

PARTICIPATORY, DEMOCRATIC, ELLITIST AND AUTHORITARIAN STRANDS
AND TRENDS IN TANZANIA: A Sketch

By Reginald Herbold Green

The purpose of society is man; but in order to serve man there must be a social organisation of economic activities which is conducive to the greater production of things useful for the material and spiritual welfare of man. This means it may well be a function of society to organise and sustain efficient economic organisation and production techniques even when these are in themselves unpleasant or restrictive.

- President Julius K. Nyerere

Development means liberation. Any action that gives the people more control of their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread.

- Party Mwongozo (Guidelines)

Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own effort, by our own sacrifices ...

- Amilcar Cabral, late President PAIGC

Mistakes are mistakes.

- President Julius K. Nyerere

If the people are to develop they must have power. They must be able to control their own activities within the framework of their village communities ... At present the best intentioned governments - my own included - too readily move from a conviction of the need for rural development into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong ... people do know what their basic needs are ... if they have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own priorities of development.

- President Julius K. Nyerere

Tanzanian¹ Political Commitments and Continuity: An Overview

Tanzania is a relatively large (18 million people, 900,000 square kilometres), quite poor (among the 30 least developed) nation. Its history is marked by substantial political continuity over the past quarter century (including the pre-independence mobilisation as prologue) and a fairly clearly defined set of political standards and goals.

The main political commitments of the governing sole party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi - Revolutionary Party - formed in 1977 by the merger of mainland Tanzania's TANU and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party) are:

- a. transition to a socialist (not "African socialist") mode of production and pattern of social/production relations;
- b. broad participation in political, economic and social life including decision taking with decisions and implementation substantially decentralised;
- c. democratic participation including contested elections, a rule of law and a variety of channels of access to decision takers (or redressors);
- d. egalitarianism in respect to incomes, access to basic services and ability to participate;
- e. self-reliance (nationally and communally) as an intellectual and organising principle and as an operational goal;
- f. rapid increase in the level of productive forces (6% a year) combined with economic restructuring to increase self-reliance and interdependence;
- g. universal access to basic services (ie primary and adult education, pure water, preventative and basic curative medicine);
- h. universal access to a socially acceptable level of personal consumption through adequately productive and fairly enough remunerated employment or self-employment.

There has been substantial evolution of these goals - their pre-independence formulations by TANU were distinctly vague and ambiguous. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 (slightly over five years after independence) was a substantial reformulation in tighter, more realistic and more operational terms. Its first steps included substantial nationalisations (securing public sector

dominance in finance, external trade and manufacturing), rigorous separation of state - public enterprise - party leaders from private economic activity and major emphasis on Tanzanian intellectual, ideological and material effort toward self-reliance. The stress on participation became co-equal in the 1971 Guidelines.

While there has been a continuous evolution of forms, particular policies and emphasis before and after 1967 and 1971, the post-1971 pattern is clearly one of building and refining rather than of basically reformulating. Given the existence both of significant sub-class tensions and of varying domestic and external objective challenges, there have also been fairly substantial variations in which principles received central attention at any point in time.

CCM (including TANU) has remained a mass (albeit not an open entry) party with substantial popular support and mobilising ability and increasing dominance over public policy for over a quarter-century. Tanzania has achieved relatively rapid increases in national cohesiveness, access to basic services (eg 80% adult literacy), per capita production and economic restructuring, and a substantial - if perhaps much more uneven and problematic - advance in broad participation. It has done so from an initially fragile national base (there was no dominant pre-colonial state), one of the lowest pre-independence productive force bases - even in Africa, in an international economic context which has often (especially 1974-76 and 1979 to date) been unfavourable, and despite need for national or collective action to guard against/repel armed aggression in every year since 1970.

That Tanzania's economic and political system are facing the most severe set of crises since independence is a fact.² The impact of

that crisis on the continuity and ability to maintain priorities of the political system remains problematic. What is surprising is not the severity of the strains and the numerous secondary erosions of aspirations and standards, but that the political and economic systems remain basically functional with, at most, tactical retreats from goals (not including any substantial increase in authoritarianism).

Some Problems of Research and Analysis

Tanzanian political and social analysis suffers from several constraints. One is a distinct tendency - at all levels - to tell the questioner what the answerer thinks he wants to hear - the "Ndio, bwana" - "Yes, boss" pattern. Because most researchers are seen as "authority figures" by peasants and workers, this affects answers to radical critics almost as much as to main-line officials.³

Because the Party and government decision-taking is substantially decentralised, systematic data collection and interpretation is difficult. This is exacerbated by the fact that most meetings are not open, and while neither the content of meetings nor of decisions is usually secret, public coverage is very fragmentary and collection by interview very tedious. For non-Swahili speakers and non-Tanzanians these difficulties are exacerbated.

Macro-analysis on many topics necessarily rests on inadequate micro-bases. Therefore, there is a tendency to use quite real cases which fit an author's thesis and to suppress equally real ones which are inconsistent, because which is representative is, under present data conditions, necessarily to a substantial degree a matter of judgement.

A further problem is the quantity of analysis which sets up goals for Tanzania attributed to Tanzanians and tests performance against them, when these goals bear little resemblance to those of significant Tanzanian institutions or sub-classes.⁴

Political Economic Ideology - The Main Line CCM Position

The initial TANU political economic ideology was probably dominantly nationalist, populist and anti-colonialist. The leaders' commitments to bourgeois democracy and social democracy (in Scandinavian more than British⁵ or German terms) were not necessarily understood in detail by the mass membership. A significant strand was a widely held belief that the Christian gospel did support both self-determination and greater equality. As this was not a reading supported by the majority of Church hierarchies, more articulated Christian-based positions - eg, the very deep left Catholic (pre-liberation theology) elements in President Nyerere's thought were also relatively rare.

Marxian elements - at least in a recognisably articulated form - were not very evident in mainstream TANU thinking before 1967. Their minority proponents were not significantly involved in TANU's transition to a basically Marxian position - indeed the most significant bitterly opposed it.⁶ The tone of the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo is clearly Marxian, and subsequent major speeches (not only of the President) are even more so, albeit with a distinct predilection for a broadly understandable style of presentation and a certain avoidance both of elaborate specialised language and, usually,⁷ of posing domestic sub-class contradictions in terms which would heighten antagonism.

The non-standard terminology, for a socialist party, has three reasons: first, as noted, broad intelligibility⁸; second, a belief that socialism in Africa must re-examine sequences, contexts and possibilities, not copy European or Asian ones; third, a relatively late - and not necessarily very wide - reading of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Gramsci.⁹ There has never been a main-line belief that European and Asian socialist state policy and experience could be imported wholesale, nor that any one Communist or Socialist party or thinker had a monopoly on wisdom. Equally, there has never been a belief that the principles and goals of socialism were so different in Africa that "African socialism" (as opposed to "socialism in Africa") was a valid goal, rather than either a self-mystification or a cover terminology for variations on dependent capitalism.¹⁰ Particularly in respect to the Arusha Declaration, the nationalist and socialist strands interacted. The goal of economic self-determination could not - on the 1961-66 Tanzanian record and more general African experience - be pursued effectively under capitalism. Or as President Nyerere put it: "Capitalism in Africa will not be African capitalism."

Ujamaa: Evolution Toward Socialism In Tanzania

Commentaries on Ujamaa (now the Swahili word for socialism, albeit the previous use would more accurately have been rendered "extended familyhood" or "communalism") tend to be confusing and confused. In part this relates to its evolution - President Nyerere's 1962 formulation was pre-Marxian and not in an operational (as opposed to a politically mobilising) form, whereas the 1967 and later overall (or articulated sectoral and strategic) formulations are Marxian and, in general, operationally oriented. To read them as if they were contemporaneous is not useful.

It is fairly clearly true that Ujamaa is not Marxist-Leninist in the socialist European meaning of that term. In origin it is arguably "folk Marxist" and in evolution substantially more concerned about current mass welfare and participation and the dangers of authoritarianism than the main lines of socialist European official ideology. In certain respects, it is therefore more similar to some aspects of Maoism.¹¹ In particular, it is much more open to officially admitting ideological or strategic mistakes and sharply critical of using any text (whether of Marx or of Nyerere) as permanent revealed truth to be reinterpreted, rather than revised or rejected if it proves objectively unsound in the actual Tanzanian context.

Ujamaa in its appeal to elements in pre-colonial, pre-capitalist society is a "myth" in the technical meaning of that term. By citing elements of egalitarianism and redistribution, and of communal effort and social relations, and by contrasting them to capitalist/colonialist penetration and post-independence neo-colonial dependence, it served as a mobilising and uniting theme. This was important both because up to 1967 the colonial bias against Marxian thought still had substantial residual strength, and because the building up of broad support for a socialist orientation required that it be presented in terms intelligible and related both to the auditor's communal history and nationalist commitment.

Ujamaa - in its appeal to African social elements - has never been presented as historical analysis. Nor has there been any claim that the pre-colonial, pre-capitalist past could be replicated. On the contrary, both technological and social changes are asserted to make any such romantic return to a "state of nature" impossible

and undesirable.

Ujamaa has at no point denied the existence of classes and sub-classes - au contraire. However, the 1962 version could be read as denying the need for class or sub-class confrontation. That is clearly not a plausible reading of the Arusha Declaration or subsequent speeches, laws and actions. The nature of the contradictions - antagonistic or not, and primary or not - and therefore of the appropriate forms and timing of confrontation, have been the topics of substantial intra-party debate (as well as by both left and right critics). The tactics have varied - eg, the massive, abrupt assault by nationalisation on landlords in 1971 vs the step by step breaking of neo-kulak group power over 1965-76.¹²

Basic Elements - 1980's

There are a number of central themes in Ujamaa as it now exists, beyond transition to a socialist mode of production in terms of dominant public sector ownership (which is largely achieved). One is Tanzanian self-respect in terms of recognition of the validity of Tanzanian history and culture, and its ability to provide both continuity and creativity. The goal is increased self-perception and initiative both as the intellectual/cultural side of self-reliance and as the basis for self-mobilisation and self-discipline.

