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SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY
IN THE 1980'S:
AN EXERCISE
IN HAZARDOUS BUT CONCERNED SPECULATION

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A few months ago whites in a certain neighbourhood in Salisbury, Rhodesia, were agitating against a few Asian people who had moved into their area. A few weeks ago, the laws regulating racial ownership of land were repealed allowing any black person to acquire property wherever he or she wishes. Such is the speed of change in Rhodesia.

What strikes one about Rhodesia is the fact that traditional social patterns persisted and were defended as if they were immutable, unchallengeable and inevitable rights up to the very threshold of sudden and sweeping readjustments. Literally the past few months in Rhodesia and South West Africa - Namibia have seen the partly visible but largely invisible emergence of completely different kinds of societies. Such is the tempo of events in Southern Africa today. Every other white-controlled society in our region has reached what for many seemed a remote political and social watershed within no more than a brief few years of quickening events. I do not know whether South Africa's watershed lies in the nineteen-eighties or not. I do know, however, that we are moving irrevocably towards this watershed of social change. This makes my task today very difficult. By 1989, South Africa may be very much as it is today, or it could be, or on its way to being, a significantly different kind of society, with new political faces, new policies and a different social fabric.

Scientists, even social scientists, are supposed to be cautious people who hesitate to generalise beyond the indications of available evidence, and whose claims should be subject to possible refutation if alternative evidence, argument or experience is produced. Hence, while 'futures research' is gaining stature in social science, one is uneasy nevertheless about speculating about future trends in any kind of society. Prediction, as opposed to speculation, is legitimate but rare, since it requires knowledge of the trends in and salience of all the variables likely to produce a future social situation. This is clearly impossible when one does not even know the precise patterning of variables determining our present situation. Therefore I must indicate in advance that the scenarios I am about to sketch are speculation. The most one might say of it is that it is informed guesswork.

An exercise like this, however, is not entirely disreputable. There is some value in extrapolating present social trends and indications

and it lies in the fact that the picture which emerges highlights the implications of the present and allows one to reflect on what we, collectively, might be in the process of reproducing and creating. Just as we must learn from the past we also should be enlightened by our possible or probable future.

South Africa, like Rhodesia, old Mozambique, and Namibia, is a society under mounting external pressure, indeed we may say under siege. The siege is made doubly stressful by the fact that an unknown proportion of people behind the battlements see the siege as a source of hope not fear. The siege, for some, is made even more difficult by the knowledge that some of the enemies at the battlements have a just cause.

For present purposes, however, the most important thing about the siege is that sentiments are strong, morale is exposed to attack, many interests, material or otherwise are at risk and the normally very reassuring or repressing edifice of tradition, precedent and taken-for-granted social reality has developed large and visible cracks. In other words, our society has begun to acquire what some superficial observers (predictors of imminent revolution) have long thought it always had, namely the preconditions for unexpected swings of behaviour and attitude, even for social disruption and disorder. This means two things; firstly that anything like precise forecasting is totally impossible, and secondly, that, now especially, it is very important to try to assess future developments.

I SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

Speculating about the future on the basis of arbitrary, selective or impressionistic trends can be interesting; it can even contain the occasional gifted insight. I would prefer to proceed within some kind of guiding framework, best outlined by the following basic assumptions and propositions - some compatible with one another, others contradictory.

1-1 Although heavily outnumbered, whites in South Africa have

a sufficiently large absolute population size to retain considerable bargaining power under virtually all conditions of change. Their bargaining power is enhanced by education and technological skills and ultimately resides in the fact that whites, by themselves, could severely disrupt, violently or otherwise, any system which would threaten their basic interests. The situation here, therefore, is significantly different from those in Rhodesia and South West Africa or those in Mozambique and Angola before the Portuguese coup.

1-2 Western pressure on South Africa, all surface indications notwithstanding, is fundamentally aligned with the interests of South Africa's private enterprise economy in that it affords the West the justification for keeping other interested external powers at bay (e.g. Soviet Union) or discouraging an escalation of fundamentally antagonistic military influences (e.g. Cuba). Western strategies for change in South Africa are also ultimately constrained by majority public opinion in Western countries which is likely to be aroused from indifference by anything that began to look like a 'sellout' of whites. (It should be noted that popular racial attitudes in Europe are fairly similar to popular attitudes among South African whites, particularly English-speakers. (Deutsche Institut fur Internationale Pädagogische Forschung/ Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1976))

1-3 *Political change in South Africa is most likely to take a so-called 'consociational form' in the initial stages of power-sharing.* Consociation is the name given to arrangements whereby the leadership of racially or culturally defined groups in a society shares decision-making in one form or another without there necessarily being a formal joint participation in politics at the grassroots. South African politics are racially organised, since whites, because of the colonial roots of modern South Africa, inherited their privileges collectively as members of ethnic groups. Interests, although deeply affected by class, are perceived in racial terms. When power is devolved in South Africa, it is most likely to occur by way of a process of joint negotiation between ethnic groups and subgroups leading to a period of formal ethnic representation on governing councils. Later on, when cross-cutting links and shared interests develop between blacks and whites a non-racial franchise could emerge.

