SOUTHERN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1983-84: A STUDY IN SURVIVAL

By Reginald Herbold Green

> We have been watching SADCC's progress to determine if it was going to be another East African Community. It is clear not only it isn't but that it is not making the same mistakes of over-heavy and centralised bureaucracy as other existing regional programmes. We thought it time to reflect that confidence in our practical support. (Pledges totalling $C 125 million.)
>
> - C. Bassett, Vice President CIDA, speaking for Canada at Lusaka, SADCC, 1984[1]

> Droughts are endemic to much of the SADCC region, and since 1978 each of the SADCC States has suffered from abnormally severe weather conditions for one or more years. The 1982/83 agricultural season has seen one of the worst droughts in living memory, creating an abnormal demand for food imports and food aid as well as rehabilitation aid to allow farmers to restore production when the drought breaks. Potentially even more devastating is the threat to the resilience and viability of the fragile economies of our region.
>
> - SADCC, Overview for Lusaka SADCC[2]

> The Conference deplored continued South African actions which denied peace and stability to the SADCC region. It noted that there were some apparent signs of a less aggressive stance by South Africa and recognised that continued international pressure on South Africa was essential to bring these signs to fruition and bring about a process of peaceful change in the region.
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> Communique, Lusaka SADCC[3]

Progress In Adversity: An Overview

1983-84 has been an appalling year for most of the Southern African region's independent states. The continued impact of adverse international economic conditions, of aggravated drought and of South African destabilisation have gravely debilitated the economies of eight of the nine SADCC members.[4] Only Botswana has been able to regain external balance and resume economic progress while the economic situation and short term prospects of Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia can only be described as dire. The apparent South African initiatives to de-esculate destabilisation are both problematic and tentative.

In that context the survival of SADCC as a functioning body is remarkable - economic adversity has in Africa and the Americas tended to have a very negative impact on even fairly firmly established cooperation groupings. Indeed, SADCC has not merely survived - it has expanded the scope and depth of its coordination work and continued to mobilize funds for implementation.[5] In a very economically troubled region it is a clear example of success. Adversity in this case appears to have reinforced, much more than it has weakened, perceptions of common interests and of the need to pursue coordinated, regionally agreed priorities toward furthering them.

The same response - albeit in a lower key - can be seen in the Arusha Accord re-establishing normal economic relations between Kenya and Tanzania and opening explorations on new forms of economic cooperation among the members of the late East African Community. So too progress on the "Central Corrider" transport links among Tanzania-Zaire-Burundi-Rwanda and Uganda has continued. While the case of the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa is more problematic, it has survived, established its first functioning programme (a payments clearing house) and scheduled its initial preferential tariff cuts for mid-1984.

SADCC's Programme: Momentum Maintenance

By 1983/84 SADCC had to demonstrate both that programme articulation continued and that a substantial number of projects were passing from the drawing board through final studies and financing to implementation. This it did.[6]

The most rapid advances in 1983/84 were in Agriculture (especially Crops

Research and Drought/Food Security) and Industry. Coordinated agricultural research moved closer to major project operation in respect to drought resistent grains and grain legumes. Links were developed with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and the ongoing series of technical group meetings of agricultural specialists as well as those of agriculture senior officials and ministers were stepped up.

Food Security/Drought was pushed into prominence by the series of bad weather years which have plagued most SADC members since 1978 and particularly in the 1981-82 and 1982-83 (and apparently 1983-84) crop years.[7] The programmes outlined by the states and coordinated for the Lusaka SADCC totalled over $500 million including a limited amount of food aid (largely sought earlier on a bilateral basis) and much more extensive rehabilitation, drought impact limitation and food production boosting projects.[8] These are seen as broadly coordinated elements to enhancing regional food security - including eventual regional food reserves albeit the degree of direct multi-country involvement in individual projects or their output is lower in this sector than in others.

