic reforms, persistent and worsening incidence of poverty, climate change and its challenges to sustainability, and declining agricultural productivity and logistical constraints (Léautier, 2009a). All these risks require a cadre of human and organizational capacities that can stretch policy design, implementation, and monitoring beyond individual issues to tackle generic issues of risk, as well as processes and policies that can stretch beyond geographies, generations, and sectors.

Properly designed and implemented capacity development addresses those risks and facilitates both the financial sector reform necessary in order to build financial resilience and the policy reforms necessary to achieve sustainable improvements in private capital flow management and protect countries against domestic currency instability. Trade finance also takes on greater urgency against the backdrop of balance-of-payment deterioration. More generally, capacity development can strengthen Africa's ability to leverage the benefits of international trade and regional integration by

fostering the enhanced negotiation skills necessary to realize more advantageous terms of trade, trade policy formulation and management, and international contractual agreements on investor protection and intellectual property. African countries also need to strengthen their management capabilities to address supply-side bottlenecks, inside-the-border constraints, and international non-tariff barriers to trade, notably sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards for agricultural trade.

In addition, the food price crisis and climate change bring to the fore the need to strengthen capacity for agricultural policy and institutional reforms to attract greater private and public investment. There is also need to promote innovation and technology transfer in national agricultural systems to ease the food supply constraint and appropriate larger parts of the agricultural global value chains, which will improve agricultural terms of trade and unleash a larger agricultural multiplier effect (UNCTAD, 2009). Sustained economic growth, poverty reduction, and general macroeconomic stability depend on sustained efforts at capacity development for sound macroeconomic policy analysis and management. This creates a greater challenge for fiscal policy management against a backdrop of growing fiscal imbalances and limited options for deficit financing, as well as for prudent exchange-rate management in light of the increased currency fluctuations. Capacity development for sound macroeconomic management should turn out a cadre of individuals and organizations that can formulate, implement, and evaluate economic policy.

Another important aspect of capacity development for Africa relates to the need to secure political and social stability across the region, even for perceptibly mature democracies, given

recent experience that demonstrates that the socio-political order is reversible in virtually any country (e.g. the recent post-election violence in previously stable Kenya and the election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire). Such capacities include capabilities at the local, country, and regional levels to aggregate and address citizen needs, foster participation of diverse stakeholder groups, including minorities, women, and other underrepresented groups, in the development process (Léautier et al., 2010).

The outcome of the new global compact on capacity development (OECD, 2006a) is a greater appreciation that capacity development involves much more than enhancing the knowledge and skills of individuals; it depends crucially on the quality of the organizations in which they work, and those organizations are, in turn, conditioned by the enabling environment—the structures of power and influence and the institutions—in which they work. In other words, the emerging consensus is that capacity is about not only human skills development and knowledge generation, but also incentives and governance. The new global compact views capacity as three dimensional, comprising *human, organizational, and institutional capacities* (OECD, 2006a; World Bank, 2005a).

1.3 African Capacity Building Foundation's twenty-year work on capacity and fragility

Two seminal appeals for capacity-building were made in the 1990s, with seismic effects in the donor world. The first was by Edward Kim Jaycox, who expressed his concerns by stating, “development partners and African governments have, together, compromised capacity in Africa; they are compromising it faster than they are building it” (Jaycox, 1993). The second appeal

came out of a report published the same year by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which stressed that “almost everybody recognizes the ineffectiveness of technical cooperation in terms of what should be its main objective; greater autonomy in beneficiary countries by creating institutions and building local capacities in the area of managing the national economy” (Berg, 1993: 244).

On the initiative of Jaycox, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UNDP then launched an African Capacity Building Initiative at a meeting of development partners in Paris in 1990. Following an appeal for funds that was beyond all expectations, an agreement between the development partners led to the official creation of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) on February 9, 1991. The World Bank (2005a) noted that at its beginnings, ACBF gave donations to economic policy units and training programs with the aim of improving the activities of central ministries, agencies, and their basic planning and management. In 2000, a new initiative called Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa (PACT), which was incorporated into ACBF, was launched by the World Bank in conjunction with African governments, with the aim of supporting a broader range of activities, including the interaction between decision-makers, civil society, and the private sector.

On this basis, ACBF's vision has been to be the leading African institution in partnership with all stakeholders in building sustainable capacities, with the objective of good governance and poverty alleviation in Africa. The areas of competence decided on, from this point of view, were:

- Economic Policy Analysis and Management;
- Financial Management and Accountability;
- National Statistics and Statistical Systems;

- Public Administration and Management;
- National parliaments and parliamentary Institutions; and
- Professionalization of the Voices of the Private Sector and Civil Society.

In most African countries, ACBF employs a three-pronged intervention that comprises design and development of projects and programs, funding of projects and programs, and knowledge management and networking. With this platform, ACBF provides technical assistance through grant agreement instruments to national and regional institutions and programs to support a wide range of development activities. The beneficiaries of ACBF grants appreciate its assistance, as the grants support both human and institutional capacity development. Currently, there are 104 active projects in the ACBF portfolio, and since its inception, ACBF has supported 254 fully fledged projects and programs and committed over US\$ 400 million in grants for capacity development in some 44 countries.

Working with countries at various levels of capacity through a variety of instruments, ACBF has supported development of independent policy units and think tanks, development and upgrading of skills of personnel in the public sector, and organizational performance in terms of accountability and transparency. The Foundation has sought to target its support most effectively to those areas where it can achieve results at scale and help countries build capacity in critical areas; foster the achievement of specific capacity development results; and employ capacity development for effective results.

1.4 ACBF's conceptualization of capacity development

The literature devoted to capacity is abundant and covers a wide range of disciplines, from economics to education, from management to public policy. Each discipline gives different meanings to the term *capacity* or *capability*, but common factors emerge (Bryson and Merrit, 2007): the importance of developing individuals, the meaningful role that work can play and the scope of interaction between the individual and the organization in capacity development. Common weaknesses are also apparent: a tendency not to place the individual at the very center of everything and, in particular, the impact of institutional structures, organizational policies, and the behavior of individuals on development and the expression of capacities. Sen (1997) proposed bringing together the theory of capacity and the theory of human capital. An examination of the relevance of this unification underscores the usefulness of the capacity approach, which is seen as an improvement of the theory of human capital.

Despite the wide-ranging disciplines involved in capacity, there is some broad agreement in the literature on the operational definition that *capacity* comprises the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully; and that *capacity development* is the process by which people, organizations, and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain capacity over time. Capacity is also better conceptualized when answering the question: *capacity for what?* Capacity for individuals, organizations, and

societies to set goals and achieve them; to budget resources and use them for agreed purposes; and to manage the complex processes and interactions that typify a working political and economic system. Capacity is most tangibly and effectively developed in the context of specific development objectives such as delivering services to poor people; instituting education, public service, and healthcare reform; improving the investment climate for small and medium enterprises; empowering local communities to better participate in public decision-making processes; and promoting peace and resolving conflict. Capacity building is synonymously used with capacity development in the literature, although the former term is fast getting out of vogue because of its connotation of a process starting from scratch and involving a step-by-step erection of a new structure, based on a preconceived design. However, experience does not seem to fit well with that linear view of capacity building (OECD, *op cit*, World Bank, *op cit*).

Before the new consensus as articulated forcefully in the Paris Declaration and reinforced in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) — among other forums — capacity development was viewed mainly as a technical or mechanistic process that involved the simple transfer of knowledge, skills, or organizational models from North to South, without due consideration of the broader political and social context of capacity development interventions. This approach inevitably led to the mistaken overemphasis on what were the “right” answers or best practices, to the exclusion of those approaches that best fit the country circumstances and the needs of the particular situation, let alone the neglect of the importance of country ownership of capacity

development interventions. On the other hand, the new consensus holds the view that capacity development should be an endogenous process that is strongly led from within the country, with development partners playing a supporting and catalytic role. In that set-up, stakeholder/country ownership, political leadership, and the prevailing political and governance system assume crucial importance in creating opportunities and setting the limits for capacity development.

With better conceptualization of capacity and capacity development, and starting from the clear definition of the particular sector for which capacity development is required (capacity for what?), the best approach would be to proceed by systematically thinking through what might work in the particular circumstance. The OECD (2006a) argues that this can be done by giving adequate attention to each of the three components of capacity: individual, organizational, and institutional (enabling environment—to be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2) and, for each of these three dimensions, undertaking the following five main steps:

- **Understanding the international and country contexts** through “institutional analysis,” “political economy analysis,” or “drivers of change analysis,” as is increasingly done by donor organizations during the formulation of country assistance strategies to discover the incentive deficits underlying the lack of political will that is commonly blamed for development programs’ failure. At the organizational level, standard assessment criteria should be supplemented with formal and informal organizational analysis to include internal and external stakeholders and an assessment of the importance of

the brain drain and the mitigating potential of the Diaspora.

- **Identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change**, which basically seeks to generate and promote virtuous cycles in political will and stakeholder ownership of capacity development efforts. Development partners should support policy frameworks for capacity development that benefit from high-level political commitment and avoid launching parallel systems that fragment efforts and divert critical resources. In the absence of high-level commitment, the focus should be on strengthening the capacity of non-state actors to create demand for effective public-sector capacity to deliver public services. Capacity needs assessments should therefore address the question of capacity “for what?” to avoid the trap of generic training on broad areas at the exclusion of the particular needs of specific organizations. Efforts should also be directed to aid those organizations or sectors with considerable spillover effects to other sectors. Equally, capacity development champions should be identified and harnessed from within and without the particular sector and country to promote the core agenda for change.

- **Delivering support** whose design is sensitive to institutional constraints and ensures that donor interventions do not lead to capacity vicious cycles through, for example, a sparing use of Project Implementation Units (PIUs) – which are frequently blamed for diverting scarce human and material resources away from the government and undermining the development of sustainable public capacity. It is also essential to engage existing local capacity from the

countries' consulting professionals, NGOs, think tanks, the private sector, and South-South linkages. Long-term technical assistance should be used only as a last resort, in favor of more benign approaches such as institutional twinning, South-South or triangular partnership, distance learning, or peer reviews. This approach not only would contribute more to building and retaining local capacity, but would also ensure cost-effectiveness and a greater chance of stakeholder ownership of the proposed interventions.

- **Agreeing on a results measurement and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework** between development partners and beneficiary organizations is another crucial stage of the preparatory work for capacity development. A key lesson learned is that capacity development should lend itself to clear causal links from clearly stated goals, outcomes, objectives, processes, and finally, inputs. At each stage, there is need to agree on a results measurement framework replete with indicators and their monitoring framework; this is important for stakeholder ownership and economy of the proposed intervention. There is also need to avoid constrictions, given the complexity and uncertainty of most capacity development processes, and to leave space for bargaining and re-strategizing, mindful that needs and priorities may change along the way, and taking into account the state of our imperfect knowledge when entering such a process (OECD, 2009a).

- **Learning from experience and sharing lessons** is an integral component of project or program design for capacity development. Conscientious effort should be made to maximize learning and

promote a shared understanding about what works and what does not for the capacity development challenge at hand, vis-à-vis improving the enabling environment.

ACBF's notion of capacity development focuses on the abilities embedded at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels for particular mandates to be delivered through six core competencies: implementing economic policy analysis, enhancing public administration, strengthening national statistics and statistical systems, strengthening the voices of non-state actors, improving financial management and accountability, and strengthening governance through enhanced parliamentary institutions. "Capacity," in ACBF's definition, means having the aptitudes, resources, relationships, and facilitating conditions required to act effectively to achieve these six specified mandates. "Sustainable capacity" by definition implies the endogenous processes that exist within an organization, society, or country, apart from whatever external development partners do.

1.5 The Africa Capacity Indicators Report (ACIR)

Given the paucity of understanding around the capacity challenges facing Africa, the ACIR is conceived as a Flagship publication of the African Capacity Building Foundation, designed to bring to the fore the capacity development agenda in Africa. The report, which is to be published annually, is conceived on the assumption that owning the process of defining capacity indicators, designing the data collection instrument, and being involved in collecting the data, leads to ownership of the process of following up in improving the outcomes of

capacity. Through the approach taken to prepare the ACIR, ACBF aims to encourage the enhanced capacity of states and societies in Africa and make their mandates operational. By asking participants in countries in which ACBF operates as well as the policy units and think tanks that lead development thinking in those countries to collect the data and oversee the process of its aggregation, those countries will develop the adequate capacity to manage their own achievement of development results. Through better ownership of the process of assessing capacity, ACBF intends to tackle difficult areas such as facilitating poor women's and men's access to basic services and helping to increase their income generating capability. The rationale policy makers and practitioners in the country own the process of accessing their capacity for delivering such services.

The rapid economic growth seen in several major developing countries, especially those in East Asia, including China and South Korea, came about because policy makers placed pressure on the public and private sector to deliver results. In other cases, such as in Bangladesh, it is because civil society provided measurement mechanisms for tracking effectiveness of the public sector. Such pressure for results is needed if African countries are to compete effectively and reap any positive benefits of globalization.

Objectives:

The ACIR is driven by three key objectives:

a) To examine the key issues and challenges facing countries in cross-border capacity development and cooperation in Africa. Empirical case studies and examples of best practices will be drawn from specific sectors as identified by

African practitioners. The ACIR is expected to lead the discourse on capacity development in Africa, and therefore examine both “software” and “hardware” issues affecting capacity as well as regional cooperation. The “software” aspects include legal, regulatory, procedural, and other supporting policy frameworks as well as human and institutional capacities, whereas “hardware” refers to the physical infrastructural components that facilitate physical connectivity or proximity. ACIR advocates for a holistic approach to capacity development given that hardware does not work without good software.

b) To develop better theoretical underpinnings to the various capacity development interventions being undertaken on the continent. As argued by Léautier (2009b), assessing capacity development requires the use of numerous theoretical frameworks as the efforts undertaken to address issues related to capacity typically stretch across multiple disciplines, are applied in various sectors, have influence in different spheres, and have a scope of application that is quite varied. The ACIR provides a search for a framework that evolves over time to better apply to the African context and to the work of the Foundation; and

c) To serve as a definitive knowledge product targeting policymakers, public sector officials, private sector people, civil society (including women's organizations or organizations focusing on promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women), and other experts involved in capacity development on the continent. As noted above, the ACIR is intended to provide a solid analytical framework, effective policy advice and business guidance on key issues concerning capacity development

projects through, among other models, regional cooperation. It is expected therefore to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on regional economic cooperation in Africa. The ACIR attempts to outline what needs to be done in terms of policies and best practices to meet the region's various capacity challenges. The ACIR also seeks to document experiential learning to uncover the critical factors in the political economy of change, which include the long-term commitment of decision-makers and country leaders to overall development goals, as well as leadership and risk taking at various levels (Léautier, 2009b).

The Flagship introduces a unique and consistent series of data on Africa Capacity Indicators. It examines key issues and challenges confronting in-country and cross-border developments in capacity in Africa with regard to ongoing efforts to support regional cooperation. The ACIR serves as a major diagnostic tool and guides the development of priority actions by providing practical recommendations where necessary. To this end, the ACIR offers a basis for advocacy on major capacity development issues and brings to the attention of policy makers the thematic and sectoral factors that might be affecting state and societal effectiveness in the delivery of specified mandates. It also serves as a tool to galvanize capacity development and poverty reduction actions in Africa by providing research-informed data on capacity from across the continent.

The ACIR provides the outcome of an approach that relies on country practitioners to participate in the definition, collection, and analysis of data on capacity. As such, it benchmarks the methodology against existing and well-known indicators of country capacity, especially in the least

developed countries, such as the International Development Association (IDA)-based Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) methodology.

Additionally, the ACIR furnishes ACBF with a unique opportunity to showcase various interventions and its special role as an institution, push the frontiers of discourse on capacity development as a major driver of development, and reinforce its position as an agency of change and major source of transformation. It gives great visibility to the work of the Foundation and its partners and strengthens the operations of the Foundation's current knowledge communities. With indicators conceived and data collected by country-level experts and policy makers and African practitioners, this data series is intended to establish a new quality standard for assessing capacity development in Africa.

Characteristics of the indicators

What is the difference between the ACI (the index) and the ACIR (the Report)? The basic purpose of capacity development is to enlarge people's choices by empowering individuals, groups, organizations, and societies to deliver on their specified mandates. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements that do not show up immediately, or at all, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, better satisfaction of leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms, and a sense of social inclusion. As such, the enabling environment is made up of multiple indicators that come from various sectors and are understood and achieved using theories and practices from different disciplines. A holistic understanding

can be arrived at through some process of aggregation into a single indicator or index.

A primary objective of capacity development is to create an enabling environment for social transformation. However, any transformation effected by enhanced capacity needs to be tracked. This is most easily done when the number of dimensions being tracked is limited, which is another reason for creating the Africa Capacity Index (ACI). The purpose of the ACI is to measure relevant factors that make for a successful and thriving society due to enhanced capacity. Africa needs a common denominator for all countries that serves as a starting point of capacity development, such that one can track progress over time.

ACBF publishes the ACI as a group measure of capacity development that offers a different approach to the common practice of measuring and evaluating a country's progress in capacity and development. This approach is based on levels of individual, organizational, and institutional capacity considered in juxtaposition with the four clusters of policy environment, processes for implementation, development results at country level, and capacity development outcome. ACIR is therefore "an annual research-led review of capacity development issues," written by an independent team of researchers led by an external reference group (ERG) in collaboration with the ACBF Secretariat. The ACIR highlights indicators that allow for tracking overtime, comparability, and give a sense of assessments of results in capacity development in Africa.

The ACI is the signature trademark of the ACI Report (ACIR), published annually, on a theme identified by the Foundation's various stakeholders and clients.

The theme of this inaugural 2011 edition is Capacity Development in Fragile States. These states are no less deserving of capacity development interventions than other developing and transition countries, although their conditions may call for a more selective and targeted approach. Fragile states encompass a variety of country situations, from post-conflict reconstruction to political tensions and weaknesses. It is more likely that capacity development could provide the entry point for donor engagement with fragile states in the first instance. Successful capacity development, especially in fragile states, builds on a good understanding of the country context. There should also be a focus on core state functions, particularly those with a direct bearing on state collapse/failure or further conflict. Extra caution is needed to avoid undermining existing and dormant capacity and to promote working with non-state actors in a manner that fosters the development of public sector capacity in the longer term.

This Report gauges the status of capacity in 34 surveyed countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The following twelve countries also were surveyed in relation to the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA): Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Technical background papers on selected sub-themes complement the

field data. The method of calculating the ACI is explained in the Technical Note to this Report.

Dimensions of capacity being measured

In the current literature, three levels of capacity are measured: (i) the enabling environment; (ii) the organizational level; and (iii) the individual level.

The enabling environment refers to the system beyond the single organization. It describes the broader system within which individuals and organizations function and one that facilitates or hampers their existence.

The organizational level of capacity comprises the internal policies, arrangements, procedures and frameworks that allow organizations to operate and deliver on their mandate and that enable the integration of individual capacities to work together and achieve goals. The individual level refers to skills, experience, and knowledge that are vested in people.

The ACI is a composite index computed from four sub-indices, each of which is an aggregated measure that is calculated on the basis of both a quantitative and a qualitative assessment of various components that form a cluster. The clusters are obtained using an exploratory approach, which yielded the following dimensions: policy environment; processes for implementation; development results at country level; and capacity development outcomes.

The policy environment examines the conditions that must be in place to make development possible, with particular emphasis on effective and development-orientated organizations and institutional frameworks. It is focused on (a) whether countries have put in place national

strategies for development (including a strategy for agricultural development, given the importance of transforming agriculture particularly in fragile and post-conflict states and in the face of oncoming climate change challenges) and if so, their level of legitimacy; (b) their levels of commitment to meeting development and poverty reduction objectives established within the MDGs; (c) their awareness and focus on better utilizing limited resources for capacity development as measured by the presence of policies for aid effectiveness related to capacity development; and (d) degree of inclusiveness that supports their long-term stability as measured by the existence of gender equality and other social inclusion policies.

Processes for implementation are related to the extent to which the countries are prepared to deliver results and outcomes. They are concerned with the creation of an environment that motivates and supports individuals; the capacity to manage relations with key stakeholders inclusively and constructively; and the capacity to establish appropriate frameworks for managing policies, strategies, programs and projects. Processes for designing, implementing, and managing national development strategies, MDG-related processes, and resource effectiveness tracking and for ensuring inclusiveness and gender awareness are particularly tracked through a series of indicators.

Development results at country level are concerned with tangible outputs that permit countries' development. The main areas covered in this cluster are geared toward specific programs for capacity development; the coordination of aid support to capacity development; the level of creativity and innovation in agriculture; achievements in the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; and achievements in gender equality and social inclusion as well as in partnering for capacity development.


Capacity development outcomes tend to measure the desired change. Indicators to this effect are captured mainly through the financial commitment to capacity development; the actual achievement of MDGs; and the achievements in agriculture, among other measures. The performance of the ACBF with respect to the objective of scaling up capacity development in the countries where it has been delivering support is also measured as a specific outcome to track the effectiveness of ACBF in building capacity.

1.6 Conclusion

The inadequacy of capacity has been a major factor in Africa's not achieving its major development objectives, such as the MDGs. The above has been compounded by the challenge of a systematic measurement of achievements in capacity development. Capacity development is crucial for achievement of results, building ownership, alignment of aid, and providing for accountability. Capacity is not only about skills. It also includes issues of governance capacity; institutional capacity; capacity to manage aid and coordinate development assistance; and capacity for democratic accountability. The political economy of capacity—for example, the functioning of the civil service and the availability of skills in the private sector and in universities—is another vital aspect of capacity development. Understanding of *capacity development* and appropriate ways to *measure* it is thus paramount. However, assessing the results of capacity development is based on an understanding that it is not an end in itself. The ACIR is conceived to fill the gap in measuring any such change. The Report explores the theme of fragility and highlights emerging development challenges that require the attention of stakeholders on the African continent.

2

Conceptualizing Capacity Development and Fragility in Africa





2

Conceptualizing Capacity Development and Fragility in Africa

2.1 Introduction

Despite its recent good economic growth performance, Africa has the world's most extensive history of civil wars and instabilities. The period 1990-2000 saw 19 major armed conflicts and cross-boundary civil wars (Obwona and Guloba, 2009); in 1999 alone, there were armed conflicts in 16 of Africa's 54 countries (Addison, 2001). Although many were relatively short-lived, they are among the bloodiest (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000a), and the first decade of the new millennium ended with an estimated 22 African countries struggling under post-conflict conditions (Sambanis, 2008; Ali, 2009). If we regard countries with 10 plus years of post-conflict peace as having normalized and evolved to a development phase, the number of post-conflict countries drops to 12 (Ali, 2009).

The total population of countries currently labeled post-conflict is approximately 482 million, which represents over 66 percent of Africa's total population in 2005. The consequence of these conflicts has been devastating. Not only have they resulted in the loss of life and destruction of physical capital, with detrimental implications for growth and development; at times, they have threatened the very existence of some of the polities. These economies are characterized by high levels of poverty and inequality: an estimated 48.5 percent live below the poverty line; the Gini coefficient for those who have data in the mid-1990s averages 0.46; there is a low level of human development; the population is predominantly rural (approximately 63 percent); and calculations show a 0.32 value of average risk of civil war (Ali, 2009: 27-32).

State fragility related to post-conflict situations is particularly challenging for policy makers in that it represents a situation that needs to be managed cautiously. The extant literature rarely presents capacity development in that context. Understanding the dynamic link between capacity development and conflict requires understanding the character and determinants of conflicts as well as their duration, intensity, and the modalities for their cessation and post-conflict reconstruction. Analysis of the impact of conflicts and post-conflict conditions is crucial to our understanding of the need for capacity development in post-conflict and fragile societies.

2.2 Capacity Development in Fragile and Post-Conflict States in Africa

Concept of state fragility - the concept of state fragility emanates from a number of distinct but closely interrelated policy initiatives that have gained wide currency over the past two

decades. The term reflects an evolution in thinking from the times when terms in use included difficult development partners, difficult environments, countries at risk of instability, Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), poor or weak performers, failing and/or failed states, and collapsed states. The literature is also replete

with debates on conceptualization and operationalization of the term fragile states and the terms it has come to replace. There, however, appears to be no consensus on the basic definition and typologies of fragility. Despite the conceptual fuzziness of and empirical difficulties in measuring fragility, it has become a key factor that determines approaches to development assistance strategies and other international interventions. Most rich donor countries and institutions have developed policy papers that describe approaches toward state fragility and its consequences. This has raised the issue of whether there are sufficient similarities among states categorized as “fragile” and whether they are sufficiently distinct from other countries to warrant differential policy analysis and recommendations.

A number of organizations have helped make the concept of fragility and its measurement operational:

- The UK's Department for International Development (DfID) defines fragile states as occurring where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor, where core functions include service entitlements, justice and security (DFID, 2005b);
- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition emphasizes the “lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies” (Morcos, 2005, quoted in Prest et al., 2005: 5);
- Canada's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP) definition extends beyond service entitlements to include those states that lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad (CIFP, 2006);
- The USAID approach is similar, but differentiates between states “in crisis” and those that are “vulnerable.” USAID uses the term fragile states to refer generally to a broad range of failed, failing, and recovering states; and
- The World Bank identifies fragile states as “low-income countries under stress” (LICUS), which are fragile states characterized by a debilitating combination of weak governance, policies, and institutions, indicated by ranking among the lowest (<3.2) on the Country Policies and Institutional Performance assessment (CPIA) index (discussed in detail in chapter 4).

Another definition close to that of CIFP extends the first dimension—capacity—to include “lack of will” by defining fragility as loss of comprehensive service entitlements, authority, and legitimacy, whereby service entitlements may fail due to capacity or political will (Stewart and Brown, 2009). Failure to deliver services is defined to include failure to reduce monetary poverty as well as failure to provide public services. If fragility is generally understood this way, it is worthwhile to discuss the different categories and levels of fragility and bring out post-conflict situations as cases of fragility with special characteristics.

State fragility is, therefore, said to exist where the society is fractured, the economy mismanaged, and social service delivery so weak that the social contract between the state and its people has been undermined or has broken down altogether. In such circumstances, society lacks cohesion and the state is prone to disintegration.

When states become fragile, they retreat from basic public functions and sometimes from some parts of the country. In turn, local chiefs, gang leaders and/or warlords fill the political vacuum, sometimes in collusion with corrupt public officials. Failing effective domestic leadership, systemic terror, rape, property destruction, large-scale population displacement, and forced conscription of young people tend to gradually become ingrained in society. Similarly, with state fragility, legitimate enterprises lose space to operate, and the pursuit of wealth by illegal means extends from occasional grudging utilization of significant

profit making opportunities to the culturally acceptable way of doing business. State incapacity to deliver services and ensure security causes loyalty to the regime to wither as the locus of authority shifts to minority groups, indigenous movements, ethnic and religious leaders, or even criminal syndicates that are able to deliver security services to those who can pay. As the state becomes fragmented, institutions of democratic governance—like those of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties—crumble, and low-intensity or large-scale violence eventually ensues (Rackley, 2006) alongside the formations of extra-legal groups.

Box 1

Resource-based extra-legal groups in Liberia

Cheng (2006) defines a resource-based extra-legal group as one that is formed to illegally exploit and control a national resource. Its core support usually comes from ex-combatants, but membership may also include criminals, state officials, and business owners. Their goal is to control an economic resource (agricultural, mineral, oil) and profit from its exploitation. In situations of post-conflict transition, these groups are provided with a window of opportunity to take advantage of weakened security structures and judicial systems. If left unchecked, they develop powerful bases of local support, gradually expand, and eventually pose a real threat to the state itself. Usually, peacekeepers have no mandate to deal with them; nor will a newly constituted (or severely weakened) government be in a position to confront them. In the absence of any effective checks on their power, resource-based extralegal groups become embedded in society and remain there, outlasting the tenure of any international peacekeeping mission and compromising the future stability of the state.

For example, Liberia's post-conflict environment created the breeding ground for this type of network, particularly in the rubber, timber, and diamond mining industries. After the civil war ended in 2003, most sectors of Liberia's pre-war economy were paralyzed. UN sanctions on diamonds and timber were still in place, and iron ore production was at a standstill. The only legally viable industry left was rubber. But five of the country's six major rubber plantations had already been taken over by rebel factions or government militias. Two remained illegally occupied by extralegal groups involved in tapping rubber for profit. While rubber tapping per se is not an illegal activity, these two groups had unilaterally taken over territory to which they had no legal claim and had slowly grown more and more powerful.

Cheng argues that in the short term, the biggest threat posed by these extralegal groups is a return to war. In the long run, they can develop a local monopoly on protection, or they could use their financial resources to permanently establish a power base that could undermine the state. Just as likely is that these groups will create permanent shadow economies that lie beyond the authority of the state. All of these scenarios present substantial threats to a weakened state.

Source: Cheng, C. (2006). "The Rise of Extralegal Groups during Post-Conflict Transitions: Illegal Rubber Tapping in Liberia." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151191_index.html

According to Chauvet and Collier (2005), state fragility tends to have far-reaching negative implications that go beyond the country's borders. It is estimated that once a country becomes fragile, its neighbors suffer from a 2 percent decline in annual rate of growth. At the same time, two-thirds of the economic damage caused by a fragile state will invariably be borne by its neighbors rather than by itself (Chauvet and Collier, 2005). Due to state fragility, a wide range of unlawful organizations and corrupt international businesses take advantage of modern communications technology and management methods to engage in illicit trade in agricultural, forestry and wildlife products as well as drugs, arms and weapons, diamonds, antiquities, stolen cars, toxic waste, and counterfeit goods. Such fragile states have arguably become the weakest link of the international security system (Goodhand, 2004).

Following the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC September 2001, fragile and failed states such as Afghanistan and Somalia were seen as prime examples of the intersection of state collapse and the incubation of international terrorism as well as of the security issue of global narco-trafficking and high sea piracy. Suddenly, the issue of fragile states was at center stage among Western governments' national security and military planning concerns. It quickly appeared as a priority security issue in the development agenda, as well. Concerns for state fragility have come to cover a broad spectrum of issues and now embrace claims that fragile states present direct threats to Western national security on the assumption that terrorist networks can take advantage of the lack of government control in failed states. Related ills include mass migration, organized

crime, violent conflict, communicable diseases, and environmental depletion.

In defining fragile states, one does not aim to provide a definitive list of countries, because numerous elements of subjectivity and probability play into the issue, as do surrounding controversies. In the context of this report, fragility and lack of capacity can be hypothesized as being the significant challenges for aid harmonization. Fragility is not only a problem for coordination, but it is also detrimental to reconstruction efforts, as it increases the likelihood of reversion to violence. Conceptually, fragility is multi-dimensional, and the literature is the diverse, confusing and controversial (Besley, 2010). When considering fragile states' situations, the international community needs to give special attention to other global issues such as climate change. For development economists, other social science professionals, and humanity in general, fragility of states is impossible to ignore due to its potential negative spillovers (Blattman, 2010). One of the most pressing international security and development challenge is stabilizing fragile states (Zoellick, 2008). However, in both academic and policy circles, there is a lack of solid understanding as to why some states display a propensity to fragility.

One could argue that the discourse on state fragility has also become a veritable academic industry. The debate has come to involve a number of analytical frameworks, instruments, and indices that claim to measure different dimensions and indicators of state fragility and failure (Cammack et al., 2006). Mainstream narratives tend to concentrate on endogenous explanations of the occurrence and underlying internal causes of failure: these analyses attribute failure to allegations that the state and society do not have the required capacities to exercise

positive sovereignty and are incapable of adopting the necessary reforms in the economic and institutional realms. They have conjured various definitions and typologies of fragile or failed states. By distinguishing between capacity and will, Patrick (2006) distinguishes several typologies: (i) endemically weak states; (ii) resource-rich poor performers; (iii) deteriorating situations; (iv) prolonged political crises; (v) post-conflict situations; (vi) brutal dictatorships; and (vii) reform-minded governments struggling with unfavorable legacies. While much closer to the realities on the ground, it is difficult to recognize the specific criteria underlying this kind of typology.

To further underscore the endogenous explanation for fragility and failure, most mainstream discourses emphasize the inner characteristics of the local political and social elites as the main source of state failure. State repression, corruption and neo-patrimonial institutions and practices manifest the resulting governance failings. Kofi Annan (1998) singles out the character of the African state and politics as a key source of conflict across the continent and argues that power in Africa gets personalized in the “winner-takes-all” brand of politics. He notes, that “insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, lack of respect for human rights, results in political control becoming excessively important and stakes dangerously high” (Annan, 1998: 4). Although Annan appreciates the role of history, the colonial legacy, and the manner in which the continent is integrated in the global capitalist system, he nonetheless concludes that after over three decades of

independence “...the continent must look beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflict. Today, more than ever, Africa must look at itself” (ibid: 4). Rotberg (2003: 93) agrees with Annan's conclusion by observing that state failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor—fundamentally—caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. Leadership decisions and leadership failures have destroyed states and continue to weaken fragile polities that operate on the cusp of failure.” This lack of capacity “is a result of internal bad governance” (Doornbos, 2006: 2). In other words, there is no use blaming outsiders for Africa's misfortunes and troubles.

Some scholars disagree with the aforementioned arguments, and assert that donor interventions to “restore,” “rebuild,” “create,” or simply strengthen African institutions and societies assume away the role and consequences of its history and the nature of its unequal integration into the global capitalist system (Rodney, 1972; Amin, 1974). The main challenges of building democracy in Africa must be understood in the context of the slave trade, colonialism, and neocolonialism, which have contributed to the entrenchment of administrative and institutional structures that are not conducive to the promotion of sustainable development and democracy building. The colonial boundaries of African nations produced complex nation-states that were multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious. In addition, the colonial powers left many African states with a system of authoritarian values and norms that weaken public administration and the education systems, both essential for effective democracy building. Nonetheless, as some countries have shown, this past is not an insurmountable impediment to democracy building, but the structural and

historical roots of Africa's weakness and fragility should be highlighted in every discussion that seeks to fully appreciate the complexities of state building, stability, and development.

As some critical observers have discerned, many of the conclusions generated by post-Cold War peace building and capacity development theory and practice are single-mindedly driven by the neo-liberal internationalist paradigm. Its underlying ideology, policy, and institutional designs are broadly informed by faith in the peace-producing power of the “neo-liberal” paradigm. The thesis is firmly premised on the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is a functioning market democracy, that is, a neo-liberal democratic polity with market-oriented economic institutions. Regardless of local social practices, political traditions, and cultural expectations, it is assumed that the institutionalization of neo-liberal modes of governance should be promoted as the only policy or strategy to ensure the protection of human rights and the promotion of the rule of law. The neo-liberal modes of governance are also assumed as the ones to be relied on in managing conflicts over power, resources, and identity in divided societies. This paradigm is further underscored by claims that democracies having similar values and institutions are more reliable trading partners, are less inclined to start war or to threaten each other's security, and are probable allies in the case of conflict. As democracy spreads, so the argument goes, democratic states form a separate “zone of peace” with each other (Doyle, 1986).

Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the demise of global communism, a new neo-liberal-democratic worldview has become

virtually hegemonic. It encapsulates a pre-packaged development solution that has become an ideology, no longer a subject for debate, rethinking, or resolution. It engenders the parameters of domestic development policy. Such development theory, policy discourse, and institutional designs have been largely derived from a single and virtually unchallenged source of intellectual inspiration. The neo-liberal peace framework provides a set of broad ideas that define, elaborate, and justify the contemporary capitalist order and the ways in which changes can “legitimately” take place within that order. The theory and resulting policy praxes have continually been paraded as a panacea for a broad range of social ills, from fragility to poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental destruction.

While still professed as the dominant reconstruction development model, successful development stories of neo-liberal peace experiments in Africa are rare. There is still little consensus on the adequacy of the state, the structure of the state and economy to be built. This proves only that the whole approach is fatally flawed; and as Hettne and Soderbaum (2005) have concluded, it is too much focused on short-sighted 'fire brigade' programs. Other leading scholarly critics and development practitioners maintain that the standard package proscribing neo-liberal peace is unrealistic, internally contradictory, and more likely to exacerbate fragility and generate new conflicts than to sustain peace. The political and economic competition that it unleashes in highly fragile environments, for example, tends to exacerbate social exclusion, inequality, criminality, and weak governance, and it risks the renewal of violence (Collier et al., 2003; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Pugh, 2005; Guttal, 2005; and Suhrke, 2007). Not surprisingly, most of those failed social


engineering experiments in Africa have come to involve rigid transplanting of Western models of social, political, and economic organizations into war-shattered states in order, presumably, to manage conflicts (Richmond, 2004). Similarly, Jabril has observed that, “the aim is not less than to reconstitute polities through the transformation of political cultures into modern, self-disciplining, and ultimately, self-governing entities that inevitably transcend ethnic or religious fragmentation and violence. The trajectory is punishment, pacification, discipline and ultimately liberal democratic self-mastering” (2007: 124). Duffield (2001: 11) goes even further to contend that the neo-liberal peace paradigm “seeks to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and especially, stable societies.” The clarion call for a paradigm shift increasingly became louder and even more irresistible.

Post-conflict states as special cases of fragile states - the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) identifies four types of fragile states: a) deteriorating; b) arrested development; c) early recovery; and d) post-conflict. Such a typology is constructive in thinking through the different stages as well as in understanding post-conflict economies as a special case of fragile states. That said, the post-conflict concept is generally blurred. The political and social situation may remain fragile for a long time, with a high degree of polarization among groups and communities.

Public authorities in most post-conflict settings are usually weak in both technical capacity and effective control of their territory. Consequently, the former conflict area may remain a gray area for a long time (Michailof, Kostner and Devictor, 2002). Since post-conflict

states fall within the broader definition of fragile states yet have a hope of durable peace, they are basically a special case of fragile states. Given this characterization, it's necessary to address the issue of whether post-conflict economic policies need to be distinctive? (Geda, 2010). The answer appears to be yes. A very key characteristic of post-conflict societies is that there is a high risk of reverting to conflict within a decade. The literature also indicates that economic performance has an important effect on this risk (Miguel et al., 2004). Therefore, economic policy—for instance those policies that relate to employment creation or general capacity development—in post-conflict countries has the additional potential of helping reduce the risk of reverting to conflict. This is important in view of the fact that other policies, such as democratization and increased security capacity, do not seem to lead to reduced risk, at least not in the short run. In such societies, capacity is the most serious binding constraint and needs a major focus.

With that in mind, a fragile state, by definition, is not in a position to correct its own weaknesses fully. Sometimes it lacks the authority to do so. In other cases, the government does not want to correct particular weaknesses, such as social and political exclusion, or cannot, however willing, correct all deficiencies on its own due to limited human and financial resources and capacity. In those instances, the international community's role is clear, even if difficult, and capacity development stands at the heart of such intervention. Of the 34 countries surveyed, financial commitment to capacity development was found to be very low (figure 1). Capacity development requires patient capital because the outcomes of investments in capacity, perhaps even more so in a fragile environment, tend to come to fruition over the medium to long term.



Source: ACI field survey data

Analysts and international institutions further stress the importance of focusing on fragility and addressing such concerns because they have implications for the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), aid


effectiveness, and global and regional security and stability targets (Iqbal and Starr, 2008; Carment et al., 2008; McGillivray, 2007; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001). Table 1 provides an illustrative topology of fragility.

Table 1 An Illustrative Fragile States Typology

	Deterioration	Post-conflict transition	Arrested development	Early recovery
Fragile state scenarios description	Capacity and/or willingness to perform core state functions in decline (economic and social indicators falling)	Accord, election opens window of opportunity for stakeholders to work with government on reform	Lack of willingness, failure to use authority for equitable or pro-poor outcomes	Willingness, efforts to improve performance, but uneven results
	High levels of corruption, self-enriching elites, and erosion of government legitimacy	High risk of return to conflict	May be anarchic or authoritarian; may have moderate or high capacity	May be post-conflict or not
	May have chronic low capacity, weak rule of law, territory beyond control, conflict/risk of conflict	High levels of unresolved grievance	Entrenched elites resist reforms; may have recurring cycles of instability	May lack strong leadership for reform and capacity to implement in government
		Capacity low, willingness may be high or low	Economic stagnation	Windows of opportunity for positive change
Civil society	Decreased cooperation, fragmentation, localized conflict	Polarized, initial peace building. Limited social capital	Suppressed, little cooperation or resilience	Recovering, cooperation increasing
	Decreased cooperation, fragmentation, localized conflict	Polarized, initial peace building. Limited social capital	Suppressed, little cooperation or resilience	Recovering, cooperation increasing
Examples	-Zimbabwe -Papua New Guinea	- Liberia - DR Congo	- Guinea - Fiji	- Timor-Leste - Sierra Leone

Source: Brinkehoff (2007:5)

Figure 2 suggests that countries that have emerged from conflict and early recovery have a stronger policy environment for capacity development as compared with those in deterioration or arrested development.



Source: ACI field survey data

Causes of fragility: flaws of the neo-liberal peace model. Analysts tend to concur that a full resolution of fragility and war-related crises in Africa will be neither effective nor lasting unless all factors and all forces standing as impediments to the realization of peace, security and development are fully and comprehensively addressed. This political economy framework of fragility includes an understanding of the uniqueness of each fragility context in terms of its own particular socio-economic and political history, the root causes and immediate consequences of the fragility or conflict, and the specific configuration of the actors and their interests. It further encompasses the capacity of the key change agents, and, equally vitally, addresses the nature of the regional and international environments within which the envisaged transformation from fragility or war to peace is expected to take place (Sen, 2008; Woodward, 2002; Rugumamu, 2009). Such a comprehensive understanding informs what kinds of policy and institutional reforms to undertake, actors to be engaged, and the relative time for engagement. Predictably, the processes of capacity development for state building and reconstruction are not simply a list

of activities to be undertaken, with matrices of actors, methods and impacts. The kind of a state to be built, the nature of public goods to be delivered, and, above all, the determination of what state-society relations need to be nurtured should inform the types of capacity development intervention activities to be supported, the sequence under which they will unfold, and their duration. Unlike the seeming ideological neutrality of relief operations, the tasks of capacity development are as openly political as is development and carry with them certain assumptions about the primacy of particular norms, values, and institutions.

As pointed out above, the neo-liberal peace model has become the blueprint for policy and institutional design for moving from conflict societies to peace and from shattered economies to dynamic self-sustaining national economies. Such a narrative raises a number of theoretical, policy, and practical questions. Above all, most fragile and post-conflict states, particularly those in Africa, are expected to undertake several transitions at the same time: from war to peace; from authoritarianism to liberal democracy; from quasi-command economies to free markets; and

from relief to development. The neo-liberal peace perspective does not explicitly articulate a comprehensive and integrated policy approach that links conflict resolution to sustainable peace and development. Nor does this “One-size-fits-all” construct provide a practical and relevant guide on how to address the root causes of fragility and conflict, consequences of war, and competing actor interests in different sets of environments. Not surprisingly, the fragile and post-conflict landscape in Africa continues to be defined by weak institutions, inter-group tensions, systematic discrimination against the outer groups, widespread insecurity arising from the presence of armed groups, grinding poverty for the majority, poor provision of public goods, and a profound disconnect between the government and its people. The peace that prevails and endures is often prefixed with terms attesting to its compromised quality: “brittle,” “fragile,” “turbulent,” “nervous,” and so on. Such less than impressive performance has contributed to various arguments that favor major scaling back of international capacity development efforts to give war-torn and fragile societies the necessary political space to pursue their autonomous recovery strategies (Weinstein, 2005; Kaplan, 2008; Englebort and Tull, 2008).

The World Bank's more recent evaluations have admitted that the neo-liberal model of development and governance recommended for fragile states has turned out to be more problematic than earlier anticipated. The Bank's 2005 study concluded that even with “good” policy reforms, debt relief, continued high levels of official development assistance, promising developments in governance, and a relatively supportive external climate, no widespread and

definitive outcome has so far been witnessed in Africa. The World Bank aptly suggests that “reforms need to go beyond the generation of efficiency gains to promote growth” (2005b: 8) since economic growth also “entails structural transformation, diversification of production, change, risk-taking by producers, correction of both government and market failures and changes in policies and institutions” (2005b: 10). The Bank further recognized that “no country (in Africa) has achieved sustained growth to transform its economy and pull its neighbors along” (2005b: 11). What might have gone terribly wrong? Is it a flawed theory, poor policy implementation, or even both?

First and foremost, the mainstream discourse on the root causes of Africa's fragility and conflict is partial at best and misleading at worst. The larger global environment within which fragile states are historically located remains virtually undefined as a problem. The discussion ignores the role of colonial history, unequal integration in the global capitalist system, and past and current donor-supported policies and practices that have contributed immensely to contemporary situations of state fragility in the first place. “...[T]his is so because of its stake in the preservation of the existing system, which leads the analysis to become ideological” (Tandon, 2000: 18). Other critics have even suggested that the whole concept of fragility/failed states is fundamentally flawed, premised on false understanding of the past and colored by a strong ideological basis. The precise ways in which the internal and external determinants of fragility interact and coalesce in prompting the processes leading to state fragility and collapse should inform any serious analysis. Worse still, the conventional narrative ignores the various

types of empirical statehood that exist in the group; it conflates the absence of a central government with anarchy; it creates an unhelpful distinction between “accomplished” and “failed” states; and it is guided by a teleological belief in the convergence of all nation-states (Fayyad, 2008; Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009).

Second, the notion of the state assumed by the “failed/fragile state” discourse is abstracted from the historical development of particular forms of state and is isolated from the economy and the social relations that constitute society. This reifies the surface appearances of formal political institutions and functions and falsely assumes the universality of distinct political forms specific to capitalist society. Despite its relative brevity, colonial rule had a long-lasting impact on Africa's independent states as it launched radical new ideas of territoriality and control. Yet, the transfer of modern state institutions proved extremely shallow. The British indirect rule system, for example, was a common feature of all colonial administrations and relied on intermediary local elites to compensate for the thinly spread colonial apparatus. Although colonialism and decolonization represented early initiatives of state building, they reflect a transfer of modern state institutions in all but theory. In short, the colonial legacy is one of weak, inappropriate institutions and a profoundly fragmented political identity (see Anderson, 2004; also see Englebort and Tull, 2008:112 on the DRC experience).

Third, post-colonial state building in Africa has also witnessed repeated unsuccessful donor attempts to mold the continent's institutions to Western templates. State building and capacity development are often seen as technocratic exercises in which fragile countries import and institutionalize inflexible formulae.

Development partners and Western scholars seem to agree that fragile and collapsed states will not emerge from weak policies, weak institutions, and weak governance on their own. They also accept the proposition that intervention in the form of mediation, peace building, and state building is necessary, if not the key, and instrumental in reversing the political and economic decline of poorly governed states. Finally, development partners assume that local institutions are either inappropriate for development or have been badly weakened by violent conflict and disorder. Against this formulation Pureza (2006), Kaplan (2008) as well as Fayyad (2008) all suggested that fragile state institutions in Africa might entirely be a product of the neo-liberal doctrine that dominated the development process over the past four decades. They contend that states have become fragile or failed due to the minimization of their role as part of neo-liberal policies and cite structural adjustment policies and marginalization of democratic institutions as the root cause. The “rolling back of the state,” in the economy has been manifested by severe downsizing that reduced public service, cut state budgets, privatized public enterprises, and scaled down public services. It has also caused a sea change in the role of the state relative to both local and national governance on the one hand, and multilateral institutions and international development agencies on the other. African states have been virtually under pressure, with little leeway to devise homegrown policies that could consolidate their political power base, promote national unity, or simply protect the economic interests of the poor and disadvantaged. These policies were so heavily packaged that they tended to foreclose any options for modification either to preserve national interests or to provide critical goods and

services that private actors were unwilling or unable to provide. Deep cuts in the state provision of employment and social services, for example, further eroded the social base and legitimacy of most African states and exposed them to violent political contestation. Further and deeper cuts in defense expenditures eroded the limited state capacity to provide basic security to citizens and free them from fear (Mkandawire and Saludo, 1999). To the above-noted agenda, Doornbos (2006: 6) adds other forms of capacity and legitimacy erosion of the African state that were directly provoked by the donor community. These include significant diversion of aid funds via non-governmental organizations, the formation of donor coordination consortia and a donor specialization in selected sectors involving a devaluation of the policy roles of ministries, and a preference for working with autonomous non-bureaucratic corporate bodies. A combination of this neo-liberal standard reduction of the social and economic capacities of states and the increased set of requirements by some within the donor community to aid-recipient governments should be considered as one of the major explanations of state failure in Africa.

Fourth, the premises of the neo-liberal peace model tend to be influenced by the rich countries' concerns about the consequences of political disorder in poor developing countries on their own security and stability rather than by the altruistic desire to promote genuine peace and development for poor countries. The threats of catastrophic terrorism using weapons of mass destruction, the flood of refugees, the growth of drug smuggling networks and the spread of deadly disease fit into this category. For whatever

reason, this analysis tends to suppress the other side of the equation: their collective security is equally threatened by the obscene structural inequality in power and wealth between the rich and poor countries of the world. The rich and powerful continue getting richer and more powerful while the weak and the poor grow continuously weaker, poorer, and more alienated (Galtung, 1969). The World Institute of Development Economics Research of the United Nations University recently reported that the richest one percent of adults alone owned 40 percent of the global assets in the year 2000, and that the richest 10 percent of adults alone accounted for 85 percent of the world's total. It also notes that 90 percent of the world's wealth is concentrated in North America, Europe and high-income Asian Pacific countries (WIDER, 2006). Structural inequalities tend to exacerbate fragility by accentuating exploitation, mass hunger, desperate poverty, and unjust social, political and economic systems that endanger global peace and security. Sustainable state and peace-building in fragile environments would arguably be possible if the root causes of structural violence are placed squarely on the global development agenda.

Fifth, and at a practical level, the neo-liberal peace model has a tendency to give preference to a case-by-case peace building and reconstruction frame and to a very short-term scope of engagement³. Admittedly, most intra-state conflicts in Africa are inter-linked within regional conflict systems, for example the Great Lakes, the Nile Basin or the Mano River. Surprisingly, the bulk of traditional official development assistance to Africa remains predominantly country-specific. Only a small percentage of

resources tends to be devoted to promoting regional peace building, disarmament, demobilization, and integration of ex-combatants. Due to inextricable cross-border dynamics (cross-border ethnic links, economic ties, and war economies), most pacification and reconstruction efforts for the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi post-conflict reconstructions, for example, should have had sub-regional coverage. At the very outset, regional cooperation and confidence building measures would have been encouraged to facilitate the evolution and deepening of a culture of good neighborly relations. Earlier studies show that the fixation of the neo-liberal peace model on one country caused the loss of the invaluable opportunity to exploit synergies with neighboring systems to ensure coherence across regional conflict systems. Besides confidence building, a multi-country approach tends to promote donor coordination and harmonization, knowledge sharing, and special projects and resource allocation (World Bank and UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2000).

Sixth, there is also a considerable degree of vagueness about the length of development partners' commitment to capacity development in fragile environments. The time necessary to enable a post-conflict state to do without outside support remains unsettled. Each of the actors has a different take on what kind of institutions should be built, what activities constitute state and society building, and how long it should take. The current bureaucratic organizational structures, hierarchical cultures, short-term evaluation criteria, and risk-averse financing systems of most international agencies tend to be at variance with the real needs of complex African post-conflict peace-building

reconstruction systems. Each participating agency has clearly defined mandates, priorities, and a sequencing of activities as well as independent evaluation and reporting systems, which tend to disconnect them from a long-term post-conflict capacity development and reconstruction effort. Whereas the OECD's *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States* mentions that capacity development in core institutions would normally require an engagement of at least ten years, bilateral development partners are often vague on the subject. In fact, few donor countries are willing to sign up for more than a few years of capacity development in a given country. As has been proposed by some experts, a lengthy and well-resourced engagement is critical to the creation and maturation of institutions necessary to prevent a rollback into state failure. Similarly, a greater clarity on the criteria for donor exit would open up new objective criteria for the selection and sequencing of interventions. Two different degrees of engagement with fragile states have emerged: the prominent cases and the rest of other recipient group. The prominent cases that neatly coincide with strategic post-conflict states, Iraq and Afghanistan, receive much more aid per capita and longer-term commitments than any other member of the recipient group. On the other hand, conditionality and possibly other obscure criteria of selection have once again created "aid orphans" among fragile/states states. These include Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Chand and Coffman, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 2004; and Weinstein, 2005).

