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THE ROLE OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN AFRICA'S
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE TRANSKEI

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I. By now most of the manpower-related development problems of Third World countries are fairly well-known. Evidence has accumulated steadily to underscore much of what has been said even by a very radical critic of development strategy in Africa like Dumont (1962) in his book *False Start in Africa*, and an impatient critic like Andreski (1968) in his *The African Predicament*; specifically in regard to human resources, Richard Jolly (1970: 203-230) gives a comprehensive and useful summary of the problems.

Jolly, in a broad assessment of the situation in most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America notes that "Major sections of the adult population are under-employed, working short hours at half-pace for much of the year. Large numbers, especially in urban areas, are openly unemployed, living off relatives or petty theft while seeking a wage-earning job which never materialises. Thousands leave school every year ... only to spend the following months or years looking for jobs" (Jolly, 1970: 203).

More specifically, Jolly points out that employment opportunity tends to grow more slowly than population, which in turn has grown more slowly than output from the schools. Inequality within the societies has tended to increase, with rapid or fairly rapid increases in the incomes of those (privileged few) with jobs compared with little or no increase in the incomes of subsistence farmers. He suggests that increases in money wages of 7 to 10% per annum are not uncommon when prices have increased by 2 to 3% and agricultural prices have remained constant. (Admittedly higher rates of inflation in very recent times may have altered the picture somewhat, but not to the benefit of the rural sector as far as cash income is concerned. Wage policies also often "embody the worst priorities of the existing economy: high pay for the overcrowded white-collar ... urban bureaucratic jobs: low pay for the undermanned technical, manual and rural jobs. Instead of payment by results, a big proportion of jobs seem to be paid regardless of whether they contribute to development or not" (Jolly, 1970: 220). This pattern is, of course, self-reinforcing in that it encourages inappropriate aspirations. Furthermore, the influences emanating from the developed countries through the media, which portray as normal what amounts to extreme privilege in a less-developed country, reinforce such aspirations. Rising wages among the salaried workers also create demands for imports from developed countries,

while reducing the competitiveness of goods produced locally for export. The resulting problems make it even more difficult to expand employment opportunity for local populations.

There are noteworthy exceptions to this pattern; in a country like Tanzania, for example, attempts have been made to shift economic and ideological priorities towards rural development to restrict inequality of incomes and limit the wages of bureaucrats and executives. Even despite massive attempts to resocialise and re-orient aspirations among the population, however, results do not appear to have been spectacular (Saul, 1974; Feldman, 1970), which, of course, raises the hoary question of whether one can equalise without destroying incentive, or alternatively whether idealistic group-centred commitment to development (e.g. Israel) or massive state-promoted ideological uniformity (e.g. China) are not pre-requisites for avoiding some of the problems outlined.

Some of these problems will be dealt with again presently, but before doing so, I would like to make two general points in regard to the way these problems should be viewed. Firstly, as academics from developed countries, we cannot afford to be patronising. Industrial revolutions in Western Europe occurred in a far less competitive World Market, which helped sweep many of our own mistakes under a carpet of initial industrial success. Furthermore, our countries (or countries of origin in my case) could benefit from profitable access to raw materials in colonial possessions, and even benefited from the then backwardness of medical technology, which reduced levels of population growth. Admittedly we had a strong craft tradition and a tradition of fairly intensive market-oriented peasant agriculture, but our major technological triumphs and colonial conquests were considerably facilitated by skills acquired in the development of a (morally dubious) war technology in strife-torn Europe.

More essential to my topic, however, is the observation that in considering the prospects for development in Southern Africa, and more especially the Transkei we face a situation where both the fortunate and the unfortunate effects of interaction between the developed and less-developed worlds are writ large. The implications of this interaction between a developed and a less-developed economy are so important that the conclusion of this paper will be directed at these problems, with, of course, a specific focus on manpower.

II. It is probably appropriate to enumerate fairly systematically the kinds of problems which developing Africa faces in the broad area of human resources and their utilization.