Furthermore, group representation means, in effect, a form of broad compromise between the two polar opposites of, on the one hand, a non-racial or integrated franchise, in which whites would be a small minority unable to ever exercise independent influence as a group, and, on the other hand, race separation involving some form of partition. In present circumstances, a compromise path between these two opposites seems likely. At this stage whites will resist integration as too radical an alternative and partition, if it is to be in the least way equitable, will involve too large a sacrifice of resources and, indeed, military security.

Inter-race negotiation or joint ethnic decision-making as a form of political transition in South Africa is also indicated by the fact that the speed at which pressures for change are building up probably will leave insufficient time for an extension of the franchise on a mass popular basis as it has occurred in European and other Western democracies. The pace of internal political reform is so slow that at some stage or another it probably will be necessary to 'short cut' the process by bringing into being a committee or council (formally 'consultative' in the early stages; perhaps) composed of representatives of the various ethnic groups as they currently are represented in the common area of South Africa.

Another reason for this prediction is that large, powerful and coherent party organisations which currently exist (the National Party, Inkatha, and perhaps even the (Coloured) Labour Party) are most likely to retain their identity and possibly even their positions of pre-eminence within their constituencies within an 'ethnic' governing coalition or consociation. Party interests are likely to be very powerful in dictating the direction of change.

One possible variation on the scenario outlined would be an inter-party and simultaneously an inter-ethnic coalition, along the lines of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia, taking the country towards a non-racial franchise. However, this basically would involve the same kind of inter-racial negotiation as the major scenario given above presupposes.

Finally, it is important to note that popular political attitudes among black and white come closest to basic agreement on the issue of a 'consociational' devolution of power, among all the alternatives (Hanf et al, 1978).

1-4 South Africa's social and political system - called the 'apartheid society' in the councils of the world - rests on multiple foundations. These different foundations will shift, decay or crumble at different rates. The various basic processes which have produced apartheid are:

a) A conflict of nationalisms and accompanying power-interests within the same territory. Afrikaner and Zulu nationalism is overt, English-speaking South Africanism is a latent, unarticulated form of corporate identity with fairly open boundaries but with a much firmer centre than the boundaries would suggest. White society in South Africa is in many ways a coalition of two nationalisms; one dominant, the other accommodated but subdominant.

b) Material interests and privilege. The material interests of the white employer class have at times in our history depended on the super-exploitation and political subjugation of blacks but this is not a constant relationship. Under conditions of economic growth and expanding markets the employers interests cannot only accommodate but be served by black socio-economic and political development, provided that political stability is maintained. The popular material interests of rank-and-file whites, however, are much more directly in contradiction to the interests of blacks since these depend on privileged access to education and training, wage-bargaining power, land and public facilities. While an 'expanding economic cake' can accommodate the purely monetary interests of all races, benefits like residential land, space for and quality of public facilities, effective education and training and life-style opportunities generally do not expand in step with economic growth but are constrained by physical space and population pressure, limitations of technology, lags in planning and bureaucratic inertia.

c) All the myriad and very common, universal social, psychological and cultural factors which cause inter-group tension, like prejudice towards outgroups, fear of strangers, parochialism, frustration and aggression deflected onto others, racial differences in lifestyles and verbal culture, etc. These lower-order factors acquire a particular

power when they coincide with the interests shaped by nationalism, power and privilege.

Therefore, the form and nature of our society is not simply the result of any one single factor like prejudice, Afrikaner traditionalism or class interests. The structures of our divided society are massive. Whereas in racially homogeneous societies equally pervasive structures of inequality may exist, there is an appearance of flexibility because 'personnel' changes readily occur. Working class children with good education can grow up to become staunch and accepted members of the middle class; people can adopt new lifestyles, acquire new religions, etc. The structures of social inequality, though powerful, are abstract in the sense that they are not socially visible. In South Africa, on the other hand, their forms coincide with race, people's appearance and ethnic differences and these characteristics have come to be synonymous with nationalism, with status, etc. Hence, South African society has resisted and will continue to resist the gradualist, evolutionary processes of change in terms of which individuals move upwards or change their social categories, which is so characteristic of homogeneous societies. Change in South Africa is much more likely than elsewhere to result from either violence, pressure or, as outlined in 1-3, an open acknowledgement of ethnic identity and the structures it symbolises, and a search for progressive alternatives within the framework of ethnic identity.