Seventh, in addition to the inadequacy and irrelevance of the neo-liberal peace model is the

lack of the necessary political will by external partners to invest a substantial amount of political and financial resources³. This factor lies at the core of poor capacity development performance in Africa. Far too often, the Security Council has shown a lack of sustained political attention to countries perceived to be of low strategic importance. The early post-Cold War peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Sudan failed to prevent or effectively respond to genocidal mass murders. At the same time, major powers have shown political willingness to commit their own troops as well as massive funds to enforcement operations even without the Security Council's authorization in Europe and the Middle East. Yet these powers have generally refused to send troops with adequate mandates to end brutal conflicts and develop requisite institutional capacities in Africa (Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003: 11; Rugumamu, 2005: 23). Such double standards by the key players in the Security Council have sometimes given rise to occasional perceptions of the marginalization and exclusion of Africa with respect to the management of international peace and security.

Eighth, as noted earlier, the incongruent dimensions of capacity development and reconstructions are inextricably interlinked and interdependent. Multiple actors can achieve system-wide impact only when deliberately coordinated and monitored by synchronizing different mandates, roles, and activities of various stakeholders and actors. As in the oft-cited analogy, the intertwined strands of a piece of rope are stronger than the individual strands themselves. However, the frequent donor role duplications, parallel chains of command, and fights over allocation of funds have had a noticeable toll on the efficiency and effective-

ness of post-conflict peace building and reconstruction in war-torn African countries. The net benefits of donor and relief agency specialization are rarely balanced with the paramount need for an integrated and coherent effort. The design and implementation of multi-stakeholder partnerships is definitely crucial. As will be discussed below, the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness demand cooperation and coordination among external actors, cooperation and coordination among internal actors, and cooperation and coordination among the internal and external actors. Concerted efforts to resolve this bottleneck have remained slow and hesitant.

Finally, African leaders are not exempt from blame for creating and sustaining fragile environments. Inspired by the rapid economic development and political stability in the former Soviet Union, early African nationalist leaders embarked on a project of strengthening the state and its role in the economy and wider society. Competitive politics and distributive justice, it was claimed, were luxuries that poor countries could ill afford. Rapid nation-building and economic growth called for the concentration of power, not its dissipation. The building and consolidation of nationhood required the elimination of every opportunity for fissiparous tendencies to find expression. At an operational level, state building included the limitation of popular participation in decision-making, heavy centralization of political and economic power in the state, as well as centrally controlled political party activities. As a result, the doctrine of a single party as a vanguard for African progress gradually but discernibly took root in most countries on the continent. It is not surprising, therefore, that independent civil society organizations (such as trade unions, youth

organizations, and women's and students' organizations) that had supported nationalist struggles were either banned or turned into affiliates of state ruling parties. This misguided state-building strategy, bankrolled by donor support, went a long way toward sowing seeds of broad-based insecurity, corruption, and erosion of institutional and organizational capacity of the state and legitimacy in most of Africa (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982a; Kaplan,

2008). For example, parliaments in Africa were one of the major victims of marginalization by the executive branch of government and by multilateral and bilateral agencies. Military governments in Africa repeatedly dissolved parliaments. Countries found themselves ruled by rubber stamps in one-party systems, were bypassed by donor agencies in policy management, or simply were starved of basic resources in fragile multi-party state systems⁴.

Box 2

Key characteristics of United Nations security involvement in Africa

In 1993, there were seven UN peace operations in Africa. UN peacekeeping forces in Africa numbered almost 40,000, or 51 percent of approximately 78,400 uniformed peacekeepers (military personnel, police officials, and military observers) deployed worldwide (Berman and Sams, 2000: 4-5). UN peace operation expenditures reached around US\$3 billion.

By June 1999, there were only three UN peace operations in Africa, and the force levels were less than 1,600 (Berman and Sams, 2000: 4-5). This made up about 16 percent of an approximate worldwide total of 10,000 deployed uniformed UN peacekeepers (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2006: 24). The drop in numbers did not correspond to a drop in conflict levels on the continent. Between 1993 and 1999, major wars were being fought in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Southern Sudan, and there were 16 ongoing conflicts in Africa in 1999 (Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 2000: 638). The UN peace operation expenditures were down to approximately \$1 billion in 1998 and \$1.3 billion in 1999 (Global Policy Forum, 2005).

From the second half of 1999, something of a re-engagement of the UN in Africa was seen. Uniformed peacekeepers deployed worldwide had reached 65,000 by December 2004 (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2006: 24). By January 2008, this figure reached 90,883, approximately 70 percent of whom were deployed in Africa, and ten out of the 20 UN-led peace operations worldwide in April 2008 were in Africa. The re-engagement comprised large-scale peace operations to conflicts such as Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The UN peace operation budget was increased in 1999–2000 and reached \$2.1 billion in 2000 and \$2.7 billion in 2001 (Global Policy Forum, 2005).

As of 1 January 2008, the biggest contributors to the UN's peace operation budget were the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, and China, and the bulk of that budget of nearly \$7 billion in the 2007–2008 period was pledged for African peace operations, with \$1.48 billion of the budget destined for the UN-AU mission in Darfur alone, the UN's biggest ever approved budget for a single mission. On the other hand, the bulk of UN peacekeepers in Africa come from African countries.

Sources: Berman, E. G. and Sams, K. E., 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. Geneva: UNIDIR; Global Policy Forum, 2005. *Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures*, 2005. Heldt, B and Wallensteen, P, 2006. *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*, 2nd ed, Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications, Sweden. Sollenberg, M and Wallensteen, P, 2000. 'Armed Conflict, 1989–99'. *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5, pp. 635–649.

Box 3

The capacity of African parliaments to hold presidents to account

At first glance, legislatures in Africa's current regimes seem to have limited institutional capacity to represent citizens, make laws and ensure accountability among presidents. Building the institutional capacity of parliaments has thus been an important focus of democracy assistance programs since the 1990s, when many countries in Africa resumed democratic practices. While it is true to say that the institutional capacity of most African parliaments is weak, it is important to recognize that there are wide variations. Size is one indication of the differences in capacity that exist among African legislatures; Botswana's is smallest, with only 63 members, and South Africa's is largest, with 400 members. Parliamentary size influences capacity because the members are a human resource with skills and time to fulfill the institution's responsibilities.

Resource considerations aside, powerful presidents are often cited as the most important reasons why modern parliaments in Africa are generally regarded as weak institutions. The constitutional design of executive-legislative relations is an important part of the institutional capacity of Africa's parliaments. Especially in the African context where neo-patrimonialism and "big man" rule are more than just minor legacies from a distant past, some degree of autonomy is crucial if parliaments are to exert any influence on lawmaking or hold strong executives accountable. Empirical investigation of the relative powers of parliaments and presidents across the continent suggest important variations in regime types and patterns of executive-legislative relations but generally confirm the conventional wisdom about Africa's governments: weak parliaments are faced with strong presidents. Combined with generally low levels of parliamentary resources, this means that the institutional capacity of African parliaments to hold strong presidents to account is fairly limited.

Source: Nijzink, L; S. Mozaffar and E. Azevedo (2006). "Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality of Democracy on the African Continent? An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions." Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) Working Paper 160. University of Cape Town: CSSR.

Consequences of fragility: theory of conflict.

Understanding the causes of conflicts is critical to stopping or preventing war and building capacity in a fragile environment. The causes may be complex and country specific. Each situation demands a detailed and specific conflict analysis. Two principal categories of causes of conflict are cited in the literature.

The first presents the motivations as a dichotomy of greed (for power and resources) and grievance (such as pronounced inequality, lack of political right, and ethnic or religious repressions in the society) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a). The addition of "greed" in the literature is basically an extension of the "motive" based argument. Others argue that the "feasibility hypothesis" or opportunity (such as financial or natural resource rent, for building rebel organizations) is much more important (Collier, 2009a, 2009b). Empirical investigation led to the hypothesis that opportunities provide more

explanatory power than do motives such as grievance as the cause of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a; a similar argument is also put forward by Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Three common sources could give rise to opportunities for conflict: extortion of natural resources (primary commodity export as percentage of GDP is used as a proxy), remittances from the Diaspora, and subversion from hostile governments (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a). Research also determined that indicators of the opportunity cost of the combatants (per capita income, secondary school enrollment, growth rate of GDP) are statistically significant.

Within this economic explanation, a particular risk factor and source of conflict is found to be dependent upon primary commodity export⁵. The indicators used for grievance, proxies of ethnic and religious tensions, are found to be

unimportant. However, ethnic dominance, where one ethnic group comprises 45-90 percent of the total population, and lack of democracy are found to be important in

increasing the risk of conflict. In general, the three grievance models have very low explanation power (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a).

Box 4

Conflict and resource “lootability”

“Lootability” refers to the fact that resources, particularly extractives like oil, gas, minerals, and gemstones, are often easily accessible to governments and rebels alike with minimal bureaucratic infrastructure. Furthermore, resource extraction activities are, to a greater degree than other economic activities, spatially fixed.

Unlike manufacturing and to some extent agriculture, primary resource exploitation activities cannot be relocated. Although resource businesses may decide not to invest in or to disengage from their current operations, they generally sustain their access to resources and protect their investments by paying “whomever is in power,” which can translate to anything from a few dollars to let a truck pass a check-point to multi-million dollar concession signature bonuses paid to belligerents. This situation provides ample opportunities for internal contenders to challenge rulers through direct control over resource-rich areas, transport routes, or export points, which leads to a splintering of political movements along lines of economic interest.

As natural resources gain in importance for belligerents, so the focus of military activities becomes centered on areas of economic significance. This has a critical effect on the location of conflicts: it prompts rebel groups, in particular, to establish permanent strongholds wherever resources and transport routes are located to complement their traditional strategy of high mobility and location along international borders. The nature and geography of resources thus play a crucial role in shaping conflicts.

Source: Le Billon, P. (2001). “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” *Political Geography* 20 (5): 561-584.

Inequality measures and other grievance indicators used in such studies are not only badly measured but also regarded as not embedded in the social, political, cultural, and historical authenticity compared across contexts (Cramer, 2001; 2006). If this is corrected, as seen in the cases of Angola and Rwanda, grievance indicators such as inequalities do matter in explaining civil conflict (Cramer, 2001; see also Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997; and Pastor and Boyce, 1997, for a similar argument). Work done by DfID on horizontal inequalities further emphasizes the importance of these findings. Ten years of DfID-funded research on governance and fragile states 2001-2010, titled “The Politics of Poverty:

Elites, Citizens and States,” yield findings related to the role of citizens in addressing grievances and inequalities and underscore the fact that to understand development, one must understand the politics that shape it. The research argues that the political settlement is central to all development and that security is a precondition for development. The report further noted that in countries where cultural or ethnic groups feel there is economic, political, and social inequality, wars are more likely. This emphasizes the importance of looking for solutions in a broader political-economy context (DfID, 2010; Stewart, 2010).

Box 5

The “curse” of natural resources

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the tenth-largest producer of crude oil in the world. Its economy depends heavily on the oil sector, which accounts for 95 percent of export revenue, 76 percent of government revenue, and approximately one third of gross domestic product (GDP). With its large reserves of human and natural resources, Nigeria has the potential to build a prosperous economy, reduce poverty significantly and provide health, education, and infrastructure services, which its population needs. However, Nigeria, which was one of the richest 50 countries in the early 1970s, has regressed to becoming one of the 25 poorest and most unequal countries in the world. Since 1999, when Nigeria made the transition from over two decades of continuous military dictatorship to civil rule, civil society organizations have tried to have a sustainable effect on management of the nation's resources. These efforts include engaging with the budgeting process at all levels of government, joining the international campaign on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, pursuing government economic reform policies, and adopting anti-corruption initiatives. However, attempts by civil society to restore public confidence in public resource management via improved accountability and transparency have had little impact.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have shown that natural resource wealth considerably increases the chances of civil conflict in a country. According to their estimates, a country that has no natural resources faces a probability of civil conflict of 0.5 percent, whereas a country with natural resources-to-GDP share of 26 percent faces a probability of 23 percent. Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian's recent work on Nigeria argues that Nigeria's poor economic performance stems largely from having wasted its resource income. While Nigeria is now formally a democracy, the balance of power between citizens and public officials, including those at state and local government levels, is inordinately skewed in favor of the latter by virtue of their easy access to oil revenue. This perpetuates politics, even democratic politics, as patronage. They argue that exhortations to the new leadership to provide visionary leadership and implement the familiar litany of reforms—prudent macroeconomic policy, privatization, trade liberalization, strengthening the financial sector, and so forth—will undoubtedly fail unless control over Nigeria's natural resources is placed effectively in the hands of the citizens.

Source: Sala-i-Martin, X and A. Subramanian (2003). “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: an Illustration from Nigeria.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9804. Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Research using a logit regression and comprehensive data of civil wars over the period 1960-1999 arrived at concrete empirical findings about the risk of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a). The effect of primary commodity exports is found to be both considerable and highly significant. At its peak (primary export being 32 percent of GDP), the risk of civil war is about 22 percent. A study that used a different dataset and sample and restricted analysis to ethnic civil war (as opposed to revolutionary or ideological civil war, where natural resources are found to be important) found primary commodity export to be unimportant, however (Reynal-Querol, 2002).

The size of Diaspora also is a strong risk factor (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a). If its size changes

from smaller to larger in the sample, the risk of repeat in conflicts increases six-fold. Opportunity costs for those engaged in the civil war are also found to be important. A 10 percent rise in secondary school enrollment reduces risk of civil war by 3 percent. Another proxy for opportunity cost, an additional percentage point on the growth of the economy, reduces the risk of war by about one percentage point. Social fractionalization is found to reduce the risk of war: a maximally fractionalized society has a risk of conflict only one quarter of a homogenous society (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a: 11-13). Some research, however, has found religious divisions more important than ethno linguistic divisions because religious identity is fixed and non-negotiable (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Only one of grievance indicators, ethnic dominance, was

found to double the risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a), but civil wars are predominantly explained by socio-political rather than economic grievance (Sambanis, 2001 and Reynal-Querol, 2002). In particular, studies found the level of political inclusiveness and level of democracy to be important.

A study of the causes of civil war that focused on African countries found that for a median African country, the risk of civil war in any five-year period is relatively high (25 percent). Studies find this risk to be related to low levels of economic development and lack of political rights, which could trigger a median African country's probability of being in war by 11 percent. The study found four particular factors that trigger war in Africa: dependence on natural resources, low level of per capita income, failure to educate poor young males, and failure to develop strong democratic institutions (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000a: 9-10). These factors, rather than ethno-linguistic fragmentation, were shown to be responsible for the relatively high prevalence of war in Africa. In fact, the study argues that Africa's ethnic diversity is a deterrent rather than a cause of civil war. Their other findings are fundamentally similar with Collier and Hoeffler's (2002a) finding that used a worldwide database, except for the ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable. The policy implication of their analysis is that African countries need to promote political freedom and mold a governance framework that accommodates Africa's social diversity. It is also important to ensure a high standard of living, economic diversification, and economic transition to reduce dependence on natural resources. This has direct implication for capacity development in fragile (and post-conflict) states.

Similar to the studies reviewed above, which could be referred to as the "neoclassical models of conflict," there is also a strand of the literature that could be referred to as the "game-theoretic approach" to civil wars. This approach fundamentally assumes the existence of two or more groups with the predicament of making decisions regarding engagement in production, fighting, and looting. Agents are assumed to put these decisions into effect by anticipating their rivals' action in the context of a general equilibrium game-theoretic model (cf. Azam, 2001; Noh, 1999; and Grossman, 1991; among others). As with the "neoclassical models of conflict" rationality and methodological individualism are at the heart of these models.

Another perspective in the literature could be described as "the political-economy approach to conflict analysis." This school of thought argues that conflict directly expresses social, political, and economic relations and that conflict study therefore requires analytical tools directly geared toward understanding these associations (Cramer, 1999, 2006). Both the grievance (difference) and greed as well as opportunity arguments, for Cramer, use concepts with an indirect grasp of relations at best. He argued that the former (sometimes referred to as "structuralist") group bases itself on the presumption of differences as causes of conflict, while the latter is rooted in methodological individualism and rational choice presumptions of neo-classical economics. Both are open to statistical analysis. However, "both approaches airbrushed the significance of context and social (class) relations" and thus, these analyses deprive their subjects of context. The exclusive focus on economic opportunities has the danger

of being reductionist and can “... simply replace one simplification—the tribal (sic) or cultural explanation with another—economics” (Cramer, 1999: 12-16; 2006). The implication of this criticism is that conflict analysis, as exhibited in the recent Collier type literature, needs to accommodate the social features (see Cramer, 1999, 2000; 2006; Stewart, 1998).

The neoclassical-based empirical analysis of conflicts includes variables of the “social”—manifest in the form of collective identity—but excludes them from the underlying assumptions of the model, which are neoclassical and methodological individualism. In addition, at times the proxies selected as variables in such analysis have a tenuous link with the theoretical concepts sought for explanation, and invariably such a model has only a 50 percent accuracy rate in predicting civil wars—like “tossing a coin” (Cramer, 2006). Thus, what emerges is a combination of neo-classical utility maximization assumption with social concepts such as ethnicity, stripped altogether of their history and context. This has been dubbed “the slash and burn approach to historical specificity and...rape and pillage of the social...” (Cramer, 2001: 3; and Cramer, 1999: 17). The alternative to such an approach is to abandon the analytical framework that begins with methodological individualism for a non-social assumption that considers the economic and the social as separable spheres. This requires adoption of a framework—a political economy approach—that presupposes economic relations, behaviors, and performance as organically embedded in the social and the political context. From this perspective, scarcity, poverty, and economic and environmental crises are themselves to be understood as social events (Cramer, 1999: 17).

The sharp distinction noted between the neoclassical-based approach and the political-economy approach is partly the reflection of the unit of analysis used. It is problematic if not impossible to treat the social and historically specific features of the political economy approach when one is conducting a cross-country empirical analysis. Similarly, it will be quite mechanical to dwell upon the quantifiable dimension of conflicts alone when one is analyzing a specific country. Taking into account the social and historic specificity of the country in question is invaluable in understanding the dynamics of conflicts as well as their post-conflict reconstruction. In particular, since cross-country studies may not say much about causation, as opposed to association, political-economy based country studies are vital to redress this weakness. The two methodologies can be creatively used to enhance one's understanding of conflicts and post-conflict societies. The studies, based on the neo-classical approach and underscored by cross-country evidence, are helpful not only to identify factors that are strongly associated with societies in conflict but also to evaluate their relative importance. It is conceivable that researchers can use the political-economy approach and hence use the social and historical specificity of a country to analyze the stylized facts that emerge from the cross-country evidence. Such country level political economy-based analysis may also complement the neoclassical-based cross-country analysis by helping to identify other important factors that could be empirically examined. In fact, it will be quite interesting to compare and contrast the two approaches so as to deduce to the best rationalization (Lipton, 1991; Lawson, 1989; Wuyts, 1992; and Geda, 2002, 2004).

The consequences of conflicts: empirical evidence⁶. War and conflict have multi-dimensional consequences: social, psychological, political, and economic (Addison, 2001). Conflict's most visible impact is on physical infrastructure—transport, energy, telecommunications, public buildings, and housing. Direct damage is often compounded by the lack of maintenance during years of war. Because of long-lasting conflicts, such vast regions as southern Sudan and Chad have almost no viable road network left. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, where land transport has almost collapsed, must rely on air transport. During the war, and at times immediately after, as was the case in Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda, the rebel forces tend to target physical infrastructure as part of their strategy (ACBF, 2004a; Rugumamu and Gbla, 2003; UNDP, 2010; World Bank, 2005c).

Apart from infrastructure, other economic bases of a functioning state are also affected. Less than a fifth of the 1980 cattle stock in Mozambique remained by 1992 (Collier et al., 2003: 14-16). Approximately 40 percent of Mozambican immobile capital in the agriculture, communications, and administration sectors was destroyed. The pre-war transport system had been one of the largest foreign exchange earners, as goods were transported from and to the neighboring landlocked states of Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (Bruck, 2001). Thus, the structure of the economy is usually deeply affected. Agriculture and trade, crucial for most people's survival, decline rapidly with the onset of conflict: insecurity, the collapse of infrastructure and, in some cases, land mines hamper access to both land and markets. Therefore, markets may become highly fragmented and inefficient, and a large part of those who remain in rural areas turn

to a subsistence economy (Michailof, Kostner and Devictor, 2002; Mlambo et al., 2009). In addition, institutions often collapse. In many cases, the civil service ceases to function, and social services can no longer be delivered effectively—a failure that has short-term and long-term consequences. The lack of educational opportunities jeopardizes a generation's prospects and lays the groundwork for further instability. The incidence of diseases and epidemics increases while social indicators deteriorate (Michailof, Kostner and Devictor, 2002; Châtaigner and Gaulme, 2005; IDA, 2007). Thus, because of their very nature, African conflicts have become a development issue. They severely damage many countries' development prospects and hold them back for long periods of time (Geda, 2004; Michailof, Kostner and Devictor, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2007).

Economic consequence could be either a peace dividend or war hangover; these outcomes depend on the composition of stock of factors of production that have different degrees of vulnerability to war (Collier, 1999). In this view, there are five ways in which civil war damages the economy: through destruction of some resource, disruption with the often-concomitant social disorder, diversion of public expenditure, dis-saving, and portfolio substitution. Following restoration of peace, all are ameliorated with the exception of the portfolio substitution effect, which depends on private sector choice of portfolio (Collier, 1999). To evaluate the implication of these on the post-conflict economic performance, Collier used a standard Cobb-Douglas production function harnessed to provide the differential return for using resources abroad or at home. In this framework, disruption and diversion effects are taken to reduce productivity (and hence lower the rate of

return on factors endogenous to war) while the destruction effect is taken as equivalent to depreciation (Collier, 1999:2-4).

Using this framework, Collier advanced and empirically investigated four propositions: (i) civil wars gradually reduce the stock of endogenous factors and have a negative impact on the growth rate of GDP, (ii) because adjustment of the endogenous factors may have been incomplete by the time war ends, peace may not result in the immediate reversal of GDP growth, (iii) because peace may reverse the exodus of endogenous factors, there is a potential for accelerated growth—a peace dividend, and (iv) the longer the war, the more likely that there will be a peace dividend rather than a war hangover

(Collier, 1999: 5-6). In the empirical analysis, he found a strong “convergence effect” interpreted as a peace dividend, since destruction of resources by war is similar to being reduced to poor country status. In general, the empirical analysis shows that during civil war the annual growth rate is reduced by 2.2 percent; a fifteen year long civil war thus reduces per capita GDP by about 30 percent of what it could have been. Apart from this aggregate growth effect, he also found that the impact of civil war affects different sectors differently (Collier, 1999: 9). This has direct implication for the type of capacity development required in post-conflict economies. As figure 3 shows, the peace-dividend or affinity for social inclusion is stronger in fragile versus non-fragile states.


Box 6

Does inequality cause conflict?

A vast literature exists that attempts to establish whether, and to what degree, inequality causes conflict. Cramer (2001) refers to the examples of Angola and Rwanda to illustrate the difficulty with making easy assumptions about this causal link. While Rwanda is comparable in economic measures to Angola, Cramer argues that both countries share dramatic inequalities: in income, in access to resources and to services such as health and education, and in suffering. Both have experienced a history in the late colonial and post-colonial periods of extremely violent conflict. However, inequality, argues Cramer, came to matter in different ways in each country. In Angola inequality is a hugely important factor in the country's prolonged history of violent conflict, but economic inequality exists by virtue of the social and political forces that give rise to it, just as material forces shape the social and political. Similarly, in Rwanda there is nothing to be gained by artificially abstracting economic inequality, in the form of a poorly measured Gini coefficient, from the country's history, from the combination of population pressure on land and a history of poor policy choices, from the vagaries of international commodity markets, from the agency of individuals and groups, and from international interests and the timing of international demands for “democratization.”

Rwanda's history of conflict, Cramer suggests, may be just as significant an explanation for its vulnerability to civil war as a variable like inequality, given how often war seems to breed war. As in Angola but in very different ways, highly specific forms of inequality were central to Rwanda's horrific recent history. Social relations were being disturbed by policy influenced material developments: the crudest beginnings of what could become capitalist class formation were clearly evident in rural Rwanda, access to the state was a fulcrum for accumulation and differentiation, and the resentments and fragile opportunities of diverse groups of people were increasingly displaced onto the ideology of divisive-collective-identities. The relation between these particular kinds of inequality was what gave a murderous passion to the point blank relations of envy, grievance, greed, and fear. Even in these conditions, the genocide was not mechanistically predictable but owed a lot to the role of *contingent developments*, in neighboring Uganda, in international commodity markets, in the feebleness of the international community's management of the early 1990s peace negotiations and their manipulation by the French (Adelman and Surkhe, 1996), and in the post-Cold War vogue for “democratization.”

Cramer's argument, then, is that while economic inequality is hugely important to explaining civil conflict, this is true only insofar as the economic is considered inseparable from and embedded in the social, political, cultural, and historical.

Figure 3 Social inclusion efficiency in fragile and non-fragile states

Source: ACI field survey data.

2.3 Capacity Development in Fragile Environments

Theory on capacity development. The first chapter of this Report, highlighted the fact that the literature devoted to capacity is abundant and covers a wide range of disciplines, with each discipline giving different meanings to the term capacity. The report also highlighted the appreciation of the value of the “capacity approach,” which marries the theory of human capital from economics with theories in management science and education as Sen (1997) has proposed.

The theory of capacity enables a shorter link to be established between training and the performance of the main indicators of productivity, growth, or sustainable development. Empirical studies bring to the fore a simple link between the capacity to do and these main indicators, underlining the closeness of the notions of the capacity to do and of overall productivity for the producer. In many countries, restrictions to social mobility may be great, which translates into a more or less significant drop in the output of human capital. The evaluation of freedom of choice using the theory

of capacity makes it possible to better distinguish the situation of each country and to put forward appropriate solutions that go beyond mere observation, through the evaluation of a macroeconomic index of human capital output and the poor performance of educational systems. The theory of capacity corrects overly superficial evaluations of education; evaluations limited, for instance, to initial training. ICT, innovation and the economics of learning, as well as depreciation of human capital, have necessitated an accelerated renewal of the capacities to do by taking into consideration the possibility of radical changes in the activity throughout the life cycle.

The expression “institutional capacity” often refers to the means a country has at its disposal at the administrative and management levels, especially in the implementation of economic policies. It covers a broad range of activities, including the:

- collection of statistical data needed for the correct implementation of economic policies, by adhering to internationally approved standards,
- means to properly plan public spending and

the delivery of public services at central and local levels,

- capacity of the public sector to use the aid and to implement projects,
- effectiveness with which public bodies fight against corruption and strengthen governance,
- setting up and functioning of appropriate regulatory or prudential frameworks for businesses and banks,
- drawing up and implementation of legislation and regulations as well as judicial reforms,
- protection of property rights, and
- promotion of competition and, generally, of a competitive market.

By considering institutional change as the modification of an initial set of organizational rules and the measures of influence, constraint, and reproduction associated with them, capacity development can be seen as the result of a redefinition of the relative position of different actors implying a sometimes radical questioning of their respective possibilities of access to collective resources. It is therefore an endogenous process linked to interactions between organized actors who have a perception of their interests and are likely to result in groups of winners and losers (Nenovsky and Rizopoulos, 2003). The importance of the balance of power in institutional change has already been advanced by Marx (1894), Perroux (1973) and Galbraith (1976, 1984). In the institutionalist tradition, Commons (1931) accords a particular importance to “strategic transactions,” which are aimed at controlling and influencing the process of institutional change, whereas Olson (1966, 1995, 2000) and North (1990, 1994, 1997) underline the role of organized interest groups. Contributions on the

political economy of transition in general (Roland, 2002) or the monetary and financial system in particular also stress this point (Berglof and Bolton, 2002).

Contrary to approaches that see institutions as optimal solutions to a repeated non-cooperative game, serving the collective welfare of substantively rational agents (Schotter and Schwödiauer, 1980; Schotter, 1981), each institutional configuration crystallizes asymmetries regarding the distribution of resources. Aoki's (2000) approach to institutions basically belongs to this same current, despite the adoption of a hypothesis of rationality of weaker agents; North (1990) maintains that institutions primarily serve the interests of those who wield considerable negotiating power by allowing them to draw up and set the rules; and Binger and Hoffman (1989) point out that most institutions are the source of gains for some members of society while they impose costs on others.

Institutional capacities cover a vast field and range of aptitudes that involve the entirety of the authorities and their capacity to train human resources as and when they are replaced. Thanks to the building of institutional capacity, both partner countries and donor countries will be able to optimize their investments by enabling them mainly to measure the cost-effectiveness ratio of their choices through the analysis of a broad range of performance criteria (Lusthaus et al., 1996).

One can also envision capacity from the activities of development partners, who have adopted a variety of frameworks to conceptualize external support to developing countries and make it operational. For example, the development

partner coordination problem can be investigated in the context of the principal-agent model. Insights from game theory show the reasons why coordination fails (for example, Prisoner's Dilemma as it is characterized by the selfish action of actors). Free riding by some development partners in a group aimed at building the capacity of fragile states is another potential source of coordination failure. As an alternative, Samy and Carment (2010) opt for an integrative framework referred to as the "Authority-Legitimacy-Capacity" model instead of a specific case study approach pursued by economists, comparativists and international relations researchers. They suggest that external development partners should channel aid to context-specific weak points in relation to authority-legitimacy-capacity (ALC). Sandler (2004) provides a detailed account of the Country Development Framework (CDF) of the World Bank.

Capacity development in fragile states. Three areas have proven essential for post-conflict stabilization, recovery, and development: (i) rebuilding the state and its key institutions, (ii) reviving war-ravaged economies, and (iii) rehabilitating, reconstructing, and reintegrating communities and addressing their urgent needs. Although the specific challenges in each of these areas will differ by country, experience shows that they have to be addressed simultaneously (Mlambo et al., 2009). Thus, at a specific level, rebuilding the state requires simultaneous action in a number of areas, including the re-establishment of the state's control over security forces (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), re-establishing the state's fiscal capacity, restoring macroeconomic management capacity, and developing a

functioning judiciary and an effective penal system to re-establish the rule of law as conditions for security and economic restart (Mlambo et al., 2009: 61).

The major constraint in this endeavor is lack of capacity. Efforts at capacity development need to be established on three pillars that address: (i) the immediate needs of post-conflict societies, (ii) core political economic issues and (iii) issues of finance and financial sector reconstruction. Capacity development is often an inherent part of all international interventions in peace building and development (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002). It has been defined as "the process by which individuals, organizations and societies develop abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve goals" (UNDP, 2002:1-2). It also highlights at least 10 kinds of national capacity attached to every goal (UNDP, 2002: 4,6), including the capacity to:

- set objectives;
- develop strategies;
- draw up action plans;
- develop and implement appropriate policies;
- develop regulatory and legal frameworks;
- build and manage partnerships;
- foster an enabling environment for civil society;
- mobilize and manage resources;
- implement action plans; and
- monitor progress.

Capacity is a requisite intermediate objective toward the goal of intervention in post-conflict economies so as to set the country on a path to durable peace, stability, and development (Huang and Harris, 2006). For this reason, policy makers see capacity in post-conflict and fragile states as a means of equipping and enabling the state to fulfill its own functions effectively and

fairly and with requisite oversight by its citizens. The capacity development interventions could vary depending on the category (such as resource, skill, organization, politics and power, and incentives) and how targets are set in the first place (see table 2).


Table 2 Capacity building targets and illustrative interventions

If Capacity Building targets are defined in terms of...	Then interventions focus on...
Resources	Material and equipment Micro-credit Food aid Budget support Dedicated funding (trust funds and social funds)
Skills and knowledge	Training Study tours Technical assistance Technology transfer
Organization	Management systems development Organization twinning Restructuring Civil service reform Decentralization
Politics and power	Community empowerment Civil society advocacy development Legislative strengthening Political party development Discouraging ethnic-based politics
Incentives	Sectoral policy reforms (trade and investment, pro-poor social safety nets, monetary and fiscal policy, private sector friendly regulation, health, education) Encouraging civic dialog, social compacts, and consensus building Democratic elections Strengthened accountability structures and procedures Improved rule of law

Source: (UNDP, 2002: 4, 6).

Analysis of field survey data suggests that interventions need to be more focused on resources, skills, and knowledge in fragile states (see figure 4). Fragile states, according to this analysis, are distinct from non-fragile states in their achievements in capacity in the critical areas of resources, skills, and knowledge; they show no difference in the capacities related to politics and power and incentives, and little difference in capacity dimensions related to organizational capabilities. This finding is supported by the fact that fragile states maintain

the capacity to wage war and sustain conflict, but lack the capacity to deliver critical services (like education, health, and water supply) due to internal weakness and suffer from brain drain (which would impact the use of skills and knowledge). Inability to deliver services is mostly due to weak organizational capacity in fragile states and the lack of sufficient stability for skills and knowledge to be deployed effectively. Poor allocation of resources and distributional inequalities would also explain the low ratings with respect to resources in general.

Figure 4 Comparison of capacity dimension indices between fragile and non-fragile countries

Source: ACI field survey data


The field assessment of capacity development in fragile states done by country level experts under the ACI exercise further corroborates findings in other studies that indicate that interventions in fragile states share several similarities with interventions in countries where fragility is not a problem. As seen in table 2 and figure 4, much of what is considered desirable for effective capacity development in general applies to fragile states as well. The differences are, in some cases, matters of degree, and at times the environment of operation (Brinkerhoff, 2010). It also appears that lack of unified decision-making, and hence, turf battles and bureaucratic infighting, are recognized features of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, including capacity development (Brinkerhoff,

2010; Keating and Knight, 2004; ACBF, 2004a)⁷. The narrow margin of error factor is qualitatively different from non-fragile situations: in societies that have been fragmented by deteriorating or conflict conditions, people's trust and tolerance levels tend to be lower and their suspicion levels are heightened. They are less likely to be willing to cooperate across societal groups or to give others the benefit of the doubt.

Thus, capacity development efforts that fail to yield quick results or that deliver benefits to one societal group and not another risk being perceived as intentionally unfair or demonstrating favoritism and leading countries to slide to a conflict situation (Briscoe, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2010).

Figure 5 shows the levels of outputs in capacity development for the 34 countries surveyed under the ACI initiative. The results indicate that the majority of countries have very low levels: not a single country scored high or very high. Given the importance of capacity to guarantee peace, stability, and inclusive and sustainable development results, this finding indicates that there is a higher than expected risk that even stable countries today could fall into fragility,

unless the general question of capacity is resolved. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of countries are in the “very low” category indicates that a lot of work needs to be done to ensure that the development results achieved to date in Africa are maintained and that reversals are minimized. This underscores the importance of investing further in capacity development.



Source: ACI field survey data

As table 3 shows, the differences in capacity development in fragile and non-fragile states suggest lessons for the capacity development targets.

Similarities	Differences
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to consider sustainability and reinforcement of endogenous capacity • Long timeframe • Change agents and champions, political will and ownership • Importance of adaptation of intervention templates • Systems perspective to capture complexity and interconnections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure to restore services and security quickly • Short timeframe • Limited capacity to build on • Often not simply rebuilding, but creating new capacities • Little ‘margin of error’ (lack of: trust and social capital, institutional resilience) • Hyper-politicized environment

Source: Brinkerhoff (2010).

First, regardless of the capacity deficits targeted, it is essential to think about how choices can positively or negatively influence stability and reconstruction operations and post-conflict assistance. Second, because of the limited capacity available in fragile states, development partners should choose targets selectively and sequence capacity development assistance (World Bank, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2010; and UNDP, 2010). Third, because the timeline for results is short and levels of trust and tolerance are low, it is important to focus on restoring critical and visible services. Finally, since there is little margin for error and implementation takes place in hyper-politicized environments, it is important to embed highly consultative and participatory approaches where dialogue and communication are given high priority.

Capacity development to address concerns of post-conflict societies. Although capacity development efforts need to focus on addressing the core causes of conflict to attain durable peace, this can't be done without first addressing the immediate needs of post-conflict societies. This task may begin by building the capacity to provide humanitarian assistance. Such humanitarian assistance is very complex and includes conflict-related emergency relief as well as related social services. This should be based on a development framework that would facilitate a rapid transition from emergency to development (Obidegwu, 2004: 21). While a development framework is unlikely to exist in the early stages of post-war recovery, the government should be assisted in elaborating strategies for key sectors such as education, health, agriculture, and housing and resettlement to provide the framework for the extension of humanitarian assistance into needed socioeconomic reintegration support (Obidegwu, 2004: 21). Meeting humanitarian

needs (resettlement, demobilization of combatants, and other survival needs) is a prerequisite for the ultimate economic recovery of vulnerable households. Reintegration assistance to vulnerable groups and their communities would typically involve permanent housing and the provision of social services such as education, health, water, and sanitation services to the community (Obidegwu, 2004). It should also cover support for the engagement in income generation activities, with access to land, seeds, and farm implements for rural settlers and access to market space and credit for urban dwellers, with the objective of reintegration. Thus, reintegration is the bridge between emergency relief and development. Such reintegration activities should be progressively incorporated in the government's development program, with an explicit strategy for community development programs to strengthen social capital (Obidegwu, 2004: 21-22; Ali, 2009). There is acute shortage of capacity in these areas, however, owing to the effect of conflict. This underscores capacity development's importance in addressing those effects.

Despite the importance of meeting all immediate needs of post-conflict societies, limited capacity is available in fragile states. Thus, development partners should choose targets selectively, sequence capacity development assistance, determine which agency or agencies to target, and decide which target(s) to prioritize within those organizations. The international community lacks definitive answers to these questions (World Bank, 2006). However, in many cases, clear answers will remain elusive given the complex tradeoffs and country specificity of the issues involved (Brinkerhoff, 2010). This is why consultative approaches that solicit priorities from communities affected by conflict and seek

to balance provision of services across different groups identified in contextual and historical analyses are so important. Equally important are flexible instruments that can adjust to shifting priorities on the ground and emerging champions.

There is also an immediate need to thwart the possibility of relapse to conflict for both the post-conflict state and its neighbors. Recent research shows that on average, there is a 0.55 probability that a country neighboring a conflict will also slide into war. Often, a large number of refugees in an area puts pressure on local natural resources, heightens social tensions, and creates instability in host communities. In addition, refugee camps may become havens from which rebel movements launch attacks against government forces in their own country; the situation in the Great Lakes region is a case in point. This, in turn, may bring incursions of foreign troops into the host country and initiate a cycle of border incidents and fighting (Iqbal and Starr, 2008).

Capacity development efforts need to focus on addressing these problems following the onset of peace. Related to this, since the end of the Cold War, small arms have become easily available at low cost from both regular army stocks and the international market, as the evidence in the Horn of Africa region shows. This has made conflicts dramatically more lethal. According to Michailof, Kostner and Devictor (2002), addressing this issue would require that the international community acts forcefully in four main areas:

First, access to armaments by non-conventional forces and oppressive or expansionist states should be restricted. Suppliers can often be

identified, and the feasibility of applying diplomatic and economic sanctions should be explored.

Second, the donor community should monitor the military expenditures of African states and interrupt sub-regional arms races through diplomatic and economic pressure, as was attempted during the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict.

Third, it is important to control the trade of key commodities, such as oil and diamonds, that support the self-financing capacity of warring factions (Keating and Knight, 2004). This again requires capacity on the part of external development partners, since post-conflict states invariably do not have that capacity.

Finally, for conflict affected countries, aid is mostly used to fund relief, physical reconstruction, and social reintegration, in effect to restore the capital destroyed by the war. Programs such as demining, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants are indispensable for countries coming out of conflict and are usually costly. These are high risk and expensive exercises that use up resources that could be invested in productive and human capacity but are absolutely necessary to buy peace. However, as table 4 shows, the amount spent on emergency relief varies across countries depending on the intensity of conflict (Obidegwu, 2004: 11-12). Given the acute shortage of skill at this stage and the detrimental impact of the size of diasporas in aggravating conflicts, it might be wise to design a capacity development plan that may use the Diaspora with the twin objective of embracing them in the post-conflict peace building effort as well as bridging the huge skill gap.

Table 4 The share of emergency aid in total net ODA for selected post-conflict countries

Country	Year of end of Conflict	1995	2000	2005	Total 2000-05
Burundi	2000	5.2	19.81	25.78	24.44
CAR	1996	0.02	0.00	3.85	2.02
Chad	1997	0.08	0.57	18.24	9.36
DRC (Congo)	2000	4.63	14.44	12.72	5.63
Congo Republic	1998	0.01	7.61	0.95	2.40
Ethiopia	1991	3.31	10.67	19.44	15.71
Guinea-Bissau	1999	0.06	2.93	13.33	3.73
Mali	1995	0.20	0.33	2.31	0.75
Mozambique	1992	1.34	7.18	0.52	2.08
Rwanda	1994	15.94	3.58	4.62	3.83
Sierra Leone	2001	5.13	12.48	7.76	14.37
Sudan	2002	19.8	20.34	37.46	35.46
Uganda	1992	0.29	0.43	5.64	5.64

Source: Mlambo et al. (2009) cited in Geda, A. (2010: 15)

Capacity development to address core political and economic causes of conflict and building agencies of restraint. Once conflicts occur, the next question is how to address them. Social conflict is inevitable, every change throws up new conflicts, and the mark of successful communities is their management of conflicts. (Hirschman, 1995). Thus, the most important issue is to identify policies that help to manage conflicts and minimize their duration and damage where they break out. Policies for conflict and post-conflict societies are multifaceted (Addison, 2001). In general, they should be designed primarily to address the root cause of the conflict by focusing on both political and economic aspects of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction and peace building exercises are not simply technical projects but are sharply political (Cramer, 2006). These aspects of capacity development should be dealt with simultaneously, if possible; if not, one may begin with the most pressing aspect in a particular country context, which usually is the political aspect. Then it is important to build an agency of restraint (a regional economic and political organization like ECOWAS or a continental one like the African Union) as well as influential

partners of the post-conflict state and international agency of restraint (for example, the UN) to help the state make the transition to durable peace.

The core political and economic problems of fragile states in general and post-conflict economies in particular need to be addressed within a general development framework that builds on policy practice in developing countries. In this respect, the most relevant framework for Africa's post-conflict economies needs to be based on a broader framework and definition of development as a process of expanding the real freedom that people enjoy (Ajakaiye and Ali, 2009; Ali, 2009). A relevant framework for transitioning from post-conflict recovery to sustained development can plausibly be formulated on the basis of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It should include four dimensions that have immediate policy implications: development, wealth sharing, pro-poor growth, and aid requirements. In this broad policy framework, a focus on governance, peaceful conflict resolution, and security and infrastructure reconstruction may require special attention (Ajakaiye and Ali, 2009; Ali,

2009; Obwona and Guloba, 2009). Development partners and international agencies cannot accomplish this, however, without deeper understanding of African post-conflict economies, in particular.

Unfortunately, they rarely gain that understanding. There is a substantial disconnect between scholarly work on African statehood and the reconstruction policies applied on the continent. Scholars have linked African state failure to leadership failure, the structure of African states, the dynamics of democratization in polarized societies, or the vagaries of aid dependency. Yet, reconstruction exercises typically consist of bringing all violent actors (including the very people who previously demonstrated failed leadership) together in power-sharing agreements, re-asserting the integrity of the failed state, organizing elections, and showering the country with aid (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 16). Moreover, although African elites adopt policies that maximize their power and material interests, the typical reconstruction agenda assumes instead their altruism and desire to maximize the welfare of the country as a whole. Given the poor record of state reconstruction in Africa, that disconnect and its implications deserve particular scrutiny (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 17).

Englebert and Tull (2008: 17) further submit that Africa is unique in the extent to which its states were already dysfunctional prior to violent collapse and failure. Thus, most African states have tended to have ineffective institutions and have often relied instead on the personalized networks of patronage. They have rarely generated sustainable growth or managed to absorb their youth within the economy. Factionalism tends to be politically prevalent,

and a number of states have been instruments of private predation and extraction more often than tools for the pursuit of the public good.

In Africa, state failure is less an objective condition than a permanent mode of political operation. Recognition of the past deficiencies of African states sheds doubt on the goals that reconstruction can plausibly attain and on the value of the exercise itself. Such an exercise needs to be country specific.

Thus, African reality must inform political and economic reconstruction as well as associated capacity development efforts; African development stakeholders also need greater acknowledgement of indigenous rebuilding efforts, which understandably may vary across countries. With this understanding, the capacity development effort may proceed to address core political and economic reconstruction efforts.

The transition from war to peace is no less challenging than the transition from colony to nation. It is often a fragile phenomenon that consists of two related and potentially mutually reinforcing processes: (i) a post-war political transition that involves efforts to persuade all the belligerents to abandon violence as the means to achieving their objectives and instead embrace a new inclusive and legitimate political dispensation, and (ii) a socioeconomic transition that depends on the length of the war and the damage to socioeconomic infrastructure and institutions, the progress in restoring security, the institutional efficacy of the political transition process, and the support from the international community. The success of the latter reinforces the political transition (Obidegwu, 2004).

Capacity development for financial sector reconstruction. In post-conflict economies, in addition to the distorted policy and institutional environment, there is often a lack of experience in and information (data, facts, and statistics) for managing the economy in a rational participatory way. There is also a lack of experience in dealing with external relief and development agencies (Obidegwu, 2004: 24-25). The capacities of key government economic agencies—the core economic ministry and the central bank; the key line ministries such as agriculture and infrastructure, education, and health; and the security agencies such as the police, are often very weak and have to be rebuilt. Development agencies' good intentions and financial pledges to assist the conflict-affected country, including funding for capacity development, are often not matched with the necessary capacity on the donor side for prompt and effective delivery of the resources (Obidegwu, 2004: 24-25). Development agency coordination has also been lacking, with grave consequences for state building where myriad actors claim to have a role (Englebert and Tull, 2008). For instance, in Cameroon, various donor agencies were reportedly implementing 1,184 different projects in 2005 (Englebert and Tull, 2008). Between 400-500 annual missions evaluated these, and each development agency had its own modalities and reporting requirements, which put a huge strain on already weak state administration capacity (Englebert and Tull, 2008:13). Thus, the first and foremost issue in addressing the economic causes and consequence of conflict is not to put undue pressure on the government and indigenous institutions; this underscores the need to coordinate interventions by external agencies.

Once such coordination is achieved, the rebound is led by economic sectors that require minimal new investment to restart. This would include agricultural activities, small-scale commerce and transport, housing rehabilitation, and banking. Capacity development efforts need to focus on these important issues. State owned industrial enterprises are slow to reopen, as the government would not have the resources to make even the minimal rehabilitation investments (Obidegwu, 2004). The rebound, rapid as it may be, often does not change the fundamental structural weakness of a post-war economy as it relates to productivity, change in patterns of investments, sustainable change in technology, and capacity to absorb shocks (Obidegwu, 2004: 23).

Policy-related as well as structural risks factors, such as population size and geographic concentration, may threaten post-conflict reconstruction. The policy-related risks are, in order of importance, the extent of dependence on rent extracted from natural resources; lack of alternative economic opportunities, especially for young men; and existence of ethnic dominance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Collier, 2000a). A post-conflict society with these pre-conflict risk factors may need not only to reexamine the risk composition but also to focus on natural resource rent, the size of Diasporas, and the growth of economic opportunities, as these are found to be very important (Collier, 2000a: 6; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a, 2002b; Collier, 2009a).

In 1997, a pilot initiative by the *Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)* for the capacity development of microfinance institutions in Africa launched an experimental operation

called Pilot Initiative for the Capacity Building of Micro financing in Africa. This operation, which covered East and West Africa, aimed mainly at working with African training institutes, so as to organize training in financial management for the benefit of the MFIs. The objective was to set up bases for the development of a market of viable services and of good quality in the field of training and technical assistance in the region. In fact, microfinance institutions in Africa come up against numerous difficulties that prevent them from providing viable financial services to a great number of poor clients. Microfinance practitioners, decision-makers and donor representatives have observed that the lack of competent managers and agents is the main obstacle which is hindering the development of microfinance institutions in the region, and they consider that it is particularly crucial to invest in this area.

The European Union framework program on microfinance for African, Caribbean and Pacific nations (EU/ACP) provides a remedy to one of the main bottlenecks, the absence of retail institutional capacity. The program granted 6.5 million Euros in subsidies to eleven partner organizations to extend cover through innovative mechanisms and products and to increase transparency. Most of the subsidies are meant to lend support to the MFIs, but two are going to set up new microfinance banks. The initiatives were chosen following a single call for tenders. The EU/ACP framework program on microfinance had achieved the following results by the end of September 2007:

- Direct strengthening of at least 40 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the following countries: DRC, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Togo, Mali, Niger, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe;
- Support to ProCredit DRC that enabled it to carry out considerable expansion and facilitate 24-hour access to clients by introducing the very first electronic cash dispensers in the country;
- Setting up of two new Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) in Madagascar and Cameroon;
- Training of more than 500 people throughout Africa, especially personnel of rural community associations for financial services in Kenya and village banks in Cameroon;
- Support to two microfinance networks (a regional network and the Ugandan association);
- Introduction of initiatives to educate and protect consumers by the Ugandan Microfinance Association;
- Setting up of SMARTRAC with the training of local management consultants and carrying out of missions;
- Complementary contribution to investments by the European Investment Bank (EIB) thanks to investment funds from Cotonou, with at least three subsidies granted;
- Participation in experiments for different financial services: micro-insurance and savings;
- Granting of scholarships to policy-makers from ACP countries (via the central bank, ministry of finance, or similar agency) to enable them to register for the Boulder training program in microfinance.

Capacity development is an act of managing human resources. It encompasses monitoring and development of the careers of actors in microfinance and falls within the framework of GPEC (Gestion Prévisionnelle des Emplois et des Compétences). Companies commit large sums to train their personnel and, in reality, training is only a means. For it to be applied, it must be written and disseminated, so that different

actors in the business can refer to it. The career of the worker in the field of microfinance implies continual learning, not only in relation to management techniques but also especially in terms of organisational psychology and human development.

Commercial capacities. A civil war changes the nature and risks of trade and international relationships. In particular, it destroys external agents' confidence in the country's ability to deliver exports, with adverse impact on the trade of the country at war and in post-conflict state. Export and import operations (including tourism) are particularly adversely affected (Obidegwu, 2004: 15). This calls for capacity development designed to create enabling conditions to revitalize economic activities in general and international trade in particular. Once this is accomplished, the next step is to lay the foundation for structural transformation of the country. This refers in particular to infrastructure and social development, a move away from resource rent income through diversification, and provision of jobs for youth and the unemployed, among others.

First, trade and its liberalization can contribute to development. Trade and trade liberalization are not ends in themselves, but they can give a country greater access to a whole range of goods, services, technologies, and knowledge. By stimulating entrepreneurship, trade can create employment, promote vital learning phenomena, attract private investment flows, increase exchange revenue, and generate resources to guarantee sustainable development and reduce poverty.

Second, developing countries' desire to be incorporated into the world economy must be

managed cautiously. In order for integration into the world economy to be beneficial, considerable effort needs to be made to carry out reforms and to ensure a more effective participation in institutional decision-making mechanisms that shape the world economy.

Third, the new economic world order is full of promises but poses some difficult problems. Given the growing complexity of world markets, the new challenges of the multilateral trade system and the contradictory requirements of regional, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, developing countries find themselves faced with a growing range of problems regarding competitiveness as much as the orientation of their action. Often, they have neither the institutional capacities nor the necessary human resources to tackle these problems.

Fourth, those responsible for trade policies are strongly advised to build the capacities of developing countries in the area of trade. It is in the interest of OECD countries that developing countries overcome their capacity deficit in the area of trade, negotiate effectively, apply trade agreements and respect the permanent commitments they would have made in accordance with these agreements.

Finally, development partner support can strengthen the multilateral trade system by resolving the problems that developing countries come up against in the area of trade. Governments have committed to strengthening the integrated framework, and at the G8 and G20 Summits on June 25-27, 2010 in Toronto, Canada, heads of state requested capacity development in the area of trade and improvements in their realization.

Capacity development in the area of trade makes public sector decision-makers, companies and actors in civil society in partner countries better at:

- Collaborating in the creation and implementation of a trade development strategy that is integrated into a more general strategy of national development.
- Strengthening trade policy and institutions as a basis for reforming import systems, increasing the volume and added value of exports, diversifying export products and markets, and increasing foreign investments suitable for creating employment.
- Participating in institutions, negotiations, and processes that shape national trade policy, as well as in the rules and practices of international trade, and benefiting from them.