(a) Poverty. Few will dispute the fact that up to 9 out of 10 people in developing Africa live at subsistence or below subsistence levels. It is also true that more and more observers are coming to realise that the conventional growth indices are poor yardsticks of the welfare of the masses of African people. Even so, however, the growth rate of 4,4% in the Growth Domestic Product of developing Africa between 1960 and 1969 (Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1971) was below the 5% target set by the United Nations for the first development decade. This growth rate improved subsequently (Statistical and Economic Information Bulletin Africa, 1973) but has probably declined over the past two years with the international recession. Indices like the Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product and average per capita income figures tend to mask wide discrepancies in welfare between countries and within countries, since there are wide inequalities of income between elites and workers, between workers and the under-employed, and between urban and rural areas. Poverty has an obvious significance, but it is also self-reinforcing, as Andreski (1968: 21) notes: "Impoverishment fosters strife and predation, which further impoverish the country, which leads to even more strife and predation, which bring about still further impoverishment ... and so on until a certain nadir is reached".

(b) Population Growth. The tragic significance of poverty is dramatised by rates of population growth. The growth rate in Africa generally was estimated at 2,6% per annum between 1965 and 1970, and further estimates suggest that it might increase to 3,0% in the decade 1980 to 1990 (Gerold-Scheepers, 1974: 116). A rate of growth of this order will be the highest in the world. It is fairly commonplace to predict that urbanization and education will lead to a decline in fertility, but some authors alert us to the danger that modernization will stimulate population growth, in the initial stages at any rate (Gerold-Scheepers, 1974: 116). As we will note presently, rates of population growth typical in Africa have meant that employment opportunity cannot keep pace with demand. It has also been suggested that at least 10% (and possibly more) of the total National Product must be allocated to investments - "demographic" investments - which merely counteract the effects of the population increase (Andreski, 1968: 23). Furthermore, it produces a highly unfavourable "dependency ratio" - as population growth edges towards 3%

per annum the proportion of people of age 0 to 15 or 60 and older (i.e. dependents) will exceed 50%. At present, it is already roughly 47% for Africa generally (Demographic Handbook Africa, 1971: 23-24; Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1971: 338-339). Problems of high population growth, if they deepen poverty, can be self-reinforcing in that people tend to produce as many children as they can in order to maximise earning capacity within the family, in order to compensate for child mortality and as a hedge against material insecurity in old age.

There are optimists who maintain that high rates of population growth create demands which stimulate economic growth. More specifically, Boserup (1965) and Clark (1967) suggest that population pressure forms a pre-condition for technological, social and economic changes within subsistence sectors of the economy. More generally, however, those who have taken a comprehensive view of relations between economic growth and population trends consider that the inter-relationships cannot be quantified or even assessed in general terms, and that each country or region should be analysed separately; see for example, Meilink (1974).

As a non-economist, I would not hazard any opinions on this issue, except to express the feeling that any assumptions that population pressure will operate positively to produce demand-stimulation and incentives implies a basically efficient economy with generous growth potentials. Policies oriented along such lines involve enormous risks in the context of third world economies at the present stage.

Even Davidson, who argues that there is no general case for "Malthusian gloom", is quite clearly not optimistic about Africa's prospects of coping with the problems of population growth (1974: 15-23).

(c) Unemployment. The definition of unemployment raises some very tricky problems, particularly on a continent where subsistence agriculture is the dominant activity. The difficult distinction between unemployment and under-employment is not an issue which I would like to debate in a paper of limited length. Suffice to say that all observers agree that both unemployment and under-employment are high. Richard Jolly points out that in Tanzania 1,25 million school-leavers were expected over the period of that country's five year plan, compared with an expected increase in wage-earning employment of 55 000, and adds that "These figures, though startling, are not exceptional"

(Jolly, 1971: 219). The active labour force in Africa is expected to fall from 38,5% in 1970 to 36,2% in 1980 (Gerold-Scheepers, 1974: 120).

Even in South Africa, where employment has generally managed to stay abreast of population increases in the past, recent trends suggest a sharp increase in African unemployment; see statement by the South African Prime Minister (*Sunday Express*, 11/4/1976; see also Maasdorp, 1974: 10).

(d) Urban Drift. Increasing rural densities, the effects of education, the generally less than adequate growth in rural production and wide inequalities of income between rural and urban areas throughout Africa have led to a drift to the towns and cities. This movement, coupled with the increase in unemployment, has led to shantytown fringes round the cities characterised by the prominence of informal economic activities, including high rates of crime (Andreski, 1968: Ch.3).