1-5 Inequality is South Africa's greatest imperative for change, yet also the greatest single impediment to such change. Democracy and freedom is in a sense a luxury in the world, in substantial part made possible by the fact that in democracies different social groups, while perceiving their differences and competing interests, have an overriding sense of interdependence and of shared basic interests. Strong authority is not necessary because people at basis are willing to obey the rules of the social, economic and political 'game'. South Africa simply does not have sufficient guarantee of basic consensus to make a liberal democracy possible at this stage. As long as authority has to exist it will tend to operate differentially on different groups, and so increase basic disagreement about the rules of the game. Therefore South Africa needs socio-economic reform as a preconditional for political evolution. Without rapid reform, South African society simply will not achieve the basic

consensus to make a democracy work by the time that it is expected of South Africa.

1-6 Blacks in South Africa do not all have the same lot in life. Basic to many variations in circumstances there are two kinds of frustrations which different groups experience in different degrees - deprivations of material welfare on the one hand, and deprivations of dignity and status on the other. A working class black person with poor education feels the material pinch above that of lack of social esteem. A black graduate, on the other hand, has a justifiable objective claim to dignity, worth and lifestyle opportunities, and he feels status deprivation most keenly. (Obviously both experience each other's deprivations to a large degree.) Status deprivation is psychologically more painful than material deprivation (within limits) and people are sensitive to the most subtle nuances of deprivation. Therefore, the educational and social development of blacks will inexorably produce growing radicalism unless there is either full social acceptance of them by whites or clear-cut and complete separation. Since the latter is manifestly impossible, and the tempo of change in social conventions is slow, South Africa's greatest challenges to political stability lie ahead.

1-7 More broadly, our long period of relative stability and the patient acceptance by blacks of their lot has rested in large measure on what I have called elsewhere the 'perceived immutability' of the system (Schlemmer, 1976). White control and authority had acquired a thing-like quality of unchangeability. Recent events in Southern Africa, however, and necessary and inevitable reforms themselves have probably altered that perception. Previously our politics were the politics of depressed black political consciousness. Our future will be a future of rising black political consciousness.


1-8 The black rank-and-file who have job-security and reasonable material prospects tend more than the middle-class elites to display political caution and a fear of any political instability which may undermine the economy and unleash the effects of latent ethnic divisions among blacks (Schlemmer (forthcoming), based on research conducted in Soweto). This group is as yet largely unrepresented by political

spokesmen. Provided a pattern of economic growth and community improvement can be sustained, the political mobilisation of this group will be at one and the same time a strong source of stability in a period of political change and an effective encouragement for further progressive change in South Africa since the articulated political aspirations of this group is likely to act as a powerful reassurance for whites.

1-9 The use of concepts like 'real change' or 'cosmetic' change is generally superficial and lacks any reference to processes whereby change can occur. Existing patterns in South African society are maintained by myriad norms and conventions and it is possible that a period of relatively 'superficial' change (blacks in international hotels, integrated sport) could so modify norms and perceptions on both sides that a threshold of social 'readiness' is reached beyond which 'real' change is possible. On the other hand, an example of 'real' change introduced suddenly may cause a mobilisation of resistance which will in fact delay wider change on a longer-term basis. Obviously, it is also possible that 'cosmetic' changes may lull South African whites into thinking that a challenge is being met and so delay meaningful reform. Each issue has to be individually assessed.

1-10 Social change at the level of root conditions tends to be a slow process. While particular characteristics of racial status in a society which are directly governed by law, regulation or public expenditure can change fairly rapidly (like black representation on representative councils, or numbers of blacks achieving a given level of education, for example), other patterns which are regulated by more complex processes change much more slowly. An example of this is to be found in the U.S.A. where despite the powerful civil rights movement and a generalised public commitment to racial equality, certain changes in the status of blacks are very gradual. Median family income for blacks in the U.S.A. was 54% of the white median family income in 1965 and had risen to only 58% by 1973. In this period the absolute gap in median family income had widened from \$4 700 to \$5 330 in real terms. Between 1963 and 1973 the percentage of employed black men working at managerial and executive levels in the public and private sector rose from 3,5% to only 5,2%. (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

1973.) These examples are not intended as criticism of the U.S.A. but simply to illustrate how remarkably persistent certain patterns are despite attempts at reform.



II A BROAD ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES SINCE 1970

South African society, like any other society, changes all the time. When one speaks of social change in a South African context, however, one tends not to be interested in the complexity of small shifts and readjustments which take place in daily life over time, one thinks of the broad patterns of race relations, economic behaviour and political policy which have tended to exhibit considerable basic persistence over numerous decades.

