
Occasional Paper 179

Liberal Dilemma with Difference:
Muslims in a western Democracy

Mollica Dastider

May 2010



CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALCUTTA



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by Mollica Dastider

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ABSTRACT

This paper is about western liberal democracies' unease with difference.

My engagement in this essay is largely with how secular Europe finds it difficult to accommodate Islamic cultures in European public space, as often represented by its Muslim citizens. Taking a cue from the public debate in Europe that ensued after the angry reaction of the French footballer Zinedine Zidane at the finals of 2006 World Cup football, the paper addresses the notion of 'well integrated children of French Republic'. A concept mostly used in the context of Muslim immigrants in Europe, and in determining whether they are the 'misfits' in a liberal democratic setup, misfits as in those who do not adhere to the tenets of the enlightenment ideals of secularism, democracy and freedom of the individual. The study points out that both the colour blind policy of French republican-secularism and the German anxiety over 'religious Muslim' behaviour in a 'secular German polity', emerge from the common concern of a possible non-Christian religious influence on the culture of liberalism in Europe.

What emerges in this study is that the debate over secular Europe's discomfort with religious Muslims is not an issue confined only to either Europe or Islam, but has wide reaching implications in terms of enlightenment ideals and its universal applicability. The concern reflected in questions such as 'how well integrated the Muslim immigrant workers are with secular republican ideals' or 'how would a religious Muslim behave electorally in a secular German polity' does indicate western democracy's skepticism over non-western practices in relation to state. For it is apparent that the European dilemma, in other words, is the dilemma of the liberal modernity. A rather political outcome of the social movements in late 18th century Europe to re-define relationship between state and society, and between community and the individual under the new categories of nation state, individual freedom, secularism and rule of law. The Liberal dilemma with Difference in effect addresses those dilemmas of modernity in accepting any different social behaviour that does not fall in the purview of Enlightenment rationality. The community life in the east as against the notion of western individualism; and perhaps more importantly the role of religion as everyday faith in infusing moral and ethical norms in the community life, are the two broad areas that offer clear contrast to the western political concept and its strict separation between the religious (church) and the non religious (state).

ALBERT

The first part of the book is devoted to a general survey of the history of the subject. It begins with a discussion of the early attempts to explain the phenomena of life, and then proceeds to a more detailed account of the development of the theory of evolution. The author discusses the work of Darwin and Wallace, and the evidence in support of their theory. He also discusses the work of other biologists, such as Huxley and Lyell, and the influence of their work on the development of the theory of evolution. The second part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the development of the theory of evolution. It begins with a discussion of the early attempts to explain the phenomena of life, and then proceeds to a more detailed account of the development of the theory of evolution. The author discusses the work of Darwin and Wallace, and the evidence in support of their theory. He also discusses the work of other biologists, such as Huxley and Lyell, and the influence of their work on the development of the theory of evolution.

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INTRODUCTION

The Zidane Episode

Let me at the outset take you back to one of the most talked about 'experience' of television viewing in the recent past: the Football World Cup Finals of 2006. The melodrama with which the Final match between France and Italy came to an end, right in the heart of Europe, has ironically been befitting of our times. More than the actual game, the 'violent' head-butt of the French star footballer Zinedine Zidane, left the world groping in the dark about the provocation that ended the chances of Zidane and France from making football history! The reportage following the infamous head-butt came up with various explanations, and it became an occasion to score points within the European nations. The English press was particularly scathing. *The Economist* declared that the red card was *not* shown to Zidane per se but it was a red card for the dogmatic French policy of colour-blind integration that breeds racism in reality. It went on to describe the event as a metaphor for the failure of France with multiculturalism. At the same time, *The Guardian* pointed out that despite Zidane's shocking let down he remained a popular national hero, for 'this son of a north African Muslim migrant worker is also a well integrated son of French republicanism'; the newspaper nevertheless went on to observe that the 'politics of race and football in France is especially revealing of the French society'.¹ The flurry of such reactions is perhaps understandable in view of the persistent and simmering rage among the black and Arab population of France, which continued even months after the widespread rioting of late 2005. A period when the well integrated citizens of Arab or Black African origin were being referred in France as the 'forgotten children' of the French republic. This is the social milieu from which Zidane comes. Although he apologized, Zidane, interestingly, did not regret his (in)-famous head-butt. For he felt that more than his action on field, it was the comments made by senior

European law makers that called for an apology. Especially that of the Deputy President of Italian Senate, who remarked that the French defeat was inevitable, since 'Blacks, Muslims and Communists' had apparently come to represent the French National Football Team. The remark was very much in keeping with the xenophobic sentiment of the French nationalist leader, Le Pen, who was anguished over the "exaggerated proportion of players of colour in the national team".