Migration to urban areas tends to continue despite dwindling employment opportunities, simply because migrants seem willing to risk unemployment for a period in the expectation of finding employment in the long run (Todaro, 1971).

The effects of urban growth rates of 6% per annum or more has generally been to remove able-bodied men (and women in some areas) from the land. Opinions are divided on the effects of this movement on agricultural production. Although it is often seen as lowering the efficiency of agricultural activity (Wilson, 1972; Skinner, 1965) some authors like Mabogunje, for example (1972) see the movement as opening new perspectives for developing agricultural techniques. Obviously, if the rural productive system is not to suffer, however, some re-organization and reallocation of land, whether formal or informal, is necessary. Andreski, quoting Albert Meister, reminds us that migration to the towns in Europe commenced mainly after rural production had increased - the process in Europe may have been functional. In Africa, however, it poses delicate problems of rural and urban strategy. The problems associated with oscillating "migrant labour" are really a separate issue and will be discussed in a later section.

(e) Education. Generally African societies have taken over the educational systems bequeathed them by European missionaries, colonial governments and international (mainly Western) aid. These educational systems have been

very sharply criticised in recent years (Dumont, 1962; Andreski, 1968; Dore, 1975; Carnoy, 1974; Illich, 1971; Jolly, 1971; Davidson, 1974; Hanf, *et al.*, 1975, and many others). The main criticisms are that while absorbing vast amounts of public funds (up to 6% of Gross National Product in many countries) the performance of education leaves much to be desired. Richard Jolly points out that while roughly 50% of relevant age-groups are in primary schools, roughly 7% tend to enjoy secondary education and under 1% get to university (Jolly, 1971: 208). The qualifications of teachers tend to be inadequate, the drop-out rate in itself produces a widespread sense of failure, curricula are inappropriate to the needs of developing countries - too little emphasis is placed on technical and agricultural training, for example, and the schools encourage a distaste for manual labour and rural pursuits.

Education in Africa has tended to (or attempted to) cling to the standards of education in developed countries where the luxury of cultivating the tastes and sensibilities of youthful populations is easily afforded. In Africa, and the third-world generally, courses could be shortened to include only the essentials and the need for long drawn-out courses to protect the scarcity value of particular professions does not exist. Furthermore the pattern of education tends to be supportive of a Western European pattern of status distinctions and as such encourages status cleavages in Africa which are highly unfortunate (see later). Added to this, as Jolly points out, the cost of providing education in Africa is very much higher than in the developed economies, due to the fact that very much higher proportions of the population are of school-going age, and the fact that teachers' salaries, relative to average wages are astronomical. (In Uganda some years ago, a secondary school teacher earned between 25 and 40 times the average income (Jolly, 1971: 211)).

Murphree gives an excellent (critical) synopsis of even more radical attacks on African (and third-world) education systems; the educational system is seen as producing an elite of collaborators with neo-colonial powers, it is seen as teaching the African to accept the superiority of "developed" culture and the inferiority of his own, or it is accused of producing disciplined consumers of imported goods; in other words, education is seen as the means whereby colonial or neo-colonial manipulation of indigenous elites is achieved (Murphree, 1976, quoting Carnoy, Suret-Canale, Illich).

As Murphree, Andreski, Dore and others point out, Africa in

pre-colonial times was characterised by a stratification system very different from that which is typical of most countries today. In adopting new values as regards status and prestige, education came to be regarded as the major criterion of social success and was accorded high esteem. Education, therefore, has come to acquire greater importance in allocating status than in inculcating specific skills or imparting appropriate task-specific norms and standards. Dore refers to the "ritualizing disease of qualificationism"; Andreski discusses at length the almost magical significance of the diploma. Education in so many developing countries is merely a test of endurance or a painful rite of initiation, characterised by anxious rote-learning and a purely instrumental orientation, both destructive of talent, flexibility and innovation.

Murphree notes the additional tragedy of the "qualification spiral" - as more and more people attain a given level of education, so the requirements for obtaining jobs move upwards, creating a demand for more education. Because education is so important as a means of acquiring status, the political system can be coerced into providing bigger and better educational facilities by progress-hungry populations, even when public funds could be better spent on other forms of training or investment.

