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**CASS**  
DURBAN

BLACK ATTITUDES:  
ADAPTATION AND REACTION

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I. A fairly recent event in Rhodesia was the shooting of a number of Africans in Salisbury townships, as a sequel to demonstrations by groups of young Africans outside a building where a meeting of African leaders was taking place. The specific reasons for the disturbances are not relevant to this discussion, but these incidents erupted in sharp contrast to what appears to be surface calm among Africans in Rhodesia's towns and cities during a time of the entrenchment of white rule after U.D.I., and subsequently of mounting world condemnation of such rule, of heightening guerilla activity in rural areas close to the borders, and of generally increasing expectations of a change in the society expressed in the mass media. One report on the disturbances revealed that road-blocks in Salisbury were able to be removed the following day and that workers streamed into the city without incident (*Daily News*, 2-6-1975).

To some observers, the surprising thing about the incident must have been that it was of such short duration, and that it has been a fairly isolated event of its sort in the main centres of Rhodesia in recent years. This, of course, raises questions about the situation in South Africa as well. No details need be given here of the scope and extent of inequality and institutionalised racial discrimination in South Africa, which has developed and persisted over three centuries. Yet, particularly over the past thirteen to fourteen years, the South African government has been able to claim with considerable justification that South Africa is one of the most 'peaceful' countries in Africa.

There have, however, been recent mass strikes of African workers; at the end of 1971, 13 000 Ovambo workers in South West Africa went on a protracted and partly successful strike over low wages and poor working conditions and contracts. Since 1972, strike activity in South Africa proper has shown a significant increase, with the most important event being mass strikes by over 60 000 African workers in Durban in 1973. A careful study of the Durban strikes (*Institute for Industrial Education*, 1974) has shown that these strikes were spontaneous and wage-oriented, but that the participants, in the level of their wage demands, may have been recording a symbolic political protest. These events which were greater in scope (in the sense of numbers participating) than any disturbances in the height of African resistance activity in the

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1950's and early 1960's, nevertheless did not threaten or even confront the established political order in any immediate sense. The strikers were generally good humoured in their public displays and little force was used by the police who were ubiquitous at the time of most of the individual incidents. How can the appearance of a fairly widespread acquiescence among South Africa's Black people be explained, and how may such an understanding contribute to our knowledge of the phenomena of persistence and change in divided societies?

Few people are likely to accept the view that Africans in South Africa are contented and that desire for change has low salience; this is patently absurd in view of the material and status disparities in the society. Furthermore, the rigid, legally sanctioned social segregation of races is so complete as to create powerful preconditions for group solidarity among Blacks which would cut across stratification within the subordinate status communities. Individual mobility of Blacks into status roles comparable with those of substantial numbers of whites is severely restricted, and consequently 'egoistic' satisfactions are considerably contained.

The argument is often voiced that the stable public order is to be explained solely or mainly in terms of coercion, or more bluntly, force of arms wielded by a powerful and determined white minority. This view is certainly not untrue - most authority is ultimately rooted in the threat of force and this threat is by no means remote in South Africa. Legal constraints on political action are all-pervasive, and any minor disturbance is attended by large numbers of police, who, however calm their demeanour, must create a powerful demonstration effect. Apart from the mass strike in 1973, when relatively few strikers were arrested, even wage-oriented African strikers are regularly prosecuted and in addition run the severe risk of administrative action to deprive them of rights to continue to live and work in the area where the law was transgressed.<sup>1)</sup>

These observations notwithstanding, the proposition that unequal societies (or an unequal society like South Africa) are regulated by coercion or the threat of coercion requires refinement. Mason (1970) observes that "Through long periods, men have accepted the premise of inequality as inherent in the world order. The bluff of the rulers has worked." Part of the success of the 'bluff' of the rulers lies in the fact that the regularities in a social order become institutionalised and reinforced by myriad legitimating values of such complexity and obliqueness that they cannot be identified by individual actors as supportive of interests opposed to their own. Without a

guiding value orientation emanating from a coherent group of his own, the individual is emeshed in a web of expectations which secure effective, albeit unwilling, compliance. This may be simply because social institutions and values appear immutable and separate from the groups whose interests contradict his own. The presence of latent conflict in society does not necessarily nullify the systemic qualities which value-guided inter-relating regularities of behaviour produce. For the atomised individual established social values and patterns can become a transcending taken-for-granted facticity which can render even extreme degrees of discontent a mute force. System integration may not deny powerful latent conflict of objective interests, nor does it imply consensus or willing acquiescence to conditions. It may imply a type of 'false' or 'partial' consciousness, however, and Mason's broad observation would suggest that 'false consciousness' can endure interminably. Men may honour the 'rules of the game' for a very long time even though they may know that they have little chance of winning. These broad possibilities might bear closer consideration in the South African context.

It seems necessary to search for hypotheses which, if confirmed, could refine our understanding of what Adam (1971) terms the problem of South Africa's "stalled revolution". Adam goes on to say "As a near ideal type case in the Weberian sense, it permits the basic question of the limits of suppression to be studied, an issue which Dahrendorf regards as the fundamental problem of political sociology" (Adam; 15). Gurr (1970) as part of a very comprehensive review of existing evidence of the preconditions for violence and revolt, formulates a large number of inter-related hypotheses which may possibly be very fruitfully explored in the South African context.

Gurr's basic proposition, not unexpectedly, is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of Relative Deprivation; this being defined as the discrepancy between value expectations - the goods and conditions to which people consider themselves rightfully entitled - and value capabilities - the goods and conditions which they perceive themselves able to obtain and retain. Gurr makes the obvious point as does Runciman (1966; 9) that an 'objective' outsider can easily misperceive the extent of relative deprivation since it cannot be inferred from actual conditions. absolute deprivation (*inter alia*, abject poverty) may not be perceived as unjust by those suffering it, however painful their lives may be.

Gurr proceeds to refine this basic assertion by detailing a number

of factors and processes which may affect the strength of relative deprivation. By no means all his hypotheses can be covered here. He distinguishes, for example, between three basic categories of values that may be involved in the relative deprivation syndrome: welfare values (economic and self-actualisation desires), power values (desire for participation and security), and inter-personal values (status, communality and ideational coherence). The salience for a collectivity of a particular value (or values) is of course paramount in the determination of the scope and intensity of relative deprivation. Once again, the value expectations as experienced subjectively in a collectivity have to be known before the salience of a particular value-class and hence relative deprivation can be assessed. Furthermore, the number of salient value-classes with respect to which discrepancy is experienced is important in relation to the intensity of relative deprivation. On the basis of survey evidence collected by Cantril, Gurr suggests that in a large national population, the intensity of relative deprivation is most highly affected by economic expectations, followed by expectations of security and communality, and then by expectations of participation, self-realization, status and ideational coherence.