At Maseru the first articulated industrial sector priority list was criticized as uncoordinated albeit a high proportion of projects did, in fact, receive indications of interest. Further studies and emphasis on the logic of the agricultural input/construction material core of the priority list were organised by the coordinating country (Tanzania) leading to a January 1984 sectoral workshop in Harare.[9] This was SADCC's first sectoral meeting with donors and investors and also the first in which companies (over 80) as well as countries and international agencies (over 20) participated. Together with followup at the Lusaka SADCC, Harare led to indications of definite interest for almost all of the 88 projects (55 for implementation and 33 for study) presented. While the firmness of the interest/commitment varies and exact amounts under discussion (up to $700 million)[10] and required (up to $1,500 million)[11] are not very firm it appears that with sustained followup by member states and the coordinating country a number of projects can move to contract and design stage in 1984-85 and to construction by 1985-86.

Transport and Communications remains SADCC's largest sector, the one with the greatest involvement in project design and financial mobilisation and possessing the largest (and most formal) institutional structure based on the Southern African Transport and Communications Council in Maputo at the technical and Ministerial and official committees at the policy level. It also has the largest number of identified priority projects - nearly 120 - and of projects completed under implementation or fully/partially funded - over half. By the end of 1983 nearly $700 million in definite commitments to projects had been secured and up to $450 million more was under negotiation - out of somewhat over $2,000 million total foreign exchange cost. Increased attention to data base development, coordinating specialised training and dialogue on how to build up cooperation/coordination in operations (especially cargo routing and timing) was noticable over 1982-84.[12]

However, the finance still to be secured is also large and, at the 1983 rate of definite new commitments of about $200 million, would take seven years to raise and perhaps twelve to complete or virtually complete implementation.[13] Further, three basic port and access route clusters - Dar es Salaam, Beira and Maputo have definite commitments of only 6%, 18% and 22% of total costs respectively versus over 50% in civil aviation and telecommunications.[14] SATCC and the coordinating country (Mozambique) are well aware of these limits to the undoubted successes achieved to date. These three routes are critical to restoring and increasing regional self sufficiency in transport and in creating a viable regional network to facilitate trade expansion.

In respect to Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia Railway)[15] and Dar es Salaam Harbour[16], and perhaps to a Malawi link to TAZARA, progress toward securing funds - especially from China, Federal Germany, IDA and the Nordic countries now seems to be gathering momentum in part as a result of SATCC technical and promotional work. Studies in respect to Beira and Maputo are now virtually complete and - especially if security improves - breakthroughs on the financing front like to those in 1982-83 on the port of Ncala and rail link to Malawi may be attainable in 1984-85. Once these routes are fully operational Zambia and Zimbabwe can achieve substantial cost - as well as broader political economic - savings by ending or sharply reducing dependence on South African ports and both Mozambique and Tanzania would benefit from significant transit traffic earnings while Botswana would have a practicable regional route to the sea ending its near total dependence on the South African rail and port systems.

The energy sector has built up substantial momentum over 1982-84. Except for the regional petroleum personnel development centre in Luanda - and probably by the end of 1984 projects to enable Mozambique to supply additional power to Zimbabwe and Zambia/Tanzania to rehabilitate the Dar-Ndola pipeline - this does not yet lie in capital projects under implementation. Rather it consists of progress toward building a coordinated regional data base, analyzing options, articulating more specific topical and project studies and building up a habit of cooperation.[17]

Even broadly favourable commentators have suggested that demand projections are too optimistic and the stress on multi-country (as opposed to purely national) solutions too low and rising too slowly.[18] This overlooks the long gestation period of major power projects and high cost of power shortages - which make too low demand projections very expensive and the fact that building up a coordinated versus a narrowly national approach to power questions requires experience in joint reviews of data and working together. In fact demand estimates will be reviewed in specific studies and four projects involving seven countries (Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) are under study in respect to electricity generation. While energy project feasibility, design and financing stages are notably slow the present base gives cause to expect a breakthough to implementation in a few years time. The thorough, step by step approach adopted by the coordinating country (Angola) appears to be paying off.