Two more dysfunctional elements of education in Africa may be noted. Jolly, Eisenstadt (1970), Andreski and others have observed that where education outstrips employment opportunities for white-collar work, a high degree of discontent is aroused among the youth, threatening political stability. Hanf, *et. al.*, (1975: 83, 84) provide us with a highly instructive ten point illustration of the escalating demand for education in developing societies; illuminating the fact that over-expenditure on education is self-reinforcing due to the pressures on the polity created by education itself. A period of withdrawal of resources from potentially more productive avenues of investment finally culminates in attacks on the system by the job-hungry excess of educated people. Andreski makes the valid point that for many positions in the bureaucracy, education in itself is insufficient preparation for the type of responsibility required (1968: 153-155). In the newly independent society, the certificated young man whose education lands him an administrative position simply lacks the self-discipline, dedication, judgement and other qualities that can only be acquired with experience in a reasonably competitive occupational system. (It is interesting to note that Hanf, *et. al.*, point out that the importance of education in allocating positions in highly industrialised states is undergoing a steady decline (1975: 69).

These authors describe broadly an evolution of educational policy in Afro-Asian states which holds out some hope for more appropriate education in more and more African countries in the future. The first three stages are marked by moves towards an identity of educational opportunity and standards *vis-à-vis* those of the colonial (or former colonial) establishment. This is followed by a recognition of the inappropriateness of some of the content of colonial education, leading to "indigenization" and a loss of comparability of standards with those of the metropolitan societies. The ensuing difficulties of gaining recognition for the products of the educational system lead to either a complete break with the past tradition of education and a search for radically new alternatives, or to pragmatic policies in terms of which maximum recognition is sought for educational courses which retain a local orientation. Ironically, Hanf *et. al.* point out that the system of "Bantu Education" in South Africa represents a form of indigenization which has been rejected by the Transkei and other "Homelands", in which the perceptions of policy-makers appear to be oriented towards an earlier phase (Hanf *et. al.*: 80-81). This still appears to be the case in many of the independent countries in Africa as well.

(f) The Need for Planning. Finally, on the topic of education and man-power problems, we have to take note of the observation of Richard Jolly, that careful planning appears to be very necessary in developing societies. "The efficient working of the labour market (in shaping educational priorities, determining wage structures, etc.) is doubtful in the developed countries ... A strategy, consciously planned, is therefore needed. The right pattern will not simply emerge from the interplay of market forces" (Jolly: 206).

III. The listing of problems provided above may be interpreted in many ways. Unkind critics may see the description as confirming prejudiced or racist convictions that Africans, as people, are unequal to the task of development. Such a view, apart from anything else, would be naive and reflect much more unfavourably on the critic than on African people. The factors underlying the problems of development in Africa are complex and subject to much heated debate. Some discussion of underlying factors is necessary here, even if it is limited to the ambit of manpower and human resources.

Perhaps the most established theories of underdevelopment in the social sciences focus on certain key aspects of the culture of under-developed societies. Hoselitz (1960, 1964) has posited that compared with developed, modern societies, the norms governing performance in and recruitment to

positions are inappropriate to modernization. Encumbents of roles are not universalist in orientation but concerned with parochial, local, ethnic or, more generally, "particularist" goals. They are also not achievement-oriented, but tend to see the attainment of status as "ascribed" on the basis of some social criterion. Furthermore, the functions which the encumbents perform are not crystallised and specific, but "diffuse", covering many different needs or goals.

As these norms influence individual orientations they also exist in social structure and institutions: in the pattern of ethnic organization, of organizations serving a multiplicity of purposes or of poorly crystallised market forces, etc. More comprehensively, an author like Deutsch (1961) uses the term "social mobilization" to refer to a wide variety of socio-demographic processes and commitments which are (or have to be) eroded and broken down in the process of modernization, ranging through kinship, consumption, occupational orientations and material status. The psychologist, McClelland (1961, 1964) concentrates on the hypothesis that societies showing slow development contain low proportions of people with high achievement needs and motivation, and even suggests that the modal personality structure of individuals in such societies has at least as powerful an effect in shaping economic outcomes as the social and economic environment.

