STABILITY AND CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA:
THE PROSPECTS AT LATE 1982

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1. <u>SOUTH AFRICA: THE LATENT INSTABILITY</u>

South Africa, over past decades, has not been what one could
describe as an unstable society.   Investment risk analyses frequently
place South Africa among the more risk-free countries of the world.
The level of labour unrest is below that in the more strike-prone
European economies, like the UK and Sweden.[1]

The urban disturbances of June 1976 onward in Soweto and
other black areas gained very widespread publicity and the loss of
life represented an immense historical tragedy.   However, the
security apparatus of the state was barely extended even at the
most critical times.   The participants were mainly youthful and
non-economically active.   Various calls for stay-away strikes in
support of the demonstrators either failed or had brief, mdeiocre
success.   Any escalation of the violence could have called for
the massive counter-violence from the authorities against which
the demonstrators would have been pathetically ill-equipped.
Youth demonstrations in European capitals like Berlin and Amsterdam
have at times been more serious than the June 1976 uprisings in
South Africa.

Yet every sign of instability in South Africa, whether
it be a strike, a rent demonstration, a bus-boycott or a youth
protest has a resonance which similar events in Europe lack.   This,
obviously, is because South Africa is assumed to contain within it
certain potentials for an instability which could tear apart the
fabric of the society and the economy.

It is necessary, perhaps, to inspect this assumption by
enumerating the broad factors which militate for and against instability.

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1)   In South Africa in 1981, 35 man-days per 1 000 workers were lost
     compared with 45 in the UK and 105 in Sweden (1980 figures).
     Report of National Manpower Commission, 1981.

Factors (all well-known) which create the potential for instability are:

- clearly distinct social groups (races) with wide disparities
  in income and life chances;

- exclusive control of the central legislative and instruments
  of government and administration by the more privileged white
  group;

- formal and imposed social and political identities for the less-
  privileged group which create a solidarity by making the move-
  ment of individuals into the ruling groups impossible;

- government commitment to a programme which would exclude the
  black majority from participation in the central government
  in perpetuity;

- partly as a consequence of the above, lack of opportunities
  for leaders in the black majority to peacefully negotiate
  political reforms at the centre;

- once again, partly as a consequence of the above, a weakly-
  developed internal black leadership committee to a moderate
  and peaceful negotiating strategy;

- a continuing pattern of administration of blacks which produces
  frustration and constant reminders of a lesser political status
  (controls on movement, forced resettlement, restriction to
  certain residential areas, exclusion from most of the better
  educational institutions, etc.);

- an externally-based leadership claiming allegiance of the
  black majority, committed to the violent overthrow of white
  rule by insurgency and revolution if necessary;

- a well-established programme of insurgency, supported by
  sympathetic major powers in the form of training, weapons
  and funding;

- international movements, the UN Committee Against Apartheid,
  the Anti Apartheid Movement, etc. of confrontation, mobilising
  various kinds of moral and symbolic support for punitive
  action against the South African government;

- ongoing development in the technology of violent insurgence
  (more and more effective lightweight explosives, portable
  rocket launches, etc.) which makes insurgency more and more
  viable as a weapon against the government;   and finally

- ample evidence that black dissidents can leave the country
  for training and re-enter South Africa either for insurgency
  or in order to mobilise the local black populations for
  action of various kinds.

These are the factors which create the assumption that
South Africa has a potential for extreme disruption, if not a
blood bath.   This assumption, obviously, can be seen to be well-
founded.

Operating against instability, however, are the following factors:

- a vigorous economy which in the past has proved its capacity
  to increase employment opportunity, incomes and general well-
  fare among all groups;
- total white control over and majority white personnel in the
  combined security forces of the country;
- relatively-speaking, a massive security establishment well-
  organised to counter threats to social order;
- security curbs which over-ride legal controls, which severely
  restrict or discourage individuals likely to organise people
  to action against the government, thus preventing a confront-
  ationist leadership developing within the country;
- a high rate of success (+ 90 percent according to police
  spokesmen) in tracking down active insurgents;
- very marked superiority of whites over blacks as regards
  educational levels, technological and managerial skills
  thus making it difficult for blacks to envisage displacing
  white administration and control;
- serious divisions among blacks over strategies for change,
  compared with near-unity among the very substantial white
  minority that the basic patterns of the society should be
  protected;
- a massive consistency in the administration of separation
  and inequality, projecting an image for blacks of the
  immutability or resilience of the system.