Manpower Development has continued to broaden the scope of its studies and has begun to develop concrete projects especially in teacher training and health but has not made a breakthrough to substantial operational external interest. Two new initiatives for 1984-85 are intended to revitalize the sectoral programme. The first is closer liaison between the manpower development coordinating country (Swaziland) and sectoral meetings and those of other sectors in respect to specialized training projects critical to sectoral development. An earlier partial example of this is the veterinary faculty in Zimbabwe designed to serve several SADCC states. An early new initiative is likely to be in mining where the initial regional projects developed by the coordinating country (Zambia) relate to expanding the region's existing technical and professional level training institutions to relieve the acute bottlenecks in personnel availabilty (citizen or expatriate) at these levels. The second new approach - in response to the successful Harare Industrial Workshop - is a sectoral international workshop with agencies and personnel specializing in manpower development scheduled for Mbabane in the second half of 1984.

SADCC's commitment to developing a sectoral programme in trade dates from the 1980 Lusaka Declaration.[19] However, largely because SADCC saw production as central and trade a consequential means overt attention to coordination of regional trade expansion did not begin until 1983 although the topic has repeatedly arisen in manufacturing sector discussions. A further complicating factor was the existence of the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa whose 14 members include 5 SADCC states and whose approach embodied in its 1981 Treaty is not identical to, and could prove incompatible with, the Lusaka Declaration's emphasis on building up trade links from a coordinated network of bilateral trade accords.[20]

In fact SADCC has increased and begun to coordinate invisible trade - in transport and communications - but this poses different and lesser problems than does trade in goods. Further several SADCC states - notably Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Tanzania have built up networks of bilateral agreements with target trade levels, key products and rough guidelines for clearing imbalances. Intraregional trade in goods is not negligible -

approximating $300 million in 1981[21] but is still only 5% of total SADCC members' external trade. About 45% relates to Zimbabwe and 12 to 15% each to Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique so that there is substantial imbalance in participation.

In October 1983 the SADCC Ministers of Trade and Finance met in Arusha and agreed a report to the February 1984 Lusaka Council of Ministers. The Council called for two further studies - one on trade proper by a regional team headed by Tanzanian IMF Alternate Executive Director Edwin Mtei and one on clearing and financing arrangements by an external consultant - to be considered at the July 1984 Gaborone Council of Ministers meeting.

There does not seem to be disagreement on what would constitute a basic sectoral programme were it to be adopted. There are reservations - apparently particularly by Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi[22] - both on timing and on the need to avoid overlap or conflict with the PTA.

SADCC's progress toward consolidating its central secretariat with a small full time core staff and part time or specialist consultants as needed suffered a severe setback in March 1984 when Executive Secretary Arthur Blumeris died suddenly from a heart attack. The Chairman of the Standing Committee of Officials, Lebang Mpotokwane (who had acted as de facto Secretary General prior to the establishment of the secretariat), became interim Executive Secretary with a permanent second Executive Secretary to be named by the SADCC Heads of State and Government probably at the July 1984 Gaborone Summit.

SDACC Lusaka - A Working Conference

Lusaka on 2-3 February 1984, was SADCC's fifth annual conference with invited guests and donors. In the view of SADCC Ministerial Chairman Peter Mmusi and of many other veteran participants it was the most successful since the 1980 Maputo launching Conference. It was a working conference with pledging one among a number of topics since - unlike Maputo - there were operational achievements and problems to discuss and an ongoing set of programmes to review.

Pledging - rather to the irritation of the press - has become less of a tallying of broad intentions and more of a noting for further action of specific indications of interest in or commitments to individual projects. In addition, with ongoing programmes and sectoral followup, it has become less concentrated at Annual Conferences. A rough estimate of pledges at Lusaka is $500 million[23], though disentangling new money from broad pledges now made concrete, distinguishing between Harare Industrial Workshop and Lusaka pledges and evaluating both non-price tagged statements of intent with respect to projects and bilateral project support within the SADCC coordination priorities, but not pledged at a SADCC conference, makes any such figure remarkably imprecise. On the whole overall expressions of practical interest and support seemed higher than at any conference since Maputo, a not insignificant achievement in the present climate for aid.