Eisenstadt (1970) provides us with a highly sophisticated framework of analysis for discovering some of the causes of a breakdown of growth in developing societies and of the normative and ideological impediments to "modernization" referred to both by Hoselitz and McClelland. Fundamentally* he sees the problem as one of an institutional disequilibrium between a highly mobilised and often very modernized political centre or elite-grouping (and leadership of large state corporations, and other state-controlled organizations) on the one hand, and on the other hand a mass of subsistence farmers and urban dwellers whose political mobilization is partial, superficial, and not reflected in organized activity. The absence of social bridges between the political elites and the small, poorly-organized "middle class"*** of urban workers and small traders, and the even more badly-organized masses allows for the emergence of close, unchecked, oligarchic elites oriented towards self-aggrandizement, the

* My summary of Eisenstadt is of necessity very crude and oversimple.

** Middle class in terms relative to the stratification pattern.

maintenance of their own position and the erosion of commitment to developmental goals.

The lack of mobilization and organization allows for the emergence of what Eisenstadt refers to as a profusion of small scale, ephemeral social groupings (cliques, mutual and societies, separatist religious groups, etc.) with goals which can be irrelevant to, or counter-productive for growth, and a variety of forms of recrystallization of traditional associations and structures in response to change.

Eisenstadt says that perhaps the greatest problems are the extent of affinity between the elites and other major social strata, and between elites and the very important "solidarity-making" cultural and lower level political leaders (the teachers, social workers, nurses, party workers, trade unionists, etc.).

In this "disequilibrium", there is little chance of effective popular symbols of modernization emerging, very little thrust towards the encouragement of ordinary people to adopt developmental ideals and acquire a sense of common purpose and unity. A rigid, conservative educational system will, of course, contribute very little towards ideological mobilization for growth. The lack of a sense of participation and reward also contributes to discontent, conflict, schizms and cleavages and a general lack of morale and productivity, all of which strain the institutional and legal systems, and lead to instability and possibly a breakdown of development.

In an attempt to overcome growth problems, and sometimes in order to create jobs for the products of the inappropriate educational systems (Hanf, *et.al.*) the state bureaucracy is enlarged. In the nature of poorly-motivated bureaucracies, it often becomes cumbersome and in any event swallows valuable resources which could be used for alternative investment - a point made very cogently by Andreski, who points to the fact that the Ivory Coast, a country which has maintained favourable growth, has decreased its expenditure on administration in contrast to most other states (Andreski: 222).

The analyses of people like Hoselitz and McClelland, and by implication, Eisenstadt as well, have been sharply criticised by radical students of development; in particular by Andre Gunder Frank (1971). Frank points to the failure to realise that the economies of most developing societies are locked

into and dominated by the more powerful Western metropolitan economies, and that the developing societies are mere "peripheries" of London, New York, Paris (and Johannesburg). The dependence on metropolitan economies leads to a manipulation of elites, to an over-concentration on single or a few export products required by the metropolitan economies, at the cost of diversified production and production for internal markets and import substitution, to a net outflow of capital mainly in the form of repatriated profits, development aid notwithstanding, to the encouragement of the developing countries adopting the advanced technology of developed societies with attendant capital rather than labour intensive development, to the subtle encouragement of the values of Western consumerism and status-symbolism, and a host of other negative factors. Where a dependent country exports labour, in the form of migrant labour to a larger economy (say to South Africa, or the Ivory Coast), the negative effects are even greater since leakages of earnings occur on a large scale (migrants spend a great deal of their money in the central economy) the surplus value of their labour accumulates in the central economy, the agricultural production and availability of labour in the peripheral country may be affected, and the migrants can come to undervalue their own territory as a focus of commitment and effort (Schlemmer, 1976).

The major general objection of the radical critics, however, is that established theories of the human factors in under-development ignore the encompassing structures of Western metropolitan capitalism and all its economic and subtle socio-political effects.

These criticisms are valuable - there can be little doubt that "dependence" has severely distorting effects, and any peripheral economy would do well to counteract these as far as it possibly can. However, the theory of dependence does not supplant the framework offered by, say, Eisenstadt - it simply complements it in valuable ways. An awareness of broad structural features in sociology is never an excuse for ignoring processes at the middle range, or the particular forms which the structural features take in particular cultural and social settings. Eisenstadt's analysis remains particularly valuable.