These opposing lists of factors contain nothing new, but they
illustrate a situation which can be symbolically described as "irrestable
force versus immovable object" South Africa's stability rests on a
neutralisation of massive potential violence by an equally massive
and pervasive system of controls and rewards, with the latter more
efficient up to now.

The main point to consider, however, is that this balance
or neutralisation of forces can change, and could even shift quite
rapidly.   For example, if insurgency increases beyond a point at
which a majority of insurgents are apprehended, then obviously it
will escalate rapidly after that.   If the economy becomes chronically
unable to increase or maintain income and employment levels, the number
of recruits for insurgency-training abroad will escalate.   The latter
is a very real danger at the moment, but the downturn is temporary.

Furthermore, as the black population becomes more and
more educated and more and more politicised (both inevitable) the
pervasive sense of the unchangeability of the system will diminish.
A result in the form of more and more internal social and labour unrest,
which at the very least will affect economic confidence, could unleash
other consequences.   The ice of peace and order in South Africa is thin.

2.   CHANGE AND REFORM: ARE THEY ADEQUATE?

Reform in the circumstances of quality of life of the mass
of the people is a good in itself and in this sense need not be debated.
However, in South africa, reform is also seen as necessary in order to
strengthen the basis of stability.   This view is predominant among
these whites who want basic reform.   After the urban disturbances
in 1976, it became fashionable to call for the building of a contented
black middle class as a bulwark against urban unrest.   The Prime Minister's
espousal of development and reform at the well-publicised "Carlton"
and "Good Hope" conferences carried the same message.

The pace of reform has quickened in South Africa since 1976.
We can also accept that reform of a kind is inevitable in the future,
partly as a consequence of justified moral pressures, partly in order
to accommodate the needs of the expanding and changing economy and
partly emanating from deliberate policy-designs of the government.

However, are the changes that are taking place adequate?
Is the reform programme of the government likely to deepen the conditions
for peace and stability?   Are some of the changes not perhaps likely
to do more harm than good?

2.1 Patterns of change over recent past

The past few years since 1977 have seen the following shifts,
trends adaptations and legislative changes in South African society:

2.1.1 Wages and employment: real wages in primary, secondary
and tertiary industry increased as follows between June 1980 and
June 1982:[1]

whites	2,8 percent p.a.
Coloureds	6,6 percent p.a.
Indians	9,4 percent p.a.
blacks	6,6 percent p.a.

However, over the same period employment growth rates were:

whites	2,5 percent p.a. [1]
Coloureds	1,9 percent p.a.
Indians	1,6 percent p.a.
blacks	1,5 percent p.a.

While the wage rates above indicate a narrowing of the wage
and salary gap between blacks and whites, the growth rate in employment
for blacks is well below the population growth rate of 3,2 percent p.a.
Income rates for the black population will not have kept pace with the
wage rates due to a rising ratio of earners to dependents.

2.1.2 Labour relations: The Labour Relations Amendment Acts of
1981 for the first time defined the black worker as an employee, thereby
extending trade union rights to all races.   Black trade unions which
do not wish to register with the state authority may continue to operate,
subject to certain controls which apply to registered unions.

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1) Source: Government Statistical News Releases Calculations done
by V. Møller, J. Nattrass and L. Schlemmer.

Strikes and work-stoppages have shown the following pattern over the past eight years:

	Black Employees - Rounded Man-days lost.[1]
1973	± 260 000
1974	94 300
1975	18 300
1976	22 000
1977	15 000
1978	10 200
1979	16 500
1980	148 200
1981	206 200

In 1982 the trend seems to represent an increase over 1981, and the figure of man-days lost will probably be close to the high 1973 figure. The loss of working time which the more recent figures suggest is fairly serious, since it places South Africa above many industrial economies in terms of strike-proneness. However, South Africa is still below the very strike-prone nations (as already indicated). Furthermore, political motivations have not yet emerged as a direct cause of labour unrest - the relatively slight bulge in the figures for 1976 tend to reinforce this impression, and that bulge could have been due to other factors. The recent sharp increases (1980/81/82) are to some extent due to specific causes like the "pensions" strikes. Generally, after a new legal dispensation, a period of restiveness and re-adjustment accompanied by higher industrial unrest must be expected.

Given the fact, however, that few alternative outlets for political and community grievances exist for black people, the already fairly high levels of labour unrest could be aggravated by political motivations. The trends in labour unrest have to be watched with great concern.