Other themes included detailed consultations and speeding implementation. The first was at least partly catered for by the inauguration of official level sectoral workshops the day before the International Conference proper. Implementation criticisms arose from both donors - especially the UK[24] - and SADCC members and coordinating states. The Chairman in his closing address stressed the need for more direct discussion of problems by donors with members and coordinating units at a specific project level.[25]

A lively discussion on agricultural policy developed with the Nordic States[26], the African Development Bank,[27] EEC[28] and the USA[29] among the major contributors.[30] The themes of greater food self sufficiency and more research as well as of emphasis on supporting expanded peasant production and providing incentives were common to most contributions of which the Nordic was the most comprehensive. Emphasis on prices, availability of goods, transport, marketing and the effectiveness of public sector institutions varied - as did SADCC state responses especially as several of the topics (e.g. producer prices) are national rather than SADCC areas of coordination.

A main controversy before and during the Conference came over the terms of USAID's proposed funding of the bulk of the $18 million regional sorghum and millet research project - a potential model for coordinated, field tested, applied research which is almost totally lacking in Sub-Saharan Africa. AID's offer specifically excluded project components in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania and any benefit going to these states. This proved unacceptable to SADCC whose unity held up against this clearly (whether intentionally or not) divisive offer. A potential resolution seemed to be USAID financing of the regional core of the work to "benefit the entire region" and the components in six countries (specified positively not negatively) with a seond donor (possibly CIDA of Canada) to fund the balance.[31]

The Chairman's opening address[32] highlighted both the progress made and the three overarching problems - adverse international economic environment, drought and South African destabilisation - confronting SADCC and its members. His closing address[33] stressed the need for more and more frequent exchange of views on policies and on implementation at technical and official levels as well as political - a development begun by the sectoral workshops held the day before SADCC proper and by the Nordic paper in agricultural policies[34] as well as by EEC Commissioner Pisani's posing of what he saw as basic challenges in agriculture, trade and priority setting.[35]

The Communique[36] included a summary of attendance, broad endorsement of programmes, expression of satisfaction with the greater opportunity for dialogue and discussion and recognition of the external economic and especially drought problems' burden on the region. Its somewhat enegmatic and guarded welcome to possible South African adoption of less agressive policies sprang from uncertainty as to actual South African intentions and its warning that continued international pressure was needed from bitter experience with South African words and deeds. In both his addresses the Chairman cited the need for more active international action to bring pressure against South Africa to halt aggression and destabilisation pointing out that appeals for a renunciation of violence should be directed to Pretoria not SADCC Lusaka as "neither SADCC nor its member states have instituted or practiced violence in regard to South Africa's internal problems."[37] Commonwealth Secretary General Sridath Ramphul made a similar call for solidarity and international action to protect the independent states of Southern Africa and to liberate Namibia from South Africa even more forcefully and was sharply critical of at least some Western States lack of action to contain, and/or "constructive engagement" with, South Africa.[38]

The SADCC meeting's invited guests were given an object lesson in how vulnerable to weather the region is when a cyclone lashed Mozambique and Swaziland with the loss of hundreds of lives, tens of millions of dollars of damage, severe damage to transport and communications and further loss of crops and livestock.[39] While direct pledges at Lusaka were limited, the immediacy and presentation of this debacle to the Conference seems to have had an impact on bilateral followup.

For the first time the SADCC International Conference was preceeded by an NGO conference on SADCC organised by War on Want. The 35 participating organisations studied SADCC's programme, discussed with SADCC and member state participants in the main conference and adopted a resolution of support for SADCC including a commitment to continuing liaison as well as educational and support work in their home countries.[40] This was welcomed by SADCC Chairman Peter Mmusi in his closing address where he noted that the NGO statement would be included in the official Lusaka SADCC proceedings volume.