One of the principal objectives of capacity development in the area of trade is to help developing countries to put in place frameworks and strategies of sustainable action in the area of trade. Despite the importance of capacity in the area of trade, few studies or needs assessments have been conducted to shed light on the needs for such capacity in Africa. The ACIR field data indicates that for the 15 countries in which needs assessments for capacity development have been conducted, 93 percent of the studies have focused on capacity needs in putting in place policies for macroeconomic management; 87 percent have focused on capacity for fiscal policy; and only 67 percent on capacity for trade policy (see Statistical Annex).

Any framework for capacity development in the area of trade will rely on institutions and specific agreements, each one of which will have to be given attention to by developing countries and

development partners. A valid framework and action strategy in the area of trade will help developing countries to seize the numerous opportunities in the area of trade; facilitate trade development efforts at a truly local level; reduce the risk to which development partners' priorities in the area of trade policy expose developing countries' trade policies; and allow the latter to maintain and improve their capacities in the area of trade after the development partners have left. Without claiming to propose an ideal framework of action, certain characteristics or mechanisms appear to further its success. Development partners and developing countries must put this in place from the following elements:

- A coherent trade strategy fully incorporated into the country's global development strategy,
- Effective consultation mechanisms among the authorities, companies, and civil society,
- Effective mechanisms for coordinating policies within government services,
- A strategy aimed at improving the gathering, dissemination, and analysis of information in the area of trade,
- Networks for developing trade policies, supported by local research bodies,
- Networks of establishments working for trade promotion,
- Establishing links within the private sector, and
- A commitment by all stakeholders to put in place regional and international strategies for opening up the market.

The first implication for development partners is to more closely coordinate capacity development efforts in the area of trade. A framework of action of this nature cannot function effectively if it is made up of institutions and arrangements

that are constituted (or strengthened) independently.

The second implication is that capacity development activities in the area of trade have a global impact and are carried out in an integrated manner. Establishing viable frameworks of action for the authorities will require measures to be taken in many areas and by many interested parties and the efforts undertaken in one area will have to be carried out in conjunction with efforts undertaken in other areas.

The third implication is to encourage local populations to take responsibility and to participate in all cooperation activities in the area of trade. The participation and consultation of local populations constitute the premises of an effective strategy of action for the authorities. By assisting developing countries in this way, development partners will greatly contribute to ensuring that local populations take charge of initiatives regarding cooperation for development bring those initiatives about by demand. An effective strategy of action in the area of trade will also minimize the long-term risk of development partner interests conflicting with those of their partner countries.

The fourth implication requires the adoption of approaches that increase partner countries' capacity to continue to help themselves, even when the development partners have left. When cooperation for development is focused on putting in place trade policies, it becomes evident that development partners need to find the means to set up sustainable capacities. In projects for providing personnel, development partners should as much as possible recruit local skills.

The fifth implication suggests that they build their own capacities in the area of trade. It is particularly important that development partners have the necessary expertise to set up institutions (public, private, or mixed), consultative mechanisms, and networks of action for the authorities and for support. They would also benefit from a more systematic exchange of information on their respective programs and experiences.

The final implication requires the commitment of considerable financial and personnel resources to set up, in developing countries, frameworks of action for the authorities in the area of trade, with a view to obtaining substantial results. Contributing to setting up a country's initial framework will require long-term commitments on the part of development partners and the sustained effort of a large number of able public servants.

The Aid for Trade initiative aims to help developing countries overcome structural deficiencies and the lack of capacities that limit their ability to get the most out of trade prospects. At the time it concluded its work in 2006, the special WTO team responsible for Aid for Trade stated, aid for trade aims at helping developing countries increase their exports of goods and service, to integrate into the multilateral trade system and to take advantage of international trade liberalisation and greater access to markets.

Aid for Trade is an integral part of the ordinary programs of development partners who for many years have been providing considerable aid to programs linked to trade. But the targeted areas have multiplied. During the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of 1986 to 1994,


assistance related to trade had essentially aimed at providing technical support to help developing countries negotiate and implement trade agreements. Subsequently, the scope of this assistance broadened to include supply-side capacity development, particularly the private sector and trade-related infrastructure.

Now the program also includes structural adjustment related to trade. Aid for Trade is a global capacity development approach that brings together different themes in a single framework, especially:

- Technical assistance linked to trade: for example, helping countries to develop trade strategies, to negotiate trade agreements and to implement them;
- Trade-related infrastructure: for example, the construction of roads, ports, and telecommunication networks, to link

- domestic markets with the world economy;
- Capacity development production (including developing trade): for example, providing support so that industries and sectors can turn their advantages to good account and diversify their exports;
- Assistance to adjustment related to trade: helping developing countries to meet the cost of trade liberalization, for example, the lowering of customs duties, erosion of preferences, or deterioration of terms of trade;
- Other needs related to trade: if they are mentioned as development priorities related to trade in the national development strategies of partner countries.

As Figure 6 shows, while the greatest part (44 percent) of Aid for Trade at present goes to Asian countries, flows to Africa have been steadily increasing (35 percent).



Source: Tsafack, R.N. (2010: 29)

Since 2005, resources going toward Aid for Trade have increased by about 10 percent per annum. In 2007, Aid for Trade represented 32 percent of the apportionable development assistance per

sector. Japan committed to paying US\$ 12 billion for Aid for Trade between 2009 and 2011. Three other States made individual commitments: the Netherlands committed to paying at least 550

million Euros per annum, France 850 million Euros from 2010, and the United Kingdom approximately 1 billion Pounds Sterling per annum between 2009 and 2011 to stimulate growth and trade in poor countries. These commitments complement the previous collective commitment made in Hong Kong regarding the payment of 2 billion Euros per annum until 2010 for trade-related aid. At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, the USA committed to contributing US\$ 2.7 billion dollars per annum to this aid until 2010.

Capacity development to address the political causes and consequences of conflict. Capacity development to address the political causes of conflict in post-conflict countries in Africa must begin with comprehensive understanding of state building in Africa. The essence of state building in Africa is not to construct state structures per se, but to foster state formation by way of interaction and bargaining processes between government and society. This is a key element in the promotion of local ownership and the construction of a viable political order in post-conflict countries.

Box 7

State-building from below

Politicians, the global donor community and academics alike have, since at least the early 1990s, advocated multi-party elections as a means for promoting democratization and stability in Africa. Recent developments in Guinea-Bissau in which Western assistance focused on stabilizing the state through the promotion of multi-party elections suggest that this focus is flawed. Kohnert has argued that what is needed is not state-building from above, which is poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of a country, but rather nation-building from below as a precondition for the creation of viable state institutions.

Guinea-Bissau has been ridden by political instability, a bloody civil war (1998-99) and numerous coups or coup attempts (the most recent in April 2010). On the night of March 1, 2009, within hours the army chief, general Batista Tagme Na Waie, and the head of state, João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira, were both assassinated, a demonstration of longstanding internal feuds among the country's politico-military power elite, stimulated by transnational networks of drug and weapon traffickers. To prevent a power vacuum, the interim government, assisted by the international donor community, was at pains to re-establish law and order by early presidential elections. The prevailing view was that the priority for Guinea-Bissau was a functioning state and that free and fair elections were vital for post-conflict stability and development.

On June 5, 2009, the eve of the start of the electoral campaign, further high ranking politicians, among them one presidential candidate, were killed; others were abducted or persecuted. The attorney general received repeated death threats because he tried to bring to justice the culprits of the March killings.

Undeterred, the development partners, led by the UN and the EU, continued to focus on financing and supervising early elections scheduled for July 28, 2009, which international election observers judged "free, fair and transparent" and an "important step towards achieving political stability and security".

An alternative to this focus on state building from above would aim at empowerment from below – a reorientation of development assistance aimed at integrating cherished informal political institutions into a revised state structure.

Source: Kohnert, D. (2009). "Democratisation via elections in an African 'narco state'? The case of Guinea-Bissau." *Journal of International Development*. 21 (1): 42-57.

In this respect, support for businesses and their associations might be productive, as they have a vested interest in political order (Englebert and Tull, 2008). Businesses' capacity to pay taxes is, in turn, crucial to building states and to rolling back aid dependency. Given the propensity of democratic institutions to emerge only in later phases of state building, assisting groups such as local media, conflict resolution bodies, or human rights watchdogs would contribute to promoting state accountability. This involves a balancing act between supporting local actors and leaving them enough political space to develop their own institutional solutions. Capacity development to address the political causes of conflict needs to focus on these activities in the first phase of its activity (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 48).

Conflicts that are motivated by political interests of one kind or the other are difficult to resolve amicably. Attempts at peaceful resolution of issues are difficult under such circumstances. The modality used to resolve one set of conflicts usually plants the seed for another round of (future) conflict—for example, those elites left out of the power arena begin to castigate the incumbent government. This is aggravated by the fact that the incumbents do normally accumulate wealth using state machinery. This triggers both greed (at the elite level) and grievance (at the ordinary citizen level) and serves as a catalyst for the next round of conflict.

An interesting question related to capacity development efforts is why there is a failure to design peaceful power sharing mechanisms among the political elites in Africa. The historical and social specificity of a particular country helps to answer this. Unless capacity development efforts are designed to ameliorate these

challenges in the short run and tackle them in the medium to long run, it will be a futile exercise. For these reasons, capacity development needs to be part and parcel of a broader development plan of a post-conflict economy.

Another important area on which capacity development should focus is the role of local institutions. Development partners have paid scant attention to the coexistence in Africa of informal political institutions with formal bureaucratic procedures and structures of the state (Timilsina, 2007; Birdsall, 2007; Keating and Knight, 2004; Englebert and Tull, 2008). Behind the rational-legal statehood, informal decision-making processes, which are strongly determined by personal relations, dominate politics in Africa. Based on reciprocity, these relations constitute patronage-based clientele networks that vertically connect the political center and its elites to groups in society. Political allegiance to the patron is exchanged for services and goods received by the clients. From the outside, this form of politics may be regarded as engendering corruption, misrule and bad governance; however, for those involved it is eminently rational and facilitates accommodation processes among elites that lend an often astonishing stability to otherwise weak institutional state structures (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 15-16).

Furthermore, the decision-making authority during post-conflict periods shifts from the top civil servants to the politicians and political appointees, and the authority of the state tends to be increasingly centralized in the office of the head of state. To survive, the top civil servants have to be subservient to political appointees and need to find alternative legal and illegal means to maintain their standards of living and ranks in the society. These civil servants are

unlikely to be highly committed to the programs the high authorities have imposed on them and the country (Obidegwu, 2004).

The result is poor, distorted decision-making, weak implementation, and the creation of an environment prone to corruption. Service delivery deteriorates, damaging the legitimacy of the government. In addition to this, the destruction of social capital would remain a major challenge for post-war socioeconomic development (Obidegwu, 2004). Understanding this political process and designing capacity development efforts to encourage or discourage such institutional set ups, depending on their positive and negative effect on durable peace and development, is vital for agencies concerned with capacity development. Society's resilience, if factored into designing post-war socio-political institutions, can facilitate post-war recovery (Obidegwu, 2004; Englebert and Tull, 2008).

Finally, whichever capacity deficits are targeted in fragile states, from insufficient resources to inadequate policy frameworks and incentives, the political ramifications of these choices must be recognized. There is a need to think about how choices, including capacity development efforts, can positively or negatively influence stability and reconstruction operations and post-conflict assistance. Political sensitivity will be increased by:

(i) learning enough about the country's socio-cultural and political context to assess with some degree of confidence what those ramifications might be. It is important to factor that analysis into capacity development programming and ideally enabling capacity development programs to target fragility's root causes and not just its symptoms; and (ii) communicating actively with

country actors regarding capacity development plans and programs; this makes it possible to avoid contributing to misunderstandings and, equally important, to engage country partners in a two-way exchange of ideas regarding capacity issues (Brinkerhoff, 2010)⁸.

Capacity development for infrastructure and social sector development. Capacity development initially focused on building the institutional infrastructure to help countries formulate and implement their developmental goals, often with financial support and assistance as well as technical expertise from the international donor community. More recently, however, capacity development has been aimed at promoting and ensuring the development of a society's human capabilities to achieve better governance and overall development. As already noted, capacity development now refers to the ability of individuals, groups and institutions, and organizations to identify and solve development problems over time (Morgan, 1998). Differences in the nature, causes, degree of destruction, and consequences of war and conflict mean that a one-size-fits-all approach to post-conflict reconstruction is impractical. While being shaped by the environment, post-conflict reconstruction policies should be conceptually guided by the need to sequentially deliver security (in which roads and communications systems play a particularly important role); develop state institutions, especially its functional capacities; promote the human and social capabilities of societies; build physical infrastructure; and promote political and economic governance and redevelopment. This should include emerging issues – especially to reflect the new aid architecture (as discussed in full in Chapter 3).

Box 8

Support for rebuilding infrastructure is central to post-conflict capacity development

The impact on infrastructure is one of the most visible and long lasting of the post-conflict challenges faced by many African countries. Conflict has an enormous impact on transport, energy, telecommunications, and buildings. Direct damage to roads, utilities and other public infrastructure is often compounded by lack of maintenance during years of war as resources are diverted to war efforts or drained away by systemic corruption in anticipation of conflict. Long-lasting conflicts, such as in Sudan and Chad, have left vast territories with almost no viable road or communication network. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, where land transport has almost collapsed, have been reduced to unprecedented reliance on air transportation. In Mozambique, it is estimated that some 40 per cent of immobile assets in agriculture, communication and administration sectors were destroyed by conflict. The east-west transport networks that were originally better developed by colonizers were targets during the conflict. At the end of the war in 1992, only 10 per cent of roads were in good or fair condition, while 50 per cent of all roads remained impassable.

The process of rebuilding state institutions itself requires reliable infrastructure in place. For example, in an analysis of determinants of civil war in Uganda, Deininger (2003: 596) suggests that remoteness and larger distance to infrastructure increase the probability of civil strife, while the costs of policing decrease in the presence of infrastructure and public goods. Therefore, the agenda for successful recovery should be broad, with adequate attention given to prioritizing basic infrastructure: road networks, energy supply, and water.

Source: Mlambo. M., A. B. Kamara, and M. Nyende (2009). "Financing Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: The Role of International Development Assistance." *Journal of African Economies* 18: 53-76.

Governance and parliamentary capacity development. What parliaments can achieve as one of the key national governance institutions depends squarely on the level of power, resources, and influence they wield or can develop. Of course, in fragile environments a parliament may no longer exist or may be seriously weakened and limited in its capacity to respond to the challenges of the moment. Parliaments in politically fragile or post-conflict environments may be in weak positions that are compromised by the executive and constrained by constitutions that may fail to provide for parliamentary independence. In most of these weakened political systems, parliaments are often bypassed in policymaking processes by bilateral and multilateral development partners who tend to deal with the executive rather than the legislature⁹. These structural weaknesses leave parliaments unable to control the legislative agenda, responsibly represent the interests of their constituencies, or hold the executive

accountable. Reflecting on the role of African parliaments, the 2005 African Governance Report concluded, "in terms of enacting laws, debating national issues, checking the activities of the government and in general promoting the welfare of the people, these duties and obligation are rarely performed efficiently and effectively" (UNECA, 2005:127).

The early parliamentary capacity development interventions tended to underestimate the precariousness of Africa's fragile environments. Some post-independence parliaments in Africa, such as those in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, had emerged from violent conflict situations and were often allocated paltry resources from national budgets. Worse still, their respective legislative agendas were usually extensive, sometimes overwhelming, and encompassed contested constitutions, demobilization of former combatants, and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced

persons. Moreover, newly constituted parliaments often had virtually no legislative experience, trained staff, or adequate information and materials to serve their members effectively. In addition, many of the elected MPs were not accustomed to working in multi-party environments, and there was often an increasing demand, particularly in post-conflict environments, for ensuring greater participation of women, not only in parliamentary processes but also in the wider political environment. Not surprisingly, the overwhelmed parliaments tended to undermine the governance project in several important ways. They poorly represented the needs of individuals and groups in society. They also permitted undue concentration of power in the executive, military, or other less popularly accountable groups. Ultimately, the resulting poor oversight record also tended to encourage poor performance, rampant corruption and greed, and by extension, diminished public trust in parliamentary institutions. Viewed retrospectively, one of the major challenges that confronted democratic governance in fragile African environments was how to effectively constrain the executive's power and creatively balance its discretionary authority without unduly diluting its ability to fulfill its constitutional obligations (Hudson and Wren, 2008). All these challenges called for an urgent institutional capacity development, considering the increasing recognition of the central role that parliaments are expected to play in reinforcing democratic governance.

As the promotion of democracy and human rights has become one of the new central features of the post-Cold War international aid regime, most African parliaments, regardless of the quality of their respective institutions, have begun to enjoy increased and generous financial,

infrastructural, and technical donor support for “good governance.” Some of the major development partners have included bilateral development agencies such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the German GTZ, and the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), the UK's Department for International Development, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), among others. African parliaments have also received enhanced capacity development support from multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the European Commission, and the World Bank. Furthermore, capacity development support for governance has come from Parliamentary Networks and Institutes from the global north. These include the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), the Union of African Parliaments (UAP), the Joint EU-ACP Parliament, and the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) and the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC). Other partners have included political party foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, as well as the Netherlands' Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and the National Institute for International Affairs, among others. One of core roles of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is to build the capacity of Africa's national and sub-regional parliaments. Various arguments have been advanced to explain the recent development partners' enthusiasm with parliamentary capacity development.


Particularly in fragile environments, popularly elected parliaments are likely to play key roles in ensuring that the values of democracy are restored, firmly rooted and preserved. In their legislative function, they are expected to contribute to developing fair and equitable laws that promote peace, stability, and development. Specific responsibilities in this area may vary from one fragile nation to another, but a parliament that lacks the ability to amend or assert control over the passage of relevant legislations may be extremely limited in its capacity to protect the interests of the weak and vulnerable groups from the narrow self-interests of capricious politicians. Ordinarily, it is the role of parliament to review, deliberate, revise and approve or disapprove the bills brought before it. Strengthening the capacity of parliaments to exercise independent authority in the legislative process can arguably contribute enormously to reducing abuses of power and ensuring that the basic rights of citizens are respected and upheld.

Development partners have shown growing enthusiasm for focusing parliamentary capacity development on strengthening the oversight function. Although the executive branch usually proposes annual budgets, parliament should have the capacity to evaluate and, where necessary, amend budget proposals to ensure that the funding reflects the highest priorities of post-conflict imperatives of peace building and institution building and that it promotes broad-based development of the country and its citizens. Developing and strengthening parlia-

mentary authority in budgetary and funding approval and oversight is regarded as a worthy political cause for donor investment in strengthening parliamentary capacity in fragile environments in Africa (IPU, 2006).

As the primary representative of the citizenry, parliamentary bodies in fragile environments must maintain continuous communication with the public, promote dialogue on critical national development issues, and provide an understanding of parliamentary actions. Routine and effective communication with previously fractured societies and institutions tends to build confidence and trust in parliament and can even go a long way in helping to counter the public distrust toward government in general and parliament, in particular. It is therefore argued that by creating an environment where citizens develop trust in their elected officials and their governing institutions, previously divided societies are likely to promote a shared commitment to democratic values and promote sustainable peace and stability (IPU, 2006; Power, 2009).

While this is one of the most difficult of areas in which to show progress, it is heartening to see that most of the countries surveyed have established mechanisms for dialogue, in particular with respect to in country mechanisms for capacity development (see figure 7). The majority of countries have a rating of high or very high in the presence of dialogue mechanisms for capacity development.

Figure 7 Dialogue mechanism for capacity development

Source: ACI field survey data.

Capacity development for training and science.

Higher education, including the research carried out in universities, plays a crucial role in development. It makes it possible to generate human capital in key areas such as health, agriculture, and engineering, and it strengthens a country's means of attaining self-sufficiency. For example, one of the reasons why the “green revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s was more successful in Asia than in Africa is that Asian countries had more technological means at local level. Agricultural universities and local agronomic research centres (many of them were set up by the GCRAI—Groupe Consultatif pour la Recherche Agricole Internationale) were able to adapt new technology to local conditions.

In Francophone Africa, French colonization, which advocated a policy of assimilation, led to African elites being trained in French institutions. With few exceptions, it was only after independence that higher education and research institutions were set up (UNESCO, 2004). Designed at the outset along the model of French institutions, these African university institutions taught, for a decade, the same programs as those of their French counterparts, and the degrees they issued were fully recognized in France. Subsequently, the validity of

these degrees was replaced by equivalences, as African institutions had not carried out the reforms required to adapt to the needs of their countries. Moreover, resources gradually decreased since African countries, confronted by Structural Adjustment Programs from the mid-1980s, devoted fewer and fewer resources to public institutions and therefore to higher education institutions, where the private sector was totally absent. This resulted in a serious crisis in higher education in Francophone Africa, which brought about a continuous deterioration of conditions of study.

The combination of these unfavorable factors in local institutions led families who had the financial means as well as the state, in some areas, to send undergraduate students to train in institutions of higher education abroad, therefore creating ideal conditions for brain drain. However, in young national universities, post-graduate training was scaled down, inasmuch as each national institution wanted to set up its own structures. Faced with this situation and with the increasing needs for specialized training, the bulk of post graduate training took place abroad. Even if some aspects of this emigration for the purposes of training are controlled from the outset, there is no

guarantee that the graduates will return. These migratory flows are evidenced by the increasingly numerous visa applications to the extent that, in the diplomatic missions of host countries, study visas have now been introduced.

In the particular cases of South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (see table 5) professors and lecturers face not only dilapidated and obsolete

equipment in research centers and laboratories, but also the closure of those centers and laboratories. This situation may lead to a halt in the production of doctorates and no recruitment of new lecturers which, coupled with the increasing demand for access to higher education, translates into an explosion in the student population, such that lecturers find it increasingly difficult to devote time to research.

Table 5 Researchers and academics in Africa: selection of countries in 1999

	Personnel in higher education	Full-time researchers employed by public sector	Full-time researchers employed by private sector	Equivalent full-time researchers	Researchers per million inhabitants
Algeria	16,000	1,200	700	3,000	100
Burkina Faso	700	200	-	350	30
Cameroon	1,800	300	-	800	60
Côte d'Ivoire	2,000	500	-	600	55
Egypt	40,000	1,500	-	10,000	230
Kenya	1 800	600	-	1,000	35
Madagascar	900	260	-	300	35
Morocco	10,000	700	3	200	120
Mozambique	600	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	14,000	1,300	-	3,000	40
Senegal	1,000	435	-	600	80
South Africa	17,000	8,500	5,000	13,000	350
Tanzania	1,400	-	-	600	70
Tunisia	9,000	800	400	3,000	350
Zimbabwe	1,100	300	-	600	30

Source : Compiled from Waast and Gaillard (2000).

Table 6 Scientific Articles published in 1998: selection of countries

	Number of scientific articles	Articles per million inhabitants	Articles per billion dollars of GNP
Algeria	241	8	5.5
Burkina Faso	72	7	26.0
Cameroon	167	12	18.0
Côte d'Ivoire	87	6	8.0
Egypt	1 313	120	17.0
Kenya	506	17	53.0
Madagascar	50	3	13.5
Morocco	510	20	14.5
Nigeria	450	4	14.5
Senegal	106	12	21.0
South Africa	2,738	72	21.0
Tanzania	196	6	30.0
Tunisia	55	55	26.0
Zimbabwe	176	16	21.0

Source: Adapted from Tsafack, R.N. (2010: 18) table 4.

In such a situation, efforts made in research are important, as table 6 shows, with satisfactory output in South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, Tunisia, and Nigeria. But it is still not enough.

Two distinct responses were developed in English-speaking and French-speaking Africa. In English-speaking Africa, the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) was set up with its head office in Nairobi, Kenya, to direct and fund research and training programs, primarily a Collaborative Masters Programme and a collaborative PhD Scientific Program.

In the Francophone university system, the Agence Française de la Francophonie (AUF) plays an important role in the training of trainers and in doctoral and post-doctoral programs of national and international repute. It is currently putting together an important capacity development program in ICT in African university institutions, the aim of which is to create a framework that can be used in preventing the skills drain and encouraging Africans abroad to return home. The Conférence des Institutions d'Enseignements et de Recherche en Economie

(CIEREA) initiated and hosts the Programme de Troisième Cycle Interuniversitaire en Economie (PTCI) which is the counterpart of AERC's Collaborative Masters Programme for East and Southern Africa. Supported by ACBF, the PTCI, which runs an international doctoral program, is split between several universities in the following countries; Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The originality of the PTCI lies in the creation of a program of excellence in the African university fabric.

Starting from an extremely poor endogenous scientific capacity in 1960 (Eisemon, 1979), Africa experienced a particularly active phase of institutional creation (training schools, research centers and institutes, and universities) in the 1970s and 1980s (Davis, 1983; Kolinsky, 1985; Gaillard et al., 1997), which was accompanied by an explosion of its university population and rapid growth in the number of its supporters,

students, and researchers. Table 7 shows that South Africa is a major contributor to scientific capacity in Africa. This country alone accounts

for two thirds of institutional capacity for research in all scientific fields, that is 172 out of the total 602 between 1998 and 2007.

Table 7 Number of institutions per field between 1998 and 2007: selection of countries

	Agriculture, fisheries and forestry	Health, nutrition	Energy, mines, and geology	Manufacturing	Environment	Basic Science	Social sciences	Multidisciplinary	Total
Burkina Faso	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	6
Cameroon	12	2	5	-	2	-	4	2	27
Côte d'Ivoire	5	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	17
Egypt									
Kenya	14	4	-	4	2	1	3	1	29
Madagascar	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	4
Morocco									
Mozambique	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	4
Nigeria	21	2	2	4	-	-	6	-	35
Senegal									
South Africa	30	31	11	21	6	17	37	19	172
Tanzania	19	5	1	3	1	-	4	3	36
Tunisia									
Zimbabwe	25	-	2	2	3	1	1	2	36
Africa (with South Africa)	232	76	35	50	38	24	90	57	602
Africa (without South Africa)	202	45	24	29	32	7	53	38	430

Source: Computed from UNESCO (2007), and Word Sciences Report (1998)

The renewal of interest in regionalism has also created a climate conducive for sub-regional scientific and technical cooperation. Regional communities such as the Commission de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and l'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) can give a decisive starting point to sub-regional cooperation for the purposes of scientific and technical capacity development. Through policies, institutional arrangements, and financial aid, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) can serve as bases for cooperation

between higher education and research establishments with a view to training top-level scientists. What is more, most RECs agree on the role that science and technology could play in economic development and regional integration.

However, Africa has had the experience of two models of sub-regional cooperation enabling it to build capacities. The African Network of Scientifics and Technical Institutions (ANSTI), which was set up by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1980, is an institutional network model (grouping together a range of establishments); while the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR), set up in

1971, is a model of a network of centers of excellence. CGIAR has set up regional centers of excellence and pooled their resources within a network. This network is distinct from the model proposed by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD's) Plan of Action for Science and Technology (2005), in which existing establishments are selected, designated as centers of excellence, then made to cooperate within a network. This model does not require new premises, and in that regard it is similar to the ANSTI model and has all the advantages of an institutional network. The analysis of sub-regional cooperation experiences leads one to think that it needs to be strengthened by means of measures such as bolstering the infrastructure of new information and communications technologies in higher education establishments; setting up databases on existing human resources in training and research establishments in the sub-region to derive the greatest possible benefit from them; and developing data on the mobility of competent human resources to determine the nature of losses due to brain drain, track where trained professionals go, and create a biennial forum to facilitate regular sharing of experiences.

Advances in information and communication technologies make it possible to explore benefit from skills established outside Africa through the use of electronic networks. Other scientists in the African scientific Diaspora have also taken initiatives to set up links, with colleagues in their countries of origin. Such programs have set up led to the establishment of approximately 41 networks around the world that are linked to 30 African countries.

Development partners and capacity development. International financial institutions (IMF,

World Bank, and AfDB) have different objectives and areas of operation regarding capacity development in Africa. Despite their different mandates, they make fairly similar contributions using fairly similar mechanisms. These contributions are all the more effective, incidentally, since they insist on the coordination and complementarities of their efforts. These financial institutions:

- i) Provide financial assistance (most often in the form of loans, but sometimes as a large donation) to help these countries attain the objectives agreed on during consultations;
- ii) Help national authorities to formulate the measures necessary to attain their economic and social objectives. This is done through extensive consultations (with the political authorities and representatives of the private sector, but also between the head office and the resident personnel of these institutions) whose objective is to identify bottlenecks in these economies and the main problems that they face;
- iii) Encourage the development, dissemination, and respect of internationally recognized standards or codes of good economic and financial conduct;
- iv) Offer training in many areas. This training may take place within the framework of specific projects undertaken by the beneficiary countries with the support of these institutions to reform state enterprises, public service, tax administration, or the financial sector; and
- v) Collaborate, both in Africa and beyond, with regional training and research bodies, such as the Economic Policy Management Program

(EPM), PTCI and AERC, to facilitate the transfer of knowledge; fund the training of economists, public officials, and trainers; or support economic research.

The IMF

The IMF makes an important contribution to capacity development by conducting, with a wide range of African public bodies, an action that goes far beyond loans to institutions and debt-relief efforts. The IMF also operates in four areas.

The first area is economic training offered by the IMF Institute (and other departments). Its thematic or macroeconomic management courses are for public officials occupying various levels of responsibility in different types of agencies. Over the last 20 years, more than 3,000 African public officials have taken courses at the IMF Institute, and some 8,000 applications are forecast in the coming years. To meet this demand, the IMF Institute has undertaken to broaden the range of themes offered and to strengthen regional partnerships. To this end, it had decided to:

- Devote, every year, high-level seminars on economic questions which are of particular interest to Africa;
- Set up, sometimes in collaboration with regional training institutes, regional seminars focused on more technical issues (public expenditure, bank restructuring, monetary markets);
- Strengthen its traditional cooperation with training centers of the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) and the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC);
- Form partnerships with English-speaking African countries by cooperating in various courses offered by the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute (MEFMI) in Harare, Zimbabwe and the West-African Institute for Economic and Financial Management (WAIFEM) in Lagos, Nigeria;
- Promote distance teaching to reduce long stays abroad; and
- Set up in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), together with the AfDB and the World Bank, the Joint Africa Institute (JAI).

The second area is technical assistance, which aims to respond to the very diverse needs expressed by member states. The Department of Public Finance offers its assistance to facilitate the mobilization of revenue and the strengthening of tax and customs administrations, or to reform pensions systems. The aid provided by the Department of Currency and Exchange covers regulations, bank monitoring and restructuring, currency transactions, organization, management, and accounting of central banks. And the Department of Statistics helps member States to respect internationally recognized standards in the areas of monetary statistics, balance of payments, the actual sector, and public finance.

The third area is that of the IMF's periodic consultations with member states. Less explicit, but no less important, these consultations are conducted in accordance with Article IV of the Articles of Association and enable the IMF to engage in dialog with the authorities of the country concerned. This covers the detailed analysis of the economy, the examination of possible options and formulation of action to be taken. These consultations draw various agencies and their services into closer collaboration, which

helps the country concerned to build its capacities of analysis and action.

The fourth area is the dialog, which presides over the formulation and monitoring of programs supported by the IMF. More than the Article IV consultations, the programs supported by the IMF mobilize teams of experienced economists from member states and other international financial institutions. Their collaborative effort very considerably improves economic management, especially in the ministries of finance and the central banks. Resident representatives of the IMF also play a key role in this regard by helping states to apply their programs on the ground.


The World Bank and other development partners

Decades after countries in Africa achieved independence, higher education has fallen into disrepute. This is in part because donor countries and countries that are beneficiaries of aid considered it a costly and inefficient public service that was benefiting the wealthy and the privileged and producing too many social sciences graduates who had fairly poor job prospects. It is also in part because of problems related to brain drain, which has left African institutions continuing to experience difficulties

in keeping their trained personnel. In the 1980s and 1990s, the importance of the return on investments gradually assumed importance for most of the funding institutions.

A World Bank study found that in 1986, the level of social profitability for higher education, as measured by the increase in national revenue resulting from an additional year of study, averaged 13 percent lower than returns on basic education in developing countries. A later study on 98 countries for the period 1960-1997 noted that the level of social profitability in primary education was 18.9 percent, versus barely 10.8 percent for higher education. In 1994, the World Bank insisted that priority no longer be given to higher education in development strategies; it consequently cut its spending on higher education from 17 percent of the funds it was devoting to education in 1985-1989 to barely 7 percent in 1995-1999 (figure 8).

Other development partners did likewise. The International Forum on Education held in Dakar (Senegal) in 2000 confirmed the international community's lack of interest in higher education in the developing world and its commitment to retaining only primary education as the motor for the improvement of social well being in general.



Source: Adapted from Tsafack, R.N. (2010: 33)

A report published in 2000 by the World Bank and UNESCO confirmed a shift in thinking by assuming that higher education in developing countries was in a “perilous” situation and that as long as it could guarantee rapid development, sustained progress would be impossible to attain without this type of education. In 2005, the Commission for Africa Report urged the international community to recognize the value of higher education for development. It recommended that development partners increase the capacity of higher education in Africa by in this sector and called on them to pay US\$ 500 million per annum (and up to US\$ 3 billion over ten years) to scientific and technological centers of excellence.

In 2008, the World Bank went further by recognizing the need for an “approach to

development more centered on learning” in Africa and by admitting that such an approach demands that there be more focus on higher education. It is already working with many partners in its projects to develop higher education, by granting loans of US\$ 327 million per annum on average, mainly to projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (43 percent) and in East Asia and the Pacific (21 percent), including projects aimed at increasing access to higher education and its management in Chile, Nepal, and Vietnam. But the World Bank is not the only institution to intervene financially. In fact, many governments and private foundations are currently investing large sums to boost higher education in developing countries (table 8).

Type of aid	Definition	Principal development partners
Bilateral aid	Aid paid directly by the government of one country to another country.	France (AFD), Germany (GTZ), Japan (JICA), Netherlands (Nuffic), Spain (AECID), Sweden (SIDA), United Kingdom (DFID), United States (USAID).
Multilateral aid	Aid or loans granted by the government of a foreign country other than a developing country to an international agency.	World Bank, European Commission, regional development banks (AfDB, ADB, IDB).
Private foundations	Charity organizations that distribute private funds that are not official or public.	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Kresge Foundation.

Source: Tsafack, R.N. (2010: 33)

For example, France, which is without doubt the largest bilateral donor in the higher education sector, paid almost US\$ 1.36 billion in development aid to higher education in 2007 (see table 9). It uses the aid to foster university reforms by encouraging African French-speaking universities to restructure their degrees so that they meet international standards. French aid also attempts to strengthen scientific means; at least half is devoted to grants, mainly in France, but part of it for studies in developing countries. One

of its leading projects in sub-Saharan Africa is the International Institute of Water Engineering and the Environment (2iE), located in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. It brings together researchers from partner universities, of which six are from Africa and seven from France. More than US\$ 8 million in French aid has also made it possible to conduct the reform of this institution and to train more than 3000 technicians and managerial personnel for the private and public sectors.


Table 9 Aid (millions of US dollars) devoted to higher education

Country	1995	1998	2001	2004	2007
France	-	380.25	415.38	1045.29	1361.17
Germany	78.17	504.59	445.77	860.9	1054.66
Japan	223.82	83.27	401.87	804.53	338.48
Netherlands	6.78	68.56	23.24	119.64	279.92
European Union	5.2	-	72.11	159.81	241.71
Turkey	-	-	-	133.79	150.07
Austria	76.11	69.28	52.98	70.27	129.46
Belgium	47.79	29.68	39.85	82.57	115.43
United States	-	6.65	110.74	33.36	87.38
Korea	-	1.26	6.75	27.42	81.67
Spain	29.24	43.25	43.66	41.03	75.04
Greece	-	3.87	5.14	17.22	56.52
United Kingdom	40.06	10.81	3.65	1.41	54.37
Norway	-	0.57	51.71	28.79	50.78
Australia	246.44	82.48	23.85	15.67	49.65
Portugal	17.69	9.88	10.58	43.07	47.49
Canada	100.94	37.11	50.48	80.33	32.84
New Zealand	27.12	-	20.86	19	21.94
Italy	67.5	3.59	12.99	17.22	21.42
Switzerland	9.65	4.4	5	3.93	11.04
Sweden	16.73	9.05	15.97	17.38	10.18
Total, DAC member countries	993.58	1,349.06	1,743.98	3,322.71	3,800.62

Source: OECD statistics cited in Tsafack, R.N. (2010: 34)

Figure 9 traces the amount of public aid for development devoted to higher education coming from the 10 principal development partners. The United States has for a long time been supporting higher education in the

developing world. USAID's African Graduate Fellowship Program was in operation from 1963 to 1990 and was followed by the Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills project from 1991 to 2003.

Figure 9 Aid devoted to higher education: 10 largest development partners

Source: Constructed from OECD statistics

These two programs represent investments of US\$ 182 million, funding more than 3200 African students pursuing higher education programs in more than 200 American universities. Of students trained in these universities, 85 to 90 percent returned home at the end of their training.

Correlation between capacity and socio-economic development. Although numerous capacity indicators may be identified, they do not give clear information on their correlation with development. There is, however, an extremely useful exercise for determining the major role that is played by capacities on the development path. It is also useful for identifying the most important variables and arranging them by order

of importance in an African context that is still financially constrained. This exercise is also very limited by the fact that desired statistical data (for example capacity indicators for the same year for all African countries) is not available.

Despite this caveat, it has been possible to question the existence of a correlation using the principal component analysis with per capita GDP on a matrix of the following ten (10) African countries with 16 variables presented in table 10. These countries are: Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Senegal for West Africa; Cameroon for Central Africa; Kenya, Tanzania, and for East Africa; Zimbabwe, South Africa and Madagascar for Southern Africa.

Table 10 Description of Variables

Description	Variable
Total of higher education teaching staff in 1999	V1
Number of researchers per million inhabitants in 1999	V2
Number of articles per million inhabitants in 1998	V3
Number of articles per billion dollars of GNP in 1998	V4
Total of research and development personnel in 1995	V5
Internet penetration rate in 2002/Internet users per 1000	V6
Literacy or schooling rate of men over 15 years old in 2002	V7
Literacy or schooling rate of women over 15 years old in 2002	V8
Literacy or schooling rate of men 15-24 years old in 2002	V9
Literacy or schooling rate of women 15-24 years old in 2002	V10
Rate of economic activities of men over 15 years old in 2002	V11
Rate of economic activities of women over 15 years old in 2002	V12
Public health expenditure in 2000 (% of GDP)	V13
Number of primary school teachers in 2000	V14
Education expenditure (% of GDP) in 2000	V15
GDP per capita in 2002	V18

An assessment was done of the correlations between these 16 variables of capacity in higher education and the level of development of a country as measured by per capita GDP. The results are shown in table 11, which ranks the variables according to their correlation coefficients with per capita GDP.

Table 11 Capacity indicators positively correlated with per capita GDP


Capacity indicators	Rating	Correlation with GDP per capita
Number of researchers per million inhabitants	V2	0.98
Number of articles per million inhabitants	V3	0.98
Total of research and development personnel	V5	0.87
Internet penetration rate/Internet users per 1000	V6	0.85
Total of higher education personnel	V1	0.73
Public health expenditure (% of GDP)	V13	0.55

Table 11 suggests that the number of researchers and the number of articles per million inhabitants are key capacity development variables that very strongly boost development (with development measured by per capita GDP). An attempt was made to detect any relationship between overall levels of capacity and per capita GDP in the field data. No clear relationship between capacity and economic development, as measured by the level of Gross National Income per capita, was found. The proportion of low level of capacity seems to be highest within middle-income countries. However, some reservation needs to be expressed: the small number of middle-income countries (six only) as compared with the number of low-income countries (28) in the database may not allow a robust comparison. It may also be that certain variables of composite indicators are more sensitive than others to income levels. More detailed analysis of the characteristic values was also done, including analysis of the first and second factorial levels, which indicates that four variables basically explain most of the variation in the data (74 percent). Those variables are the number of researchers (V2); their publications as measured by the number of articles (V3); the size of the research community as measured by the total number of research and development personnel (V5); and the access to technology as measured by the internet penetration rate (V6)

Strategic policy choices for capacity development. How does one build capacity for development? Increasingly, attention is focused on institutions' crucial role in development; the issues of state building and state capacity have become central. This in turn means that the authorities must make several strategic policy choices to build the required state capacity. Notions of good governance have emerged that specify how states should behave; such behaviors include, inter alia: predictable, open and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; accountability; allowance for strong civil society participation in public affairs, especially in development planning and policy dialog; and the respect for the rule of law and human rights. Of the 34 countries surveyed, it was uncovered that all have a national development plan, vision, or strategy. Most of the countries have had at least two such plans since 2000. 10 countries (29.4 percent) adopted their plans in 2006, which suggests that most African countries have five year planning cycles. Of the countries surveyed, 70.6 percent mainstreamed capacity development/building into national development strategies, plans, and visions, and 54.5 percent had specific national programs for capacity development.

Putting capacity development at the forefront of Africa's development agenda is crucial for achieving the MDGs. Many African countries have undertaken reforms to enhance their governance frameworks. However, save for a handful of success stories, the rate of progress is widely inadequate for the continent to be on course to meet the MDGs, which are centered on halving the incidence of extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Africa still has the highest incidence of poverty among all developing regions; it is home to 30 percent of the world's

poor although it accounts for a mere 15 percent of the world's population. The region is the only one in the developing world to have regressed in terms of poverty in the 40 years leading up to 2005, leaving the incidence of extreme poverty at twice the global rate. Of the countries surveyed, the level of government commitment to the achievement of the MDGs was found to be high at 73.5 percent. Yet 54.4 percent had not achieved any single target. These results are presented in figure 10.



Source: ACI field survey data

Stakeholder participation in country capacity development. Capacity development encompasses the empowerment of individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations to participate in national capacity development at all phases, including identification, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of capacity development initiatives. The participation of stakeholders, both state and non-state actors, in the conceptualization through to the evaluation of country capacity development interventions ensures that the capacity development solutions are aligned to national priorities, which helps to secure buy-in from and commitment of stake-

holders at an early stage as well as assure the sustainability of the investment.

There is therefore the need for countries to establish mechanisms for engaging relevant stakeholders on capacity development issues. Institutionalizing a dialog mechanism enables countries to tap into the skills, knowledge, and competencies of both locals and the wider development community in a consistent and coherent manner that assures the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of national capacity development initiatives. Additionally, continuous and systematic engagement

between stakeholders facilitates consensus building; reduces and/or eliminates the duplication of efforts; and supports resource mobilization for capacity development interventions.

Government Commitment. The study revealed that most heads of states/governments and other high-ranking officials in the sampled countries demonstrated a high level of commitment to capacity development. For example, the survey revealed that 71 percent of state/government and other high-ranking officials made more than three public pronouncements on capacity development issues during the 2009 calendar year. This is an indication of the increasing recognition by leaders in Africa of the importance of capacity development in achieving development outcomes.

Civil Society Participation. Civil society has been especially instrumental in spearheading the capacity development agenda across sub-Saharan Africa. The level of civil society participation in country capacity development agenda settings is above average at 77 percent. According to the survey, civil society participation in capacity development is uneven across the countries. Whereas 48 percent of surveyed countries indicated high participation, 23 percent considered civil society participation low.

Financial commitment for capacity development. Financial commitment to capacity development requires patient capital. This is because the outcomes of capacity development interventions tend to come to fruition over the medium to long term. Governments thus need to appreciate

these facts about capacity development to allow for the allocation of adequate resources. In the recent survey of 34 African countries, 16 disclosed the levels of resources they allocate in their budgets for capacity development. Of the 16, 10 (or 62.5 percent) allocated 0-10 percent of the national budget to capacity development. Only two countries allocated 21-30% of the budgets to capacity development. With respect to ODA disbursed toward capacity development, 19 countries provided information. Of those, 15 countries (78.9 percent) received 0-10 percent of Official Development Assistance for capacity development. Only three countries received 21-30 percent of ODA disbursed toward capacity development. In view of these figures although capacity development may be gaining currency in the development discourse, traditional approaches to donor assistance remain dominant.

Variation in capacity levels in Africa - as one moves from the policy environment (Cluster 1) to capacity development outcomes (Cluster 4), the majority of countries shift from the highest category (very high) to the lowest one (very low). The environment is conducive for policy development and management, as reflected by the high score in the policy environment (88 percent scored very high). However, while some efforts are being made on the processes for implementation of capacity development programs, results are yet to follow. The majority of countries score very low or low for development results at the country level (62 percent), and almost all the countries with regard to capacity development outcomes (97 percent) as shown in table 12.

Table 12 Percentage of countries by clusters

Level of capacity development	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
Very Low	0.0	0.0	2.9	61.8
Low	0.0	2.9	58.8	35.3
Medium	2.9	29.4	26.5	2.9
High	8.8	50.0	11.8	0.0
Very High	88.2	17.6	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: ACI field survey data

There is also a tendency for capacity to be low at the individual levels (see table 13) compared with the organizational and institutional levels, where achievements seem to have been higher across all countries. Not a single country scored very low on the enabling environment or institutional level of capacity, which indicates that the

building blocks for development results are in place. Only 5.9 percent of countries scored very low in the aspect of capacity related to organizational capabilities, compared with 44.1 percent of countries at the individual capacity level.

Table 13 Capacity dimensions/levels in surveyed countries

Level of Capacity development	The three dimensions of capacity		
	Enabling environment/Institutional level	Organizational level	Individual level
Very Low	0.0	5.9	44.1
Low	2.9	23.5	47.1
Medium	67.6	20.6	5.9
High	29.4	17.6	2.9
Very High	0.0	32.4	0.0
TOTAL	100	100	100

Source: ACI field survey data

2.4 Conclusion

In post-conflict and fragile states, capacity development is needed to address (i) immediate needs of those states, (ii) the core economic and political causes of conflict (including building agencies of restraint), and (iii) issues of finance and financial sector reconstruction. The priority

task is to build the capacity that is focused on addressing the immediate needs of post-conflict societies. This task may begin by building the capacity to provide humanitarian assistance, which is very complex and encompasses conflict-related emergency relief as well as related social services. This should be based on a wider development framework that would facilitate a

rapid transition from crisis to development. It ought to be followed by capacity development to address the root political and socio-economic cause of the conflict without which bringing about durable peace is impossible.

Any capacity development efforts need not put undue pressure on the government and indigenous institutions. The rebound of the economy will be led by economic sectors that require minimal new investment to restart. This would include agricultural activities, small-scale commerce and transport, housing rehabilitation, and banking. Capacity development efforts need to focus on these important sectors. As the government would not have the resources to make even the minimal rehabilitation investments, the rebound, rapid as it may be, often does not change the fundamental structural weakness of a post-war economy as it relates to productivity, changes in patterns of investments, sustainable change in technology, and capacity to absorb shocks.

Thus, the issue of building capacity will be important to the extent that it leads to the transformation of the economy as well as engaging in economic activities with higher propensity to create jobs for the young and the unemployed, who are vulnerable to recruitment by political entrepreneurs. Addressing capacity development in this context also means building institutions that ensure a peaceful power sharing mechanism among interest groups. This political aspect of post-conflict construction is strictly linked with the economic reconstruction noted, and the two need to be tackled simultaneously. A related important capacity development task that is required to bring durable peace relates to the need to build agencies of restraint that prevent fragile states from relapsing to conflict. These agencies could be domestic, regional, or

international institutions with the capacity and willingness to act as agents of restraint. When such institutions are weak or not properly functioning, building such capacity is important to ensure durable peace.

Capacity development also has the potential to address issues of financial sector reconstruction and financing. Two important issues regarding this issue in post-conflict economies, with their implication for capacity development, are the construction of the financial sector itself, without which relapse to conflict is a real possibility, and financing the post-conflict reconstruction by international financial agencies and development partners. Particularly important tasks include instituting currency reform, rebuilding (or creating) central banks, revitalizing the banking sector, and strengthening prudential supervision and regulation. Bank crises can destabilize economies in recovery from war, and their fiscal burden takes resources away from development and poverty spending, thereby threatening post-conflict reconstruction itself. This calls for capacity development in each of these areas by prioritizing different aspects of the reconstruction exercise, depending on context of the post-conflict economy in question.


While capacity issues are pressing in post-conflict and fragile environments, there are similar capacity pressures in countries that are in the reformer or developmental states, as well. Not a single country scored high or very high in the overall achievement of capacity. Given capacity's importance in securing peace, stability, and sustainable and inclusive development, these results indicate that the risk of reversal or backsliding remains high even in those countries that have been stable for a while. More progress has been achieved at the broader

institutional level, which establishes the environment in which development takes place and in which broad ranging capacity is built. More work is needed at the organizational level to speed up achievement of development results and enhance implementation capacity.

Effort is still needed at the individual level to secure the hard earned gains made in previous attempts and enhance the on-the-job or how-to skills of practitioners at all levels of decision making in the public, private, and civil society sectors.

3

State Legitimacy, Reconstruction, Social Inclusion and Donor Coordination in Fragile States





3

State Legitimacy, Reconstruction, Social Inclusion and Donor Coordination in Fragile States

3.1 Introduction

The designation of states as “fragile,” “failing,” or “failed” entered the international relations and development lexicons in the early 1990s. In particular, the concept of the “fragile state” entered the development discourse when, in the early 1990s, the Somalia state and society disintegrated. Millions of its citizens experienced massive insecurity and violence at the hands of armed groups that partly resulted from the fragmentation of the state into different regional entities vying with each other for power. Millions of other Somali citizens faced starvation and even death because of the ensuing economic dislocation and social exclusion. However, the concept was not given adequate attention by neither academia nor by development policy specialists. Until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, only the humanitarian organizations worried about fragile and collapsed states in developing countries. The dominant discourse on the root causes of fragility and conflict in Africa, for example, tended to emphasize weak institutions, poor implementation of economic policies, and bad governance. Little attention was given to the role of the larger global economy within which these weak states, economies, and societies were located. Accordingly, in order to escape from the fragility trap, conventional policy recommended the opening up of Africa's economy to foreign capital as a means of improving growth and thus eliminating poverty as a cause of conflict, as well as the adoption of a more democratic system of governance as a means of encouraging more inclusive kinds of politics. The strategy presented itself as encapsulating a comprehensive answer to all society's problems, from poverty and illiteracy to violence and despotic rule. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and most multilateral and bilateral development agencies have broadly held this view.

As already noted, all too often, the notion of an effective state was equated with a liberal democratic state and largely focused on the extent to which civil society successfully set up mechanisms for effecting checks and balances on the exercise of state power. The role of other institutions of democratic governance in the national governance processes was either given peripheral attention or bashed outright by multilateral agencies in the design and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. However, from the late 1980s onward, a new wave of political liberalization and democratization has swept across the entire African continent. In country after country, autocratic civilian governments and military regimes were replaced with periodically and popularly elected governments. Moreover, more citizens began to demand that their leaders be accountable and transparent, and that they serve with integrity,

honesty, and commitment. The reactivated institutional structures and arrangements for democratic governance—multiparty systems, independent legislatures and judiciaries, civil society groups, and unhindered media—gradually became part, at the very least, of the dominant constitutional discourse. Related to this trend, donor support policies and programs started tying development assistance resources strategically to progress toward “good governance” by recipient governments. More significantly, the growth of civil society organizations both in number and sophistication began to push the role of parliament and the practice of popular participation to the political center stage. Slowly but inexorably, a democratic political culture began taking root in which all the main political players seem to be accepting democracy as 'the only game in town', à la Linz and Stepan (1996: 1). It is no longer surprising that many development partners who previously paid little attention to the role of formal democratic institutions have come forward to support such institutions to strengthen their respective capacities, particularly in politically fragile environments.

Does the recent upsurge in enthusiasm for developing state capacity in Africa effectively address the fundamental conditions that generate fragility? Are the new capacity delivery modalities going far enough to respond to the critical needs of societies in fragile environments? What should be the main drivers of reconstruction? How can the strong commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness be effectively, efficiently, and sustainably exploited in identifying and linking the three points of capacity development, the individual, the organizational, and the enabling environment?

