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Addressing and Mitigating Violence

Settling After the Revolts? Egypt's Political Settlements and Violent Transition

Mariz Tadros

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SETTLING AFTER THE REVOLTS? EGYPT'S POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND VIOLENT TRANSITION

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List of Abbreviations

FJP   Freedom and Justice Party
IDS   Institute of Development Studies
MB   Muslim Brotherhood
ODI   Overseas Development Institute
SCAF   Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
WHO   World Health Organization

Executive summary

This paper analyses how political configurations examined through the lens of political settlements in transition contexts influence national and local levels, types and experiences of violence. Egypt is used as a case study to examine the interplay between the elite power-brokering inherent in political settlements and people's influence on the processes, outcomes, and very survival of such pacts. The paper notes that in the period between January 2011 and January 2013, Egypt witnessed two regime ruptures and three political settlements being forged against a backdrop of increasing levels of violence.

While not all forms of violence can be accounted for in terms of the nature or outcome of the political settlement, the paper argues that first, the nature of political settlements in terms of its inclusionary/exclusionary nature does have a bearing on violence, but only in constellation with other contextual factors. The paper shows, for example, how increased political violence witnessed after the Egyptian revolution in 2011 has its roots in the informal pact forged between the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 2011, which excluded key political actors. A second political settlement was forged between the Muslim Brotherhood and a broad spectrum of political actors popularly known as the Fairmont Agreement in June 2012, which promised political support for President Morsi to win the elections against his contender in return for power sharing if he became president. However, a majoritarian approach to governance pursued by the Muslim Brotherhood when in power catalysed some youth groups to resort to violence, a strategy that benefited from a public mandate, manifest in the very limited expressions of public condemnation of it.

The reverse is true of the third political settlement forged after the ousting of President Morsi in June 2013. When the Brothers resorted to violence against the ruling powers, the public did not condone their actions and in fact, represent a key actor resistant to their inclusion in any unfolding political settlement. In effect a bottom-up approach to political settlements, pursued in this paper, shows that the public play a key role in legitimising or rejecting the use of political violence to leverage influence in shaping the nature of the political settlement.

The paper is based on a mixed method approach undertaken between May 2012 and January 2013 covering the period of Egypt from the January 2011 revolution and up to seven months after the ousting of President Morsi in July 2013. Qualitative research on the actors, agendas and networks involved in violence was complemented with a survey of 2,423 citizens who had participated in the 30 June revolts and 12 focus groups undertaken in six governorates.

The paper notes that at the moment there is no political will on the part of the key stakeholders to change the terms of the political settlement to make it more inclusive: neither the government, nor all but a small part of the population, nor the Muslim Brotherhood and

allies in the Coalition to defend Legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist political groups do not recognise the legitimacy of the current status quo in the first place and therefore have rejected all calls to participate in any of their activities (such as the Roadmap). The Egyptian government shows no intention of engaging with the Brotherhood and its allies through any other means than a systematic and bloody security crackdown. The leadership (in the person of General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi) is unlikely to yield to Western pressures to stop the crackdown on the Muslim Brothers because he will not sacrifice his populist standing. Hence, in effect the only political will that is in favour of a political settlement that includes the Muslim Brothers is that of a number of Western governments, who have spoken of inclusive democracy. At the moment they do not have the political clout to influence the internal scene in Egypt.

The key policy messages of this paper are:

- *Recognition of limitations of direct Western policy influence* in view of the public perception of their displays of partisan standpoint against them. Western actors should be particularly sensitive to recognise that attempts at direct policy influence, in particular *vis-à-vis* human rights are likely to create a backlash that will be felt most intensely on a local level.
- *In order to regain credibility among the Egyptian people reflected in public opinion towards the West, governments should adopt a policy of condemning all parties involved in violence, whether it be initiated by state or non-state actors. This will contribute to altering the image that Western governments are partisan to violence perpetrated against the pro-Morsi faction and not against the broader citizenry.*
- *Promote transitional justice* Multilateral agencies may wish to strengthen relations with the Egyptian Ministry of Transitional Justice in order to increase its capacity and its influence in Egyptian society. Such collaboration can take the form of sharing experiences of approaches to transitional justice pursued in other countries that have experienced high levels of violence and polarisation, as well as building local capacity to design initiatives that can be mainstreamed across governmental institutions in order to promote a culture of tolerance and forgiveness.
- *Prioritise youth job creation* A large proportion of Egypt's youth exists in a context of high unemployment especially among the educated and the urban populations. Unless jobs are created and youth provided with vocational training, political, economic and social forms of exclusion will foster the conditions for violence to thrive.

Introduction

The uprisings in the Arab region generated much hope among significant proportions of the population that a rupture with the status quo would herald a new era marked by bread, freedom and social justice/human dignity, the catchphrase of many of the revolts. However, the new political settlements in many instances neither created the spaces for more inclusive politics, nor were they responsive to the masses' aspirations.

This paper presents the case study of Egypt, a country that between January 2011 and July 2013 witnessed two regime overthrows following mass uprisings of a scale unprecedented in the region. While the country has not fallen into a state of civil war such as Syria, it has nevertheless been experiencing rising levels of violence since the revolution of January 2011. This paper discusses the nature of the political order in relation to violence through two nexuses: first, the extent to which the surge in violence, in particular political violence, can be attributed to the nature of the political settlements forged, and second, the extent to which a bottom-up approach informs our understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of political settlements.

The research is based on a mixed method approach undertaken between May 2012 and January 2013 covering the period of Egypt from the January 2011 revolution and up to seven months after the ousting of President Morsi in July 2013. Qualitative approaches were used to identify the actors, agendas and processes that informed the shaping of the unfolding political settlement, of a formal and informal nature, as well as the actors who have resorted to violence to influence policy. This is complemented with a quantitative analysis of some of the indicators of politically, socially and economically motivated violence. Further, a survey was undertaken in December 2013/January 2014 with 2,423 citizens who had participated in the 30 June revolts against the regime in order to gauge their experiences of violence, their perceptions of its dynamics and coping strategies. Twelve focus groups undertaken nationwide sought to provide more nuanced readings of the survey results.

This paper argues that: firstly, the nature of political settlements in terms of their inclusionary/exclusionary nature does have a bearing on violence, but only in constellation with other contextual factors. The paper shows, for example, how increased political violence witnessed after the Egyptian revolution in 2011 has its roots in the informal pact forged between the Supreme Council for Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 2011 which excluded key political actors. However, the exclusionary measures of the political settlement cannot alone account for the instigation of violence by youth groups. Rather it was the public empathy and implicit condoning of it that allowed it to thrive. The reverse is true of the second political settlement forged after the ousting of President Morsi in July 2013. When the Brothers resorted to violence against the ruling powers, the public did not condone their actions and in fact, the public represent a key actor resistant to the Brothers' inclusion in any unfolding political settlement.

An interrelated argument is that the political settlement in the Egyptian context has been greatly influenced by popular will, manifest in mass uprisings, not only in elite configurations. They have played a key role in rendering legitimacy to the use of political violence to leverage influence in shaping the nature of the political settlement.

The paper is divided into five sections: section 1 defines the concepts used and discusses the opportunities and limitations in the use of a political settlements framework and how the methodology was pursued. This is followed in section 2 by a presentation of the scope, dynamics and pattern of violence at a macro-level and grassroots insights into citizens' experiences of violence and survival strategies. Section 3 analyses the political settlement between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood and its implications on political violence. Section 4 analyses the unfolding political settlement behind the 'Roadmap' that comprised the pact between the military and various political actors after the ousting of President Morsi in 2013. It also complements the elite pact analysis with a bottom-up reading of the political settlement from citizen perspectives. Section 5 presents the conclusion, an analysis of some possible scenarios and policy recommendations.

1 Concepts, theoretical framework, contextual background

In the first part of section 1 of the paper, concepts such as violence, conflict and political settlements are defined in terms of how they are used in this context. In the second part of section 1, I discuss the relevance of the political settlements theoretical framework for understanding the changing power configurations and their relationship to violence in the context of Egypt. The nature of political settlements does have a bearing on violence, though it is not the only variable.

Political settlements is taken as the theoretical framework for understanding how the configuration of power is contributing to instability and crisis of legitimacy, which manifests itself partly through violence.

Violence is a deeply contested term potentially meaning a variety of different phenomena; however, one starting point is the use of physical force (Moser and McIlwaine in Moser and Horn 2011). Violence in the context of Egypt is defined along the World Health Organization (WHO) terms as: 'the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation' (WHO 2002 in Moser and Horn 2011: 8). The focus in this paper is on the use of physical force or power in public space. In line with feminist scholarship, one acknowledges the artificiality of the public-private demarcations, however, the intention here is to clarify that domestic violence in terms of its drivers and outcomes is not dealt with here. Nonetheless, the impact of public forms of violence on families is discussed briefly since it was repeatedly raised by women in focus groups (see section 1.1 on methodology).

In scoping the forms of violence existing in the context of Egypt, Moser's classification of political, social and economic forms is used. Political violence refers to violence in contexts of political turmoil and has been defined by Moser as 'the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power' (Moser 2001: 36). Politically motivated acts of violence may be instigated by guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, armed conflict between political parties, etc. Political violence is to be distinguished from economically motivated violence that involves the 'commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power' (Moser 2001: 36): these would be manifest in abductions and rape during economic crises. Social violence is 'the commission of violent acts committed by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power' (*ibid*: 36). This would be manifest at the interpersonal level such as spouse abuse or sexual harassment by gangs, thugs or various public actors. Moser acknowledges that the demarcations between political, social and economic violence are not rigidly set and some forms of violence are motivated by a combination of political, social and economic motives.

However, for the purpose of analysis, distinguishing between the political, economic and social motives of different forms of violence is helpful as a starting point for examining the underlying power dynamics and the actors behind them. In Egypt, all kinds of violence, politically, socially and economically motivated were acutely felt by citizens. Some forms of violence such as theft and sexual harassment existed prior to the 2011 revolution but increased dramatically thereafter, as well as other kinds of violence such as *haraba* (see section 2.1) and the particular targeting of members of the Christian minority for kidnapping in return for a ransom. However, by far, it is politically motivated violence that dominated the Egyptian scene in the transition period, pointing to the importance of understanding what it is about the political organisation of power after the regime rupture in 2011 that contributed to

this. It is argued in the paragraphs below that political settlement, though with its own limitations, is still analytically useful for understanding the link between violence and what Egypt experienced in the three-year phase after the ousting of President Mubarak.

Political settlement can be a fuzzy term that can mean a number of very different political processes thus making them devoid of analytical value (Moore 2012). Political settlement has been used as a term to mean political processes and junctures as varied as an elite agreement to end peace after war to a negotiated agreement between state and society to an informal pact between various actors. Despite the fact that the term may seem vague and limited in its potential to be applied to contexts undergoing very different political processes, nonetheless, it will be argued here that the term's value lies precisely in its emphasis on examining the configurations of power at critical historic junctures and adopting a process approach rather than assuming a series of one-off events.

A political settlements framework was found to be far more useful in examining the violence experienced in Egypt after the regime rupture with Mubarak than, for example, transition theory. Transition theory is premised on countries going through two phases, the initial phase characterised by governance policies geared towards meeting certain milestones associated with liberal procedural democracy (such as elections) which then enable them to move towards a democratic consolidation phase characterised by a broadening and deepening of human rights and citizenship. Transition theory is highly problematic in its implicit linear character (procedural democracy manifest in elections followed by more substantive elements), in its construction of a democratic path premised on countries achieving a number of milestones and in its ahistorical, decontextualised approach which assumes that one can predict the democratisation path of countries where authoritarian regimes have been ousted on the basis of the experiences of Latin America and Eastern Europe. Carothers proposed that the transition paradigm be abandoned in favour of new approaches that examine unfolding political configurations in their more fluid ways (Carothers 2002: 19).

Crucially, the definition of political settlement needs to be adapted to the context and the kind of negotiation being described. Political settlement here is used to describe 'the formal and informal negotiations, bargains, pacts and agreements between elite actors, as crucial drivers of the locally effective institutions and policies that promote or frustrate the achievement of sustainable growth, political stability and socially inclusive development' (Laws 2012: 1). They can be conceived of as 'dynamic and fluid processes of (overt and covert) negotiation, compromise, bargaining, accommodation and coalition and network building between powerful individuals and groups' (Schultze-Kraft 2013: xx).