Gurr distinguishes between decremental deprivation where expectations remain constant but value capabilities (the possibility of gratifying expectations) decline, aspirational deprivation, where capabilities remain static but expectations increase or intensify or both (progressive deprivation). Aspirational deprivation would be most likely to occur in expanding economies or non-traditional societies. In cases of aspirational deprivation, according to Gurr, the salience of a value expectation would depend on the perceived closeness of the desired position at the time deprivation is first experienced. Gurr adds "An especially violent, often revolutionary response is likely when men who have been persistently deprived of valued goods ... are led to believe that their government is about to remedy that deprivation but then find the hopes false (Gurr; 21).

The notion of a "revolution of rising expectations" has been widely expressed in discussing violence and subversion. Here too, Gurr, on the basis of available evidence, refines the proposition. He hypothesises that the possibility of rising value expectations through symbolic exposure to a new mode of life varies strongly with the intensity and scope of pre-existing relative deprivation in the group, and varies moderately with the perceived availability of value opportunities for attaining expectations. People must see some chance of obtaining the goods they desire. Consequently, increases

in value capabilities, especially if they are merely marginal and do not provide the desired satisfaction, tend to increase the salience of the value expectations in a group. Kuper (1974; 274) claims this to have been the case in Ruanda and Zanzibar prior to the well-known upheavals in those societies. Mason (1970; 278) argues that the belief that nothing can change is an essential aspect of the structure of stable stratified or divided societies.

Another factor relating to the intensity of relative deprivation mentioned by Gurr who quotes, *inter alia*, the study of *South African African Bourgeoisie* (Kuper 1965) is that of value disequilibria; status attributes that are differentially ranked on various value hierarchies, or gains by a group in terms of certain values but without a comparable increase in other (presumably salient) values. Gurr adds to these propositions the suggestion that the rate at which group value expectations for a discrepantly low value rises, varies moderately with the extent to which the discrepant value can be used to justify and obtain improved positions on other value dimensions.

As regards the importance of change, Gurr also suggests that the rate at which a group's value expectations rise will vary with the rate and duration of the group's past value gains. Quoting Davies (1962; 6) he suggests that violence is most likely to occur during periods of reversal after prolonged improvement.

Many authors have drawn attention to the relevance of reference groups in situations where perceptions of deprivation may vary. After exploring the views and findings of Runciman and others, Gurr advances the argument that a self-conscious egalitarianism should not be expected among all underprivileged groups. He summarises the result of a host of observations in the hypothesis that the rate at which value expectations rise varies strongly with the rate of value gain of the most rapidly advancing group of similar status.

Interestingly enough after mentioning the absence of overt violence in South Africa, Gurr raises the possibility that the discomfort of relative deprivation in the long run will tend to make men adjust their value expectations to their value capabilities, resulting in a state of equilibrium between expectations, means and ends. He also reminds us, however, that perceptions of relative deprivation may be remarkably persistent over time, and may even be conveyed from generation to generation.

Finally, with respect to relative deprivation, it should be mentioned that Gurr's evidence leads him to state that the intensity of relative deprivation varies with the number of actively pursued opportunities that are blocked. Some of the evidence he quotes shows that where a society produces or allows a range of alternative avenues for satisfying value expectations, relative deprivation may be contained even though basic inequality persists. The example is quoted of participation in friendly societies, trade unions, co-operatives and building societies by large numbers of members of the British working class in the mid 19th Century. Obviously, where so much flexibility of value stocks exists that reforms are perceived as significant or match expectations, relative deprivation will decrease.

In terms of Gurr's paradigm, the intensity and scope (i.e., numbers affected) of relative deprivation produces the potential for collective violence. Before collective violence becomes transformed into collective political violence, however, politicised discontent must emerge, and this depends on the intensity of popular normative and utilitarian justifications for such violence; i.e., new norms and ideologies of resistance must emerge. Space does not allow an exposition of the factors relating to justifications for violence but selective reference to some of these will be made in the concluding section.

Up to this point the paradigm indicates no more than a potential for political violence, however, and the appearance and nature of activism and unrest depends on the extent to which the means of coercive control available to dissidents compares with that of the regime. The strength of coercive control obviously involves a variety of factors, such as the scope of populations under surveillance, size and resources of forces, severity and consistency of sanctions and loyalty of forces; these factors being relevant both to regime and to dissident forces. In terms of Gurr's paradigm, the magnitude of political violence also relates to the institutional support of the regime versus that of the dissidents. Institutional support involves factors like the scope of social and political organization and the complexity and cohesiveness of such organization, the extent to which organizations have scope for strategy and action and the extent to which organizations can offer relevant rewards to participants (the "value stocks" of organizations). In particular, if organizations controlled by the regime allow dissidents scope for protest, to some extent the institutional support of the regime will be strengthened. Gurr extends his paradigm to cover the forms and processes of political violence, but these aspects will be touched



on briefly in the concluding section of this paper rather than at this stage.

No doubt many of the specific arguments advanced by Gurr could be debated at length or even seriously questioned, but his presentation offers a serious and very rigorous challenge to any facile predictions of impending revolution or equally facile predictions of long-term or perpetual stability. It is not uncommon to encounter the assertion, for example, that the South African Black population has revolutionary or pre-revolutionary consciousness or that revolution is imminent or inevitable in the foreseeable future, despite linked references to the destruction of dissident organizations and leadership, brutal and consistent repression, black "stooges" in the 'Homeland' political institutions which have developed as an alternative to full political rights, etc., etc., Needless to say some of the assertions made by pro-regime observers are very much more curious, to say the least.

II. Gurr's hypotheses raise interesting questions about the potential for dissidence and internal resistance in South Africa. For example, while one might predict that discontent or feelings of deprivation among Black people are widespread, what is the extent of relative deprivation among them? This would depend in part on the number of expectations which are blocked and also the salience of the values involved. What is the relative salience, for example, of economic values versus the values of political participation? Is the demand for a meaningful franchise which is voiced by the Black middle-class equally salient among the masses? Does the franchise represent a 'base value' in Gurr's terms; a value which facilitates the attainment of other expectations? Are any reforms which are perceived to have been granted such as to be seen to enable other expectations to be gratified? If so, is relative deprivation reduced by such perceptions?

Certain reforms have been granted in recent years. Over the past two years, for example, black wages have increased at a more rapid rate than white wages (Leistner and Breytenbach, 1975) although the absolute gap in incomes has widened. The colour-bar in employment has weakened under the impact of a severe skills shortage particularly since 1967/68. Whatever the significance of these reforms (or lack of it) the fact of such changes suggests that relative deprivation would be 'aspirational' rather than 'decremental'. Do such reforms, when and if perceived, reduce the intensity of relative deprivation or do they produce disequilibria - status incongruities - which heighten discontent. The fact that political expectations and expectations of social esteem comparable to that enjoyed by whites are

are more effectively blocked than economic and job mobility expectations may indeed produce the disequilibrium which, if Gurr's propositions are valid, would lead to intensified discontent.