3.2 Legitimacy and state fragility

In situations of fragility, poor or virtually non-functioning institutions are combined with a lack of political legitimacy (Debiel, 2005: 2). These states typically are characterized by fragmented political identities and weak institutions that, together, undermine the capacity to govern and therefore the legitimacy of the state, “leading to political orders that are highly unstable and hard to reform” (Kaplan, 2009: 2). A lack of legitimacy can thus be seen as both a cause and a symptom of state fragility. Situations of fragility tend to be characterized by variability in the degree of legitimacy a state commands across a given territory, with high levels of legitimacy in some areas or among some sectors of the population and less legitimacy among others. Legitimacy

may, for instance, be high within patrimonial networks closely linked to political elites and low among those who find themselves outside these networks of power and resources. Within a single state territory, there may be high levels of trust and confidence in the state among some communities while these levels are low among other groups. This variability may reflect, for instance, “people's past relations with the state, historical experience, the compatibility of local organisations and state institutions, the strength and legitimacy of local leaders and their relation with state leaders, geographical proximity to state institutions, and political or ideological factors” (OECD, 2010: 33). This seems to be confirmed in figure 11, which graphs how large countries seem to have lower levels of legitimacy.

Box 9

Geography of legitimacy


Geography has contributed enormously to the governance challenges of sprawling countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The country, which is as large as Western Europe, consists of several densely populated areas that are hundreds of miles apart from one another. Communication links are sparse. In the presence of plentiful mineral deposits, violent conflict and ethnic and regional divisions are exacerbated: “Local militia and foreign armies smuggle vast amounts out of the country while doing everything within their power to prevent a weak state from establishing its authority” (Kaplan, 2009: 8).

Similarly, in countries such as the Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola, political geography contributes to the difficulty of effective state management. Separated by vast distances and poor rail, road, and other communication links, citizens and state officials are literally worlds apart: “distance markedly decreases both the capacity of officials to govern and the ability of a population to hold its leaders accountable” (Kaplan, 2009: 7). There is little incentive for political leaders at the center to make the effort to serve distant, sparsely populated areas. Instead, “government spending in fragile states is usually lavished on the capital city for the simple reason that only the people living there pose a tangible threat to the ruling elite” (Ibid.).

Inasmuch as large unwieldy states whose scale and diversity is an obstacle to good governance are part of the legacy of colonialism, so are small countries whose very size is debilitating, such as those in West Africa. Small economies are vulnerable to, for instance, natural disasters or changes in the external trade environment (Kaplan, 2009: 10). In these instances, as Kaplan argues, a regional approach may offer a potential solution. He suggests, for instance, that in the 15 countries of West Africa, which stretch from Senegal to Nigeria, instead of “trying to fix a plethora of dysfunctional governments one by one, international efforts would be better concentrated on building up a regional organisation which... could provide practical help and incentives to raise governance standards, merge economies, and integrate transport systems. By superseding national institutions, in a few crucial domains, the new organ would also help circumvent some of the region's most deep-rooted problems: political illegitimacy spawned by discredited policies, toxic intergroup relations, and legions of corrupt bureaucrats” (Kaplan, 2009: 17; see also Kaplan, 2006).

Figure 11

Geography and legitimacy: Public Sector Management and Institutions rating in three African countries



Source: ACI field survey data

Legitimacy is also in part a function of expectation: how people perceive the performance of the state depends on what they expect of it and what they regard as appropriate or inappropriate in the way that the state functions. In states where traditional forms of authority coexist with liberal democratic mores, an elected official may derive legitimacy not only from the process of

having been elected, but in equal or even greater measure on kinship ties or a record of patronage that is viewed favorably by some sections of society. In fragile state contexts, the state's inability to provide for basic needs such as the security of citizens undermines its legitimacy and may in turn serve to bolster the significance of alternative forms of authority, such as traditional

rulers and customary forms of power. Contestations of state power frequently take the form of disputes over who does and does not have a rightful claim to legitimate authority and on what basis. Chiefs, for instance, may contest the right of the central state to jurisdiction over populations within their immediate sphere of influence based on lineage rather than election.

In the same way as the veracity of the idea of fragility can be questioned because it implies a fixed standard against which actually existing states must be measured, as both Moore (1998) and Lentz (1998) suggest, it is not useful to see legitimacy as a fixed absolute quality against which actual conduct could be measured. It is more fruitful to investigate the processes through which various actors and institutions attempt to legitimize and vindicate their actions. What is legitimate varies between and within cultures and over time and may be continuously re-established through conflict and negotiation (Lund, 2006:693). As Lund further points out (2006: 698), even institutions that appear stable and enduring are constantly in a process of being actively reproduced, although these processes may be inconspicuous. Part of the definition of hegemonic power is the capacity to manage and reproduce certain institutions—to “normalize” them and give them the appearance of stability when in fact they are reliant on a process of constant social reproduction. As one turns now to a closer exploration of the concept of legitimacy itself, one is mindful of the need both to provide a general framework for the elucidation of the concept and to allow for the particularity of social context including varying bases for the justification of political power and the mobilization of consent.

The Concept of Legitimacy. Where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, it is referred

to as rightful or legitimate (Beetham, 1991: 3). The idea of legitimacy in the study of political systems is closely allied with that of authority in the sense that a state that lacks legitimacy lacks authority. Legitimacy is concerned with the basis upon which state authority is justified. A legitimate state is a state that citizens accept as the ultimate political authority. To possess legitimate authority is to possess the entitlement to make and enforce binding rules for society and the interaction between social actors, as Arendt suggests: “since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed” (1983: 92).

Legitimate authority is to be distinguished from power. Both bank robbers and political leaders have the power to influence and constrain the choices made by private individuals. However, while bank robbers have power, we would not describe them as having legitimate authority (Barry, 2000: 85). A legitimate state is one in which those who are subject to the power of the state obey its commands for reasons other than the fear of punishment or the promise of reward for doing so (de Jasay, 1985: 70). While brute force might be the ultimate sanction at an authority's disposal, it encompasses a notion of obedience arising from the legitimacy of power but also “compliance based on prudential considerations as well as habit” (Crook, 1987: 553). The problem of legitimacy thus arises from the problem of power. Power relations involve negative features: exclusion, restriction, and compulsion. A legitimate state is one in which the powerful enjoy moral authority as opposed to mere de facto power (Beetham, 1991: 57) and they do so because the governed consent to the power that is exercised over them (Box 10).

Box 10

Faith-based organizations in Nigeria and the withdrawal of consent

One of the criteria for legitimacy is the ongoing articulation of consent to the ruling framework on the part of the governed. While mass mobilizations, protests and strikes offer the starkest examples of the withdrawal of consent, there are less direct ways in which the erosion of legitimacy manifests itself. Marshall's work (1993) on Pentecostalism in Western Nigeria discusses how implicit challenges to state power and critiques of power elites are embedded in Pentecostalism. In the 1970s, rapid economic expansion took place in Nigeria based on oil revenue. This period saw a process of state centralization, massive mismanagement, and misappropriation on the part of the Nigerian government.

Marshall argues (1993: 222) that during this time “the rules and values which had hitherto helped legitimate and reproduce relations of inequality under an export system relying on agricultural surpluses, in which wealth was strongly associated with work, and the ability to develop kin-based networks of labour and patronage, were undermined by the overwhelming influx of petro-naira.” As Barber (1982: 435) points out, “it was not only the size of the petro-naira tide, but the fact that its production did not involve any more than a minute number of Nigerians, nor were those who received the wealth seen to have produced it by work. It was a situation in which gigantic sums of cash seem to have appeared as from nowhere, being appropriated by those who contributed virtually nothing to its production, and in the process enriching a few Nigerians on a colossal scale.”

The years of relative prosperity came to an end with the collapse of oil prices in 1981. As elite groups struggled to maintain control over the production and circulation of both material and symbolic resources, the conversion experience offered not only hope but, crucially, was accompanied by “a surprising degree of egalitarianism in the congregations” and the promise of “a sense of individual self worth outside the categories of material success” (Marshall, 1993: 224). By developing a sense of pride in self-help activities, people were also developing institutional alternatives to the social services the state was meant to provide, thus increasing the “irrelevance of this aspect of state power to people's lives” (1993: 225).

At the peak of the oil boom, those excluded from access to Nigeria's conspicuous new wealth saw the newly enriched “big men”—local and national elites—“as not having acquired their wealth through legitimate means by the standards of Yoruba norms—i.e. by dint of hard work and individual struggle” (Marshall, 1993: 225). “This world awash with money underwent a dramatic change with the collapse of oil prices and a decade of massive government overspending. As the economy began to collapse and urban austerity was put into effect, clients abandoned by their patrons, urban workers, servants, clerks and the new army of unemployed, all began to vilify the big men in the most extreme terms...the power which elite and even moderately successful people had, was recast in imagery which emphasised its evil and corrupt nature” (Marshall, 1993: 226). All this provided fertile ground for the articulation of a movement of the “born again.”

Source: Marshall (1993)

It is customary to begin discussions of legitimacy with German sociologist Max Weber's categorization (1947: 324-9) of authority into three types: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic:

Rational-legal authority is characteristic of the modern, industrial, bureaucratic state in which those entitled to make orders and pronouncements do so because of impersonal rules, the existence of which can be justified on more or less rational grounds. In traditional authority, unwritten but internally binding rules, the explanation of which is historical rather than

rational, entitle individuals to obedience. The authority of the chief is an instance of this. Charismatic authority appears to be unrelated to rules but is explained in terms of some personal quality that entitles an individual to obedience. Weber presented these as “ideal” types of authority, essential for social analysis rather than exact descriptions of reality. Most societies will exhibit elements of all three types, although one is likely to be predominant (Barry, 2000: 92).

Weber's concept of legitimacy has been criticized for its exclusive focus on the level of

beliefs: power relations are legitimate when those involved in them believe them to be so (1968: 213). In a similar vein, Lipset sees legitimacy as “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for society...While effectiveness is primarily an instrumental dimension, legitimacy is more affective and evaluative. Groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values” (Lipset, 1959: 87). Habermas (1979) criticized this way of understanding legitimacy for its “empiricism”: it leads to an approach to legitimacy that involves simply reporting on people's beliefs. Power is legitimately wielded if people believe this to be the case. There are no independent criteria by which to judge a system's legitimacy outside the beliefs of those subject to it. As Pitkin put it, “Weber in effect made it incomprehensible that anyone might judge legitimacy and illegitimacy according to rational, objective standards” (1972: 283). Habermas was aware, however, of the equally problematic nature of what he called “normativist” approaches to the study of legitimacy that impose from the outside norms and criteria of judgment for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate power.

To avoid these twin traps, we need an approach to the study of legitimacy that both provides a general framework and allows for historical and cultural variability. Rather than simply describing peoples' beliefs about legitimacy, the objective is also to explain peoples' grounds or reasons for holding these beliefs. In terms of the general framework, one must ask if power is valid according to the rules, if the rules are justifiable in terms of the norms and beliefs of the particular society, and if there is evidence of expressed consent. This leaves for empirical investigation

of particular societies the specification of relevant rules and conventions, the content of beliefs justifying how power is acquired (tradition, the people, divine justification), who should exercise it (hereditary, achievement), the ends that power ought to serve, whose consent is required, and what counts as the expression of consent.

To study legitimacy, then, is to study whether the law is justifiable in terms of the established beliefs and values of the society and whether there is demonstrable evidence of consent to the given relations of power (for instance by way of voting in elections). In terms of this general framework, power is legitimate if:

i) It conforms to established rules

Modern political theory distinguishes between power and authority by reference to the way obedience is secured. The existence of a person, or body of persons, in authority suggests that obedience is secured by means other than threats and implies that the exercise of authority is a product of rules (Barry, 2000: 91).

To say that legitimate power is power held and wielded according to the rules is also to say that legitimate power is limited power. One of the ways in which legitimacy is lost is when the powerful fail to observe the limits of their power. And one of the ways in which legitimacy is maintained is by the powerful respecting the limits imposed on their power by a set of rules and the underlying principles in which those rules are rooted (Beetham, 1991: 35). The rules create predictability by determining what the powers of the powerful are and what they can expect those subordinate to them to do. In other words, they “impose obligations and create corresponding entitlements, which are publicly acknowledged and collectively enforced” (Beetham, 1991: 65).

So the first criterion for legitimacy is legal validity. For this criterion to be met, however, there must exist a set of institutional arrangements and practices designed to protect the rule of law, and these must be firmly grounded in the support of society at large. The paradox that state power is legitimate only if it is legal is that “there is no higher rule-making power to validate and enforce the state's own rules” (Beetham, 1991: 123). Part of the very definition of the state is that it enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of the instruments of force. What this means, therefore, is that states are uniquely well positioned to break the law, because they cannot be subjected to the coercive power that would normally come into play when rules are broken. It is because of this paradox of power that legitimacy is thought to rely on the existence of a number of institutions, such as an independent judiciary that renders the legislative and executive branches of government subject to the law, an independent press and other media to ensure that breaches of the law by state personnel are brought to public attention, and the effective subordination of the military to civilian control. However, the precise nature of the institutional configuration required is not important. Rather, it is important to understand that acceptance of the need for rules that limit a legitimate state's power correspond to acceptance of the need for a set of mechanisms to ensure that the state observes its own rules.

ii) The rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both the dominant and the subordinate

Legitimacy is related to the study of the problem of social order and state stability in that continuity and cohesion in society cannot be achieved by power alone; it requires “some minimal agreement about social values and rules so that there

are [right ways of doing things] and authoritative procedures” (Barry, 2000: 88). While citizens clearly do not agree about all things and therefore have the need for someone in authority to make binding decisions over them on their behalf, for authority to be considered legitimate there must be in place some background agreement about the procedures for rule-making. In any society, there will exist beliefs about the general principles that are necessary to justify power relations. There may be a belief, for instance, that rightful power can ultimately be derived only from a divine source; or there may exist a utilitarian conception according to which power can be justified if it serves the interests of the greatest number in society; or perhaps a conception of justice is thought to be the underlying rationale on which legitimate authority rests; or it may be that legitimate authority is thought to be that which derives from “the people.” Legitimacy is dependent less on which of these beliefs is held than on, at least in a minimal way, these beliefs being shared. “Without a common framework of belief, the rules from which the powerful derive their power cannot be justifiable to the subordinate; the powerful can enjoy no moral authority for the exercise of their power, whatever its legal validity and their requirements cannot be normatively binding, though they may be successfully enforced” (Beetham, 1991:69).

This second dimension in the study of legitimacy reflects a concern with establishing that the relations of power and subordination that the law sustains are rightful or morally justifiable and coming to an understanding that the principle or dominant justification underpins a system of rule. It concerns, moreover, understanding whether these underlying principles are a matter of relative consensus or dispute in society. Finally, by elucidating how a particular society

understands power to be legitimately derived and wielded, it becomes possible to perceive what will be regarded as the most troublesome or potent sources of threat to the legitimacy of a state. For instance, if legitimacy is derived from a divine source, then challenges to religion or religious belief will be the most threatening to the overall legitimacy of the system. If authority is derived from the people, then popular protest or widespread unfavorable public opinion will be regarded as particularly threatening to a regime's legitimacy (Beetham, 1991: 36).

iii) There is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation

Legitimate rule is often defined as rule by consent rather than coercion, but there are many different bases upon which consent can be secured. Citizens may invoke criteria for legitimacy based on local beliefs, traditions, cultures, and histories. If consent is taken to mean voluntary agreement to power, then some of the persistent puzzles associated with the concept concern what is to count as “voluntary” and what evidence is needed to demonstrate the existence of such an agreement. Beetham argues that what we should focus on are the actions that publicly express consent: “these are important because they confer legitimacy on the powerful not because they provide evidence about people's beliefs. They confer legitimacy because they constitute public expressions by the subordinate of their consent to the power relationship and their subordinate position within it; of their voluntary agreement to the limitation of their freedom by the requirements of a superior” (1991: 91). In liberal democratic societies, taking part in elections constitutes the prime example of such an activity. Other examples include the swearing of an oath of allegiance and public acclamations of leaders for instance at popular rallies. Because of the force

of the idea of popular sovereignty as a source of legitimacy in the contemporary world, mass displays of public support are particularly important legitimizing rituals.

What counts as consent and from whom it is required will differ historically and culturally but the exercise of power always incorporates rituals of consent that demonstrate to a wider audience the legitimacy of the powerful. The absence of these indicates the erosion of legitimacy. But legitimacy should not be confused with empirical evidence of compliance or popularity (Crook, 1987: 553). Nor should legitimacy be conflated with effectiveness: parts of the German army, civil service, and aristocratic classes rejected the Weimar Republic not because it was ineffective “but because its symbolism and basic values negated their own” (Lipset, 1959: 87). Instead legitimacy has to do with “the principle or principles according to which the rightfulness of a system of rule is judged” (Crook, 1987: 553) and these may be thought to constitute a theory, an ideology, or a rationalization of power. In fragile states, the problem is often precisely one of the existence of a diversity of justifications for power that exist simultaneously and are difficult to reconcile.

The colonial roots of illegitimacy. Englebort's study of state legitimacy and development in Africa highlights the imported origins of African states as a central feature of their lack of legitimacy. While most Western European states evolved over centuries and were shaped by domestic relations of power (Englebort, 2000: 73), “the majority of contemporary African states are exogenous institutions superimposed over pre-existing political structures and inherited by domestic but westernized elites at independence” (Englebort, 2000: 74). As “instruments of colonisation abandoned by their

creators and often appropriated by new domestic political elites upon independence” these states are characterized by “structures that conflict with pre-existing political institutions, underlying norms of political behaviour and customary sources of political authority” (2000: 5). While states in Africa exist as juridical entities, most lack what Jackson and Rosberg called “empirical statehood” (1982b). Because under these conditions, it is difficult for leaders to generate support for themselves and loyalty to state institutions, they resort to patronage, nepotism, and corruption to bind people to them. The state is reduced to a set of resources used by rulers to foster their own power (Engelbert, 2000: 5). This, in turn, further reduces respect for state institutions. The extent to which a state is the outcome of an endogenous process of institutional evolution or is more akin to an institutional transplant, then, will determine how acute a “power conundrum” (Engelbert, 2000: 7) leaders of low-legitimacy states face.

The more likely a state is to have evolved endogenously to local relations of power, and to represent therefore either the instrument of an established hegemonic group or the joint solution to a collective action problem among competing groups, the freer its rulers are from the imperative to consolidate their power, and thus the more likely they are to adopt policies with a longer time horizon. States lacking this initial allegiance find it difficult to implement developmental policies and to foster their power by “delivering the goods” of growth and welfare. They derive more benefits, in terms of their power, from taking the opposite route and using state resources to pursue their quest for hegemony, either by attempting to reshape their societies into a new state-defined mould or by establishing new networks of support based on

patronage, nepotism, regional preferences, and other forms of neopatrimonial policies. Because these strategies of power imply a biased set of policies and a hijacking of state institutions, the capacity of the state, weak to begin with, is further eroded, sometimes until its actual collapse. Economic performance is first affected by the poor policy choices leaders make and by the deteriorating quality of governance they provide, and second, by the mechanisms of escape that societies use to respond to the state's failure to govern, such as an increase in informal economic activity, a return to subsistence farming, or the substitution of smuggling for trade (Engelbert, 2000: 116).

Illegitimate states are states that have become detached from their environment and are therefore unable to make use of their people's “histories and customs to construct effective formal institutions with wide legitimacy” (Kaplan, 2009: 3). The roots of this phenomenon often lie in a colonial past of borders that were drawn arbitrarily to create states out of disparate identity groups, which often lacked a shared history. Commenting on colonial rule's legacy of incomplete state formation, Herbst reminds us not to confuse pervasive violence and control: “The extent of violence was, in many ways, not an indication of control but the result of the very limited presence of administrative structures in many areas outside the major cities. When the colonialists wanted to get something done, they had to use force rather than the regular sinews of government” (2000: 91).

But colonialism's legacy went much further, as Kaplan describes: “Africa's colonial masters typically made no effort to develop formal state institutions that were strong enough to nurture a cohesive political community where one did not exist” (2009: 3). Given the high cost of

administration, little effort was made to develop extensive administrative networks or to exercise control over vast swathes of territory formally under colonial rule. Little was provided by way of services such as education or healthcare, and infrastructure was developed only insofar as to facilitate extraction and not for the benefit of local populations. Colonial administrations were deliberately disconnected from local societies, a pattern that the postcolonial state inherited. “Governments remain largely divorced from, and autonomous of, the very societies that they are supposed to serve” (Logan, 2007: 7, cited in Kaplan, 2009: 4).

Following Tilly (1992) and Luckman (1996), Moore argues that after formal decolonization, access to external resources “helped free elites from dependence on their own citizens, and turned internal political support into an optional extra rather than a basic necessity for effective rule” (2001: 397). In such environments, an enormous gap appears to separate the small cadre that manipulates or controls the state—and therefore favors its perpetuation—and the general population, who are indifferent, ambivalent, or hostile toward their own government. External financial support exacerbates the disconnect between state and society by removing the state’s incentive to build its relationship with society through, for instance, the creation of an effective public service as part of revenue collection.

Compared with the states of the rich world, those of the poor world tend to be relatively independent of their citizens: to have autonomous sources of finance and other critical resources; and/or be able to use international connections and resources to rule over their citizens in a relatively unre-

strained fashion. In poorer countries, public authority has been constructed in a context in which there has been less bargaining between states and (organised) citizens than has been the norm during the process of state construction in the North. In the South, state elites have more often either ignored their citizens or related to them more coercively – and have been able to do so because of the resources and support they (state elites) could garner from their relations with other states, the international state system and international markets. (Moore, 2001: 387)

In sum, these states share certain characteristics:

- they were created rapidly, with artificial borders, as a result of colonial conquest;
- while they are internationally recognized as formal jurisdictional entities state elites often have little motivation to extend central bureaucratic control over the whole of their territories and populations;
- local elites rely for their power on external sources and have little incentive to pay much heed to the concerns and interests of local citizens;
- control of the state provides elites with access to export resources that are used in part to purchase military hardware with which to create and maintain dominance over citizens through coercion;
- state elites are often engaged in symbiotic but politically corrosive relationships with international networks engaged in illegal activities; and
- reliance on unearned income, mainly mineral revenues and development aid makes for limited incentives to engage in bargaining processes with citizens over processes of public revenue and expenditure (Moore, 2001: 389).

Attempts to simply superimpose Western legal, governance, and education systems on states with these characteristics usually serve little purpose. Instead, forms of intervention are needed that bolster local communities' ability to take advantage "of their own resources, capacities, and social networks" (Kaplan, 2009: 7). Frequently built atop the colonial state's architecture, states in these contexts have very shallow societal roots, and the imposition of imported systems and norms of governance do little to embed those roots more deeply. Kaplan appeals instead for support for forms of state building that take into account "centuries of common history and intricate social relationships" along with the "informal institutions that drive much of behaviour" (2009:8).

Causes of legitimacy deficits and failures and their consequences. Clearly, the legitimacy deficit in postcolonial contexts of state fragility has multiple causes. Those already mentioned include aspects of the colonial legacy and the nature of the postcolonial state. More specifically, these states have often failed to win high levels of legitimacy because of:

- their dependence on foreign resources and political models rather than roots in the context in which they find themselves;
- widespread social inequalities that make it difficult to convince people that the state is serving their interests;
- conflicts and discord based on ethnic, regional and other identity rivalries;
- their over-centralization and location of power in narrow urban bands, which has rendered them incapable of drawing on local capacities, histories, and customs to improve their effectiveness and enhance their standing in the eyes of the populace; and
- the fact that governing elites' survival often depends on patronage which serves to bolster the legitimacy of particular elites but to undermine the legitimacy of the state as such: "if the preservation of its power depends on sources of legitimacy of this kind, governments become trapped in a situation where their political survival is incompatible with state building" (Norad, 2009:4).

Corruption is often cited as a cause of illegitimacy. In one sense this is correct: corruption can delegitimize the state and undermine its fragile bond with citizens. On the other hand, patronage can help build a political settlement and strengthen output legitimacy. Moreover, as Szeftel (1983) has pointed out, when citizens object to corruption, often what is being objected to is their own exclusion—the fact that favoritism takes place at their expense.

Many of the circumstances described above worsened with 1980s and 1990s structural adjustment programs that were postulated on redefining economic frameworks to include cuts in the size of the government apparatus and privatization of publicly owned enterprises. An unintended consequence of privatization was the undermining of government output legitimacy caused by a retreat of the state from provision of social services (Debiel, 2005: 28). These programs were based on a major thrust of liberal democratic theory, which has to do with finding ways to limit the state and place limits on its power. African commentators, however, have emphasised that "it has been the absences of the state as much as its intrusions; its weaknesses as much as its authoritarian power, which have undermined its legitimacy. The state has not been there to do what needs to be done" (Ranger and Vaughan, 1993: 260). The need is for stronger but less arbitrary states, a goal that has

too often been undermined by the intrusions of international experts and NGOs in the name of efficiency and democracy.

A lack of legitimacy often causes fragility where fragility refers not only to a lack of organisation, institutional and financial capacity but also to an absence of common norms, rules and regulations that are recognised and shared by both the state and the people.

(Norad, 2009: 3-4)

The more secure its legitimacy, the greater the stress a government can withstand. When regimes weak in legitimacy are subjected to stress, a crisis can rapidly develop because manifestations of dissatisfaction or opposition to a particular policy can turn into opposition to the system of government and its authority itself. The result may be the collapse of government, coups d'état, civil war, or invasion. Ongoing legitimization is needed if a state is to “achieve those purposes that depend upon the support of its population, and to maintain its political system intact in the face of serious policy failure or challenge to it” (Beetham, 1991: 118). “Passive non-cooperation, work to rule, feigned incompetence, looting, and so on...these attributes...are typical of subordinates where legitimacy has become eroded” (Beetham, 1991: 29). Legitimacy serves to enhance state effectiveness, but it is also necessary for the maintenance of stability and order.

As Englebert (2000: 154) puts it, legitimate states are “better leviathans.” He measures the African states he counts as relatively legitimate—Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles and Swaziland—against the

majority of African states and finds that in the former, property rights are enhanced more consistently, citizens have more trust in their court systems, and the countries tend to be less repressive of their citizens' civil liberties¹⁰. “In contrast, lack of a stable hegemonic class in non-legitimate states leads to arbitrary personal rule, random policy turnabouts, and weak property rights, all of which make the state an unreliable partner and a weak provider of public goods. Furthermore, and most fundamentally, citizens in non-legitimate states hardly understand their governments to begin with. Indeed, about 84 per cent of the population in non-legitimate states speak a different language at home than the country's official language. For legitimate ones, the number is 25 per cent only. In other words, the citizens of states whose continuity has survived the colonial ordeal are significantly less alienated from their public authority than those of states created by colonialism, which typically embraced the language of the coloniser.”

Compliance with the law lends stability to a polity. Compliance can arise for a variety of reasons related to the resources available to the powerful to put in place incentives and sanctions that will elicit obedience. Legitimacy, or power rightfully exercised, generates an obligation on the part of the populace to obey so that when power is perceived as being legitimately wielded, obedience stems not merely from prudence or the quest for advantage but from a sense of its “rightness.” Where legitimacy breaks down, the state has perpetually to buy or threaten citizens in order to ensure their compliance and, to the extent that these rewards and sanctions are costly and difficult to apply evenly, social order will continually be threatened. Moreover, the


exercise of sanctions itself requires that the state win legitimacy at least among its military and other armed forces. But if its legitimacy in society more generally is threatened, it is likely that it will be threatened in its capacity to ensure the loyalty and support of its armed components. As Beetham (1991: 28) argues, where legitimacy is eroded or absent, “coercion has to be much more extensive and omnipresent, and that is costly to maintain. Moreover, the system of power now only has one line of defense, that of force; and it can therefore collapse very rapidly if coercion is insufficient or people believe that those in power have lost the will to use it.”

What is the evidence on legitimacy of policy environment and efficiency of instrument?

Among the greatest challenges Africa confronts are legitimizing key policy institutions, conventions, and practices and replacing dysfunctional institutions that have been compromised by corruption, limited adherence to meritocracy, and clientelism. African countries need greater capacity to complete the current process of systematic transformation and must enhance both the policy environment and the efficiency of policy tools. “Governance reform” is a shorthand reference to an array of changes required in numerous institutions and practices,

to realize the national development goals of consolidating democracy, sustainable growth with equity, and containment of conflicts in Africa. An important lesson for the continent is that sustainable economic growth depends not only on good policies but also on sound institutions. So what has been the achievement of countries under this measure of capacity, which seeks to enhance the legitimacy of the policy environment and the efficiency of existing strategies in terms of ownership by the broad polity? Of the 34 countries surveyed under the ACI initiative, 76.5 percent were found to have national development strategies with high levels of legitimacy; 8.8 percent had national development strategies with low levels of legitimacy. (fig. 12)

The levels of legitimacy are reinforced by the levels of incentives for compliance provided by the national development strategies. Only 11.8 percent of countries had national development strategies with low levels of incentives for compliance. Equally, only 14.7 percent of countries were found to have national development strategies with low levels of flexibility. In other words, most countries have enabling policy environments as well as relatively efficient planning instruments.

Figure 12 Legitimacy levels of the 34 national development strategies:

Source: ACI field survey data

3.3 Reconstruction in post-conflict and fragility in Africa

Consequences of wars and conflicts While the reasons outlined above for civil wars and conflicts in Africa including state legitimacy are by no means exhaustive, it is clear that all wars come at severe costs not only to the participants and factions but also to neighboring countries. As Obwona and Guloba (2009: i81) point out, wars often cause poorer households to fall further behind as they, for instance, lose land and livestock, which weakens their ability to participate effectively in productive activities and to adapt to economic reforms. Moreover, Zartman (1995: 1-5) notes that the costs of war often include increased insecurity, the flow of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP), ethnic tensions, and an inordinate amount of resources focused on diplomatic activities. For example, it is estimated that during the 1994 Rwanda crisis, almost 800,000 people were killed over a three-month period, leaving thousands of widows/widowers and orphans; women were raped and infected with HIV/AIDS; 120,000 people were held in country-run prisons;

two million people were internally displaced; and two million people sought refuge in neighboring countries (Nadjaldongar, 2008). A similar situation occurred during the civil wars in DRC, Liberia, and Mozambique. It is estimated that almost four million people lost their lives as a result of the war and conflict (1998-2003) in the DRC (Coghlan et al., 2006). During Liberia's 14-year civil war (1989-2003), 250,000 people died from the violence, 600,000 people were internally displaced, and another 600,000 people became refugees in various parts of the world (Centre on International Cooperation, 2007: 74). This mass movement of people robbed Liberia and its communities of skills, knowledge and experience, and resourcefulness. Furthermore, many Liberians and foreign investors shifted their capital out of the country (UNDP, 2006: 44). Similarly, during the fighting in Mozambique (1974-1992), one million war-related deaths were counted and up to six million people became internally or externally displaced (Costy, 2004: 150). Also, simmering tensions and conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan and in Somalia have forced many people to flee these countries and settle as refugees elsewhere.

Drained resources and the damage inflicted in the course of the conflict represent additional losses (Collier et al., 2003). The financial costs of war represent one challenge with which governments must contend; their effects are worsened by the disruptions that occur in other sectors of the economy, notably agriculture, mining and industry, and the country's overall development (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Notable costs associated with wars and conflicts also include destruction of physical infrastructure, such as telecommunications, airports, ports and harbors, roads, energy supplies, and of social services like health and education (Arabi, 2008: 36). In Liberia, for example, rebel groups and other looters impaired the delivery of basic healthcare by destroying the country's two largest hospitals. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front razed police stations, the Central Bank, and other major government buildings, as well as infrastructure such as electricity supply centers. By the end of the war in Sierra Leone, up to 340,000 homes had been destroyed, almost one million homes needed repair, up to 65 percent of schools had been burned down, hospitals were barely functioning, and primary healthcare needs were not being met. This put Sierra Leone at the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) (Jones, 2004: 85). During Mozambique's civil conflict, the country closed down some railway lines that were used to transport minerals to Southern Congo and Zambia (Arabi, 2008: 36). This, combined with the destruction of trucks and vehicles, contributed to a fall in the country's export earnings. Not surprisingly, by the beginning of the 1990s, Mozambique's social infrastructure lay in ruin. One third of all rural clinics and approximately 70 percent of schools were destroyed or abandoned. In addition, road destruction, landmines, or erosion limited access to large portions of the country. As a result, in

1992, Mozambique ranked last on the UNDP HDI, while official aid as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 43.7 percent in 1987 to 115 percent in 1993 (Costy, 2004: 150).

Furthermore, considerable harm is inflicted on the children who are forcibly captured and abducted as soldiers in much of contemporary African war. During wars, children lack proper schooling, nutrition, and healthcare (Arabi, 2008). Many schools are closed down due to the lack of resources and teachers, which in turn has huge implications for the human development aspect of the African continent. Aside from the physical consequences associated with participating in conflict, "the psychological effects of war on children are particularly dangerous because of the long-lasting consequences they can have for a society, especially in promoting cycles of violence" (Hill and Langholtz, 2003: 281, cited in Samaroo, 2006: 43). Moreover, wars in Africa have a devastating impact on the social fabric of the affected societies in terms of social disintegration. This is manifested in the breakdown of social institutions, erosion of community bonds, and disintegration of the bases of social reproduction and exchange (Busumtwi-Sam, 2004: 324). They also tend to heighten awareness of existing social differentiation, hasten processes of collective identity formation, and have the effect of transforming collective groups into corporate groups.

Finally, the negative economic consequences are not limited to the country where the conflict takes place, but often spill over into neighboring countries that consequently face huge challenges and problems. For example, during Mozambique's civil war, trade with neighboring countries was disrupted, and this led to economic decline in Malawi and international airport costs due to its status as a landlocked country (Arabi, 2008: 37).

Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and post-conflict reconstruction In view of the costs associated with war, concerted efforts are often made to bring it to an end and engage in peace building in post-conflict societies, which is understood as preventing future conflict by removing the structural causes of violent conflict and channeling conflict through peaceful means (Jones, 2004: 57). The concept of peace building is based on the idea that simply putting resources, personnel, and a humanitarian approach in place will not lead to the end of conflict if the root causes and underlying reasons behind the conflict are not adequately addressed (Samaroo, 2006; Arabi, 2008). This is because the predatory behavior, along with the coping strategies adopted to survive within the distorted political and economic structures that emerge during internal conflict, are often carried over into the post-conflict period and can have serious implications for both short-term and long-term peace consolidation and post-conflict reconstructions efforts (Critchley, 2008: 31). As a multi-dimensional concept, peace building therefore involves activities that both end conflict and prevent future wars (Jones, 2004: 57).

It is in this vein that bringing conflict and war to an end and engaging in peace-building activities often entails a process and mechanism of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) those who were involved. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process is the cornerstone for any peace building process and should be seen as the “pentagram” that incorporates technical, military, political, security, humanitarian, and developmental dimensions into one program aimed at reducing the risk that combatants pose to the peace

process (Salomons, 2005:22). Similarly, “effective DDR can substantially reduce the chance of armed violence re-emerging and help the foundations for social and economic development to take root” (Dzinesa, 2007: 74). In this vein, DDR programs are often “implemented in an attempt to ameliorate the security threat posed by the continued presence of illicit arms and the ineffective reintegrated ex-combatants” (Dzinesa, 2007: 73). Moreover, DDR not only is considered an important part of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, but also is a domain in which economic, political, and individual motivations intersect, thus allowing for a better analysis of how the political and economic distortions created during a civil war can influence behaviors in the post-conflict setting (Critchley, 2008:6).

It is, however, important to point out that the successful completion of each phase of the DDR process is crucial to the success of the next (Hitchcock, 2004: 36). In most cases, the disarmament process, which represents the first phase of trying to bring peace, is designed to remove the means of perpetuating violence and to create an environment in which confidence and security can be augmented (Critchley, 2008: 33). This phase thus entails the collection, control, and disposal of weapons and ammunition from combatants (Dzinesa, 2007: 74). Given the fact that the existence of arms and other weapons creates general insecurity within communities, disarmament will mean that those who used to carry guns among the civilian population will no longer have easy access to them, thereby reducing the tensions, harassment and insecurity within the society (Arabi, 2008: 81-82).

Box 11

Women and Disarmament

So-called light weapons have killed millions of people. They have become the instrument of choice in most armed conflicts, and the UN Secretary General has described them as weapons of mass destruction. After wars, they are the tools of banditry, crime, and conjugal violence. In post-conflict societies, women's voices have been prominent in the lobby to end the proliferation of small arms and light weapons including land mines.

Increasingly, women are playing important roles in weapons collection. Whether informally or in partnership with international organizations and government, their knowledge of the location of arms, the pressure they can put on their families and communities, and their organizing skills have led to increased involvement in providing security through disarmament.

- The Women's Network of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) coordinates organizations that work on issues concerning women and gun violence to promote their participation in international efforts and legislation to combat small and light weapons (SALW).
- In 1997, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Jody Williams, then coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, whose global advocacy and efforts were credited with the adoption of the Ottawa Convention.
- In 1999, women from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea attended a civil society meeting convened by the Economic Community of West African States to discuss the recent arms moratorium. They formally submitted the Bamako Declaration for Peace by the Women of West African Civil Society in which the women "... firmly reaffirm our resolve to contribute to efforts to combat the illicit and controlled possession of small arms and light weapons..."
- Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, the largest Kenyan women's organization, with over one million members, lobbies for international and national legislation to eliminate SALW as part of their campaign to protect their communities from cross-border cattle raids and increased urban violence.
- Gun-Free South Africa, a women-led initiative, raises awareness of SALW, enhances public debate, and lobbies for change in the country's policies. In 2000, the parliament responded by passing the Firearms Control Act, which imposes stricter controls and regulation.
- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, women have demanded disarmament as a necessary first step in the peace process.
- In the late 1990s, the Liberian Women's Initiative pressed for disarmament as a precursor to elections. They advertised for women to join the movement across the country and stationed women at every arms collection point. The women encouraged the fighters to hand in their weapons and offered them water and sandwiches. Estimates indicate that some 80 percent of weapons were collected in 1996 prior to the election.
- In Mali, women were credited with organizing the first public burning of arms to launch a successful UNDP weapons collection program. The arms were burned in Timbuktu on March 27, 1996, in a public ceremony called the Flame of Peace. An annual nationwide celebration continues to mark the important event and the ongoing policy against SALW in Mali.

Source: Pampell Conaway, C. (2004) "Arms, Light Weapons and Landmines" in S. Anderlini et al. Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: a Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Denver: Hunt Alternatives Fund. Security Issues http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/48_small_arms.pdf

Since it is difficult to see what can be achieved by disarmament alone in the contemporary security environment (Spear, 2006: 173), it is important to adopt a process of demobilizing ex-combatants if efforts at attaining peace are to be realized. Thus, demobilization, which is often carried out in conjunction with the disarmament process, is when armed combatants are either downsized or completely disbanded. This involves assembling, quartering, administering, and discharging of ex-combatants. While not always the case, as

part of this process, ex-combatants are sometimes given some form of compensation in order to make their transition to a civilian lifestyle smoother. Finally, reintegration, which is generally seen as the most complex, time consuming, and costly part of the equation (Hitchcock, 2004: 37), is the process by which former soldiers once again become an enduring part of the social, economic, and political life of their community (Willibald, 2006). The reintegration part of DDR represents the most important

part of eliminating future wars and conflict because when ex-combatants are not properly reintegrated, they are likely to remobilize and pose a new form of security threat to their society (Box 12). As part of this resettlement process, ex-combatants are given clothing, foodstuffs, job placement assistance, vocational training, and health services (Dzinesa, 2007: 74). Reintegration also often involves efforts to rehabilitate ex-combatants through counseling and general therapy to help clear the mental and physical effects of war, ease tensions, build trust, and overcome the memories of war (Arabi, 2008: 83). Effective DDR programs also provide for the most vulnerable groups of ex-combatants, which include the disabled, child soldiers, and women (Obwona and Guloba, 2009: i92).

Although the success of the DDR process is very much dependent on the successful completion of each phase (Hitchcock, 2004: 36) and the provision of programs to the most vulnerable, it is often bedeviled by a number of challenges and constraints. The lack of coordination among the different stages; the fluid, and sometimes ambiguous, nature of peace-building mandates; and a misunderstanding of the expectations and perceptions of those for whom the DDR programs are designed make it difficult to achieve the desired objectives and results (Gamba, 2003: 127). Moreover, DDR processes often do not dovetail with the economic interests of combatants, and incentives to partake in the process tend to be aimed at rank-and-file soldiers and do not appeal to middle-level officers who profit from the political economy created by conflict and war (Critchley, 2008: 42). Hence, averting a return to conflict and war calls for an incentive, sometimes monetary in nature, or other alternatives that will ensure not only that security is attained but more important, that individuals in society have a

regular source of income through the availability of gainful employment. In Mozambique, for example, the provision of cash incentives over a two-year period was generally seen as contributing positively in the reintegration efforts that occurred after the country's protracted civil war (McMullin, 2004). However, the provision of cash as an incentive to ex-combatants to lay down arms does have its critics. The general criticism is that besides being unsustainable in the long term, such incentives will breed resentment in the broader community, since it would seem to be rewarding bad behavior (Willibald, 2006). In addition, it can serve as a disincentive in the effort to achieve long-term stability, since it can encourage increasing regional trade in arms, as was the case during conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Moreover, as was evident during the Namibian situation, efforts to stem demonstrations by ex-combatants with a one-time gratuity payment did little to stop them from demanding more.

The DDR process was hindered in the DRC by lack of funding and inability to provide alternative livelihoods to disarmed combatants. It was further plagued by exclusion from formal economic activity, lack of skills and/or training that would facilitate reintegration into the market, frustration and destitution linked to the marginalization of certain groups from patronage networks, and limited access to resources (Critchley, 2008: 115-125). In both the DRC and Sierra Leone, economic issues were treated as secondary to political and security considerations, which undermined the peace-building process. Finally, many DDR programs deal only with the symptoms that often trigger violence and wars, such as unequal distribution of power, struggles over natural resources, and proliferation of small arms, but fail to deal fully with the structural causes, which often include the failure

to meet basic human needs, population pressure, unequal distribution of wealth, environmental degradation, poverty, unemployment, and ethnic tensions (Willett, 1998: 409-413).

Box 12

Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating (DDR) – Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone

Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants is a critical part of a broader strategy of post-conflict reconstruction. Often, ex-combatants are a key cause for concern in post-conflict environments. If they are not successfully reintegrated into the civilian community, former fighters have the military know-how, the experience, the tools, and often the will to turn again to violent means of achieving change.

In a study of reintegration of ex-combatants as part of a DDR effort in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein found that ex-combatants from different factions employ markedly differing strategies for reintegrating into civilian society. The study found, too, that most ex-combatants reject violence as a strategy for achieving political change and believe in the impact they can have by organizing peacefully, voting in elections, and holding officials accountable for results. However, the ex-combatants in the study were found to have more faith in outsiders than in their own government, seeing appeals to the international community and to NGOs as the best ways to hold their government accountable and to achieve positive results. This is cause for concern, because after the withdrawal of the UN mission the primary means of holding politicians accountable must come through internal mechanisms of influence and control, rather than from the intervention of outsiders. As the international community shifts its attention to other conflicts, drawing in outsiders to influence the government will become more difficult and could potentially require a return to violence.

Most (over 90 percent) were accepted by their families when they returned from fighting, although abductees had greater difficulties with being accepted back into their communities, which may be the result of their having been forced to commit atrocities against their own communities.

It was a finding of the study that non-participants in DDR initiatives appear to have reintegrated as successfully as those who did participate. This may indicate that DDR programs, while important, are not determinative in giving rise to a stable post-war outcome. But there are other possible explanations. It may be that non-participants in DDR programs were non-participants precisely because they did not anticipate problems with reintegrating. A second potential explanation for the finding is that non-participants did just as well as participants because of the positive spillover effects of the DDR programs. Since most combatants took part in disarmament and training, the vast majority of returnees and new community members had gone through a process of transition from war fighting to a postwar life with the assistance of the government and the UN. In this respect, DDR programs had a spillover effect—creating positive conditions for the return of non-participants to these communities.

Source: Humphreys and Weinstein (2004). 'What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone'. Center on Globalization and Sustainable Development (CGSD) Working Paper No. 20. New York: The Earth Institute at Columbia University.

Capacity development and post-conflict reconstruction. While the DDR process represents a positive step in efforts toward peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, attaining long-lasting peace requires more than merely ceasing hostilities between warring parties (Samaroo, 2006: 35). Since post-conflict reconstruction cannot be expected to succeed if the underlying

structures generated by a civil war are not properly addressed (Critchley, 2008: 118), additional approaches need to be implemented in order for post-conflict reconstruction to occur. The heart of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction is the nexus of political, economic, and social development on one hand and sustainable peace on the other (Busumtwi-

Sam et al., 2004: 315). Because of their transformational qualities, development and reconstruction are requirements within peace operations for dealing with the underlying structural causes of war (Jones, 2004: 58-59). Thus, post-conflict reconstruction, which seeks to meet the needs of societies that have come out of conflict and also identify and put in place policies to achieve their development goals, often involves the promotion of “positive peace”—the elimination of the conditions that cause violence and the undertaking of structural changes that can facilitate overall socioeconomic development, build capacity, and thereby help in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies (Galtung, 1976). Once socioeconomic and political progress is made in society, it would take people's minds and attention away from the conflict (Arabi, 2008), and the best way to achieve this is to engage in capacity development measures that will lead to the attainment of “positive peace” and long-term socioeconomic development and reconstruction of post-conflict societies.

Establishing and delivering security; maintaining law and order. Since the availability of security is a basic requirement in any post-conflict reconstruction effort, one of the first and most important state structures that must be delivered and enhanced is the security and police apparatus. Security governance is essential to the other dimensions of capacity development and reconstruction because reestablishment of long-term security, legitimate authority, and law and order can serve to alter the situation that led to the war (Jones, 2004: 62). In addition, the existence of security enables parties to solve conflict through non-violent means and prevents backsliding into violence. Without security, the transaction costs of economic activities increase,

particularly production and investment, as well as enterprises' risk of failure (Obwona and Guloba: 2009: 192). Also, in the absence of good security sector reforms, many people will be unwilling to do away with their arms, since they see small weapons ownership as an instrument of personal protection for themselves and their families. Thus, having in place an effective and efficient security apparatus is an important element of post-conflict reconstruction and capacity development initiative. A viable and legitimate security sector helps to uphold national security, law and order and ensure the safety of civilians (Jones, 2004: 79). Having adequate security without resorting to personal protection will not only build trust but also contribute to an environment that will ensure increased economic activity and overall socioeconomic development.


Part of Sierra Leone's reconstruction and capacity development process involved enacting serious reforms that were carried out by the International Military Assistance Team (IMAT), a British-led program with a commitment to working with the Sierra Leone army (Jones, 2004: 81). Under this program, British forces were filtered into the Sierra Leone army at all levels to provide expertise and training. The training and restructuring of security forces included civic and human rights education. There was also the establishment of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2006 as a channel for continued international support for peace building. It functioned as a combined political support mission and country office to strengthen state institutions in Sierra Leone. UNIOSIL's police section, for example, provided training and mentoring, with officers embedded in regional headquarters and in divisions dealing with human resources. In addition, UNIOSIL

works with the Sierra Leone government to develop a youth employment strategy to address the security concerns associated with disaffected and unemployed youth (Centre on International Cooperation, 2007: 132-133).

Similarly, the signing in August 2003 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana brought an end to Liberia's fourteen years of brutal war. Since then, security has been provided throughout the country by troops deployed under the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Security reforms focused on UNMIL's vetting the existing police force and providing basic training to police officers, including new recruits (Centre on International Cooperation, 2009: 112-114). A new program to train 500 police officers for a specialized anti-crime and riot control unit was established in December 2007. As UNMIL gradually reduced the number of troops in the country, the United States took on a leading role in building a coherent and viable security infrastructure and restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The U.S. government contracted two U.S. private security companies (DynCorp and Pacific Architects

Engineers) to create an effective Liberian army and reestablish three army bases.

State institutions. Wars affect states' capacity and credibility to allocate, legislate, and regulate resources toward growth, education, and improved living standards. In destroying infrastructure, public utilities and communications, wars limit the effectiveness of state institutions (Aron, 2003: 474). As a result, reconstruction in a post-conflict African environment calls for measures and interventions to rebuild the capacity of public sector structures and institutions, which for all intents and purposes are generally weakened after a period of conflict. Since individual as well as institutional capacities are important variables in the efforts toward reconstruction, post-conflict African countries need to improve their public sector performance if their social and economic development goals, as well as efforts to alleviate and reduce poverty and better provide services to their citizens, are to be attained. In other words, state institutions are stronger in a non-fragile environment (see figure 13).



Source: IRAI Table 2009, World Bank.

Capacity development in the public sector needs to focus on three main areas or dimensions: human, organizational, and institutional (World Bank, 2005d). Human capacity development should focus on having individuals with skills to analyze development needs; developing design and implement strategies, policies, and programs; and monitoring results. Developing and strengthening the personnel capacity will enable the public sector to fulfill its role and responsibilities and help ensure better performance of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies. At the organizational level, this should entail a process whereby a group of individuals would be bound together by a common purpose with clear objectives and internal structures, processes, systems and staffing, and other resources to achieve them. At the institutional level, this should focus on both the formal rules of the game, such as hiring and promotion policies in the public services, and laws and regulations defining responsibilities and power relationships among actors. This is in addition to the informal norms that provide the framework of goals and incentives within which organizations and people operate (World Bank, 2005d: 7).

Institutional capacity development also encompasses the functional capacities necessary for the successful creation of management policies, legislation, and programs, including policy design and strategy formulation, resources and budget allocation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (UNDP, 2010). Finally, it involves the strengthening of public institutions, especially as they pertain to better financial management. Effective financial management is important because it helps in generating and channeling resources to productive sectors of the economy and, in the process, supporting both private and public sector growth. Similarly, public sector resource

management is essential because not only does it ensure the efficient and effective utilization of resources, but also it enhances transparency and accountability in the use of public resources.

Human and social capabilities. As human and social capabilities are essential to the development of a society, especially one that has recently experienced conflict, the importance of addressing human deficiencies and thus building on human and education capacities as part of the reconstruction process cannot be underestimated. Focusing on the social dimensions of reconstruction and peace building, especially education, draws attention to building local capacity to achieve conditions for sustainable reconstruction (Samaroo, 2006). Education, which should entail formal schooling for children, adult education classes, or jobs and technical training, can constitute a means through which children and youth can learn constructive skills for economic survival and conflict resolution. Education can also foster a positive conception of peace, or be geared toward constructing amicable relations among individuals, families, and formerly warring factions of communities (Cannon, 2003: 137, cited in Nelles, 2006: 46). Moreover, education through schooling not only provides a sense of normalcy and routine but also can help build a strong human infrastructure for a community emerging out of conflict (Samaroo, 2006: 59-60). Furthermore, education can be used as a tool to foster greater tolerance and understanding of differences and diversity, promote skills for conflict resolution, advance healing and reconciliation, and nurture ideas and capacities for peace. In sum, making education a key plank in the capacity development efforts of post-conflict societies increases or enhances the prospects of long-term peace. To this end, capacity development through education in

Sierra Leone's post-conflict environment involved the establishment of the Training and Employment (TEP) and Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP). Although limited in nature because of the lack of adequate funds, these programs focused primarily on providing children with skills training and occupational placement (Samaroo, 2006: 76).

Physical infrastructure. Given the destruction of physical infrastructure that often accompanies wars and conflicts, one of the key aspects of post-conflict reconstruction is building and developing the capacity of the society's economic and physical infrastructure. The reconstruction of the physical infrastructure should encompass restoration of electricity, supply of piped water, and construction of roads, railways, and other transportation conduits. Building hospitals, schools, and other physical infrastructure will allow citizens to see that there is another way to live other than fighting (Arabi, 2008: 84). As part of the capacity development process, the DRC government entered into agreements that granted mining concessions to private and foreign companies in return for investment in infrastructure such as roads, railways, hospitals, and schools (Critchley, 2008: 128). Specifically, in 2008, the DRC government entered a US\$ 6 billion agreement with the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CERC) to rebuild 2400 miles (3860 kilometers) of roads, 2000 miles of railway, 32 hospitals, 145 health centers and two universities. In return, China was granted concessions to mine 10 million tonnes of copper and 400,000 tonnes of cobalt, metals needed to fuel its economy.