Building a "non-market" set of organising principles is a second theme in the sense of rejecting the von Mises-von Hayek-Friedman mystical view of "the market" as a moral organising principle, not in that of any commitment to general material balances planning. (In fact Tanzanian planning and public productive sector policy is managed-market oriented on lines broadly similar to those of Hungary.) Basic public services and basic household incomes (more

accurately a context in which households can earn them) are seen as more important than maximising economic growth or accumulation, and as not adequately protected by market mechanisms. Human beings and their welfare - not pure productive force levels - are seen as the only justification of socialism. In this respect, Ujamaa is inherently anti-economistic.¹³

An acceptance of the validity of coercion after broad, participatory discussion leading to decisions - the example of vaccination was cited by the President as a parallel to the 1974-75 compulsory villagisation exercise, and the nationalisation and taxation measures (as well as those creating Workers Councils) are compulsory whatever else they may be. This is not seen as preventing re-opening a decision if events suggest such a course, but as a duty to comply with, and support it, so long as it is in force. This approach clearly has distinct elements of democratic centralism (or of British Cabinet collective responsibility) as well as of the participatory strands in traditional African political processes.

The dangers of exploitation (by capitalists, bureaucrats, party officials, men - ie by men of women, urban wage earners - ie of peasants) are a major theme in Ujamaa. As indicated, this is an articulated theme and one which frequently leads to action (eg a rather draconic rural bias in incomes policy over 1975-81)¹⁴.

The need for discipline (to prevent exploitation and anarchy) and self-discipline (to achieve results and to reduce the "need" for authoritarian measures) has been handled frequently in both statements and dialogue. Whether it has been articulated in a way synthesising the inherent tension between the two, and the different implications in different social and production relations is much

more problematic.

Efficiency has been stressed - in terms of progress toward objectives whether directly productive or not. This is, of course, not to claim it has always been achieved; the body of main line analysis and speeches criticising inefficiencies is very large. The point is that choice, allocation and avoidance of waste are primary objectives. One of the President's more irate statements was that to equate waste with, or justify on the basis of, socialism, was a sin.

Raising the level and altering the structural makeup of productive forces is central in most main-line Ujamaa presentations. The "non-market" organising principles are seen as operational only if higher levels of material and service output are available, and both sustained growth and self-reliance as dependent on achieving a more integrated and balanced structure of production and use. Much of the economic writing relating to production is, taken by itself, arguably not very closely integrated with, nor informed by, enough internalisation of the other themes of Ujamaa.

Egalitarianism has been a central operational principle of Ujamaa - as well as one leading to some of the most severe attacks on it from left as well as right. The most readily quantifiable aspects relate to income distribution (eg with the maximum after tax income differential in the public sector now about 7.5% to 1 down from 50 to 1 at independence). However, the egalitarian theme applies to basic services (primary education basically universal, 80% literacy and access to a health facility within walking distance, 55-65% access to pure water) and the ability to participate in decision-taking (where results are harder to quantify and progress both more uneven and less rapid¹⁵). This principle has informed not simply

tax, expenditure, wages and prices policies, but also many of the specific measures against exploitation and primary community structures (in respect to enterprises, governmental operations and the Party).

Anti-imperialism (or collective self-reliance) has been overtly present in almost all post-1969 formulations. One element has been self-defence (against Portugal, Uganda and others at home, and against Rhodesia and South Africa collectively with Mozambique). Another has been liberation - FRELIMO, MPLA, ZANU, ANC, UNIP, SWAPO have all at one time been based in Tanzania, "the bastion of liberation movements" as a Mozambican minister put it. Collective self-reliance has been pursued bilaterally (eg with Zambia and Mozambique), regionally (first in the East African Community, now primarily through the Front Line States, Southern African Co-ordination Conference and the Kagera Basin grouping), continentally (eg OAU, ECA) and globally (eg Non-Aligned, Group of 77).

Some Characteristics of Ujamaa in Praxis

Ujamaa has evolved - in responding to challenges, building on achievements and responding to crises. Accepting that mistakes can be made, need to be identified and should then be openly admitted as well as corrected, is a basic principle (albeit in practice a disputed one despite the President's example). This is not to say that all evolution has been adequate or all mistakes promptly identified, admitted or corrected, but that evolution and mistake admission/correction are accepted principles in practice as well as on paper.

Emphasis has usually been on a limited number of antagonistic, secondary contradictions viewed as surmountable (synthesisable?)

at a particular time and providing a basis for subsequent advance. Limited resources (of personnel, mobilising capacity, decision-taking and analytical capacity even more than of money) require that most areas are treated as "pre-focal attention" (limiting problems or shoring up structures) or "post-focal attention" (raising micro-efficiency within the macro frame created by the synthesis).

This pattern necessarily creates an unbalanced strategy at any one point in time - or a spiral, not a "turnpike", path forward. The imbalances lead toward new focal area selection - sometimes returning to an area previously centred on a new context (better if the previous synthesis held but worse if it was initially misguided or succumbed to events).

The positive results of this strategic approach in basic services and most production sectors have been substantially limited by its inability - until 1980 at least - to identify import capacity (and therefore exports) as a strategic area. This seems to stem from the fact that technical input alone will not result in emphasis on a contradiction unless it is so perceived by a substantial number of political leaders, and that limited political consciousness of priority and limited short-term technical possibilities tended over 1961-1979 to interact to downgrade export development.¹⁶ A second problem is that in some cases the consolidation of micro-efficiency stage has not followed the initial emphasis (eg acquired rental properties), has lost momentum (eg National Bank of Commerce in mid 1970's, Workers Councils over same period) or has gone into reverse (eg majority of Crop Authorities in late 1970's).

Counter Ideological Strands

Tanzanians - including some Tanzanian leaders - are by no means monolithic in support of the main-line Ujamaa ideological position. At least three authoritarian orientations can be identified: left, bureaucratic/managerial and right. All three are represented within the Party and state machinery, albeit substantial fractions of the first and third are overtly outside it, and the Party commitment of the second is often more tactical and formal than real.

The left authoritarian position (sometimes characterised as production socialist) has no real class or sub-class base. It is primarily a stance of professional intellectuals and - therefore - rather well publicised.¹⁷ Over 1967-1970 the supporters of this position did have a substantial involvement in Party affairs as advisors. They spearheaded the call for a vanguard, exclusivist Party. Their expulsion over 1969-70 (well before Mwongozo) turned on their demand for leadership positions on the basis of ideological rectitude without submitting themselves to Party member (worker and peasant) selection. This was not in itself a left/right clash but a sharp reaction to self-proclaimed Platonic guardianship.

The "production socialist" strand opposed primary attention to basic services and to mass consumption standards, ie implicitly it supports a Mahalanobis model overall and - apparently - a neo-Stalinist rural strategy made more effective by converting peasants from "false consciousness" to support it. In general the "left authoritarian" approach would increase Party and managerial power but after purging most present Party and public sector figures whom it perceives as a compradore "new class". The stated commitment to worker and peasant welfare is one to be defined and administered by a "vanguard" until the present worker and peasant false consciousness is eradicated.

The bureaucratic/managerial authoritarian stance turns on efficiency, discipline and incentives. For these one can read giving management a free hand, giving managers and officials back the power to rule workers and peasants,¹⁸ increasing the real incomes and other rewards of technocrats.

The support for this orientation comes from a substantial portion of the official-managerial sub-class. Their influence is increased because they do hold key knowledge needed to operate state and economy, and because they have close links with and - on specific issues at least - over backing by the bulk of the aid agency/technical assistance community. This is not surprising, as the technocratic world-view is authoritarian and global.

In respect to this orientation's membership, particular identification problems arise because up to a point efficiency, discipline and incentives are main-line priorities. Therefore, the gradation from a basically main-line orientation to this one is gradual with no clear break except in praxis on concrete issues or crises. Further, to date at least, this orientation has not been self-conscious in the sense of coherent opposition to main-line goals on a consistent basis as opposed to criticism of specific policies and individual efforts - within the Party and State - to alter the balance of priorities.

The right authoritarian position used to centre on the neo-kulak fraction of large peasants and associated officials, managers and politicians. The 1965 election, the 1967 Arusha Declaration and the series of measures to reduce the power of the old line co-operatives and the traditional agricultural technocrats as well as selective expulsions from the Party and - in one or two regions - land redistribution under villageisation, have reduced the potential

of neo-kulakism organising a counter sub-class alliance against the main line.

The present right authoritarian orientation is not coherently organised except in one or two regions. It includes some officials and managers, the remnants of the neo-kulak sub-classes and some private sector economic activists. While it can cite foreign ideological statements as compatible with "its" goals more than with the main lines, its foreign support in terms of close contacts or backing on specific issues, is minimal. The last group battle of this orientation was against the 1973 Income Tax Act (as a symbol of egalitarianism). Initially a majority of MP's (though not necessarily of elected mainland MP's) backed them, but recoiled in total rout in the face of a Presidential-Party statement that a general election on the egalitarianism issue would follow defeat of the bill.¹⁹

This orientation is overtly anti-egalitarian (in respect to income, services, participation) not merely seeking restoration of 1960's real salary levels. It is also basically anti-Party and State because it sees them as worker and peasant dominated and democratic which it sees as demagogic. Its desire to unleash the private sector and put peasants and workers "in their place" is overtly anti-socialist as well as authoritarian.

In addition to these three strands, there are populist counter-ideological fragments. These are not coherent in sub-class base or objective nature of goals, nor are they stable over time. Their influence has been in affecting Party policy sequences (eg sumptuary legislation limiting ownership and use of private cars) or in being used by particular Party leaders to create a momentum for their

personal priorities (eg nationalisation of large-scale landlords). At a more micro-level worker/manager conflict outside Party/State channels has often been populist - genuine or manipulated by managerial fractions. Finally, there have been gestures like the 1982 aeroplane hijacking, which are best characterised as febrile, lumpen proletariat populism.

Part of the difficulty in identifying these orientations is that each has certain goals and priorities which, in part, overlap those of fractions of main-line adherents. Thus the position of individuals and groups is not easy to fix and, indeed, shifts from issue to issue. Further, while CCM is not an open membership party it is a broad membership one, so that holding a set of views more consistent with one of these orientations than main-line Ujamaa has, in the past - and to a somewhat lesser extent today - not necessarily been incompatible with continued Party membership and holding significant statal or parastatal leadership position.

Toward Democratic Choice and Review-Elections

Tanzania is characterised by widespread use of competitive elections for Party, state and workplace bodies. These are often very hotly contested with over 100 candidates in the primary round for some National Assembly seats in 1980.

In general the use of elections is increasing. With the completion of restructuring the elected element in Regional, District and Ward Development Committees and restoring local councils, there will be complete tiers of elected bodies from village to national level in both state and Party.