2.1.3 Black Occupational Advancement: Job reservations of a formal, statutory kind has been phased out with the exception of certain categories of work in the mining industry and Municipal service.

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1) Source: 1973, calculation based on an answer to a question in Parliament. 1974 onwards, Report of the *National Manpower Commission*, 1981.

At present negotiation is in progress aimed at the phasing out of
these remaining restrictions on black advancement is in terms of
changes in labour regulations of the black urban areas act,
registered black workseekers are now no longer restricted to the
area of their local authority but can seek an administration
board, covering several local authority areas.

Overall patterns reveal steady black occupational advance-
ment.   The following are results from the 1970 and 1980 population
census:

	Blacks as a Proportion of all Employees in the higher-level Occupations.	
	1970	1980
Professional, (higher-level) technical and related workers	21%	29%
Administrative, managerial and clerical workers	18%	27%

The rate of job advancemenet of blacks at very high level,
however, has been dissappointingly slow, due partly to deficiencies
in black education which inhibit successful job-role adjustment.

2.1.4 Social Integration: International hotels may apply for
an annual permit to integrate facilities and all social pursuits
(including swimming and dancing).   At other hotels, blacks may
be admitted at the proprietor's discretion, without having to obtain
permission in advance, subject to a report on numbers afterwards.

The Durban Corporation has approved a mixed beach and the
Cape Provincial Administration has approved several mixed beaches.
Restaurants now have right to apply for blanket permission to admit
all races and any restaurant can admit on discretion subject to a
report afterwards.   Licenced social clubs can apply for blanket
permission to admit all races.   These permit are freely granted.
Non licenced clubs have no restrictions.

2.1.5 <u>Education</u>: There is increasing flexibility in the granting of permission for non-white students to attend white universities.   An open system is envisaged in the near future subject to a fixed maximum proportion of non-whites at white universities.   Complete parity of remuneration for <u>qualified</u> teachers of all groups has been achieved.   Since 1981 permission has been fairly readily granted by Natal and Cape Provincial Councils to private schools to admit black, Indian and Coloured pupils.   The ratio of per capita expenditure on education for whites versus blacks has not changed, remaining at roughtly 10 to 1 over the past three years, but it is expected to improve in 1982/83 after the submission of the de Lange report [1] to the government earlier this year.   The black education budget rose from R249 million in 1980/81 to R370 million for 1981/82. Compulsory education for blacks was introduced in 38 townships in 1981, and this year is being steadily expanded to all areas in the Republic of South Africa, outside the homelands.

During 1981, the number of Adult Education Centres, allowing blacks to undergo schooling on a part-time basis increased from 157 to 369.   The number of blacks passing the Std. 10 school-leaving examinations has increased from 2 360 in 1970 to an estimated 23 086 in 1980 - a ten-fold increase.

2.1.6 <u>Training</u>: The new consolidated Manpower Training Act of 1981 rationalises and streamlines the process of industrial training for all groups.   A large range of training facilities for blacks exists and total trained output is rising fairly rapidly.   In 1978, Africans were allowed to enrol as apprentices in the common area for the first time.   Now, although a small minority of total apprenticeships, African apprenticeship training is increasing rapidly.   In 1979 there were no black apprentices, in 1980 there were 82 and in 1981 there were 495.

The number of black children in schools and colleges for technical education rose from 3 145 in 1980 to 5 195 in 1981.   Although

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1) Human Sciences Research Council investigation into Education,
   undertaken at the request of the Prime Minister, under the
   Chairmanship of Professor J.P. de Lange.

the absolute number is still low, this is a respectable increase.

In-service technical training of blacks is increasing more rapidly.   The number of blacks being trained in private in-service schemes and centres and in the public in-service training in 1981, and both figures are a very large increase on earlier years.[1]

2.1.7 Housing: Most of the indices of change discussed above show fairly positive patterns.   The same cannot be said of housing. Among blacks there is currently a housing backlog in urban and peri-urban areas, including homelands of some 600 000 units.[2]   At roughtly R10 000 per unit including services, this means that R6 000 000 000 at current prices will be required to eliminate the black housing backlog.   This does not take account of the annual increase in demand of something like 100 000 units.

Against these estimates of the need, the amount of housing for blacks being constructed is very low indeed.   From April of 1976 to the end of 1981, under 70 000 units for blacks were developed outside the homelands.   In the 1981 calender year, roughly R320 million was spent on black housing in both the common and homeland areas.   This contrasts with the roughly R1 000 million needed each year in all areas (at R10 000 per unit) to meet the animal increase in demand. In other words, one-third of the annual amount required is being spent quite apart from the elimination of the backlog.