In passing, it may also be noted that Frank's specific criticisms of Hoselitz's and McClelland's theories, while entirely valid, partly draw on examples of the responses of the "power elites" in both less-developed and more-developed societies. He is able to demonstrate that the power elites in

Western society are not functionally specific (their influence and activities are diffuse) and that the elites in developing societies do not lack achievement orientation. However, he completely ignores the middle and lower roles in both types of society as regards these criteria, where differences in the degree of universalism, achievement orientation, and a clearly-defined concept of role may be crucial for sustained development, as Eisenstadt points out. Even radical authors like Davidson and Saul acknowledge the need for ideological mobilization for development among the rank and file traditionalist farmers in Tanzania, for example (Davidson, 1974: 156-161; Saul, 1974).

The preceding discussion may have suggested that all developing countries in Africa suffer the various types of malaise analysed. This is far from being the case. There are notable exceptions, sometimes entire countries and more often regions or communities within countries. These are often exceptions that prove the rule, but at the same time they demonstrate the potential.

IV. There are some very specific problems in the field of human resources which exist for the independent "dependencies" (as they are sometimes called) of Southern Africa, whether they be geographically marginal (like Malawi) or encapsulated states and regions like Lesotho, and South African Homelands, including the Transkei. Three features are of major importance and deserve mention immediately. The first is that between one-quarter and over one-half of the economically active males in the *de facto* populations are absent for most of the year as migrant labourers in South Africa (Maasdorp, 1974: 7; Natrass, 1975). For the Transkei in 1970 the figure appeared to have been roughly 25% (Benbo, 1975: 30). The second major feature is that a number of closely juxtaposed states and territories are locked into the same dominant core economy and have to compete with each other for many of the advantages which may be seen as resulting from the interaction with South Africa. The third factor is that the territories are mainly small, with a range of problems particularly characteristic of small, less-developed countries (Maasdorp: 4).

I will not attempt a discussion of the other human resource problems experienced by the African territories in Southern Africa. Needless to say, some are similar to what we have already surveyed for Africa generally while others are more specific to Southern Africa. To save space I will briefly (and regrettably oversimplify) deal with any specific features of these areas in the final section, in which I will venture some tentative suggestions in regard to

an appropriate policy of human resource utilization for African areas in Southern Africa.

V. By now, with evidence from the third world accumulating every year, there is no excuse for any government not recognising that indications of growth do not necessarily mean development. Growth with widening inequality between subsistence farmer--industrial worker--professional and bureaucrat is change, but unless such growth is sufficiently rapid to steadily draw a larger and larger proportion of people off the land and out of the schools into employment, few observers are likely to be impressed. The problem of income inequality is particularly thorny in Southern Africa, where the wage standards for white-collar, professional and industrial labour are set in the highly developed industrial core. The "rate for the job" is an accepted norm, and how does a peripheral government justify paying second class wages to bureaucrats, teachers and industrial employees? No administration can seal off the norms and standards emanating from South Africa when huge proportions of its population work there anyway.

The same principle applies to education, as we have already noted in quoting Hanf *et. al.* How does a government justify introducing syllabus requirements which may be perceived as apart from and inferior to those in the non-African South African educational system?

Then again, how does one prevent the better-educated leaving as temporary migrants to South Africa in greater numbers than the less well-educated, less productive citizens (Nattrass, 1975)? The peripheral territories in Southern Africa, in their efforts to educate, are serving the South African economy in very large measure, not their own. How does one prevent the people who acquire experience in administrative positions leaving (or wishing to leave) for more glamorous and remunerative employment as personnel officers and sales representatives in South Africa? How does one prevent the highly elaborated and thoroughly atomising prestige hierarchies of Soweto, Kwa Mashu, and other African areas in South Africa being emulated in Umtata, Maseru and Manzini? The status symbolism of these areas of reference is inimical to savings and local capital formation, due to aspirations toward conspicuous consumption.

These few examples illustrate the sociological problems attendant on attempts to define Southern Africa as a region of separate societies and separate economies. The "master-system" is all-embracing.

Another example - birth control programmes tend to be anathema to Africans in South Africa who perceive them as attempts by Whites to redress numerical imbalances. Consider the problems of mounting a family planning programme in Kwa Zulu, or the Transkei.

Tanzania experiences extreme problems of securing acceptance of its development ideology in areas where some degree of commercialization of agriculture has already occurred (Feldman, 1970). How much more difficult would it not be for a territory in Southern Africa to attempt an approach to development which deviates from that of the core economy. Chief Buthelezi in Kwa Zulu has already experienced dogged resistance to plans to introduce a gradually-phased scheme of state retailing. The territories of Southern Africa are, therefore, constrained in their choice of policy alternatives.