Longer range future change cannot be predicted on the basis of past change, but within a limited time-span immediate past changes might display a pattern which, to a less or greater degree, will hold for the immediate future. The period from 1970 to 1980 may, therefore be helpful in considering the likely changes which will take place from 1980 to 1990. The assessment of the past decade will of necessity be cursory and superficial.

From 1970 onwards, black political activity appeared to recover from the 'lull of despondency' following Sharpeville and the destruction of the ANC and PAC movements in the early sixties. Not only has formal political activity increased (e.g. Inkatha, the Black Consciousness Movement in its formal manifestations like Black Peoples' Congress, and the South African Indian Congress, etc.) but South Africa has seen the re-emergence of underground political activity manifested in trials under the Terrorism Act and other laws.

Black labour activity and organisation (unregistered) has also re-emerged, in part stimulated by favourable job-market conditions up to 1975/76. The strikes in 1972 and 1973, both in Natal and elsewhere attested to increasing worker restiveness.

This rash of labour activity coincided with a heightened

wage-reform consciousness in the country as a whole from 1974 onwards; this being the era of the 'Poverty Datum Line' and the acceptance of more adequate minimum wage levels for blacks. The government responded to both the unofficial strikes and the unregistered labour activity by legislating for and encouraging a form of in-house bargaining (the Works and Liaison Committee system, introduced earlier in the form of Works Committees but never encouraged) which was a slight improvement on earlier labour-relations practices for blacks which were almost entirely repressive. The Committee system, however, was not able to secure labour stability to the extent that had been anticipated. The government also banned a number of unregistered trade unionists. The outcome of this somewhat contradictory pattern has been the appointment of two commissions of enquiry (Wiehahn and Riekert) to usher in what is confidently expected to be a range of moderate but meaningful reforms in the sphere of official policies regarding black employment.

Another outcome is that black wages (not necessarily per capita black income) rose meaningfully and more rapidly than white wages over the period and at one stage just before the recent recession, even the absolute wage-gap between black and white wages narrowed marginally. In view of trends in income inequality in other societies this shift in the trend in wages in South Africa is not to be underrated. This trend appears to have been slowed but not reversed by the 1976-9 recession.

The movement of blacks into higher-level positions in industry and commerce appears to have been slow but steady (with the exception of more rapid advances for Indians) and quite recently has received a boost from various codes of conduct for industry, the initial ones emanating from outside South Africa (Sullivan Principles, the British Parliamentary Enquiry and the EEC code). The broad pattern at the moment is that black graduates with suitable skills and a minimum of experience can find high-level employment in industry and commerce. Such employment at this stage, however, is still limited to specialised functions dealing with black labour or black consumers/customers. The movement of African and Coloured personnel into 'line' executive positions is currently blocked by convention and by the lack of suitable skills. Blacks are, however, very slowly but steadily moving into lower-level line-supervision but here again the suitability of skills, both formal and

informal is an impediment. Despite the economic recession, these recent developments highlight the desperate need for improved educational facilities for blacks.

At the constitutional level, the government has reacted to the effective breakdown of the very largely consultative functioning of the Coloured Persons Representative Council first by appointing a commission of enquiry (the Theron Commission), then by rejecting the far-reaching political reforms suggested by that commission, and more recently by proposing a new constitutional arrangement to encompass white, Coloured and Indian politics - a system of parallel legislatures and limited possibilities for joint decision-making. When these proposals were widely rejected by influential Coloured representatives, the government departed from traditional one-sided decision-making and entered into a process of discussion and negotiation with Coloured leaders which is still continuing. While the outcome is uncertain, these events have revealed one aspect of the change-potential which inheres in at least some of the ineffective political structures created by the government for blacks; this being that when these arrangements fail by virtue of their ineffectiveness, the government, in order to retain credibility for its policies, has to attempt to replace them by arrangements less likely to fail, and hence probably more effective as reforms.

One of the reasons for the delay in introducing new constitutional arrangements for Coloureds and Indians is the insistence of representatives of the latter groups that Africans should be included in the arrangements. This has added a new thrust to the challenge to government policy represented by the question of non-Homeland urban Africans.

This challenge, however, was manifested in most dramatic and concrete terms by the African and Coloured urban disturbances which occurred from October of 1976 until mid-1977, claiming many hundreds of young African lives. Essentially disturbances among youth and young unemployed adults, these were demonstrations which nevertheless appeared to have the support and blessing of nearly six out of ten urban residents (Hanf et al, 1978: 335-336). These disturbances also revealed a surprising degree of shared consciousness across the African-Coloured racial barrier. Caused in an immediate sense by educational grievances the disturbances

soon revealed themselves to have much deeper political roots. In this author's view the causes included a sudden growth in unemployment after a period of rapid expansion of opportunity up to 1975, insecurities in regard to citizenship and future residence in the run up to Transkei independence, a factor which deeply affected one of the most politically conscious of all African groups, the Xhosa-speaking group, the pervasive conscientising effect of black consciousness thinking among young blacks and the rise in political expectations following on the rapid series of changes in Southern Africa since 1974.