Needless to say, it is very unlikely that the required amounts will be spent.   The government has taken various steps to encourage and facilitate private sector involvement in black housing. Housing utility companies will also be established in larger urban areas.   Nevertheless, the standards of housing for blacks at the lower-income levels are likelyto drop since most of the new housing

1) Figures from the report of the National Manpower Commission.

2) Estimate compiled from various sources in the Centre for Applied Social Sciences.   Mercabank (*Focus on Key Economic Issues*, No. 29, Oct. 1981) put the figure at 560 000.

level have to be of a self-help kind using semi-traditional materials, a process which the government has started to encourage. Housing is likely to be a chronic problem over the next decade.

2.1.8 <u>Unemployment:</u> Official figures obtained from the government Current Population Surveys, relating to black unemployment showed a decrease from 9,3% in 1979 to 8,5 percent and 7,3 percent in 1980 and 1981. With the economic downturn, black unemployment is once again increasing. These figures have to be increased by about 2 to 3 percent overall if male and female under-employment is to be included. Even so, the figures are likely to be under-estimated since many of the informal shack areas in which the unemployed and under-employed are concentrated, are difficult to survey. Hence black unemployment could be well in excess of 10 percent. Fully 60 percent of the unemployed in the population surveys are under 30 years of age. In some areas known to the author more than 60 percent of black-school leavers are unemployed for the first two years.

While unemployment has not increased, apart from the trends in sluggish phases of the economy, its levels among blacks, particularly young adults are enough to cause grave concern.

2.1.9 <u>Rights of blacks in the developed industrial centres:</u> Recent legislative changes, including the Black Local Authorities Act (see later) and the introduction of the 99 year leasehold scheme in urban black townships in the common area have illustrated the fact that the government has accepted blacks as permanent residents in the common area of the Republic of South Africa - a change from the 1960's.

The Influx Control laws ("Pass Laws") continued to be enforced with vigour and showed only a mild decline in urban areas:

Arrests in terms of Influx Control
Laws - Main urban areas.[1]

1979	127 000
1980	118 000
1981 (estimated from 1st. to 6 months)	109 000

The latter figure reflects a sharp decline in action by
the South African police, but an <u>increase</u> in prosecutions by the
Administration Boards in the main centres. Hence, the unemployment
of policy by the government department responsible for black affairs
shows no sign of softening.

This attitude has been reflected more recently in legislation
drafted by this department (Cooperation and Development) . Contrary to
certain recommendations in the Riekert Commission, new legislation
drafted in 1981 and again in 1982 would actually have the effect of
reducing the right of access to the developed urban economy. The
draft legislation (the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons
Draft Bill) has come under such heavy criticism that it has had to
be withdrawn for reconsideration. This step required the inter-
vention of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under a different
minister. There appears to be a strong and persisting determination
in the bureaucracy responsible for black urban affairs to maintain or
increase the rigidity of the proscriptions on black urban rights.
Other examples are also available, notably a tightening up on the
concessions to commuters from KwaZulu to enter Natal to seek or
take work.[2]

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1) Source. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1981,
   South Africa Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1982,
   (on the basis of answers to questions in parliament).

2) Evidence to the *Buthelezi Commission of Enquiry into the Future
   of Natal and KwaZulu*, Durban. H and H Publications, 1982.

2.1.10 <u>Security action against dissidents</u>: Apart from actual trials which offer the protection of due process, during 1981 at any given time there were between 120 and 150 people in detention. Detentions in terms of the Internal Security Act appear to have been a rough average of 100 days.[1] But the period seems to have been shorter in detentions in terms of other acts. A count by the S.A. Institute of Race Relations suggests that the overall numbers of people detained in 1980 and 1981 were 768 and 630.

In 1979, 77 people were convicted for political offences of a serious kind, in 1980 the figure was 52 and in 1981 it may have declined marginally, although full figures are not available. On the other hand, acts of sabotage, presumably mainly committed by persons infiltrating the country appeared to increase (the figures above include less serious crimes than sabotage). Since 1976 there had been 110 acts of sabotage, of which as many as 37 were committed in 1981.[1]

As authoritarian states go, these figures are not unusually dramatic (in Poland at one stage earlier this year at least 15 000 people were in detention, for example). However, they provide ample evidence of the continuig existence of a political underground movement of substantial proportions.