South Africa is a rigidly stratified society in which the different racial groups are so administered as to lead very self-contained social lives. The only place of (unequal) contact is in places of employment. This might be predicted to assist the normal tendency hypothesised by Gurr for subordinate groups to select reference groups of similar status to themselves. Do Africans, for example, tend to compare themselves with whites or rather with other black groups? The implications for relative deprivation of restricted reference groups are well-known.

Very important questions could arise concerning the 'Homelands' and the political institutions associated with them. Are these developments perceived to offer opportunities for value gain? Are these opportunities not perhaps so marginal as to simply heighten expectations for more meaningful developments? To the extent that 'Homeland' political institutions allow the voicing of protest, do they draw off political energies and strengthen the basis of institutional support of the regime? Moving from Homelands to independent Africa, does the presence of free African societies to the North produce a 'demonstration effect' which is likely to lead to the ideological conversion required if relative deprivation is to have political relevance? Or, do the masses of Africans see the freedoms of independent Africa as unavailable to them; too remote and alien to be applicable to their own expectations? In the light of very recent developments in the liberated ex-Portuguese colonies this question is particularly important.

One could go on at great length posing similar questions but these probably suffice as an introduction to the next section. One last question may be important, however. Has the wide spread of mission Christianity as well as the almost total control of the mass-media by either the government or by liberal (rather than radical) whites protected the system against the growth of normative or utilitarian justifications for violence? Has the rhetoric of violence which is commonplace abroad spread to the rank and file among Africans? Has the violence of despair among the suppressed black opposition movements of the 1960's persisted in popular consciousness? Whatever the intensity of relative deprivation, the degree of activism sanctioned by popular ideology is crucial to an understanding of the dissident majority in South Africa.

III. Studies in the field of African attitudes towards whites or towards their situation in South Africa have left no doubt as to what was and is probably obvious; i.e., that Africans resent their situation, are deeply discontented, frustrated, view dominant institutions with basic suspicion, experience an acute sense of 'pariah status' (Mayer 1972), respond to frustrations with suppressed aggression and evince hostility towards whites (Durand 1970, van den Berghe 1962, Mayer 1972, Brett 1963, de Ridder 1961, Edelstein 1972, Viljoen 1972). These studies go beyond the obvious to explore other themes as well, but hardly any work has been conducted in exploring the concept of relative deprivation and the more detailed aspects of political consciousness among Africans.

To some extent this topic area has been covered in a study conducted by this author among a sample of settled urban African men in Durban in 1971 and 1972. The sample was a two-stage systematic probability sample of 298 African men in Kwa-Mashu, Lamontville and Chesterville, these being one large and two smaller townships in Durban. Interviews were very lengthy ( $\pm$  2 hours) and were conducted exclusively by African research assistants who had previous research experience and who were carefully screened and trained. The refusal and replacement rate among respondents was not unreasonable for this type of study at slightly over 10%, but the problem of availability of male respondents for interview led to a larger proportion of better-educated people being included in the sample than existed in the township population.\* In addition to the refusal and replacement rate of  $\pm$  10% given above, therefore, there was a pre-contact address replacement rate of roughly 15%. This 'random bias' was tolerated because it allowed generalisations to be made about the normally very small proportion of better-educated people in a typical township population. This procedure, however, makes it essential for results to be presented in categories of educational attainment or occupational status in order for them not to be misleading. The interviewing technique employed was a modification of that employed earlier by Biesheuvel (1957). People were presented with

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\* African male factory workers, for example, were less likely to be available for interviewing than say, better-educated non-blue collar workers, due to long hours at work, shift work and the like. After at least 3 calls at an address and finding no adult male available, interviewers could replace the address with another systematically selected. This led to a 'random bias' in favour of better-educated people which was foreseen. Within the limits of finance no other procedure was possible.

a wide range of hypothetical conversations\*; for example :

One man says "Things are getting better for the African people with every passing year".

Another man says "Things remain as bad for the African people or get worse with every passing year".

Respondents were then asked to indicate with which speaker most people they knew would agree, and for the reasons. The reasons given were probed at length, and the bulk of the interpretation is drawn from the probed reasons for choice of one of the two arguments. The purpose of asking about 'people they knew' was to allow them freedom to express controversial opinions. Without exception respondents lapsed into the first-person in talking about 'reasons'. In all, 30 hypothetical conversations were presented as stimuli. (See schedule in appendix).

In this brief analysis it is impossible to give results for each 'hypothetical conversation'. After processing the information item by item, each schedule was considered as a whole, and the respondent was classified in terms of a range of dimensions of attitude. The present data are drawn partly from these overall classifications of interviewee attitudes, as reflected in free answers following each of the 30 stimulus conversations. Answers to individual questions are, however, also analysed below.

There are many legitimate criticisms to be levelled against the attitude survey as a methodological approach, and therefore before proceeding to analyse the present material, a few comments are necessary on the way the data are approached.

In attitude surveys the respondents are often subjected to stimuli which are artificial in the sense that they are developed from assumptions and concepts which may be incongruent with or irrelevant to the concerns, assumptions and consciousness of the people being studied. Hopefully, this mistake has been avoided to some degree by basing most stimuli on free and spontaneous responses obtained in completely informal conversations (see footnote\*). Furthermore, the analysis is largely based on open-ended

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\* Most of the content for the hypothetical conversations was derived from earlier free informal interviews at bus-stops, beerhalls, etc. In this sense the stimuli were not artificial but were drawn from authentic responses in the community. The very important probing for reasons was completely open-ended.

probing for reasons for the choice between alternative stimulus statements.

However, despite such safeguards, the interviewing situation in itself is highly artificial and particularly so in a coercive, oppressive political climate such as that of South Africa; hence the problem of validity of responses must be faced. In this study the issue of controversial and dangerous answers was debated quite openly with respondents and they were given the choice to speak for themselves or to speak for anonymous 'others'. They inevitably chose to speak for themselves, but where a particularly 'dangerous' sentiment came to mind, many did in fact take recourse to the 'safer' alternative. Nevertheless, complete frankness in terminology was not expected (although the results contain much material which could hardly be more bluntly expressed), and the responses are usually analysed in terms of the type of sentiment voiced rather than in terms of intensity of hostility, discontent or activism expressed. Furthermore, where effective rapport could not be established with respondents, the interviewers recorded a 'refusal'. (See earlier technical comments).<sup>2)</sup>

This refusal rate constitutes a bias and for this reason, *inter alia*, great caution has been exercised in the assessment of categorisations which are quantitatively expressed. The data are approached broadly and cautiously, and no formal tests of statistical 'significance' are considered appropriate in evaluating responses; although sampling error has been borne in mind.