In the case of Egypt, there were three political settlements, two after regime ruptures. The first regime rupture that the country witnessed was in February 2011 after 18 days of mass uprisings that were instigated in what became known as the 25 January revolution. President Mubarak was ousted and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces representing the army assumed control of governing the country. Some have argued that this was a quiet coup by the generals, the Old Guard, presiding in the army against President Mubarak's plans to hand over power to his son, Gamal. The army had limited experience in governing, and as with any institution, there were multiple wills at hand, that of the General Intelligence (headed by General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi), the military police headed by General Annan, etc.

The youth revolutionary forces who had called upon the Egyptian people to rise also comprised different groups. The most prominent was the 6 April movement, which then splintered into two movements after internal disputes emerged after the revolution. There was also the National Committee which was led by Mohamed el Baradie, a Nobel Prize winner who prior to the revolution was one of the first Egyptians to openly challenge Mubarak's plans of transferring power to his son. There were other coalitions representing

smaller constituencies. All coalitions were in flux, reconfiguring according to the changing political situation (Ezbawy 2012).

The Muslim Brotherhood whose leadership had initially rejected participation in the planned revolts of 25 January was one of the most organised political entities at the time. Established in 1928, it had built a large constituency through a multi-tiered approach that involved building a popular base among the poor through the provision of charitable goods and services and religious education via its mosques; building a constituency among the middle class through activism in the syndicates and professional unions and the provision of high quality fee-based education; and also a support base among the Muslim Brotherhood constituency in the Diaspora that helped it build international links (see Tadros 2012a). The Muslim Brotherhood had existed during Mubarak's tenure as a movement that was officially banned but sufficiently tolerated as to engage in the political, social and economic life of the nation. Another important group of important political weight at the time were the Salafis, a conservative traditionalist movement comprised of different groups, who propagated the return to the ways of living at the time of the first rulers in Islam. They had not been politically active during Mubarak's reign but had built a constituency through religious education and charitable associations. They were openly opposed to participation in the 25 January revolution on religious grounds (it is prohibited, from their perspective to depose a Muslim ruler); however, they later joined the revolts in its latter days. A number of non-Islamist political parties were on the horizon, some whose existence goes back almost a century but had a small constituency, others that had begun to be formed after the Egyptian revolution and who were also struggling to build a popular base.

The first political settlement to have emerged after the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 could be described in terms of an informal pact between the Supreme Council for Armed Forces representing the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, the details of which are described in section 3. An attempt to arrive at a political settlement in terms of formal negotiations to agree to a power sharing agreement was made between the Muslim Brotherhood before they came to power and the opposition in 2012, commonly known as the 'Fairmont Agreement' in reference to the five-star hotel where they all met. A third political settlement was arrived at between the military represented in the person of General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi and various political forces and actors in Egypt in July 2013 and is still unfolding.

There are some important theoretical links between political settlements and violence. Political settlements are the means through which societies overcome violence and political instability (Laws 2012: 7; Brown and Gravingholt 2009). In fact, the nature of political settlements to emerge out of processes of political transformation has a direct impact on levels of political violence (DFID 2009: 9; Di John 2008). There are two critical pathways through which a political settlement lens is key to understanding violence in the Egyptian context. First, is the association between how inclusive a political settlement is and the likelihood of political instability and its violent spillover effects. Second is the association between responsiveness (to citizens' aspirations) and the government's performance. Department for International Development (DFID) (2009) argue that in order for political settlements to be legitimate, they need to be seen as responsive by the citizens. Responsive features include delivering on security and macro-economic stability. These have been the two prime concerns of the Egyptian citizens.

What is clear is that there is a need to complement elite bargaining/mediation at the top level with more bottom-up analysis of political settlements and their outcomes. The settlement approach will also need to include ways of taking the citizens' pulse and capturing their interpretations and perceptions of reality, in other words, the agential dimensions of how political settlements unfold, not just the rules of the games.

The urgency in understanding the unfolding political settlement in Egypt is both in terms of *process* and *outcome*. Inclusive political settlements tend to enjoy stability and legitimacy at least in the long run (DFID 2010; Parks and Cole 2010: 8; Whaites 2008: 18 in Laws 2012). Laws (2012) concedes that there have been occasions when political settlements have not been inclusive and where they have enjoyed some stability, because the power of the elites who were excluded was limited in comparison to the other parties. However, he argues that for political settlements to survive in the long run, they still need to be inclusive enough (Laws 2012: 20). In order for political settlements to be stable, ordinary citizens also need to feel that the process and outcome of the political settlement is legitimate. However, what will be shown in section 4 is that citizens through mass uprisings, can influence the very survival, not only the outcome of a political settlement.

DFID notes that there is a need to develop an integrated approach including new research and guidance on political settlements, tensions and trade-offs, priorities and sequencing, and the role of service delivery to inform its policies (2009: 17). However, in order to capture the dynamics of the changing power configurations, it is not enough to analyse the institutional factors influencing the unfolding political settlement, it is pivotal to also understand the agency of actors in civil and political society, the relationships that exist between them and their dynamic engagement with the changing political context. Existing methodological approaches to the study of political settlements do not sufficiently engage with the role of political and civil society in influencing the emerging political order. Consequently, policy recommendations miss strategic points of influence and engagement, as they focus too narrowly on the policymakers involved in the political settlement.

Finally, violence in transition contexts is not only affected by political settlements. Violence is also influenced by political economy factors, by political economy; for example, economic predators such as groups that trade in drugs and weapons benefit from the state of transition and are therefore important drivers of violence even if they do not feature as part of the negotiations that characterise political settlement. The political economy of violence perpetrated by informal and opaque actors is discussed briefly in section 2.1, since they too became enmeshed in the unfolding political configurations of the country.

1.1   Methodology

The research presented in this paper is based on a mixed method approach, using both qualitative and quantitative research tools. The research design was informed by:

1.   The need to understand political settlements in terms of inclusive/exclusive *processes* and *outcomes* and the extent to which these influence violence;
2.   A desire to understand the extent to which citizens' perceptions of the political configuration of power inherent in a political settlement influences the prospects of its success, failure and outcomes.

In order to address (1) it was necessary to understand the key players influencing the political scene and the relationships between them. Together with scholars from the Centre for Egyptian Affairs, a local thinktank based in Cairo, we sought to undertake a scoping of the key junctures in Egypt's political trajectory during the transition and the key players influencing the various political settlements. A number of research papers were commissioned, which this paper draws on and which we will be publishing in a forthcoming publication. These papers were discussed in a general workshop which brought together academics, the press and media and security analysts.

To understand citizen perceptions in point (2) above, survey and focus groups were undertaken. The purpose of the survey was twofold: (a) to understand citizen perceptions of their experiences of violence prior to and after the revolutions of 2011 and 2013, the kinds of

violence that affects them most, their views on which actors are responsible and their sense of what needs to be done, and (b) to understand why people endorsed and/or participated in the protests against President Morsi that erupted on 30 June 2013.

The two aims of the survey are not entirely exclusive. Focus groups previously undertaken by local partners in Egypt for several research initiatives led by the author had all confirmed that the two main grievances (and demands) of the Egyptian citizens since 2011 and throughout 2012 were an improvement in the economic situation and an improvement in the security situation (explained in terms of human security, i.e. enjoying freedom from theft, violence and freedom to walk the streets safely, commute without harassment, etc.).

In order to fulfil the twin objectives of the survey, a purposive sample was taken of all those who had participated or endorsed the protests of June 2013 against the regime. In other words, only those who claimed they supported the revolution of 2013 were included in the sample. The total sample taken (excluding some questionnaires which were incomplete) was 2,423. As it was a purposive sample, the aim was to try and get a balanced representation in rural/urban contexts, geographic coverage of the country, and gender. The sample included 46 per cent men, 53.9 per cent women, rural representation of 49 per cent and 48.8 per cent urban across 30 communities. In terms of geographic coverage, Cairo was selected as a large city, Alexandria from the Delta, Fayoum from Western Egypt and Beni Suef, Qena, and Minya from Upper Egypt. Citizen participation in the revolution of 2011 was extremely low from Upper Egypt, which witnessed a large turnout (in comparison to the first revolution, not to the rest of the country) the second time round. The selection of the citizens was undertaken through snowballing. In each community, the interviewer would start with one person whom they knew definitively had participated in 30 June and they would ask him/her to refer them to another person they knew who endorsed/participated, and so forth.

The questionnaire[1] was informed by an examination of former templates that have examined violence with some of the questions adapted to the Egyptian context, and then modified further based on the suggestions of local partners. The interviewers had previous extensive research experience and were trained for the purpose of pursuing this research. A pre-test of 60 questionnaires was undertaken to ensure the clarity and precision of the questionnaire. The data was collected throughout December and up to the first week of January.

A workshop was held to discuss the research process and findings with data collectors. They unanimously spoke of the difficulties they faced in undertaking the field survey because of the particular historic juncture that the country was at. Firstly, some interviewers were confronted with harassment from security personnel who questioned them as to the purpose of the data they were collecting. Secondly, some participants accused them of collecting information for a foreign entity to harm Egypt's reputation and were particularly harsh in their criticisms of 'civil society' whom they associated with being agents of the West. Thirdly, some participants 'read' the questions as indicative of a bias against the 30 June revolution while others 'read' the questions as favouring the ruling powers. Egyptian society is deeply polarised between the anti-coup vs. the pro-revolution and which for the most part tended to represent the pro-Muslim Brotherhood vs. pro-General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi. This made the environment in which the interviewers were undertaking the research highly tense and many interviewees were trying to second guess where the researchers stood. Fourthly, some of the recipients' answers to sensitive questions (such as whether they carry weapons or have faced domestic violence) were evasive, but after completion of the questionnaire, would informally share their real experiences and insist their answers were not written down.

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[1] I am grateful to Professor Patricia Justino for her review of an earlier draft of the questionnaire.

1.2   Characteristics of the sample

The purposive sample did not include age selection criteria. However, through snowballing, the results showed that over half the population that participated in the 30 June revolution were below the age of 36 (23 per cent between 17 and 24 years and 33.3 per cent between 25 and 35 years of age). Interestingly, 6.9 per cent were aged between 51 and 65 years. The remaining percentage was at either side of the age bracket. In terms of education, more than half had at least a higher school degree (25.7 per cent) and the highest category (33 per cent) had a university degree. However, a sizeable proportion (27.9 per cent) were illiterate.

In terms of occupation, strikingly almost half of those who endorsed/participated in the revolution were unemployed (47.8 per cent), with a further 8.3 per cent being *orzoki* (a term referring to irregular worker) and 5.1 per cent were involved in seasonal work. This shows the employment vulnerability profile of those who protested. The sample was one tilted towards the bottom half of the population with respect to income levels. The Egyptian government announced that the minimum wage for 2014 is LE1200 per month (equivalent of £100.00). When respondents were asked about their income (rather than wage) per month, 58.8 per cent of the respondents said that their earnings were less than LE1200 and 25.3 per cent said they had no income at all, while 15.9 per cent said they earned more than LE1200. This challenges the popular notion that revolutions in the Arab world and popular protests elsewhere consistently comprise the middle class.

Of the sample, 54.8 per cent participated in the protests and another 14.7 per cent said they participated and encouraged others to join, while 5.7 per cent said they assumed a leadership position. In other words, about 65 per cent were actively involved in the protests at one level or another. Another 16 per cent openly expressed their support though they did not go down to the protests themselves (some of the women were not allowed, some of the respondents said they had health conditions, others said there was no congregation at their community level that they could join). The remaining percentages endorsed the protests but did not express it in public, keeping it to themselves (4.2 per cent) or within the family (4.5 per cent). It is highly noteworthy that when asked what the factor was that most drove the respondent to participate in the revolutions, the most cited reason (35.8 per cent) was '*Akhwanat el Dawla*' (the 'Brotherhoodisation' of the state) which refers to people's sense of the Brothers having monopolised power and allocated positions in the government (especially at a local level) to its supporters while marginalising the rest of the population. The second most widely cited reason was the deterioration of the economic situation, mentioned by 29.8 per cent of the sample. However, the link between absence of security and revolting was clear, it was the third most common reason cited by 12.5 per cent of the respondents. In section 2.2, the results pertaining to their experiences of violence are discussed at greater length.

The survey was complemented by 12 focus groups, two in each governorate (Cairo, Alexandria, Fayoum, Beni Suef, Minya, Qena). The purpose of the focus groups was to acquire a more nuanced understanding of what drove people to participate in the revolts, their experiences and reflections and aspirations for the next phase. There was also a particular focus on experiences of violence and strategies of survival and resilience. Each focus group comprised roughly eight persons. The composition of the focus groups varied. In Alexandria and Minya, the two focus groups were conducted with youth, one with young men and one with young women. In Fayoum, the two focus groups were with women of differing ages, while in Qena the focus groups were with men.