Political governance . Equally important to reconstruction in a post-conflict environment is the need to redevelop political institutions, re-establish political legitimacy and work demo-

cratic institutions capable of mitigating and resolving conflict through non-violent means (Obwona and Guloba, 2009: 193). Promoting good political governance is important because there is consensus that persistent bad governance is one of the root causes of long-term economic and social decline and the kind of political crisis that led to the civil war in Liberia (UNDP, 2006: 35). Promoting good political governance should involve having in place a political system and arrangement that is transparent, accountable, democratic, and representative in nature. This is essential because in the immediate period after a conflict, the state lacks institutionalized trust and legitimacy in the eyes of many of the citizens. Thus, one way to bridge this trust deficit and provide legitimacy and social stability as well as rule by consent as opposed to coercion is to ensure the promotion of an accountable and transparent government as well as a democratic system that is able to deliver and promote justice. Allowing people to influence decisions that affect their lives is vital for increasing transparency, the necessary bulwark against corruption and bureaucratic abuse. It also counters efforts by economic elites to manipulate state policies to for their narrow advantage (Cheru, 2002: 207).

However, for democracy to flourish as an instrument of reconstruction and peace in a post-conflict environment, the relevant political actors must perceive some gains from the political order and thereby come to see its maintenance as in their interests (Busumtwi-Sam, 2004: 330). In addition to procedural aspects of democracy, attention should be given to what he calls "substantive and performance legitimacy." While performance legitimacy involves achieving agreement and consensus on desired goals and values that inform the political

game, with performance legitimacy, political authority is accepted based on the ability of those exercising political power to achieve certain ends and goals, even if they did not acquire power through the formal procedural mechanism of democracy. The impact of promoting good political governance has been evident in places like Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which have conducted relatively peaceful elections since conflicts came to an end in their countries. Similarly, in Rwanda, there was institutional reconstruction in the form of the drafting of a new socially inclusive constitution, the promotion of national unity, the emergence of good bureaucratic governance, and the holding of democratic elections (Thomson, 2007).

Besides the holding of free and fair elections to choose political leaders, another important aspect of good political governance in post-conflict reconstruction relates to the decentralization of state power and the restoration of local authorities. The decentralization process, if properly adopted and implemented, can lead to efficiency in service delivery, improve access to services, encourage local ownership of policies, and empower the people at the grassroots level, and promote better governance and participation in government affairs.

To create an enabling environment for peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, the state's efforts should be complemented by the activities of civil society. This is because as state structures weaken, civil society often fills in the gap in creative ways. For example, during the civil war in Uganda, parent-organized schools provided education to the youth of the country. Such initiatives merit being preserved or strengthened until the state is sufficiently well established to take on its roles and responsibilities.

In addition, civil society in most cases helps contribute to good governance by opening up democratic structures at the local levels, creating the political space for citizens to be involved in various facets of life, providing information, and encouraging power-sharing activities among various parties and stakeholders.

Economic governance and employment. All the foregoing policies are necessary to rebuild and reconstruct the economies of countries that have experienced conflict. This is because the effectiveness of political legitimacy and the other aspects of post-conflict reconstruction will be dependent on economic legitimacy, which involves the ability to create the framework conditions for economic growth and well being, ranging from macroeconomic stability to ensuring a supportive private sector-enabling environment (Obwona and Guloba, 2009: 193). Economic activities and growth will not only give people an income but also reduce the attractiveness of using conflict as a source of livelihood. To this end, rebuilding the economic governance of post-conflict societies should involve the creation of an enabling and favorable macroeconomic environment that will help spur domestic economic growth and attract foreign direct investment. The transformation of ex-combatants and ex-refugees into market actors underlies the process of macroeconomic reform (Busumtwi-Sam, 2004: 331). Economic restructuring is often aimed at creating jobs and gainful employment opportunities as well as alleviating and eradicating poverty, since in the absence of employment there is a greater risk of dissatisfaction and a return to violence (Jones, 2004: 78). It would also be the foundation for a working economy in the society. There is little point in providing capacity and raising expectations at the individual level when there are no economic

opportunities (UNDP, 2006: 14). Thus, measures to create employment have the prospects of achieving lasting peace in post-conflict environments. Employment, especially in the public sector, creates a situation where individuals will easily identify with the government and thereby be dissuaded from engaging in any activities that affect the peace and stability of the society. The sense of belonging will contribute to the promotion of loyalty to the state, and this is something that cash transfers and payment to ex-combatants cannot achieve. Be that as it may, the success of macroeconomic policies will be dependent on the extent to which their contents are tailored to the conditions in the specific post-conflict society (Busumtwi-Sam, 2004).

Challenges to capacity development. Although capacity development efforts have yielded accomplishments in post-conflict societies, the process still faces a number of gaps, constraints, and challenges. The UN Economic Commission for Africa's African Governance Report (2005) noted that in the area of political governance, in addition to the fact that protecting the rights of women and children remains a huge governance challenge in many post-conflict countries, law enforcement agencies also continue to violate the rights of many other people in society. Economically, there are also the continued constraints and challenges of doing business in a number of African countries. Besides the costs, it takes a long time to register a business, and commercial and contract law enforcement is weak. The absence of transparency and availability of information in the design and implementation of economic policies is a further complication. More important, most post-conflict governance institutions are weak in both technical capacity and effective control of their

territory, which makes it necessary to address this problem in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Obwona and Guloba, 2009: i79). A major finding of the UN African Governance Report (UNECA, 2005) was that the prevalence in many post-conflict African countries of governance institutions', human, material, and institutional capacity deficits creates a disconnect between legal, formal provisions and stipulations and implementation expectations.

Aside from these challenges and gaps, most post-conflict reconstruction efforts have a bias in funding the social sector that is not directly productive and comes at the expense of laying firm foundations for wealth creation and long-term growth (Obwona and Guloba, 2009: i91). Another challenge is mobilizing funds and resources from domestic sources to finance many of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa.

The weakened institutions and social divisions in conflict-affected countries often cause authorities to rely more heavily on peace accords and donor support to jump-start capacity development initiatives and social cohesion building (Obwona and Guloba, 2009). In providing these funds, there is often an implicit assumption by the donor community that western state institutions can be easily transferred to African societies as part of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. However, the reliance on external support and assumptions is one of the reasons behind the failures of post-conflict reconstruction in African countries (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 110-116). In the attempt to reform African states, development partners have conditioned their aid on the states' willingness to implement specific policy prescriptions such as neo-liberal

structural adjustment reforms and democracy promotion. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts have seen limited success because development partners have paid scant attention to the co-existence in Africa of informal political institutions and informal decision-making processes that are strongly determined by personal relations and dominate national politics. In the DRC, for example, the 2003-2006 foreign-sponsored democratic transitions merely ushered in an authoritarian and corrupt political and economic system similar to that of the late President Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled the country during 1965-1997. The limited success of donor-sponsored market reforms and democracy promotion indicates that the grand vision of state building, with its one-size-fits-all approach, is likely to meet resistance and contribute to the failure of post-conflict reconstruction (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 110).

Furthermore, most capacity development initiatives and post-conflict reconstruction efforts are externally initiated and driven by foreign experts and models of development (Englebert and Tull, 2008). The inputs of national experts familiar with Liberia's social, economic, and political landscape were limited, with no attempt to engage Liberia's allies or to advocate, promote, and assume leadership roles affecting reforms in the country's post-conflict reconstruction (UNDP, 2006: 51-52). The intrusive donor and foreign involvement in key national programs and the lack of an effective voice, particularly of intended beneficiaries, were exacerbated by a fragmented government with poor overall public financial management capacity, entrenched corruption in core government agencies, and widespread nepotism and patronage, which weakened the pursuit of organizations' formal tasks.

In addition, there is the issue of human capital flight, or brain drain, that stems mostly from poor public service conditions and other socioeconomic hardships in many African countries, especially those that may have experienced conflict. With low salaries for civil servants, it becomes difficult to attract and retain skilled professionals to support the urgent post-conflict reconstruction and recovery and development priorities. Moreover, with the loss to the industrialized world of trained and highly skilled personnel in post-conflict societies, there arises a deficit of skilled human capital and personnel that are essential to the post-conflict reconstruction of these countries.

3.4 Service delivery and social inclusion

Function of the state beyond fragility. The basic function of state, which comprises a number of institutions for the making and implementation of decisions with regard to interests of various kinds, is to provide goods and services to citizens based on “realization and representation of public interests and its possession of unique public qualities compared to business management” (Haque, 2001: 65).

The importance of service provision is underscored by the fact that there is a link between service provision and taxation, which leads to a contract between the state and citizens and thereby promotes state legitimacy. This involves asking why people should pay taxes; the answer is because they see it as a fiscal contract between them and the state. For taxpayers, paying taxes to the state is a *quid pro quo*, that is, they expect services to be provided. It is basically “revenue for services.” As pointed out by Fjeldstad (2004), South Africans were more likely to pay for local service charges if they felt that the government

was providing services equitably, collecting revenue fairly, and using the revenue to provide services. Legitimacy comes in large part from government delivery of services that people want and need. Fiscal capacities are needed to build a legitimate state. Democratic elections do not themselves ensure state legitimacy. Neither do “quick impact projects” in which foreign aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. Unfortunately, however, in most African states the provision of public services is unreliable and where it has been provided services have been regarded as not of good quality. The weak link between taxes paid and services provided to citizens has exacerbated poverty in most African countries and sometimes eroded the legitimacy of some governments (Brautigam et al., 2008).

According to the World Bank (2004a) the effective provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, security, justice, health, education, electricity, and agriculture extension, is a major challenge for development. In many developing countries, the poor (especially the rural poor) receive substandard services in terms of access, quantity, and quality. This situation is exacerbated or magnified in fragile or post-conflict societies where the state lacks the resources to provide the services as a result of the destruction of these basic services leading to exclusion of vulnerable groups. In fact, it has been pointed out that poor people and marginalized groups such as women and children lack access to services in fragile states for a number of reasons. These include deliberate social exclusion (on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, caste, tribe, race, or political

affiliation), remote geography, inappropriate services, high real and/or opportunity costs, or security concerns. There is therefore the issue of dealing with social exclusion: ensuring that institutions and communities do not engage in practices that deliberately exclude access for particular groups (Berry et al., 2004).

The basic functions expected of states are (i) to maintain security across their terrain; (ii) to enable economic development; and (iii) to ensure that essential needs of their citizens are met (Meagher, 2008). In other words, the ability of a fragile or failed state to provide and deliver basic services is seriously compromised by the weakness of its institutions, lack of capacity and/or disruption related to ongoing or recent armed conflict or violent insecurity (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008). In addition, failed or fragile states are countries whose governance systems have broken down or were destroyed and opened the door to instability, oppression, conflict, and unchecked political and economic opportunism. Table 14 shows that the focus of interventions in functional states emphasizes institutionalizing systematic change in the formal governance system, whereas interventions in failed or fragile states target rebuilding trust and cooperation among citizens and laying the groundwork for reconstituting basic governance functions (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002). In fragile states, governance and administrative systems are both part of the problem due to their absence, insufficiency, or capture; at the same time, they are part of the solution in their centrality to the viability of the state (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002).

Table 14 Illustrative governance interventions in functional and failed/failing states

Functional State	Failed/Failing State
• Structural adjustment/macroeconomic management	* Constitutional reform, legal frameworks and rule of law
• Regulatory framework and legal reform	* Demilitarization/demobilization of excombatants
• Democratization and electoral reform	* Reconciliation mechanism (truth and reconciliation commissions)
• Decentralization	* Conflict resolution and/mitigation
• Legislative strengthening	* Security/peacekeeping
• Administrative reform	* Professionalization of military and police
• Budget systems	* Reconstituting representative institutions
• Public sector management training	* Rebuilding central government core agencies
• Privatization	* Reconstructing legitimacy (elections)
• Infrastructure development	* Limited service delivery/basic infrastructure
• Sectoral service delivery capacity building (health, agriculture, social services)	* Rebuilding community organizations
• Community development • Civil society strengthening/social capital formation • NGO watchdogs (human rights, anticorruption)	* Civil society trust-building

Source: Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002)

Social inclusion. Social inclusion is the opposite of social exclusion and refers to the equitable distribution of resources and benefits to every member of society or citizen, irrespective of his or her race, ethnicity, gender, age, economic standing, or physical condition. It is non-discriminatory and knows no boundaries between the rich and the poor, advantaged and disadvantaged, or empowered and disempowered, or invulnerable and vulnerable. It strengthens the bonds between citizens and government, dispels distrust created by a history of discriminatory politics, and reduces polarization, civil wars, and communal violence. It builds social and economic participation for all individuals, groups and communities without leaving any one behind and linking them together will improve living standards and the quality of life of people. In short, social inclusion promotes unity and good governance since it takes care of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity and ethno-regional discrimination (UNECA, 2009).

In this Report, social inclusion is the process or mechanism of granting access to all citizens in fragile or post-conflict societies with quality

public services such as water, security, justice, sanitation, health, education, and electricity. Access to such services is considered a right for all citizens, regardless of their income or status (Birner and von Braum, 2009).

Service delivery. Vaux and Visman (2005) have conceptualized service delivery as the process of interaction between policy makers, service providers and the people. Under this definition, it encompasses services and their supporting systems that are typically regarded as state responsibility. These include *social services* (primary education and basic health services), *infrastructure* (water and sanitation, roads and bridges), and *services* that promote personal security (justice and police).

According to Pinto (1998) public services involve three basic functions: *provision*, *production* and *delivery*. Provision refers to assuring the delivery of a service, production refers to the process of generating the service, and delivery involves distribution of the service to the end users (Pinto, 1998). Many innovations pertain to the *production* and *delivery* parts of the public

service equation, which are quite amenable to operational changes and improvements. Less attention tends to be paid to the provision side of the equation, where allocative policy and financing are central and determine the range of service coverage among users and the distribution of the cost burden. Thus, while production and delivery can be treated by different market-based institutional arrangements, provision is inherent in policy and remains at the core of public administration, as framed by the state. Innovations in provision translate, for example, into governments' exiting a given service area, leaving it entirely to the market: the most radical form of privatization (Batley, 2004). Regulatory decisions by governments, as another example, may be entirely based on issues of provision and standards of service with little or no reference to questions of production and delivery, which are left entirely to private producers and deliverers. While issues of service provision can be viewed in the context of the scope of government and how they drive policy decisions to privatize services, there is also the potential of innovations in those service areas where the state remains as provider/financier and seeks exit from production and delivery. The service voucher modality, for example, represents state control of provision with total exit from production and delivery (Pinto, 1998; Batley, 2004).

Good governance and service delivery. It is increasingly recognized that good governance is a precondition for development and maintenance of peace and security (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005; Dorussen, 2005; Fukuyama, 2004). In terms of service provisioning, it is difficult to identify what works where and under what circumstances. We draw here a lot on Collier's vision of Independent Service Authorities (ISAs) after providing a brief general historical view of service delivery in Africa. Collier

(2009c) argues that the service delivery structures inherited from colonial times are not suitable for Africa, most notably for post-conflict states. Delivery systems that account for local context can be attempted, and we will identify the ones that can potentially succeed in fragile environments. The colonial heritage of service delivery in Africa is based on ministries, which structure their activities on central planning principles. The planning element was reinforced in the Cold War, era especially in countries that were loyal to the socialist bloc. Currently, mainly due to the complex heterogeneous composition of the population and poor financial incentives, public sector service delivery staff in Africa lack strong sense of identity, social equity, accountability and spirit of serving the public. Hence, Collier argues that the centralized service delivery model, which worked in Europe after World War II, is unlikely to succeed. The failure is commonplace not only due to the behavior of the public sector staff but also due to the intensive up-to-date information requirement of a planned system that is literally absent in much of Africa, let alone in fragile states. Monitoring and evaluation structures are also poorly designed.

There is a need to support Africa financially to build its capacity for service delivery, and the historical route of channeling all donor support via government ministries is unlikely to succeed, but this does not mean no service delivery capacity should go to governments. Rather, one should think hard to deliver this donor support to minimize the leakage and years of failure. It is increasingly accepted to bypass the government ministerial set up and provide capacity development for services to NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). As Collier (2009c) pointed out, this alternative undermines state capacity, fosters poor political accountability, and has

short life span. Such an alternative may also lead to tension between governments and NGOs, as the recent crackdown of the Ethiopian government on internationally funded local NGOs shows. One also should not forget the role of NGOs in many of the regime changes in the late 1990's that worsened the existing suspicious dialogue between NGOs and governments. To compound the already complex issue of service delivery, there is also a growing suspicion between development partners and governments (Macrae et al., 2004). Potential coordination failure is also a disincentive for development partners when they contemplate engaging with NGOs because the non-state sector is highly fragmented. There is no guarantee that service delivery efficiency is going to improve if support concentrates on NGOs and CSOs, as these very organizations could be very corrupt. It is common to hear that NGOs often engage in profit making ventures and other corrupt activities such as selling vehicles locally for exorbitant prices by abusing their duty free status for most of their imports, including cars and machinery. Hence, there is a delicate balancing act and weighing up of tradeoffs to be seriously considered by the donor community without losing sight of what one can learn from history.

Since post-conflict societies are the focus here, the Report emphasizes the details of ISAs that are believed to be a workable alternative for public service delivery in weak states. The idea of ISA is based on the common model we now see in Europe. Public agencies (with possible non-governmental appointees in board membership) are commissioned or financed by governments to deliver one or more activities of a given ministry. ISAs can be designed to evolve into

permanent delivery outlets and can take different forms. For transparency reasons, donor agencies and civil society representatives should be on the board of directors of an ISA. Government ministries should also be part of this board. One should note that ISAs are complementary alternatives, not substitutes for the usual government sponsored service delivery responsibility. ISAs' capacity development support can be conceptualized as a ring-fenced budget support for specific service delivery in post-conflict environments (Collier, 2009c). Some fragile states are more capable than others of providing a service delivery framework through ISAs. Therefore, donor coordination efforts to support capacity development for service delivery should be heterogeneous based on the context and the capability prevailing in each country.

The three strategies of service delivery in fragile states. Given the challenges facing fragile states in connection with the performance of their governance functions, and the importance of service delivery to secure legitimacy, three strategies have been used for service delivery in fragile/post-conflict countries in Africa. They are: (i) purely humanitarian, project-based, short term approach; (ii) state delivery of services; and (iii) non-state delivery of services (DfID, 2005a; Collier, 2007a; Berry, 2009). It is, however, instructive to note that the strategies have exhibited three key features. First, they exhibit support for pro-poor service delivery as a highly complex and long-term activity, given the institutional and governance failures and protracted periods of violence and crisis. Second and more important, the strategies appear to be “one-size-fits-all” approaches that fail to take into account a sound and robust political analysis

of specific context and sector. Universally accepted as blueprints, they have been implemented in all fragile states in Africa and developing countries on other continents with varying degrees of success (McCloughlin, 2009; Gobyn, 2006; Chataigner and Gaulme, 2005). In terms of implementing administrative reforms, "Because one size does not fit all, all reforms in post-conflict societies must be based on strong assessments and diagnoses of country needs, political conditions and implementation visibility. One of the enduring lessons of experience is that reconstruction of public administration can succeed in post-conflict societies only if it meets indigenous needs; fits national economic, social and political conditions; and has the support of 'champions' among the political and bureaucratic elites" (Rondinelli, 2006: 21).

Third, it has been difficult to find the appropriate balance between responding to immediate humanitarian needs and building long-term capacity, engaging with the public sector and non-state providers (NSPs) and supporting and working with central and lower-level institutions (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008; Batley and McCloughlin, 2009).

What are the impacts of the strategies?

Purely humanitarian, project-based short term approach. This is the dominant mode of engagement in service delivery in post-conflict countries. It involves emergency relief provided by the UN and the international community in conjunction with national NGOs in an effort to stave off a humanitarian crisis. Newly established governments depend on large amounts of external assistance to be able to extend services, especially to marginalized and vulnerable groups. Providing health and education services,

especially in refugee camps that can easily become recruitment grounds for militants, plays an important role in preventing renewed conflicts (Collier, 2007b; Joshi, 2008).

However, this mode of engagement has led to a fragmented and uncoordinated response that inadequately addressed the institutional failures and governance deficits that are the core of state fragility. The promotion of vertical, non-integrated programs, such as the creation of multiple vertical or special programs, to address the same health issues has been perceived as creating mechanisms that bypass rather than include state institutions and systems. This, in turn, has undermined the already weak relationships of accountability and even created new and often deeper institutional failures (Commins, 2005; Berry et al., 2004; Meagher, 2008; Newbrander, 2007; Joshi, 2008). Consequently, it has been recognized that sponsored service delivery initiatives by the international community should be designed to involve rather than bypass the state so as to strengthen the institutional apparatus to ensure long-term, sustainable service provision and delivery.

The negative effect of the humanitarian approach has been emphasized in McGovern's chapter, "Liberia: The Risks of Re-building as Shadow State" (2008), which reviews the experience of the international community in Liberia during its post-conflict transitional period and finds that deeply intrusive forms of intervention often risk long-term sustainability for medium-term success. It argues that unless reforms and reconstruction are rooted in consultation and a sense of local ownership, they are likely to collapse as soon as donor interest and resources shift elsewhere.

Service delivery by state institutions. Effective reconstruction requires governments to create a strong state quickly and in such a fashion as to strengthen the capability of the governing authority not only to provide security, eliminate violent conflict, protect human rights, and generate economic opportunities, but also to extend basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies, and combat poverty and inequality (Rondinelli, 2006). As noted by the UNDP (2004: 3) “in post-conflict situations, such as in Sierra Leone or Somalia, establishing some form of credible representative government that can provide essential services is increasingly seen as an essential part of the first stages of post-conflict reconstruction.” Consequently, the first best solution for ensuring effective targeting of essential services in post-conflict countries is to have a willing and capable state take responsibility. This is important for two reasons. First, states gain legitimacy by being seen to provide services as part of the social contract with citizens. Non-state provision of core state functions is seen to have potentially negative impact on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state (Ghani and Lockhart, 2005: 11). Second and more important, even if non-state actors are the direct providers of services to clients, there are some specific services (for example, vaccination) and some indirect coordination, oversight, and purchasing functions (setting policy frameworks and ensuring service provision by setting standards, coordinating, regulating and financing) that independent providers left alone will not provide efficiently or at all (Collier, 2007a; Call and Wyeth, 2008).

For these reasons, in countries where there is some willingness and some capacity at the

central government level, the national government is used by the international community as a partner in pro-poor policymaking to deliver services by strengthening state capacity and working directly with the state and its structures. Decisions as to where to engage, whether at the center or at lower levels, are based on a political analysis of the specific context aimed at locating capacity and will at different institutional levels (Berry et al., 2004). This is of crucial importance because in countries such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone where lack of willingness at the central level was a significant constraint to pro-poor service delivery, the international community found “pockets of willingness” or “entry points” within certain ministries or at least lower levels of government. In this way, the international community was able to build on existing pro-poor political will and work with lower-level institutions aimed at integrating initiatives into government processes and structures in the longer term (Berry et al., 2004; Ranson, et al. 2007; Meagher, 2008). Similarly, after the war in Uganda, UNICEF adopted the Ministry of Health by providing strong leadership and close collaboration in the health program. Responsibility was eventually turned back to the Ministry, which had developed significant capacity under UNICEF’s mentorship (Carlson et al., 2005).

In some dysfunctional environments in Africa (for instance, Sierra Leone) the best options for ensuring service delivery to the largest number in need has been to use local governments and traditional authorities because they exercise real authority and retain more legitimacy than the national government (DIIS, 2008). However, even though local service delivery may be ideal for certain services such as potable water, the

decision to work with local governments has incurred either the hostility of some national government or added to the incoherence among disparate service initiatives across the countries (Meagher, 2008).

In some post-conflict countries (for instance, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Ethiopia) the international community, apart from dealing with *de jure* state actors, also dealt with *de facto* actors and structures such as dissident political movements or rebel groups to ensure access and continuity of service provision (Berry et al., 2004; Carlson et al., 2005; Call and Wyeth, 2008).

Non-state delivery of services. Non-state delivery of services is used where the dominant role of centralized line departments in the provision of public services has receded in the face of financial constraints, as public sector capacity, including resources are inadequate to sustain significant levels of provision. Sustained conflict has prevented the central government from reaching populations in parts of a territory affected by conflict, with insecurity rendering consistent provision impossible. Policy initiatives to tackle such problems have emphasized alternative forms of service provision through private and non-governmental agencies. This means more limited involvement with government or, if necessary, avoidance in favor of non-state providers. Delivery of services by private firms or NGOs is not necessarily inferior to delivery by the state, and in some countries is preferable, but state fragility inevitably reduces the role of the public sector in favor of non-state actors or non-state providers (Batley and McLoughlin, 2009).

It is instructive to note that the guiding principle of engagement with non-state service providers requires that the international community engage and partner with such providers and strengthen public institutions. It is important that initiatives premised on engagement with non-state service providers are not totally disconnected from the public service delivery track and that hand-back mechanisms to ensure the eventual transition from non-state to state actors are incorporated in program planning and designing from the very beginning (Commins, 2008; Meagher, 2008).

Impacts of the strategies on service delivery The impacts of the three strategies on service delivery and social inclusion can be summarized as follows:

- **Purely humanitarian, project-based short term approach:** This approach has been commonly used in all fragile countries in Africa and indeed, all over the world. It is the first entry point in trying to restore basic services to fragile environments; consequently, there is no doubt that it has led to a vital start of reconstruction activities and the delivery of vital public services such as healthcare, school water, shelter, food, and internal security in all (UNECA, 2003; Berry et al., 2004; Batley and McLoughlin, 2009). However, its long-term effect on service delivery has been questioned, as it is largely geared to addressing service delivery challenges temporarily and in the short-term. It is an emergency relief or stopgap approach and, like all emergency approaches, it lacks sustainability. Moreover, it is a “one-size-fits-all” approach that does not take into account the peculiar contexts of the countries

involved, such as elite capture, geography, and history of the war; thus, in some countries (such as Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique, and Burundi) the approach has tended to compound access to services by marginalized groups such as women and children (McCloughlin, 2009).

- **Service delivery by state institutions:** To what extent has the delivery of service by state institutions contributed to equity across disparate groups, which has helped to repair societal fractures? Is there a relationship between state responsiveness and service delivery? Studies on this question in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Nigeria, southern Sudan, and Cambodia have shown that the relationship is not straightforward because

the level and nature of fragility, violence, patronage, ethnicity, and economic growth all played a part. Furthermore, other studies have found that health sector strengthening, for example, can contribute to state building in the health sector but that its impact on wider state building remains unclear. In stabilization contexts, the particular challenge is how, given that the state often lacks the capacity to ensure reliable services, provision by external actors and development partners have enhanced state legitimacy and not weaken it (Eldon, 2008; Call and Wyeth, 2008). From these studies, it seems that visible service delivery by state institutions has not resulted in state legitimacy, strengthening of the social contract, and hence the promotion of state-building

Box 13

Service delivery in contexts of low state capacity and low willingness: Education in southern Sudan and health service delivery in the DRC

In southern Sudan, due to protracted conflict and historical neglect of the region, there is little in the way of state structures for the provision of services. In this context, basic service delivery came to be provided for several years by international NGOs. While security, health, and food dominated the humanitarian agenda, education received little attention. With increasing peace prospects, attention turned to the lack of official capacity or resources with respect to strategic planning as well as technical skills, for instance with regard to curriculum development, teacher training, and teaching itself. Organizations such as Save the Children UK began to focus their attention on developing formal education systems, particularly for primary education but also programs providing for adult literacy and numeracy skills. Education for Development's work in one part of southern Sudan focused on local capacity building and peace building as the underlying approach to developing literacy skills. Communities were involved in developing the curriculum for the training themselves, allowing them to conceive of taking a wider role in decision making more generally. An acknowledged limitation to the work of this project was that it did not feed into wider discussions of education policy development taking place in southern Sudan. This points to the need to develop closer networks so that expertise developed at very local levels can be shared and utilized on a wider scale.

Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of Congo there is a long history of international involvement in health service delivery. Using the state structure as a basis, development partners have, since the 1970s, taken responsibility for the provision of health services to different parts of the country. The government (of then Zaire) itself provided no health funding. Currently, the attempt is being made to increasingly seek the involvement of government in the provision and regulation of health services.

Source: Carlson, C. et al. (2005). "Improving the Delivery of Health and Education Services in Difficult Environments," London: DFID Health Systems Resource Centre.


- **Non-state delivery of services.** The absence or weakness of state services usually means that the majority of services are delivered by non-state actors (including international and local non-governmental organizations and traditional and commercial service providers), particularly in the early recovery phase. Studies have found that this results in the fragmented and uneven provision of services in fragile environments in Africa (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009). There is also concern that the delivery of services through non-state providers has a negative impact on the development of state legitimacy and capacity. Furthermore, there is concern that states with weak capacity cannot effectively perform the indirect stewardship roles of managing, coordinating, and financing non-state providers of basic services and how non-state providers can support the development of state capacity for direct provision in the long-term. Above all, contracting mechanism—which is widely used by non-state service providers while in theory is to increase service utilization, service quality, improve efficiency and reduce service fragmentation—has actually promoted precipitous decentralization in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda, eroded the independence of non-state service providers, and fragmented service provision given that such providers were seldom able to provide an overall framework in which they operated (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009; GSDRC, 2009; Berry et al. 2004; Moreno-Torres, 2005).

The strategies confirm that improving pro-poor service delivery is an increasingly prominent feature of engagement in post-conflict countries. State fragility and service delivery are seen as interrelated and mutually

reinforcing: state fragility negatively impacts on service delivery; conversely, pro-poor service delivery interventions have the potential to address the root causes of state fragility. However, the impact of the strategies on social inclusion seems limited given their “one-size-fits all” nature and the different contexts in which they were implemented (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008).

Gender equality and social inclusion. The issue of gender policy was captured in the ACIR data collection process through three questions related primarily to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and processes for implementation of a gender equality policy.

Across all the countries surveyed for the Report, the policy environment for gender equality is good. The majority of countries have made strong commitment to gender equality. All of the countries surveyed have ratified the CEDAW, even if some did so with reservations, and 83 percent have embodied the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitution or other appropriate legislation (see figure 14). As reported, 82 percent of countries have mainstreamed gender into their development planning through clear guides and targets set in their Poverty Reduction Strategy/National Development Plans. However, with regard to the processes for implementing a gender equality policy, 61 percent of countries reported that the allocation of financial resources to gender related activities was not clearly done. This finding goes in the same direction with regard to the process for collecting data on gender issues. For 62 percent of countries, there is no clear guide on delineating statistics by gender.

Figure 14 Levels of commitment to gender equality

Source: ACI field survey data

Improving governance through a strong parliamentary framework is crucial for engaging society as well as making states effective: the link between good governance and sustainable development has been known for some time. Good governance encourages social inclusion, the development of social capital, and a cohesive and stable society. The history of governance in African states in the last few decades has been characterized by dictatorship, corruption, and nepotism: a society where little was demanded of the state for the provision of basic social services or the respect of human rights. In the 1990s, a new wave of social transformation (especially democratization) swept across the continent. Parliamentary elections have been held and other forms of representative government instituted, especially at local levels. These processes have seen the emergence of more responsive governments and articulate civil groups demanding better social services and more accountable government. Of the 34 countries surveyed, the majority (58.8 percent) had entrenched parliamentary tradition whereby the constitution limits the president/head of state from appointing representatives to parliament in addition to the elected representatives. Most of the surveyed countries (67.7 percent) did not require nationals to have

special qualifications to enjoy certain privileges; 79.4 percent of these countries indicated social services are accessible to nationals on equal terms. Equally, a majority of the countries (75.8 percent) indicated that all nationals have equal employment opportunities; and indeed, there are policies and laws that provide equal opportunity for all (87.9 percent of countries). Equally, most countries surveyed provided protection in law for the vulnerable in society (91.2 percent). Thus, most countries surveyed encouraged social inclusion.

Indeed, capacity development encompasses individual, group, institutional, and organizational empowerment to participate in identification, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of national capacity development initiatives. The participation of stakeholders (state and non-state actors) in the conceptualization through to evaluation of country capacity development interventions ensures that they are aligned to national priorities, have secured the buy-in and commitment of stakeholders at an early stage, and are sustainable investments.

There is therefore the need for countries to establish mechanisms of engaging relevant stakeholders on capacity development issues. Institutionalizing a dialogue mechanism enables


countries to tap into the skills, knowledge, and competencies of both locals and the wider development community in a consistent and coherent manner that assures the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of national capacity development initiatives. Additionally, continuous and systematic engagement among stakeholders facilitates consensus building, reduces and/or eliminates the duplication of efforts; and supports resource mobilization for capacity development interventions.

Of the 34 sub-Saharan African countries surveyed, 17 countries, representing 50 percent of the total, have an institutionalized mechanism for engaging with domestic institutions while 10

countries (29 percent) have no formalized mechanism for engaging with domestic institutions (figure 15).

Further, the survey revealed that 71 percent of the countries do not have an effective mechanism for engaging development partners on capacity development. Most of the countries do not have specific mechanisms of engaging the development community; it is done as part of the broader engagement for development support. Only 10 countries (Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) had established institutionalized dialogue mechanisms for capacity development.

Figure 15 Mechanisms for Stakeholder participation in setting country capacity development agenda




Source: ACI field survey data

The survey found that civil society has been especially instrumental in spearheading the capacity development agenda across Africa. The level of civil society participation in country capacity development agenda setting is above average at 77 percent. However, according to the survey, civil society participation in capacity development is uneven across the countries. Whereas 48 percent of surveyed countries

indicated high participation, 23 percent considered civil society participation low (see figure 16). This indicates that there is room to go in terms of integrating citizen views, including those from civil society, in the processes of capacity development. Such efforts should also bolster the legitimacy of existing governance structures and further strengthen the ownership of the development process by the polity.

Figure 16 Civil society participation



Source: ACI field survey data

3.5 Donor coordination and international support in fragile states in Africa

Backdrop. Development partners face a dilemma: they must provide aid for either projects or budget support. The latter is feasible in strong states with effective governance structures, while the route of capacity development via projects has an appeal in fragile or weak states. Donor engagement with fragile states takes different forms; this points to the lack of policy coherence, which is not surprising in complex settings coupled with heterogeneous donor priorities and motives. These engagement routes include the OECD-DAC principles (OECD-DAC, 2007), the “whole of government” approaches that bring together their diplomatic, defense, and development instruments, or the 3Ds (Patrick and Brown, 2007); and the Coherent, Coordinated and Complementary (3C) approach (Anten, van Beijnum and Specker, 2009). But neglecting weak states, as occurred since the 1980s, is detrimental to the citizens of these countries, and donor support not only enhances development but also reduces the probability of fragility (Carment, Samy and Prest, 2008; Macrae et al., 2004).

In recent times, a consensus has emerged to re-engage with these states. Capacity development can take, inter alia, the form of provision of public and other goods (roads, education, health, employment, water, sanitation, food security) by bilateral as well as multilateral development partners and also demobilization and integration of ex-combatants in places such as Liberia, Burundi, Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They focus on rebuilding a nation's shattered human and social capital along with the inevitable requirement of building its physical capital. However, for sustainable peace and economic development, key concepts need to be clarified, coordination/level/type of intervention decided, actors of intervention identified and successful/promising case studies carefully reviewed. This enhances capacity to develop appropriate policies and strategies to be followed in the future. One of the most important pressing recent developments is the current economic recession. The economic downturn is a huge challenge for the donor community.

Heterogeneity of context is of paramount significance. For instance, in Liberia there is

minimal ethnic strife. Hence, ex-combatants from different ethnic factions form a group and occupy rubber plantations for employment purposes (Cheng, 2010). But in other parts of Africa, ethnic tensions often jeopardize post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Given the list of past failed aid efforts, future actions should focus on improving the support allocated for building the capacity of weak states in Africa. Support for the continent and elsewhere is driven by political, historical, and commercial motives, including post-colonial links, the Cold War legacy, the search for natural resources, and the war on terror (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). Today, approximately 38 international organizations have a mandate and an interest in regional security; collectively, their efforts cover virtually the entire globe (Tavares, 2010). There are also bilateral and multilateral organizations involved in the rebuilding of post-conflict states. For instance, there are about 30 development partners and 300 NGOs in Rwanda, each with its own reporting and working mechanisms, and one can imagine the huge coordination problem of such a complex scenario. Fragile states are disproportionately represented in Africa. But due to long term donor strategies and emergency situations, the focus of the international community is predominantly on Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Haiti, and Pakistan.

In Africa, Millennium Development Goal targets can be met only if development partners act decisively and forcefully to build the capacity of fragile states that are “falling behind and falling apart” (Collier, 2007b). Since the ultimate goal of development is poverty reduction, capacity development has a major role to play in fostering this goal (Kedir, 2010a). Neoclassical and endogenous growth theories tell us that after

countries survive shocks, they revert to pre-conflict steady state growth trajectories. Development partner support to struggling weak states is useful, as are credible indigenous development efforts and strong political will by recipients. For instance, Rwanda after 1994, Uganda after 1986, and Ethiopia after 1991 made recoveries with some conflict episodes along the way. Relative internal political stability, governance efforts, and sustained donor intervention helped the respective recovery processes of these countries.

Sovereignty Axiom. Outside intervention, whether well intentioned or to promote covert economic and other motives, is justifiably resented by most nations on the basis of sovereignty principles. However, this resistance has drawbacks, as some flexibility of this principle facilitates peace building and security. For instance, the African Union (AU) replaced the principle of non-interference with the principle of non-indifference. The recently formed Peace and Security Council of the AU made the reversal of one of the basic principles of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) possible. This reversal should not be confused with a complete surrender to interventions from outside; rather, it is a flexible arrangement that creates room for development partner support to be effective in difficult environments. In other settings, as opposed to fragile states, the reversal may not be necessary, as country ownership and sovereignty are essential. The reversal has its merits in terms of bringing peace and security in Africa, as seen in the peace mediations brokered in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Tavares, 2010). Now there is increased interaction between the AU and UN, which is also crucial for conflict anticipation, prevention and constructive intervention. For

instance, to this effect, the AU and UN signed a Ten Year Capacity Building Program.

Who owns the policy? This question has strong links with both sovereignty and coordination of aid. In the new era of aid paradigm literature, there are concerns over country ownership of policies because development partners often push for implementation of policies in their own priority areas. Country ownership is flagged as a solution to aid chaos and welcomed by development partners (Sandler, 2004). However, there is a limit to the potential viability of this solution, mainly in fragile states where weak or non-existent institutions are unable to handle the complexity of aid targeted at capacity development. Therefore, in a context where local institutions are well functioning, country ownership can be pursued. To probe further the country ownership idea in Africa, we should learn a great deal from recent economic history of the continent. In the later part of the 1980s, the continent was subjected to numerous economic reform agendas pushed mainly by Washington based institutions. There was intense debate for and against the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which put aid conditionality on recipient countries. Many academic commentators cautioned against the blanket push for faster, unsequenced, and comprehensive free market reforms. The development partners were pushing the reforms based on lessons learned from rich countries (which are far removed from the real structure of African economies) and some alleged but unsustainable success stories within the continent.

At present, there is consensus that conditionality should leave the scene from national ownership. Not imposing conditionality is a feasible route in weak/fragile states, which are, for instance,

unlikely to meet the requirements of preparing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) necessary to qualify for aid under the World Bank's Country Development Framework. The argument for conditionality based on good policies is supported by many. If capacity is enhanced, some fragile states can be in a position to decide on their policies and demonstrate commitment to program implementation. To realize this in fragile states, development partners can provide and monitor the allocation of capacity development resources. Capacity development ensures the sovereignty concern and enhances the effectiveness of peace, security, and economic reconstruction processes driven by recipients. A good country ownership example is Burundi, which ensured coordination with different development partners, such as Belgium and France, by taking the lead in project planning and implementation.

Traditional peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) vs Multidimensional PKOs (MPKOs). Country ownership is relevant in both drafting and agreeing to economic policy and security blueprints. The current literature in peacekeeping discusses the transition of traditional PKOs to multidimensional PKOs. Traditional PKOs can initiate the first step of nation building by ending direct violent conflicts. Multidimensional PKOs are the next step in the nation building process in post-conflict societies; their work encompasses investment in education, health, infrastructure, democratization, and governance.

This transition by the UN is a serious undertaking that joins the peace, security, and development agendas, an ambitious but appropriate¹¹ venture, though some perceive it as threatening to central authorities of domestic actors (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2008). MPKOs build the peace

component into traditional foreign aid (mainly economic and technical aid) and are concentrated in fragile states and hotspots such as the African Great Lakes Region. Since multilateral institutions such as the World Bank have development partner support objectives in a multidimensional sense, the transition gives development partner coordination a promising future. This is feasible as far as the UN and World Bank are committed to working together in fragile environments.

The purpose of this encouraging transition by the UN and of embedding good governance within peacekeeping missions is to transform fragile post-conflict states into well-governed

societies with enduring peace and economic development. The disaggregated event data analyzed from four multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions in the African Great Lakes region provides useful insights for development partner coordination in fragile states. Dorussen and Gizelis (2008) used a multinomial logit framework to analyze whether the actions and policies of PKOs produce cooperation and conflict. Their results indicate that democratization is controversial (most likely due to the confusion over the concept of “Western” democratization) while policies that focus on state capacity development and elections led to cooperation outcomes between the UN and fragile states.

Box 14

Peace operations in Africa

Since its birth in 2001, the AU has deployed around 15,000 troops as part of large-scale peace operations to four states: Burundi (2003-2004, 2007-2008); Sudan (2004-2007); the Comoros (2006, 2007, 2008); and Somalia (2007-present) (Williams, 2009a: 98). The AU Peace and Security Council and the AU Assembly sanctioned these operations. All but the Somalia mission had host state consent. The UN Security Council endorsed all but the African Mission in Burundi.

These missions all relied on external support. The troops were committed by a limited number of countries: South Africa provided almost all the troops for the missions in Burundi (2003-2004) and the Comoros (2006, 2007, 2008); Uganda provides most of the troops for the operation in Somalia (2007-present); and Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa were the main troop contributors for the AU's operation in Sudan (2004-2007) (Williams, 2009a: 112).

Peace operations by ECOWAS have included: Liberia (1990-1997, 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), and the ECOWAS mission for Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) (2003-2005). There have been numerous other missions by sub-regional actors (Söderbaum and Tavares, 2009: 71).

Of these, only ECOMICI and AMIS were given mandates that included explicit civilian protection tasks. Most of these operations were transitioned into UN (blue-hatted) peace operations, for instance the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (1999-2005), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (2003-present), the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) (2003-2006), the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (2004-present), and the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (2007-present). Bergholm suggests that this gives the impression that AU missions are meant as interim measures until UN peace operations have been assembled.

Sources: Söderbaum, F. and Tavares, R. (2009). “Special Issue: Regional Organizations in African Security,” *African Security* 2, no. 2-3; Williams, P. D. (2009). “The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis.” *African Security* 2, no. 2-3: 97-118; Bergholm, L. (2010). “The African Union, the United Nations and Civilian Protection Challenges in Darfur.” Oxford Department of International Development Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper no. 63.

War overhang, the peace dividend, and the peace dividend insecurity paradox. The concept of war overhang is used here to highlight the importance of categorizing post-conflict countries by the number of years of conflict they experienced. Fragile states were in either short or long civil wars in the past. Development partners need to recognize the fact that those emerging from short wars are characterized by a war overhang effect (Ansoms, 2005; Collier, 1999). Hence, in countries that emerged from short conflicts, capacity development support and aid coordination can be skewed more toward short-term peace maintenance rather than long-term economic development goals. In the first decade after civil conflict, growth trajectory follows an "inverted U path". Rapid growth is often preceded by peace settlement reached after long-term conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a).

The peace dividend's economic benefits in post-conflict environments were criticized mainly on the grounds of the long-term nature of any peace related economic development benefits, if any. Pointing to the need to consider the myriad factors in peace maintenance, Ferreira (2005) argues that the peace dividend is not guaranteed because the reallocation of former military resources to development is not straightforward. Ferreira's concept of the peace dividend insecurity paradox and the war overhang effect are relevant to post conflict reconstruction efforts whether they are undertaken by African states alone or in collaboration with external support. The theoretical concept gives us an insight into the dynamics of peace and development in fragile environments and the situations under which post-conflict peace can be vulnerable to fragility.

Timing and sequencing. One practical but complex process is reallocating the human resources (such as ex-combatants) and building key physical infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) as short-term but intensive donor support component undertaken at the right time for the sake of a long-term peace building effort. African states that emerge from conflict often label ex-combatants as rebels for life, exclude them from normal life, and impose financial and social humiliation on them. This can create a large and frustrated underclass of young men who can derail all security and development efforts. As African states tend to ignore and/or give little attention to the complex issue of the reintegration of ex-military personnel to society, donor coordination mechanisms can support grassroots organizations and NGOs that attempt to address the plight of ex-soldiers. Timing and sequencing are key ingredients of any support and intervention in volatile countries such as Liberia, which has problems of forced seizure of large rubber plantations by ex-combatants¹². This is alarming for the maintenance of peace. Angola too has its own share of potential problems with a history of long civil war in the recent past and large group of young ex-soldiers.

Donor Coordination: key issues, review of interventions and strategy papers.

There is no question of the need to support fragile African states. Despite his cautious optimism about the effectiveness of foreign aid, in a special report for the World Bank Institute (Collier, 2009d) and also in his award-winning book "The Bottom Billion" (Collier, 2007b), Paul Collier suggests a Marshall Plan type big push and intensive injection of aid to rebuild failing states. At the same time, he mentioned the

common frustration of aid coordination failure by giving an example in relation to three aid agencies that were planning to build a hospital in the same location.

A large number of the fragile states with millions of residents are in Africa. China's arrival on and increasing involvement in the aid scene complicates the coordination problem with all its political economy dynamics. It is obvious that the effectiveness of aid for capacity development in fragile states can be enhanced if there is increased donor alignment, coordination, and harmonization (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007).

Based on context-specific needs assessments in fragile states, in recent years donors coordinated their efforts with some success using multi-donor trust funds, national programs, social funds community driven development, and the creation of national compacts, all of which are perceived as ways to align donor funds behind national and community priorities (McCloughlin, 2010). A rigorous and careful investigation of the issue of donor coordination and aid ownership are the central objectives of existing efforts to reform the foreign aid system. This is evident by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by more than 100 donor agencies and recipient governments. It is legitimate to criticize this declaration after 5 years. The verdict on its effectiveness is that the declaration has not led to a significant decline in donor fragmentation. However, the declaration is a big step toward aid harmonization among donors. Revisiting the signed commitment and changing the rhetoric into action is one way for current donors to address the daunting donor coordination problem instead of signing other declarations to overwrite the previous one (Whitfield, 2009).

The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) is a step in the right direction in terms of fulfilling the harmonization of aid and makes coherent connections with the 2005 Paris Declaration and the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation. AAA recognizes that aid is only part of the development process and appreciates diversity and context-specific drafting of country action plans to be integrated to regional and global aid coordination efforts. It also focuses on meeting MDGs, promotes demand-driven country ownership of programs, and is explicit about what recipients and donors should do in their own accord. It highlights the slow progress of coordination efforts that are more complicated owing to the recent introduction of new partnership working arrangements with the global funds, private sector, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

In principle, AAA puts the coordination issue at the top of a list of challenging issues of the current aid delivery architecture. Timely and consistent with some of the new forms of aid to poor states, AAA emphasizes accountability, which is the core component of, for instance, the Birdsall et al. (2010) proposal on cash on delivery. AAA's promise to evaluate and identify best practice in coordination programs and future achievements remain to be seen. Much of its implementation and effectiveness depends on donors' commitment to capacity development in fragile states.

In difficult environments, the large number of actors from both the recipient and donor sides can compromise harmonization and alignment of priorities, policies, and procedures. The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Common Appeal Process (CAP) are important initiatives designed to address this problem

and track the destination of aid resources. There is some improvement in capacity development, but much has not changed on the ground when it comes to harmonization (OECD, 2005).

In an era of austerity, there is an immediate need to avoid fragmentation in aid delivery, and the objective should be to achieve the best outcome using the ever shrinking global pot of funds. Therefore, donors should loosen their allegiance to their own bureaucracies of aid delivery and work toward coordination. This is in their best interest or given the budget crisis they face. The global aid architecture is often wasteful, is populated with multiple competing agendas, and is putting administrative and financial pressure on poor countries.

After the end of the Cold War, a new aid model emerged that pushed for country ownership and aligning donors to national priorities and allocation of aid to better performing countries (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). The 2000 Millennium Summit and 2002 Monterrey Conference are prominent examples prior to the Paris 2005 declaration. Although coordination is vital, its complexity should be recognized both in emergency or long-term development situations.

It is complex because donors have heterogeneous priorities and motives and engage in different activities in different countries. Therefore, no unified formula for donor coordination can be applied in all settings. However, within a given country or region, donors can benefit from basic information exchange, expertise sharing, resource pooling, and flexibility of working arrangements on the ground. At a country level, most donors provide support to promote trade (such as African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), Generalised

System of Preferences (GSP) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), peace/security, climate change, environment, infrastructure (as with the World Bank on roads in Ethiopia), agriculture, governance, basic needs (such as water and sanitation), social services (health and education), human rights, and gender equality. At a regional level, political and economic development/integration is supported by donors, through the African Union, New Partnership for Africa's Development, United Nations, European Union, and World Bank. Despite the legitimacy of heterogeneous intervention and the need to recognize context specificity, the need for coordination is a matter of urgency in the current climate of the global economic crisis.

- **Asymmetry of expectations: fungibility, cost-recovery, and time inconsistency problem**
Neglect of human resource remobilization is not the only factor that can make the proceeds of a peace dividend a distant reality. The way foreign aid is used in recipient countries can also have this impact. Fungibility of aid is a huge concern. Based on theoretical insights from public choice, McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) show how it can arise even when donors and recipients agree about how the aid budget should be allocated. Donors may have little control over the allocation when countries divert money from immediate short-term investments such as creating sustainable livelihoods for demobilized soldiers. In relation to this, corruption, the time inconsistency problem (breaching original contractual promises), and government commitment failure come into the picture.

Another indicator of donor-recipient expectation mismatch occurs when donors

expect recipients to recover part of the costs incurred in the provision of social services such as education and health. This was mainly the case during the 1990s, when Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) proved unpopular. Recipients often do not realize such conditions are attached to the aid they receive. The obvious solution in future donor-fragile state relationships is for donors to refrain from attaching unpopular and ineffectual conditions and for fragile states to use the capacity development money they get as intended. The time inconsistency problem is well recognized in the aid literature (Sandler, 2004). Recipients often agree to donor conditions but change their commitment promises once access to aid is guaranteed; this leads to high transaction costs to monitor alignment to original recipient pledges. Past experience of such breaches of promises might condition future interaction of fragile states and donors.

- **Overlapping Development partner roles**
Development partners often fail to work on a common framework, which leads to duplication of effort, lack of timely intervention, and inevitable waste of resources. In fragile states, there is a long history of donor intervention via international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral organizations. One of the immediate weaknesses of current donor participation in the reconstruction of fragile states is the lack of commitment to building on existing experience. For this commitment to happen, donors should share vital information in a transparent and sustainable manner.

One area of improvement is consolidation of various donors' Africa strategy reports. As it stands, most donors have separate African

strategy reports. There is a room for developing coherence across strategy reports of regional, bilateral, and multilateral donors on the continent. For instance, the EU has a regional strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa, and there should be a way to integrate the country level strategies within their spheres of operation. Norway gives most of its aid to climate change, conflict prevention, reintegration of combatants, training security forces, peace building (mainly in Sudan and the horn of Africa), human rights, gender equality, governance, anti-corruption initiatives, and capital access. Sweden has a somewhat similar support regime, particularly in the peace and security sector, with its well-known focus on environment and conflict.