Perhaps, the greatest mistake in the analysis of attitudinal data is to link the attitudes recorded with possibilities of social action. Attitude studies could possibly only predict behaviour if the substantive attitude were to be recorded not only in terms of its content but also in terms of salience, intensity, action-orientation, etc., and if these data were to be complemented with assessments of all the relevant kinds of attitudes towards the situations in which potential behaviour could take place. The attitude material in this study is useful only in so far as it assists in an understanding of the kind of consciousness associated with the public political behaviour which is readily observable in the South African political arena. No predictions of behaviour are, or should be, made on the basis of the results.

Other methodological problems also exist but space being limited only one further point will be made; this being the fact that social survey data is static; it freezes social reality at a point in time. Therefore,

cautious generalisations will only be made for the recent past, and, due to factors which will be discussed, even more cautiously for the present. Consciousness can change very rapidly as perceptions of possibilities and alternatives for action alter. There is a constant interplay between consciousness and the constraints and incentives which inhere in the dynamic structure of social action; consciousness itself probably only achieves an independent determining significance in rare circumstances where free opportunities for political education exist among highly discontented populations. In other words, attitudes are generally responses to situations and usually they have meaning only in institutional or communal contexts; changes in which are obviously the primary focus of any study in modern society. If this study has merit, this merit lies in the fact that it might assist in explaining how men, at the level of their own subjectivity, consciously shared or otherwise, adapt to, endure or resist political coercion at a particular point in time. To paraphrase Adam's words again, it is intended to explore the response to suppression and, therefore, also the issue of system persistence in highly unequal coercive societies.

IV. Perhaps one can reflect the obvious first. The responses obtained in the study in Durban revealed almost overwhelming discontent and a very considerable extent of resentment due to prevailing conditions. In Table I the pattern of responses is summarised. Since more than one type-classification of responses was possible, the sum of percentages exceeds 100 and only the first two categories are mutually exclusive of one another and of the others. The classification, as has been explained, is one which is derived from the global assessment of response patterns following all stimulus statements.

Two things strike one immediately. Firstly the very low proportion of Africans whose responses reflected no bitterness or discontentment, and secondly the remarkable similarity of the responses among less well-educated and better-educated people. One difference has an obvious explanation; better-educated Africans understandably would be more discontented about housing conditions in townships because their status aspirations would be frustrated by the lack of differentiation in the housing provided. Quite clearly, and not unexpectedly, economic deprivation, and race discrimination in general, are major foci of discontentment among majorities of people.

TABLE I

## MAJOR FOCI OF DISCONTENT AMONG URBAN AFRICANS IN DURBAN

(More than one major focus allowed for, hence percentages exceed 100)

Type of Discontent	Less than Std.8 (n = 181)	Std.8 (or equivalent*) and above (n = 117)
No Discontent Manifest	6%	6%
General unfocused discontent	5%	1%
Discontent - economic conditions	62%	62%
Discontent - housing/community conditions	10%	16%
Discontent about general race discrimination	54%	56%
Resentment directed at Whites	44%	34%
Resentment directed at Indians or Coloureds and Whites	12%	14%
Resentment of Government/ Administration	18%	21%

\* Persons with Std.6 or 7 plus a diploma or certificate were grouped with Std. 8. In tables which follow, this qualification will not be repeated.

If one combines the percentages of respondents who display resentment towards whites and towards Indians or Coloured people and whites, (permissible: there is no overlap between these categories), then the percentages among less well-educated and better-educated respectively are: 56% and 48%. It would seem that one-half and more Africans in the city articulate their discontent in clear resentment towards whites. The fact that the proportion may be higher among less well-educated people is puzzling; it may, perhaps, be due to the fact that they are more likely to be exposed to harsh treatment at the hands of supervisors, officials, etc. Yet, one would expect the better-educated people to be more sensitive to the reactions of whites. Later results will show that the responses of civil servants among the better-educated have possibly reduced the 'quantity' of anti-white hostility in this group, in relative terms. Generally one reason why so many South African whites may be unaware of this hostility is neatly summed up in the verbatim translation of the answer of one respondent: *'One can think we are one with whites because when we are at work we laugh and joke - inwardly we are great enemies'*.

This type of hostility towards whites is by no means limited to

urban Africans. As a minor digression I may add that in more recent studies conducted (for other purposes) by the Institute for Social Research among rural labouring class Africans, we have encountered similar clearly focused racial hostility among substantial proportions of people. The hostility or resentment emerges most clearly in response to the nature of white employer/black employee relations. Here are a few quotes from completely uneducated rural men: *'We can't say anything because we work for whites'*. Whites are *'people who still talk down at us because we are black'*. *'The whites do not help by talking to us in a way which upsets the spirits'*. *'I have never heard of kind whites. Most of them have bad spirits because they have never done any good for us'*. Whites are often regarded as *'Somandla'* (the powerful) *'The white man is a frightful thing'*. In one not atypical rural employment situation, (although possibly better than average), 40% of African labourers used the word *'cruel'* in their descriptions of whites, 27% expressed the view that whites dislike Africans, 23% used the word *'selfish'* and 20% used the Zulu phrase for *'hypocritical'*.

The situation, then, seems to be one of majority discontent. What of perceptions of relative deprivation in the terms defined by Gurr? Relative deprivation derives from a perception of 'rightful entitlement' to rewards. One stimulus conversation presented to subjects went as follows: One man says: *'In Durban Africans are treated as they deserve to be treated - they should not complain'*. Another man says: *'In Durban Africans are treated unfairly and they have every reason to complain'*. The results of the open-ended probing of the reasons for choice of argument appear in Table II below, in which an attempt is made to classify responses in terms of the notion of relative deprivation.

The trend in the results seems to be that blue-collar subjects are slightly less likely than private sector white-collar respondents to experience a sense of relative deprivation. Civil servants, on the other hand, appear to be relatively more inclined, as a group, to express satisfaction or acceptance of conditions, although the proportion among them experiencing relative deprivation is no lower than average. It is of interest to note that the proportions of subjects in different categories of educational attainment perceiving deprivation in relative terms was as follows :

- up to Std.3 (n = 101)	38%
- Std.4 to Std.7 (n = 80)	41%
- Std.8 (or equivalent) and more (n = 117)	40%

The trend according to education, therefore, is less indicative of differences between status groups than the results for occupational groups.



TABLE II

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER CONDITIONS IN DURBAN ARE DESERVED OR JUSTIFIED OR NOT, AMONG AFRICANS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATION

Type of Response	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)	White-collar Civil Servants (n = 34)
No information	2%	3%	3%
Conditions justified - Africans deserve no better	2%	3%	6%
Conditions satisfactory	17%	14%	24%
Ambivalent	4%	5%	3%
Economistic discontent but no manifest perception of unjustified treatment	36%	30%	23%
Manifest perception of unjustified treatment or unfair discrimination (Relative Deprivation)	39%	45%	41%
Total	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: 6 Entrepreneurs and 19 unemployed people were omitted from this analysis. Civil servants included school-teachers.

Another hypothetical conversation bearing upon the same topic went as follows : "One man says: *Africans are poor because they are treated badly and not given opportunities.* Another man says: *Africans are poor because many of them are backward and lazy.* A classification of open-ended reasons for choice of argument appears in Table III.