A pertinent question relates to the representativeness of the sample of the overall population. This was a purposive rather than representative sample, insofar as the selection criteria were based on endorsement/participation in the Egyptian revolution. There are two other categories in the Egyptian population whose views were not covered. Firstly, supporters of

the Muslim Brotherhood who staged counter-protests in support of President Morsi. Secondly, citizens who are referred to in popular Egyptian literature as '*hizb al kanaba*' whose literal translation is 'the sofa party', refers to those who did not support either camp. It is important to note that the uprisings that began on 30 June were the largest ever in the region in its contemporary history, estimated to be around 14 million. The number of pro-Morsi supporters was in the thousands.

Hence while the sample is not representative of the entire population, it is representative of a majority of them. Further, it can be argued that it is representative to a large extent of the populace who rose up on 30 June 2013. It is important to note that the survey respondents could not be dismissed as people who rose against the Morsi regime because they were remnants of the Mubarak political system. 19.2 per cent of them had voted for the Freedom and Justice Party and 11.8 per cent of them had voted for Dr Mohamed Morsi as president in December 2011/2012 and June 2012 respectively (this is consistent with nationwide election results: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23846680). In essence it means that almost one in five of those who had joined the protests on 30 June 2013 had put their faith in the Brothers and then turned their back on them because of their failure to deliver.

2   Scale, types and patterns of violence

Section 2 presents the types and patterns of violence that the country has witnessed during this transition period and second people's experiences of violence in daily lives. The data presented in section 2 is a synthesis of the background paper written by Mohamed El Naggar (forthcoming publication) providing a scoping of violence in Egypt. The analysis of the causes behind the trends and dynamic of violence are also presented.

El Naggar compiled the data from a database documenting incidents of political violence to cover the period from 2011–13 (http://wikithawra.wordpress.com/).

There were a number of methodological challenges that El Naggar faced when collecting the information. First, the data on political violence prior to 2011 was not accessible and hence the material presented on violence after the revolution could only be complemented with alternative sources which are less systematic in their coverage. This includes annual human rights reports produced by human rights organisations such as the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights which is one of the oldest and most authoritative sources in Egypt. The diversity of sources made it particularly difficult to compare and contrast the pre- and post-revolution periods especially since different human rights organisations had different methods of classifications. While the systematic documentation from 2011–13 makes comparison possible for these years, the data presented for the period before that, 2009/10, is more indicative of patterns and trends than the full scale of political violence.

With respect to the data on economic and social violence, El Naggar's paper relied on the annual reports produced by the Ministry of Interior's General Security Authority (*maslehet al amn al a'm*). Where it was missing, it was complemented with other sources specific to the type of violence examined, such as the National Council for Women's reports on women's exposure to gender-based violence.

In terms of political violence, the overall number of deaths varied across different phases. The total number of deaths associated with political violence documented since the ousting of the Egyptian revolution up to the end of November 2013 is 4,648. 1,075 people died during the 18 days of protests since the first revolts against the Mubarak regime were instigated on 25 January and up to the ousting of the president 18 days later (Figure 2.1). From February 2011 up to June 2012 when Egypt was governed by the Supreme Council of

Armed Forces, there were 438 deaths. During President Morsi's term in office, there were 470 deaths. Since the eruption of the second Egyptian revolution on 30 June 2013 and up to November 2013, there have been 2,665 deaths as of December 2013 (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1   Total number of persons killed in political violence 2011–2013

Source: data compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming) from database http://wikithawra.wordpress.com.

In examining the incidents of political violence phase by phase one notes that of the 1,075 deaths occurring during the 18 days of revolution in 2011, there were 1,022 civilian deaths, 49 security forces personnel, and four from the army. It is critically important to note that while the instigators of the revolution had adopted a non-violent position in their struggle against the regime, not all the civilian deaths involved the killing of peaceful protesters or non-violent persons. During this period, there were incidents of physical assault on police officers and the burning and looting of some police stations and some civilians were killed; some were political activists, some were thugs, others were criminals taking advantage of the state of chaos. It is unclear what percentage of these deaths involved civilians using violence. However, many were killed by members of the security forces in peaceful protests (see Figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.2   Political violence deaths in 18 days of revolt, January 2011**

Source: compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming).

There were 577 deaths that took place in confrontations between the security forces and civilians. The 13 who died in sit-ins were peaceful protesters who died in the infamous Battle of the Camel on 2 February when armed men riding on camels stormed Tahrir Square and attacked the sit-in. The 186 who were killed in violent confrontations while detained included 183 civilians and three police officers. Fifteen persons were killed while active as members of vigilante groups. On 28 January, in response to the breakdown of the security system as a consequence of the police force release from duty (whether voluntary or under command) coupled with the release of approximately 23,000 prisoners from prison, citizens formed vigilante groups. These vigilante groups were formed at a neighbourhood level to physically ward off criminals who were looting and vandalising public and private property.

During the period that followed the ousting of President Mubarak, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces ruled from 11 February 2011 when it announced that it would govern Egypt for six months until parliamentary and presidential elections could be held. However, they remained in power for almost 17 months until President Morsi came to power in July 2012. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of deaths relating to political violence during the rule of the SCAF.

Figure 2.3 Incidents of deaths related to political violence during SCAF's rule

Source: compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming).

It is interesting to note that there were 64 civilians, predominantly Christians, who died in sectarian attacks on them predominantly by Islamists, but also by thugs and criminals. Of the 88 who died in violent confrontations with the security forces, all but one policeman were civilians. The second highest number of deaths (72) happened in one night in the killing of supporters of Al Ahly football club in the football stadium of Port Said (see section 3). Of the 65 who died in violent confrontations with the army (in particular the military police), the majority were civilians (see Figure 2.3).

During President Morsi's one year in office, there were 399 civilian deaths, 52 members of the security sector and 19 from the army (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4   Incidents of death related to political violence during Morsi's reign

Source: compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming).

There were also 172 incidents of death associated with political violence involving violent confrontations between the security and the protesters, and a rising number of incidents (79) involving civilians clashing with members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Protests erupted on 30 June, after being planned for several months. Counter-protests by the pro-Morsi factions were also organised and there were incidents of violence.

After giving the pro-Morsi demonstrators who had gathered in Rab'a and el Nahda squares a warning to vacate the squares which they had occupied for over a month, the security forces stormed the place. There were violent confrontations which left 421 of the protesters dead and 3,572 injured according to the official statistics.

All in all, the six months after the 30 June revolution witnessed a dramatic increase in incidents of death and injury. Up to December 2013, there were 2,421 civilian deaths, 174 policeman and 70 army men. Again it is important to note that some of the civilians who died were killed in violent confrontation between security forces and groups who were armed or in confrontations between pro- and anti-Morsi groups, where again some of the civilians were armed.

2.1   Economic and social forms of violence

Since the revolution, ordinary citizens who neither have a political profile nor were in political spaces, have also experienced an increase in criminal activity in everyday life. This includes petty crime as well as life-threatening criminal activity. For example, with respect to car thefts, there was a dramatic increase in frequency after the revolution: there were 4,203 car thefts in 2010 which rose to 14,267 in 2011, representing a 340 per cent increase. This rose again to 20,375 in 2012, representing another 140 per cent increase from the 2011 rates and a 485 per cent increase from 2010.[2]

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2 ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﺣﺼﺎﺋ ﯾﺎت ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﻣﻢ اﻟﻤ ﺗﺤﺪة ﻟﻤ ﻨﻊ اﻟ ﺠﺮﯾ ﻤﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ 1102، واﻻﺣ ﺼﺎﺋ ﯾﺎت اﻟ ﺨﺎ ﺻﺔ ﺑ ﻌﺎم 2102 ﻣ ﺼﺪرﻫﺎ
ﻟﻮن ﻣﺨ ﺘﻠﻒ ﻧ ﺘﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﻟ ﺗﻘﺮﯾ ﺮ اﻟ ﺴﻨﻮي ﻟﻤ ﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟ ﻌﺎم اﻟ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻟ ﻮزارة اﻟ ﺪاﺧ ﻠﯿﺔ ﻟ ﺬﻟﻚ ﺗ ﻢ ﻣ ﯿﺰ ﻋﺎم 2102 ﺑ
ﻻﺧ ﺗﻼف اﻟﻤ ﺼﺪر[The figures for 2011 are from UNODC: United Nations on Drugs and Crime www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-

Armed robbery has also increased dramatically since the 25 January 2011 revolution.

Figure 2.5   Armed robbery, 2006–2012

Source: compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming).

As is evident from Figure 2.5 above, there has been a ninefold increase in the incidents of armed robbery from 2010 to 2011. The column for 2012 is in orange because the numbers were derived from a different database than that used to calculate the previous years and hence calculations may be different.

New forms of violence that did not exist previously emerged in Egyptian society, such as *haraba. Haraba* is a concept that emanates from Islamic jurisprudence which punishes criminal activity by enforcing irreversible physical harm on the perpetrators such as the cutting of limbs (Shahin 2012). In several parts of Egypt, criminals (thugs, thieves or murderers) were captured by the masses who assaulted them to death. These were public spectacles which in many cases were captured on video and put up on YouTube.

Moreover, religious inspired violence increased after the Egyptian revolution in particular against the country's largest non-Muslim population, that of the Coptic Christians which amount to about ten per cent of the population. Sectarian violence towards the Christian minority involved incidents where the political, social and economic motivations of violence were sometimes entangled. For example, from 2011 onwards, a new phenomenon that was not witnessed in Egypt in the years prior to the revolution came to the fore: members of Islamist forces belonging to the Salafis and Gama'at imposing ransoms on Copts in Upper Egypt as 'protection money', i.e. so as not to subject them to assault. This was a form of violence that was politically motivated because it complied with the belief of these Islamists that non-Muslims must show subservience to Muslims as part of the instatement of an Islamist governance system. Secondly, it was economically motivated insofar as the intention was to collect money. It was socially motivated insofar as it was intended to instil the notion that Copts are second class citizens.

and-analysis/statistics/index.html, and the figures from 2012 are from www.elwatannews.com/news/details/116846].

Gender-based violence also rose and assumed new forms. While gender-based violence was on the rise during Mubarak's era, it assumed new proportions after the revolution. Against the backdrop of the absence of security, and a radical Islamist discourse on women's place being at home, women became increasingly subjected to individual and group forms of harassment in public space. Moreover, politically motivated sexual assault targeting women in protest spaces through violent group assaults in order to deter them from political activism also took on new forms after the Egyptian revolution, in particular in 2012 and 2013. Again, it is not possible to discuss at length this phenomenon, which is discussed elsewhere (see Tadros 2013a and Tadros 2014).

Rizk (forthcoming) notes that against the backdrop of the Egyptian revolution of 2011 there was increased economic hardship and a breakdown in the functioning of the police force. Both of these factors led to the emergence of activities that directly affected violence. These were activities of an economic predatory type or that had emerged to mitigate the deteriorating economic circumstances.

Economic predation featured criminal and illicit activities such as weapons and drug trafficking, theft and armed robbery. Rizk's paper features the accounts of Gen. Abd al-Fattah Etman, the deputy chair of the security department of the Interior Ministry, made at a meeting of the Shura's Council committee on Arab and foreign affairs and national security, as of Sunday 2 September 2012, in which he highlights how the situation in neighbouring Libya has led to the proliferation of the arms trade and smuggling to Egypt on an unprecedented scale.

> According to Etman's statement, the spread of weapons was responsible for the spread of thuggery and a 40 per cent increase in the crime rate from the previous year. Etman said that a virtual arsenal had been seized in 2012, including 14,000 missiles, 587 shotguns and automatic weapons, 143 anti-aircraft missiles, 20 thermal missiles, 9 landmines, 64 RPGs, 25 explosive canisters and missile projectiles, 279 and missiles, 149 intercity/cross-city missiles, 400 sound grenades, 139 explosive heads, 16 hand grenades, 48 fission bombs, 350,000 rounds of ammunition, and 29,427 bladed weapons. He added that most of the heavy weaponry was smuggled across the country's western and southern borders. Etman said that as of September 1, 2012, there had been 1,286 killings, compared to 774 in 2010 and 1,885 in 2011, and 1,645 robberies, compared to 733 in 2010 and 2,622 in 2011. The number of abductions rose from 107 in 2010 to 258 in 2011. He also stated that some 186,000 citizens had applied for weapons permits; 30 per cent of these from Cairo and Giza were approved.
> (Rizk, forthcoming)

In many of the focus groups held, citizens cited the widespread availability of weapons in their communities as one of the main reasons behind the increased violence. Participants in the focus groups noted that there were weapons of different types, prices, and quantities and it was possible to easily purchase and trade in them. From the focus groups, it seemed that some were used for self-protection, some were taken up as a new fashion fad among adolescents, and some were evidently used for assault by individuals and groups. It is likely that the actors who trade in weapons and arms have a vested interest in the country's continued state of chaos and security breakdown, since their business thrives on it. In other words, their economic predatory behaviour rests on the continued perpetuation of violence which sustains the need for arms.