There are limitations on the electoral process - some overtly designed to increase freedom of choice (whatever the result) and

some designed to eliminate candidates committed to racism, religious intolerance, capitalism or authoritarianism.²⁰ Candidates (for state as well as Party posts with the de facto exception of village committees) must be Party members which means that they must be workers or peasants, at least formally committed to transition to socialism and not significantly involved in private enterprise. After primary selection processes (limited to Party members - again de facto except for villages), candidates are subject to central Party review. The number of rejections is usually very small - there have been higher proportions at regional or district party level in cases in which pro-capitalist coalitions were strong in particular areas.²¹

Election campaigns are held for limited time periods, with strict limits on campaigning (usually only at meetings held by the Party at which both candidates speak) and a ban on significant expenditure (especially "treating" votes). In state institution elections all registered citizens of 18 and above are eligible to vote not only Party members.

The Presidential election is somewhat different. The Party selects a single nominee who is de facto subject to a yea/nay referendum. A 'nay' majority would lead to a second referendum with a different single candidate. There is a not insignificant body of thinking in the Party in favour of shifting to a two candidate system in 1985 (when President Nyerere will not be running for re-election).

For most state bodies there are a substantial minority of appointed members and indirectly elected ones. The forms of indirect election vary - usually with nomination by a group (eg co-operatives, trade union, women's league, youth league, university) and election by the

other members of the body in question. Party bodies also have substantial proportions of ex-officio members and at National Executive and Central Committee levels, the elected majority is elected by the National Congress (ie, indirectly elected).

Workplace elected bodies are dominant only in villages. In places of employment Workers Councils (and Committees) as well as JUWATA (trade union) and Party branches committees are directly elected. However, they are participatory, advisory, dialogue and confrontational rather than executive and managerial bodies.

The results of elections suggest substantial elements of initial choice and review exist. Turnover is high - normally over 50% for the National Assembly - and uncontested elections are relatively rare (less so at the lowest Party levels). Voter turnout is relatively high - on the order of 30% of registered voters and 65% of those potentially eligible in National Assembly/Presidential elections. Petitions can be and are filed, and do on occasion (in each National Assembly election) result in orders (by the Courts in National Assembly cases) for re-election on the basis of violation of electoral process rules.

Party Supremacy: Nature and Structure

Tanzania has been a de facto one party state since 1961 (TANU never had a significant opposition) and a de jure one since 1962. As noted above, Party membership is a pre-condition for state as well as Party elective office, but both primary (Party) and final (adult citizens for state electoral offices) elections are competitive.

The Party is supreme, ie the National Congress of the Party is the ultimate policy deciding body and between its sessions ultimate

decision-taking power vests in the National Executive Committee, Central Committee and/or Party Chairman. The National Assembly is the law-making body but does not have authority to decline to act on or to act against basic Party policy or decisions - an issue tested in several clashes, all lost by the Assembly.²² While the Party is financed by a State budget transfer and the Ministry of Finance can debate the amount, action to restrict the Party by financial cuts is not a conceivable line of action.²³

CCM (TANU plus Afro-Shirazi) is a mass party with in the order of 2.5 million members, or 30% of adult citizens. It has rejected the frequently presented case to become a vanguard party on three grounds: fear of creating a new authoritarian elite (many vanguard advocates clearly were authoritarian in outlook, "quis custodiet custodies?" and belief that mass mobilisation and consciousness-raising required a mass party.

On the other hand, CCM is not an open membership party - broad church it is, but innocent of creeds and definitions of heresy it is not. Only workers and peasants are eligible to become or remain members. Leaders and their immediate families cannot have significant private business involvement - a rule with teeth, albeit not very tightly enforced in respect to farmers with small permanent labour forces, small family businesses with only casual employees and either one large or several small rented houses. There is not a capitalist fraction of significance in CCM nationally, nor in more than two or three mainland regions. There are managerial/bureaucratic proto-fractions but not organised as such, and very rarely dominant. Whether workers and peasants are dominant is less clear - most leaders came from worker/peasant families, clearly feel responsible to them, could be elected "out" by them, but have

education, income and household consumption patterns atypical of workers and peasants as classes.

Ideological consciousness in CCM is very uneven - at all levels, not just at the base. Party ideological college, teacher and member education courses have sought to combat this as have major Party and leader documents and speeches. Except for those by the President, the latter often err either toward being too intellectual (or technical) with too few objective corollaries readily grasped by the man in the street. The political education work has - at its mass teacher training and member levels - often been noticeably more rhetorical and jargonistic and shorter on Tanzanian context and actual strategy-policy-tactics than Party internal dialogue and praxis.

The Party's interpretation of supremacy does not include detailed policy formulation nor implementation. These are seen as state responsibilities. Monitoring, review and corrective action (including investigations and firings) are seen as parallel state/Party responsibilities. The Party, therefore, does not have a large technical secretariat. The reasons are threefold: if the state is to do detailed articulation and implementation it must have technical staff and there are not enough in Tanzania to staff two parallel structures; a highpowered Party technocracy might divert attention from overall policy-strategy-review; state and Party technocrats might unite to influence the Party and reduce its ability to view and control managers and bureaucrats.

At sub-national levels the operational meaning of Party supremacy is unclear. It clearly does not mean cell or branch or constituency or regional Party direct action to block or reverse village,

decentralised government or parastatal decisions/actions. It clearly does comprise direct representations to the bodies taking such actions, and, in the case no agreed resolution results, upward reference within the Party. However, very considerable practical confusion and tensions exist with occasional Party intervention inconsistent with this reading and with more frequent refusal by statal and parastatal bodies to take Party representations seriously.²⁴

The Party's organisational structure is based on 10 House (family) cells. There are then sub-branches and branches which are either residentially (eg villages, wards) or workplace (eg factories, service establishments, ministries) based. Beyond these are constituency (district), regional and national units. Beyond the National Congress - and chosen by it, are the National Executive Committee, Central Committee and Chairman. (The Chairman of the Party and the President of the United Republic need not be the same person. Indeed, as the two terms overlap, the first two years of a new President's term are likely to be paralleled by the last two of his Presidential predecessor's term as Chairman). The NEC meets frequently, while the Central Committee is basically full-time with specialist committees to oversee policy formulation and performance in particular sectors (eg public enterprises).

Party-state overlap is relatively low in the state to Party direction. Few Ministers and senior officials are NEC or CC members. In the Party to state direction Regional Commissioners are Party Regional Secretaries and Regional executive heads, plus members of parliament and Party nominees do sit as such on a number of parastatal boards. At village level the separation of state and Party is somewhat artificial - its formal structural reality is unlikely

to be perceived as very meaningful by most villages.

Party performance in communication, mobilisation and control is distinctly uneven although substantially greater than most outside observers have seen it as being.²⁵ Perhaps surprisingly, communication up from base units (ie, the more active ones) to regional and national level is more generally effective than that downward to explain Party decisions and apply them to concrete local realities. National leader speeches can substitute for a more effective Party structure on explanation but not on local application. Mobilisation has been successful at three levels - nationally organised support for basic national policies, certain national campaigns articulated to local level (notably in respect to environmental sanitation and literacy) and village (and occasional urban ward) self-help action so long as the choices of action urged included some village priorities.

A related function at 10 House Cell and Ward levels is reconciliation and arbitration of disputes (subject to taking the case to court). Policy formulation has been uneven, especially in checking whether statal/parastatal articulation actually implemented the basic decision, was at a tangent to it or - in some cases - clearly misinterpreted (accidentally or on purpose). There has been a tightening up since 1979 in this area as well as in review - investigation - corrective action decision-taking (largely by the Central Committee) but results remain problematic. Discipline of Party leaders is, on the whole, effective, that of statal and parastatal leaders is so far from complete in coverage (or coherent in process) as to appear arbitrary, and may do more to cause avoiding taking any decisions rather than to "encourager les autres" to reform their probity or efficiency.

Statal and Parastatal Structures

The legislative and executive/operational side of the state are articulated at five levels (national, regional, district, ward and village) both for statal and for parastatal bodies (albeit in practice the latter - except for wholesale trade - are dominantly national). The two middle levels - district and ward - are the weakest.

The National Assembly is formally primarily a legislation debating and passing body, but in practice this is not a function it performs very deeply, as it has limited capacity to debate in detail (despite specialist committees) and de facto none to amend and redraft. It can, and does, force reconsideration of bills, but relatively rarely. It is an effective questioning and performance review body (especially via member questions and the Public and Parastatal Accounts Committees). As a National Planning Commission (divided into specialist committees with co-opted members) it has a significant - albeit unevenly used - role in policy articulation (except in response to crises where the technocrat-Minister-Cabinet-President-CC or NEC route effectively bypasses it). MP's are members of Party and state bodies at district and regional level, and are in a position to act as two-way communication agents (including representing local needs and criticisms) but only a minority appear to play this role effectively.

At regional, district and ward level there are Development Councils (or Committees) with non-official majorities. These are influential although the weight of the public versus official members varies widely. Urban district councils have been re-established and rural ones will be, regularising (and allowing renewal of) the elected members of the district and ward development bodies. The legislative

powers of the councils are relatively limited - greater in the urban case where separate budgets of some substance and not insignificant district revenues exist. Village assemblies (all adult members) are presumably the legislative body at that level, albeit in practice the Village Council normally carries out most policy-making, as well as executive/operational functions.

The executive/operational side of the state is headed by an Executive President with a Cabinet of Ministers (appointed by him but a genuinely policy deliberative body). The operational side of government is headed by a Presidentially appointed Prime Minister. In practice the President, Prime Minister, and Ministers are responsible more to the Party than to the National Assembly, albeit the latter can, and has, been severe and effective in criticism of certain parastatals, ministries and ministers.

The Ministers head functional ministries which are responsible for government operations. De facto Regional Commissioners head an additional 21 regional, multi-function ministries. While the latter are co-ordinated by the Prime Minister's office and liaise with central ministries, they are basically at parity with central ministries (except PM's, Finance, and Planning) in terms of power, influence and relative autonomy. District and Ward operational units are subsidiaries either of Regional or National Ministries as are central government personnel in villages. However, Village Councils and their committees have substantial operational programmes - particularly in communal investment and in certain parastatal-type marketing and trading functions - which are basically independent and largely self-financed.

Parastatal operations (which dominate large and medium-scale directly

productive activity) are carried out by separate enterprises. Most are responsible to functional ministries (eg financial institutions to Finance) for purposes of broad policy formulation, annual budgeting review and performance monitoring. In practice their degree (and use) of autonomy varies widely. Wholesale parastatals are jointly responsible to Regions and to Finance with a technical monitoring body in the Board of Internal Trade). There are a few regional parastatals and a substantial number of (largely unsuccessful) district ones.

Decentralisation, Access, Competence, Leadership

Basic government operations except Finance, Planning, Security, Justice, post-primary education and most health services are decentralised to Regions. Regions are not self-financing - partly because variegated local tax structures would make a nonsense of national economic policy and partly because providing increasingly uniform levels of basic services to regions with very unequal levels of productive forces per capita, and of geographic factors affecting units costs would in any event entail very large central government transfers. That this in practice limits their autonomy in programme formulation more than that of central ministries is by no means evident.