The urban disturbances have brought a response from the private sector in the form of the establishment of the Urban Foundation, an organisation dedicated to improving the quality of life in the cities, but there has also been some melting of the government's formerly firm ideological stance which would have it that urban Africans are to have no status and rights other than those of Homeland citizens 'temporarily' absent from their own territories. Concessions on the part of the government have recently included the granting of 99 year leasehold rights to urban Africans with rights to inheritance (an assurance was recently given that children who were Homeland citizens would be able to enjoy normal urban security of tenure), increased funding for African education in urban areas and support for urban upliftment schemes in Soweto, the major urban black complex. There have also been accumulating verbal indications of a softening of the government's earlier resistance to regarding the urban Africans as a group whose civic and constitutional future is inescapably part of the common domain of South African politics and not of that of the Homelands.

The Homeland policy has continued to deliver its own contradictions within South African politics. While the independence (political but not economic) of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana has revealed a strong tendency among Homeland-based elites to maximise short-term political advantages, the numerically most powerful group, the Zulus, under the leadership of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, has accepted Homeland autonomy but clings with determination to its political stake in the common society by rejecting ultimate independence. To boot, this conviction as well as other political and developmental goals are now formally pursued by the largest black political organisation in South Africa's

history, Inkatha. This organisation, protected by its semi-formal status within the Homeland political system and its firm rejection of violence and confrontation, holds out the possible prospect of a consolidation of massive economic bargaining power if its growth and organisation prosper in the future.

A massive setback to South Africa's attempts to cultivate external support has been a series of deaths of blacks while in detention for alleged or suspected political offences. In particular, the death of the well-known black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, caused large international repercussions. The political costs of what so many regard as naked police brutality have become painfully obvious over the decade and, tentatively, one senses a much more cautious approach in very recent times. More broadly, the leading generals in the defence force have been actively propagating a 'hearts and minds' policy of winning black loyalty to the South African government's cause. Recent moves to improve the conditions of urban blacks, to alleviate the Coloured housing shortage in a crash programme and other departures reflect a slow but steady change in the *mode* of securing order in South African society. Statements by various Cabinet Ministers reveal a growing awareness of the political utility of securing compliance through the satisfaction rather than repression of aspirations. The government's often stated awareness of the political risks and costs of unemployment is another example of a new approach. A belated policy of strategic reform appears to be gradually emerging to complement harsh political security measures.

As one would expect in the changing climate of South Africa, and in the light of the lessons of Rhodesia and South West Africa, white racial and political attitudes are changing. The trend is for a slow but meaningful liberalisation of racial attitudes as an overall trend. This broad movement is not even across all areas of race relations, however, and certain issues reflect hard interest in the maintenance of traditional patterns, like, for example, the Group Areas Act, which provides for separate residential areas for different races. The resistance to residential integration illustrates the powerful effect of a combination of material interests (inter alia property values) and the desire to protect the private social sphere from 'invasion' by people perceived to have different lifestyles and modes of community

interaction. Although the prospect of black *control* of political affairs is firmly rejected by whites, other reforms in the political and 'public' sphere are receiving increasing support, like the possibility of a degree of power *sharing*, integration of public facilities, and increased economic and occupational opportunity for blacks (Schlemmer, 1978).

This changing climate of attitudes has recently been accompanied by the first signs of actual changes in behaviour which extend beyond the formally sanctioned confines of racial mixing in 'international' hotels and integrated sport. One notices more and more black people in certain 'white' nightclubs, black people now dare risk having meals in some 'white' restaurants and lunch-bar facilities, a few Coloured people informally rent flats in the more anonymous white apartment house areas in Johannesburg, Coloured and Indian supervisors and foremen now can have whites working under their control in some sectors of employment, and, more formally, for example, some black children attend white private schools, more and more park facilities are integrated and black traffic inspectors are exercising authority over all motorists, etc.

In contrast to these trends, there may be signs of a determined 'backlash' reaction from groups of whites of unknown size. One notices, for example, private campaigns to rid white apartment house areas of Coloured tenants, a newspaper summary of the survey results upon which the picture of attitude trends given above was based elicited numerous truculent late-night phone calls to the author and very recently the white Mineworkers' Union called an illegal strike in protest against the softening of 'job-reservation'. The indications are that a *polarisation* of attitudes and reactions to race is taking place among whites, but a somewhat elliptical polarisation with the majority group undergoing a slow but steady liberalisation of attitudes. These proportions may be reversed, however, in the membership of the National Party and its caucus - there is clear evidence that even government-supporting white voters are more liberal than their public representatives, on average (Schlemmer, 1978, Hanf et al, 1978).