It is most likely that the large-scale arms mentioned in Etman's statement were being trafficked to militant groups, in particular those based in Sinai. The political economy of weapons and the arms trade is complicated by the fact that its control does not only rely on

domestic matters, but rather the internal policies of neighbouring countries and the foreign relations between Egypt and its neighbours more generally.

One of the most visible phenomenon on the main streets of the city centre in Cairo and major cities and towns in Egypt has been the quiet encroachment of informal street vendors on the pavements and in some cases, on the pathways leading to the subway (Metro). Rizk notes that the informal sector has been a major generator of income for a bulk of the country's unemployed. However, faced with fewer jobs, and the deepening economic crisis after the Egyptian revolution, many more, in particular young people, resorted to street vending and in the absence of any regulatory environment they took over streets and squares. Vendors sometimes found themselves clashing with thugs who sought to 'claim' parts of the streets and squares as their own in order to collect money (for parking, selling goods, etc.) and such confrontations often got violent. Rizk notes that they became entangled in incidents of political violence.

After the Egyptian revolution, as the nature of the political struggles changed rapidly during those years, so did the alignments of the vendors, and their involvement in incidents of political violence. Rizk summarises this as follows:

> Initially, they [the vendors] joined the revolutionaries against the evacuation of the square [by the authorities]. Later, when their conditions had stabilized somewhat and police left them to peddle their wares in peace, they allied with police against some revolutionaries. It was vendors on July 26 Street who confronted a march of revolutionary Ultras and the Black Bloc on Friday, May 3, 2013. Following clashes between the two sides, the demonstrators retreated to Talaat Harb Square and from there to Tahrir Square. There were also skirmishes between vendors and protesters in support of the judiciary on Friday, April 26, 2013. Several vendors around the High Court threw stones at demonstrators accusing them of interrupting their business. These are just two examples of the attitudes of vendors during Morsi's tenure. Peddlers were also present in Rabaa and Nahda Squares during the occupation by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies. After Morsi's removal, they then began to confront Brotherhood protesters in Cairo and several governorates, especially Daqahiya and Sharqiya, usually in clashes that involved weapons on both sides.
> (Rizk forthcoming)

While political loyalties of the street vendors shift and represent a changing variable, political consciousness of their identity as an economically and socially marginalised group has grown. They have begun to organise collectively to defend their interests and have expressed a willingness to resort to violence should attempts at clearing them off the streets be made.

2.2 People's perceptions and experiences of violence

People were asked about their experiences of both political, social and economic forms of violence and how it impacted on their lives in both the survey and focus groups. Their replies to the question of when in the past few years have they experienced the highest level of violence is congruent with El Naggar's finding that there has been a sharp rise in political violence after the Egyptian revolution in January 2011. Only 3.1 per cent of the sample said that they experienced the highest level of violence before the 25 January revolution of 2011. This does not suggest that the rest of the citizens did not experience violence before 2011, only that in relative terms, the years that followed were worse. Almost half the respondents said that they experienced the highest level of violence during the year in which President Morsi ruled. At first glance, this may seem incongruent with the data presented in the section above which suggests that incidents of deaths were lower during Morsi's reign than that of

SCAF or the interim government after 30 June. However, it is important to note that number of deaths is only one indicator, and people's experience of everyday forms of violence needs to be captured through alternative indicators. The second important point is the duration of the term in office. While the incidents of deaths under SCAF occurred in a period extending over 17 months, the number of deaths witnessed under Morsi was over 12 months, and hence its severity and intensity may have been more acutely felt. Finally, the survey focused on those who participated in the revolts against the regime; if the sample was of those who had protested in favour of the regime, the survey outcome would have been very different, since they are likely to have responded to a spike in violence after the 30 June revolution.

The second highest percentage (31.1) said the highest level of violence they have experienced has been since the June 2013 revolution. Interestingly only 14.6 per cent said that it was under SCAF's reign that they experienced the highest level of violence (see Tadros 2013). In focus groups, it was clear that the rise in political violence as a consequence of the stand-off between pro- and anti-Morsi supporters has been deeply felt by all citizens and it is what is behind their sense of an increase in violence. Moreover, it became clear from the focus groups that they had a sense of increased *threat* to violence.

Figure 2.6   Citizens' perceptions of levels of violence experienced as per survey

Source: compiled by El Naggar (forthcoming).

Six in ten respondents (61.5 per cent) stated that they had personally experienced violence since January 2011. Examining the profile of those who replied positively to experiencing increased violence, it was notable that there were no particular attributes that made them more or less vulnerable, except perhaps that though Cairo has been the site of the highest level of political violence, it was citizens living in Upper Egypt that seemed to report the highest levels of exposure to violence, except Qena. A quarter (25.6 per cent) of the entire sample of respondents said they have experienced political violence. Of the percentage that reported being exposed to political violence, respondents in Beni Suef were the most likely to report such exposure (26.8 per cent) with Fayoum following closely (24.2 per cent).

Economically motivated forms of violence were one of the most notable of citizens' preoccupations. Seventeen per cent of those surveyed said they experienced a theft/attack on their property or home. It is striking that of those who experienced such a form of violence, the citizens of the governorate of Fayoum (28 per cent) reported experiencing this more than the other governorates.

Of all the different kinds of violence, religious-based or sectarian violence was the most reported. 35.9 per cent of the entire sample reported having experienced religious-based violence. It is striking that while sectarian violence is hardly ever perpetrated by members of the religious minority (Christians), 32.6 per cent of Muslims said they suffered from sectarian violence. 45.1 per cent of the sample of Christians reported sectarian violence. The reporting by Christians of increases in sectarian violence is not surprising in view of the fact that they have been at the receiving end of violence. However, what is perplexing is the high percentage of Muslims – roughly a third reported being affected by sectarian violence. This may seem strikingly high in comparison with the number of incidents of sectarian violence reported nationwide. However, it is important to note that most incidents of sectarian violence do not get reported (interviews with journalists). The geographic location of these Egyptian Muslim citizens is a defining feature. Cairo has the highest percentage at 67.5 of the total number of Muslims within Cairo who reported experiencing sectarian violence. This can be compared with Minya where it is 4.5 per cent. With respect to the Christian respondents, the reverse is true: 64.1 per cent of Christians in Minya reported experiencing sectarian violence, followed by the Christians in Beni Suef (46.9 per cent), with Cairo being the lowest (23.6 per cent). Another statistically important feature is age. About half of the Christian respondents (52.6 per cent) aged between 17–24 reported being exposed to sectarian violence; the percentage is lower in the different age categories. If we look at the age profile of Muslims, it is the middle age category (36–50) who were most affected. Gender did not seem statistically significant in increasing exposure to sectarian violence, whether Christian or Muslim.

2.3   Coping with violence

In order to understand citizens' coping strategies, a number of 'yes/no' questions were asked. It is striking that 65.1 per cent of respondents said that they have coped with the increase in violence by reducing the number of times they leave their home. The statistically significant predictors are two: income and gender. Of the sample who reported limiting the times they leave home, people who are economically deprived were more likely to report that than those who come from an economically better off background. 69 per cent of the sample of people who earn an income less than LE1200 and 66.5 per cent who reported no income were limiting the times they left home compared to 48.4 per cent of those who earn more than LE1200 who have taken similar measures. This indicates a direct correlative relationship between poverty and vulnerability to conflict.

The second statistical variation is by gender: 71.1 per cent of women said they leave home on fewer occasions compared to 58 per cent of the men. This confirms that violence disproportionately restricts women's mobility compared to men, thereby potentially affecting opportunities for earning income, seeking an education or addressing health needs.

A lesser percentage, but a significant one all the same (38.1 per cent) said that as a coping measure with increased violence they have added a new lock on their front door or keep it shut more often. The highest proportion of those who responded positively to this question were from Minya (57.9 per cent) and there is a slight variation with Christians more likely than Muslims to resort to such a measure (51.1 per cent and 33.2 per cent respectively). Age is also an important variant, older respondents aged 51–65 were slightly more likely to add a lock/close door (48.8 per cent) than the middle age category (35–50), 27.8 per cent.

In response to the question as to whether increased violence had propelled respondents to carry a personal weapon, 83.9 per cent replied in the negative (though some confided off the record that they do). 15.8 per cent said they carry a personal weapon. 22.6 per cent of respondents in Fayoum said they carried arms, being the highest of all the governorates. The highest percentage of those carrying personal weapons is youth under the age of 16. A quarter of the youth (23.3 per cent) carry personal weapons. The gender variation is statistically insignificant (18.8 per cent of men carry arms compared to 13.3 per cent of women).

A third of respondents (33 per cent) said they no longer go out in the dark. The people of Minya and Fayoum have taken such a precaution the most (51.8 per cent and 41.1 per cent respectively). There is also a gender differential, again suggesting that women are more likely to restrict their mobility: women respondents who said they no longer go out in the dark accounted for 36.4 compared to 28.9 per cent of the men. There was also a religious variation, with 47.7 per cent of Christians adopting such a measure compared to 27.3 per cent of Muslims. Almost half of the people who live in urban areas (47 per cent) reported going out in the dark less. This is compared to 18.7 per cent of people living in the rural areas who reported restricting outings after dark.

In response to the question of whether as a coping strategy they would only leave home accompanied by someone, 27.4 per cent said yes. 15.8 per cent of the men said that to minimise risk of violence, they only go out accompanied, compared to three-quarters (73.2 per cent) of the women who said that they now only go out accompanied. In focus groups in both rural and urban areas, women of all ages complained about their sense of inhibited freedom, that after being able to leave home freely to go to schools, universities, work, visit friends and family, and for leisure (such as going to the hairdresser) they found themselves with the security laxity and increase in violence either having to ask male members of their families to accompany them on errands or having family make their outing from home conditional upon being accompanied (by a man).

Very few respondents (5 per cent) said that they changed their residence. The percentages across the different indicators are all similar. The only statistically significant predictor is religion and governorate. 9.7 per cent of Christians said they moved residence to cope with violence (compared to 2.5 per cent among Muslims). 15.8 per cent of people living in Minya have relocated as a consequence of violence, followed by Fayoum, 8.4 per cent. It is likely that Christians moved from Minya where sectarian violence is high to Cairo where many Christians have migrated in recent years. Gender and age and other factors are not predictors.

In order to cope with the increasing violence, a little more than a quarter of the entire sample (26.9 per cent) said they no longer leave their neighbourhood. There are statistically significant predictors across governorates. Almost half of the people of Minya (46 per cent) reported resorting to such measures compared to Cairo, for example, where it declines to 11 per cent. Religion is another predictor: 23 per cent of Muslims said they no longer leave their neighbourhoods compared to 37.1 per cent of Christians who had resorted to such a measure.

In a separate question on what has been the *most* impact that increased violence has had on you or any of your family members (see Table 1), it was clear that education had suffered the most, whether in terms of reduced attendance or dropping out altogether. Geographic location and income were important predictors. The percentage of people living on below LE1200 a month who dropped out of school was higher than the overall percentage (37 per cent of those earning less than LE1200 reported reduced attendance at school/university but their dropout was up at 19 per cent). Moreover, the percentage of people living in rural areas who reported reduced schooling or dropout rate was disproportionally higher than the rest of

the sample (35 per cent less attendance at school/university while the percentage of dropout reported by rural respondents was 23.5 per cent).

Table 2.1 What has been the *most* impact that increased violence has had on you or any of your family members?