These results are similar to those in Table II in the sense that civil servants are more likely to be accepting of the present situation; a relatively higher proportion in the group considers that the circumstances of Africans are justifiable in terms of a lack of education and social development. The responses in Table III, however, reflect a greater scope of relative deprivation among the population than the previous results (approaching 6 out of 10 people in the private sector). In these results there also appears to be no important differences in the perceptions of white-collar and blue-collar workers.

TABLE III

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFRICANS IN DURBAN ARE DUE TO LACK OF INCENTIVE OR TO LACK OF OPPORTUNITY, AMONG RESPONDENTS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATION

Type of Response	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)	White-collar Civil Service (n = 34)
No information	1%	8%	3%
Developmentalist attitudes - Africans require education, changed outlook, etc.	24%	23%	35%
Ambivalent	3%	3%	3%
Economistic discontent but no manifest perception of relative deprivation	11%	8%	12%
Manifest perception of unfair restrictions and discrimination (Relative Deprivation)	61%	58%	47%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Respondents were also asked: *'If one were to ask Africans that live in this township why white people are richer than Africans, what would their answers be? (Probe)'*. The probed, open-ended answers are presented in Table IV.

TABLE IV

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF REASONS GIVEN FOR INCOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN WHITES AND AFRICANS, ACCORDING TO CATEGORY OF OCCUPATION

Type of Reason	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)	White-collar Civil Service (n = 34)
No information	7%	6%	9%
Africans inferior in abilities, development, skills, education, expertise, experience, etc.	14%	11%	12%
Inequality simply recognised and/or deplored but not explained	23%	27%	24%
Inequality explained in terms of discrimination, lack of opportunities, lack of access to capital, white hostility, etc. (Relative Deprivation)	56%	56%	55%
Total	100%	100%	100%

In Table IV, the results suggest, once again, that the perception of relative deprivation in the sense described is present among almost 6 out of 10 people. No differences are present between the different occupational groups.

Subjects were also asked what they saw as the main problems facing them in their day-to-day lives and were asked to outline the reasons for the problems. The results reflect the following pattern:

- no serious problems	7%
- problems simply recognised - no explanation other than repeating the existence of the problem	21%
- problems seen as brought about by Africans themselves	4%
- problems seen as being due to white policies, laws, discrimination, unequal treatment, etc.	68%

The latter category of answers, once again, can be seen as reflecting very broadly, perceptions of relative deprivation.

Unfortunately, no questions were asked which could reflect the level of 'salience' of different kinds of deprivation at a subjective level. Some idea of the importance of different problems for the community at large is obtained from the proportions of respondents mentioning various issues as 'main problems':

- lack of money	80%
- transport problems	46%
- accommodation/housing problems	41%
- hostility, discrimination and punitive legislation on the part of whites or Government	41%
- employment opportunity and conditions	40%
- access to and quality of education	32%
- Influx Control laws (pass laws)	31%
- crime in the townships	26%
(other problems were mentioned by less than 20% of respondents)	

It would seem that the concerns of greatest scope and importance in the population are those relating to material welfare, money, security and practical difficulties in day-to-day living. However, the perception of the quality of race relations and race legislation in general, by some 40% of people, should also be noted.

The salience of material and money concerns was underscored by the open-ended reasons given in response to another hypothetical conversation. This conversation was: "One man says: *Things get better for the African people with every passing year.* Another man says: *Things remain as bad for the African people or get worse with every passing year.* The vast majority of people approached the question in the light of their perceptions of material circumstances. The results appear in Table V.

TABLE V  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ARE IMPROVING OR NOT, AMONG AFRICANS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATION

Type of Response	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)	White-collar Civil Service (n = 34)
No information	3%	2%	3%
Circumstances improving	47%	52%	65%
Uncertain/ambivalent	1%	5%	-
Circumstances constant or deteriorating	49%	42%	32%
Total	100%	100%	100%

These results indicate that there may be more or less an even balance in the perceptions of whether or not circumstances are improving or not, except among civil servants; a group which quite clearly has a majority of people who are optimistic in outlook. When the results are related to education the following pattern appears:

	<u>Belief that Circumstances are NOT Getting Better</u>
- up to Std.3 (n = 101)	51%
- Std.4 to 7 (n = 80)	43%
- Std.8 plus (n = 117)	38%

Generally, these results, as well as those relating to occupational status, show a slight tendency for perceptions to become more optimistic with improving socio-economic status. It should be borne in mind that the study was conducted during a period before the Durban strikes in 1973, when it would seem that wage-increases for blue-collar workers were not keeping pace with increases in the cost of living for Africans.<sup>3)</sup> It is entirely possible that the trend in the perceptions was influenced by this.

V. So far, these results have suggested the following. In 1971-1972

there was an almost overwhelming majority of Africans who were discontented with their present circumstances. Roughly 5 to 6 out of 10 Africans experienced this discontent as a form of relative deprivation, broadly defined. Their sense of relative deprivation emerged from the perception that their access to opportunities and rewards (mainly but not exclusively material) was restricted as a consequence of racial discrimination against them at a variety of levels. A perception of negative discrimination quite clearly implies a recognition of receiving less than that to which one would otherwise be entitled. Opinion on whether conditions were improving or not was more or less evenly balanced. Roughly 1 out of 2 people felt that circumstances were improving, and this proportion may have increased since then.

Even so, however, a substantial proportion of Africans today must combine feelings of relative deprivation and perceptions that circumstances are not undergoing gradual improvement. We now have to turn to other variables to broaden an understanding of the basis of political orientations among African people in Durban.

One of the arguments advanced in the introduction was that the comparative reference groups which people have influence perceptions of deprivation. If most Africans compare themselves only with other Africans in similar circumstances, the salience of relative deprivation probably would be much reduced. One of the hypothetical questions in the study was as follows: "One man says: *When I see what the whites have I feel envious and feel it is right that I should have the same.* Another man says: *It is hoping for too much to have what the whites have - I compare what I have only with what other Africans have.*" The results of the open-ended probe of the reasons for choice between the two are presented in Table VI.

From these results it seems as if there is a significant difference between blue-collar and private sector white-collar Africans as far as overt comparisons with whites are concerned. However, when the contradictory responses (which revealed covert or unacknowledged comparisons with whites\*) are added to the responses indicating overt comparison, this difference

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\* These answers did not seem to be due to any unwillingness to admit to comparisons with whites; rather they seemed to indicate that the respondents were people who felt very resentful of whites and who for some reason or another set their minds against making 'conscious' comparisons.

diminishes. It would seem, then, that roughly 50% of all non-civil service Africans tend to take whites as a comparative reference group. Civil servants appear to be more inclined than others to restrict their comparisons to the circumstances of other Africans.