The detentions without trial and bannings (not referred to above) also illustrate the extent to which the state considers itself forced to circumvent the courts in the protection of the system. There features, as well as certain controls over the media and access to information reflect the government has to attempt to secure legitimacy by authoritarian means. It all adds up to a weak moral position of the existing order in South Africa.

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1) *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1980 and 1981.

This legitimacy problem, however, is well recognised by the Prime Minister and certain other ministers, since over the past three years they have taken pains to state publicly that reform will be more effective than coercion in securing the safety of the society in the longer term.

2.1.11 <u>Constitutional reform</u>: In 1982, the Black Local Government Act was passed, providing for fully fledged black municipal rights and functions on a basis equivalent to whites. It remains to be seen, however, with what speed the act will be implemented, since the introduction of the new system will depend on the judgement of the Minister in the case of each local black township.

Subsequent to the report of the President's·Council on Constitutional reform, the government proposes to introduce legislation to give Coloureds and Asians representation in separate chambers in parliament. All matters common to all three groups will have to be dealt with by each chamber. Joint standing committees will provide for some joint decision making. A mixed Coloured, Indian and white President's Council will act as an Upper House for arbitration and review. The ratio of representatives will be 5:3:1 for whites, Coloureds and Asians respectively. This ratio is likely to be roughly mirrowed in the President's Council. There will be an Executive State President assuming the powers of the present Prime Minister, with an appointed Cabinet. The autonomous powers of the Presidency will increase vis-s-vis parliament, but these powers will probably fall short of those, say, of the French President. The President will be elected by a parliamentary Electorial College, which will ensure a white choice. It is fully expected that there will be two or three Coloured and Asian members of the Cabinet.

At local and provincial levels of government, the proposals are not clear. From the ongoing debate, it would seem as if the

the following will emerge: the Provincial level of government will
be attenuated, delegating some powers downward and some to the
centre.   Directly elected provincial representation will fall away
with either nominees of the new Minister of Constitutional Affairs
and for Local Government or of local and regional authorities taking
office as executive councillors under a nominated Administrator.
The function of the Provincial level will be largely that of co-
ordinating local and regional affairs.

At the next tier, there will be Regional or Metropolitan
authorities, dealing with matters relating to bulk services, physical
planning, infrastructure, etc.   Representatives will be nominated
by Local Authorities in proportion to the tax-base or services-
consumption of the various nominating groups, ensuring a white
majority.   It has been hinted by the Prime Minister that representatives
of black local authorities could serve on these largely a - political
bodies.   This level of government will effect some redistribution of
the proceeds of taxes to the poorer communities, in the form of services
they would not otherwise afford.

At the lowest tier of government, there will be separate
local authorities for the different groups although it is probable
that very small Coloured and Asian residential areas in white cities
will be integrated into the white system.   The Prime Minister has
hinted at the possibility of integrated voters' rolls as one of the
options.   The Minister of Constitutional Affairs has given the
reassurance that financial provisions will be made to make smaller
Coloured and Indian "dormitary" municipalities financially viable.
A great many of the most sensitive issues of inter-racial contact
will be within the functions of the local authorities, such as
mixed amenities.   However, there will be a government department for
the Co-ordination of Local Government, under a Minister of Local
Government.   What powers to over-ride local authority decisions
will exist will yet become evident.

On the one hand, the proposals represent a break with the trend over the past thirty years to reduce the direct influence in government of Coloured and Indian people. As such the government has taken a step in the direction of constitutional reform which is not to be dismissed lightly. In fact, the split in the governing part (see later) was in large measure a reaction to these proposals.

Furthermore, the principle of having to obtain successive approval of three chambers with links in the form of joint standing committees will force "consensus" government or issues of common concern. Although the legislative process will be cumbersome, in a divided society, consensus mechanisms ("consociation") are a vital necessity. In this sense the proposals have merit.

On the other hand, the proposals contain a number of weaknesses which will reduce the functional effectiveness as means of securing stability:

- blacks have been completely excluded, with quite explicit statements that the political connection blacks will have with central government will be through the confederation of Southern African regions, involving no more than a consultative relationship. The one-sided constitutional reform can be expected to aggravate the political alienation of blacks. Furthermore, with common-area black local government falling under a ministry of the central government while other political rights have to be exercised through homeland governments and back to the central government via a confederation, quite serious contradictions in structures are created.