There is a scope to identify, exploit, and optimize the complementary aspects of the strategies. DFID (2009a; 2009b) outlines the UK government's strategic framework in conflict and fragile states. The US provides, among others, capacity development support in Africa to prevent, mitigate, and respond to conflicts. The US military's Africa Command-AFRICOM conducts peace and security capacity development with a focus on curbing extremism; in 2009, AFRICOM issued an African position document. Other capacity and economic development initiatives are supported by USAID. The UNDP has country action plans and a continent level strategy document not only on conflict, peace building, and recovery, but also in areas of poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs (UNDP, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c). There are also country strategy papers by the IMF and the World Bank whose themes focus predominantly on economic development but are not completely devoid of reconstruc-

tion of fragile states. Under the Vulnerability Financing Facility (VFF), the Low-income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) approach, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the World Bank provides support for governance, safety nets, basic services, and pro-poor growth in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia. It has less involvement in the latter two countries but promised to re-engage more in the future as detailed in its assistance and interim strategy papers (World Bank, 2008a; 2008b; 2009). This is a significant and mind-boggling overlap of activities, plans, policies, and strategies among donors. Most of these strategies have planned budgets embedded in them but often consist of pledges, not commitments, and with a provision to raise funds from other partners. This joint funding provision in most of the strategic papers justifies the need for coordination to assess how much is needed for what purpose and to identify the arrangement(s) to share the funding, logistic, and administrative responsibilities.

- **Transparency and intensity of capacity development**

The role of institutions and donor supported expenditure tracking mechanisms is another issue related to donor coordination. Gibson et al. (2005) argue that the effectiveness of donor capacity development support is limited in weak states mainly due to the limited structure in its delivery. Other coordination issues relate to decisions regarding the level of intervention and intensity of capacity building activities. In places like Liberia and Somalia, interventions by donors need to be intensified over wide areas because conflicts destroyed much of the physical infrastructure, whereas

destruction was more limited in the cases of Ethiopia and Uganda. These heterogeneous interventions need to take into account the differing contexts prevailing in each fragile state.

- **Asymmetries**

Sandler (2004) argues that to work, donor-recipient partnerships must address different asymmetries, including those related to information, technology, culture, size, and accounting and finance). Collier (2007b) also stressed the undesirability of donor-introduced complex accounting systems. This is particularly important in fragile states where budget management is poor and the accompanying system is dismal. In addition to being fundamental to coordination, these asymmetries create an opening for free riding by some donors.

- **Development partner coordination case studies: UN's Peace Building Commission (PBC).**

Established in 2006, PBC is an intergovernmental advisory body that, with the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) and the Peace Building Fund (PBF), comprises the UN's new peacebuilding initiative. When it comes to coordination, PBC increases coherence through Integrated Peace Building Strategies (IPBS) that involve local and international actors. It benefitted countries such as Burundi that gained the attention of multilateral institutions for macroeconomic support.

The lessons so far include the need to avoid duplications of local plans and to limit emphasis on national ownership in fragile states. The process can be time-consuming

and overwhelming on the ground, but coherence and the participation of civil society representatives have been achieved in places like Sierra Leone and Burundi. On the side of African fragile states, governments should encourage and ensure the participation of any section of civil society instead of cherry-picking only the urban-based organizations that are loyal to them. Evidence so far regarding PBC's mixed success has prompted a call for reforms within the UN to improve coordination.

- **Post conflict peace: boosting troops**

Some fragile states build their military hardware in post-conflict periods. Consider the case of Sudan, a geographically and ethnically diverse country whose conflict between the south and north killed nearly 2 million people. Resident coordinators and the UNHCR support war widows and refugees stationed mainly in Kenya. In relation to security, it is instructive to review what has taken place recently in Christian southern Sudan, which is seeking independence from the Muslim majority north. The south is spending at least 40 percent of the national budget on military, which can be perceived either as a measure to boost troop levels to prevent future insecurity or as a tendency to engage in war with the north. An international mechanism facilitated by donors as well as the fragile state (in this case, Sudan) could monitor this or any similar dangerous development in the interest of conflict prevention and could channel resources to valuable investments such as roads, which are still not well developed in southern Sudan.

This illustrates how central the peace element is to promoting economic develop-

ment in fragile states. The challenge for the international coordination body is to iron out the thorny issue of Sudan with respect to water, oil reserves, resettlement of refugees, education, child and maternal mortality, and the military. Conflict over resources might make Sudan more fragile. The same is true in many fragile environments in which understanding the complexity of political economy (coupled with donor motives) and identifying priority areas in a given context is the first coordination quagmire to be addressed. If peace, and therefore security, is hanging by a thread (as in Sudan), in the grand scheme, capacity development without consideration of these key issues has the potential to be another failure.

Lessons: What works where and under what circumstances?

One can draw a number of lessons with respect to development partner coordination in fragile environment. Some of the issues to be considered are:

a. Post-conflict reconstruction: timing and sequencing

The case studies and empirical evidence provided by Samy and Carment (2010) examined issues of timing and sequencing that point to potential policy options for donors in fragile states of Africa. They defined sequencing as the order in which the dynamics of ALC occur over time; in contrast, timing refers to the speed with which a donor engagement responds to changes in ALC. They also allude to strategic timing, “a response to a sequence of changes within a fragile state in which a decision is made to allocate resources with the full understanding of the consequences of that resource allocation” (Samy and Carment, 2010: 4). It is interesting to

note that accountability is embedded in the definition of strategic timing.

There is a lack of critical understanding of where, when, and how donors intervene and allocate resources in fragile states. While Samy and Carment's (2010) work did not establish a definitive guide, it provides some insight on this issue for a global sample. In their case studies, they took a 40-year profile of changes in ALC structures of different countries with heterogeneous backgrounds of fragility, such as the DRC, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone. Samy and Carment (2010) surmise that it is not clear whether donor support on authority leads to improved capacity in cases like those of DRC and Somalia, which had to contend with volatile authority challenges and very low capacity. From a policy perspective, even Samy and Carment are critical of simultaneous policy interventions, mainly due to the failure in Afghanistan. However, due to unique circumstances, they suggest a simultaneous donor support for capacity and authority in DRC and Somalia. In Zimbabwe, legitimacy scores move with changes in capacity, but this is not the case in Sierra Leone.

b. Development partners, elections and democracy

Though important in the long run, holding elections and giving priority to democratization in circumstances where there is no history and where political instability prevail should not be the immediate preoccupation of development partners (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2008; Samy and Carment, 2010). A major myth that needs to be dispelled is the misconception that democracy does not exist in societies outside the West. As Sen argues from philosophical and historical perspectives, “the implicit assumption that

democracy belongs exclusively to the West” is inappropriate (Sen, 2010: 322). Both fragile states and development partners that embark on democratization should share an understanding that rejects this misconception. Such an understanding should recognize the potential and actual presence of democratic attitudes and participatory forms of decision making in fragile states. This will afford an opportunity to build on existing local governance processes and development partners' capacity development support can play a complementary and effective role. Fragile states certainly have a lot to learn from the contemporary participatory democracy well developed in the West. Therefore, development partner aid can be used to reinforce a culture of participation, dialogue, freedom of dissent, free media, and interaction among societal members. The development partner support needs to be sustainable, as these are long-term changes. For this reason, development partners should not restrict their help to pre-election periods and highly successful democratic nations. Instead attention should be directed at the issues highlighted above in a patient and continuous manner to allow change to take place within existing structures as much as possible.

c. Case studies on some key aspects of development partner-recipient interactions

i. MDRP: (Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda)

Many post-conflict societies complete the process of demobilizing soldiers but fall short of reintegrating them into society. This failure is a serious weakness that may lead to state fragility, as peace cannot be guaranteed when there are thousands of disenfranchised ex-soldiers. A good example of coordination of demobilization

and a reintegration program relevant for fragile states is the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program. MDRP, the largest operation of its kind in the world, demobilized and reintegrated 300,000 combatants by raising US\$450 million (Disch et al., 2010). The Multi-Donor Trust Fund comes from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Commission, and 12 country donors: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and UK.

The seven countries that benefitted from the program are Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, RoC, Rwanda, and Uganda. UN agencies and NGOs were used as implementing agencies and contributed to the success of demobilization and reintegration in Angola, Burundi, and DRC (MDRP, 2008). Lessons learned for future success encompassed such areas as, national ownership, sustainability, accountability, clear roles of actors, and providing targeted and long-term support for vulnerable groups such as children and women. Development agencies could facilitate future improvements ensuring that their operational and administrative procedures are aligned to the ambitions of key coordination ventures such as MDRP.

ii. Liberia

Fragile states must maintain a particular focus on the need to give priority to employment creation for youth. A dissenting, hopeless group of youth filled with anger, frustration, and a sense of societal inequality can be a threat to a fragile state's hard earned peace. Hence, integrating the young through employment programs and giving them a sense of worth and social inclusion should be at the heart of a long-term nation building process (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2007). Nations' social safety net programs (often financed by the World Bank) can be designed to

target the young. Other complementary local initiatives, like the rubber plantations of Liberia (despite an ongoing property rights dispute with local authorities), can also be used to engage and benefit the young (Cheng, 2010).

iii. Ethiopia

Development partner support to Ethiopia is characterized by a stop-start pattern. Development partners withdrew particularly following major conflicts such as the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea and the period following the May 2005 elections. Withdrawal of support by development partners serves as a signal to reward states with a genuine security and development objective. As Africa's only uncolonized nation, Ethiopia guards country ownership zealously and sometimes to unreasonable levels.

Though country ownership of policies is useful to dictate the pace and degree of reforms, it should not be confused with state intervention to manage all affairs of the economy and select civil society representatives. Undesirable intervention can be a barrier for effective coordination of aid for capacity development and reconstruction.

The World Bank and UN lead most of the in-country development partner coordination with a recent shift toward bilateral development partners. As in many other countries, development partner-recipient coordination is relatively easy in less contentious areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. But there are tensions over the government's biased focus on tertiary education at the expense of primary education and on building health facilities without having the trained health personnel. Hence, the mismatch in preferences between development partners and the government leads to coordination failure, and recipients need to minimize the occurrence of such conflicting preferences.

One of the major contributory factors for failure in coordination is the limited competencies of the public sector employees who are negotiating with development partners. This is not restricted to Ethiopia, as most African states lose their competent and bright labor force due to either international migration or absorption into the well-paying private sector within the continent. Hence, capacity development in the form of technical assistance will be beneficial to addressing the problem, but it cannot be a long-term solution. Coordination failure is more likely if recipients engage partially with development partners. For instance, Ethiopia excludes significant donors such as USAID and the Netherlands from high level policy discussions by focusing only on development partners that provide budget support. Capacity development needs assessments are often done by politicians with little input from technical experts. Establishing surveillance missions by development partners (as the IMF did in 2006 to check the “Protection of Basic Services”) will lead to reduced resource leakages, corruption, and fungibility of aid (Furtado and Smith, 2009).

iv. Rwanda

Rwanda's first and second Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were compiled in 2002 and 2007, respectively. PRSPs are prepared by almost all recipients as a requirement to benefit from donor program support and to qualify for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative as well as development aid under the World Bank's Country Development Framework. In Rwanda, more aid is channeled to promote the growth-led poverty reduction agenda (Hayman, 2009) or the Vision 2020 as opposed to Ethiopia's Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy. Aid coordination in Rwanda demonstrates to other fragile states the need to

avoid the creation of numerous coordination agencies. Inevitably, overlapping responsibilities with ill-thought-out mandates simply exacerbate the existing complexity of the aid delivery coordination matrix. Leadership roles in the health sector are unclear for both donors and Rwanda, while there is clear country ownership for education. Rwanda's example is a passive recipient case that contrasts with Ethiopia's active engagement.

On the other hand, harmonization of aid for capacity development is unlikely to succeed when development partners give mixed messages. For instance, the World Bank continued supporting the Rwandan government while some bilateral development partners such as the UK withdrew due to Rwanda's policy toward DRC (Hayman, 2009). The same mixed signal from development partners was observed in the post May 2005 election in Ethiopia. The aid coordination architecture gets more complicated when development partners switch from previous direct support to governments to supporting NGOs, as occurred with Norway in Rwanda. Condemnation of bad governance by withdrawing support is a good signal and provides a strong incentive for fragile states to maintain peace, respect human rights, and prevent potential violence. However, the development partner community should do it in a coherent manner, with full regard to the potential political sensitivities that may skew the level and breadth of engagement of external players.

d. The illusion and reality of emerging partnerships: AU vs. development partners

As pointed out earlier in this Report, there are encouraging interactions between the African Union and other international organizations

such as the UN. The AU is more effective than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, in preventing instability and further disintegration of some countries. For instance, it helped Sudan, Togo, and Madagascar in peace making negotiations and criticized unlawful governmental structures in those states. However, it has not lived up to all expectations. Most actions by the AU are still ad hoc interventions, biased toward personal initiatives, with limited systematic follow-up and limited resources. As a key intra-continental group, the AU should take the initiative to coordinate the development partner activities that are aimed at peacekeeping and reconstruction.

It is clear that there are a number of high-level institutions with a capacity development mandate in Africa. The AU/NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF) details how qualifying capacity development projects are implemented on the African continent. It is not clear how the continent based capacity development via the ACBF and AfDB fit in the larger scheme of the CDSF. It would be useful for coordination if all these institutions were to create a clearer joint structure of capacity development in fragile states. For instance, in August 2010, the Liechtenstein Foundation for State Governance (LFSG) and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency) signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement. This continent-wide and project-based support initiative for qualifying countries is in agreement with CDSF. NEPAD should seek to harmonize the work planned under this initiative with actions by others such as the AfDB and ACBF in qualifying countries.

e. High Level Meetings (HLMs) for effective coordination

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of working with regional organizations both on security and economic development. This is mainly driven by the necessity of engaging with developing countries, including fragile states, based on a different and new approach. One of the challenges of development partners is lack of resources to execute planned rebuilding activities in fragile states. This financial pressure also necessitates effective engagement with regional organizations with different mandates. So there is an encouraging momentum of collaborations, for instance, between the UN and regional organizations in Africa. In this partnership, the existence of clear guidelines on the roles of each collaborating party is of paramount importance. In an attempt to create collaborative and coordinated environments, the UN has sponsored High Level Meetings since 1993. The primary issues of discussion in these meetings include security, peacekeeping, and peace building. These reforming meetings have been threatened recently by decisions to no longer hold and facilitate them; this may exacerbate the development partner fragmentation problem and militate against the aim of development partner coordination. Currently, there is a plethora of good intentions from various quarters that lack implementation and proper adoption. A case in point is the proposal put forward in Kofi Anan's report "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights" (Tavares, 2010). In 2006, there

was a promising report, *Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities*, which states, “the opportunities before us lie in the establishment of a more effective partnership operating in close cooperation with the Security Council based on a clear division of labour that reflects the comparative advantage of each organization. As important is the development of a programme of action for capacity-building across the globe” (UN, 2006a). Even if there is an increased realization of partnership on the ground among different development partners and organizations, the lack of guidelines to coordinate activities will force one to label the current working arrangements simply as illusions rather than realistic and effective options.

The OECD-DAC's principles for good engagement in fragile situations stress that aid should be flexible, long-term, harmonized and integrated to bridge humanitarian, recovery, and longer-term development goals. The Accra Agenda for Action adopted at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness reinforces these principles and committed development partners to monitoring their implementation (Mcloughlin, 2010; OECD-DAC, 2007). With the demise of the High Level Meetings previously held by the UN, African countries need to replace them with continental and sub-regional processes. The AU has been conducting many more of these types of meetings and regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC have also been doing a lot more to bridge the gap. Capacity to engage in high level discussions on peace, security, and development needs to be increased and support by development partners in this area is critical, as is support from member states themselves.

f. Food Security and climate change

Most food crises emanate from climate change, conflict and its consequences (Alinovi, Hmerich and Russo, 2007). A reverse causality is also a possibility as food shortages (both for humans and cattle) mainly driven by environmental degradation can lead to conflicts (UN 2006b). Most fragile states in Africa undoubtedly lack the institutional and technical capacity to prevent shortages and secure food for their citizens. The improvement in early warning systems in some countries (such as Ethiopia) is encouraging but not sufficient. Development partners can use carefully planned food security interventions with geographical equity in mind as an effective tool to stabilize fragile states. International efforts that fail to support local people and institutions that attempt to address food insecurity will not solve the crisis, as in the case of southern Sudan; those that succeed, will. Coordinated outside help can be used to link humanitarian emergency assistance with development if the ultimate goal is to address dynamic and long-term food insecurity, which in turn leads to better security and state stability. This entails capacity development support of development partners (along with local actors) that approaches transformation of African agriculture's production capacity from a big picture perspective that includes improving the resilience of fragile states. This can be accomplished by reinforcing existing public sector strategies for agricultural development while leaving the immediate task of access to food for coordination by NGOs.

Field interventions provide some good lessons and examples to follow with adaptations to local contexts. For instance, the Nuba Mountains

Community Empowerment Project (NMPACT) in Sudan is innovative in the sense that it takes the participatory approach seriously and addresses the food crisis via livelihood supports and peace building. It is the only program that brings conflict and food crisis into discussion among policy makers, the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government of Sudan (FAO, 2008). This should be noted and encouraged by development partners in other fragile state contexts.

g. World Bank and the UN

Evaluations of the World Bank's LICUS initiative have yielded key lessons. In particular, they illustrate the importance of: (i.) maintaining capacity development and governance support within the World Bank's agenda; and (ii.) providing more human resources to support LICUS field staff in different countries to work on program reforms and sequencing (World Bank, 2006). It is encouraging that there is a change of heart and some degree of commitment by the World Bank, as demonstrated by the establishment of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU) and the adoption of an Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict.

In the context of working with other multilateral organizations, some issues are worth discussing. For instance, the World Bank-UN coordination of activities has not been smooth due to the institutions' different procedures and, at times, ideological leanings. The World Bank is often reluctant to integrate peace and security issues with its overarching poverty reduction agenda. It is also restricted in its ability to engage with informal groups, and this might be true for most development partners working in fragile environments (International Alert, 2008). At an operational level, there is room for improve-

ment when the World Bank and UN attempt to coordinate joint operations. Procedures and ideology aside, they can maintain their relative historical comparative advantage (the World Bank in economic development and UN in peace building) and support fragile states. They can work to avoid confusion about their respective roles, mandates, and operational procedures.

h. AfDB (fragile state facility-FSF of AfDB)

The African Development Bank, working with bilateral and multilateral development partners, coordinates a Fragile State Facility (FSF) operation that is managed by the Fragile State Unit (OSFU); both were created in 2008. As a commitment to engaging in active aid coordination, OSFU participates in the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which focuses on aid and development effectiveness in fragile states. In the future, the household conflict research program based on micro/household survey level welfare information will be a useful source of evidence to gauge the effectiveness of development partner support in fragile states at the micro level.

What are the countries saying? A number of issues from the ACI field survey corroborate the analysis above on development partner coordination in fragile states in Africa. Some of the issues are:

a. Development community commitment

As a key stakeholder, the development community plays a significant role in capacity development across the sub-continent. Its contribution should support the setting of the capacity development agenda through the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of capacity development outcomes. Notwithstanding the potential role of the development community,

the survey revealed that most of the countries do not have an established mechanism for coordinating capacity development support from the development community. Of 32 countries assessed, 22 (or 69 percent), indicated that they do not have institutionalised mechanisms or formalised means of coordinating capacity development in their respective countries. Only 10 countries—Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—have institutionalised formal mechanisms for coordinating capacity development.

b. Partnering for capacity development

Support from development agencies constitutes one of the most important sources of funding for capacity development to African countries. Development agencies contribute to capacity development in African countries mainly through multilateral, bilateral and or decentralized cooperation. In all, multilateral cooperation was identified as the most common source of support for capacity development in these countries. However, it was revealed that most of the countries do not have an established mechanism for coordinating capacity development support. Of 32 countries assessed, 18 indicated that they do not have institutionalized mechanisms or units responsible for coordinating capacity development in their respective countries. Only 14 indicated that they have institutionalized formal mechanisms for coordinating capacity development.

c. Development partner country strategies

In the ACI field survey, 32 countries were asked about development partner strategies in their respective jurisdictions; 53.1 percent indicated

that for the calendar year 2009, not all main partners for multilateral cooperation developed a tailored country assistance strategy or program. For the same year, 55.5 percent of the countries surveyed reported that not all main partners for decentralized cooperation developed specific country assistance strategies or programs. These dynamics have implications for development partner coordination and aid effectiveness.

d. Aid effectiveness and capacity development

Aid to the African region has declined sharply in recent years, particularly following the global financial crisis. Moreover, the region continues to lag behind in human development as it faces both old and new challenges in the form of persistent poverty, rising inequality, a human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic, and a proliferation of low-intensity regional conflicts. There is a pressing need to make the case for aid to the region. The overall leveling off of aid flows since 1990 can be attributed to several causes. The first of these is the end of the Cold War, a period when much of so-called aid was provided less with development in mind than with the intent of securing political allegiance. Second, former colonial powers have shown declining involvement and interest in the development processes of their former African colonies. Third, the global financial crisis has put mounting pressure on development partners' national budgets. Fourth, development partners have been disappointed with recipients' performance and concerned that their assistance was not achieving its objectives and tangible results.

As a follow-up to the discussions at Monterrey and Kananaskis, developing and developed

partner countries agreed in the 2003 Rome Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that there was an urgent need to make aid effective if the fight against poverty was to be won and the MDGs achieved. The Rome Declaration outlined good practices and principles for effective development cooperation:

- Aligning development intervention with national priorities, strategies, and systems;
- Strengthening local ownership and leadership of the development agenda;
- Improving coordination and harmonization of interventions to avoid, among other things, duplication and overburdening of institutions in developing countries;
- Improving transparency, accountability, and predictability of disbursements and aid flows; and
- Strengthening the capacity of aid recipient countries.

In 2004, the multilateral banks and OECD Development Assistance Committee agreed to strengthen and nurture a global partnership for managing for results. This became known as the Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results. In 2005, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was made; it commits developing countries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and regional organizations to put in place arrangements that will ensure aid effectiveness. All the parties would subscribe to partnership principles, reaffirm their commitments to the Rome Declaration, harmonize and align aid delivery, and accelerate implementation. Specific areas of action were identified:

- enhancing national development strategies and frameworks;
- improving alignment of aid with national priorities, systems and procedures;

- helping build national capacity for effective delivery;
- enhancing development partner and recipient country accountability;
- eradicating duplication and rationalizing development partner operations;
- reforming and simplifying development partner procedures;
- improving the levels of delegation of authority of development partners' field staff
- improving transparency and fighting corruption and misuse of resources;
- ensuring greater predictability of aid flows; and
- strengthening the capacities of institutions in developing countries to develop and operational results-based national development strategies.

The Declaration also specifies targets and indicators to allow for the monitoring of country level progress. Examples of these indicators include: partners with development strategies, level of aid tied, level of aid flows aligned to national strategies, use of country systems, strength of national capacity to avoid the use of parallel systems based on Project Implementation Units (PIUs), audit and reporting structures, and predictability of aid.


The ACI field survey also sought to tease out the issues of aid effectiveness related to capacity development. Of the 34 surveyed countries, 94.1 percent confirmed that they have endorsed the Paris Declaration; 82.4 percent also confirmed they have an aid coordination policy in place. Indeed, most of the countries (73.5 percent) reported moderate strength in their coordination mechanisms, and 52.9 percent indicated that development partners have used parallel

implementation structures. Use of PIUs seemed to be on the rise, up by 43 percent in 2009.

For capacity to be developed and countries to achieve development results, aid needs to be predictable. From the ACI field survey, only 11.8 percent reported getting above 80 percent aid for capacity development disbursed on time. Some 41 percent of countries received 41 percent and above of bilateral aid for capacity development as untied aid in 2009, while 46 percent of countries reported a rise in bilateral aid for capacity development from their 2008 to 2009 levels. Yet the M&E frameworks for aid monitor-

ing remain non-existent or inadequate in 59.4 percent of surveyed countries. Results revealed that 74.2 percent of countries had conducted mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments between their governments and development partners. Much remains to be done to implement the Paris Declaration in its entirety. The quantity of human and financial resources devoted to build and develop capacity need to be increased. At present, such resources are to a large extent unequally distributed among the surveyed countries (see figure 17).

Figure 17 Resources invested in capacity development



Source: ACI field survey data

3.6 Conclusion

The discussions in this chapter centered on the linkages among legitimacy, reconstruction, service delivery, and development partner coordination in fragile environments. It highlighted the question of capacity development as a challenge with its own peculiarities in Africa because of the issues of fragility. More important, most post-conflict governance institutions are weak in both technical capacity and effective control of their territory, which makes it necessary to address this problem in the post-

conflict reconstruction efforts. The prevalence of capacity deficits in governance institutions in many post-conflict African countries creates a disconnect between legal, formal provisions and stipulations and implementation expectations. Indeed, most post-conflict reconstruction efforts have a bias in funding the social sector that is not directly productive and comes at the expense of laying firm foundations for wealth creation and long-term growth. The weakened institutions and social divisions in conflict-affected countries often cause authorities to rely

more heavily on peace accords and development partner support to jump-start capacity development initiatives and social cohesion building. In providing these funds, there is often an implicit assumption by the development partner community that western state institutions can be easily transferred to African societies as part of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. However, the reliance on external support and assumptions is one of the reasons behind the failures of post-conflict reconstruction in African countries. In the attempt to reform African states, development partners have conditioned their aid on the states' willingness to implement specific policy prescriptions such as neo-liberal structural adjustment reforms and democracy promotion.

Post-conflict reconstruction efforts have seen limited success because development partners have paid scant attention to the co-existence in

Africa of informal political institutions and informal decision-making processes that are strongly determined by personal relations and dominate national politics. The limited success of development partner-sponsored market reforms and democracy promotion indicates that the grand vision of state building, with its one-size-fits-all approach, is likely to meet resistance and contribute to the failure of post-conflict reconstruction.

Nevertheless, there are visible signs of progress with respect to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Many countries have put aid coordination mechanisms in place, but much remains to be done in terms of the predictability of resources channeled toward capacity development and the systems for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of implementation arrangements.

4

Fragility and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of Africa





4

Fragility and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of Africa

4.1 Introduction

The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) aims to assess the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework in terms of how conducive it is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. CPIA ratings are used to inform country assistance strategies and World Bank loaning activities. Many agencies, such as the African Development Bank, UNDP, and DfID have followed the World Bank methodology (described below) for the sake of greater harmonization and consistency. The CPIA is based on the analytical work done in the Bank as well as information coming from other sources produced by in-country, regional, and international organizations. Data are also collected from consultations with national stakeholders within the countries being assessed. The IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) provides an overview of key features of a country's institutional and policy framework.

However, the CPIA ratings have tended to focus on policies and institutions rather than development outcomes and results. Based on actual, not planned policies, they represent a snapshot of country policies and institutions at a particular point in time, underestimating the policy-making capacity of countries. The CPIA ratings are produced by World Bank staff and reflect the biases and assumptions of what constitutes good policy and institutions of the organization to which they belong. In the spirit of the Marrakech Plan of Action and the Paris Declaration, one could argue that there is need to enhance and improve the CPIA methodology to allow for self-evaluation and in recognition of the fact that if country ownership is to be respected, then ownership of assessment is also critical.

Following up on the above argument, ACBF supported field assessments of capacity in 12 sample countries in which it is working to ground-truth the assessments done under the CPIA. The survey was based on the same set of questions used by World Bank experts in generating the indicators in the CPIA. This approach differs from the one used by the World Bank in that (a) countries rate themselves and (b) the vetting processes for the field survey commissioned by ACBF used an external reference group primarily made up of African experts, whereas the World Bank uses its internal processes. The commonality in the two approaches is that both use expert judgments and are likely to be subjective; the main difference is in which expert opinion is being used. The comparison between the CPIA ratings from these two approaches is also done in order to ground-truth the validity of the ACI methodology in general, by using a well-accepted set of measures (the CPIA) as a benchmark.

4.2 What is the CPIA?

The Bank initiated the CPIA methodology in the late 1970s. The assessment consists of a set of criteria that represents the different policy and institutional dimensions of an effective poverty reduction and growth strategy (including quality of budgetary and financial management, debt policy, and gender equality) and is intended to guide the allocation of IDA lending resources. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The scores depend on the level of performance in a given year assessed against the criteria, rather than on changes in performance compared with the previous year. Bank staff assess the country's actual performance on each of the criteria and assign a rating. These scores are averaged—first to yield the cluster score, and then to determine a composite country rating as the average of the four clusters. The ratings reflect a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments based on country knowledge, originated in the Bank or elsewhere, and on relevant publicly available indicators. The ratings depend on actual policies and performance rather than on promises or intentions.

Since that time (the 1970s), the volume of IDA loans and grants to the poorest developing countries has been determined by and managed within the World Bank's Performance Based Allocation system. The core element of the Performance Based Allocation is the assessment of countries' institutions and policy reforms anchored by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).

The Bank and other development partners have used the CPIA for other purposes, as well. The assessment informs the World Bank's country strategies as well as cross-conditionality with the IMF. The IMF and the World Bank use the ranking within their Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) for the calculation of country-specific debt-burden thresholds, which form the agencies' basis for determining the grant/loan mix in aid allocation. Furthermore, it is known that some other development partners (such as DfID and CIDA) use the CPIA in their aid allocation formula.

The six-point ratings process involves two key phases: a benchmarking phase and a rating review and justification phase.

The Benchmarking Phase. A small, representative sample of countries drawn from all regions in which the World Bank is active is rated; in the second phase, staff rate the remaining countries using benchmark countries' scores as guideposts. The benchmarking phase helps ensure that, given the criteria, the ratings are set at the right level and are consistent across countries and regions. The World Bank's six regions, networks, and central departments assist in selecting a representative sample of countries that covers all six regions; includes IBRD and IDA-eligible borrowers, good as well as poor performers; and has a ratings distribution similar to the overall distribution of the CPIA country scores. The set of benchmark countries is reviewed every year, taking into account the need to both maintain some continuity in the sample and to refresh it. At the onset of each year's exercise, the Bank communicates the set of benchmark countries to the regions and networks along with the timetable for the exercise.

The Benchmarking Review Process. For each of the benchmark countries, country teams propose ratings for each criterion, accompanied by written justifications. The proposals and the write-ups are vetted by the respective regional chief economists and then reviewed by the networks and central departments. The final ratings are determined at a meeting in which representatives from the regions, networks, and central departments review the proposed ratings for all the criteria and for all the bench-

mark countries. Using the CPIA criteria as the anchor, the country teams' submissions, Bank-wide comments, available external indicators, and other relevant supporting documentation (which may include analysis that was developed outside the Bank) guide the discussion of the ratings for the benchmark countries. At the conclusion of the benchmarking phase, these ratings are “frozen” and the second phase of the CPIA exercise begins.

Box 15

2005 CPIA criteria

A. Economic management

1. Macroeconomic management
2. Fiscal policy
3. Debt policy

B. Structural Policies

4. Trade
5. Financial sector
6. Business regulatory environment

C. Policies for social inclusion/equity

7. Gender equality
8. Equity of public resource use

9. Building human resources

10. Social protection and labor

11. Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability

D. Public sector management and institutions

12. Property rights and rule-based governance

13. Quality of budgetary and financial management

14. Efficiency of revenue mobilization

15. Quality of public administration

16. Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector

Source: World Bank, 2009 CPIA Questionnaire

The Second Phase. The steps followed in the second phase are similar to those in the benchmarking phase. Country teams prepare ratings proposals that are accompanied by a written justification. These proposals are reviewed within the respective region by the chief economist and then submitted to a Bank-wide review by the networks and central departments. Throughout this process, the ratings of the benchmark countries are used as guideposts to help ensure consistency of the ratings among countries within and across regions. Given the large number of countries reviewed at this stage, virtual communications

usually replace physical meetings to finalize the ratings.

Criteria

Rating scale. A 1 rating corresponds to a very weak performance, and a 6 rating to a very strong performance. Intermediate scores of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 may also be given.

Country scores - Country scores should reflect a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments that are based on country knowledge originated in the Bank, analytic work or policy dialogue, work done by partners, and relevant

publicly available indicators. Country scores should take the following into account:

Quality of policies and institutions: The CPIA assesses the quality of a country's policy and institutional framework—that is, the extent to which that framework supports sustainable growth, poverty reduction, and the effective use of development assistance.

Policies and institutions versus outcomes: The criteria focus on policies and institutional arrangements, the key elements that are within the country's control, rather than on actual outcomes (for example, growth rates) that are influenced by elements outside the country's control. Good policies and institutions are expected to lead, over time, to favorable growth and poverty reduction outcomes, notwithstanding possible yearly fluctuations due to external factors.

Scoring against the criteria: Countries should be rated on their current status in relation to the criteria and to the benchmark countries. The agreed ratings for the benchmark countries will be provided to the staff before the start of the second phase of the exercise. The proposed ratings should focus on the level of performance assessed against the criteria, rather than the degree of improvement since last year.

Policy actions and implementation: The ratings should depend on actual policies, not on promises or intentions. In some situations, steps such as passage of specific legislation can represent a breakthrough that merits consideration in the ratings. However, the manner in which such actions are factored into the ratings should be carefully assessed, because the impact of the legislation depends on its implementation.

4.3 How is the ACBF field validation approach structured?

ACBF took a field survey approach and collected data in 12 countries in Africa on the basis of the 16 CPIA criteria described in the last section. The indicators and observations used are the same as those of the World Bank to allow for comparability. The questionnaire administered was exactly the same as the one that was used by the World Bank to allow for comparison of results and consistency. The data was collected by in-country policy units and think tanks. In each of the countries, the policy units and think tanks knew the country reality very well and could be seen as the equivalent of the World Bank country teams. The preliminary results were tested out in a validation workshop supported by an external reference group (ERG) of experts that played a similar role to the World Bank staff to provide technical guidance on the validity or other otherwise of these results.

4.3.1 General Results


The results of the survey are given below.

a) Economic Management (CPIA Cluster A). With the exceptions of Burundi, Kenya, and Zambia, the ACBF ratings for economic management in the 12 countries were either equal to (Benin and Burkina Faso) or higher than (Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe) those of the Bank. Some countries could not be compared, as the Bank does not report an index on them. For example, the Bank does not disclose the rating for Botswana, as it is not an IDA country. ACBF did survey Botswana to get a benchmark for comparison with other countries. The result displayed in figure 19 suggests that when countries self-assess their capacity for effective

economic management, they could come up with ratings that differ from those of the World Bank. This outcome could be interpreted in two ways: there may be countries that have a stronger basis for economic management than reported by the Bank; or

when countries self-assess, they are more generous than when assessed by the World Bank. Since the nature of the difference is not always in the same direction (25 percent lower; 25 percent higher; and 50 percent equal to the World Bank ratings), there may be some other factors at play.

Figure 18 Comparison of ACBF and World Bank CPIA indices on economic management




Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

b) Structural policy (Cluster B). As can be noted from Box 15, this cluster covers reform issues around trade, the financial sector, and the business regulatory environment. For the countries surveyed, only in Benin were structural policies found to be weaker than

those assessed by the Bank. Again the Bank did not report figures for Botswana, as it is not an IDA country. The ACBF survey differed the most in this cluster for the cases of Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Zimbabwe (see figure 19).

Figure 19 Comparison of ACBF and World Bank CPIA indices on structural policies




Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

c) Policies for social inclusion/equity. This cluster provides an assessment of “equity and equality of opportunity for disadvantaged groups” in the CPIA. For countries surveyed by ACBF, except for Burundi and Mauritania, the Bank rated all countries higher than ACBF

in policies that allow for social inclusion and equity. There is a big difference in the ratings for Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Zimbabwe between the Bank and field-based CPIA ratings in terms of having policies that seek to redress inequality and social exclusion (see figure 20).


Figure 20 Comparison of ACBF and World Bank CPIA indices on policies for social inclusion/equity



Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

d) Public Sector Management and Institutions. It was only in Benin, Burundi, Liberia, and Zambia that the World Bank found stronger frameworks for public sector management and better institutions than were identified in the field-based ratings.


The variations in the findings of the two agencies in Burundi and Zambia are very small. Again, the reported strength of public management and associated institutions in Kenya and Zimbabwe are much higher in the field-based assessment as compared with that of the Bank (see figure 21).



Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

e) Global comparison between the field-based and World Bank indices. In comparing the World Bank's 2009 CPIA ratings and the ACBF field-based survey results, it is found that the ratings by ACBF are higher than those of the Bank for most countries surveyed save

for Benin, Burundi, and Zambia (see figure 22). The reported “global” strength for Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Zimbabwe have the widest margin of difference, with those for Zimbabwe almost twice as high in the ACBF findings as compared with those of the Bank.

Figure 22 Comparison of ACBF and World Bank CPIA indices

Source: ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

4.3.2 *Outlier results: the case of Zimbabwe*

Looking at the ACBF field results, while there were a number of cases where the ratings diverged in wide margins from those of the World Bank, the picture for Zimbabwe is striking and seems to be contradictory to the views of most analysts. It is generally agreed that Zimbabwe is a fragile nation with an estimated 2008 gross national income of US\$360 per capita (compared with the sub-Saharan Africa average of US\$1,428), making it one of the poorest countries in the world. During the period 2000–2008, Zimbabwe's economic activity fell drastically. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth recorded a cumulative contraction of about 48 percent (nearly 5 percent per year). The decline was across almost all key sectors, despite the country's rich resource endowment. Value-added agriculture contracted by 86 percent during the period 2002–2008.

The poor state of infrastructure (for example in water supply and sanitation systems, transport,

and energy) and the deterioration of institutional capacity to manage them have had a negative impact on the provision of social and economic services for the whole population. The more vulnerable segments of the population have been hit particularly hard with increases in disease and rising poverty levels. The impact has been felt beyond Zimbabwe's borders. For example, an estimated two million Zimbabweans have left the country recently, including many skilled personnel, causing a massive brain drain and skills deterioration.

Following the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections, a Global Political Agreement (GPA) was negotiated and signed in September of the same year by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change. The Global Political Agreement resulted in the formation of an Inclusive Government (IG) as of February 2009. The people of Zimbabwe have embraced the GPA and the IG as core mechanisms for peace, stability, and fundamental political and economic change in the country.

The IG promptly adopted in March 2009 the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) as the framework for reversing economic decline and improving social conditions. Key measures included: trade liberalization, prices and exchange rate regime, and the introduction of timely and prudent fiscal budgets aimed at reining in the large fiscal deficits. It also formally adopted a multi-currency system, with the South African rand as the reference currency and the US dollar as the main transaction currency, to replace the Zimbabwean dollar. The early dividends of the establishment of the IG were the restoration of macroeconomic stability and the revival of economic activity.

All these achievements notwithstanding, disputes related to the implementation of several aspects of the GPA have threatened the power-sharing arrangement. Some of the most contentious issues have revolved around political and economic governance, including: sharing of posts of provincial governors, diplomats, and senior public servants; the disputed appointments by ZANU-PF of the attorney-general and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor; and arrests of members of parliament. The MDC has also expressed concern about alleged political repression, lack of rule of law, abuse of human rights, continued farm invasions, media control, and ZANU-PF's alleged refusal to adopt broader political and democratic reforms, especially constitutional review.

The Government's near- and medium-term strategies to institute a number of reforms and actions to jump-start economic recovery are contained in the current STERP and the Medium Term Plan (2010-2015). The priorities of the STERP include: political and economic gover-

nance reforms; economic stabilization and recovery; social protection, including provision of food assistance; revitalization of education and health services; and the re-establishment of relations with international development agencies.

As a result of the stable and more liberalized economic environment, real GDP is estimated to have grown by 4.7 percent in 2009 (higher than the IMF projection of 2.8 percent), compared with a decline of about 14 percent in 2008. This may be, in part, an outgrowth of the restoration of business confidence as reflected in the gradual improvement of capacity utilization, especially in manufacturing. Capacity utilization in manufacturing reportedly rose from less than 10 percent in 2008 to a range of 30-50 percent by 2010.

The hyperinflation of 2008 was brought to a halt by dollarization and the end of the traditionally huge monetary injections. From January to October 2009, month-on-month inflation remained low and stable at 1-3.1 percent. Inflation remained stable and within single digits throughout 2010, which reflects a continuation of these favorable developments.

Notwithstanding these improvements in the economy, the country continues to face major challenges:

- Arrears of some US\$3.2 billion on external public debt impose significant limits on the amount of support available from development partners. The public debt overhang of about US\$6 billion (about 170 percent of GDP) has constrained Zimbabwe's access to international capital markets, discouraged private investment, and imposed a liquidity crunch.

- As noted earlier, deterioration in the basic infrastructure remains a key bottleneck that impedes short- and medium-term economic recovery.
- Lingering concerns about security and the rule of law, coupled with concerns about inadequate protection of property rights, have led to sagging private sector confidence. Recent corporate laws that give an automatic 51 percent share to Zimbabweans have worsened this situation.
- Food insecurity; the rising incidence of malnutrition; and deterioration and poor access to clean water, medicines, and other health services have eroded the quality of life for a majority of the population.
- There is a severe shortage of official and private external financing, which constrains business operations.
- Erosion of human and institutional capacities in the public and private sectors continues to impede the capacity for economic reform and delivery of basic services.

Zimbabwe has thus experienced rapid increases in poverty and decline in survival indicators. The prospects for achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain weak. The poverty rate increased from 42 percent in 1995 to 63 percent in 2003 and is currently estimated to be over 70 percent. Inequality is very high: the Gini coefficient was estimated at 57 percent in 2003, is likely even higher now, and remains one of the highest in the world. Some estimates of unemployment put it at 80 percent. An estimated 1.2 million people, close to 10 percent of the population, live with HIV/AIDS. These factors have contributed to the deterioration in Zimbabwe's human development indicators, as demonstrated by the recent UN Human Development Index.

As noted by many commentators, governance institutions and mechanisms have, in recent years, been compromised by political considerations, understaffing and lack of resources. Since the formation of the IG, steps have been taken to address some of the weaknesses. Notably:

- In November 2009, parliament passed the Reserve Bank Amendment Bill, aimed at strengthening board oversight and refocusing Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's institutional framework to its core mandate of monetary policy and financial sector supervision. However, this reform remains pending;
- In December 2009, parliament passed a new Public Financial Management (PFM) Bill aimed at improving the legislation that regulates the management of public resources;
- Also in December 2009, parliament passed a new Audit Bill, which clarifies the role of the auditor general and creates the Audit Office with a separate civil servant structure for its staff;
- The Government has submitted to Parliament the draft of a revised Mines and Mineral Act with a view to facilitating investment, reviewing the mining title system, and ensuring transparency in line with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative requirements. This proposal seems to be negated by the new corporate laws that give an automatic 51 percent shareholding to Zimbabweans; and
- The Government has set aside US\$31 million for the commencement of a land audit, designed to provide information on the nature of land holdings and demand for land, land tenure issues, utilization, infrastructure, and compensation issues.

The above and various challenges pitch Zimbabwe official opinions at odds with those of the international community on many of the CPIA criteria. This arguably explains why Zimbabwe positively self-scored itself on all the 16 criteria with the highest score being in the area of property rights and rule-based governance despite the global outcry of lack of the same in the country. It could also be that countries tend to look at themselves in relatively positive lights. Indeed, with the exception of Benin, almost all the countries surveyed rated themselves better than what is given to them by the World Bank. This could be a pointer to some of the weaknesses of the CPIA processes.

The main issues raised with respect to expert judgments as in the case of the CPIA relate to whose judgment counts and whether one or the other is more objective.

4.4 Some criticisms of the CPIA

The CPIA and the various methodologies used to derive it are said by some critics to have numerous limitations, including:

a) An unproven premise: The main criticism of the CPIA relates to whether it serves its intended purpose: to help improve policies and institutional performance in order to achieve growth, poverty reduction and aid effectiveness. There is little evidence that the CPIA enjoys broad ownership in terms of countries' implementation of reforms that would support the improvement in the index over time. The CPIA does serve, however, as an allocation system according to achieved performance.

b) One-size-fits-all design: The CPIA methodology is founded on the assumption that the same set of policies advances aid effectiveness, poverty

reduction, and growth in all countries. However, by designing a second set of indicators for post-conflict countries, the Post-Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPI), the Bank seems to acknowledge that different challenges merit different measures of performance. Ideally, the Bank should have country-specific indicators because "good" policies vary by the country, its stage of development, and its circumstances. Experts and authorities may contest many of the CPIA's "ideal" policies.

c) Undercutting democratic practice: The CPIA's promotion of one set of policies poses a risk to globalization and democracy because it shrinks national governments' capacity to respond to the policy preferences of their electorates. Lack of responsiveness to citizens creates political instability and builds opposition to governments and the globalization process.

d) Lack of responsiveness to Africa's unique priorities. The CPIA does not adequately address issues that are vital to Africa's future, including: economic vulnerability to powerful exogenous shocks; MDGs; agriculture; manufacturing; and environmental challenges (such as mitigation of/adaptation to climate change). Unfortunately, the use of the CPIA results in lower allocations for countries with low levels of human development or low levels of progress (or regression) relative to the MDGs.

e) Double standards—the west and the rest: The richest countries in the world have been unable to achieve many of the "ideal" policies specified by the CPIA. If the World Bank used the CPIA to rate the financial and economic management performance of the US and many European governments, these countries would receive the CPIA's lowest possible rating (in, for example,

risk management; oversight and supervision of the financial sector; budget imbalances; and debt levels) as indicated by the current economic crisis in those countries. The CPIA scores of IBRD countries are not publicly disclosed or used for allocation purposes, as they are for IDA countries, making it difficult for fast reforming IDA countries to be benchmarked and advanced to the next stage of aspirations in seeking to become middle income countries.

f) Subjective rating process: Recently, the African Development Bank (AfDB) attempted to do a rating similar to the CPIA, using the same CPIA criteria to assess the performance of the same African countries. Yet, the country ratings of the AfDB are higher than those of the Bank for most of the 16 CPIA criteria and seem to confirm the ACBF survey results. Self-assessment by countries themselves, while as subjective as the World Bank and AfDB approaches, could be more relevant in getting ownership for reforms.

g) Aid concentration: Two-thirds of IDA's assistance disbursed to Africa goes to only six countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, DRC, Uganda, and Mozambique). Also, assistance to fragile states is highly concentrated in a few countries—the “development partner darlings”—which creates a set of countries with needs but little support. Fragile states that are no longer eligible for post-conflict allocations generally experience a sharp drop in their allocation, with unintended consequences in regional stability. Additionally, the allocation process fails to take into account the extent to which development partners and creditors other than the World Bank provide financing to each recipient government; so precious IDA resources are disproportionately allocated to those development partner “darlings.”

Complexity and lack of transparency. The IDA allocation system is complex, with eight factors that, in addition to the CPIA, determine a country's IDA allocation. Given this complexity and the fact that the CPIA is built on confidential data, it is not possible for outsiders to verify the results. This undermines the credibility of the allocation process and may render it out of tune with the Paris Declaration.

4.5 Why recommend self-assessment in the CPIA process?

There are number of reasons that call for self-assessments and explain why they come recommended. These include:

a) Enhanced country ownership: There has been a growing consensus that development efforts have to be nationally or otherwise owned to be relevant and sustainable. Local ownership of the process means that policies and interventions take place within the context of locally defined priorities and frameworks. It also could result in more sustainable actions and results given the prioritization of local needs or rights, resources, and the likely mobilization of local political support. Indeed, recognizing the political nature of development is crucial for the design of effective coordination frameworks such as thematic and working groups. Project/program success requires political commitment to demanding change, leadership, performance-orientation, and beneficiary-participation, all of which redefine the power balances in terms of, for example, gender and other factors with an impact on inclusion, in and around the projects. In many instances, policy coordination tends to be undermined as many partner countries' so-called sovereignty-related programs remain outside the focus of development assistance

frameworks such as the Country Assistance Strategy, PRSPs, and UNDAFs. For example, it remains difficult to assess the opportunity costs of investing in educational capacity as opposed to defense and national security. Self-assessment becomes a crucial tool for local ownership and buy-in of the CPIA process.

b) Greater accountability for outcomes and results: Countries must be given opportunities for self-assessment to allow for greater inclusivity in the discourse on aid and development assistance. Excluding African states and citizens from efforts to chart their development priorities also produced its own Achilles heel in that patrimonialism, dictatorship, corruption, mismanagement, and conflict became the major characteristic of recent development history on the continent. Nurturing policy coordination and setting the “correct” institutions become particularly problematic in failed or fragile states and post-conflict environments. In a failed-state environment, there is no single authority to define the development agenda, as illustrated by the example of Somalia since 1991. In such circumstances, the limited capacity continues to be eroded and state mandates are delivered on a fragmented “clientelist” basis. On the other hand, due to the huge reconstruction and humanitarian needs of post-conflict countries, competing development partner bureaucracies and establishments may undermine coordination and the environment as they occupy space during periods of heightened intervention, leaving the country with disrupted systems after the crisis is over. Indeed, most of the interventions in a post-conflict environment tend to be relief-oriented and short-term despite huge development needs and the large numbers of development partners keen to work in such

countries. Self-assessment by countries and communities to derive the CPIA would give greater inclusivity and accountability for development outcomes and results.

c) Strengthening participation. Recent discourse in development has emphasized the importance of participation as a mechanism for social inclusion and the creation of state legitimacy. These arguments are powerful enough to see change in the way the CPIA are developed and executed in countries. Self-assessment by countries would open the way for participation and social inclusion in the CPIA, thus giving greater ownership and credibility not just to the overall processes but the outcomes and results that flow from them.

d) Enhancing policy dialogue. By definition, self-assessment grants a country and community the opportunity to engage in retrospection and self-reflection. This would considerably enhance the quality of policy dialogue and subsequent programmatic decisions derived from such processes. It is relatively well known that quality of policy dialogue in most parts of Africa, until recently, remained relatively poor due to weak governance frameworks. Self-assessment in the CPIA process would give countries and communities a voice in the decisions that are derived from the CPIA—especially prioritization of resource allocation; and

e) Giving credibility and acceptance to CPIA-related processes: There are significant principal-agent problems with CPIA and aid-giving processes that have been undermined by the nature of the relationship between development partners and recipients. The relationships between development partners and the intended ultimate beneficiaries of aid projects,

the poor, tend to be largely indirect and distant. This results in a very long and complex chain of principal-agent relationships: those starting with the taxpayers delegating authority to elected officials, who in turn become principals that delegate authority to a new set of agents, the heads of aid agencies, which delegate to agency employees, contractors, and consultants. In the recipient country, there are similar relationships between citizens, their government, and those that actually implement programs.

Consequently, policy objectives, incentives, and information available to these agents are not always well aligned with the objectives of either the taxpayers or the beneficiaries. This problem affects all aspects of aid delivery, including program design, implementation, compensation, incentives, monitoring, evaluation, allocation, and development partner coordination. CPIA initiatives must be cognizant of this difficulty to ensure aid effectiveness. Self-assessments could cut this rather long CPIA process chain and grant it greater credibility and acceptance.

Agreement between the World Bank and field-based CPIA assessments. A statistical measurement of agreement between the World Bank and ACBF field survey assessments was conducted to test the CPIA methodology for soundness. The ACBF field survey used policy units and think tanks to assess 11 countries that had already been assessed by the World Bank (Botswana could not be used for assessment as the results by the World Bank are not disclosed), using the same instrument as the World Bank. Following the assessment, countries were grouped into “fragile states” and the “non-fragile states,” on the basis of the total average.

As shown in table 15, World Bank and field-based assessments by policy units and think tanks agreed on the assessment of 7 countries as follows:

- 1 country (Burundi) was assessed as “fragile” by both the World Bank and the ACBF
- 6 countries were assessed as “non-fragile” by both the World Bank and the ACBF (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, and Zambia).

		World Bank		
		Fragile	Non-Fragile	Total
ACBF	Fragile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Burundi 		1
	Non -Fragile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Côte d'Ivoire • Liberia • Zimbabwe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Burkina Faso • Kenya • Mauritania • Niger • Uganda • Zambia 	9
	Total	4	6	10

Source: Computed from ACI field survey data and World Bank (2009)

The relative observed agreement between the two assessments is 70 percent and the hypothetical probability of chance agreement is low; specifically, the probabilities of random agreement are as follows:

- Field-assessment by policy units and think tanks assessed 10 percent (1/10) of the countries as “fragile” and 90 percent as “non-fragile”
- World Bank assessed 40 percent of the countries as “fragile” and 60 percent as “non-fragile”

The probability that both raters would assess a country as “fragile” randomly is 4 percent, while the probability that both raters would assess a country as “non-fragile” randomly is 54 percent.

Thus the overall probability of random agreement is 58 percent, and the Cohen's Kappa coefficient K is 0.29, which is a value between 0.20 and 0.40. On a magnitude scale proposed by Landis and Koch, the agreement between the World Bank and ACBF-supported Policy Units can be considered fair¹³. These results support the conclusion that it may be better to have self-assessments accompany those done by the World Bank in order to get better ownership for reforms; however, self-assessments could be biased upward as countries have difficulty in providing low ratings under self-rating mechanisms.