Lastly, in this overview, some mention must be made of the so-called 'Information Department scandal'. The details, however juicy, need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the net effect of the

whole affair has probably been to create widespread impressions of financial corruption among certain senior officials, impressions of government complicity in the use of public funds and resources to promote party political interests, signs of dangerous adventurism in South Africa's international relations and impressions of high-level attempts to cover up the true facts. Whatever the outcome, this episode has hastened a process in which National Party politics has become increasingly distinguishable from Calvinist moral rectitude, and it has also severely weakened the web of nationalist Afrikaner unity - virtually all the 'heroes' and 'villains' of the piece, the executioners and the scape-goats have been members of the corporate power-elite. The National Party's formerly central location in Afrikaans religious culture and 'folk unity' is shifting noticeably.

These, very briefly and oversimply stated, appear to be the trends that will take South Africa into the decade of the eighties. With the earlier propositions and these trends as guidance, a speculative picture of South African society in 1989 will now be sketched.

III SOUTH AFRICA '1989'

The following 'predictions' are based on the assumption that there will not be a change of government by the end of the 1980's. At most there will be a realignment of factions within the National Party government (see later). The speculation is deliberately concrete.

Wealth and Lifestyle

White South Africans will be less-affluent, on average than they are now; inflation and fuel costs having steadily outstripped increases in wages and salaries. Economic growth over the eighties is likely to have been lower than the minimum necessary to help maintain formerly high levels of affluence. The economy will, however, probably be sound, having withstood a succession of crises of confidence and shortages of investment capital, helped by government investment in arms production. It will also have achieved well-nigh universal localisation of production and import replacement, part of a policy aimed at withstanding international pressures. A new local industry of high prestige will probably be the

computer and cybernetics industry.

Lifestyle in general also will be relatively constrained by growing shortages of space for recreation and housing. New developments in South African cities will be of a medium density type and the re-development and upgrading of areas closer to city-centres will be widespread. This will make possible sophisticated forms of electrical public transport and Johannesburg will have a developing underground transportation system. Life for the white urban dweller will much more closely resemble that in the more crowded European cities than is the case at present. This change in lifestyle will be somewhat 'softened' by the fact that black domestic service, although it will be much more expensive, will continue because of a persisting shortage of jobs for less-skilled blacks (see later).

Personal Freedoms and Civil Liberties

It was mentioned in the beginning of this discussion that South Africa is becoming a 'siege' society. The pressures will develop in the eighties (see later). These pressures and threats to state (or government) security will have been used as justification for even more security legislation than we have at present, including severe curbs on freedom of the press. The rule of law and the right to legal redress will have been even further undermined. It needs to be noted that the restriction of freedoms associated with democratic society will be *accompanied by* fairly significant race reforms. Indeed, the more reform the greater will be the perceived need for a tightening of internal security.

By the end of the eighties, some of the Afrikaans press under pressure from journalists, will have joined the English-language press in fairly vehement opposition to curbs on press freedom - an opposition severely constrained by the very restrictions it would oppose. Certain newspapers, however, will act as automatic legitimators of government policy.

For most white South Africans the restrictions of the freedoms associated with security affairs and communications will mean little in *direct* ways. They will have become subject to far-reaching *indirect* effects, however. The ready justification for all manner of restrictive

laws and regulations will have *infected* other areas of public life. A trend discernable in the sixties and seventies will have hardened into a firm style of administration. This style will rest on the assumption by public authorities that all areas of public, semi-public and even private life can be regulated within a bureaucratic framework, aimed at achieving consistency, a lack of troublesome (for the administrator) 'untidiness' in public behaviour and a compliant, regulated public. Each successive small inroad into personal liberty will undermine the morale characteristic of populations in an open democracy and make further inroads easier to achieve. South Africa will have come to resemble an East European society of the fifties and sixties and few will complain, more will simply emigrate. White South Africans will have paid a heavy and unwitting price for the protection of their identities and privilege. Fishermen will be regulated and licenced, dogs controlled, gardens and sidewalks kept under surveillance for 'nuisance', traffic fines will be exorbitant, a 'braai on the beach' will make one liable to arrest, uniforms will have massive connotations of authority, occupations and professions will be regulated, etc., etc. All this will be achieved no longer so much in the name of morality but efficiency and regularity, while a dispirited population will become less and less efficient. The insecure lower-middle classes will love it, the talented individualists will scale their symbolic Berlin wall and leave.

Society always tends to generalise specific norms and standards if they are very salient. Pale and non-political forms of the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act will creep into the neighbourhood, the campsite, the garden, the school and the office building. In the Cape it is already an offence to light a campfire on a beach; the damage has been done.