Decentralisation is seen as technically efficient because it allows decisions on small local projects/programmes and in the local data /requirement context in a way not realistically attainable in a Dar es Salaam centred system. It is also seen as pro-participatory because workers and peasants can reach officials responsible for decisions directly affecting them - which they could not, were such decisions taken in Dar es Salaam. Limited data and personnel and a fairly standard bureaucratic desire to limit participation do restrain - but not eliminate - gains on these counts since

decentralisation in 1972.

Both decentralisation to regions and functional allocations to particular ministries and parastatals require effective inter-institutional co-ordination to avoid inconsistencies. Such co-ordination varies from quite good - eg Water, Forestry, Education, Health with Regions, Finance with financial parastatals, the industrial and investment promotion committee to astoundingly bad, eg Agriculture with regions and with its parastatals, Water and Power with urban water and power users - statal or parastatal.

Access and participation vary even more widely by Ministry, Region and parastatal. In practice parastatal access to the general public (as opposed to workers or institutions represented on boards) is generally poor. Even those - such as the Coffee Authority - which are highly responsive to grower needs and effective at meeting them have little formal access and no formal participation (and as a direct result, horrible image and public relations problems with growers).

Ministries are unequally responsive. Positively, the Treasury has acted repeatedly to protect taxpayers from attempts to nullify tax reductions (or in one case collect a tax twice), Lands and Urban Development has in fact recognised squatters rights, sought to regularise their position (and other Ministries and authorities have moved to provide water, health and education to them). Negatively, Lands has not worked out a useable surveying/planning system for "informal" sector-built, low-income housing areas and Agriculture (nationally and regionally) has not realised that its imposition of outside Village Managers is neither technically efficient (they are isolated and largely unable to act) and contrary to any village-based development process.

All statal and parastatal institutions tend to be relatively hierarchical and closed. In practice a majority of their personnel have a class bias against taking workers and peasants seriously, or altering policy at their instance.

Competence²⁶ of statal and parastatal bodies varies enormously. Both sectors are objectively overextended. Whether more limited functions would be a general solution is less clear, as the private sector has even more limited competence. In almost all cases there is a substantial capacity to act - few institutions exist only on paper and in offices with no operational activity. A number have very substantial results to their credit. Parastatal operating profits at gross level exceed 5% of GDP and not of losses of other parastatals, probably 3%. (This suggests the diversity of competence in the sector, albeit it understates it, as the worst loss-makers tend to be bad at producing their intended goods or services.) The present economic crisis has clearly affected competence (in terms of performance) negatively.

Managerial/bureaucratic personnel are, in terms of Tanzanian income distribution, basically middle-class. Operationally they are collectively powerful. They have not, however, been able to prevent substantial erosion of their real incomes absolutely and relative to minimum wage earners and peasants (a result partly mitigated by somewhat oddly formulated fringe benefit incomes).²⁷ Equally, both the Party and workers/peasants have eroded their power to take decisions without direct accountability. Prior to retirement they are not able (in principle or to any substantial extent in practice) to have private business interests or to draw salaries for more than one public sector job. While some became businessmen (or influence peddlers) on retirement, most in practice have no such

opportunity whatever their inclination. Therefore, to see them as a dominant class appears somewhat eccentric.

Security and Coercion

The quantity of force available to the Tanzanian state and Party is quite inadequate to operate systematic coercion (as opposed to specific cases) except coercion with broad popular backing (eg nationalisation, progressive taxation). This is a factor reinforcing the main line Ujamaa ideology against generalised coercion and especially against generalised authoritarianism.

Police number less than one per thousand population. The Home Affairs budget has risen less rapidly than public expenditure generally.

The police are under civilian control, political and administrative. Abuses of authority - including illegal detention and torture have happened. The most notorious case of the former led to a major press campaign and a number of firings (as well as releases), the worst case of the latter to resignation of the Minister and Head of Police (as responsible though unaware) and to prosecution and conviction of senior police officers for murder. While the response does not excuse the offenses it does indicate that it is not policy and that action against such abuse is possible.

In general the police are civil rather than violent in the performance of their duties - the exceptions relate to suspects they believe to be guilty. Crimes of violence and robberies of poor people are the offences which most arouse the force (not burglaries of upper income households). In general worker and

peasant criticisms of police relate to inadequate numbers and toughness not to oppression or class bias.

Tanzania's prison service is basically rehabilitation through work (farming and industrial crafts) oriented - probably with some success in respect to economic context motivated offenders and persons convicted of minor crimes of violence. Because Tanzania is a poor country - not because of any state view of bad conditions as punishment - food and accommodation are austere.

Since 1965 Tanzania has had threatened or actual incursions or calls for solidarity from a neighbour in every year. Self defence clearly does explain the rise in military forces to over 60,000 at the peak of the response to the Ugandan invasion. Portugal, Zairois factions, Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, Rhodesia, and South Africa have featured as threatened and/or actual invaders. The largest military operation was the turning back of the 1978 Amin invasion and subsequent support for Ugandan liberation followed by provision of security forces to the four successive civil governments to mid-1981. The second and third have been provision of assistance to Mozambique for self defense against Rhodesian and South African/South African puppet incursions (the last a continuing operation).

The armed forces have never been used domestically. (The militia - a rather uneven homeguard - have sometimes been used as police auxiliaries but as a fairly random cross section of lower income workers and peasants whose formal involvement

is very low can hardly be seen as armed forces or even as a true security force distinct from civil society.) They are under civil government and Party (in respect to political education and ideology) control. The serious military coup attempt (Kambona 1967) came unstuck because the officers canvassed immediately reported the canvasses. The military services do not appear to be or aspire to be a separate military force though they clearly are consciously nationalist and proud of their record of professional success.

Laws, Laws, The Judiciary and Detention

Tanzania - both formally and in terms of the beliefs of a majority of its leaders - is committed to the rule of law. The passage of the 1975 village government act to regularize internal village organisation and powers (including those in relation to land), nationalisation and compensation statutes and the powers (and exercise thereof) of the Controller and Auditor General all underline this.

However, there are distinct vagaries. Many officials do not know or understand laws governing their conduct. The concept of administrative law as a tool of the state which must be obeyed while in force but subject to amendment (not casual violation) when it impedes implementation of policy is not widely grasped with much clarity.

In general major decisions directly affecting individuals are justiciable. In some cases the venue are specialist tribunals but most of these do provide for appeal to the High Court.

The exceptions to justiciability are basically political economic judgement decisions for which the appeal is seen as to the Party on policy and the Party or the ombudsman (Permanent Commission of Inquiry) on equity or propriety. In practice justiciability is little used - appeals are usually to more senior state officials, the Party or the ombudsman.

Independence of the judiciary is practically as well as formally entrenched. In certain major political cases (e.g. the treason trial) court acquittals have been allowed to stand and judges have not been removed. In a case in a sense apparently involving a state policy commitment²⁸ a senior judge privately inquired of a senior politician whether he should overrule the assessors²⁹ and convict. He was told it would be as totally improper to answer his question as it was of him to have asked it and if he repeated such an approach he would be sacked.³⁰ Certainly the courts have on occasion emasculated themselves by refusing to act on cases in which law and policy seemed in conflict but this has not, in at least the main cases, been from state or Party pressure. Indeed its main result was to delay the recognition of need to amend laws to correspond to basic policy decisions; a realisation which would have come sooner had the initial cases been adjudicated.

Tanzania has detention legislation. It is on occasions abused at both national and local levels. Abuses are at least sometimes publicized, corrected and action taken against the abuser of authority.

Detention nationally has been used to defend state security against what were perceived as real dangers but ones in which proof beyond reasonable doubt (as opposed to evidence up to reasonable certainty of a clear and present danger) was not to hand. These have included a handful of sedition/~~treason~~ cases,³¹ at least one purportedly populist agitator (to murder of suspect cattle thieves) and a rather larger number of exchange control and economic corruption cases perceived as economic sabotage threatening national economic security.³² The numbers actually in detention (excluding awaiting formulation of charges which will in fact follow) have apparently been as high as 1,000 - largely exchange control - but have usually been under 100 and often (as at early 1982) either under 100 or nil.³³

Detention without trial is undesirable because always open to abuse. Tanzanians are aware of this danger. To date use of detention has been relatively rare, relatively brief and - with the possible exception of the exchange control cases - not a handy substitute for trials.³⁴

The greatest dangers to the rule of law appear to be technocratic weaknesses. Prosecutions are often inept, many of the magistracy do not seem to have a very good comprehension of the law, the seriousness (in social and rational terms) of certain economic offenses (e.g. exchange control violations resulting in substantial foreign exchange loss) is not comprehended by the courts,³⁵ the police are understaffed qualitatively and particularly in respect to specialist personnel. Weaknesses in arrest and conviction rates,

acquittals (however proper) on technical grounds and trivial sentences for crimes having major national economic consequences do erode faith in the legal process.

Freedom of Speech, Fear, Access to Communication

Formally Tanzanians have freedom of speech. In practice many exercise it both within and outside Party/state forums. While most criticism is supportive, a substantial amount calls for substantial and some for systemic change. Prosecution or detention for criticism is unknown and victimisation in other ways, while not unknown, not particularly common.

That said, there is a widespread concern that respect for authority can become fear to criticize, fear to make criticism (especially of misconduct) detailed enough to act on and - especially - fear to make proposals as to ways, means and new policies lest these be misconstrued as hostile criticism. Building up civil criticism and intellectual initiative (rather than suppressing it) has been of substantial concern to the President and a significant number of other Party and state leaders with some success over time.

How much fear there is is hard to evaluate. Some surely. But when criticisms so serious and so detailed as to justify wholesale restructuring of senior regional personnel can be and are made to the President at an open meeting (and are acted upon - Mwanza 1980/81) then one is not in anything resembling a basically repressive state. Similarly when police investigating complaints about street vendors refusing to pay licenses after their abolition read the newspapers

waved by vendors, ring the Treasury to check and tell the city would be collectors to be gone or arrested for harrassment, neither fear of petty administrative power (nor a basis for such fear) in its classic form exists. However, as the cases submitted to and reported on (often with particular or more general results) by the ombudsman show, there are reasons for fear but also a belief that improper actions should be challenged and can be to some purpose. Letters to the editor in the press (which is basically Party and parastatal) are on balance frank and critical - sometimes hostilely so.