Governorate		Drop out from school or university	Less attendance in school/university	Resignation from work	Less attendance at work	Fewer visits to see medical assistance	Payment of ransom not to be attacked	Restrict times of leaving home	Did not happen	Other	Did not answer	Total
Fayoum	#	73	157	24	65	34	14	30	30	0	16	443
	%	16.5	35.4	5.4	14.7	7.7	3.2	6.8	6.8	.0	3.6	100.0%
Minya	#	14	69	17	136	22	8	34	8	3	0	311
	%	4.5	22.2	5.5	43.7	7.1	2.6	10.9	2.6	1	.0	100.0%
Qena	#	73	137	16	53	25	4	23	71	0	0	402
	%	18.2	34.1	4	13.2	6.2	1.0	5.7	17.7	.0	.0	100.0%
Beni Suef	#	67	212	13	57	5	0	23	32	0	10	419
	%	16	50.6	3.1	13.6	1.2	.0	5.5	7.6	.0	2.4	100.0%
Cairo	#	81	169	22	72	12	4	6	88	1	0	455
	%	17.8	37.1	4.8	15.8	2.6	.9	1.3	19.3	.2	.0	100.0%
Alexandria	#	7	179	8	93	34	1	25	30	16	0	393
	%	1.8	45.5	2	23.7	8.7	.3	6.4	7.6	4.1	.0	100.0%
Total	#	315	923	100	476	132	31	141	259	20	26	2,423
	%	13	38.1	4.1	19.6	5.4	1.3	5.8	10.7	.8	1.1	100.0%

Source: Author's own.

It is important to note that many of the respondents answering the survey expressed deep disappointment that they had to choose one answer, since they shared that they have been impacted by almost all of the measures suggested. Their answers can only be read in that light. What is evident is that violence has had a direct and severe impact on the human development and wellbeing of citizens in Egypt, affecting the most vulnerable to the greatest extent, namely, people in the lowest income bracket and those living in rural areas. It is particularly distressing that young people—who have suffered from high levels of socioeconomic exclusion have borne the brunt of violence by having their education compromised (reduced attendance) or disrupted altogether. In sections 3 and 4, I will discuss the extent to which people's experiences of violence are attributable to the nature of the political settlements forged during the three years of transition.

3 An exclusionary political settlement gone wrong

Section 3 discusses the nature of the political settlement that emerged between the army generals and the Muslim Brothers and which influenced the political scene between February 2011 up to the appointment of the Brothers' candidate Dr Mohamed Morsi as president in June 2012, and which contributed to the revolt against the Brothers in June 2013. It discusses the stalled negotiations which were the making of a new political settlement in June 2012, and whose failure greatly influenced the lead up to the emergence of a counter-coalition acting as a political bloc in December 2012. It will be argued that the non-inclusive nature of the political settlement forged between the army and the Brothers and the failure to arrive at a national unity government (as a consequence of a stalled attempt at arriving at a political settlement) was one of the key factors that contributed to the second revolution of June 2013.

When Mubarak's 'departure' was announced by Omar Suleiman on 11 February 2011, it was also declared that the army represented by the SCAF would take charge of the country. At first, the youth revolutionaries welcomed SCAF's takeover. After all, had it not been for the positive intervention of the army, there was a possibility that there would have been some very bloody massacres and possibly a civil war. However, shortly after the demise of Mubarak, the first indicators of SCAF's alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood began to appear in the form of a political settlement, i.e. an agreement reflecting that 'the best interests of both parties are served in a particular way of organising political power'.[3] The kind of political settlement between the two parties can best be described as an informal pact. An informal pact is 'uneasy arrangements between elites that find accommodation through the brokering of interests' (DFID 2010: 23).

Evidence for the informal settlement between SCAF and the Islamists began to manifest itself on several fronts. Shortly after the ousting of Mubarak, the youth revolutionary forces began to hold SCAF accountable for the failure to deliver on policies by calling upon the people to go down to the streets in '*millioniyyas*' to demand their rights (one million person protests). The Brotherhood and the Islamists prohibited their members from joining and threatened to expel those that broke ranks with the movement. A systematic campaign to demonise the youth revolutionaries began, instigated by both the army-controlled media as well as the Islamists' outreach channels.

Specific political concessions began to be made in relation to the Islamists. Despite the fact that the Egyptian constitution prohibits the emergence of parties on religious lines, all of the Islamist parties were easily registered, with no mechanisms to hold them responsible for showing compliance with the law (see Tadros 2012a).

The informal entente reached its epitome around the constitutional amendments that were put forward in March 2011. SCAF put forward a number of constitutional amendments that would in effect serve to consolidate their power while simultaneously facilitating the Islamists accession to power. SCAF and the Islamists urged the people to vote 'yes' for the proposed amendments in a constitutional referendum. The youth revolutionary forces and non-Islamist political parties urged a 'no' vote. The Islamists' instrumentalisation of religion was effective in mobilising the majority to vote favourably for the constitutional amendments. It sent a clear message to the armed forces that they could count on the Islamists' power to influence the populace, and therefore served well as a strategic ally. It also sent a clear message to the

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[3] Based on DFID's definition of a political settlement.

revolutionary youth: they may have instigated the revolution, but it was the Islamists who controlled the streets.

As predicted, the Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis) won a majority in parliament, one which had hardly any members of the youth movements who had instigated the uprisings, women or Copts. The Muslim Brotherhood announced their commitment to drawing up a new constitution via an inclusive and consensual process whereby both men and women would be represented, as well as Muslims and Christians, secular and Islamist forces. However, they monopolised on their majority status in parliament to draw up an Islamist majority in the 100 person committee responsible for drafting Egypt's constitution. The liberal forces, together with others, withdrew from the committee and it was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court. Evidently, had the constitution been drawn up before the parliamentary elections through an inclusive process, the Islamists who had not yet ascended to political power, would not have been able to assume majority representation over the first constitutional committee. However, there were contending claims to representation. The Brothers believed that representation in the constitution should be directly tied to the outcome of the parliamentary elections. It happened that the Salafis represented a significant bloc in parliament and therefore made claims to having more legitimacy to representation than other forces. While alliances waxed and waned, the Muslim Brothers found it easier to win over the support of the Salafis and other Islamist movements than other political forces, hence there was also a vested interest in mollifying the Islamist bloc in the composition of the constitution than the other political forces. Undoubtedly, as the Brothers looked to minimise opposition to their governance, it was easier for them to work with the Islamists. This majoritarian approach was made possible through the entente with SCAF, since the latter was assured that the legitimacy of the Brothers was derived from the street (ballot boxes being the proxy for it) and that such an arrangement would not undermine the army's demands to be secured in the constitution.

As with any pact, the terms and conditions were continuously being negotiated as the political situation developed on the ground. It appears, according to former President Morsi's account, that his nomination for the presidency was also a matter that was negotiated with the SCAF. After his ousting during his trial process, when asked to comment on being accused of treason (through information sharing to international actors), Dr Morsi commented that such an allegation was absurd in view of the fact that other than being given the clearance by the intelligence apparatus in Egypt, members of the SCAF had told him in conversations that took place with the Brothers that they had reservations over Khayrat el Shatter's nomination for presidency, but had no qualms with him (Mohamed and El Sheikh 2014). The details of the interview suggest high level policy meetings occurring on a regular basis between SCAF and the Brotherhood leadership, at the very least up to the point when Morsi became president.

It can be inferred from the unfolding political situation that the terms of the SCAF-MB alliance were that SCAF facilitated the Islamists' access to political power in return for the Islamists containing the streets so as to undermine the revolutionary forces' resistance against military rule. Moreover, one important aspect of the deal was that in return for SCAF's role in facilitating the Islamists' ascendancy to political power, the latter would allow them a 'safe exit' from power, which would grant them political immunity from future prosecution. According to Akram Al Alfi, 'the emergence of tactical youth violence since mid-2011 can primarily be explained as a sense among a growing segment of young people heavily involved in the January 25 revolution that they had been excluded [from the entente between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood]' and that no amount of peaceful protesting was going to alter the terms of this alliance. He suggests that among Egyptian youth groups, the Ultras were the only ones with the expertise and organisational form that make violent tactics a viable option. The experience of other youth groups is limited to the violent clashes with security forces during the 25 January revolution, especially on 27 and 28 January. The Ultras

are a football fan club established in 1997 for the Al Ahly football team, with a large young, broad-based membership and who played a prominent role in the Egyptian revolution of 25 January. Al Alfi notes that individuals who belong to the Ultras may also belong to other movements and entities, since often people had multiple membership in various initiatives or moved from one to another depending on the political moment.

However, faced not only with an exclusionary political order, but a dysfunctional one, violence by the youth came to take on other motives as well as other than challenging the power configuration, namely, revenge. Al Alfi writes that a new round of violence erupted between the regime and the Ultras after the Port Said massacre, in which 72 Ahli fans were killed during rioting at the Port Said stadium following a match between the Ahli club and the Port Said al-Masri club on 1 February 2012. After the massacre, the Ultras accused the SCAF, the Interior Ministry and the Port Said public of involvement in the massacre of Ahli fans and responded by stepping up violent tactics such as storming the metro (subway).

3.1   Fairmont Agreement gone bust

In June 2012, in the presidential elections, there was a run-off between a former Mubarak government official, Ahmed Shafik and Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi. It was a tight race in which the possibility that the Brotherhood's opponent Ahmed Shafik might win the race was real. At that point, before the second round of elections, the Muslim Brotherhood met with representatives from 17 political parties and youth groups at the five-star Fairmont Hotel to arrive at a pact in order to discuss the kind of guarantees (or concessions) the MB could make in return for their endorsement of their candidature. The conditions that they laid out were that Morsi should:

* launch a 'national unity project';
* form a 'national salvation government' that included representatives from all political forces and be headed by an independent political figure;
* select a presidential team that reflected Egypt's diverse political arena;[4]
* ensure a more diverse and representative membership in the constituent assembly responsible for drawing up Egypt's constitution.

The political parties and youth coalitions agreed to mobilise in support of Mohamed Morsi's candidature. Mohamed Morsi won the elections by a narrow margin of one per cent over Ahmed Shafik, which does not amount to a sweeping success. The political parties and youth coalitions believed that this margin of success was due to their endorsement and they expected that once in office he would fulfil his part of the pact.

President Morsi and the Muslim Brothers concede that the odds were set against them from the outset. In an interview with The Guardian a day before his ousting President Morsi made two important arguments about the nature of the opposition to his rule. Firstly, he did not see that the rising opposition to his rule was from the grass roots nor that the violence was organic. He maintained that the fighting was coordinated by 'the deep state and the remnants of the old regime' (Hirst and Kingsley 2013). The deep state refers here to the institutional setup of the governing bodies in Egypt, which were, from the perspective of the Muslim Brothers resistant to change. Another element of the deep state is the remnants of the former regime who retain positions of power at various levels of the government and who may have an agenda of obfuscating the Brothers' rule. Finally, there were the malfunctioning and corrupt elements inherited from the previous regime. As one Muslim Brotherhood senior member who believed that the MB's leadership was ill timed: 'The MB took up a house that

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[4] Shukrallah (2013). For a Muslim Brotherhood perspective on the Fairmont Agreement see http://photography.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13597/the-brotherhood-after-30-june_an-interview-with-th.

was in ruins. They should have first let in a builder to clean up and sort out the place before they occupy it' (personal interview).

Morsi also argued that the violence was perpetrated by hired thugs belonging to the old regime. The second important argument was that he denied that he had pursued an exclusionary policy towards the opposition, arguing that he had offered them a number of positions which they had declined. Further, he defended his own appointments saying that the nature of democracy is that he is entitled as president to appoint his own allies.

However, during his year in office, Morsi pursued majoritarian strategies that in the long term alienated the opposition and the youth movements and catalysed them to coalesce into a counter-coalition called the 'National Salvation Front' which endorsed the 30 June revolution. Hesham Kandil, the prime minister heading the government was known to be a Muslim Brotherhood sympathiser, the key ministries were given to MB loyalists and the non-MB advisors placed on the presidential team had no influence on the decision-making process. Talks were held between the president and the opposition during those months but they never materialised into concrete steps forward. The opposition believed that they were window-dressing measures rather than genuine spaces for participation and influence.

As for the constituent assembly designated with developing Egypt's new constitution, it was dominated by an Islamist majority, leading to the resignation of the key political actors of non-Islamist orientation (Tadros 2012a). While Morsi did not have a say on the members (though the MB had significant clout on that via parliament), he did not have to express his endorsement of the constitution until evidence of broad-based consensus (rather than majoritarianism) was ensured. Again, this was intended to mollify the Islamists as part of an understanding that in return for the political clout the Islamist bloc was given in designating the constitution, they would support the president and the Muslim Brotherhood's governance, or at the very least, challenge the opposition when they attacked them. The constitution was both non-inclusive in process and outcome. It had in effect brought the Fairmont Agreement a step closer to its disintegration, however; what led to its death was the announcement of the 'Constitutional Decree' in November 2012 which was seen by the opposition as leading to the concentration of legislative and judiciary powers in the hands of the president (Tadros 2012b).