TABLE VI  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WHETHER CONDITIONS ARE COMPARED WITH THOSE OF WHITES OR WITH THOSE OF OTHER AFRICANS, AMONG RESPONDENTS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATION

Type of Response	Blue-collar Manual (n = 143)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 58)	White-collar Civil Service (n = 27)
Comparison restricted to other Africans	36%	36%	59%
Whites admired, not envied	13%	9%	-
Ambivalent	3%	2%	-
Contradictory (no comparisons with whites claimed but reasons given indicate comparison)	17%	10%	19%
Acknowledged comparison of circumstances with those of whites	31%	43%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: Sample size is lower than in previous tables because the question was not asked in one smaller township (Lamontville).

When the analysis is conducted according to education, the following results emerge:

	<u>Proportion Comparing Circumstances with Whites Openly or Covertly</u>
- up to Std.3 (n = 79)	46%
- Std.4 to Std.7 (n = 68)	50%
- Std.8 plus (n = 100)	46%

Generally, there does not seem to be a clear trend with increasing education; the proportion in the latter category is probably reduced by the civil servants who are mainly in the highest category of education.

In parenthesis, one would expect those people who compare their circumstances with those of whites to have a greater sense of relative

deprivation than others. The reasons given for income disparities between Africans and whites (see Table IV) were cross-tabulated against the question on whether or not respondents compared their circumstances with those of whites. The results are given in Table VII.

TABLE VII

	<u>Percentage Giving Reasons for Inequality Which Suggest Perceptions of Relative Deprivation</u>
Circumstances compared with whites (overt and covert) (n = 116)	64%
Comparisons restricted to other Africans (n = 102)	46%

From this comparison it would seem as if this relationship does exist, although it is not as strong as might have been expected.

Another relationship of some interest is that which may exist between perception of improvement or lack of improvement in circumstances and whether or not circumstances are compared with those of whites. This relationship is presented in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

	<u>Proportions of Africans Perceiving Conditions to be Static or Deteriorating</u>
Circumstances compared with whites (overt or covert) (n = 116)	51%
Comparisons restricted to other Africans (n = 102)	40%

Here again the relationship is in the expected direction, but is also not quite as strong as might have been expected. What these relatively weak relationships indicate is that by no means all Africans whose sense of relative deprivation is sharp and which is derived from or strengthened by perception of white privilege are likely to have no hope for reform or value-gains over time. To attempt to quantify this assertion on the basis of cross-tabulations would be expecting far too much of the precision of the results. Tentatively, it would seem that, in 1971-1972 at any rate, the number of Africans who experienced a sense of deprivation conceptualised in the light of white privilege, and who expected no incremental improvements was well below a majority in the community.

VI. The foregoing results have suggested that, notwithstanding overwhelming discontent, the subjective basis for a militant consciousness may not have been present among a majority of Africans in Durban in 1971-1972. Other results may add to an understanding of the position. One broad question that may be asked is on the extent to which the type of ideological conviction existed that could give perceptions of relative deprivation (or even general discontent) a sharpened political focus. One issue which may be of importance concerns the conviction that African rule or majority rule would be to the advantage of Africans at large.

The following hypothetical conversation was presented to the respondents: "One man says: *The whites treat us unfairly and harshly - we would be better off under our own people.* Another man says: *The whites are strict but honest and fair with us - we would not be happier under our own people.*" Another conversation presented was: "Africans should be able to govern themselves - they would then be better off" versus "If Africans governed themselves there would be no improvement because they would fight among themselves". The results are presented in Table IX.

TABLE IX:  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES INDICATING CONFIDENCE OR LACK OF  
CONFIDENCE IN AFRICAN POLITICAL CONTROL ON THE ISSUES OF  
1) HONESTY AND FAIRNESS, AND 2) UNITY AND CO-OPERATION

Type of Response	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)		White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)		White-collar Civil Service (n = 34)	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
No information	4%	7%	2%	2%	9%	9%
Uncertainty/reservations re African/majority control	34%	29%	30%	17%	35%	35%
Ambivalent (plus some references to Homeland Self- government)	8%	5%	3%	9%	9%	9%
Desire for African Traditional Rule	N/A	9%	N/A	20%	N/A	-
Confidence in and/or desire for African/majority rule	54%	50%	65%	52%	47%	47%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: For some reason the first stimulus did not attract a meaningful 'traditional' response.

The only difference between groups of any import in Table IX is the suggestion that non-manual respondents (private sector) include a somewhat



higher proportion of people who are convinced of the merits of African rule or majority rule. The results of the first stimulus conversation when analysed by education tend to support this conclusion; the proportions with confidence in or desire for African control are as follows:

- up to Std.3	49%
- Std. 4 to Std.7	58%
- Std.8 or more	59%

However, what is important is that in all groups analysed, almost a majority or a slight majority (broadly, say, 47% to 60% or a little more) are attracted by the idea of majority rule or African control. It should be borne in mind, however, that the proportions of Africans in all groups who are ambivalent or uncertain about the consequences of majority rule are by no means insubstantial.

A factor specifically mentioned by Gurr as having a bearing on the degree to which discontent and relative deprivation can become a focussed political impulse is the presence in the population under study of normative or utilitarian justification for political activism (Gurr's terms are ideological justification for violence, but a broader concept will be used here). Space allows only for a presentation of a relevant classification of responses obtained throughout the interview. The results of individual stimulus conversations, however, do not reveal patterns which are sufficiently different to warrant their analysis in a brief paper. The results which are presented are also more valid, since they represent a global appraisal of the tone and content of the entire interview. The responses referred to appear in Tables X and XI.

The results in Tables X and XI, which relate to what one may call the quality, tone and intensity of expression of discontent, do not refer so much to ideology as such, but rather to one of the subjective bases of ideology in a population. Perhaps one should cautiously refer to the results as reflecting 'receptivity' to activist ideologies. As such, however, they might be informative.

TABLE X  
TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTH OF DISCONTENTMENT AMONG URBAN  
AFRICANS IN DURBAN

Type of Discontent	Less than Std.8	Std.8 +
1. No discontent manifest	6%	6%
2. Discontent without characteristics below	16%	13%
-----		
3. Discontent with marked bitterness but nothing else	19%	9%
4. Emphatic rejection of Apartheid/ expressed preference for majority rule	71%	77%
5. Aggressive hostility manifest but unfocused	7%	3%
-----		
6. Political action oriented - unspecified	17%	16%
7. Political action oriented - non-confrontationist or non-violent	13%	23%
8. Political action oriented - violent	2%	1%
	32%	40%

NOTE: Since more than one orientation was possible, percentages exceed 100. However, categories (1) and (2) and categories (6), (7) and (8) are exclusive and hence the latter three can be summed. An 'action' orientation was only assumed to exist if it appeared consistently throughout the interview records.