The trend appears to be toward more, more detailed and more searching criticism. Clearly the problems of the present crisis create reasons for such a trend but that it is evident suggests that they have not given rise (as they might well have) to greater authoritarian suppression of criticism.

The radio is state operated. It is not particularly critical and except for major speeches or national campaigns perhaps not very analytical or educational in any direction despite some improvement over the past few years. The main press (two parastatal papers, one a Party institution) is another matter. It is frequently critical, reasonably and increasingly (if unevenly) analytical and does publish letters to the editor and "guest features" which are often critical of major policies as well as of improprieties and botches and are sometimes basically in contradiction (to left or right) with main line Ujamaa ideology. There are indeed limits to the freedom of these papers - the proprietors do sometimes write leaders, in 1971

the (then largely expatriate) editors of the Daily News were changed when it openly backed a communist military coup in the Sudan against known government policy (in military camps in general as well as that instance) - but they are probably less restrictive than those imposed by most proprietors.

There are some independent, weekly or monthly, church papers (one Lengo very much in the business of social analysis and criticism and the sister to a paper subject to severe pressures from time to time in Kenya) which do have claims to critical and analytical independence. The one or two private commercially oriented weeklies avoid any socio political or political economic substance and are hardly significant communication media.

Publishing in Tanzania includes independent magazines (basically critical main line and left critic mixes) and both parastatal and private commercial book publishers (related to more general printing business). Left (by the parastatal publisher) and right (by a church press) critics volumes have been printed (and reviewed, not necessarily hostilely, in the parastatal newspapers). Given the limited foreign exchange newsprint and ink import licenses could easily be - but have not been - used to control all publications.

The foreign press corps is exiguous and not very professional. It has on occasion been sharply criticized but deportations or visa denials are rare and usually related to causes broader than criticism per se. Foreign newspapers, magazines and books

are not very widely available not because of censorship but because of foreign exchange limitations. The partial exceptions are Africa, Africa Now, New African, Newsweek and Time. Foreign radio broadcasts are not jammed. A selection of foreign press reports - somewhat oddly usually highly critical³⁶ ones - are printed in the parastatal newspapers under the heading "What they say about us".

Relations of Party, statal and parastatal bodies to the press and to researchers are marked by a mixture of desire to inform (based on a belief they can often take pride in what they have achieved and a parallel belief that outside observation and analysis can provide useful insights), a fear of being misinterpreted, a conviction that knowledge is power and should be reviewed before release, a shortage of time (compounded by the arrogant time demands of many researchers and pressman) and an old tradition (colonial but also global bureaucratic) of secretism. In practice release of information and access for research is very uneven, sometimes amazingly open and biased in favour of known persons (citizen or foreigner) whose past performance leads to a belief there will be a fair (not necessarily favourable) assessment and a return flow of useful comment and analysis.³⁷ On balance the record is improving, better than in the USSR, probably better than in the UK but distinctly poorer than in Scandinavia or the USA.

Voluntary Organisations: Scope and Limitations

It would be a mistake to see Tanzanian civil society and social organisation as consisting solely of Party and state units or adjuncts. The network of organisations to which individuals, families and members of sub-classes belong is substantially more complex and dense.³⁸

One group does consist of Party affiliates and sections - youth, women, parents, wage workers, elders. At one level these are part of the Party structure but in terms of local, and even in some cases national level activity they have substantial autonomy and initiative. This is especially true of women and parents. UWT (the women's organisation) serves as an umbrella for a wide array of basically independent local women's groups related to particular economic and social level and/or liberation issues. TAPA (the parent's organisation) has turned into a pressure group for middle income parents seeking to protect/expand private secondary schools to buy their children an extra chance if they fail to pass state system entry exams. Arguably - some CCM leaders have indeed argued it and TAPA was almost dropped as an affiliated organisation in 1977 - this is a sub-class position quite inconsistent with the main line Ujamaa ideology.

Somewhat analagous are the ~~Workers~~ Councils as foci for employment unit level worker organisation (often, outside the formal trade union - JUWATA - branch). Such organisation ranges from non-existent to significant and in the latter case often goes

beyond employment conditions, and receiving respect for workers as human beings to direct economic (eg co-op shop, savings and credit society) and mutual assistance activity.

The largest voluntary organisations in the Western sense are religious - Islamic and Christian with a combined fairly regularly practicing membership of perhaps 5 million and a much larger less active one. The membership of the former is larger but the latter are much more organised and socially active. While direct basic social service function provision is largely state, there is still a significant religious institution involvement in health and teacher training as well as less broadly based services including counselling (para-psychiatric) and urban residences for unmarried women. Church involvement in rural development has been uneven but quite substantial at grassroots level in certain views both in the past and today. There is no very coherent Christian or Islamic socio or politic economic/applied theological position. While there are liberation theologians, the institutional churches are relatively conservative but not usually to the extent of being identifiably part of any counter ideological position or even of being very coherent or frequent critics of state and Party. On balance state relations with church and mosque as social institutions are friendly, albeit not particularly close.

Urban co-operatives have several thousand members (beyond those in co-op shops which are adjuncts of employment unit worker organisations and women in specifically women's production or

trading co-ops). They are in retail trade, small industry or crafts and transport with quite uneven levels of success - a number have demonstrated substantial capacity to survive and to continue to carry out economic functions.³⁹

Other Western type organisations include sports clubs, YMCA's and YWCA's, a family planning association, Rotary and Round Table, Red Cross, St. John's Ambulance Society, and a variety of local social service bodies. The sports clubs-entered on football - have by far the largest membership and some of them are the only basically working class organisations in this group. The Y's and family planning association are fairly strong but basically middle class. The Rotary and Roundtable by their nature are noblesse oblige manager/owner groups and as such have a real impact. The others are fairly weak in membership and programme with a handful of local, specific issue exceptions.

Modified African "traditional" civil society bodies have not been studied very systematically.⁴⁰ While traditional community ("tribal" and clan) organisations are, in general, not strong in Tanzania a number of other groups - eg age groups - are and have significant roles within certain "modern" institutions including villages, rural militia units and Party units up to branch level.

All voluntary organisations require registration to operate in Tanzania and must file annual reports on operations. This

requirement is not operated particularly restrictively albeit some of the refusals to register - usually on the basis of concealed social divisiveness or anti-Ujamaa orientation - are less than easy to understand on their face. The standard African ban on Jehovah's Witnesses and its direct action wing, the Watchtower Movement, applies in Tanzania. Bodies which - as the Witnesses/Watchtower do - specifically deny the legitimacy of the state (and Party) fall outside the limits of tolerance and democratic choice as they are interpreted in Tanzania. The same holds true of bodies which set themselves up as advocates and operators of alternative socio-economic policies especially if they are substantially foreign led or funded - eg the Ruvuma Development Association.⁴¹

The larger voluntary organisations (and those like Rotary/Round-table providing specific social service complements to the state sector) are perceived by the state and Party as legitimate and significant parts of civil society. They receive funding for particular programmes. The Tanzanian Community Development Trust has been reorganised as a quasi official liaison body to bring together foreign and local (especially village) voluntary associations in programme cooperation.

Sub Class Struggle: Notes On Problematic Complexity

The main line Ujamaa ideology, as noted, quite overtly recognises the existence of class struggle and the need for action based on class interests. It is equally clear in situating CCM as a party of workers and peasants at least in membership base and aspiration.

However, the tone of CCM (and its predecessor TANU) on sub-class struggle has usually been in terms of non or semi antagonistic contradictions to be resolved by a series of state actions no one of which could be described as revolutionary and which would not, in practice, cause heightened inter-sub class antagonism. Even in respect to more revolutionary measures - eg nationalisations, leadership code, Mwongozo on participation - the level of rhetorical condemnation has been relatively muted, and the "who is not against us is with us" approach has been used to maximise acceptance and minimise the potential allies for actual or would be active opponents.

There are a number of reasons behind this approach:

1. Tanzania took over state power in working order, peacefully but also without the breadth and intensity of national consciousness a longer and more bitter independence struggle might have forged;
2. Tanzanian consciousness of exploitation was largely in terms of foreign domination not domestic sub-classes and at the latter level was at independence dangerously open to deteriorating into racism against the Asian minority;⁴²
3. The human, ideological, consciousness institutional and financial resources of Tanzania (and until 1977 perhaps especially those under firm Party/state control) were (and remain) limited and fragile - thus repeated violent contradictions could shatter rather than speed up development and transition to socialism;

4. Objectively the main enemy is seen as imperialism in the sense of a great power dominated global political economic and geopolitical system, and in particular, the white Southern African sub-system (now reduced to South Africa and its occupied territory of Namibia, but in 1961 comprising all territories south of Tanganyika, as it then was). Therefore, the cost of domestic class struggles to national solidarity against imperialism was perceived as substantial, especially if the struggles became bitterly and openly antagonistic;⁴³
5. The relative ease of the transition to independence meant not just that there was no clear "anti-national" sub-class coalition which had stood with the colonialists (as there clearly was in - say - Mozambique) but also no coherent sub-class coalition ranged against TANU, a context in which heightening contradictions might solidify opposition, and force it to organise more effectively than a less high-key and more gradual approach;
6. Many - probably most - Tazanians share President Nyerere's belief that civility and reasoned discourse are valuable because of the nature of the human relations they make possible. "Argue, don't shout" as the President titled a foreign policy memorandum to leaders, has been a working maxim of TANU/CCM and of state organs.

This is very far from saying that class struggle has not taken place or that the Party/state have not been directly - and usually conspicuously - involved, sometimes in problematic or ambiguous ways. It is perhaps easiest to cite instances in respect to particular sub-classes: Neo-kulaks, Peasants, Wage Earners, Bureaucratic-Managerial Elite, Capitalist/Rentiers, Intellectuals and Women.

Neo-kulaks - The Main Perceived Domestic Challenge

The alliance of neo-kulaks (large peasants amassing good land and employing labour) with officials (particularly local, but more generally within the Ministry of Agriculture) and co-op managers was at independence potentially a real challenge to more worker/peasant orientation dominance within TANU. Senior politicians up to Cabinet level were - at least then - associated with it, while the co-op structure including two major financial institutions was the largest African controlled economic institution in Tanzania.

Clashes between these two orientations were fairly frequent at local and regional Party level - especially in Kagera (then West Lake), Mwanza, Shinyanga, Arusha, Kilimamjaro and Iringa Regions. The 1965 elections weakened the neo-kulak strength in the Assembly (although it remained of some significance at least until the 1968 expulsions of a group of MP's associated with or seeking to build a base on it).