The issue of appropriate technology is one of the thorniest of all. Only certain types of goods can be produced competitively for small local markets, and where possible, the smaller states of Southern Africa should encourage this kind of production (Maasdorp, 4,5). However, most of the investment flowing to these territories is aimed at the larger markets of the Southern African region, and the products must be competitive in quality. This adds to the well-known tendency for sophisticated, capital-intensive technology to be implanted in less-developed countries, with a consequent reduction in employment potential. In none of the lesser developed territories of Southern Africa is industrial expansion keeping pace with numbers of new entrants to the labour markets.

It is not for me to prescribe policies for Southern Africa, further than to venture the comment that the economic destiny of the ex-high commission territories and newly independent homelands and that of South Africa is unavoidably a common one, whatever political changes occur, and human resource utilization must take account of this.

Many problems, like income inequality, migrant labour, and the nature of production techniques will have to be solved by the countries of Southern Africa collectively. This does not mean to say, however, that the independent peripheral states cannot take the initiative in seeking solutions. In some cases what is good for them will be good for South Africa as well.

In seeking progressive solutions, however, the policy makers of the

peripheral territories need to motivate and mobilise their populations. Eisenstadt's analysis is very informative here, and although involving a wide spectrum of strata in more complete political participation will make life less comfortable for politicians in the short run, if their intentions for their peoples are sincere, the benefits of uncoerced stability in the longer run can only be beneficial, since the populations can then be more easily motivated to participate in development strategies.

The educational systems should be reconsidered carefully in order to provide intermediate level practical skills to allow citizens to become more productive, whether as farmers, as industrial workers or clerks. Education should be expanded beyond the school into the village and township, in the form of continuing adult education. The wage gap in Southern Africa will not close rapidly, but racial differentials may be "bridged" more easily if a wide range of skilled jobs are broken down (fragmented is the negative term used) into parts on a rational basis. This is a strategy which is highly appropriate for developing countries, and can combat the scarcity value and ultra-high wages attached to some skills held by Whites, Coloureds and Indians. A flexible, innovative educational system can do much to assist this process. Along similar lines, small workshops and technical entrepreneurs should be encouraged with government assistance and special skills training. It is this type of skill which Africa so desperately needs and which will allow Africans in Southern Africa to gain advantages from the proliferation of mechanical technology.

In regard to migrant labour there is little that can be done, in the immediate future, to eliminate the system. Major responsibility for alleviating the worst features of the system does not lie with the less-developed territories although, following Nattrass (1975: 23), I would suggest that if peripheral territories centralize control over the supply of their labour to South Africa, so gaining bargaining power, and worked towards levying a tax on employers of migrants (or the migrants themselves), they might be able to transfer part of the modern sector surplus to agricultural and other development in their own areas. With a similar goal in mind, capital investment, whether from South Africa or from further afield, should as far as possible be accepted on a phased partnership basis, so that ultimately a greater proportion of the modern sector surplus can be retained in the peripheral economy.

This still leaves the rural sector denuded of its most productive


males. I do not have space to discuss positive possibilities of increasing the flexibility of the land tenure system without depriving kin-groupings of their rural security, but alternatives along these lines should be carefully explored and researched to allow those men who remain in the rural areas opportunities of worthwhile agricultural effort. With relatively risk-free employment opportunity available at high wage rates relative to agricultural incomes, however, the response is not likely to be dramatic. My own view is that the women should be given far more attention, in the way of teaching them skills involved in vegetable and fruit cultivation and small livestock raising on an intensive or semi-intensive scale. If marketing opportunities are adequate, one of the most seriously under-utilized segments of the Southern Africa Black population could contribute meaningfully to an improvement in nutrition and general welfare.

After having deviated from my topic into agricultural development, I think I should conclude this discussion. In so doing, I would like to emphasise one theme again: while one cannot, in my view, separate the problems and challenges in the field of human resources in Southern Africa into separate national compartments, the peripheral territories may well be able to contribute meaningfully to solutions for the region, if they benefit from the lessons learned elsewhere in Africa, and if they co-operate with one another in these endeavours.

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