- The proposals to dismantle the provincial level have the appearance of a strategy to prevent Coloureds and Asians coming close to controlling any regional authority (Indian in Natal and Coloureds in the Cape have the numbers to make this possible). The insistence that local authorities be separated according to race is another example. The image of such constitutional planning is that of engineering developments in such a way as to retain white control in all spheres in which whites are affected.

- The same principle applies at Parliamentary level, where the separate ethnic chambers for Coloureds and Indians have a permanent political minorities. In a more open system, minority groups can identify with political interest groups which cut across ethnic divisions, thus affording them fully-fledged

participation.   The strict principle of ethnic autonomy
strengthens racial and ethnic solidarity which, if blocked
by a number's imbalance, can encourage extra-parliamentary
political action (as in Northern Ireland).

The government's rationalisation for this, embodied
in the concept of "segmental autonomy" (or the "food forces
make good neighbours" principle) cannot be expected to acquire
credibility among groups with a formal minority status
guaranteed in perpetuity.

- The proposals at the central level imply a clear distinction
  between matters of ethnic community concern and matters of
  common concern, with the President's Council or arbiter.   Any
  realistic appraisal will suggest that there are few matters which
  are of group concern only.   This issue is likely to be a cause
  of great conflict in the machinery of government.   A good
  example is the Group Areas Act, a topic which is likely to be
  raised very early by the Coloured House.   Whites will claim
  it is a matter of community concern, but Coloureds and Indians
  will insist that white residential privileges diminish their
  access to land and housing, and hence should be a matter for
  joint consideration.

- Already, strong pressures are being exerted on the government by
  conservative Municipal Associations (*Sunday Express*,1/11/82)
  to reduce the status of Regional and Metropolitan government
  to that of consultative bodies and to maintain street segregation
  in local government.   If these are to be the outcomes, then
  conflict will be reinforced by an abrupt frustration of the new
  raised expectations of Coloured and Indian voters.

One saving feature of the new dispensation is that after the
failure some years ago of the Coloured Persons' RepresentativeCouncil,
the government needs the successive participation of Coloureds and
Indians as much as the latter need political progress.   Possibly
compromises can be expected.

2.1.12   The New Regional Development Policy: In order to attempt
to counter the increaseing centralisation of economic growth, the
pressure for black urbanisation and to attempt to stimulate development
closer to the black rural areas, the government has announced the
formation of a new decentralisation strategy involving increased
incentives for development in eight demarcated regions straddling
the borders of white areas and national states.   In addition to
decentralisation of employment "cooperative projects" across "soft"

borders between homelands and the common area are envisaged. A
Southern African Development Bank will provide development aid
on various forms.

These proposals have a great deal of merit but suffer from
the following possible shortcomings and dangers:

- If the Regional Development Policy is to be mainly concerned
  with decentralisation of economic activity which could or
  would or does occur elsewhere, then it will fail. Decentral-
  ised job-creation in the formal sector is expensive (some
  existing growth points entail a cost of up to R35 000 for
  the creation of each job if one takes account of infrastructure
  costs). Overall job-creation may be retarded.

- The institutional framework for the administration and planning
  of the regional development nodes is very complex. In the
  "white" areas the advisory committees are heavily dominated
  by institutional representatives and civil servants. An
  innovative planning input is likely to be lacking.

- In the early stages of the formulation of the strategy in 1980
  and 1981 it was hoped that opportunities would exist for joint
  decision making between black and white in regions straddling
  the political boundaries. As the strategy has emerged in
  practice, only joint consultation on an advisory basis seems
  likely to result. Hence the Regional Development Strategy
  will use political legitimacy among blacks.

- Great difficulties have existed in launching the Development
  Bank because of its inevitable connection with this proposed
  confederation. Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu, for example, has
  stated that it is impossible for him to accept a bank with a
  board composed of members composed to represent the varying
  statuses of participants in the political structures of
  Separate Development. While a purely commercial or professional
  development bank is a dire necessity, a politicised institution
  serving not only the purpose of development but also the function
  of promoting the confederation is a doubtful economic innovation.

2.2 Assessment of Implications.

These are the major political, social and economic developments
in South African society over the past few years. They represent a very
mixed balance-sheet in terms of change and stability.