The action to reduce the neo-kulak power base was step by step. Co-op movement inquiries led to re-organisations and suspensions designed to remove entrenched neo-kulak leadership and strengthen small peasant influence. In 1971 the Co-op Bank and Rural Development Credit Agency were taken from the Co-ops, and the first merged into the National Bank of Commerce and the latter reformed as the Rural Development Bank (both responsible to Finance, not Agriculture). In 1976 co-ops beyond primary level were abolished. Their planned recreation at district and regional level, given the new village primary society base and the general weakening of neo-kulak influence, may have quite different sub-class implications than was previously the case.

Land reallocation in Ujamaa (1967-73) and Development (1974-76)

villages reduced the neo-kulak share of good land. Villageisation reduced their influence over other peasants and the degree to which state services were concentrated on them. The creation of a Rural Development Division in the Prime Minister's Office provided a counter to the believed pro-kulak bias of most agricultural offices. All these changes were relative - larger peasants still have more land (albeit land distribution in Tanzania is very equal - excluding parastatal units and a handful of plantations - by world or even African standards), hold a disproportionate share of village level posts, and receive more attention from extension officers than their numbers warrant. The impact has been uneven - in some villages and districts neo-kulak influence remains strong, and - especially in the Arusha-Moshi area a number of neo-kulaks are individually prosperous and organised to protect their interests as a local sub-class. But overall, it has been weakened absolutely, is no longer advancing and can hardly be seen as a potential focus for a counter coalition inside or outside the Party.

Peasants: Penetration, Participation and Power

Small peasants are the mass base of CCM and their interests the key reference point for many leaders both verbally and in practice. However, their actual power has always been somewhat problematic.

At one level the struggle against neo-kulaks was waged for (not really by except in isolated land shortage areas like Ismani near Iringa, cases of traditional quasi-feudal rents eg Bukoba and battles for the control of Lake Victoria zone cooperatives) small peasants and they have gained by it. Similarly 'villageisation' was largely to allow them to organise themselves and to have access to government services.

As the opening quote from President Nyerere suggests, there is a distinct view by many within CCM that the approach has been too paternalistic and bureaucratic. It has often hampered peasant initiatives and raised questions as to whether peasant access to power and state penetration⁴⁴ and surplus extraction⁴⁵ was the underlying goal. Ironically the cases of coercion surrounding villageisation in some districts, the rather high handed imposition of village managers and frequent patronising or overtly authoritarian attitudes by some Party and state officials have combined with the greater case of self organisation afforded by villages to raise peasant class consciousness in many villages. Taking the main line ideology at its face value (at least tactically) they have sought to alter the power balance between themselves and officials and to secure more resource

allocations. Retreat from the broader polity and economy (also possible given the objective lack of real rural coercive power) seems to have been much less frequent. Objectively with village councils, substantial communal activity and greater self consciousness of peasants' paid position, morale and self image appear to have strengthened. However, to describe them as dominant would be blindly romantic.

Wage Earners - Income and Production Relations Issues

Organised wage earners in Tanzania have not been a dominant class but have been more self conscious and self assertive than peasants. Their position has also been more problematic as rapid increases in their personal incomes could worsen overall national and especially urban/rural income distribution and because before the 1964 military strike (a true military coup attempt it was not) trade union leaders had shown signs of wanting a more populist, chauvinist strategy than the government and Party would countenance.

JUWATA does not self evidently represent or organise workers very effectively. Post 1965 minimum wage increases (to protect real purchasing power until 1975 and to halt its erosion in 1980 and 1981) seem to have turned on Treasury initiatives and the creation of Workers Councils as employment units based participatory bodies to alter production relations on Party initiatives. While JUWATA has been active in developing employment security and working conditions/ grievance procedures (eg Workers Committees), in organising adult education (including political) for workers, and in appointing worker directors

(symptomatically at least as often from its own staff as from the company in question's workers) its worker level base is tenuous and its claim to be controlled by its shop floor members very problematic.

Worker self organisation - reflected in and stimulated by Mwongozo - has turned on de facto "workers assemblies" led by Workers Council members and in CCM workplace branches.

It has not been primarily economic and its economic objections have more often related to fringe benefits (free travel to work, hot noon meals, medical care), co-op shops and incentive schemes than to wages per se. Achieving respect for workers (including self-respect) and a disciplinary system that applied to managers as much as to workers (and in the same way) have been the dominant short term aims with an actual, effective voice in firm planning and operation overtly a significant present, as medium-term are in some cases. The clashes on management disrespect for workers have normally been over by workers - with state/Party backing. The attainment of effective discipline and managers had been less operational support and the ways of making worker participation an enterprise overall decision taking effective (beyond the firms in which management, for whatever reason, backs it) have received very limited and not very systematic attention.

A spate of attempted worker direct takeovers of private enterprises and a handful of strikes seen as relatively privileged worker attempts to exploit quasi-monopolies over 1971-72 were strongly resisted by the government and Party. The reasons turned partly on order and due process and partly - at least in the wages cases - on a belief that these particular workers were seeking to exploit not to and exploitation. Attempts by managers to roll back Workers Council/Mwongozo gains to restore

authoritarianism have in general failed. Indeed some worker leaders at plant level have carefully planned approaches to build up Party/state leader backing for specific gains (in some cases wholesale managerial changes) by showing reasons why - eg - Treasury or Parliament should have concerns complementary to those of workers.

However, the majority of wage workers (in the private sector, government units, many parastatals) do not have effective Workers Councils or employment unit level organisation. Production and industrial relations have changed but remain heavily paternalistic/hierarchical (and in a not inconsiderable number of cases oppressive) and very far from participatory socialist. Workers as a class do have a deeper consciousness than in the past and have somewhat more power (especially to protect themselves) but are not a dominant class whether singly or together with peasants. (Indeed at typical worker/peasant level it is doubtful whether there is any coherent, mass sense of mutual class interests beyond the level of slogans.)

Bureaucratic - Managerial Elite - Weakness and Centrality

In sub-class terms the relative power of bureaucrats and managers either in terms of personal incomes or of ability to direct and coerce workers and peasants has declined since 1967 and especially over 1971-73 and 1975-77. This erosion strongly suggests they cannot be seen as a dominant sub-class.⁴⁶ For individuals - at least until 1973 - advance in respect of both real income and power was quite possible given generally rapid promotion; since 1973 erosion has affected most individuals.

This is a somewhat surprising objective trend. Managers/bureaucrats are a relatively self conscious class and are well aware that they - as a group - are essential to the functioning of the state. They have - in a majority of cases - sought to limit increases in worker and peasant participation and power.

One reason is probably that many managers and bureaucrats have internalised substantial elements of the main line ideology. They certainly oppose some elements - usually on a case by case not a general principle basis - but wish to be perceived as critics within the main stream not proponents of a systematic alternative. How seriously most oppose worker participation is unclear - when discussing their problems among themselves the participation/discipline set of issues is very much less prominent than when talking to "outsiders." They do not have a very firm sense of sub-class solidarity - institutional (rather than sub-class) loyalties, parastatal - civil services tensions and a lack of any instinct to rally round managers/officials of other bodies under pressure from workers or peasants are quite noticeable. Finally, few really do see a clear route to a design for a better alternative system - even for themselves - than the present one and feel quite certain that they will continue to enjoy well above average income, status and power under any likely evolution of the main line ideology.

Capitalists/Rentiers - Contraction, When and How Far

At independence there were no substantial African capitalists and rentiers. While their numbers grew to 1967 they were still minute and African capital was a minor fraction of domestic, let

domestic and international, capital in Tanzania. Citizen Asian and external capital had - in practice - no way to make alliances with other sub-classes (not even, at those dates, with African capital because of their historic - and to a degree continuing - exclusion of Africans).

Party/state attitudes toward capitalists since 1967 have fluctuated moderately, but around four main themes:

- a. in the long run there is no place for large and medium-scale capitalist enterprises in Tanzania;
- b. the state directly productive sector must consolidate and maintain its dominance at the level of large and medium-scale economic activity;
- c. in the medium-term private capital can play useful roles in small and medium-scale production (especially industry), specialised distribution and joint ventures requiring inputs the state cannot otherwise acquire;
- e. within the limits of "b" and "c" relatively friendly, if also frank, negotiations leading to operations of the private sector useful to Tanzanian development with a socialist orientation are possible.

This approach - combined with the objective weakness of domestic capital - has meant that since the 1967 nationalisations, clashes have been on specific issues (normally lost by the capitalists unless the public sector could not, in practice, cope - eg, urban butchers were returned to the private sector) and that there has been absolute (not relative) growth of domestic private capital. The opportunities which the post-1978 crisis has created for exploitation in the colloquial sense may break this truce - at least in respect to major fractions of domestic capital - but do not alter the fact that the

class is very weak politically, especially as it lacks any serious symbiotic links with foreign capital.

Rentiers - in the Tanzanian context, landlords - have been viewed with less favour by TANU/CCM with the exception of elderly persons owning a limited amount of rental accommodation to provide a de facto pension.⁴⁷ 1971 legislation virtually eliminated large-scale private landlordism (albeit with more evident results in limiting cross exploitation among upper-income groups than either benefits to workers and peasants, or to state revenue). While some has crept back on a limited scale, that remains the broad picture.

Intellectuals - Sub-class? Class Spokesman? Illusionists?

Whether intellectuals are a sub-class is somewhat problematic. They can be the analysts, apologists and among the leaders of quite different sub-classes but that is a different type of statement. In Tanzania many university faculty and some journalists would see themselves as constituting an intellectual class. University students tend to identify with this class while students, but not subsequently.

Objectively, by Tanzanian standards, that sub-class is on average well paid, subject to very lax discipline, allowed substantial freedom of expression and not very productive.⁴⁸ It is often perceived as a bureaucratic/managerial sub-class without any real responsibilities (albeit also with very little power and - as a sub-class if such it be - relatively little influence). Its own perception is that it is not respected enough and that its potential analytical and leadership roles are thwarted.

In fact, except when acting to protect material interests, this sub-class is highly fragmented. A majority are basically apolitical or passive supporters of the main-line ideology. A minority are active main-line Ujamaa ideology supporters and involved in advisory, analytical and critical roles, often of substantial influence. A minority (possibly smaller than the second but much more vocal, strident and bent on intimidating intellectuals who disagree with it) form the core of the left authoritarian counter ideology. By their demand for power without validation by workers or peasants, they have forfeited much of the substantial influence they had over 1967-69. The Tanzanian state and Party have very substantial respect for intellectual skills and substantial tolerance of intellectual eccentricities, but very little for would-be self-appointed Platonic Guardians of the right or left, external or internal.