4.6 Conclusion:

At the core of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which has signatories including most country officials and development partners and creditors, including the World Bank, is “country ownership” as the guiding principle that animates the development process. However, country authorities and experts reportedly have little or no input into or influence over the CPIA rating process. A field-based survey like the one


done by African policy units and think tanks could be conducted to enhance consultation of African countries prior to CPIA preparation. Conducting a rating on achievement without consultation could prevent countries from taking ownership of the policy reforms needed and so limit the effectiveness of the CPIA.

If the CPIA were a more important guide to the Bank's Country Assistance (or Partnership) Strategy than each country's own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), it could be an obstacle to the implementation of each country's PRSP, which would constitute a serious ownership problem. Whatever the tensions between reliance on the CPIA or the PRSP to guide policy priorities, some countries, which are in dire need of higher allocations, may decide that actions to raise their CPIA score must take precedence before all else. This would mean that use of the CPIA distorts national development priorities.

As it is, ratings take into account “stage of development,” including political economy considerations. Local participation could assist in this process. Participation by country authorities and experts could also help unravel the mystery of why some CPIA scores are declining. Indeed, policy reform, without recognizing why policies were distorted in the first place or understanding the political economy constraints, is likely to fail or may even create further inefficiencies. In general, expert assessors may not be trained in political economy or may not understand the historic, cultural, and political aspects of change in the countries in question. Since the CPIA process does not involve steps to determine the causes of perceived policy distortions, limited understanding of the fundamentals driving governance and other transformation processes at the country level could present severe biases in the selected policy reforms. These realities strengthen the case for country self-assessment in the CPIA process.

5

Responding to Fragility and the Way Ahead





5

Responding to Fragility and the Way Ahead

5.1 Introduction

Analysis of conflict and post-conflict conditions in Africa underscored the class nature of major conflicts and the significance of the political economy approach to offer adequate explanation. It has been noted that the major cause of conflict is grounded in the political economy of the countries, underscored by competition for power. History, institutions, the path-dependent nature of state formation and external intervention are important in this process. In general, governments of these economies have never been accountable to the people. This created a fertile ground for insurrection and offered opportunities for people to express their grievances or greed only through violence, often at negligible opportunity cost to the opposition leaders (the elites) but relatively high cost to the ordinary population. Inevitably, the incumbent's attempt to defend and maintain its position led to increased militarism and related repressive institutions, which are invariably bad for development and durable peace. Governments and development partners thus have to have a long-term view when building capacity to respond to fragility in their countries. Section 5.2 highlights some emerging issues and section 5.3 present some recommendations to deal with fragility and the way forward.

5.2 Emerging Issues

The world as we know it is a place with insurmountable challenges. Fragile states are overwhelmed by a multitude of these challenges at any point in time. The brief discussion of the emerging issues here attempts to draw attention to the enormity of these challenges in the context of fragile states. From a policy perspective, one needs to put these challenges at the heart of any initiatives because they either serve as barriers or opportunities to securing stable peace and development. In addition to highlighting the important challenges, the ACIR provides a list of potential hotspots in Africa, which can serve as a guide for policy makers. This list excludes those countries that are heavily

dependent on exports of primary commodities, minerals, remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) to keep the discussion within the scope of the report.

a) **The global economic and financial crisis and price hikes**

There is well-founded fear that the current global economic and financial crisis might plunge the African continent into conflict. Even if Africa is least integrated into the global financial infrastructure, it will be hard hit as development partners attempt to revive their economies and recover from the devastating crisis they are in (Naude, 2009). Most studies focus on the impact of the global crisis on the economy of African countries in a generic fashion. Hence, there is limited relevant literature emerging on aspects

of potential state fragility that emanates due to the crisis and this is more significant for countries that are coming out of conflict and on the road to rebuilding stable states and economies (Bakrania and Lucas, 2009; ERD, 2009). Collier and Hoeffler (2002a; 2004b) provided the empirical link between economic factors (i.e. income) and conflict. Studies by Bloomberg and Hess (2002) and Arbarche and Page (2007) also provide similar evidence on the income-conflict link, which is sometimes termed as 'poverty-conflict trap'.

The crisis makes fragile states more vulnerable to revert to conflict via the withdrawal or drastic reduction of support from development partners. It jeopardises existing and future safety net initiatives, delivery of services, employment creation, education and health development (Cord et al., 2009). As argued above, unemployment of the youth warrants special attention. The August 2010 ILO report states that youth unemployment is at record high and is likely to get worse. Conflict is more likely in fragile states where disengaged and idle young people are many in number (Collier, 2007b). The report of the Africa Commission in 2009 focused on job creation and can serve as a useful resource for future policy design (Africa Commission, 2009).

The limited aid resources available are being used for emergency relief purposes such as in Pakistan, Haiti and other natural disaster zones. This tightens the squeeze on the aid budget with detrimental consequences for future capacity development efforts in fragile states. Declining development partner support leads to fiscal pressures and retrenchment of employees as civil service and army wages become unsustainable. In turn this leads to potential erosion of

power and fuel instability (Jackson, 2009). Given their history of volatile aid and projected declines in aid, DRC, Burundi, Eritrea, Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone will be disproportionately affected (Bakrania and Lucas, 2009). According to the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and IMF's assessment of vulnerability of developing countries, countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Niger, Rwanda and Ethiopia can be included in this list with their protracted history of relative state weakness. If peace and security are likely to be compromised during times of economic hardship, it is also probable that economic development targets such as the MDGs are to be missed (e.g. see details of the September 2010 UN meetings in MDGs).

Dramatic fuel and food price hikes might lead to public unrest (Von Braun, 2008) and collapse in government finances in cases where fuel price subsidies are provided. Recently unbearable living cost frustrations were expressed through demonstrations in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Additional hotspots include the volatile DRC, Horn of Africa, and vulnerable West African states such as Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Niger and Togo.


b) Governance of natural resources and corruption

Governance is crucial because in weak states peace and development are not guaranteed if the focus is only on ending violent conflicts. There needs to be a system/structural change in the way institutions and resources are governed to benefit citizens in post conflict environments. For instance, inability to provide and allocate public goods can lead to reversion to conflict and perpetual 'conflict trap' (Collier et al., 2003).

Rigorous theoretical works shade some light on how development partner support for capacity development can lead to increased efficiency in the provision of public goods and economic development. The proceeds from natural resource extraction can be used to increase the size of the wealth pie in a mineral rich setting and good governance might lead to changes in citizen's probability of getting hold of the share of the pie (see Powell, 2004 and 2006 for bargaining insights). The conflict literature clearly indicates that ungoverned states lead to onset of conflict through different pathways such as power struggles between ethnic and ideologically distinct groups (e.g. Sudan); mismatch between the establishment of state institutions and pre-existing social structures (e.g. Rwanda and Chad) and rent-seeking as in DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2008). The control of the proceeds of natural resources is often contested in many parts of Africa (e.g. the Niger Delta problem) and often leads to corruption which takes the form of diversion of resources by high ranking state officials and other strategically placed elites.

Capacity development for good governance through efficient, effective and equitable resource allocation for the benefit of citizens (with all the regulatory mechanisms in place), establishing court and justice systems to bring a reduction/stop to corruption of the proceeds of natural resources of African states is one of the fundamental ways of preventing future conflicts and effective instrument of conflict management in weak states. Development partners are expected to have a common stance on how they approach the sensitive issue of corruption and governance of natural resources in fragile environments without compromising the legitimacy of the actions of the beneficiary countries. Their support might generate the maximum possible pay off if they concentrate on coordinated technical and financial assistance to improve the court, justice, transparency and regulatory mechanisms of the states in question. Figure 23 compares public resource use in some resource-rich and non resource-rich African countries.

Figure 23 Equity of Public Resource use in resource-rich and non resource-rich countries



Sources: - IRAI Table 2009, World Bank.
 - Global Economy & Development, Working Paper 29, Dec. 2008

Development partners' aid effectiveness depends on whether what is allocated for capacity development is not diverted away. Therefore, development partners should work together on a clear and strong framework and make decisions whether to channel aid via governments and/or other institutions that can do the job better than public entities. Strong international NGOs, for instance, might be the alternatives in some contexts of weak states. Another important initiative to reduce corruption is to learn from the existing system of expenditure tracking as pursued by DFID-UK. The tracking system has a huge potential to shed light on what works and where and the experience can be shared with other development partners to enhance the delivery of their capacity development support. However, so far its success is limited.

c) Intracontinental coordination

When we are talking about development partner coordination, we often forget to think carefully about the first and most important coordination failure in Africa and that is the weak intracontinental coordination. There is weak dialogue and ineffective communication between AU and sub-regional organizations, which are bogged down with overlapping, unclear and overambitious objectives (e.g. ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, EAC, IGAD, COMESA). Neighbours matter in Africa. Governance structure for better cooperation with adjacent states should be there. Deep effective regional integration is needed even if most integration efforts have already failed. African nations don't cooperate for mutual economic gains. Political barriers are exacerbated because there are not commitment technologies. It is useful to note that the East African Community is more successful for establishing, enforcing agree-

ments and creating commitment technologies.

d) Sino-Africa links: the increasing role of unconditional aid of China to Africa

The global aid scene is getting more complex as new (non-traditional) development partners such as China (a heavyweight new entrant into the aid scene), India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia come into the picture. In addition, development partner supported aid business is made chaotic as new interventions are conducted to respond to new global and regional challenges. This opportunity or challenge will likely change the dynamics of political and economic relationships of African fragile states both with the traditional development partners and the new entrants in the form of changes in the policies adopted and capacity development interventions on the ground. These new changes are interesting on practical grounds. Mostly there are aid pledges by traditional development partners that were not converted to actual disbursements. China is doing quite the opposite. It is lending to Africa more than the World Bank in recent years and there are increasing FDI inflows to Africa. The \$5 billion concessionary loan to DRC in 2007 is a case in point to build the country's infrastructure and mining industry. China promised to double its aid effort to Africa and most likely commit itself to its promises unlike some disappointment from traditional development partners. As opposed to traditional development partners that disproportionately provide capacity development support based on the social agenda, China is willing to provide support for infrastructure in a big way. A lesson for other development partners is to mimic China's willingness to support African countries in the areas they chose investments and capacity development. This might improve future aid coordination efforts regardless of the fragility of

the state concerned (Whitfield, 2009). However, China's arrival in the aid scene should be accepted with cautious optimism, as it tends to disregard the legitimacy status of some governments as it stepped in to sign a major mineral extraction deal with the current illegitimate government of Guinea. The emergence of new development partners (competitors) has implications for the bargaining power of aid recipients often in a positive way even if it introduces a new dynamics between development partners and recipients as well as among development partners themselves to the existing complex aid architecture.


e) New ways of delivering aid

Birdsall et al. (2010) propose a new modality of aid delivery, which is referred to as Cash on Delivery (COD). It is innovative and is necessitated by weak accountability and the complexity exacerbated by the presence of multiple development partners in the current aid delivery system. The proposal suggests a payment of a fixed amount of aid money to poor countries when they fulfill the pledges they entered into. It is innovative because it focuses on output instead of input, improves transparency and more importantly facilitates local ownership. Hence it contributes to the promotion of aims stated in the Paris Declaration and AAA for improving aid effectiveness. COD is attractive and relevant here because it is likely to work in fragile states. It is imperative to recognize the

peculiar difficulties in these countries such as weak information systems and institutions. However, unlike traditional recipients, such a new aid delivery system works in fragile states due to the flexibility of their environment with less vested interests of actors, the high probability of adopting a new system of aid by new leaders in these states and the tendency of traditional aid delivery to perpetuate dependence. These arguments strongly suggest that development partners can consider COD as one of the effective ways of supporting fragile states in the future.

Indeed ACBF should also think deeper on the issues around effective aid delivery. Using the field surveys, the Foundation has looked at its performance with respect to these objectives as shown in the chart below. Targeting grants to countries and programs or projects in the top right hand corner of the chart in Figure 24 below are targeted toward supporting scaling up capacity development results, while investment in grants to countries and programs or projects in the top left hand corner have been aimed at getting effective development of capacity. When funds have been spent in the bottom left quadrant of the chart, the Foundation has not been effectively contributing to capacity development. While funds spent in the bottom right hand quadrant indicate ineffective targeting of ACBF activities.


Figure 24 Effectiveness of ACBF support to countries



When the field survey is considered in relation to ACBF spending in different countries one observes that the Foundation has been very effective at targeting its grants since there are no programs in the bottom right hand quadrant of the chart below. Moreover, 62% of grants are in the top right and left hand quadrants of the chart, indicating that for the most part ACBF is contributing to scaling up capacity development achievements as well as contributing to effective capacity development. There are a number of countries where ACBF needs to be more effective in contributing to capacity development (38% of countries). These include countries like Guinea and Togo, where in 2009 ACBF had no programs. Efforts need to be made for ACBF programs to be more effective in Liberia, Sierra

Leone, Malawi and Niger. Working with the UNDP, the ACBF is seeking to better target development of capacity in Sierra Leone, starting with focus on capacity development for the parliament in that country. Also in 2010 the Foundation has signed a grant for USD2 Million to form a Policy Unit in Togo, which is aimed at being more effective in this post-conflict setting. Through more effective supervision, the projects in Liberia and Malawi are doing better in 2010. The Foundation has been very effective at targeting its interventions, as there isn't a single country in which its programs have not been effectively targeted, based on an assessment of the field data relative to the effort of ACBF in terms of grants to specific countries.

Figure 25 Patterns of ACBF support to countries



Source: ACI field survey data

5.3 Major recommendations

There are a number of recommendations that one can draw to enhance capacity in fragile environments. These are discussed next.

Enhancing governance and conflict resolutions - international institutions can help with the development of governance and public finance institutions and with technical support in post-conflict and fragile state situations. While the ability to raise funds and resources from domestic sources after conflict is a problem, the solution is not over-reliance on foreign support, since questions of sustainability always arise when support comes only from external or foreign sources. Local structures and institutions should be nurtured and allowed to grow; it is also important that local and indigenous knowledge be tapped in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Cheru, 2002: 208; Englebert and Tull, 2008). This will give a sense of ownership and empower the new society to ensure that these institutions become successful. Thus, governments and other stakeholders need to ensure

that not only is there heavy local involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction and capacity development process, but also that initiatives and measures to realize them are culture- and context-specific. This means that rather than adhering to a template, capacity development efforts should have a best-fit approach where initiatives and post-conflict reconstruction is adapted to the needs of a particular country. This is because without regarding local attitudes and relationships, any attempt to instill peace will face significant obstacles, as “locally-owned” peace and reconstruction is imperative in ensuring sustainability (Samaroo, 2006: 21) of the various capacity development measures. The Ugandan example demonstrates the importance of allowing indigenous state institutions and capacities to contribute in a meaningful way in the country's post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Englebert and Tull, 2008: 135). Thus, “we need to see local indigenous institutions not necessarily as dysfunctional or doomed to history's ashcan but frequently as viable and necessary in the society we are studying, as filters and winners of the modernization process, as agencies of

transition between tradition and modern, and as a means of reconciling and blending the global with the indigenous, the nationalist with the international” (Wiarda, 1998: 76).

Strengthening knowledge management - participation in the knowledge-based society of the contemporary world calls for post-conflict countries to build on their human and social capabilities, since without them, they are unlikely to take advantage of new opportunities that will emerge and even less likely to be ready to face new threats. By building their human and health capabilities through training and retraining services, individuals in post-conflict societies can get the skills that will allow them to adapt smoothly to changing labor conditions and move freely between jobs and locations (United Nations, 2002).

Promoting gender-based programming - gender must be included as an explicit aspect of capacity development and post-conflict reconstruction efforts and initiatives (Cheru, 2002; Arabi, 2008: 92-93). According to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (2007), capacity development to advance gender goals should go beyond training in how to mainstream gender into finance and planning ministries, or training gender equality advocates on how to formulate gender-sensitive macroeconomic policies. In order to move gender equality to the forefront of post-conflict development interventions, gender analysis must be applied and made a core competence in policy-making bodies. This is because women in post-conflict societies and environments like Sudan are often not only strong human rights advocates, but also enhance government capacity in the development of systems, policies, and legislation to protect child

and women's rights (Arabi, 2008). In Sierra Leone, for example, women played a unique role in reintegrating ex-combatants into the broader society by “adopting” child soldiers and performing traditional cleansing ceremonies.


Enhancing resource mobilisation - there have been various levels via which aid flows to developing countries including Africa can be predicted. Predictability of aid is believed to enhance the levels of aid effectiveness. Less volatile aid allows local authorities to plan in a predictable manner. A survey by Bulir and Lane (2002) found that aid is more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and this volatility lessens any positive benefits of aid to recipients. When used for budget support, volatility induces poor budgeting and the underestimation of revenue flows leading to overestimation of actual disbursements. In many instances, development partners imposing rigid conditionalities on recipients further undermine disbursements. Fiscal uncertainty faced by poor countries dependent on development partner assistance makes long-term planning very difficult (Addison et al., 2005; Moss et al; 2006; ACBF, 2008). Diverse levels of aid predictability equally undermine coordination and any capacity development efforts in fragile environments.

Strengthening strategic partnerships – currently commitment to capacity development seems weak. During the field survey, 32 countries were asked about development partner strategies in their respective jurisdictions. 53.1% indicated that for the calendar year 2009, not all main partners for multilateral cooperation developed a tailored country assistance strategy or program. For the same year, 55.5% of the

countries surveyed reported that not all main partners for decentralized cooperation developed specific country assistance strategies or programs. These dynamics have implications for development partner coordination and aid effectiveness. Support of capacity development by development partners in African countries has been conducted mainly through multilateral, bilateral and or decentralized cooperation. Multilateral cooperation was identified as the most common source of support for capacity development in these countries. However, it was revealed that most of the countries do not have an established mechanism of coordinating capacity development support. Out of 32

countries assessed, 18 indicated that they do not have an institutionalized mechanism or units responsible for coordinating capacity development in their respective countries. Only 14 indicated that they have institutionalized formal mechanisms for coordinating capacity development (see figure 26). It has to be noted that development partners need to go beyond their current system of under-financed, poorly coordinated and unpredictable approach to supporting capacity development in fragile Africa. African governments must work hard to secure long-term strategic partnerships for capacity development on the continent. There must be new and additional resources.

Figure 26 Partnering for capacity development



Source: ACI field survey data

Developing savvy leadership - the fluidity of fragile environments requires one to be “politically astute, economically savvy, business aware and emotionally intelligent” (Hanson and Léautier, 2009). These qualities are essential for an institution or individual to operate effectively in an environment that is fragile, where knowledge is highly valued and there is need for capacity to use technology in a wise, effective and efficient manner. Specific leadership and governance skills are thus to allow for capacity to: a) function in environments with low predictability, b) handle diverse potential

futures, c) be equipped with a set of values and behaviors that guide decision-makers in making choices in challenging circumstances; and d) identify patterns of change (shifts), extract important relationships (interactions), and select from a variety of approaches for handling challenges.

Exploiting skills from all corners - to overcome the challenges pertaining to the lack of skilled personnel, many post-conflict African countries are now relying on the numerous networks of experts from their countries that have been

established in the Diaspora. These networks that link professionals abroad with counterparts at home facilitate regular discussions about issues, plans and projects, and help build trust between Diaspora and home countries; thereby enhancing the success of collaborative schemes. The benefits of such initiatives are that members of the African Diaspora are able to offer research and consultancy services as well as assist in the post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts without the massive sacrifice of returning or relocating back to their countries of origin (Tettey, 2003).

5.4 Conclusion and the way forward

The ACIR acknowledges the capacity development challenges Africa faces in a fragile environment. It presents some key findings that should guide the partnerships on the continent.

First, there must be greater investments at the individual level where capacity is at its weakest. This implies greater investments in training, whatever form it takes, depending on specific country needs. ACBF will work to support new partnerships and, in so doing, will seek a balance between deep skills and continuous learning. The Foundation will also seek to strengthen partnerships between the private sector and institutions of higher learning.

Second, given that the policy environment is generally strong, the gap in realizing effective capacity relates primarily to implementing initiatives that address skill shortages. There must be greater utilization and rationalization of existing capacity as well as improved mobilization of resources to enhance overall capacity. Going forward, ACBF will support the creation of new policy units/think tanks and

provide a platform to address emerging issues and challenges, among these climate change, food security, and migration.

Third, there is a need to enhance governance and bring about leadership transformation. This means enhancing and expanding the quality of leadership toward attaining development goals beyond the MDGs. Leaders at all levels of society must be savvy, dynamic, and strategic thinkers. Such leaders should be capable of inspiring the continent with their dedication to the transformation agenda and drive to achieve results.

Fourth, there is need to foster a culture of responsibility, mutual accountability, and unwavering commitment to performance excellence across the public and private sectors as well as civil society. States must empower the citizenry of Africa in their own development processes by demanding complete accountability and more transparency from state institutions, businesses, and other non-state organizations. For examples, parliaments need to be made more effective, and the rule of law must be seen to exist and to exert social justice. ACBF will work with the African Union to commence dialog on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to ensure shared buy-in and ownership.

Fifth, Africa should enhance its knowledge base and its subsequent utilization. The linkage between research and learning institutions and the policy-making community is fundamental and requires capacity. Universities and training as well as policy units should lead the drive toward a knowledge economy. Policies will then be based on real issues on the continent and will be backed by adequate evidence-based information. This has a far-reaching effect that

influences not only political issues, but also environmental and social challenges. Going forward, the Foundation will support investment in knowledge and data, statistical capacity building, and monitoring and evaluation to enhance both its internal operations as well as those of its grantees. ACBF will also seek to utilize the skills of Africans in the Diaspora.

Sixth, Africa must find better ways to use skills and resources for unlocking African potential. The ACIR points to the fact that Africa's resources must be mobilized, optimized, and retained, and for development on the continent at local, continental, and global levels, particularly in fragility. Central to this priority is the significance of appropriate incentives, reward and management systems that effectively leverage African potential and attract the requisite capacities. Concerted efforts and targeted planning of human resources development should enable African skills to be better harnessed and utilized in closing development gaps, particularly for young people and women. This also implies securing better partnerships for capacity development and enhancing development partner coordination for aid effectiveness and development results.

Finally, going forward, the ACI will meet the need for further exploration of such issues as Africa's capacity to respond to shocks and adapt to new and emerging challenges. There is need to develop capacity to develop capacity. Critical in this respect is ownership of assessments of achievement in capacity development. African experts need to direct framework definition, data collection, and progress assessment so that Africans own and are conscious of owning the process for change that is needed to achieve superior development results.

To that end, ACBF will continue to provide Africa-specific depth of knowledge regarding issues related to effective aid delivery through both its grant-making and advisory activities and, going forward, the publication of annual reports based on future field surveys. Aided by the intelligence gathered in future field surveys and analyzed in subsequent annual ACI Reports, ACBF is well positioned to build on this success and make an active contribution to continued advances in capacity development throughout the continent.

End Notes

- ¹ It should be noted that various institutions have built centers to monitor and identify weak, failing, or failed states. They include, but are not limited to, USAID (fragile states initiative); Stanford and Yale Universities (civil war models); Fund for Peace (failed states index); US Center for Army Analysis (Analyzing Complex Threats for Operations and Readiness); the University of Maryland (Minorities at Risk); and the Brookings Institution (Index of State Weakness)
- ² The exception to this standard practice is the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) financed by the World Bank and other thirteen donors. The program supports and coordinates demobilization and reintegration efforts in the Great Lakes region of Africa. For the review of its performance see Gilbert M. Khadiagala (2008)
- ³ Resource commitments to the reconstruction of fragile states are biased against Africa's fragile countries. The annual per capita aid of US\$39 for the DRC compares unfavorably with US\$129 for Afghanistan; US\$211 for Bosnia and Herzegovina; and US\$278 for the East Timor. See Englebert and Tull (2008).
- ⁴ The example of the Malawi Parliament is quite revealing. As Lia Nijzink et al. (2006: 314) notes, despite the support of several international donors, the parliament in Malawi remains housed in a temporary office space and lacks adequate research support. It employs only two researchers and has two designated committees. Clerks serving thirteen parliamentary committees.
- ⁵ An interesting aspect of this "resource curse" argument is what is called 'the poetical Dutch Disease' problem. The latter basically refers to the situation where the windfall gains from the booming sector (say oil or diamonds) allows state beneficiaries to misallocate resources and to ignore political challenges or the economic challenges that historically led to the formation of more democratically [or better] accountable state (see Cramer, 2006: 119-120).
- ⁶ Readers interested in specific examples on the theoretical and general empirical literature in Africa are referred to the references cited at the end of this document.
- ⁷ Hence the frequent calls for donor coordination. See, for example, ODI (2005) and OECD (2006b).
- ⁸ Vandemoortele (2007) notes that donor-country consultations too often tend to be asymmetric, one-way discussions of conditions and compliance, where governments have little opportunity to engage in discussion or debate
- ⁹ One of the reasons why parliaments received less attention in the development process is that unlike coherent government ministries, they are by nature a collection of political parties and individuals elected by disparate constituencies and without clear leaders or common agendas.
- ¹⁰ A more recent wave of political reforms in Africa as a result of peaceful elections and more freedom being given to the media would result in inclusion of a new set of countries under these criteria when looking at progress between 2005 and 2009. However, there have also been some changes with countries going in the other direction, leading to most major indices of evolution in African governance (such as the Ibrahim Index) to appear static.
- ¹¹ The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) also recognizes the significance of addressing security and conflict issues alongside economic development and/or poverty reduction
- ¹² They are referred to as extralegal groups by Cheng (2010).
- ¹³ Landis and Koch proposed the following scale, given the Kappa coefficient:
- Less than 0: No agreement
 - 0–0.2 Slight
 - 0.21–0.40 Fair
 - 0.41–0.60 Moderate
 - 0.61–0.80 Substantial
 - 0.81–1 Perfect agreement

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
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A - ACIR TEAM ORGANIZATION

The ACIR Team comprised a dedicated ACBF team supported by various stakeholders at different levels, as presented in the chart below.



ACBF ACIR Team

A 12 member ACIR Team within the ACBF Secretariat was constituted to conduct the whole process from the concept note through publication of the ACIR Flagship Report.

External Reference Group (ERG)

The 15-member ERG was established to provide support to the ACBF ACIR team to develop the thinking behind the assessment and ensure that the team achieves its objective of delivering a quality publication by a set target date of end-January 2011. To this end, the External Reference Group acted as the ACIR team's strategic partner to ensure that:

- The approach and methodologies employed in preparing the Flagship Report are theoretically sound, rigorous, and balanced and draw on

divergent views as appropriate;

- The preliminary data capturing instruments are adequately reviewed and appropriate;
- Comments on the ACI template, selected indicators, and case studies and stories are provided in a timely manner;
- Presentation of findings balances views from across the broad spectrum of opinion and reflects current and innovative practice;
- The review and report balance public, legal, and operational perspectives appropriately;
- There is feedback on implementation support and costing tools for specific topics examined in the ACI, and on the appropriateness of, for example, the costing assumptions and the approach adopted within the tools as well as peer review of the background papers;
- Where needed, ACBF is supported in the identification of

appropriate networks with which to engage to assist in the development of the tools; and

- All conclusions drawn and policy recommendations provided are sound and evidence-based.

Background papers

The goal of the competitive consultancy was to source detailed background papers that would assist the ACI Team in better grasping and contextualizing the issues of capacity development in post-conflict and fragile environments. Seven (07) Consultants were contracted to draft Technical Background papers. The papers contextualized and interrogated issues of capacity development in post-conflict and fragile environments.

Focal regional points

On the basis of their geographic and linguistic affinity, the targeted countries were grouped into five regions. A policy unit was tasked with supervising the data collection process at each regional level.

Data collectors

At the country level, a national familiar with the country

context, chosen through an open and competitive selection process, conducted the administration of questionnaires. However Section G of the Survey Instrument on the CPIA was administered by twelve (12) policy units in surveyed countries.

Independent editor

An independent editor was contracted to provide editorial full support. To this end, the editor oversaw the general construction, grammar, syntax, style, and content of the publication; ensured that the language and style reinforce the report's intended messages and present data clearly and creatively; and tailored the writing and design of the report to capture the attention of the target readership.

B - DATA COLLECTION

Coverage

While it is intended for the study to target all sub-Saharan African countries, the first edition focused on 34 countries (see list below).


Table 16 List of countries covered by the study

Group 1 West Anglophone countries	Group 2 West Francophone countries	Group 3 Central Africa and other francophone countries	Group 4 Eastern Africa	Group 5 Southern Africa
The Gambia	Benin	Burundi	Kenya	Lesotho
Ghana	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Malawi	Mozambique
Liberia	Côte d'Ivoire	CAR	Rwanda	South Africa
Nigeria	Guinea	Chad	Tanzania	Swaziland
Sierra Leone	Guinea Bissau	Congo (Rep of)	Uganda	Zambia
	Mali	Congo (Dem. Rep of)		Zimbabwe
	Mauritania	Djibouti		
	Niger	Madagascar		
	Senegal			
	Togo			

Data collection instrument

The data collection instrument was designed along three dimensions of capacity: (i) enabling environment; (ii) organizational level; and (iii) individual level. These dimensions constituted the three main parts of the questionnaire. The structure is presented in Chart 2. A single questionnaire was administered in each of the country covered by the study.

Chart 2 Structure of the data collection instrument



Pre-testing of the data collection methodology

After their selection, the in-country data collectors first received at home a copy of the preliminary data collection instrument as well as a copy of the guide to the data collector. They were asked to get familiar with the instruments and assess the generic sources of information compiled by ACBF and included in the data collection guide so as to be able to provide feedbacks and take an active part to the training workshop that was to be organized.

Training workshop

A training workshop for the in-country data collectors was organized from July 13-16, 2010. During the workshop, the data collection instrument was reviewed and the final version adopted. Also during the workshop, the participants reported on their respective country assessments of the provided potential sources of information. Following an exchange of views by all participants, every participant revised his individual list of sources and adopted his final document. However, it was acknowledged that the list might be adjusted during the field data collection.

Period of field data collection

The field data collection was conducted from July 19 to August 31, 2010. Reporting was done on a weekly basis. At the end of the field data collection, the data collectors submitted the completed questionnaires and their final report.

C - COMPUTING THE INDICES**C.1. Scoring the answers to questions**

Each question was assigned an associated variable whose nature depends on the type of question asked. The scoring of the variables is in relation with their respective natures. All variables are scored on a scale 0-100.

Qualitative variables

A value is attributed to each expected answer. Questions with a YES or NO answer are scored 0 for NO and 100 for YES. Questions with three expected answers are scored 0, 50, and 100, and questions with four answers are scored 0, 33.3, 66.7, and 100.

Some few examples:

Question No.	Question	Expected answers	Score
B1	Does the country have a National Development Strategy (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, National Development Plan, Vision Strategy, etc) ?	YES	100
		NO	0
B4	Is Capacity Development (CD) integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy/National Development Plan?	CD is not mainstreamed in the current PRSP/National Development Plan	0
		CD is mainstreamed, but with no clear objectives and targets	50
		Clear objectives and targets set in the PRSP/National Development Plan	100
B26	How would you rate local organizations' influence on the process of agricultural and rural development?	Poor	0
		Good	33.3
		Very Good	66.7
		Excellent	100

Numerical variables**a- The answer is a proportion**

The score is the answer (assuming that moving from 0 to 100 percent is improving; otherwise, one may just read backward)

b- Numerical variable in the form of ordinal scales

The values on the predetermined scale is brought to a scale ranging from 0 – 100.

Example:

c- *Numerical variable in the form of figure*

Three different options were considered

C4: On the scale ¹ (Very weak) to 6 (Very strong), assess how support to capacity is being coordinated in the country Very weak = 1 2 3 4 5 6 = Very strong						
Answer	1	2	3	4	5	6
Score	0	20	40	60	80	100

Option 1 (Best achievement)

From the minimum and maximum values observed (among the countries surveyed), define a range 0 – 100, where 0 is associated with minimum value, and 100 with maximum value. One disadvantage of this option is that it may not capture sufficiently the progress made by a country, as its efforts are assessed with respect to those of other countries.

Option 2 (Best progress)

A country may be assessed with respect to efforts made the previous years. The indicator would measure the variation in the efforts it is doing by its own. This is another way to measure investment in capacity development.

$$\frac{Y_t - Y_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \text{ (in \%)}$$

Y_t = Value at current date t

Y_{t-1} = Value at previous year (t-1)

One disadvantage of this option is that positive variations may range from 0 to infinity. For example, two countries shifting from 0 to 1 and from 0 to 1000, respectively, would have the same infinite rate of increase.

Option 3 (Best relative change)

This option is the same as option 2, but with a formula that mitigates the disadvantage with the formula in option 2.

$$\frac{Y_t - Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} \text{ (in \%)}$$

Y_t = Value at current date t

Y_{t-1} = Value at previous year (t-1)

A minor disadvantage presented by this formula is that if a country experiences a drastic decrease (more than 50 percent), the indicator will be less than -100 percent. This situation, though rare, may apply to a country facing some turmoil.

For the first publication, option 1 is the only one that could be used. Results from the first publication will constitute the basis for either option 2 or option 3.

C.2 Calculating the indices

Given the fact that this is a pilot phase of the ACI publication, the confirmatory and exploratory approaches are used to calculate the sub-indices.

C.2.1 Sub-indices

As this first publication is a pilot phase, two approaches were used to compute the sub-indices: the confirmatory approach and the exploratory approach.

a- The confirmatory approach

In this approach, the sub-indexes are defined in relation with the structure of the questionnaire, which is based on the three dimensions of capacity. Three types of sub-indexes are therefore calculated, in a cascading way as follows:

- 1- Component Indicators
- 2- Section Indicators
- 3- Capacity Dimension Indexes

Component Indicators

Component Index j ($j = 1, 2, \dots, 15$) is the arithmetic mean of Variable Indicators within that component.

$$CI_j = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{i=n_j} VI_{ij}$$

VI_{ij} = Score assigned to question i within Component j

n_j = Number of Variable Indicators associated with Component j

Section Indicators

Section Indicator k ($k = 1, 2, \dots, 7$) is the arithmetic mean of Component Indicators within that Section.

$$SI_k = \frac{1}{m_k} \sum_{i=1}^{i=m_k} CI_{ki}$$

m_k = Number of Component Indicators associated with Section k

$m_1 = 6, \dots, m_7 = 2$

Capacity Dimension Indexes

Capacity Dimension Index α ($\alpha = 1, 2, 3$) is the arithmetic mean of Section Indicators associated with that Dimension.

$$CDI_\alpha = \frac{1}{N_\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{i=N_\alpha} SI_{\alpha i}$$

N_α = Number of Section Indicators associated with Dimension α

b- The exploratory approach.

The hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out using the Ward's method, applying squared Euclidian distance as the distance or similarity measure. From the findings of the analysis, four groups of factors appeared to be the most relevant:

- i. Cluster 1: Policy environment,
- ii. Cluster 2: Processes for implementation,
- iii. Cluster 3: Development results, and
- iv. Cluster 4: Capacity development outcomes.

Cluster Index j ($j = 1, 2, 3, 4$) is the arithmetic mean of Variable Indicators within that cluster.

$$CLI_j = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{i=n_j} VI_{ij}$$

VI_{ij} = Score assigned to question i within Cluster j

n_j = Number of Variable Indicators associated with Cluster j

C.2.2 The ACI Composite Index

The ACI composite Index is the harmonic mean of the four cluster indexes. The rationale for choosing the harmonic mean formula is that none of the capacity development factor as given by the four clusters should be neglected. Weakness in one of the four components should be easily captured by the harmonic mean formula, which is sensitive to small values.

$$ACI = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{4} \sum_{\alpha=1}^4 \frac{1}{CLI_{\alpha}}}$$

C.3 Ranking the countries

According to the index values, the countries are ranked into five categories as follows:

Level	Value of Index	Category	Color
1	0 to less than 20	Very Low	
2	20 to less than 40	Low	
3	40 to less than 60	Medium	
4	60 to less than 80	High	
5	80 and above	Very High	

ACI Indices

ACI Composite Index

The following section details the values of the Africa Capacity Indices. All tables are listed in alphabetical order.




Table 17 ACI Composite Index by countries (in Alphabetical Order)

No.	Country	ACI Composite Index value
1	BENIN	40.9
2	BURKINA FASO	53.8
3	BURUNDI	40.4
4	CAMEROON	38.6
5	CAR	40.8
6	CHAD	33.9
7	CONGO (DRC)	33.1
8	CONGO, REP	28.4
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	41.5
10	DJIBOUTI	43.9
11	GAMBIA (THE)	34.1
12	GHANA	53.5
13	GUINEA	12.8
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	23.1
15	KENYA	47.1
16	LESOTHO	28.6
17	LIBERIA	20.4
18	MADAGASCAR	21.0
19	MALAWI	25.9
20	MALI	51.1
21	MAURITANIA	24.0
22	MOZAMBIQUE	25.9
23	NIGER	23.5
24	NIGERIA	33.3
25	RWANDA	45.0
26	SENEGAL	44.2
27	SIERRA LEONE	24.2
28	SOUTH AFRICA	42.5
29	SWAZILAND	23.7
30	TANZANIA	30.3
31	TOGO	14.2
32	UGANDA	29.9
33	ZAMBIA	39.0
34	ZIMBABWE	43.7


Table 18 ACI Composite Index by countries

No.	Country	Level of capacity development
1	BENIN	Medium
2	BURKINA FASO	Medium
3	BURUNDI	Medium
4	CAMEROON	Low
5	CAR	Medium
6	CHAD	Low
7	CONGO (DRC)	Low
8	CONGO, REP	Low
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Medium
10	DJIBOUTI	Medium
11	GAMBIA (THE)	Low
12	GHANA	Medium
13	GUINEA	Very Low
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Low
15	KENYA	Medium
16	LESOTHO	Low
17	LIBERIA	Low
18	MADAGASCAR	Low
19	MALAWI	Low
20	MALI	Medium
21	MAURITANIA	Low
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Low
23	NIGER	Low
24	NIGERIA	Low
25	RWANDA	Medium
26	SENEGAL	Medium
27	SIERRA LEONE	Low
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Medium
29	SWAZILAND	Low
30	TANZANIA	Low
31	TOGO	Very Low
32	UGANDA	Low
33	ZAMBIA	Low
34	ZIMBABWE	Medium

Table 19 Percentage of countries by levels of capacity development

Level	% of countries
Very Low	5.9
Low	55.9
Medium	38.2
High	0.0
Very High	0.0
TOTAL	100

Figure 27 Graphical representation of table 19.



- No country in the two highest levels of capacity development.
- A significant majority (62 percent) in the lowest levels.

Table 20 Comparison of ACI Composite Indices with or without missing data

No.	Country	ACI Composite Index value (Zero value assigned to missing data)		ACI Composite Index value (Missing data are ignored)		
1	BENIN	40.9	Medium	40.9	Medium	No change
2	BURKINA FASO	53.8	Medium	55.0	Medium	No change
3	BURUNDI	40.4	Medium	40.4	Medium	No change
4	CAMEROON	38.6	Low	44.4	Medium	Shift
5	CAR	40.8	Medium	40.8	Medium	No change
6	CHAD	33.9	Low	34.4	Low	No change
7	CONGO (DRC)	33.1	Low	35.0	Low	No change
8	CONGO, REP	28.4	Low	28.4	Low	No change
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	41.5	Medium	42.9	Medium	No change
10	DJIBOUTI	43.9	Medium	43.9	Medium	No change
11	GAMBIA (THE)	34.1	Low	36.6	Low	No change
12	GHANA	53.5	Medium	59.5	Medium	No change
13	GUINEA	12.8	Very Low	14.0	Very Low	No change
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	23.1	Low	23.2	Low	No change
15	KENYA	47.1	Medium	47.1	Medium	No change
16	LESOTHO	28.6	Low	29.4	Low	No change
17	LIBERIA	20.4	Low	21.2	Low	No change
18	MADAGASCAR	21.0	Low	21.2	Low	No change
19	MALAWI	25.9	Low	26.7	Low	No change
20	MALI	51.1	Medium	52.8	Medium	No change
21	MAURITANIA	24.0	Low	24	Low	No change
22	MOZAMBIQUE	25.9	Low	29.1	Low	No change
23	NIGER	23.5	Low	23.8	Low	No change
24	NIGERIA	33.3	Low	35.4	Low	No change
25	RWANDA	45.0	Medium	45.0	Medium	No change
26	SENEGAL	44.2	Medium	49.5	Medium	No change
27	SIERRA LEONE	24.2	Low	25.8	Low	No change
28	SOUTH AFRICA	42.5	Medium	45.2	Medium	No change
29	SWAZILAND	23.7	Low	27.3	Low	No change
30	TANZANIA	30.3	Low	32.7	Low	No change
31	TOGO	14.2	Very Low	16.0	Very Low	No change
32	UGANDA	29.9	Low	31	Low	No change
33	ZAMBIA	39.0	Low	46.3	Medium	Shift
34	ZIMBABWE	43.7	Medium	48.2	Medium	No change

The difference between the ACI composite Indexes calculated with or without the missing data is not significant. A shift from low level to medium level is observed for two countries (Cameroon and Zambia). All other countries remain at their respective unchanged levels.

Table 21 Component Index values by country (zero assigned to missing data)

No.	Country	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
1	BENIN	100	89.1	32.7	21.7
2	BURKINA FASO	95.5	80.4	60.0	28.7
3	BURUNDI	100	82.6	40.9	19.1
4	CAMEROON	81.8	63.0	28.2	24.9
5	CAR	100	67.4	32.7	23.5
6	CHAD	90.9	50.0	40.0	16.1
7	CONGO (DRC)	81.8	52.2	44.5	14.9
8	CONGO, REP	90.9	69.6	20.0	15.3
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	95.5	58.7	38.2	23.4
10	DJIBOUTI	95.5	89.1	53.6	19.7
11	GAMBIA (THE)	100	71.7	55.5	13.3
12	GHANA	100	73.9	32.7	48.2
13	GUINEA	86.4	63.0	35.5	3.9
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	50.0	54.3	56.4	8.6
15	KENYA	81.8	63.0	38.2	32.6
16	LESOTHO	68.2	73.9	23.6	14.4
17	LIBERIA	77.3	73.9	44.5	6.8
18	MADAGASCAR	100	60.9	46.4	7.0
19	MALAWI	95.5	63.0	30.9	10.4
20	MALI	100	84.8	35.5	35.3
21	MAURITANIA	77.3	76.1	26.4	9.7
22	MOZAMBIQUE	90.9	76.1	64.5	8.7
23	NIGER	86.4	78.3	41.8	8.2
24	NIGERIA	86.4	56.5	38.2	15.4
25	RWANDA	100	82.6	62.7	19.7
26	SENEGAL	90.9	73.9	37.3	25.5
27	SIERRA LEONE	81.8	76.1	26.4	9.8
28	SOUTH AFRICA	90.0	42.1	78.6	21.5
29	SWAZILAND	90.9	23.9	24.5	13.3
30	TANZANIA	95.5	50.0	32.7	14.1
31	TOGO	86.4	56.5	26.4	4.6
32	UGANDA	95.5	50.0	18.2	20.7
33	ZAMBIA	95.5	41.3	26.4	33.3
34	ZIMBABWE	86.4	65.2	38.2	26.0

Table 22 Levels of capacity development by components and by countries (zero assigned to missing data)

No.	Country	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
1	BENIN	Very High	Very High	Low	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	Very High	Very High	High	Low
3	BURUNDI	Very High	Very High	Medium	Very Low
4	CAMEROON	Very High	High	Low	Low
5	CAR	Very High	High	Low	Low
6	CHAD	Very High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
7	CONGO (DRC)	Very High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
8	CONGO, REP	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
10	DJIBOUTI	Very High	Very High	Medium	Very Low
11	GAMBIA (THE)	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
12	GHANA	Very High	High	Low	Medium
13	GUINEA	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Medium	Medium	Medium	Very Low
15	KENYA	Very High	High	Low	Low
16	LESOTHO	High	High	Low	Very Low
17	LIBERIA	High	High	Medium	Very Low
18	MADAGASCAR	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
19	MALAWI	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
20	MALI	Very High	Very High	Low	Low
21	MAURITANIA	High	High	Low	Very Low
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Very High	High	High	Very Low
23	NIGER	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
24	NIGERIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
25	RWANDA	Very High	Very High	High	Very Low
26	SENEGAL	Very High	High	Low	Low
27	SIERRA LEONE	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Very High	Medium	High	Low
29	SWAZILAND	Very High	Low	Low	Very Low
30	TANZANIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
31	TOGO	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
32	UGANDA	Very High	Medium	Very Low	Low
33	ZAMBIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
34	ZIMBABWE	Very High	High	Low	Low

Table 23 Levels of capacity development by countries and by components (Missing data are ignored)

No.	Country	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Processes for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
1	BENIN	Very High	Very High	Low	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	Very High	Very High	High	Low
3	BURUNDI	Very High	Very High	Medium	Very Low
4	CAMEROON	Very High	High	Low	Low
5	CAR	Very High	High	Low	Low
6	CHAD	Very High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
7	CONGO (DRC)	Very High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
8	CONGO, REP	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Very High	High	Medium	Low
10	DJIBOUTI	Very High	Very High	Medium	Very Low
11	GAMBIA (THE)	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
12	GHANA	Very High	High	Medium	Medium
13	GUINEA	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Medium	Medium	Medium	Very Low
15	KENYA	Very High	High	Low	Low
16	LESOTHO	High	High	Low	Very Low
17	LIBERIA	High	High	Medium	Very Low
18	MADAGASCAR	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
19	MALAWI	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
20	MALI	Very High	Very High	Low	Low
21	MAURITANIA	High	High	Low	Very Low
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Very High	High	High	Very Low
23	NIGER	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
24	NIGERIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
25	RWANDA	Very High	Very High	High	Very Low
26	SENEGAL	Very High	High	Medium	Low
27	SIERRA LEONE	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Very High	Medium	High	Low
29	SWAZILAND	Very High	Low	Low	Very Low
30	TANZANIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
31	TOGO	Very High	Medium	Low	Very Low
32	UGANDA	Very High	Medium	Very Low	Low
33	ZAMBIA	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
34	ZIMBABWE	Very High	High	Medium	Low

Table 24 Capacity dimension index values by country (Zero value assigned to missing data)

No.	Country	Enabling environment	Organizational level	Individual level
1	BENIN	High	Very High	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	High	Very High	Low
3	BURUNDI	High	Very High	Low
4	CAMEROON	Medium	Very High	Low
5	CAR	Medium	Very High	Very Low
6	CHAD	Medium	Low	Low
7	CONGO (DRC)	Medium	Low	Low
8	CONGO, REP	Medium	Low	Very Low
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Medium	Medium	Low
10	DJIBOUTI	High	Very High	Low
11	GAMBIA (THE)	High	High	Very Low
12	GHANA	Medium	Medium	High
13	GUINEA	Medium	Medium	Very Low
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Medium	High	Very Low
15	KENYA	Medium	Low	Medium
16	LESOTHO	Medium	High	Very Low
17	LIBERIA	Medium	Very High	Very Low
18	MADAGASCAR	High	Low	Very Low
19	MALAWI	Medium	Very High	Very Low
20	MALI	High	Very High	Low
21	MAURITANIA	Medium	Medium	Very Low
22	MOZAMBIQUE	High	High	Very Low
23	NIGER	High	High	Very Low
24	NIGERIA	Medium	Medium	Low
25	RWANDA	High	Very High	Low
26	SENEGAL	Medium	Medium	Low
27	SIERRA LEONE	Medium	High	Very Low
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Medium	Low	Very Low
29	SWAZILAND	Low	Medium	Low
30	TANZANIA	Medium	Very Low	Low
31	TOGO	Medium	Low	Very Low
32	UGANDA	Medium	Very Low	Low
33	ZAMBIA	Medium	Low	Medium
34	ZIMBABWE	Medium	Very High	Low

Table 25 Capacity dimension index values by country (missing data ignored)

No.	Country	Enabling environment	Organizational level	Individual level
1	BENIN	High	Very High	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	High	Very High	Low
3	BURUNDI	High	Very High	Low
4	CAMEROON	High	Very High	Low
5	CAR	Medium	Very High	Very Low
6	CHAD	Medium	Low	Low
7	CONGO (DRC)	Medium	Low	Low
8	CONGO, REP	Medium	Low	Very Low
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	High	High	Low
10	DJIBOUTI	High	Very High	Low
11	GAMBIA (THE)	High	Very High	Very Low
12	GHANA	High	High	High
13	GUINEA	Medium	Medium	Very Low
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Medium	High	Very Low
15	KENYA	Medium	Low	Medium
16	LESOTHO	Medium	High	Very Low
17	LIBERIA	Medium	Very High	Very Low
18	MADAGASCAR	High	Medium	Very Low
19	MALAWI	Medium	Very High	Very Low
20	MALI	High	Very High	Low
21	MAURITANIA	Medium	Medium	Very Low
22	MOZAMBIQUE	High	High	Very Low
23	NIGER	High	High	Very Low
24	NIGERIA	High	Medium	Low
25	RWANDA	High	Very High	Low
26	SENEGAL	Very High	Medium	Low
27	SIERRA LEONE	High	High	Very Low
28	SOUTH AFRICA	High	Medium	Very Low
29	SWAZILAND	Medium	Very High	Low
30	TANZANIA	High	Very Low	Low
31	TOGO	Medium	Low	Very Low
32	UGANDA	Medium	Very Low	Low
33	ZAMBIA	High	Low	Medium
34	ZIMBABWE	Medium	Very High	Low

Country Profiles

Benin

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	40.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	11

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	58.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	67.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	86.7
Development agencies.....	77.1
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment.....	3.1
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	20.7

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009.....	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	546,912

Burkina Faso

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	53.8
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank.....	1

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	60.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	79.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.0
Development agencies	70.8
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	4.2
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	36.1

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	6
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	1,317,914

Burundi

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	40.4
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank.....	13

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	67.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	71.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	74.2
Development agencies	63.6
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.1
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	2.9
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	22.3

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	585,349

Cameroon

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	38.6
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	15

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	67.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	68.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	56.7
Development agencies	60.4
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• RAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	33.4

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	5
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	2,176,167

Central African Republic

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	40.8
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	12

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	53.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	52.5
Development agencies	88.6
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.6
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	17.9

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	694,319

Chad

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	33.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank	17

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	48.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	58.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	53.3
Development agencies	76.1
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	2.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	20.4

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	116,582

Congo (Democratic Rep. of the)

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	33.1
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	19

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	40.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	59.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	71.7
Development agencies	53.1
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	2.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	25.5

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	3
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	734,982

Congo

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	28.4
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	23

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	48.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	59.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	70.8
Development agencies.....	62.5
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	18.8

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	3
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	966,015

Côte d'Ivoire

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	41.5
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank.....	10

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	49.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	73.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	63.3
Development agencies	81.3
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	3.5
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	21.8

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	881,731

Djibouti

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	43.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	7

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	57.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	63.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	95.0
Development agencies.....	88.6
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Fragile
• Country self assessment.....	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	23.7

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009.....	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	881,731

Gambia (The)

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	34.1
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	16

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	81.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	74.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	79.2
Development agencies.....	73.9
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.3
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	5.2

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	250,000

Ghana

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	53.5
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	2

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	63.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	85.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	80.8
Development agencies.....	75.0
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	71.0

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	6
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	1,557,075

Guinea

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	2.8
Level of Capacity Development	Very Low
Rank	34

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	51.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	55.8
Development agencies	66.7
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	0

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	None
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009(US\$).....	0

Guinea Bissau

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	23.1
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	30

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	26.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	51.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	80.0
Development agencies	58.3
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.6
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	7.1

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	276,420

Kenya

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	47.1
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	4

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	65.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	34.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	60.0
Development agencies	65.6
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	4.0
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	41.6

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	4
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	263,630

Lesotho

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	8.6
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank.....	22

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	57.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	62.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	55.8
Development agencies.....	87.5
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	7.3

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	311,746

Liberia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	20.4
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank.....	32

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	66.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	52.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	54.2
Development agencies	63.6
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Fragile
• Country self assessment	3.4
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	5.2

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	182,845

Madagascar

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	21.0
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	31

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	60.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	68.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	73.3
Development agencies.....	33.3
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	8.3