RSA's De-esculation Initiatives: Problematic Puzzles

Over the first quarter of 1984 the Republic of South Africa sought and concluded accords aimed at reducing levels of overt hostility between itself and Angola (Lusaka Accords) and Mozambique (Maputo Pact). These have generally been presented as a near unconditional triumph for South Africa and defeat for The Front Line States and Liberation Movements and - consequentially - for SADCC.[41] They have been seen as a first step toward a revived and less formalized Constellation plan given the penumbra of trade, tourism, investment issues discussed on the fringes of the main security negotiations leading to the Maputo Pact[42] and with some other states in the region over the same period. The reality is much more complex and problematic, especially for SADCC.

The Maputo Pact (or Nkomati Accord[43]) was in part forced on Mozambique by the cumulative impact of the South African (and previously Rhodesian) trained, supplied, financed and logistically supported MNR (National Resistance Movement). The MNR had - especially in the context of an economy increasingly debilitated by a calamitous external balance position and severe drought - gravely eroded Mozambique's economic and social as well as security fabric. In respect to SADCC's programme it had made re-equipment and renovation of the Limpopo Valley and Beira rail lines well nigh impossible as well as probably deterring financial mobilization for those programmes. The decision to take up the South African initiative was fairly clearly President Machel's, based on security not economc or technical advice, but the economic costs had become a threat to survival - very literally for the drought stricken areas in the South to whom MNR raids made food distribution impossible.

South Africa however faced a major problem (beyond the cost of MNR support and raids in terms of money, South African lives and increasing annoyance of the USA and Western Europe) because the MNR endangered the continuation of effective FRELIMO government in Mozambique while itself clearly not viable even as a puppet regime. Maputo is the third largest general cargo port for RSA. Without the 13-15% of its total power bought from Cabora Basa, South Africa's ESCOM would have to engage in wholesale load shedding and brownouts. The MNR (in almost its only signs of an independent will) had off and on blasted Cabora Basa power pylons (with resultant Rand brownouts) and in early 1984 seems to have attacked the Rand-Maputo rail line as well as threatening to sabotage Maputo harbour facilities. Barring actual RSA occupation of Maputo, Cabora Basa and corridors from both to the Republic, a pressing South African economic need for de-esculation existed.

Whether the economic link discussion will lead to anything is unclear. They were clearly not seen as central by either side. Whether RSA really intends to provide finance for general imports or for investment beyond augmenting Maputo and Cabora Basa facilities is unclear; as is Mozambique's response to any large scale reforging of economic links. Because increased capacity at Cabora Basa would allow power sales to Zimbabwe and Swaziland - as well as for a firmer supply base for the proposed national grid - and more facilities at Maputo are a key SADCC (and especially Zimababwean) priority, RSA finance for these is problematic in its impact on strengthening regional as opposed to RSA links.

If the MNR really is not resupplied then within 12 to 18 months its ability to sabotage transport routes should be trivial. That opens the door for proceeding with the Maputo and Beira port/access route programmes which would radically reduce Zimbabwe's, Zambia's, Botswana's and potentially Swaziland's dependence on South African ports and access routes. The economic logic for such a shift is very clear: Mozambique needs transit revenues while the longer routes to East London cost the SADCC states far more than those through Mozambique would - $Z40 million a year in the Zimbabwean case.[44]

The Lusaka Accord's medium term impact is even less clear. First, RSA is dragging its feet on actual troop withdrawals. Second, while the Republic has *de facto* agreed to drop the MNR no such undertaking has been forthcoming in respect to Unita - yet (albeit Jonas Savimbi's kidnapping of De Beer's European employees and threats to blow up US oil company installations suggests he fears such an evolution). Third, both RSA and Angola say they see this as a first step toward Namibian independence. Therefore in the short run the effect on SADCC is likely to be limited to the general reduction in economic and military pressures on Angola - to expect early repair and full reopening of the Lobito Bay line seems over-optimistic.