Women: Subordination, Consciousness, Access

Women are socially, politically and economically subordinated in Tanzania in ways that for certain purposes make it useful to view them as a class. The main-line Ujamaa ideology does not deal directly with the issues of female subordination in any detail, but some of its elements do have positive implications for liberation of women.

The Party in fact apparently provided the initial breakthrough for women into public life and - via its women's league (now UWT) - the first chance of self-organisation. How conscious of their particular class interests as women this participation made them is much more doubtful. Certainly TANU did not press for, nor obtain substantial numbers of women leaders in state, parastatals or Party.

Further, UWT tended for many years to be organised and led wholly by upper middle-class women (often wives of prominent leaders) and to relate somewhat exigously to the concerns of worker and peasant women. Overt public sector job discrimination against women was only eliminated after the Arusha Declaration, and after it was pointed out by a handful of leaders and technocrats (largely men) that it seemed inconsistent with the declaration, not as an initial main principle or programme component.

Over the past fifteen years significant changes have occurred:

- a. the emphasis on rural water supply is highly beneficial to women whose time is saved thereby (albeit interestingly also very strongly backed by men) and the growing village woodlot campaign, if successful, will have a similar impact;
- b. rapid movement toward universal literacy and primary education disproportionately benefits women because of their much lower initial literacy and school attendance rates;
- c. the proportion of women in middle-level posts has risen (and that in middle-level training programmes even more) but is still below 20%, in top-level managerial/bureaucratic positions it is under 10%;
- d. villageisation has assisted rural women's self-organisation and has apparently caused somewhat greater realisation that effective extension work must relate to women as well as men;
- e. two competent women ministers were appointed in 1975 (interestingly not to traditional "women's" Ministries) and have been retained, while (largely in the appointed and - intriguingly - the indirectly elected categories) the per cent of women MP's has climbed to about 10, and that on local councils and committees to perhaps 20;

e. women's organisations - both under the UWT umbrella and outside it - have become more oriented to "women's issues" and somewhat more worker and peasant oriented and - at local level - led, while at least one significant national voluntary organisation (family planning) has a dominantly female leadership.

It is noticeable that many of these changes do not result from self-conscious organisation and struggle by women. Some - eg the basic service programmes - have rarely been perceived in terms of male/female issues. Women's status and self-image has improved. Their access to incomes and control over their earnings remains sharply inferior to that of men but less so than in 1961, 1967 or 1973. In urban areas this has created a distinct sub-class of women workers who have semi-permanent social relations with men but outside marriage or a single household, apparently to achieve control over their incomes and head of household status. How common or how rapidly growing this pattern is remains unclear - it is certainly a minority one. Men's perception of "women's roles" also seems to have changed in that the idea of women in almost any non-military and non-religious position is not not seen as per se implausible by large numbers (a majority?) of Tanzanian men.

Crisis and Response

Any overall approach to Tanzanian polity and ideology at less than volume length will give an inadequate sense of change, and especially of the process of change. How the state and Party have responded to (and built on the basis of those responses to) crises in the past is relevant both for understanding how Tanzania moved from 1961 to 1981 and for identifying possible directions of change in and after 1982.

In 1961 at independence both state and Party were weak and brittle. The very unusual response was for President (then Prime Minister) Nyerere to leave office to work full-time for a year reconstructing the Party base and leadership consciousness. In 1962 the conundrum (if not crisis) of securing actually contested elections and open debate was resolved by creating a one-party state with contested elections. The 1964 quasi-coup attempt (and believed trade union fringe relationships to it) led to radical restructuring and politicisation of both the armed forces and trade unions, but also to much more systematic attention to and speeding-up of Tanzanianisation, and of increased job security and worker influence over working conditions and grievance procedures.

By 1966 the failure of classic social democracy and a relatively liberal economic policy to reduce inequality, meet basic needs or lay a foundation for stable development was increasingly clear. The Arusha Declaration response of nationalisation to give the public sector a dominant role, the leadership code to place a divide between statal, parastatal and Party elected and appointed leaders and private business, emphasis on self-reliance (especially, though not solely, in terms of outlook) and enhanced domestic resource mobilisation was prompt, effectively followed up and

creative. (It was also - as was clearer at the time than in retrospect, a high-risk strategy.) In 1971 the Amin coup and its blatant appeals to the most chauvinistic and racist strands of populism were perceived as a threat to Tanzania's non-racial and semi-consensual ethos, especially in a context of growing sub-class consciousness. The Mwangozo - which do not actually mention the Amin model at all - responded to the internal contradiction and external ideological threat by formulating a notably more radical and contradiction-conscious set of operating guidelines centred on participation, priority to workers and peasants and redressing exploitative social and production relations (as well as ownership) patterns.

The 1974 crisis turned on drought and external (especially oil and grain) price changes. The response included a coherent, austerity strategy to sustain development momentum, limit real income losses to minimum wage earners and peasants, and to restructure the economy to reduce external dependence and vulnerability to shocks. It also included speeding-up universal literacy, adult education, primary schooling and access to pure water programmes, as well as completing villageisation and a legislative basis for village self-government. While the actual crisis management strategy adopted in 1974 and pursued successfully over 1974-76 was not broadly participatory in formulation, it was carefully and convincingly explained, (not simply imposed) while the parallel measures were all the subject of broadly-based dialogue at all levels in the Party.

In 1978 the Amin invasion created a brief fear that the state might be overthrown, and following the return to Kagera (and the discovery of the massacres) both an intense feeling of national

unity and a mass demand to hit back - "Bring back the head of the Great Snake" as the quite spontaneous mass demonstrations chanted. The cautious, low-key management of the war (which only became a commitment to help Ugandans liberate their country when there were mass welcomes for Tanzanians engaged in tactical attacks, and only too believable Amin threats to kill everyone in the districts concerned) was both politically and militarily far from moving blindly, or giving in to mass demands, as opposed to regaining leadership and leading on a rather different route.

The 1979 crisis was again economic. It had the same external shock elements as 1974 plus the bill for repelling Amin and supporting the liberation of Uganda. In addition, 1977-79 had been Tanzania's only period of fiscal laxity, and most pronounced one of managerial indiscipline (or laxity) leading to very substantial real resource wastes. The lag in producing an initial strategy was greater, the participation again narrow and explanation and mobilisation in support of it - like the strategy - somewhat more lagged and fragmentary than in 1974. Appeals to restore efficiency by restoring authoritarian discipline (ie "repealing" Mwongozo) which had grown over 1975-1978 were firmly rejected. Dialogue and discussion toward restoring district-level elective bodies and peasant-based co-op structures beyond village level were speeded up with 1982/83 set for implementation. Basic service maintenance and expansion was reaffirmed as a goal, and minimum wage increases to avert real purchasing power losses restored (in 1981 after a five year gap) despite harsh overall fiscal austerity.

This record suggests three things about how the Tanzanian system responds to crises:

- a. in general participation and egalitarianism are broadened, or at the least defended, rather than curtailed;
- b. efforts are made to use the crisis to institute measures that overcome a secondary contradiction and lay a base for further advance after the crisis, not merely to take action necessary for immediate systemic survival;
- c. however, the immediate crisis response economic packages do not tend to be broadly participatory (partly at least because of time constraints) despite detailed subsequent explanations and some of the egalitarian/basic needs/participatory programmes are in part, at least, implemented by authoritarian means (notably villageisation, albeit that experience has probably led to closer central Party/state monitoring to avoid "over-enthusiastic" decentralised implementation⁴⁹).

Fairly clearly, there is a distinct tension - at times contradiction - between the first and third characteristics. To date, it has been resolved largely in favour of the first - advances in participation and access tend to stick, incursions of authoritarianism tend to be reversed. However, because the 1979-?? crisis is longer lasting and more severe, it would be naive to ignore the danger of reversal of that pattern, just as it would be most imprudent to talk of the long-term gains from 1979-81 crisis management measures until it is clear that they will pass the immediate tests of stabilising and restoring a forward dynamic to the economy, which they have demonstrably not, or not yet, done as of the second quarter of 1982; even though they have averted the imminent collapse which appeared to be only months away in the last quarter of 1979.

Quo Vadis?

Tanzania is currently the object of analytical dirges from left centre and right external analysts and experts. Albeit for varied (in some cases diametrically opposed) reasons, they foresee collapse. While there have been earlier laments for the dying (in 1967 and 1974/75 in particular), they have never been so numerous and uniform. Were Tanzanians to accept them, their logical course of action would be that of Empedocles on Aetna. In general, Tanzanians - whether workers and peasants or leaders - do not accept these voices of doom. What can be said about this clash over prospects for the 1980's?

A series of very serious problems can be identified:

1. real import capacity is at best two-thirds what is needed to operate the economy at capacity, because over 1961-1979 export development (or earned import capacity development) strategy was non-existent, and because over 1972-1982 the unit purchasing power of exports fell by over 50%;
2. internal inefficiencies in resource use (despite correction of the more glaring over 1979-81) compound real resource scarcities and - more critically at present - are in many cases made insoluble by the foreign exchange constraint;
3. the strategy of "all boats float lower" (egalitarianism and defence of basic services in a context of falling real national purchasing power) is not a compellingly attractive strategy to any sub-class, unless a return to "all boats float higher" can be foreseen;
4. Because of nearly continuous crises from 1974 (1976-78 was the exception) there are distinct erosions of energy, probity and morale;

5. Response to crises may become increasingly authoritarian which - whether it preserved the state and Party or not - would destroy the main-line ideology;
6. The international environment is hostile in respect to the impact of the industrial capitalist economy created and continued depression, the failure to achieve even serious negotiations toward mutually beneficial changes in North-South structural relations, the geopolitical realities of the South African systems' relations with its neighbours.

Objectively it is very difficult to analyse a way forward for Tanzania and remarkably easy (especially for those with no particular commitment to Tanzania, or with Tanzanians) to sketch a plethora of scenarios of collapse. Further doubts can be raised about, and defects identified in, 1979-81 response once the gravity of the crisis had been perceived. Self-criticism and analysis has been fairly searching and complete, but its depth and emphases may be more problematic. Contingency planning has not been adequately co-ordinated, acted on promptly enough, nor explained effectively (in terms of viability and potential results, as well as of what to do) to those called on to act in support of its implementation. Mobilisation is very unequal and some facile attempts - eg, most compulsory acreage requirements for peasants - have little positive impact, raise divisive tensions and corrode the basis for genuine mobilisation.