In considering these results one should bear in mind that the 'political action-orientation' found probably is somewhat of a minimum manifestation. Despite the methods used which safeguarded respondents and allowed them to speak openly (as the verbatim results attest), some constraints must be expected, particularly on the open expression of a belief in violence. Even so, however, the results themselves show a substantial proportion of roughly 30% to 40% of people whose rejection of the system is conceptualised or expressed in terms of the possibility of political action of some kind or another.\* The suggestion from the results that this orientation is more prevalent among the better-educated might confirm the notion that education facilitates the development of the radical political consciousness that is certainly present among a proportion of Africans in Durban.

\* An 'action orientation' was adjudged to exist where respondents mentioned either the general possibility, inevitability or desirability of some form of action of confrontationist or strategic nature.

What is also important to consider is that a very substantial majority of people, at some point in the interview, were very emphatic in their rejection of apartheid or minority rule. The kind of emotional emphasis emerging in the expression of this sentiment suggested a covert action orientation in very many cases. In terms of the strength or potency of political consciousness displayed, these kinds of responses may perhaps be as radical in implication as action-oriented responses of a non-violent or non-confrontationist variety. Caution dictates, however, that one should only assume an action-orientation where this specifically appeared in the responses. The appearance of this action orientation in the responses was also analysed according to type of occupation, and is presented in Table XI.

TABLE XI  
PROPORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS IN DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES  
REFLECTING AN ACTION ORIENTATION IN THEIR RESPONSES

Type of Orientation	Blue-collar Manual (n = 173)	White-collar and Routine Non-manual (n = 66)	White-collar Civil Service (n = 34)
Political action-oriented - unspecified	17%	15%	15%
Political action-oriented - non-confrontationist and non-violent	16%	21%	24%
Political action-oriented - violent	1%	5%	-
Total action-oriented	34%	41%	39%

The results in Table XI are fairly similar in their pattern of differences to the results according to education; as would be expected. Although the trend is slightly less-marked than is the case in the analysis according to education, the suggestion from the responses, once again, is that those Africans with higher status are more likely to display a radical consciousness in the expression of their attitudes.

As far as 'receptivity' to ideological justifications for political goals and values is concerned, one must also look at the other side of the coin, as it were. By this is meant that one should consider what factors may be present in the consciousness of Africans which may make it difficult for them to remain unaffected by the essence of some of the ways in which the white ruling elite attempts to justify or legitimise white control, at a normative-ideological level. Some of the results presented thus far have

provided insight into these elements in the consciousness of respondents. In Table XII, however, a summary listing is presented of classifications of responses throughout the entire interview. This listing is focussed on the extent to which subjective elements are present among respondents which may detract from the expected conviction that the present socio-political order is illegitimate or based on false premises from the African point of view. In the table the items are not mutually exclusive of one another, and, therefore, cannot be summed or combined.

The pattern in the classification shows quite clearly that almost no Africans at all are willing to defend the system or argue its virtues. Yet, only slightly under one-fifth among the less well-educated and slightly over one-fifth of the better-educated respondents avoided responses which suggested some kind of politico-attitudinal adaptation to the situation of political exclusion as it exists at present. It might be argued that in view of the pervasive manifestation of repressive and coercive sanctions against political dissent among blacks, these proportions are surprisingly high. Certainly, they suggest that a large minority of rank and file Africans are what one might term utterly 'intractable' (the term is not used negatively) in their emotional and intellectual rejection of any of the manifold assumptions upon which attempts to justify the system of inequality or aspects of it may rest.

The pattern of responses among the remaining group, that is, the majority, might be of interest not only to social scientists and observers of the South African situation, but perhaps also to black community leaders. One should emphasise what has already been stressed in the table itself; i.e., that very few of these responses denoted an absence of discontent and/or moral condemnation of the political situation as it affects Africans. Since more than one dominant orientation was present among many respondents, only very tentative attempts can be made here to assess the relative size of different groups among Africans (apart from the two polar groups already discussed). Rather, we must look at the results as indicating the relative importance of different viewpoints. The results are classified under three broad headings: 'acceptance of justifications', 'resignation', and a 'race separatist outlook'.

TABLE XII

CLASSIFICATION OF AFRICAN RESPONDENTS IN TERMS OF DOMINANT MODES OF  
RESPONSE OR ADAPTATION TO THEIR SOCIO-POLITICO-ECONOMIC SITUATION

Type of Adaptation or Response	Less than Std.8 (n = 181)	Std.8 or more (n = 117)
Complete, consistent, emphatic rejection of situation or of any possible justification for the system	17%	23%
<u>Acceptance of a justification (albeit with discontent):</u>		
- lack among blacks of education/experience/'civilisation'/political capability at present	23%	33%
- whites seen as superior in education/ability/culture/'civilisation'	20%	9%
<u>Resignation (albeit largely with discontent):</u>		
- sense of present immutability of white power and authority	43%	38%
- shifting of hope and responsibility for change to next generation	7%	7%
- patient awaiting of change with time	19%	12%
- fatalism and low morale	3%	5%
- religious fatalism	4%	2%
- recognition of limited good in white paternalistic administration	19%	15%
<u>Race separatist outlook (albeit with discontent):</u>		
- 'Homeland' orientation in reaction to township conditions	5%	7%
- 'Homeland' orientation in reaction to political frustration	13%	15%
- pro-separatist-espousal of traditional culture	16%	11%
- pro-separatist - desire for development and self actualisation	13%	18%
<u>Apologists for or defenders of current system:</u>	<1%	<1%

NOTE: Percentages exceed 100 since more than one orientation was detected in many respondents. Therefore, each item must be assessed individually and not as an element in a distribution. Items cannot be combined or summed.

Clearly one major orientation, classified under 'resignation', is closely connected with the coercive element in the situation and with fear and insecurity. This is the sense of present immutability of white control and authority, which seems to be seen as a massive, forbidding, reified

'thing-like' presence which looms over the consciousness of roughly 4 out of 10 Africans in the present sample. This, as the table indicates, is associated with resignation, however unpleasant the implications of that resignation may be. The factor of resignation, not unexpectedly, is also linked with various other kinds of negative adaptation as reflected in the responses under this heading in the table. The results show that the resignation 'syndrome' is relatively less prevalent among the more educated Africans, although the differences are by no means dramatic.

Somewhere between 25% and 40% of Africans in general seem to accept some form of justification for the present order. The basis of this, as can be seen from the table, lies hugely in the educational differential between whites and blacks, which is sometimes interpreted by the respondents themselves so as to cause it to acquire a significance beyond the mere possession of skills. (It is seen in terms of 'civilisation', ability, etc.). What is lacking in most of these respondents is a clear recognition of the extent to which an important component of the very system which educational differentials appear to justify consists of sharp inequality of access to educational opportunity. The process which these particular results reveal is of vital importance in the political development of Africans. The impact of the way in which educational differentials are interpreted comes through clearly in the following not atypical quotations: *'The whites' knowledge is too deep - the Africans just can't compare themselves with the whites'*; *'We could never get the wisdom of the white men'*; *'The Africans can never have more power than the whites - the whites are too far from the blacks in ideas and plans'*. It is interesting that the better educated Africans tend to pass the 'blame' as it were on to the lack of education among the majority of Africans, whereas the less well-educated, relatively speaking, are much more over-whelmed by the educational-technological advantages of whites. This mode of response involves the perception of what is in fact a consequence of inequality as a basis for inequality, and as such is an adaptive response, if not a 'depoliticising' viewpoint.