Similarly it would be premature for SADCC to expect speedy accession of its tenth member - Namibia. RSA acts and statements are indeed straws in the wind, but (presumably deliberately) several winds in all directions. Ending the failed, high cost "forward policy" in Angola could mean a "retreat into laager" on the Orange River line (which is being fortified and given a command air base at Upington) or on the Kunene. SWAPO co-founder Herman Toivo ya Toivo's unconditional release could be a gesture toward negotiations with SWAPO or an attempt (almost certainly foredoomed) to create leadership problems for SWAPO. The internal "multiparty conference" could be playing out the old "internal settlement" game purely as a bargaining ploy or yet another (foredoomed) effort to create a "white government with black faces" which would have enough Namibian support to command international credibility. South Africa's clear use of unclear, complex and conflicting proposals to gain time may be until their own election or President Reagan's or until they see whether SWAPO can be crushed in Namibia given the Lusaka accords or something else. Probably RSA's leadership has not made up its mind and is not yet totally agreed.

Therefore, few definite projections can be made of the Maputo and Lusaka accords' effect on SADCC - even supposing RSA does in good faith cut off the MNR and pull out of Angola. The economic and military strains on both states would be reduced. In the case of Mozambique power and transit, transport capacity would probably be both repaired and expanded to the benefit both of RSA and of landlocked SADCC state reduction of dependence on RSA. What more may come - especially in the Angola/Namibian front - is exceedingly problematic if only because none of the main actors seems to be certain what its own medium term strategy (let alone that of the others) is. The accords do give RSA gains and costs as they do for Angola and Mozambique (and perhaps SWAPO); they do give the appearance of reducing the priority for SADCC transport routes while potentially increasing the possibility of strengthening them. Any confident scenario building at this stage is likely to look very odd in a year or two's time.

Progress Toward Preferential Trade

The PTA had a difficult 1983-84. Its initial duty reduction list is now scheduled for implementation as of July 1, 1984 although at least in March doubts remained that it had been fully agreed. Meanwhile its Secretary General had been fired - either for slowing the progress of PTA programmes, conflicts with member states or rather imprudent verbal attacks on SADCC. Former senior ECA official Bax Nomvete who supervised the PTA's birth returned as Acting Secretary General.[45]

On the other hand the PTA did increase its membership to 14 and enter into discussions with its most critical "Yet to Joins" - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. Several of its potential members sent observers to its annual summit in Harare, December 19/20, 1983. At the summit Prime Minister Mugabe as Chairman reiterated his support for PTA and expressed hope that the very slow start was now behind it.[46] On the other hand some observers felt several members were beginning to take the view that unless a real programme came into being by the end of 1984 the PTA could be written off. Zimbabwe business circles - usually viewed as among PTA's firmest backers - expressed concern that it remained at the level of idealistic politcal rhetoric and suggested it should start with "modest bilateral trade agreements".[47]

In March 1984 the PTA inaugurated its Clearing House operated by the Bank of Zimbabwe. It is to provide two monthly accountings of settlements due between members. These are to be denominated in PTA Units of Account (UAPTA) based on a dollar, yen, pound, franc, mark basket initially worth $1.30. Actual payments, due within 15 days of accounting, are to be made through the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.[48]

Kenya - Uganda - Tanzania: Toward Economic Reconciliation

The long saga of the dissolution of the East African Community[49] ended on November 17, 1983 when Presidents Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda met in Arusha to agree a formula for dividing EAC assets and liabilities and to chart guidelines for future economic cooperation.[50]

The Kenya-Tanzania border was reopened at once and air services between their capitals by national carriers resumed early in 1984 while discussion on and repairs to lake ferry and rail links were put in hand. The surviving EAC institutions - East African Development Bank, Eastern and Southern African Management Training Institute, Soroti Flying School, East African Intra-University Committee and EAC Library Services - were restored to common service status. Kenya and Tanzania exchanged lists with a view to agreeing on expanded trade on a less unbalanced basis (in 1982 Tanzania imported $10 million from Kenya and exported less than one) with hard currency clearing.