The furious debate generated by Zidane's head butt in the European press thus clearly conveyed what I describe as, 'traditional' Europe's unease with its 'new' identity. By traditional Europe I am of course referring to the modern, liberal and secular Europe. As regards its 'unease with new identity', my reference is to western liberal democracy's current engagement with its Muslim population. Communitarian critiques of liberal individualism have already challenged democracies in the west especially when it comes to co-opting the demands of cultural and religious minority groups with the age-old 'republican values' of individual rights, rule of law, mono-lingualism and a homogenous public. The majoritarianism of liberal individualism that fails to prevail over the ascriptive ties of race, religion and language in influencing prejudices, certainly makes the liberal state rethink its position on ethno-cultural neutrality. In looking at the debate on secular Europe's dilemma with its religious Muslims this study in the following sections in effect looks at western modernity's dilemma in accepting non-Christian religious influences on the cultures of liberalism.

I LIBERAL DILEMMA WITH MINORITY

In exploring 'secular' and democratic Europe's dilemma in accommodating a vast population of Muslim immigrants as its naturalised citizens an engagement with the European project of modernity becomes inevitable. Apropos the new forms of visibilities of Islam in European public domain, it is found that the encounter between two cultural codes, secular as in modern *and* religious Islam, have particularly unsettled the notion of homogenous public. The widespread anxiety on the incompatibility of "religious" Muslims' behaviour in "secular" polity particularly emanates from the way of life and practices that fall outside the purview of historically congruent modern time. Whether the public visibility of the 'other' religion that is making Christian Europe feel uncomfortable or is it the resistance of the Muslim immigrants' in getting assimilated with the modern European culture is generating a crisis in Europe's traditional identity? Questions such as this would be addressed to further clarify the dilemma. The paper may also seek to explore the ideal of Republican Secularism, a political practice that France strictly adheres to, even today. The observance of which meant integrating into the ideals of enlightenment rationalism which currently has led to serious institutional incompatibility in accommodating 'cultural difference' in western Europe. Ironically though in India the state is accused by many for not having secularized (enforced a strict separation of religion and public life) its society enough to be able to live amicably with its enormous diversity – religious, linguistic and cultural. It is often said that lack of secularization/modernisation in India has led to the rise of the majority community based nationalism or Hindu nationalism in the country and that the lack of actual modernization in the liberal tradition of statecraft has led to the communalization of politics in India. So while in India, Secularism has been accused of *not* showing the virtue of adequate modernisation and in freeing individuals from their ascriptive ties of caste, creed, and linguistic identities². In Europe, on the contrary, the very conspicuous absence of tolerating multiple cultural practices in the public sphere and conscious discouragement of any display of community traditions related to religion and culture in the public domain is clearly making minority cultures feel discriminated. Today as the debate in Europe centers around 'toleration of diverse religious and cultural practices in the public sphere', the dominant

fear is that by making secularism more 'tolerant' towards non-Christian public practices would in effect mean encouragement of anti-modern forces of religious orthodoxy and feudal backwardness.³

Arjun Appadorai in his celebrated essay 'Fear of Small Numbers' has pointed out that the history of European liberal thought vis-a-vis minorities has largely been that of 'procedural' – meaning minorities solely *by and of* opinion, and the process of accepting differing opinion has more to do with the right to dissent as a sign of free speech and opinion than with accepting cultural difference. It was only in the middle of 20th century when the issue of human rights gained major currency for negotiating elementary entitlements of humanity – 'substantive' social minorities became critical focus of constitutional and political concern in liberal thought. The displacement of temporary dissenting opinion with the rights of social and cultural minorities in contemporary times therefore has turned into a source of deep ambivalence in western liberal democracies, and this ambivalence seems to have found an ideal subject in the Muslim immigrants or the 'cultural other' in the mainland of enlightenment rationality. The friction between liberal philosophy and democratic norms comes to surface on the question of the demands of the collectives and groups in plural conditions. Especially those which are self formation of minority identity as a form of collective agency - that does not conform to the individualist norm, and where autonomy of the self is not an ultimate value. Democracy as a social theory on the contrary has always represented popular sovereignty or the political legitimacy of the large numbers, and as very aptly pointed out by Appadorai that the critical number, in the liberal imagination is number one, which is the numerical sign of the individual. In so far as the individual is at the normative heart of liberalism, the number one remains the smallest important number for liberalism. Therefore the idea of a collective or a group, in liberal thought always comes first as aggregation of individuals (that is of infinite combination of number one) henceforth both in terms of representation and collective good, liberal social theory imagines group of individuals as constituted by the addition of large sets of number one. Even the utilitarian tradition in liberal thought from Bentham to Rawls, it is well pointed out, has tried to imagine the collective as organised around aggregate decision making individuals which