Generally speaking, trends and development in the following areas are fairly positive:

- wage-rates for blacks;
- access of blacks to certain urban recreational amenities;
- skills-training;

This is not to say that the performance of reform cannot be improved. Deeper-lying problems often affect the speed of change in the areas mentioned above. For example, the quality of basic education affects the trainability of blacks. The location of black residential areas far out of town reduces access to urban amenities. Wage rates cannot escalate too rapidly during periods of economic recession in order to avoid mechanisation and labour-intensive developments in industrial production, which could reduce the capacity of the economy to absorb labour.

Areas where development and/or reform is taking place, but too slowly, given the implications, are the following:

- unskilled and semi-skilled employment creation/ combating unemployment;
- occupational advancement of blacks;
- improvements in the funding and quality of black education;

In all these areas there are fundamental problems which no government could solve overnight. Nevertheless, sustained programmes, involving the coopertion of many agencies and individuals both within and outside of the private sector are required in order to begin to marshall the resources necessary to solve the underlying problems.

The following areas in which ongoing processes of development are totally inadequate at the present stage.

- Housing development (to which one must add a range of other basic needs in the form of both rural and urban amenities for blacks);

- The rights of blacks in the common area-developments to counter the political alienation of this vital category of political actors;

- Constitutional development - the need to engender a wider "legitimacy" to the proposals;

- Regional development - the need to make it more than a decentralisation programme but also a programme for development within and with black communities in the regional development areas;

- labour relations in regard to the black labour force. Particular needs in this regard are to reduce the danger of labour action becoming counter-productive for employment creation and labour-intensive strategies, and investor confidence. Another need is to prevent the escalation of conflict through the intervention of government agencies or attempts to impose coercive control.

Both these goals require:

a greater degree of trust in the economic system and its institutions (pension funds being the most recent example);

redress for black workers as regards circumstances in their communities and in the sphere of benefits outside of the workplace; and

a credible arbitration function in cases of deadlock.

All these requirements can only be met constructively by the emergence of credible political leadership at the local level in the industrial areas which can inter-pret, informally provide arbitration in crisis situations, and work successfully for the improvement in the quality of life of black workers.

If one considers the various implications, the broad requirements in all of the key areas for change identified require strong and effective yet responsible local level political leadership which is sufficiently successful to be credible among blacks. For example, housing programmes will not be successful unless blacks accept more modest standards and put in a considerable measure of self-help. This requires political leadership. A gradualist policy in reform at the level of urban rights will have to satisfy everyone at once since presumably some influx controls will have to remain for a period. Here again the discipline imparted by credible local level political leadership will be essential.

Effective black participation in "cooperation projects" within the Regional Development policy also requires the mobilisation of local level black leadership in homeland areas. For this purpose more than mere consultation is required. Serious joint planning ventures have to be undertaken.

Add to this the compromises necessary in the labour relations field and one has a daunting task for an emergent black local level leadership. The ability to engage in realpolitik and to take and sell unpopular decisions will be paramount. This will strain the credibility of the local level leadership immensely.

Credibility of moderate leadership will simply never be forthcoming while the constitutional agenda of the central government is closed to blacks. At this stage, any black political actor who inter-acts responsibly with the real world of reform runs the risk of being labelled a collaborator "on a train to the (Apartheid) Confederation".

3. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN THE RESPONSE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

It would seem that in order to judge what kind of response to these challenges one may expect from the central government, one has to consider the government's own situation and the assumptions it makes. The following appear to be keynote features:

- the government possibly fears that it cannot move more
  rapidly or incisively on reform for fear of augmenting
  the right-wing threat. Numerous attitude surveys
  undertaken by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences
  in cooperation with Mark-en-meningsopnames tend to
  show that as far as white voters are concerned (not
  necessarily party office-bearers) the right wing has
  already garnered most of its potential support.
  However strong it is, it cannot grow much stronger,
  and in the latter regard, economic policies are just
  as relevant as political/constitutional affairs.

  Furthermore, the attitude surveys show that the inclusion
  of blacks into a process of gradual reform, does not reduce

the level of acceptance of constitutional alternatives at all.

Put differently, the damage is done and the limiting of constitutional reform to Coloureds and Asians only is seen by existing government supporters as much as a weakness as a safeguard (and it loses the government some potential support from the opposition voters to the political "left").

It is simply too late now for the government to claim that conservative voter reaction prevents a broadening of the base of constitutional reform.   Its problems, on the contrary, lie within the party and the support organisations.