The settlement provides for 42% of assets and liabilities to go to Kenya, 32% to Tanzania and 26% to Uganda with Kenya and Tanzania making payments in convertible currencies, provision of goods and services, provision of capital assets and/or reduction of claims on Uganda totalling about $200 million because the share of EAC assets physically in Uganda is far below 26%.

While the immediate response - especially in Kenya[51] - was euphoric, how much can be achieved how fast remains problematic. Kenya-Tanzania trade and two country tourist packages will rise, but probably quite modestly. Recreation either of EAC or of the Common Market is totally beyond the realm of short term possibilities. On the other hand, a climate of opinion and a record of successful bargaining has been created which should allow a pragmatic step by step buildup of economic cooperation.

The Kagera Basin and the Central Corridor

The Kagera Basin Authority continued to meet and to secure money for studies on Rusomo Falls Dam, a 2000 kilometre rail network and a telecommunications network.[52] The difficulty is that only the last appears to be likely to go ahead in the forseeable future (with ADB finance) since the first two would cost on the order of $85-100 and $2,000 million respectively.

On the other hand "central corridor" transit links and traffic between Tanzania and its four landlocked neighbours made progress with substantial Belgian and EEC support. Included are completion of all weather road links to Rwanda and reconstruction of the Kigoma port facilities on Lake Tanganyika.[53]

Regional Cooperation In Southern Africa: What Future?

The economic prospects of most SADCC states for the period 1984-1986 are poor. The world metal markets are unlikely to recover nor are terms of trade prospects for agricultural exports alluring. The external balance and arrears/debt problems of Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and on a smaller scale Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi and increasingly Zimbabwe - are daunting. For much of the region - Malawi is an exception and Tanzania may be - crop prospects are poor. Zimbabwe will have to import over half a million tonnes of grain. Botswana's drought is also entering its fourth year.[54] Survival and restructuring are the threads linking - not always fully interrelated - policies not rapid growth. The new South African de-esculation of destabilisation moves are problematic in their sincerity, stability and impact. None of this can help SADCC.

However, as demonstrated throughout 1983 and at the Lusaka International Conference, SADCC is a going concern with a built-in dynamic based on very active member participation and clear perceptions that many of its priorities are as critical to restructuring and cost reduction as to gaining greater economic autonomy (especially vis a vis South Africa). Therefore, continued progress is likely in existing sectors and by SADCC Mbabane in 1985 it is likely that an initial trade sector programme will have been agreed. Breakthroughs may also be achieved on financing for the three key port and access sytems - Beira, Dar es Salaam and Maputo - which are critical to moving the overall transport and communication priorities within sight of attainment. The fact of tensions within SADCC over how to handle certain sectors and issues is - to date - no sign of impending stagnation because the determination to reach consensus, and to do so by reinforcing rather than eroding coordinated action, remains strong.

For other overlapping cooperation schemes, prospects are less clear, partly because they do not have the common political economic concerns of SADCC to give them urgency and partly because they are not seen as equally central to economic rehabilitation and restructuring. The "Central Corridor" transport buildup will continue - it is critical to the landlocked states and is accepted as a priority by Tanzania. The Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania rapprochement will not dissolve, but initial rather overblown hopes (especially in Kenya) will not be realized and the modesty of results may cause a relative loss of interest. The Kagera Basin Authority and the PTA face more problematic futures. Neither has managed to achieve much political economic sex appeal and both have gotten off to slow starts, a fact which (however unfairly) tells against them when crisis resolution is a top priority. However, neither is moribund and if they can make some limited progress to retain visibility and credibility in 1984-85 they could become important in a future interlocking of regional economic cooperation/coordination groupings.