In effect the failed Fairmont Agreement, together with stalled delivery of improvements in citizens' lives, had two critical impacts:

1.   it prompted excluded actors such as some youth groups to resort to violence;
2.   it made large segments of the public and the media reluctant to condemn violence perpetrated against the ruling regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, thereby implicitly condoning it.

Akram Al Alfi traces the birth of several youth groups that endorse violence as the strategy of engaging the Morsi government with the events at the Presidential Palace (*al ettehadeya*) when militias supporting President Morsi comprising members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis attacked protesters who had congregated in front of the palace to demonstrate against the constitutional declaration. In reaction to the state-sponsored violence, Al Alfi notes two combat-like groups, the Black Bloc and the Revolutionary Ultras were formed. Al Alfi notes:

> The frequency of violence rose to unprecedented levels in the early months of 2013, as numerous clashes were seen in the governorates, in front of the Ittihadiya Palace, and in Tahrir. The violence was especially evident during demonstrations to mark the second anniversary of the January revolution [2013], which saw the launch of the Black Bloc and its first public appearance in a march in Talaat Harb Square. As the

group's first actions, it attempted to storm the downtown offices of the MB website Ikhwan Online, cut off the metro, and closed Sadat station in Tahrir. The clashes in the capital coincided with dozens of confrontations between demonstrators and security forces or Brotherhood elements in Suez (where eight people were killed), Mansoura (where Black Bloc groups emerged and demonstrators attempted to torch the Daqahliya governorate building), Kafr al-Sheikh, Gharbiya, Sharqiya (the home province of Mohamed Morsi), Damietta, Beheira, and Ismailiya, as well as small clashes in Beni Soueif and Fayyoum.
(Al Alfi, forthcoming)

Exclusionary and unresponsive policies did not only give birth to new actors committed to using violence to topple the regime, but also changes in the spatial dimensions of the execution of violence. In effect the youth groups shifted their deployment of violent tactics from the centre of the capital city to the periphery, in particular the towns of the Delta (Lower Egypt). Violence was spreading nationwide, creating bigger ripple effects.

4 Egypt's unfolding new political settlement

On 30 June 2013, one of the largest human gatherings in contemporary times was witnessed in Egypt as millions took to the streets and squares in the main towns in the country. Tamarod, a youth-led initiative, had called upon the Egyptian people to join in nationwide protests to demand early presidential elections. However, there was no possible way of predicting the huge turnout that was witnessed that day on account of the fact that previous calls for nationwide protests such as the one made on 25 January 2013 did not attract large numbers. Also many citizens feared that there would be bloodshed and massacres. Moreover, it was unclear whether the size of the crowds would be sufficiently large as to outdo the Muslim Brotherhood who already have a large constituency. Most importantly, in that instance, on 30 June 2013, the army's statement that it would 'defend legitimacy' was ambivalent and could be interpreted both ways: it could mean constitutional legitimacy (i.e. President Morsi) or popular legitimacy (if the numbers added up). Moreover, on 29 June, President Morsi had also conveyed confidence in the army, thus making the possibility of predicting the overthrow most difficult (The Guardian 2013).

President Morsi was ousted from office on 3 July when General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi, the Minister of Defence announced a Roadmap that would involve Judge Adli Mansur, the head of the Supreme Constitutional acting as interim president, an interim government serving until a new constitution was drawn up, and parliamentary and presidential elections had taken place. The Roadmap was based on a series of talks between General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi and a wide array of political representatives. The Muslim Brotherhood had declined the invitation that was extended to them to join. The representation was broad-based and included all the political actors who had been excluded from the pact forged between the SCAF and the Muslim Brothers in 2011. It included Sheikh Ahmed el Tayeb, heading Sunni Islam's most respected establishment body, Al-Azhar, Pope Tawadrous, leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church, representing followers of the Christian faith, Mohamed Abd el Azziz, a representative of Tamarod, the youth movement that called for the 30 June uprising; Mohamed el Baradei, representing the non-Islamist political parties that had formed into the National Salvation Front; and Galal el Morah the secretary general of the Nour party, the political wing of the ultra-radical Islamists. The presence of the latter challenges the notion that this was the military siding with the 'seculars' against the 'Islamists'. Also included was one woman, Sekina Fouad, known for her progressive stance, and several members of the judiciary.

What followed was a polarised debate in international circles as to whether what occurred in Egypt was a military coup that brought an end to all possibilities of a democracy in Egypt, or whether it was the corrective revolution that would address the hijacking of the 25 January revolution by the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF.[5] What is for sure is that what happened certainly amounted to a rupture in the status quo that has produced a reconfiguration of power, in the form of a new political settlement whose impact will be felt not only domestically but regionally as well. From the outset the Roadmap was threatened by contending visions of legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood and all Islamist movements (except the Salafis who supported the El Nour party) coalesced into the National Coalition for the Defence of Legitimacy and Against the Coup. Their position was that there can be no legitimate leader except Mohamed Morsi, since he was democratically elected to power in accordance with the constitution. They recognised no other power or leadership and since they did not recognise the 30 June–3 July protests as amounting to a revolution, the only pathway to reclaiming legitimacy was to reverse the military coup. In order for this version of legitimacy to find internal champions, it was necessary for the pro-Morsi camp to show the world that indeed, the people, or at least a substantial part of them, endorsed their vision. However, the masses who responded to the pro-Morsi camp to take to the streets were not on a par with the mass protests that were witnessed in Egypt on 30 June.

In order to counter the case made for the supremacy of constitutional legitimacy to the world, General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi called upon the Egyptian population on 24 July to grant the army and the police a mandate to crack down on 'terrorism' (the Muslim Brotherhood were by then dubbed terrorists). The message that was intended to be conveyed to the outside world was clear: supremacy of popular legitimacy over constitutional legitimacy emanated from the masses who were expressing their voices on the streets.

From the outset, arriving at a *compromise between the two contending parties* was particularly difficult. El Sherif suggests that in order for a political settlement to work, what is needed on the part of the ruling authority is for the interim Egyptian government to incorporate the Brotherhood as a political actor in the political process, halting the security crackdown and allowing it to compete. It would also require on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood to acquiesce 'to facts that render a return to the status it enjoyed before Morsi's ouster [sic] impossible. It would admit political defeat and call off its protest activities' (El Sherif 2013).

A 50-member constituency assembly was established to draw up the constitution. The membership was selected on the basis of representing the political and social diversity in the country. The committee was inclusive insofar as it included independent Islamists and those belonging to the conservative Salafi party; it included representatives of Al-Azhar, the country's authority on Sunni Islam, representatives from the Christian churches, women's rights activists, all the major political parties/trends, academics, the judiciary and representatives of the police and army. Through a process of consensus-building (with a few proddings from the army at the back) a constitution was arrived at, that was by and large problematic in certain ways (in terms of the powers granted to the Ministry of Defence to appoint their leader and to govern the army with minimal checks and balances), but was inclusive in outcome in terms of the rights granted to women, youth, Christians and the poor. The composition of the constitutional committee was to a certain extent reflective of a new political settlement: all political forces and orientations were represented except the Muslim Brotherhood. Some have compared it to the pre-2011 revolutionary settlement insofar as that

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[5] It is beyond the scope of this paper to narrate the arguments presented on both sides. For an example of the first camp, Omar Ashour is a good example. He argues that 'when elected institutions with some support on the ground are removed by force, the outcome is almost never friendly to democracy. Outright military dictatorship, military domination of politics, civil war or a mix of all are all possibilities': www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/07/egypt-revolution-democracy-in-peril. For an example of views from the second camp, see Amr Ezzat who argues that 'now here we are breaking the Boxocracy of those authoritarian Islamists that you have said "rode to power on our backs"': www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12948/revolution-coup-d%E2%80%99%C3%A9tat-the-certain-thing-is-we-bro.

had also excluded the Brothers. However, such a comparison is problematic since the political configurations at the wake of the revolution had excluded everyone except those belonging to the ruling regime, not only the Muslim Brothers. The inclusion of the Salafis, Al-Azhar and a number of independent Islamist political figures in the constitution that followed the Roadmap is indicative of the desire to avoid the emergence of an Islamist counter-bloc that would be pitted against a 'secularist bloc'. This would have carried serious legitimacy concerns for the new regime in view of the strength of various Islamist movements in Egypt.

The Coalition for the Defence of Legitimacy mobilised widely to encourage people to reject the constitution by boycotting it. However, the turnout was higher than the constitutional referendum witnessed during Morsi's tenure (40 per cent compared to 30 per cent) and had an overwhelming 'yes' vote (over 90 per cent). It is likely that those who rejected the constitution would have boycott the process and were part of the 60 per cent who did not vote.

Six months after the ousting of President Morsi, there was no indication that the position of the pro-Morsi camp (and the Muslim Brotherhood) had shifted: the demand for the reinstatement of the former president was intact.[6] In other words, what was being sought was not their inclusion in the Roadmap, or that the terms of engagement would be more conciliatory towards the Brothers, but that President Morsi be reinstated. In the midst of this deadlock, both parties have resorted to violence and other actors have also become parties to the conflict, initiating and contributing to the widespread violence, perpetuating a cycle of violence and counter-violence.

As is evident from the data presented in section 2 of the paper, the scale of violence witnessed since the 30 June revolution excels that witnessed in the three previous years (and possibly previous decades). The government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood has been systematic and comprehensive, on a par only with the crackdown that President Abdel Nasser launched against the movement in 1956. Leaders have been detained (in their thousands), some supporters have been shot with live ammunition, their premises closed, the main broadcasting station (Misr25) has been closed down, their political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, declared null and void and after the bombing of the security building in el Mansoura the Muslim Brotherhood has been declared a terrorist organisation. The accounts of many members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been frozen, some of the charitable associations were brought under the regulation of the Ministry of Social Solidarity and some members have been prohibited from leaving the country. The massacres at Rab'a and el Nahda Squares in Cairo entailed the security forces' killing and injuring hundreds (see section 2) and is undoubtedly one of the worst incidents of the security forces' use of unrestrained violence that contemporary Egypt has seen.

Those endorsing the government's use of violence have been firstly a significant part of the Egyptian citizenry and secondly, comprising the bulk of political parties and the non-Islamist commercial media. The hostility felt by many members of the Egyptian public towards the Muslim Brotherhood and the pro-Morsi camp became openly manifest after 3 July. In some instances, as the pro-Morsi marches would commence in the heart of urban suburbs in major towns in Egypt, citizens would appear in their balconies or doorways and hurl insults at them or show pictures of El Sissi. These would provoke members of the Brothers to either attack, verbally or physically, the provocateurs, and violence would ensue. There have been dozens of incidents where pro-Morsi protesters have engaged in confrontation with citizens in the neighbourhood, rather than the security forces. The other actor that has been partisan in the conflict has been the non-Islamist commercial media whose coverage of the political scene

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[6] As late as 3 October 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood's representative Omar Darrag insisted that the only legitimate president was Morsi (see George 2013).

has lacked impartiality, often demonising the Muslim Brotherhood and engaging in inflammatory language against them.

It is important, however, to concede that the political scene is not one of peaceful protesters being ruthlessly repressed by a security apparatus that has turned against its people. The level of violence waged by the pro-Morsi supporters against citizens, the police and state institutions has also been of great magnitude and of a sustained nature. Amnesty International has, for example, confirmed that the protests in Rab'a were neither peaceful nor were the citizens unarmed. It has documented incidents of torture being carried out against civilians on the premises (Amnesty International 2013). However, well before the assault on Rab'a and el Nahda squares, since the commencement of the pro-Morsi encampment in early June 2013 (before the revolution), pro-Morsi supporters had engaged in the kidnapping, torture and killing of civilians. This was stepped up after the ousting of Morsi (Trew 2013). Moreover, pro-Morsi factions accused the Coptic Orthodox Church of inciting the Copts to participate against the Brothers in the revolts and in revenge torched more than 70 churches within the space of 48 hours, and dozens of faith-based institutions such as orphanages, community service buildings and bookshops. While some questioned whether it was the security apparatus that was behind the attacks, the evidence collected from the ground by research in the governorate that witnessed the most incidents of torching places of worship, that of Minya, suggested otherwise, at least in that case. In Minya, where communities are closed, and people known to each other, citizens who witnessed the torching were able to identify people from nearby villages who were known to belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Moreover, their slogans of rising up in jihad against the infidels and their attire betrayed their identity.