- Much of the theoretical underpinnings of the constitutional recommendations of the President's Council report revolved around the impossibility of the incorporation of black political demands into the present system of the South African polity.   The constitutional proposals are based on an implicit assumption that numbers must determine power (recall the 5 - 3 - 1 ratio).   However, the black political demands will not go away and in the end could cost South Africa much more in terms of stability than the dangers of opening up the constitutional agenda to blacks.

Once again referring to available and representative studies of attitude, in particular those conducted for the Buthelezi Commission, it is clear that majorities of blacks will accept the legitimacy of a "consociational" arrangement in the form of even a few credible black representatives sitting on key political decision-making bodies.   Such arrangements when proposed to blacks even among very angry and politicised groups, gain almost as much support as the one-man-one-vote option.

- Furthermore, by now the government must certainly be realising that the acceptance of the constitutional proposals are as problematic among Coloured and Indian people and among key-influentials in the white academic, professional and business communities as they are among grass-roots white voters.   An opening of the constitutional developments to blacks could ease problems in this area enormously.

A rejoinder to these considerations is that the inclusion of blacks at this stage will represent a major deviation from government policy, and as such is an unrealistic political demand.   This is not so. There are ways in which existing policy can be adapted in order to start providing for the extension of legitimacy to a moderate and constructive

type of black leadership at the levels required by the needs outlined
earlier.

4. IMMEDIATE ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENT POLICY

4.1 The policy of Separate Development has acquired all its negative
connotations from the overall goals of a complete separation of
white and black decision-making. Despite this, the policy has
been moderately successful in mobilising the participation of blacks
in the homelands. Many very sincere blacks have grabbed the
limited opportunities made available in the homelands for
participation in a political process. Rid of the goal of
complete political separation or severance, the institutions
of government in the homelands would become considerably
enhanced.

4.2 Without the goal of independence, the policy of homeland
government could be a healthy exercise in political
decentralisation. It would in no way reduce, but rather would
enhance the quality of grass-roots participation in politics.
The policy could acquire a new and far more acceptable meaning,
both nationally and internationally. The critical issues are
these of citizenship and separation of blacks from any input
into fiscal decision-making.

4.3 Given the very established nature of homeland administration
and government, the structures and institutions that have been
created have a viability which could be useful in South Africa's
political and economic development.

4.4 One basic and minimum requirement (and a possibility) is for
the government to open the constitutional planning agenda to
blacks by modifying the end goals of its policy of "multi-
national development". Whatever face-saving name the government
chooses to give it, it could, for these areas which have not

yet taken independence, become a form of <u>regional decentralised</u>
<u>self-government</u> - an exercise in political devolution.

The effect of this would be to enhance the status of the
excellent quality of some homeland leadership, since they
would no longer be associated with the dangers of loss of
citizenship.

4.5 Without wishing to go into constitutional details at this point,
an adaptation of the <u>Executive</u> structure of government at the
centre would allow for the incorporation of homeland leadership
into central decision-making processes.   A Cabinet-level Council,
operating along consociational lines is one possibility.   This
would allow, without danger of political domination or "swamping"
by blacks, a black input into <u>at least</u> those matters which affect
their development (national planning, fiscal policies, policies
for housing provision,welfare and services, etc.)

The black participation could be by both homeland and common area
leaders (black urban leaders).

4.6 Similtaneously, however, the urgancy of development problems and
the need for effective cooperation in joint projects within the
framework of the government's own policy of Regional Development
requires political innovation at this level.

It is realised that the possibilities of cooperative decision-
making in a real sense have been canvassed within the regional
development policy and that these possibilities were resisted
by some government service agencies.   At the very least, however,
the government should be prevailed upon to re-explore the policy
of joint black-white regional authorities with certain powers
relevant to development being established in demarcated areas
across the borders of the Republic of South Africa and the home-
lands which are not independent.

4.7 I have made no suggestions in detail about the issue of Influx
Control. This issue is so complex that to attempt to introduce
real reform within a framework of gradualism without black
participation in the process would be hazardous. The constitutional
developments must be underway before any major initiatives. In
a sense the government is right in delaying the re-introduction
of the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons Draft Bill.

There are many matters of detail that could and should be
explored. The problem of political legitimacy underlies them all,
however, as the analyses I have attempted shows. Therefore, it is
the constitutional reform which is a priority issue at the present time.
The suggestions outlined could be accommodated within the outlines of
existing policy, given determined political leadership. The business
community and other key influentials should try to convey this to the
government, as a matter of utmost priority.

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