Values

Inflation and a relatively slow economic growth will have made the population more and more narrowly materialistic and, quite frankly, 'mean'. The steady breakdown of the extended family and kin networks among Africans and Indians will mean that the 'nuclear' or conjugal family will have become the focus of interests for virtually everyone. The grand traditions of Afrikaner hospitality and generosity and African communal sharing will be becoming distant cultural memories.

On a more positive note, the Afrikaans churches by 1989 will be relatively smaller and less influential, and they will have rediscovered their distant Calvinist heritage which embraces a deep responsibility and concern for the worldly condition in *all* its aspects. A unity of major Christian churches in regard to major social and political issues will be possible.

The values underpinning government will have been profoundly affected by 'Muldergate' (the Information scandal). As already indicated, Muldergate will have hastened a process of 'secularisation' of Afrikaans politics. Instead of the double standards and lip-service to Christian-National traditionalism of the sixties and seventies, the informing basic values will be those of statism - strong and pervasive government for its own sake.

In a 'managed' society, and one short of investment capital, private enterprise will find itself drawn ever closer to the administration, and the administration to big business. The trade-off will be mutually beneficial. Many irksome, traditionally-based restrictions on employer freedoms will have vanished because the administration will have 'modernised' its controls; race will be less important as a factor in labour regulations and policy. The losers will be the small competitors, and along with their demise will come South Africa's heyday of planning. The ebb and flow of the rhetoric of planning - town, regional, development, educational, manpower and all other sorts of planning - will in part replace the mechanisms of the market and of supply and demand. (It will also be the heyday of bad sociologists, unless sociology will have been squeezed into obscurity by 'Institutes' of Social Workers, Planners, Psychologists, Personnel Managers and Administrators.) South Africa will be a magnificent version of a *post capitalist cum state capitalist* society but one with planning and regulation writ very large because of the tensions of survival.

Government and Constitution

The government's constitutional proposals of the late seventies will have flowered into a complex consociational arrangement involving separate legislative chambers for whites, Coloureds, Indians (or Coloureds and Indians together), *certain* urban Africans, linked together

by a painfully cumbersome joint cabinet or executive council (names are arbitrary) with white Cabinet Ministers enjoying at least a parity of numbers, as well as a veto or blocking right. This executive will in turn be linked via another federal structure to certain non-independent and enlarged Homelands - KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Qua Qua, the Swazi and Ndebele territories and possibly Lebowa. A 'supreme council' or body of a similar description with a white Executive President and one or two African Executive Vice Presidents will be the highest tier of government, projecting great prestige to the outside world but controlled pretty effectively by the white power segment in the lower-level executive council.

Gradually, during the nineties, the interests of the ethnic leadership factions will draw closer together, and make a shift towards non-racialism possible, especially when major political parties are ready to go into coalition across race lines. In the late eighties, however, this will be prevented by as yet unresolved racial conflicts, particularly the group areas problem. (See below.) In the 1980's the system will be what Hanf et al (1978) have termed 'sham consociationalism' although it will hold more promise than the name suggests.

The National Party would have undergone quite considerable re-grouping as a result of breakaway movements by the late nineteen eighties. Quite probably it will include bits and pieces of the present conservative opposition factions and will have lost a more 'verligte'¹⁾ segment, but not a large one. A Progressive Federal Party cum verligte Nationalist opposition will be significantly larger than today.

This prediction depends, however, on the 'centre' faction of the party at the moment - shall we say the P.W. Botha²⁾ support group retaining a large share of control. If the Transvaal right-wing group gains the ascendancy there will be a much larger opposition containing one or two present Cabinet Ministers which could gain a victory at the polls. If it does the process outlined will be modified to involve much more decentralisation of government and a quicker political evolution. If it does not, the process predicted above will take five to ten years longer to emerge.

1) 'verligte' = enlightened - the National Party 'left wing'

2) The present Prime Minister

Among blacks there will be a major struggle for ascendancy at various levels of government between a fairly coherent Zulu-centred political grouping (an extension, perhaps, of Inkatha) and an amalgam of other African groupings. Coloured and Indian parties will vacillate hugely in the early eighties but gradually align themselves with whites as the possibilities of effective power-sharing emerge. Conflict between factions on the white/Coloured/Indian side on the one hand and the African side on the other will prevent race polarisation between white and African becoming a severe threat to internal stability.