privilege the number of persons no larger than one. Much as liberal individualism imagines large groups as aggregation of individuals there increases the scope of liberal majoritarianism. This is precisely where the crisis begins, by taking a collective merely as an addition or aggregation of the decision making number one, it assumes that the notion of freedom for one individual should set the norm for the collective as well. Liberalism's deep ambivalence with the collective can be further explained in its apprehension of aggregation of large numbers that turn into 'masses'. Their point of concern begins when many zeros are added to the number 'one' to describe a mass of people, for the liberal thought a collective of large numbers (many zeros) is bound to lose the rationality embedded in the number one, and hence have always viewed the politics of masses as the basis of totalitarianism. The argument is that the 'sense of collectivity' is a mindset that is being orchestrated by forces outside itself, such as by feudal leadership or a dictator⁴. While it is sceptical about the mental capabilities of a large collective, gathered around 'number one' and perceives a large congregation as being composed of non individuals, it assumes the universality of the rational individual, agreeing to the secular republican values, as a norm; the mean of an aggregate, and hence the majority. The collective self formation of identity by the Muslims in Europe too when viewed through this prism, becomes a collective of non-individuals and a basis of totalitarianism orchestrated by forces of feudal leadership from outside. This overarching apprehension that feudal and authoritarian forces hold sway over Islamic and non-western religious communities, came up most evidently when the Islamic Federation in Berlin won a 20-year-old legal battle in their attempt to extend the German law – of denominational religious education in public schools – to teaching of Islam as well. The serious anxiety of the Berlin state education ministry over the highest court's decision emanated from the fear that the school curriculum on Islam would now come under the control of fundamentalist group within the Federation. The long drawn public debate in Berlin over the issue had eventually led to the German home minister's announcement in 2008 that German language should be the medium of Islamic religious education in schools and that it should be taught by teachers with degrees from German universities.

'Integration', 'assimilation' and even 'Dialogue with Islam' have thus come up as the new governmental strategies of the liberal west vis a vis its Muslim citizens. The European project of Dialogue with Islam in effect presents a process of social bargaining on part of western liberalism to accommodate and homogenize the otherwise heterodox social and cultural life of its Muslim immigrants from the varied locations of Turkey, south Asia and north Africa. That the immigrants' demands for citizenship has become conditional to the levels of their integration into the modern European culture is much evident in the vocabularies of the governments in Europe today. Governments of France, Germany and Britain are increasingly adding the common phrase of 'integration' and assimilation into the cultures of Laicite (republicanism), British-ness, or the Leit Kultur (the defining German culture of Christianity). One is tempted here to bring in an interesting deviation by engaging a bit more with the inviolable ideals of 'Republicanism' that liberalism wants to profess. Scholars have pointed out that since Enlightenment, western political theory has been organized around the idea of 'free and equal individual', which later gave shape to the 'universal rights of citizen' and overruled all other primordialities of race, ethnicity, religion, or class. However no sooner the distinction between the "abstract domain of right from the actual domain of life in civil society" is drawn new orders of power- relations reveal itself. That society is actually based on racial, ethnic, religious gender and class distinctions was underlined once again in the month long race riots in suburban Paris (2005) when Black and Arab citizens were referred as forgotten children of the French republic; as well as in the *jus Sanguinis* model of 'ethnic-German-only citizenship policy' in Germany, that denied citizenship rights to two generations of legal residents of the state but are of immigrant origins, till 2001. Commenting upon western political theory's fixation with free and equal individual, in his essay on the *Community in the East*, Partha Chatterjee pointed out that universalism of the theory of rights both presupposed and enabled a new ordering of power relations in society based precisely on those distinctions of class, race, religion and gender that it wanted to abolish in the legal political domain. Chatterjee then comes to his argument that the emergence of mass democracies in the advances industrial countries of West in the 20th century has produced new distinction between the domain of theory built around the idea of

citizenship and the domain of policy, inhabited not by citizens but by populations. Unlike the concept of citizen, the concept of population does not carry any normative burden and is a wholly descriptive and empirical category⁵. The policy of Dialogue with Islam – a manifestation of Europe's concern vis a vis its Muslim immigrant population, had incidentally unravelled itself around the same time when the French were engaged with the debate of well integrated children of the French republic. This contemporary social phenomenon involving liberal and democratic Europe's dilemma with the 'religious other', I think can aptly be described as the 'Zidane effect'. It was around the same time when the French people were discussing Zidane's head butt as a plausible reason for their defeat in the 2006 World Cup football finals, that I had an opportunity to study the project: "Dialogue with Islam" in Germany. Irrespective of my Indian experience of living with intrinsic diversity, in Europe, the Indian participation had acquired sudden relevance for its new found realization that in democratic India majority Hindus bear the experience of living with almost 140 million of Muslim population in their country. While the enumerable category of majority and minority does indeed qualify the Muslims as national minority in India, nonetheless, the rise of BJP – the Hindu nationalist party as the ruling party in the country has rather been responsible for such a perception of Indian society in the west. Therefore it is important that we acknowledge the role of BJP in projecting 'a homogenous Hindu national identity for India' and hence making her an existing example in the eyes of the European political leadership of today !