However, an opposite set of points can be made:

1. morale is surprisingly high, given the context - a dogged determination to push forward, a commitment to overcoming particular obstacles and at least a half-faith that success is possible, are far commoner in Tanzania than cynicism or despair;

2. 1979-81 saw a remarkable improvement in policy and performance especially in respect to efficiency of scarce resource allocation and use - without it, the economy would have seized up like an unlubricated engine by the middle of 1980;
3. the physical production record is reasonably good (about 5% a year in quantity terms over the 1970's) and could be improved were foreign resources to be secured to break bottlenecks and restore capacity utilisation;
4. the substantial 1961-77 gains in - eg, life expectancy, nutrition, basic services - have, to date, been preserved;
5. the actual 1979-81 trend has, if anything, been to more consultation and participation rather than to authoritarianism;
6. Tanzania has fought its way through crises before, eg the 1974 international economic crisis, the 1978 Amin invasion when cold analysis from objective data suggested a very high risk of failure.

The future both in terms of the survival of state and Party and of positive evolution of the main-line ideological position, is problematic. Problematic, not hopeless.

For the analytical forecaster the best guide may be cautionary - Pliny's "ex Africa aliquod semper novae". For the analyst committed to Tanzania and Tanzanians, or to what Tanzania is attempting, a paraphrase of Gramsci may be a more appropriate guide to analysis and action - pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.

NOTES

1. This paper covers Mainland Tanzania (99% of area and 98% of population) only because Zanzibar and Pemba (the other partner in the United Republic) is significantly different in many respects. Since 1972 and especially since unification of the two single parties in 1977 there has been a considerable shift by Zanzibar toward positions and conditions similar to those of the Mainland, but the divergences are great enough to make coverage in a single paper impracticable - especially as the author has quite limited knowledge of Zanzibar.
2. See Bank of Tanzania 20 Year Political Economic Review and R.H. Green, "Political Economic Adjustment and IMF Conditionality" cited in Methodological Note for fuller presentation.
3. "Ndio, bwana" is also a safe answer to an order or instruction but, by itself, gives little clue to what the respondent will do.
4. Presumably the goals posited are those of the author. However, valid they may be, analysis which supposes them to be Tanzania's goals when they are not, creates confusion.
5. Tanzanian political thought and action does not seem to have been deeply influenced by Fabianism.
6. This has been a recurrent problem - an abnormally high proportion (by no means all) of the verbally hard left have recanted and/or defected over the 1961-81 period with Ugandan leaders (ex-leaders) like Nabudere and Tandon who has been prominent University of Dar es Salaam left authoritarian critics of main-line Ujamaa among the recent examples.
7. Usually but not always. The campaign for rental buildings (more accurately large landlord) nationalisation was in quite harsh class conflict terms. But then again, that was - as it evolved - basically a populist not a Marxist initiative.
8. This does not necessarily hold of university contributions to dialogue, debate and criticism.
9. In the President's case his initial major reading of these works was over 1966-70.
10. Doubtless Tanzanian perceptions have been coloured by Kenya's famous Sessional Paper No. 10, African Socialism which is an apologia for capitalism red in tooth and claw and dominated by foreign capital.
11. Not including hero-worship of the national leader to which President Nyerere is highly allergic.
12. The key actions were in cutting neo-kulak links to political power, professional officials and economic institutions rather than in any general squeezing of individual large, wage labour employing farmers.

13. That fact has led to somewhat confused criticism. Production socialists (and their capitalist analogues such as Eliot Berg) view serious resource allocations to basic consumption and service needs as whimsical. Either they assume the assertions are false - hiding real accumulation and production methods - or they criticism them as self-evidently unsound. A well publicised case turned on the Dar es Salaam automated bakery actually built to meet a proletarian demand to curb bread ~~and~~ adulteration and short-weighting (see R.H. Green, The Automated Bakery - A Study of Decision Taking Goals, Processes and Problems In Tanzania, Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) Discussion Paper No. 141, 1978. A recent production socialist critique is A.M. Babu's "Production before prestige", Guardian Third World Review, 23-IV-82.
14. Prices paid for public sector marketed crops grew 5% faster than the prices of urban goods while the urban minimum wage grew a third less rapidly, ie a 38% improvement in peasant/minimum wage-earner gross barter terms of trade.
15. This may be debateable - right critics argue that egalitarianism in decision taking/rejecting power has grown spectacularly and disastrously, and many peasants and workers that it has grown substantially and desirably.
16. The fact that intellectual criticism was of over-emphasis on exports when in fact less than 10% of investment and 2-3% of recurrent spending was so directed did not help.
17. It also benefits from expatriate domestic and external intellectual support.
18. Managers and bureaucrats do believe this power has been wrested from them by Party action and its return blocked by worker/peasant struggle backed by the Party and some elements of the state apparatus.
19. Arguably the 1971 reversal of a tentative decision to end private secondary schools (as private medical practice had been ended) and to drop the parents' association (basically a private school lobby by 1977 as a Party affiliate) was a later and successful battle. However, it was an issue which the leadership did not see as central, the private school constituency included many managers-officials-politicians who were otherwise main-line supporters, the final decision increased state control over, and power to block, further expansion of private secondary schools.
20. There have been actual disqualifications on each ground.
21. In general these were neo-kulak centred regional counter-conditions capturing Party units.
22. The ultimate power of the Party is to expel MP's as Party members which automatically disqualifies them as MP's.
23. Party personnel are paid on the state salary scale.
24. The refusal is by no means uniform - many managers and officials fear (or respect) the power behind serious Party intervention.

25. At least that is the impression given by listening either to those who have lost by such actions or those who believe they have gained from them.
26. See Bank of Tanzania volume (op cit); R.H. Green, D.G. Rwegasira, B.Van Arkadie, Economic Shocks and National Policy Making, B.U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, cited in Methodological Note for much fuller discussion.
27. The largest (and least odd) is housing provided at a fixed fraction (12½%) of gross income. Others are use of institutional vehicles, rather frequent institutional entertaining with hosts outnumbering guests, and exchange (at official prices but with preferential access) of scarce goods or services among managers of their producers.
28. In fact, the political decision was to hold a trial rather than an inquiry, not to procure a conviction whatever the evidence.
29. Four assessors sit with judges on major cases. However, the judge can overrule them on points of fact as well as of law, albeit this is rare in practice.
30. Doubtless an improper statement but one flowing from a real desire to protect independence of the judiciary from this judge.
31. Including detentions related to Zanzibar plots and one against a liberation movement.
32. When the original Ordinance was adopted before independence these were clearly not seen as threats to national security. However, the wording is general so that reading it to include national economic security today does not appear unreasonable.
33. Nil strictly political, a handful of "economic sabotage" cases.
34. The detention of 5,000 accused cattle thieves was in principle to await trial. When it became evident that such a large number of accused simply could not be tried in good time, they were released (about six months after arrest).
35. Despite very high maximum prison terms and fines and semi-compulsory forfeiture of assets involved.
36. Indeed when the author's piece "The Survival Plan That Continues to Buy Time" (Guardian, 23-III-82) was reprinted in that slot, several friends inquired what was so unfairly critical in it, so used were they to violent root and branch assaults being printed there.
37. The present author is a very poor evaluator of general access for researchers because he receives preferential access.
38. They have not been very systematically researched and are not an area of expertise of the present author.
39. They are basically equal partnerships of small, self-employed capitalists in the production cases and neighbourhood buying groups in the retail ones.

40. But see G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa cited in Methodological Note.
41. This was an association of small communal villages with an ideological basis which was an old amalgam of Emerson and Marcuse and with very significant external intellectual and technical leadership. While at one time influential in shaping ideas for launching Ujamaa Villages, the RDA came into sharp conflict with the Regional Party and was banned at the turn of the decade.
42. This danger is much less acute today. Tanzanians are by and large willing to consider individuals as such even when they hold stereotypes about the groups to which they belong. But in 1960/61 then Chief Minister Nyerere had to threaten to retire from politics to block anti-Asian limitations being inserted in the citizenship legislation.
43. Tanzania has not been as acutely worried about fifth columns as Mozambique (with good reason in both cases). "Nous sommes trahis" is not a Tanzanian leitmotif.
44. See Hyden, op cit but also J. Jiggins highly critical review in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 3-1, 1981.
45. In fact both on state and household cash flow accounts the peasant sector is a net recipient of funds, not a source of surplus. Data collected and analysed by J. Wagao in 1981 University of Sussex PhD thesis on income distribution in Tanzania.
46. But see I. Shivji, J. Saul, T. Szentes, W. Rodney in Cliffe and Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, cited in Methodological Note for a fuller debate on this issue.
47. Politically this was prudent; many TANU elders were in precisely that position. Administratively it was necessary; tens of thousands of room lets in thousands of traditional urban houses could not have been handled. In terms of mitigating exploitation of the poor it was less satisfactory - these landlords often do have a high rate of return on investment.
48. Eg, the student-staff ratio at the university is under 4 to 1, while average output of seminar papers or more widely reproduced/published materials averages about 1.5 per faculty member per year.
49. The pace of villageisation - which led to many of the technical failings and most of the coercion - was not centrally planned. The Party Congress envisaged a 1974-1977 programme, not a 1974-75. Nor was the speedup bureaucratically initiated, most civil servants were not enthusiastic about village creation and certainly had no desire to double their workload by acting ahead of their existing (in many regions) draft plans. The main instigators were a handful of Party/government administrators and a large number of elected (by peasants) local Party officials.

AUTHOR NOTE

Dr Reginald Herbold Green is a Professorial Fellow of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. He has been a student of the political economy of Africa since 1960, and has lived in Africa for almost fifteen years including over ten in Tanzania. He has served as a university faculty member, consultant and - in Tanzania - as a civil servant. At present he is a consultant to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Tanzania and the economic secretariat of SWAPO of Namibia. The analysis and conclusions of this paper are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of CCM or the government of Tanzania. As is presumably evident, he does not write as a neutral, detached observer, but as an individual with clear commitments to what is described in this paper as the main-line Ujamaa ideological position.

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METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This paper has been written with an abnormally slim overt critical apparatus. This demands an explanation to the reader.

1. The author has been in Tanzania repeatedly from 1964 to date and has observed many of the events and processes cited first-hand.
2. He has also relied heavily on direct personal contacts with a wide range of Tanzanians (usually not in the format of research interviews) which are an even more major body of source material. Both brevity and the fact that these discussions were rarely with any view to publication by either party counsel against detailed source citation.
3. Much Tanzanian official material is not secret as to substance - or indeed unavailable to an outside researcher who is persistent, establishes a relation of trust and can locate the relevant institutional resting places. Unfortunately for academic purposes much of it is in files or documents other folios or paragraphs of which are confidential or secret, so that they may not properly be cited, even though most of their contents may be used.
4. Pressure of time - and possibly of estimated reader attention - has prevented a full-scale bibliography.
5. However, a few relevant sources of general usefulness can be cited:

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