Notes

1. SADCC, Lusaka, 2-II-84.
2. SADCC, London, 1983.
3. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
4. Stressed in Conference Chairman Peter Mmusi's Opening Statement to Lusaka SADCC (2-II-84) and in Overview, op cit.
5. See Overview report on programme of action, Lusaka SADCC Sectoral Volumes, S. Turner "SADCC-donors' support underlines growing confidence", African Economic Digest, 10-II-84.
6. ibid.
7. See SADCC Drought volume (London, 1983) and Annexe (Lusaka, 1984), S. Turner "Food security emerges as the key issue", AED, 27-I-84 as well as SADCC Dar es Salaam Council of Ministers Communique, 11-V-83.
8. ibid and J. Scott, "SADCC: The quest for food independence", The Courier, March-April 1984.
9. See SADCC, Report of the Workshop On Implementation Of SADCC Industrial Projects, Harare 1984, Introductory Remarks by Minister Basil Mramba of Tanzania (Lusaka 2-II-84) and S. Turner, AED, 10-II-84, op cit.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. See Overview, op cit, and Transport and Communications sectoral volume for Lusaka SADCC and "Slow Progress on Transport Projects", AED, 27-I-84.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. See M. Selwyn, "Dar port improvements move ahead", AED, 13-IV-84.
16. See S. Turner "China offers breathing space to keep Tazara on the rails", AED, 19-VIII-83; Marches Tropicaux, 17-6-83 and (on Malawi link), AED, 2-III-84.
17. See Energy sectoral volume for Lusaka SADCC and "Energy planners face difficult policy choices", AED, 27-I-84.
18. B. Munslow and P. O'Keefe, "Energy and the Southern African Regional Confrontation", Third World Quarterly, January 1984.
19. SADCC, London, 1980.
20. See, e.g. A. Johala, "Splits emerge over trade", AED, 10-II-84.
21. Compiled from national figures.
22. Johala, op cit.
23. Demi official SADCC staff estimate.

24. SADCC, Lusaka, 2-II-84.
25. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
26. "Policies In Agriculture And Rural Development - A Nordic View", distributed at Lusaka SADCC 1-II-84.
27. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
28. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
29. SADCC, Lusaka, 2-II-84.
30. See S. Turner, AED, 10-II-84, op cit.
31. ibid.
32. SADCC, Lusaka, 2-II-84.
33. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
34. "Policies...", op cit.
35. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
36. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
37. SADCC, Lusaka, 3-II-84.
38. SADCC, Lusaka, 2-II-84.
39. See, e.g. "Cyclone wreaks havoc", Zambia Daily Mail, 2-II-84.
40. "Statement", NGO Conference, Lusaka 31-I-84 and War On Want News, April 1984.
41. c.f. press cuttings in Facts and Reports, March 30, 1984.
42. e.g. "Months of diplomacy led to pact", Rund Daily Mail, 17-III-84; Radio South Africa, English Service Johannesburg 28-II-84 on meetings with Botswana ministers.
43. It was negotiated in Maputo and signed in the "no man's land" between Mozambique and South Africa near Komatiepoort.
44. Compiled from scattered Zimbabwe sectoral estimates.
45. See AED 16 and 23-XII-83 and "Walking before running will help the PTA", Financial Gazette (Harare), 22-XII-83.
46. ibid.
47. "Walking before running...", op cit.
48. M. Williams, "Africa's newest monetary unit launched", African Business, March 1984.
49. See ACR 1977-78, 1978-79.
50. See AED 25-XI-82 and 16-III-84, R. Shaw "EAC Pact: Questions remain as the ink dries"; African Business, January 1984 and "Border reopens as EAC trio bury hatchet", AB, December, 1983; Africa Research Bulletin, November-December, 1983.

51. See Nation, Standard (Nairobi) 16-XI-83.
52. ARB, November-December 1983; AED, 25-XI-83 and 9-III-84.
53. e.g. AED, 23-III-84; 27-I-84.
54. Speech by H.E. President Q. K. J. Masire, Gaborone, 27-II-84.