Threats to the System

During the eighties the disaffected 'radical' group among blacks drawn from those many people fervently committed to a common society and unitary franchise, will grow and either be suppressed by security controls or will flee the country. The vocal expatriate group abroad will become steadily augmented, and its ranks will be swelled by younger, chronically unemployed urban Africans. This external group will be the emergent South African system's greatest source of woe. Their political idealism will be sympathetically received and their grievances will elicit concrete support from many quarters. By the late eighties they would have established a South African expatriate army if they could find a fully adequate base territory. This will be problematic for them in view of South Africa's economic strength and capacity to sanction an independent Zimbabwe, Botswana or Mozambique prepared to assist expatriate groups actively. They will, however, be given more or less token recognition by one or more of these territories and will probably establish limited base facilities during the eighties sufficient only for mounting small-scale insurgency ventures. This insurgency will undoubtedly be mounted with very sophisticated technical equipment and back-up by the late eighties and will constitute a threat of high symbolic magnitude even though it will probably lack the capacity to threaten the system. The symbolic threat will be heightened by considerable international support in a world which will find it difficult to understand South Africa's curious way of devolving power. Symbolic sanctions of various kinds will accompany the insurgency, and the occasional urban bomb blast or act of sabotage will maintain a view of South Africa as an economic risk. Because South Africa will be relatively rich in a Third World still struggling to develop, third world hostility will be sharply

focussed on South Africa, even after black faces appear in the 'executive' or 'supreme' governing councils. Hostility to South Africa will have assumed a ritualised form with its own brand of self-perpetuating rhetoric and analysis. Tensions between the West and the Third World will make it necessary for the West to pay heed to the various externally based anti South African campaigns. This will be the nature of the siege on South Africa.

The greatest threat to stability in South Africa will be in the urban areas and among black youth. The unemployed, which will be substantial in number in the eighties, will have real grievances but as in 1976/7 working adults will support them and prevent the onset of total despair. Other young blacks will be affected by the myriad subtle tensions and anxieties brought about by change and rising expectations. The challenge throughout the eighties will be the question of how to cope with the instabilities which follow change. Youth disturbances will occur again and perhaps again.

Labour unrest will occur from time to time but will be limited in scope by the fear of unemployment and will gradually come under the control of black political movements like Inkatha. If the pace of change were to slow down too much or stall, then the society might see a trial of strength in the form of mass short-term strikes organised fairly coherently.

During the late eighties the system could survive these various threats only if the process of maintaining control and order is made legitimate by having black people sharing control of the system to a substantial degree. It seems reasonable to predict that this will be so by 1989.

Race Relations

At a lower level, social interaction between the races will have changed markedly in some ways but not in others. An extension of the principle of 'international' hotels will have occurred in that there will be 'international' or non-racial zones in cities, in which completely open facilities will exist. This will spread to the entire city centre in our major metropolitan complexes by the end of the decade. This

will have taken some of the heat out of the system in that blacks will feel that they can identify with the full fruits of development. The heated debate in society will concern segregated residential areas. One might anticipate that there will emerge 'white' areas with some blacks given concessions to live in them, 'ethnic' areas and open areas; initially very limited but expanding. The feeling will be concentrated on the 'white' areas, however, and the end of the decade will probably not see this issue fully resolved.

This crisis in race relations will be accompanied by a parallel debate on the 'Immorality Act' and the Mixed Marriages Act. Because of their essentially private symbolism, these acts will outlast effective application and during the eighties, convictions under the immorality act will dwindle away. The Mixed Marriages Act will then create enormous problems and there will be a pathetic small group of 'informal' families. This debate will be South Africa's greatest absurdity for the eighties and a test of the wisdom of the society will be whether or not these laws are repealed before the end of the decade.

As said before, these 'predictions' are simply informed guesses, and I would be the last person to guarantee their validity. Possibly the most penetrating questions which can be asked about them will concern the time-scale. Black people who, understandably, are impatient for change are likely to feel that the time-scale for change is ridiculously extended. Others basically content with the situation will be lulled by the surface normality of everyday events and feel that the time-scale has been needlessly foreshortened. Similarly a longer-term historical view of the situation might suggest that change will come more slowly than suggested. At this stage, obviously, I would stand by my suggested time-scale.

The 'predictions' offered suggest that South Africa will survive as a reasonably ordered, viable and coherent system offering at least basic security to all but the very poor and unemployed on the fringes of the system. Unemployment, particularly among energetic youth, is one of the most serious threats to the system. In the absence of foresight, courageous leadership in positions of power and policies which are tested against benchmarks of effectiveness in dealing with the

root causes of problems, however, South Africa's survival will be accompanied by at least a decade of anguish and much political and administrative absurdity. Neither whites nor anyone else will be 'swamped' or driven into the sea but during the eighties many people's morale and pride might well be under severe duress.

South Africa's probable future does not indicate the need for extremes or drastic measures of any variety, whether from whites or blacks. It does, however, indicate a need for sincere concern about the quality of our collective survival.

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