Ali Bakr (forthcoming) argues that the ousting of President Morsi from office created the enabling conditions for a rapprochement between Islamist political actors who previously disagreed on ideological and political grounds. Bakr notes that the umbrella of the National Coalition to Support Legitimacy, has brought together the Muslim Brotherhood with the Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the remnants of the jihad, and several Salafi movements. In addition, an alliance was created between the Muslim Brotherhood and some jihadi and *takfiri* organisations in Sinai who have a long history of engagement in terrorist activity. Previously, they had declared the MB and Morsi to be infidels, arguing that there was no difference between Morsi and Hosni Mubarak – both were unbelievers who did not rule by God's law. In effect, what has emerged is a post-ideological movement of Islamist actors who are able to synchronise and coordinate interventions, bound together by a common enemy: the army and the security apparatus and more generally the Egyptian government in power.

By the time Morsi was ousted, a vast repertoire of militant Islamist leaders and groups had set up camp in Egypt, having returned to the country from Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere shortly after the Egyptian revolution of 2011. These were groups that had received high training in warfare, had access to weapons, and believed in the use of violence for jihad. The pool of militant Islamist leaders operating in Egypt increased after President Morsi granted clemency to 755 Islamists during his one-year tenure (Hosni 2013). These included leaders of the Gama'a al-Islamiyya and jihad movements. Interestingly, one of the men who was granted clemency, Moustapha Gamal Abd el 'Al was a leader in the militant group Ansar Beir al Maqdes which has claimed responsibility for the bombings in Egypt after Morsi's demise, and is believed to have direct links with Al Qaeda.

According to Bakr, the post-ideological phase has been informed by the representation of the struggle as one of Islam vs. secularism. In view of the fact that many of the Islamist actors such as the Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the jihadi groups have ideologically sanctioned the use of violence, the conflict becomes one of the need to initiate jihad in defence of Islam. This was also made possible because of the shift in the position of the Gama'a al-Islamiyya on the question of violence. In 1997 they had declared a ceasefire and endorsed a process of

revisionism over the religious sanctioning of the use of violence against Muslims. However, after the Egyptian revolution this position was reversed with some Gama'a leaders – namely, Safwat Abd al-Ghani – retracting their admission that the group was wrong to take up arms against the state and instead claimed that it had done so in legitimate self-defence and that such a position was taken at the time due to intense security pressures. The recourse to violence has been intensified by the fact that there have been large numbers of Salafis who had conventionally focused on religious teaching rather than activism turning to jihadi groups than the reverse trend (Bakr forthcoming). Many of the new recruits of Sinai-based jihadi groups were originally members of Salafi groups. Regional networks linking various Islamist militant groups together are likely to increase the incidents of violence experienced locally. This has been exacerbated by factionism within jihadi groups, according to Bakr: 'The relationship between jihadi groups in general, and particularly splinter groups, is a competitive one: when one jihadi group undertakes an operation, another group or splinter group attempts an even bigger operation to prove that it is more supportive of Islam and the jihad. Factionalism also leads to the proliferation of jihadi organisations, making it difficult to control them or negotiate with them, or even bring them together on a united stance. This in turn makes it difficult to engage and confront these organisations in the short and long term' (Bakr forthcoming).

The outcome has been the increase in violence on many fronts. The pro-Morsi camp, through various actors within it, have been involved in attacks on the gas pipeline, on the army in Sinai, on state property, on civilians and engaged in assassination attempts, some of them successful.[7] The Brotherhood's recourse to violence has not improved its bargaining power vis-à-vis the state which has responded by more intense security crackdowns, though it has increased the state of instability. Surprisingly, what has enabled the ruling powers to initiate such a bloody campaign without losing its legitimacy has been the reaction by the majority of the citizenry.

4.1   Political settlements from the bottom up

The increase in violence since the 30 June revolution is congruent with the findings of the survey undertaken. It is important to note that they do not necessarily represent the views of the entire country. Certainly the increased levels of violence would be experienced by all citizens after 30 June, irrespective of their political affiliation. However, the survey results on causes, dynamics and solutions would not represent the views of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and may or may not represent those citizens that neither supported the Brothers nor those against them. With respect to those that did revolt against the Brothers, 71.9 per cent of respondents said that they have experienced more violence since the 30 June revolution. 18.3 per cent said there has been more or less the same amount of violence while only 8.6 per cent said that violence has declined (and 1.2 per cent did not answer). However, the underlying causes of violence is one theme where dominant Western analytical interpretations diverge radically from that of the Egyptian citizens who responded. Following the ousting of President Morsi, many analysts suggested that deprived of avenues of formal political engagement the pro-Morsi constituency would result in violence and predicted that the security sector's excessive use of force would only serve to increase the Brothers' popularity and support base. Based on such analysis, it would be expected that people's empathy with the plight of the Brothers would increase and they would condemn the violence they are subject to. In political settlement terms, it would suggest that the failure to include the Muslim Brotherhood would delegitimise the political order, and be problematic insofar as being non-responsive to the will of the people. However, this is neither the political situation up until now (January 2014) nor is it how citizens read the political scene.

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[7] For one of the worst attacks on 19 August 2013, see Lynch (2013); and for the security crackdown see Solomon (2013). See also Keller (2013) for further analysis.

Ironically the respondents in the survey blamed the security apparatus not for oppressing the Brothers, but for not doing enough to counter the violence from the Brothers. The most significant proportion of the sample (40.3 per cent) attributed violence spikes to the role of the security forces (27 per cent said there is not enough security to ensure citizen safety on the streets while 13.4 per cent said it is the inaction of the security forces that is to blame). The second highest response to the cause of violence (21.1 per cent) was the Muslim Brotherhood's initiation of violence. Only 1.4 per cent believed it was due to the Brothers' subjection to violence. The percentage who blamed the security forces and saw the Brothers being both the victims and perpetrators of violence was still relatively low (10.6 per cent). This is despite the fact that the research was undertaken in December and early January after the bloody confrontations leading to the death of many at Rab'a and el Nahda had happened.

'In your opinion, what do you think needs to happen to reduce violence?' When citizens were asked what is needed to reduce violence generally, the most resounding answer was a security crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (50.2 per cent). The second most frequent answer cited by 42.7 per cent of respondents was 'security doing a better job of protecting citizens'.

The low percentage of people who cited reconciliation with the Muslim Brothers as the path to reducing violence was reiterated when they were asked in the question that followed: 'Do you agree with the idea of reconciliation with the Muslim Brothers?' 81.8 per cent said that they did not favour such a reconciliation while 18.1 per cent were in favour.

It is interesting that while one would assume that the notion of reconciliation – i.e. an inclusive political settlement – may yield less violence, this was not the interpretation of the respondents in the survey.

Respondents were asked two questions:

Q43: If there is *no* reconciliation, do you think violence will *increase*?

	Frequency	%
Yes	1,564	64.5
No	858	35.4
Did not answer	1	.0
Total	2,423	100.0

Q44. If there *is* reconciliation, do you think violence will *decrease*?

		Frequency	%
Valid	Yes	741	30.6
	No	1,672	69.0
	Did not answer	10	.4
	Total	2,423	100.0

The answers to these questions may seem contradictory on the surface. How can the absence of reconciliation lead to increased violence while reconciliation does not decrease violence? There is an internal logic, however, as citizens are affirming their belief that reconciliation has no effect on violence. It is congruent with the message that they were

conveying in many of the focus groups that they believe that the Brothers have and will pursue violent means anyway. It is an indication of their negative perception of the Brothers' agency more so than anything else. This was further confirmed when a cross tabulation of questions 43 and 44 was undertaken, and which revealed the following:

- 39 per cent of the entire sample believe that the absence of reconciliation will increase violence but concurrently believe that if reconciliation is pursued, violence will not go down. In other words, they are aware that violence may be stepped up if reconciliation is not pursued, but do not think that there will be a decline if it is, either.
- 29.7 per cent of the entire sample believe that the absence of reconciliation will not increase violence and if reconciliation is pursued, violence will not go down. In other words, they believe that reconciliation will have no impact on violence.

That is to say, almost 70 per cent believe that there is no positive correlation between violence and reconciliation. However, 25 per cent of the respondents believe that reconciliation will positively bear on reduction of violence and its absence will increase violence.

What accounts for the great disconnect between the top-down perspective on what kind of political settlement would positively influence the levels of violence and citizens perspectives, bottom-up?

There is a need for understanding the intensity of the animosity of a significant part of the popular towards the Brothers. Western analysts' focus on the ballot box as a proxy of citizen voices ignored other expressions of dissent that were being expressed in a spontaneous, sporadic and sustained way during the year when the Muslim Brotherhood were in power (Tadros 2013b). One indicator of the level of animosity that citizens harboured towards the Brothers while in office was their non-condemnation of acts of violence perpetrated by youth actors against the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) premises during the year when they were in power. Al Alfi observed that there was a high level 'of popular support for youth violence against the MB, as large urban populations were quite tolerant of attempts by youth to storm the offices of the Brotherhood and the FJP and only rarely stood up to such attempts' (Al Alfi forthcoming). Youth movements may resort to violence when mass mobilisation subsides 'in order to make a mark and defeat their own frustration'. However, the adoption of violence is often highly sensitive to how the public responds. Al Alfi argues that the public implicitly gave the youth movements a mandate to engage in political violence.

It is important to note that following the June revolution of 2013, pro-Morsi protesters have had to fight on several fronts: they found themselves in direct confrontation not only with the authorities but with the people themselves. There were instances in which their protests were met with rotten food thrown on them by citizens who wanted to collectively express their rejection of the Brothers. Undoubtedly this spurred violent confrontations, but the fact that it was initiated by poor people in neighbourhoods in spontaneous and collective expressions is indicative of the extent to which they had lost their constituency.

The second 'key' to understanding the disconnect is contending perceptions of the dynamics of violence. The Western press focused on the Rab'a and Nahda massacre (understandable in view of the deaths/injuries) as an indication of the brutalisation of the Muslim Brothers at the hands of the security apparatus. However, it paid scant attention to the everyday forms of violence that citizens were experiencing at the hands of the pro-Morsi (including some Brothers) supporters. In focus groups women and men shared experiences of being subjected to being threatened with and experiencing violence. No doubt the state has been involved in much propaganda about the implication of the Brothers in terrorist activities enforced through other media channels that have intensified the idea of the pending threat.

However, citizens' reactions to endorsing a security crackdown cannot simply be read as being brainwashed by the media. They have shared experiences of violence that are real and painful during and after Morsi's reign which they attribute to the Muslim Brothers and other supporters.

The analysis of the survey and focus group results shows an inconsistency and partiality in justifying violence on the part of respondents which was consistent with the findings of Al Alfi as well. When youth groups were using violence against the Brothers when they were in office, it was condoned. When the Muslim Brothers who now constitute a political minority, resort to political violence, the public condemns it. One of the reasons may be that the youth groups torched buildings but made no attacks on human life, yet the attacks by the Brothers have cost human life on a large scale. The other qualifier is the fact that the youth were never in power, and though they did not have a constituency, they were not despised, whereas the MB became a political minority after being ousted from power where desires for revenge ran high.

It would be risky to determine the terms of engagement of any political settlement on the sentiment of the populace, especially where feelings of revenge, injustice and anger run high. However, it is also important not to ignore citizens' experiences, perceptions and expectations while forging elite alliances. Citizens directly influence political settlements by giving them legitimacy. The mass uprising of 14 million persons on 30 June 2013 indicated a popular withdrawal of legitimacy of a political settlement that emerged in 2011. Moreover, citizens influence governments' choices in the terms of engagement of new settlements. If citizens had endorsed an inclusive political settlement with the Muslim Brotherhood being party to it, this would not have given the security apparatus the free rein to initiate a crackdown without any concerns for the repercussions. In effect, the security apparatus could rely on (1) the overall support of a large segment of the population for such measures and (2) the diminishing pro-Morsi constituency which is maligned by the rest of the population.

In terms of the immediate future (next two years) 42.5 per cent of respondents said they do not know what will happen to violence levels in the next two years. 30.4 per cent believe it will go down, while 17.7 per cent are bracing themselves for an increase and 9.4 per cent said they expect that levels will stay the same. When cross-tabulated with the results of the questions on whether they favour reconciliation, it becomes clear that there is no popular will among the respondents to involve the Muslim Brotherhood in a political settlement, for which reconciliation is a proxy, it is not an idea that has any social currency or acceptance.