What has been termed the 'Race Separatist Outlook' in the table, connects with an earlier paper by this author on African attitudes (Schlemmer 1972) and with the possibilities outlined by Mayer (1972). What is interesting here is that although particular patterns differ, the frequency of all responses under the broad heading among the two educational groups tends to be fairly evenly balanced. The better-educated have a lesser tendency to espouse traditional cultural ideals, but, on the other hand (and this possibly

alia, Potholm (1967) has suggested that *'The African South African tends to view the situation with either leaden resignation or wishful thinking'*. An African student has commented as follows: *'Their (the Africans) realisation that they can in no way influence a change for good usually throws them into despair or complete indifference'*. (SPRO-CAS. Ref Soc 26, 1970).

My findings suggest four major types of response among Africans to their deprivation and to the structure of power and privilege in South Africa. One pattern of response is characterised by few signs of emotional, intellectual or normative adaptation to the situation (apart from the obvious need for behavioural restraint), and is encountered among perhaps roughly one-fifth of urban Africans in Durban. This group would doubtless be the most militant. Other forms of response, however, are not necessarily lacking in militancy and are certainly not lacking in a general rejection of the system. They do, however, include elements of adaptation to the situation at the level of attitudes and perceptions.

By no means the majority of Gurr's interesting hypotheses regarding the social origins of rebellion could be explored in this brief paper (or with the kind of empirical data available). The present results show that discontent has great 'scope' in the population, and that perceptions of 'aspirational' relative deprivation, broadly defined, are present among a majority. Nevertheless, perceptions of relative deprivation specifically focussed on the formally entrenched political and economic privileges of whites may be a somewhat weaker element in the political consciousness of Africans. In addition, there was, at the time of the study, fairly widespread optimism about the possibilities of sustained incremental reform. Coupled with this broad pattern of results, some of Gurr's hypotheses can give insight into the apparent lack of widespread popular activism. This insight is complemented by the finding that while there was an ideological commitment to the notion of majority rule among a slight majority of settled urban Africans, receptivity to ideological justifications for activism may have been characteristic of a minority, albeit a substantial one. Commitment to violent action was a very small minority response in the results although it was probably under-estimated. Furthermore, on the question of the degree of ideological support for resistance, in Gurr's terms, the presence, among very substantial minorities, of (possibly inevitable) attitudinal adaptations to political minority status may have weakened yet further the receptivity to any ideological justifications for political participation or active resistance. Of course, looming over all these elements is the overwhelming

balance of coercive control possessed by the regime. In terms of this factor alone, Gurr's model would suggest that activism, where present, would be restricted to 'conspiracies' involving small numbers of people in underground movements.

Etzioni (1961) in discussing power relations in complex organizations, with particular reference to the lower status participants, makes a broad distinction between three modes of application of power: 'coercive', 'remunerative' and 'normative'. Extrapolating very broadly from his model to South African society,\* one may say that the power of the authorities over Africans involves all three elements, with the emphasis on coercive power. The coercive aspects are well-known and need not be discussed. Normative power can be detected in the attempts of the Government to justify the social and political segregation of Africans from white society and from the centres of power by the formulation of the legitimating ideology of 'multi-national development'. Remunerative power is part of the policy of multi-nationalism, in the sense that a certain (albeit limited) opportunity for progress and advancement for some Africans is offered in the Homeland development programmes and, of course, in increasing scope for occupational mobility within the economy in general.

Applying Etzioni's paradigm to the subordinate African population suggests the possibility of three types of what he terms 'involvement' with power, and therefore also three types of 'compliance': 'alienative' (in response to coercion); 'calculative' (in response to remunerative power); and 'moral' (in response to normative power). A perfectly congruent response among Africans to the nature of power would suggest a mixture of alienative, calculative and moral involvement. The present results suggest, however, that this is not the case. The moral legitimacy of separate development is not accepted and 'normative compliance' in terms of the ideology of apartheid is notably absent. Some normative compliance is, however, discernable among those whose adaptive attitudes are rooted in perceptions of educational or technological differentials, since part of the white settler ideology in Southern Africa has always been the claim to educational and technological superiority as a justification for control over blacks.

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\* I would like to acknowledge the stimulus I obtained from a paper by Cubitt and van der Merwe (1973) on this topic.



The involvement of Africans with separate development, and also the involvement with economic institutions embraces calculative or 'utilitarian' compliance rather than a normative response, as the present results have shown, and as one of the findings of Edelstein's also suggests (i.e. responses to the question of jobs in the Homelands).

Despite attempts by the white governing group to secure normative compliance, the major response of Africans appears to be two variants of the alienative response or of 'coercive' compliance. The one variant is covert militancy (or conspiracy) but the more prominent one may be what I have called 'demoralisation', and, as already indicated, involves a measure of hopelessness, resignation and anomie.

This analysis suggests that the appearance of peaceful co-existence between the races in South Africa at the present time rests mainly but not solely on the type of coercive compliance outlined. This type of compliance is both a direct and an indirect result of authoritarian legal and administrative sanctions. The sanctions themselves secure behavioural compliance, and the demonstration effect of the sanctions, plus the attendant weakening of political and community leadership and organization powerfully encourages the political atomisation and demoralisation of African communities. Yet, as has been indicated earlier, this type of compliance is probably potentially most mutable in response to other demonstration effects. A demoralised and dispirited African community can become enspirited or inspired with the vision of a political alternative over time, or perhaps, with power relations in Southern Africa and patterns of labour relations changing fairly dramatically, at any time. This point is made very effectively by Kuper (1974, 98) in discussing Lucien Goldman's concepts of 'conscience réelle' and 'conscience possible'. Whatever else the results have suggested, they have shown the presence of a substantial minority of members of the subordinate group who, in terms of most accepted criteria, could emerge as a significant political vanguard.

NOTES

- 1) Recent amendments to the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act makes it possible for Africans to strike legally, but only under very narrowly prescribed circumstances. Most strikers are not likely to be able to persist in the protracted negotiations and re-negotiations prescribed.
- 2) The refusal and replacement rate was just over 10%. Replacements occurred with somewhat greater relative frequency among less-well-educated respondents. Most replacements due to lack of rapport seemed to be attributable to a mixture of fatigue or temporary alcoholic debility mixed with misanthropy rather than to a focused type of political suspicion or mistrust.
- 3) This conclusion was gained from a submission of statistical trends by Mr. T. Vogel, a prominent personnel manager, at a private symposium, in Durban.

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