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	188,334

Malawi

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	25.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank.....	31

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	48.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	63.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	65.8
Development agencies.....	62.5
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	8.6

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	70,592

Mali

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	51.1
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	3

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	68.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	75.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	65.8
Development agencies	91.7
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	39.4

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	4
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	812,897

Mauritania

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	24.0
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	27

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	54.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	63.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	52.5
Development agencies	52.1
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	3.3
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	12.2

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	269,567

Mozambique

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	25.9
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank.....	25

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	74.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	59.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	83.3
Development agencies.....	82.3
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	9.0

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	305,889

Niger

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	23.5
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	29

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	53.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	86.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	65.8
Development agencies.....	55.2
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.3
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	3.8
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	8.9

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	620,154

Nigeria

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	33.3
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank.....	18

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	61.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	60.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	60.0
Development agencies	47.9
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	20.8

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	4
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	814,077

Rwanda

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	45
Level of CD	Medium
Rank	5

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	66.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	78.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.8
Development agencies	91.7
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	20.1

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	2
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	963,843

Senegal

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	44.2
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	6

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	81.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	92.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	67.5
Development agencies	40.6
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	37.8

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	7
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	1,138,570

Sierra Leone

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	24.2
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	26

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	71.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	48.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	67.5
Development agencies	52.1
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	3.7

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	1
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	0

South Africa

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	42.5
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	9

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	61.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	53.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	66.7
Development agencies	NA
Assessment of needs	50.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	16.2

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	5
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	673,159

Swaziland

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	23.7
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank	28

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	32.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	55.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	47.5
Development agencies	NA
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009).....	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	25.8

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	3
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	246,281

Tanzania

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	30.3
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	20

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	52.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	73.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	73.3
Development agencies	38.6
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	20.9

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	3
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$)	268,898

Togo

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	14.2
Level of Capacity Development	Very Low
Rank	33

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development	50.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	53.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	69.2
Development agencies.....	73.9
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	NA
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development	0

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	None
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	0

Uganda

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	29.9
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	21

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	50.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	39.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	67.5
Development agencies.....	35.4
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	4.2
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	33.3

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	3
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	1,274,627

Zambia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	39.0
Level of Capacity Development.....	Low
Rank.....	14

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	35.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	68.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	81.7
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009)	3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Not Fragile
• Country self assessment	3.4
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	44.1

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	4
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	635,544

Zimbabwe

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	43.7
Level of Capacity Development	Medium
Rank	8

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Index values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	68.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	15.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	70.8
Development agencies	84.4
Assessment of needs.....	100

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

• IRAI Value (World Bank 2009).....	1.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2009)	Fragile
• Country self assessment	4.0
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.....	37.7

ACBF-related activities

Number of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009	5
Total cumulative grants disbursed in 2009 (US\$).....	1,178,995

Compendium of Statistics

Strategic policy choices for capacity development

No.	Country	Existence of a National Development Strategy	Number of NDS adopted since Year 2000	Year of adoption of latest version	Integration of Capacity Development in National Development Strategy/National Development Plan (NDS)	Specific National Program for CD	Level of Government Commitment to MDGs	Number of MDGs achieved
1	BENIN	YES	4	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	0
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	1	2004	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	AVERAGE	1
3	BURUNDI	YES	...	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	0
4	CAMEROON	YES	2	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	0
5	CAR	YES	1	2007	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	3
6	CHAD	YES	2	2008	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	AVERAGE	0
7	CONGO (DRC)	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	AVERAGE	0
8	CONGO, REP	YES	2	2008	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	4
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	YES	7	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	AVERAGE	0
10	DJIBOUTI	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	2
11	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	2	2010	CD not mainstreamed	YES	HIGH	5
12	GHANA	YES	3	2009	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	NO	HIGH	1
13	GUINEA	YES	2	2007	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	AVERAGE	0
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	YES	...	2004	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	AVERAGE	0
15	KENYA	YES	3	2008	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	3
16	LESOTHO	YES	2	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	0
17	LIBERIA	YES	3	2008	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	YES	AVERAGE	0
18	MADAGASCAR	YES	2	2007	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	0
19	MALAWI	YES	3	2006	CD not mainstreamed	NO	HIGH	5
20	MALI	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	YES	HIGH	0
21	MAURITANIA	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	2
22	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	...
23	NIGER	YES	2	2007	CD mainstreamed, targets set	...	HIGH	0
24	NIGERIA	YES	4	2009	CD not mainstreamed	YES	HIGH	0
25	RWANDA	YES	2	2007	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	4
26	SENEGAL	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, targets set	YES	HIGH	0
27	SIERRA LEONE	YES	5	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	0
28	SOUTH AFRICA	YES	3	2006	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	NO	HIGH	...
29	SWAZILAND	YES	1	2007	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	YES	HIGH	0
30	TANZANIA	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	NO	HIGH	3
31	TOGO	YES	3	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	AVERAGE	0
32	UGANDA	YES	2	2010	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	AVERAGE	3
33	ZAMBIA	YES	3	2006	CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	NO	HIGH	1
34	ZIMBABWE	YES	2	2009	CD mainstreamed, targets set	NO	HIGH	1

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Policy environment/Efficiency of instrument

No.	Country	Level of legitimacy of the National Development Strategy	Levels of incentives for compliance provided by the National Development Strategy	Level of flexibility of the National Development Strategy
1	BENIN	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
2	BURKINA FASO	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
3	BURUNDI	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
4	CAMEROON	HIGH	AVERAGE	HIGH
5	CAR	HIGH	AVERAGE	LOW
6	CHAD	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	HIGH
7	CONGO (DRC)	LOW	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
8	CONGO, REP	HIGH	HIGH	AVERAGE
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	HIGH	HIGH	AVERAGE
10	DJIBOUTI	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	HIGH
11	GAMBIA (THE)	HIGH	AVERAGE	HIGH
12	GHANA	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
13	GUINEA	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	LOW
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	LOW	AVERAGE	HIGH
15	KENYA	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
16	LESOTHO	HIGH	LOW	LOW
17	LIBERIA	HIGH	HIGH	AVERAGE
18	MADAGASCAR	HIGH	HIGH	AVERAGE
19	MALAWI	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
20	MALI	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
21	MAURITANIA	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
22	MOZAMBIQUE	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
23	NIGER	HIGH	HIGH	AVERAGE
24	NIGERIA	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
25	RWANDA	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
26	SENEGAL	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
27	SIERRA LEONE	HIGH	AVERAGE	HIGH
28	SOUTH AFRICA	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
29	SWAZILAND	LOW	LOW	AVERAGE
30	TANZANIA	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
31	TOGO	HIGH	AVERAGE	HIGH
32	UGANDA	HIGH	LOW	LOW
33	ZAMBIA	HIGH	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
34	ZIMBABWE	HIGH	LOW	HIGH

Dialogue mechanisms for capacity development

No.	Country	Effective dialog mechanism (and other links as appropriate) among domestic institutions (civil society, private sector) engaged in CI	Effective dialog mechanism established by government with development partners relating specifically to CD	During 2009 calendar year, how frequently did the head of state, the head of government, and/or other high officials speak publicly and favorably about capacity development efforts?	Level of civil society participation in priority setting related to capacity development agenda	Level of transparency of information to civil society about the capacity development agenda
1	BENIN	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	LOW	HIGH
2	BURKINA FASO	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
3	BURUNDI	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
4	CAMEROON	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	HIGH
5	CAR	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
6	CHAD	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	AVERAGE
7	CONGO (DRC)	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	Once or twice	HIGH	AVERAGE
8	CONGO, REP	Informal dialog	No mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	AVERAGE
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Institutionalize dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	Once or twice	LOW	LOW
10	DJIBOUTI	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
11	GAMBIA(THE)	No mechanism	No mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
12	GHANA	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	LOW
13	GUINEA	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	Once or twice	HIGH	AVERAGE
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Informal dialog	No mechanism	Once or twice	LOW	LOW
15	KENYA	No mechanism	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	AVERAGE
16	LESOTHO	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
17	LIBERIA	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
18	MADAGASCAR	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism
19	MALAWI	No mechanism	CD discussed within broader mechanism	No public speech	LOW	LOW
20	MALI	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
21	MAURITANIA	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	LOW
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	No public speech	AVERAGE	LOW
23	NIGER	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	LOW
24	NIGERIA	No mechanism	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	...
25	RWANDA	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	HIGH
26	SENEGAL	Informal dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	HIGH	HIGH
27	SIERRA LEONE	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	At least 3 times	LOW	HIGH
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	At least 3 times	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
29	SWAZILAND	No mechanism	No mechanism	At least 3 times	LOW	LOW
30	TANZANIA	Institutionalized dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism
31	TOGO	No mechanism	No mechanism	No public speech	AVERAGE	AVERAGE
32	UGANDA	Informal dialog	CD discussed within broader mechanism	Once or twice	LOW	AVERAGE
33	ZAMBIA	No mechanism	CD discussed within broader mechanism
34	ZIMBABWE	Institutionalized dialog	Institutionalized dialog mechanism	Once or twice	AVERAGE	AVERAGE

(...) Data not available/not applicable



Strategic policy choices for improving the statistical system

No.	Country	Existence of a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)	Year of adoption of NSDS	NSDS is put into effect	Ratification of the African Charter on Statistics (adopted on February 3, 2009)
1	BENIN	YES	2007	YES	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	2003	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	2010	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	YES	2009	YES	NO
5	CAR	NO	N/A...	N/A	YES
6	CHAD	NO	N/A	N/A	NO
7	CONGO (DRC)	NO	N/A	N/A	NO
8	CONGO REP	YES	...	NO	NO
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	NO	N/A	N/A	YES
10	DJIBOUTI	YES	2010	YES	NO
11	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	2008	YES	YES
12	GHANA	YES	2008	YES	NO
13	GUINEA	YES	2008	YES	NO
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	NO	N/A	N/A	NO
15	KENYA	YES	2010	YES	YES
16	LESOTHO	YES	...	YES	NO
17	LIBERIA	YES	2008	YES	YES
18	MADAGASCAR	YES	2008	YES	YES
19	MALAWI	YES		YES	YES
20	MALI	YES	2006	YES	NO
21	MAURITANIA	YES	2008	YES	NO
22	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	2008	YES	YES
23	NIGER	YES	2008	YES	NO
24	NIGERIA	YES	2010	YES	NO
25	RWANDA	YES	2010	YES	NO
26	SENEGAL	YES	2007	YES	YES
27	SIERRA LEONE	YES	2008	YES	NO
28	SOUTH AFRICA	NO	N/A	N/A	YES
29	SWAZILAND	NO	N/A	N/A	NO
30	TANZANIA	YES	2010	NO	NO
31	TOGO	YES	...	YES	NO
32	UGANDA	YES	2006	YES	NO
33	ZAMBIA	NO	N/A	N/A	NO
34	ZIMBABWE	YES	2007	YES	NO

(...) Data not available

N/A – Not Applicable

Financial commitment for capacity development

No.	Country	Proportion of Government budget allocated to CD (%)	Official Development Assistance as % of government budget
1	BENIN	26.79	1.88
2	BURKINA FASO	...	9.04
3	BURUNDI	0.07	...
4	CAMEROON
5	CAR	15.61	25.13
6	CHAD	20.43	5.15
7	CONGO (DRC)
8	CONGO, REP	23.82	13.05
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	0.01	0.09
10	DJIBOUTI	1.71	1.07
11	GAMBIA (THE)
12	GHANA
13	GUINEA	2.16	9.24
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	0.69	1.73
15	KENYA	6.31	0.11
16	LESOTHO
17	LIBERIA	11.88	...
18	MADAGASCAR	13.11	4.05
19	MALAWI
20	MALI	3.36	3.86
21	MAURITANIA	0.77	6.28
22	MOZAMBIQUE
23	NIGER	2.84	3.88
24	NIGERIA
25	RWANDA	0.91	0.56
26	SENEGAL
27	SIERRA LEONE
28	SOUTH AFRICA
29	SWAZILAND
30	TANZANIA
31	TOGO	...	26.30
32	UGANDA
33	ZAMBIA
34	ZIMBABWE

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Agricultural policy

No.	Country	Quality of the current agricultural policy	Local organizations' influence on the process of agricultural and rural development	Existence of strategies in use for the agricultural sector	How these strategies seek to impact the agricultural sector most	Type of training instrument that has been most effective in agricultural development	Assessment of the level of creativity and innovation in use in the agricultural sector
1	BENIN	VERY GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through training	Counseling	LOW
2	BURKINA FASO	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Short courses & seminars	MEDIUM
3	BURUNDI	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
4	CAMEROON	GOOD	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
5	CAR	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
6	CHAD	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
7	CONGO (DRC)	POOR	POOR	YES	Through information and awareness	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
8	CONGO, REP	POOR	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	VERY GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Short courses & seminars	MEDIUM
10	DJIBOUTI	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
11	GAMBIA (THE)	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	YES	Through better efficiency/effectiveness	Academic training	HIGH
12	GHANA	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Short courses & seminars	MEDIUM
13	GUINEA	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	GOOD	GOOD	NO	Through training	Vocational programs	LOW
15	KENYA	GOOD	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Academic training	LOW
16	LESOTHO	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
17	LIBERIA	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through development of the sector	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
18	MADAGASCAR	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
19	MALAWI	GOOD	VERY GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
20	MALI	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	HIGH
21	MAURITANIA	GOOD	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Short courses & seminars	LOW
22	MOZAMBIQUE	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through investment in agriculture	Extension of techniques	MEDIUM
23	NIGER	GOOD	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Academic training	LOW
24	NIGERIA	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
25	RWANDA	VERY GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Academic training	MEDIUM
26	SENEGAL	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	No information available	MEDIUM
27	SIERRA LEONE	EXCELLENT	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Hands-on assistance	MEDIUM
28	SOUTH AFRICA	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	YES	through rural infrastructure	Short courses & seminars	MEDIUM
29	SWAZILAND	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Field days and demonstrations	MEDIUM
30	TANZANIA	POOR	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
31	TOGO	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	MEDIUM
32	UGANDA	GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Short courses & seminars	MEDIUM
33	ZAMBIA	GOOD	POOR	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	LOW
34	ZIMBABWE	VERY GOOD	GOOD	YES	Through agricultural productivity	Vocational programs	HIGH

Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities

No.	Country	Endorsement of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	Existence of an aid coordination policy	Technical cooperation disbursed to the country through coordinated programs in support of CD in 2009 Million US\$	Assessment of coordination of support to capacity in the country Scale 1 = Very weak to 6 = Very strong	No. of parallel project implementation units for CD development partners made use of in 2009
1	BENIN	YES	YES	34	4	58
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	47	4	80
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	...	1	18
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	...	4	3
5	CAR	YES	YES	65	4	11
6	CHAD	YES	YES	102	3	42
7	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	...	3	20
8	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	33	2	0
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	33	2	...
10	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	83	3	6
11	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	36	4	7
12	GHANA	YES	YES	...	4	...
13	GUINEA	YES	YES	42	3	68
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	NO	NO	...	2	2
15	KENYA	YES	NO	...	2	21
16	LESOTHO	YES	NO	...	4	4
17	LIBERIA	YES	YES	5	3	5
18	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	...	4	48
19	MALAWI	YES	YES	4	3	67
20	MALI	YES	YES	158	3	85
21	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	13	3	3
22	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	NO	...	4	...
23	NIGER	YES	YES	37	4	2
24	NIGERIA	YES	YES	...	2	2
25	RWANDA	YES	YES	...	3	...
26	SENEGAL	YES	YES	...	4	...
27	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	...	3	1
28	SOUTH AFRICA	YES	NO	...	4	...
29	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	...	2	6
30	TANZANIA	YES	YES	...	4	3
31	TOGO	YES	NO	3	3	13
32	UGANDA	YES	YES	...	1	16
33	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	...	3	...
34	ZIMBABWE	NO	YES	...	2	...

(...) Data not available/not applicable



Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities

No.	Country	Trend of the number of parallel units the development partners are making use of in CD since 2009	Proportion of ODA for CD scheduled in 2009 and disbursed within 2009 %	Percent of bilateral aid for capacity that was untied in calendar year 2009	Trend of proportion of bilateral aid for CD, with respect to 2008
1	BENIN	INCREASED	32	99	STABLE
2	BURKINA FASO	STABLE	64.3	55	STABLE
3	BURUNDI	DECREASED	16.4	...	STABLE
4	CAMEROON	STABLE
5	CAR	INCREASED	92	26.1	STABLE
6	CHAD	DECREASED	42	98	STABLE
7	CONGO (DRC)	INCREASED	55	30	STABLE
8	CONGO, REP	INCREASED	59.9	3.4	DECREASED
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	STABLE	85.1	10	DECREASED
10	DJIBOUTI	STABLE	45	18	INCREASED
11	GAMBIA (THE)	INCREASED	60	95	INCREASED
12	GHANA	STABLE
13	GUINEA	DECREASED	40	67.8	DECREASED
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	DECREASED	...	90	DECREASED
15	KENYA	INCREASED	58	78	INCREASED
16	LESOTHO	DECREASED	10	...	INCREASED
17	LIBERIA	INCREASED	...	82	INCREASED
18	MADAGASCAR	DECREASED	...	84	INCREASED
19	MALAWI	DECREASED	21	10	INCREASED
20	MALI	INCREASED	88
21	MAURITANIA	INCREASED	13	80	DECREASED
22	MOZAMBIQUE	STABLE	44	87	STABLE
23	NIGER	DECREASED	93.4	80.9	STABLE
24	NIGERIA	STABLE	INCREASED
25	RWANDA	DECREASED	69.5	74.6	INCREASED
26	SENEGAL
27	SIERRA LEONE	INCREASED	INCREASED
28	SOUTH AFRICA
29	SWAZILAND	INCREASED
30	TANZANIA	STABLE	77	...	INCREASED
31	TOGO	INCREASED	...	85	STABLE
32	UGANDA	INCREASED	10.3	90	INCREASED
33	ZAMBIA	STABLE
34	ZIMBABWE

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities

No.	Country	% of joint development partners' missions conducted in the field 2009	% of joint development partners' analytic works undertaken in calendar year 2009	Existence of transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against the national development strategy and sector program	Mutual assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments between the government and the community of development partners conducted
1	BENIN	25.1	44.0	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	100	100	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
3	BURUNDI	100	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
4	CAMEROON	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	NO
5	CAR	100	50.0	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
6	CHAD	NO M&E IN PLACE	NO
7	CONGO (DRC)	33.3	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
8	CONGO, REP	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
10	DJIBOUTI	100	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
11	GAMBIA (THE)	100	100	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
12	GHANA	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
13	GUINEA	75.0	50.0	NO M&E IN PLACE	YES
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	100	100	NO M&E IN PLACE	NO
15	KENYA	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	NO
16	LESOTHO	100	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
17	LIBERIA	NO M&E IN PLACE	YES
18	MADAGASCAR	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	NO
19	MALAWI	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
20	MALI	19.7	55.6	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
21	MAURITANIA	...	50.0	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
22	MOZAMBIQUE	33.3	55.3	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
23	NIGER	83.3	80.0	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
24	NIGERIA	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
25	RWANDA	100	...	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
26	SENEGAL	ADEQUATE M&E UNDERWAY	YES
27	SIERRA LEONE	...	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	NO
28	SOUTH AFRICA
29	SWAZILAND
30	TANZANIA	100	100	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
31	TOGO	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	YES
32	UGANDA	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	NO
33	ZAMBIA	M&E IDENTIFIED, NOT ADEQUATE	...
34	ZIMBABWE	NO M&E IN PLACE	NO

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Gender equality mainstreaming

No.	Country	Ratification of CEDAW	Year of ratification	Report to the Committee	Institutional mechanisms implement the CEDAW	Ratification of the Optional Protocol
1	BENIN	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1992	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1986	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
3	BURUNDI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1991	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
4	CAMEROON	CEDAW ratified without reservation
5	CAR	CEDAW ratified without reservation	...	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	NO
6	CHAD	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	No reporting	Focal person appointed	NO
7	CONGO (DRC)	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
8	CONGO, REP	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1982	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	No reporting	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
10	DJIBOUTI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1998	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
11	GAMBIA (THE)	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1992	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	NO
12	GHANA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1986	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
13	GUINEA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1982	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	NO
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2008	Reporting is up to date	Focal person appointed	YES
15	KENYA	CEDAW Ratified with reservations	1984	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
16	LESOTHO	CEDAW Ratified with reservations	1996	No reporting	Focal person appointed	NO
17	LIBERIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2009	Reporting is up to date	Focal person appointed	YES
18	MADAGASCAR	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1988	Reporting is up to date	Focal person appointed	YES
19	MALAWI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1987	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
20	MALI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal person appointed	YES
21	MAURITANIA	CEDAW Ratified with reservations	2000	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
22	MOZAMBIQUE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1993	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
23	NIGER	CEDAW Ratified with reservations	...	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	YES
24	NIGERIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
25	RWANDA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	...	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	YES
26	SENEGAL	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	YES
27	SIERRA LEONE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1988	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
28	SOUTH AFRICA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	Not all reporting done	Focal person appointed	YES
29	SWAZILAND	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2004	No reporting	Focal person appointed	NO
30	TANZANIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1986	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	YES
31	TOGO	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1983	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
32	UGANDA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
33	ZAMBIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO
34	ZIMBABWE	CEDAW Ratified with reservations	1996	Not all reporting done	Appropriate institutional mechanism	NO

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Gender equality mainstreaming

No.	Country	Embodiment of the principle of equality of men and women in national constitution or other appropriate legislation	Consistency of family laws with the principles of gender equality as under provision of Article 16 of the CEDAW	The country has put in place (enacted) a gender policy	Gender equality policy is integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy	Government allocated financial resources to gender related activities	Engendering statistics
1	BENIN	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	No clear guide
2	BURKINA FASO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	Clear guide
3	BURUNDI	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
4	CAMEROON	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
5	CAR	No law or legal measure	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	No clear guide
6	CHAD	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
7	CONGO (DRC)	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear	No clear guide
8	CONGO, REP	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	Clear guide
10	DJIBOUTI	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	Clear guide
11	GAMBIA (THE)	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	NO	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear	No clear guide
12	GHANA	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	NO	Gender not mainstreamed	Unclear	No clear guide
13	GUINEA	Draft law in place	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	Clear guide
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Gender not mainstreamed	Unclear	No clear guide
15	KENYA	No law or legal measure	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	Clear guide
16	LESOTHO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
17	LIBERIA	Draft law in place	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	No clear guide
18	MADAGASCAR	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
19	MALAWI	No law or legal measure	No law or legal measure	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	No clear guide
20	MALI	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	CLEAR GUIDE
21	MAURITANIA	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Law approved by Parliament	No law or legal measure	YES	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	Unclear	No clear guide
23	NIGER	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	No gov. budget line	No clear guide
24	NIGERIA			YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	Clear guide
25	RWANDA	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	Clear guide
26	SENEGAL	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set		Clear guide
27	SIERRA LEONE	Law approved by Parliament	No law or legal measure	NO	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives	No gov. budget line	Clear guide
28	SOUTH AFRICA	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
29	SWAZILAND	Law approved by Parliament	No law or legal measure	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	No clear guide
30	TANZANIA	Law approved by Parliament	No law or legal measure	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	No clear guide
31	TOGO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	NO	Clear objectives and targets set	No gov. budget line	No clear guide
32	UGANDA	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	Clear guide
33	ZAMBIA	Draft law in place	Draft law in place	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient gov. budget allocated	Clear guide
34	ZIMBABWE	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear	Clear guide

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Social inclusion

No.	Country	Provisions in the country's Constitution allowing the president/head of state to appoint some representatives to Parliament in addition to the elected representatives	Instances where some nationals in the country require special permission/qualification to enjoy certain privileges	Social services accessible to nationals in the country on equal terms	Equal employment opportunities for all nationals	Policy or law that provides equal opportunity for all	Policy or law that protects the vulnerable in the society
1	BENIN	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
5	CAR	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
6	CHAD	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
7	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
8	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
10	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
12	GHANA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
13	GUINEA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	KENYA	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
16	LESOTHO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
17	LIBERIA	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
18	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	MALAWI	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
20	MALI	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	MAURITANIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
22	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	NIGER	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
24	NIGERIA	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
25	RWANDA	YES	NO	YES	...	YES	YES
26	SENEGAL	NO	NO	YES	YES		YES
27	SIERRA LEONE	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
28	SOUTH AFRICA	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
29	SWAZILAND	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
30	TANZANIA	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
31	TOGO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	UGANDA	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
33	ZAMBIA	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
34	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Partnering for capacity development

No.	Country	Establishment of a National Assistance Coordinating Unit for CD by the government	Main partners from multi-lateral cooperation have developed a country assistance strategy/program relating to the country
1	BENIN	Coordination, but not formal	All
2	BURKINA FASO	Coordination, but not formal	All
3	BURUNDI	Coordination, but not formal	Not all
4	CAMEROON	No institutional unit	Not all
5	CAR	Clear unit established	All
6	CHAD	Clear unit established	Not all
7	CONGO (DRC)	Coordination, but not formal	Not all
8	CONGO, REP	Coordination, but not formal	All
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Clear unit established	Not all
10	DJIBOUTI	Clear unit established	All
11	GAMBIA (THE)	Clear unit established	Not all
12	GHANA	No institutional unit	All
13	GUINEA	Clear unit established	None
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	Clear unit established	All
15	KENYA	Coordination, but not formal	All
16	LESOTHO	Clear unit established	Not all
17	LIBERIA	Clear unit established	None
18	MADAGASCAR	No institutional unit	Not all
19	MALAWI	Coordination, but not formal	Not all
20	MALI	Clear unit established	All
21	MAURITANIA	Clear unit established	Not all
22	MOZAMBIQUE	Clear unit established	Not all
23	NIGER	Clear unit established	Not all
24	NIGERIA	No institutional unit	Not all
25	RWANDA	Coordination, but not formal	All
26	SENEGAL	No institutional unit	None
27	SIERRA LEONE	No institutional unit	Not all
28	SOUTH AFRICA	...	NA
29	SWAZILAND	...	NA
30	TANZANIA	No institutional unit	All
31	TOGO	Clear unit established	Not all
32	UGANDA	No institutional unit	Not all
33	ZAMBIA	No institutional unit	Not all
34	ZIMBABWE	Coordination, but not formal	All

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Development partners' areas of intervention in capacity development (year 2009)

No.	Country	Economic Management			Structural Policies		
		Macroeconomic Management	Fiscal Policy	Debt Policy	Trade	Financial Sector	Business Regulatory Environment
1	BENIN	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO	✓		✓	✓		✓
3	BURUNDI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4	CAMEROON	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
5	CAR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
7	CONGO (DRC)			✓			✓
8	CONGO, REP	✓	✓				✓
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10	DJIBOUTI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
11	GAMBIA (THE)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	✓	✓	✓	✓		
15	KENYA	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
16	LESOTHO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
17	LIBERIA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
18	MADAGASCAR						
19	MALAWI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
20	MALI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA	✓	✓				
22	MOZAMBIQUE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
23	NIGER	✓	✓	✓		✓	
24	NIGERIA	✓	✓				
25	RWANDA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
26	SENEGAL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
27	SIERRA LEONE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
28	SOUTH AFRICA						
29	SWAZILAND						
30	TANZANIA	✓			✓	✓	✓
31	TOGO	✓	✓	✓		✓	
32	UGANDA	✓			✓		
33	ZAMBIA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
34	ZIMBABWE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Development partners' areas of intervention in capacity development (year 2009)

No.	Country	Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity				
		Gender Equality	Equity of Public Resource Use	Building Human Resources	Social Protection and Labor	Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
1	BENIN	✓		✓	✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3	BURUNDI		✓	✓	✓	✓
4	CAMEROON		✓	✓	✓	✓
5	CAR	✓		✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD	✓		✓		✓
7	CONGO (DRC)	✓		✓		✓
8	CONGO, REP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	✓	✓	✓		✓
10	DJIBOUTI	✓		✓	✓	✓
11	GAMBIA (THE)		✓	✓	✓	✓
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU			✓	✓	✓
15	KENYA	✓		✓	✓	✓
16	LESOTHO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
17	LIBERIA	✓		✓	✓	✓
18	MADAGASCAR					
19	MALAWI	✓	✓			✓
20	MALI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA	✓		✓	✓	✓
22	MOZAMBIQUE	✓	✓	✓	✓	
23	NIGER	?		?		
24	NIGERIA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
25	RWANDA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
26	SENEGAL	✓		✓	✓	✓
27	SIERRA LEONE	✓		✓		✓
28	SOUTH AFRICA					
29	SWAZILAND					
30	TANZANIA	✓				
31	TOGO	✓	✓	✓	✓	
32	UGANDA				✓	
33	ZAMBIA	✓		✓	✓	✓
34	ZIMBABWE	✓		✓	✓	✓

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Development partners' areas of intervention in capacity development (year 2009)

No.	Country	Public Sector Management and Institutions				
		Property Rights and Rule-based Governance	Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management	Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	Quality of Public Administration	Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector
1	BENIN	✓	✓		✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3	BURUNDI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4	CAMEROON	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
5	CAR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD		✓	✓	✓	✓
7	CONGO (DRC)		✓	✓	✓	✓
8	CONGO, REP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	✓	✓	✓		✓
10	DJIBOUTI	✓		✓	✓	✓
11	GAMBIA (THE)		✓	✓	✓	?
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU		✓	✓	✓	
15	KENYA		✓	✓	✓	✓
16	LESOTHO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
17	LIBERIA	✓		✓	✓	✓
18	MADAGASCAR					
19	MALAWI		✓		✓	✓
20	MALI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA				✓	
22	MOZAMBIQUE			✓	✓	✓
23	NIGER		✓	✓		✓
24	NIGERIA	✓	✓	✓	✓	
25	RWANDA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
26	SENEGAL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
27	SIERRA LEONE	✓		✓		✓
28	SOUTH AFRICA					
29	SWAZILAND					
30	TANZANIA				✓	✓
31	TOGO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
32	UGANDA		✓		✓	✓
33	ZAMBIA		✓		✓	✓
34	ZIMBABWE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Capacity profiling and assessments of needs

No.	Country	Capacity profile conducted in the country since 2005	Date last capacity profile conducted	Who commissioned the capacity profiling	Capacity needs assessment conducted in country since 2005	Who commissioned the capacity needs assessment
1	BENIN	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Development partner
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	2008	Government body	YES	Development partner
3	BURUNDI	YES	2007	Government body	YES	Development partner
4	CAMEROON	YES	2010	Development partner	YES	Development partner
5	CAR	YES	2008	Government body	YES	Government body
6	CHAD	NO
7	CONGO (DRC)
8	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	...
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	NO	YES	Government body
10	DJIBOUTI	YES	2007	Government body	YES	Government body
11	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	2009	Government body
12	GHANA	NO	YES	Government body
13	GUINEA	NO	YES	Government body
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Government body
15	KENYA	NO	NO	...
16	LESOTHO	NO	YES	Development partner
17	LIBERIA	YES	2007	Development partner	YES	Development partner
18	MADAGASCAR	NO	YES	Government body
19	MALAWI	YES	2009	Government body	YES	...
20	MALI	YES	2005	Government body	YES	Government body
21	MAURITANIA	NO	YES	Development partner
22	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	2010	Government body
23	NIGER	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Government body
24	NIGERIA	NO	YES	Development partner
25	RWANDA	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Government body
26	SENEGAL	YES	Government body
27	SIERRA LEONE	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Government body
28	SOUTH AFRICA	YES	2006	Government body	NO	...
29	SWAZILAND	YES	2005	Government body	YES	Government body
30	TANZANIA
31	TOGO	NO	NO	...
32	UGANDA	NO	NO	...
33	ZAMBIA
34	ZIMBABWE	YES	2009	Government body	YES	Government body

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Areas where needs assessments were conducted

No.	Country	Economic Management			Structural Policies		
		Macroeconomic Management	Fiscal Policy	Debt Policy	Trade	Financial Sector	Business Regulatory Environment
1	BENIN	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3	BURUNDI						
4	CAMEROON						
5	CAR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD						
7	CONGO (DRC)						
8	CONGO, REP						
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10	DJIBOUTI	✓		✓	✓		✓
11	GAMBIA (THE)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15	KENYA						
16	LESOTHO	✓	✓		✓		
17	LIBERIA	✓					
18	MADAGASCAR						
19	MALAWI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
20	MALI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA						
22	MOZAMBIQUE						
23	NIGER						
24	NIGERIA						
25	RWANDA	✓	✓	✓	✓		
26	SENEGAL	✓	✓	✓			
27	SIERRA LEONE						
28	SOUTH AFRICA						
29	SWAZILAND						
30	TANZANIA						
31	TOGO						
32	UGANDA						
33	ZAMBIA						
34	ZIMBABWE						

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Areas where needs assessments were conducted (continued)

No.	Country	Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity				
		Gender Equality	Equity of Public Resource Use	Building Human Resources	Social Protection and Labor	Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
1	BENIN	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO	✓	✓	✓	✓	
3	BURUNDI	✓				
4	CAMEROON			✓		
5	CAR	✓		✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD					
7	CONGO (DRC)					
8	CONGO, REP					
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE		✓	✓		
10	DJIBOUTI	✓		✓	✓	
11	GAMBIA (THE)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA			✓		✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	✓		✓	✓	
15	KENYA					
16	LESOTHO			✓	✓	✓
17	LIBERIA		✓	✓		
18	MADAGASCAR			✓		
19	MALAWI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
20	MALI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA					
22	MOZAMBIQUE	✓				
23	NIGER	✓		✓		
24	NIGERIA			✓		
25	RWANDA	✓		✓	✓	✓
26	SENEGAL	✓		✓		
27	SIERRA LEONE				✓	
28	SOUTH AFRICA					
29	SWAZILAND					
30	TANZANIA					
31	TOGO					
32	UGANDA					
33	ZAMBIA					
34	ZIMBABWE			✓		

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Areas where needs assessments were conducted (continued)

No.	Country	Public Sector Management and Institutions				
		Property Rights and Rule-based Governance	Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management	Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	Quality of Public Administration	Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector
1	BENIN	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	BURKINA FASO		✓	✓		✓
3	BURUNDI	✓			✓	✓
4	CAMEROON		✓	✓		
5	CAR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	CHAD					
7	CONGO (DRC)					
8	CONGO, REP					
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE		✓	✓		✓
10	DJIBOUTI	✓		✓	✓	
11	GAMBIA (THE)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12	GHANA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13	GUINEA		✓	✓	✓	✓
14	GUINEA-BISSAU		✓	✓	✓	
15	KENYA					
16	LESOTHO					✓
17	LIBERIA		✓		✓	
18	MADAGASCAR		✓		✓	
19	MALAWI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
20	MALI		✓	✓	✓	✓
21	MAURITANIA					
22	MOZAMBIQUE					
23	NIGER		✓	✓	✓	
24	NIGERIA				✓	
25	RWANDA					✓
26	SENEGAL					
27	SIERRA LEONE				✓	
28	SOUTH AFRICA					
29	SWAZILAND					
30	TANZANIA					
31	TOGO					
32	UGANDA					
33	ZAMBIA					
34	ZIMBABWE				✓	

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

No.	Country	Economic Management				Structural Policies			
		Macroeconomic Management	Fiscal Policy	Debt Policy	Average	Trade	Financial Sector	Business Regulatory Environment	Average
1	BENIN	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.7
2	BURKINA FASO	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
3	BURUNDI	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.3	4.0	2.5	2.5	3.0
4	CAMEROON	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.7	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.2
5	CAR	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.5	2.0	2.7
6	CHAD	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.8
7	CONGO (DRC)	3.5	3.5	2.5	3.2	3.5	2.0	2.0	2.5
8	CONGO, REP	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.8	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
10	DJIBOUTI	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.7
11	GAMBIA, THE	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.3
12	GHANA	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.7	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
13	GUINEA	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.3	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.2	4.0	3.0	2.5	3.2
15	KENYA	4.5	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
16	LESOTHO	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.3
17	LIBERIA	3.5	3.5	2.5	3.2	3.0	2.5	3.0	2.8
18	MADAGASCAR	4.0	3.0	4.0	3.7	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
19	MALAWI	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.2	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
20	MALI	4.5	4.0	4.5	4.3	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
21	MAURITANIA	3.5	2.5	3.5	3.2	4.0	2.5	3.5	3.3
22	MOZAMBIQUE	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	3.5	3.0	3.7
23	NIGER	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.8	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
24	NIGERIA	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
25	RWANDA	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.8
26	SENEGAL	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.8
27	SIERRA LEONE	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.2
28	SOUTH AFRICA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	SWAZILAND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	TANZANIA	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.8
31	TOGO	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.8	4.0	2.5	3.0	3.2
32	UGANDA	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.8
33	ZAMBIA	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5
34	ZIMBABWE	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.7	3.0	1.5	2.0	2.2

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Source: IRAI 2009 Table

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework (continued)

No.	Country	Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity					Average
		Gender Equality	Equity of Public Resource Use	Building Human Resources	Social Protection and Labor	Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability	
1	BENIN	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.3
2	BURKINA FASO	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.6
3	BURUNDI	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
4	CAMEROON	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.1
5	CAR	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	3.0	2.5
6	CHAD	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.4
7	CONGO (DRC)	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.8
8	CONGO, REP	3.0	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.7
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	2.5	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4
10	DJIBOUTI	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.2
11	GAMBIA, THE	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.5	3.5	3.3
12	GHANA	4.0	4.0	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.9
13	GUINEA	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.0
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	2.5	3.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
15	KENYA	3.0	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5
16	LESOTHO	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.3
17	LIBERIA	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.5
18	MADAGASCAR	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.6
19	MALAWI	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
20	MALI	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.4
21	MAURITANIA	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.4
22	MOZAMBIQUE	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.3
23	NIGER	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.1
24	NIGERIA	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.2
25	RWANDA	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.9
26	SENEGAL	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.4
27	SIERRA LEONE	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	2.5	3.1
28	SOUTH AFRICA	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	SWAZILAND	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	TANZANIA	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.7
31	TOGO	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.7
32	UGANDA	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.8
33	ZAMBIA	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
34	ZIMBABWE	2.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.6

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Source: IRAI 2009 Table

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework (continued)

No.	Country	Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity					Average	IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI)
		Property Rights and Rule-based Governance	Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management	Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	Quality of Public Administration	Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector		
1	BENIN	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.3	3.5
2	BURKINA FASO	3.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.8
3	BURUNDI	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	2.6	3.1
4	CAMEROON	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.9	3.2
5	CAR.	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.6
6	CHAD	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.2	2.5
7	CONGO (DRC)	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.7
8	CONGO, REP	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.8
9	COTE D'IVOIRE	2.0	2.5	4.0	2.0	2.5	2.6	2.8
10	DJIBOUTI	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.2
11	GAMBIA, THE	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.0	2.9	3.3
12	GHANA	3.5	3.5	4.5	3.5	4.0	3.8	3.8
13	GUINEA	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.6	2.8
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
15	KENYA	2.5	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.7
16	LESOTHO	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.4	3.5
17	LIBERIA	2.5	2.5	3.5	2.5	3.0	2.8	2.8
18	MADAGASCAR	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.5	2.5	3.3	3.5
19	MALAWI	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.4
20	MALI	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.4	3.7
21	MAURITANIA	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.2
22	MOZAMBIQUE	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.7
23	NIGER	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.1	3.3
24	NIGERIA	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.5
25	RWANDA	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.8
26	SENEGAL	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.7
27	SIERRA LEONE	2.5	3.5	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.2
28	SOUTH AFRICA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	SWAZILAND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	TANZANIA	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.8
31	TOGO	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.8
32	UGANDA	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.3	3.9
33	ZAMBIA	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.4
34	ZIMBABWE	1.5	2.0	3.5	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.9

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Source: IRAI 2009 Table

INPUTS: ACBF-supported projects/programs population in 2009

No.	Country	Number of active ACBF-supported projects or programs in 2009	Total grants disbursed by ACBF to the country in 2009, in US\$	Total number of staff	Proportion female %	Total number of professional staff	Proportion female %
1	BENIN	2	546,912	22	31.8	10	10.0
2	BURKINA FASO	6	1,317,914	29	27.6	15	6.7
3	BURUNDI	2	585,349	24	29.2	14	21.4
4	CAMEROON	5	2,176,167	41	29.3	15	26.7
5	CAR	2	694,319	14	28.6	1	0
6	CHAD	1	116,582	66	3.0	2	0
7	CONGO (DRC)	3	734,982	40	37.5	15	60.0
8	CONGO, REP	3	966,015	18	33.3	15	33.3
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	2	881,731	21	28.6	7	42.9
10	DJIBOUTI	2	303,862	32	43.8	16	62.5
11	GAMBIA (THE)	1	250,000	10	20.0	4	0
12	GHANA	6	1,557,075	95	33.7	66	34.8
13	GUINEA	0	-	-	-	-	-
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	1	276,420	6	33.3	3	0
15	KENYA	4	263,630	39	46.2	23	43.5
16	LESOTHO	1	311,746	6	33.3	6	33.3
17	LIBERIA	1	182,845	5	20.0	3	0
18	MADAGASCAR	1	188,334	15	40.0	10	40.0
19	MALAWI	2	70,592	13	30.8	6	33.3
20	MALI	4	812,897	43	23.3	18	16.7
21	MAURITANIA	1	269,567	25	20.0	9	22.2
22	MOZAMBIQUE	1	305,889	12	75.0	7	57.1
23	NIGER	1	620,154	12	25.0	6	16.7
24	NIGERIA	4	814,077	17	23.5	17	23.5
25	RWANDA	2	963,843	26	34.6	19	42.1
26	SENEGAL	7	1,138,570	45	31.1	23	26.1
27	SIERRA LEONE	1	0	3	66.7	1	0
28	SOUTH AFRICA	5	673,159	6	50.0	...	-
29	SWAZILAND	3	246,281	36	61.1	31	64.5
30	TANZANIA	3	268,898	28	42.9	14	50.0
31	TOGO	0	-	-	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	3	1,274,627	52	30.8	42	31.0
33	ZAMBIA	4	635,544	50	48.0	23	39.1
34	ZIMBABWE	5	1,178,995	52	40.4	32	18.8

(...) Data not available/not applicable

INPUTS: ACBF-supported projects/programs population in 2009 (continued)

No.	Country	Qualification of ACBF-supported projects/programs professional staff					
		Number of PhD or equivalent	Proportion female (%)	Number of Masters Degree or equivalent	Proportion female (%)	Number of First Degree or equivalent	Proportion female (%)
1	BENIN	4	0	11	36.4	4	75.0
2	BURKINA FASO	2	0	7	0	9	66.7
3	BURUNDI	3	0	4	25.0	7	42.9
4	CAMEROON	1	0	10	20.0	14	42.9
5	CAR	1	0	2	0	4	0
6	CHAD	0	-	2	0	0	-
7	CONGO (DRC)	0	-	0	-	9	66.7
8	CONGO, REP	0	-	4	0	7	28.6
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	9	0	1	0	6	83.3
10	DJIBOUTI	0	-	3	0	13	76.9
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	-	1	0	1	0
12	GHANA	28	14.3	40	42.5	15	53.3
13	GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	0	-	0	-	2	0
15	KENYA	13	15.4	16	31.3	13	53.8
16	LESOTHO	0	-	1	100	5	20.0
17	LIBERIA	0	-	3	0.0	1	0
18	MADAGASCAR	1	100	8	25.0	1	100
19	MALAWI	1	0	2	50.0	3	33.3
20	MALI	1	0	10	20.0	7	28.6
21	MAURITANIA	3	0	4	0.0	2	100
22	MOZAMBIQUE	1	0	3	100	1	100
23	NIGER	1	0	5	20.0	0	-
24	NIGERIA	8	25	6	0.0	3	66.7
25	RWANDA	0	-	12	33.3	7	42.9
26	SENEGAL	2	50	18	16.7	13	46.2
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	-	-	-	1	0.0
28	SOUTH AFRICA	0	-	3	33.3	3	66.7
29	SWAZILAND	0	-	7	57.1	11	54.5
30	TANZANIA	3	33.3	8	50.0	3	66.7
31	TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	15	26.7	20	25.0	7	57.1
33	ZAMBIA	3	0	8	50.0	12	25.0
34	ZIMBABWE	3	0	28	28.6	19	31.6

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Outputs delivered by ACBF-supported projects/programs in 2009: leadership

No.	Country	Number of institutions strengthened	Number of technical assistance to government agencies	Number of leaders trained
1	BENIN	6	22	15
2	BURKINA FASO	32	5	715
3	BURUNDI	7	0	94
4	CAMEROON	21	34	176
5	CAR	45	0	915
6	CHAD	12	0	240
7	CONGO (DRC)	0	0	0
8	CONGO, REP	16	3	104
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	0	0	347
10	DJIBOUTI	7	10	40
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	0	0
12	GHANA	121	2	362
13	GUINEA	-	-	-
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	7	1	54
15	KENYA	60	3	707
16	LESOTHO	30	0	20
17	LIBERIA	6	2	30
18	MADAGASCAR	0	1	0
19	MALAWI	0	0	0
20	MALI	0	39	175
21	MAURITANIA	4	2	12
22	MOZAMBIQUE	0	1	1
23	NIGER	26	2	0
24	NIGERIA	17	0	40
25	RWANDA	6	1	5
26	SENEGAL	21	0	357
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	0	24
28	SOUTH AFRICA	27	2	5
29	SWAZILAND	120	0	323
30	TANZANIA	0	0	0
31	TOGO	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	0	0	0
33	ZAMBIA	64	0	72
34	ZIMBABWE	25	13	87

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Knowledge and learning

No.	Country	Number of policy studies, research			
		Completed	Commissioned by Government	Commissioned by others	Number of publications disseminated
1	BENIN	22	1	0	18
2	BURKINA FASO	10	9	1	0
3	BURUNDI	47	21	8	3
4	CAMEROON	10	6	2	14
5	CAR	4	13	30	0
6	CHAD	4	0	2	2
7	CONGO (DRC)	15	4	11	11
8	CONGO, REP	0	0	0	0
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	89	41	42	20
10	DJIBOUTI	16	14	2	20
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	0	0	0
12	GHANA	63	1	2	7050
13	GUINEA	0	0	0	0
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	1	1	0	0
15	KENYA	13	6	8	3456
16	LESOTHO	1	0	0	0
17	LIBERIA	3	1	2	0
18	MADAGASCAR	1	0	1	1
19	MALAWI	0	0	0	0
20	MALI	12	11	1	24
21	MAURITANIA	9	6	3	9
22	MOZAMBIQUE	0	0	0	0
23	NIGER	9	4	1	0
24	NIGERIA	24	0	2	26
25	RWANDA	4	1	3	4
26	SENEGAL	2	2	0	4
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	0	0	0
28	SOUTH AFRICA	2	0	1	0
29	SWAZILAND	20	0	0	40
30	TANZANIA	8	5	18	2
31	TOGO	-	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	13	9	4	7
33	ZAMBIA	7	0	0	6
34	ZIMBABWE	7	4	1	2

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Short term training program

No.	Country	No. of short courses organized	No. of workshops organized	No. of seminars organized	No. of beneficiaries of short courses	% of female beneficiaries of short courses	No. of beneficiaries of workshops and seminars	% of female beneficiaries of workshops and seminars
1	BENIN	15	8	8	371	29.6	170	16.5
2	BURKINA FASO	13	12	0	394	14.5	362	17.1
3	BURUNDI	6	5	0	649	15.3	1016	22.9
4	CAMEROON	4	6	17	69	42.0	714	49.9
5	CAR	10	6	0	0	-	915	8.1
6	CHAD	7	6	4	302	64.9	203	38.9
7	CONGO (DRC)	11	0	19	502	75.3	711	73.4
8	CONGO, REP	2	4	9	203	41.9	473	37.6
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	12	2	4	307	13.4	89	12.4
10	DJIBOUTI	27	17	11	58	36.2	538	20.3
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	0	0	0	-	0	-
12	GHANA	2	12	49	12	100	5900	63.3
13	GUINEA	0	0	0	0	-	0	-
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	3	1	6	3	0	165	32.1
15	KENYA	29	12	2	503	33.2	322	34.2
16	LESOTHO	0	1	1	0	-	30	60.0
17	LIBERIA	1	2	0	2	0.0	30	13.3
18	MADAGASCAR	0	6	0	0	0	154	45.5
19	MALAWI	0	0	0	0	-	12	25.0
20	MALI	25	7	6	587	31.7	524	56.3
21	MAURITANIA	8	3	3	89	25.8	97	16.5
22	MOZAMBIQUE	0	0	31	0	-	0	-
23	NIGER	1	0	3	17	35.3	85	30.6
24	NIGERIA	1	6	7	3	0	499	13.0
25	RWANDA	3	7	2	282	35.8	300	31.7
26	SENEGAL	5	20	13	35	100.0	719	30.6
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	3	0	0	-	24	16.7
28	SOUTH AFRICA	0	3	0	0	-	259	37.1
29	SWAZILAND	0	15	1	0	-	22	54.5
30	TANZANIA	6	6	40	18	-	115	0
31	TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	20	8	0	316	13.6	462	1.3
33	ZAMBIA	12	54	0	737	31.6	904	0.3
34	ZIMBABWE	5	44	6	61	49.2	1406	36.8

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Beneficiaries of tertiary training

No.	Country	No. of PhD or equiv.	% of female	No. of Masters Degree or equiv	% of female	No. of Post Graduate Diplomas or equiv.	% of female	No. of Certificates or equiv.	% of female
1	BENIN	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
2	BURKINA FASO	0	0	25	52.0	0	-	209	15.8
3	BURUNDI	3	0.0	0	-	-	-	-	-
4	CAMEROON	0	0	41	22.0	0	-	41	63.4
5	CAR	0	0	14	28.6	35	5.7	0	-
6	CHAD	0	0	0	-	0	-	0	-
7	CONGO (DRC)	0	0	0	-	0	-	0	-
8	CONGO, REP	0	-	4	25.0	0	-	0	-
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	-	-	40	12.5	-	-	37	16.2
10	DJIBOUTI	0	-	25	52.0	0	-	4	0
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
12	GHANA	0	-	114	26.3	-	-	11	-
13	GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	0	-	5	0.0	0	-	155	33.5
15	KENYA	0	-	36	55.6	-	-	15	66.7
16	LESOTHO	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
17	LIBERIA	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
18	MADAGASCAR	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
19	MALAWI	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
20	MALI	0	-	0	-	0	-	533	27.4
21	MAURITANIA	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
22	MOZAMBIQUE	0	-	0	-	0	-	2	0
23	NIGER	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
24	NIGERIA	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
25	RWANDA	0	-	13	30.8	0	-	277	36.1
26	SENEGAL	0	-	41	17.1	0	-	0	-
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	-	0	-	0	-	24	16.7
28	SOUTH AFRICA	0	-	0	-	0	-	127	25.2
29	SWAZILAND	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
30	TANZANIA	0	-	0	-	2	50.0	11	36.4
31	TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	UGANDA	0	-	34	29.4	4	0	2	50.0
33	ZAMBIA	4	0.0	29	100	0	-	737	31.6
34	ZIMBABWE	4	50.0	37	54.1	35	31.4	22	36.4

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Introducing or adapting curricula

No.	Country	No. of new curricula introduced	No. of curricula adapted
1	BENIN	0	0
2	BURKINA FASO	0	0
3	BURUNDI	6	0
4	CAMEROON	2	0
5	CAR	2	0
6	CHAD	1	0
7	CONGO (DRC)	0	0
8	CONGO, REP	0	0
9	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	3	5
10	DJIBOUTI	0	0
11	GAMBIA (THE)	0	0
12	GHANA	1	19
13	GUINEA	0	0
14	GUINEA-BISSAU	0	0
15	KENYA	2	2
16	LESOTHO	0	0
17	LIBERIA	0	0
18	MADAGASCAR	0	0
19	MALAWI	0	0
20	MALI	2	4
21	MAURITANIA	0	0
22	MOZAMBIQUE	0	0
23	NIGER	0	0
24	NIGERIA	0	0
25	RWANDA	1	3
26	SENEGAL	0	0
27	SIERRA LEONE	0	0
28	SOUTH AFRICA	0	0
29	SWAZILAND	0	0
30	TANZANIA	0	0
31	TOGO	0	0
32	UGANDA	0	0
33	ZAMBIA	1	1
34	ZIMBABWE	1	0

(...) Data not available/not applicable

Notes