5   Conclusion, possible scenarios, policy recommendations

5.1   Conclusion

This paper sought to establish the rise in political, social and economic forms of violence that Egypt has witnessed during the transition period that was marked with Mubarak's ousting in January 2011. In any transition context, there are spikes in violence against a backdrop of security laxity, political instability and general sense of chaos. The Egyptian context is no exception. Associated with a state of heightened revolutionary activism marked by frequent protests, marches and sit-ins, has come violent confrontations with the security forces and with the army, and increasingly after the demise of Morsi, with citizens who object to the protesters' demands. Socially motivated forms of gender-based violence also increased dramatically during this period, in some instances being also driven by political motives: to deter women from participating in protests. New forms of violence that did not exist previously appeared, such as the crowds lynching perpetrators of violence in an enactment of the Islamic concept of *haraba*. Trading in weapons took on new dimensions after the Egyptian revolution of 2011, there was an influx of a wide array of weapons, which became readily available at different price tags and became openly circulated at a community level. The abduction of Christians for ransom and the imposition of protection money on them, both forms of violence that did not exist previously, assumed dangerously high levels in Upper Egypt.

Evidence from the respondents in the survey also confirmed the increase in violence in their lives, where over 60 per cent had experienced violence in one way or another during the transition period. The rise in violence has had a clear developmental impact: on reduced attendance and higher dropouts from educational institutions.

The nature of the political settlements forged between 2011 and 2013 greatly influenced the levels of political violence witnessed in the country; however, they must be understood not only in terms of elite negotiations, but also in terms of the degree to which they enjoy popular legitimacy. The paper has argued that the level of inclusiveness of a political settlement does not on its own explain the occurrence of violence. It does, however, have some explanatory power in conjunction with other factors; in the case of Egypt during this phase, the most important factor was the pulse of the citizenry.

A political settlement was forged between SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of an informal pact at the time of the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011. This settlement was highly exclusionary and catalysed some of the excluded such as the youth groups to resort to violence for political leverage in a context where people perceived their aspirations as not being met, and therefore empathised with the youth struggle. Secondly, an attempted political settlement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition and youth groups failed when President Morsi, once in power, pursued majoritarian policies that re-enforced the earlier exclusionary power configurations. Again, this catalysed the formation of new youth groups committed to using violence to oust the regime and in revenge. However, citizens played a role in tolerating violence against the regime, in reaction to its lack of responsiveness for the promises made of improved security and economic wellbeing.

A third political settlement emerged after President Morsi was ousted from power by the military following a mass revolt against the regime. While the Muslim Brotherhood were invited to take part in the talks leading to the Roadmap, they turned down the offer, refusing to offer the right of any party to initiate negotiations other than their president.

From the outset arriving at a minimal denominator, the most basic of terms of engagement for arriving at a pact between the authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood, has been impossible. The precondition for any negotiation set by the Muslim Brotherhood has been the reinstatement of President Morsi, which would negate the will of the millions who took to the streets to demand his departure. The political settlement unfolding is therefore exclusionary of the Muslim Brotherhood but has so far included most factions in political and civil society.

Since the ousting of President Morsi, the levels of political violence have increased, generated by a vicious cycle of the Brothers' instigation of violence as a tactic of resistance, the security forces launching the most ruthless crackdown, and more violence in revenge following. Currently there is no political will on the part of any domestic actors to arrive at a reconciliation between State and the Muslim Brotherhood to pave the way to a more inclusive political settlement. The Brothers do not recognise the legitimacy of the current status quo and their strategy is to seek to weaken the government through sustained resistance, including use of violence. The government sees no other strategy to contain the Brothers other than through use of force, and will not risk its popular legitimacy among the people.

This paper has sought to make an empirically informed theoretical contribution to the study of political settlements by examining how a bottom-up approach reveals the extent to which the mobilisation of citizens collectively influences the process and outcomes of elite pacts and agreements. The Muslim Brotherhood had a large constituency in 2011 and early 2012, as was evident from their successes in the elections. However, this constituency was on the decline, well before Morsi came to power, but continued to shrink dramatically further during his year in office. Western analysts and the Muslim Brotherhood themselves failed to understand the changing pulse of the citizenry and banked on the idea that the only way in which citizens would seek to elicit change would be through the ballot boxes. The mass uprising, unprecedented in terms of scale, witnessed on 30 June bore witness to this disconnect between macro-perspectives and the situation from below. In such an instance, the mass uprising brought down previous political settlements altogether, not only influencing their outcome.

The public condoning of violence perpetrated by the youth movements in 2011/2012 against SCAF and the Morsi regime contributed to delegitimising the exclusionary political settlement between the army and the Brothers that was in place. Yet the public's condemnation of violence perpetrated by the Islamists against the current regime renders illegitimate any efforts to make the current political settlement inclusive of the Brothers. In effect, it is unlikely that political violence will subside in the short term, though a mediation of a reconfiguration of the political settlement is possible in the future and may break the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence. However, for such a political settlement to materialise, there will need to be a change of leadership within the Muslim Brotherhood, a change of popular will, and a government that feels sufficiently compelled by internal pressures or external mediation to pursue such a path.

This paper has sought to make a contribution to bridging macro-perspectives on violence and political settlements and micro-perspectives from a mobilised citizenry. However, there are some clear research gaps which are critical for understanding the relationship between political settlements and violence in Egypt and countries in transition in the Arab region more broadly. The role of international actions in influencing political settlements and violence directly and indirectly needs to be explored in an in-depth and systematic way. This would involve an analysis of foreign policy, aid and multilateral activities of Western actors as well as regional players including Turkey. The regional flow of funds, weapons, and intelligence information between militant groups bears a direct impact on the stability of any political settlement as well as violence.

5.2 Possible scenarios

It is inconceivable to predict all the possible future political scenarios of how violence will be affected by Egypt's unfolding political settlement since there are too many variables at work. It is likely that whatever the scenario, political violence is unlikely to subside in the near future. A number of political scenarios are examined below:

1.   Maintenance of the current political configurations and continued violence

An analysis of the actors on the ground in Egypt suggests that there are no political wills interested in a settlement that involves reconciliation with the Brothers or their inclusion as a political actor with contributions to make to the political trajectory of the country.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist political groups do not recognise the legitimacy of the current status quo in the first place and therefore have rejected all calls to participate in any of their activities (such as the Roadmap). Anything less than an overthrow of the current regime is not going to be an acceptable condition for them to engage politically, hence violence will be their prime way of engaging with the ruling powers.

The Egyptian government shows no intention of engaging with the Brotherhood and its allies through any other means than a systematic and bloody security crackdown. The leadership (in the person of El-Sissi) is unlikely to yield to Western pressures to stop the crackdown on the Muslim Brothers because of the intensity of the popular sentiment against the Brothers and their belief that only by taking an uncompromising situation towards their violence will the movement be contained. Other than some Islamist-oriented political parties, the majority of political parties and the main youth movement that championed the 30 June revolution, Tamarod, have rejected the idea of involving the Brothers in a political settlement, on account of the violence they have perpetrated against the citizens.

Hence in effect the only political will that is in favour of a political settlement that includes the Muslim Brothers is that of a number of Western governments, who have spoken of inclusive democracy. At the moment they do not have the political clout to influence the internal scene in Egypt. The general Egyptian public see them as siding with the Brothers, negating their will, and there is a strong anti-Western sentiment that has been growing in intensity since July 2012. Moreover, their influence over the Egyptian government in terms of use of aid seems to have diminished as other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have come to their aid.

In short it is likely that the terms of the current political settlement will remain for a while, and so will the levels of violence, a long drawn out continuation of the current situation which involves a vicious cycle of violent protests and bombings by pro-Morsi factions, followed by intense and bloody security crackdowns which in turn generate more counter-violence. It is highly unlikely that a civil war would ensue because the followers of the Morsi regime and the weapons at their disposal do not compare with those of the army and the security apparatus. However, as Bakr highlighted in his forthcoming paper, there is strong evidence to suggest that militant groups are well armed, well connected, and are competing to show their allegiance to jihad against the State. This would entail the sustained use of violence against the regime in the form of assassination of political figures, bombings of government buildings, targeting of security personnel, and possibly attacks on citizens and tourists.

2.   Regime rupture and more violence

Another possible scenario in the medium term is for the current regime to be ousted because of some unexpected variable, i.e. the exit of General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi from politics, foreign intervention/occupation of Egypt or a mass uprising against the regime. There is very little evidence of an elite counter-coalition emerging in defiance of the current status quo.

Moreover, the pulse of the citizens, so far is suggesting a willingness to endorse the coming to power of General Abdel Fattah El-Sissi. Their endorsement may change in the medium term if no improvements in the economic and security situations are felt.

The ousting scenario is also likely to be affected by the policies of regional and international players as much as by local actors, an area that has not been sufficiently tackled in this paper, but should be the focus of future research. Should the regime be ousted, it is also expected that there will be more violence and bloodshed.

3.   Shift towards a political settlement inclusive of the Muslim Brotherhood

It is possible that in the long run the terms of the political settlement will change to allow for a reconciliation with the Muslim Brothers. Such a scenario is contingent upon a number of factors. First and foremost, is that perhaps a change in the leadership of the Muslim Brothers (not just the Old Guard but those considered part of the reformist wing and who were in power) would be required for a new look. A young, reformist generation that is able to reorganise the internal workings of the Brothers, build a new leadership and promote ideological revisionism may be best positioned to negotiate a pact with the government. Secondly, such an entente would in effect require that the government decriminalise membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, release members incarcerated and arrive at a mutual ceasefire. Thirdly, there would need to be a political leadership that enjoys sufficient popularity and legitimacy as to advance a national healing process to promote a 'one nation, one people' message that would heal the deep polarisation between those that support and oppose President Morsi. Popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement would be critical for the success of such a pact, it would in effect serve as its glue.

Fourthly, it is likely that any such reconfiguring of a political settlement would require international mediation. Western countries are ill positioned to initiate a rapprochement between the Egyptian authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood because they are perceived as partisan supporters of the latter and against the Egyptian people. However, perhaps an Arab country that is perceived to be non-partisan would be well positioned to pursue this in future. Since there is very little evidence of the presence of any of these factors at the moment, it is likely that this is a long-term possibility/option, but is not likely on the immediate horizon. However, if it materialises it is likely to reduce violence, provided that the Muslim Brotherhood is able to convince its allies from within, the many different *takfiri* and jihadi groups, that stopping the jihad against the government is justifiable.

5.3 Policy recommendations

In view of the highly political volatile environment in which current political settlement is being negotiated, policy areas are best thought of in the long run, rather than in the immediate term which is ever-changing.

- *Recognition of limitations of direct Western policy influence.* Western governments are not in a position to facilitate a more inclusive political settlement because their reputation has been marred by being perceived to align themselves too closely to the Muslim Brotherhood.
  Western bilateral aid for democratisation and development is going to be facing major hurdles in the immediate future. It must be recognised that the spaces are likely to be closed or semi-closed for collaboration between Western donors/NGOs and local civil society organisations. Western donors should proceed with extreme caution in supporting local civil society associations in ways that would generate a backlash against them.
- *In order to regain credibility among the Egyptian people reflected in public opinion towards the West, governments should adopt a policy of condemning all parties involved in violence, whether it be the government, the pro-Morsi protesters, or terrorist organisations. This will contribute to altering the image that the Western governments are partisan to violence perpetrated against the pro-Morsi faction and not against the broader citizenry.*
- *An alternative path of supporting a more inclusive political order in the long run would be through multilateral agency support for transitional justice.* While the interim government has established a Ministry for Transitional Justice, it has very little to show for in outcome. Multilateral agencies may wish to strengthen relations with the Egyptian Ministry of Transitional Justice in order to increase its capacity and its influence in Egyptian society. Such collaboration can take the form of sharing experiences of approaches to transitional justice pursued in other countries that have experienced high levels of violence and polarisation, as well as building local capacity to design initiatives that can be mainstreamed across governmental institutions in order to promote a culture of tolerance and forgiveness.
- *Prioritise youth job creation.* Al Alfi notes that Egypt suffers from a youth bulk which combined with unemployment and political exclusion creates the conditions for violence to thrive. Lind and Mitchell (2013: 4) note that there is a need for policies in non-armed conflict contexts to make 'young people a central focus of state and donor efforts'. They concede that existing policies often treat the youth as an add-on, an annexe to the political settlements being negotiated. Youth job creation and vocational training are particularly important to prioritise in national plans of action. This is particularly relevant to the case of Egypt where stability will rest on the youth finding the channels to achieve political, social and economic inclusion.

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Brighton BN1 9RE

T +44 (0)1273 606261
F +44 (0)1273 621202
E ids@ids.ac.uk
www.ids.ac.uk