In this paper my narrative however will be confined to the European experience alone, i.e. the 'secular' and 'democratic' Europe's dilemma in accepting Muslim immigrants as its naturalised citizens. In the given context *the idea will be to argue* that a 'Muslim Europe' is very much a social reality, and scholarly efforts are already there to recognize it in terms of a culture's 'in-between-ness' and the concept of borderlands – that can take one beyond the framework of minoritisation or minoritizing discourses that essentially remain confined to 'national' minorities and majorities in terms of census figures and in nation-state classifications. The debate on minority cultures, this paper shall argue, should rather be seen in the light of 'migrant minority culture' (or the minoritised indigenous) – as a way of

life that interrupts historical linearity and the cultural totality and brings in the concept of cultural difference, and this minoritised 'other' also infuses an ethical spirit in the body *politik*. As the post colonial Europe grapples with the pressures of immigrant workforce and their demands for cultural freedom as never before, we find that governments in Germany, France are actively getting engaged in the social bargaining process to address the white middle class concerns (or the Judeo-Christian Europe's concerns) over the anti-modern and 'regressive' cultural intrusions of Islam. Social processes of dialogue are therefore been introduced to bring the immigrant workforce out of their ghettos and initiate them into a process of assimilation. And finally while forwarding the argument of minority culture as cultural difference, the paper explores the possibility whether the Muslim Europe provide an immediate example of a space of resistance, a location where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity?

II DIALOGUE WITH ISLAM

As someone who followed the 'integration' debate and studied the status of Turkish legal residents even earlier in Germany, it was but natural for me to feel positive about the Dialogue project in 2005 because in the early 2000 the only thing that the country's lawmakers were interested in attaining was 'integration', and 'dialogue' in relation to that, appeared much of a democratic exercise⁶. The expectation was that 'Dialogues with Islam' project in 2005 would usher in a more democratic and deliberative process of cross cultural interaction than merely handing out a 'command' for integration to its tax paying and law abiding Muslim residents, and that it was an exercise to come to terms with Europe's multi ethnic reality. However, right in the course of my first interview with a Professor of Islamic studies at the Humboldt University (who was also a leading intercultural dialogue coordinator), I was told in no uncertain terms that 'Dialogue' with Muslims was actually aimed at integrating the Muslims into mainstream, and that conducting this dialogue wouldn't have been necessary if Germany's Muslims had already got integrated into the modern values of European culture. The urgency for dialogue was further explained to me by the dialogue coordinator on behalf of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Johannes Kandall, to quote him: "nearly one million new Muslim voters have begun exercising their political rights in the democratic political culture of Germany, and another 2 million waits in the wings under the provision of new citizenship laws!" Hence, Kandall argued, it was essential for the parties to know how the "religious" Muslims would behave in a "secular German" polity. This anxiety on the future role of 'religious Muslim in a 'secular' German polity then get expressed by the Dialogue coordinators in their essay *Managing Diversity in a Civil Society*, where they observe that Muslims like others should also be a part of the civil society framework, but there are certain fundamental questions with Islam. For example, (1) Can Islam accept the fundamental principles of a secular state, human rights, democracy and rule of law? (2) Can Muslims work together with the "natives" for a common political culture? Johannes Kandall and Gerdien Jonker the two leading organisers of the "*European Project for Inter Religious Learning* (held in Zurich and Beirut), thus had expressed their concern over the political behaviour of the religious Muslim citizens in their country.⁷

The above mentioned three questions put up by the dialogue coordinators perhaps sum up western liberal democracy's dilemma with the cultural 'other' in a nutshell. The general apprehensions taking a concrete form through a process of seeking clarifications could be well attributed to the fact that the idea of minority in western liberal thought has fundamentally been procedural and not cultural, and this largely explains Europe's dilemma over its cultural minorities i.e. the immigrant Muslims. The study of the German Dialogue with Islam project helped me interact with some of the Turkish participants who would offer me the 'other' perspective that explained the differing perceptions with which these 'Dialogues' were approached by the German and Turkish community in the country. While acknowledging that Europe is a society based on rights, some of the Turkish respondents admitted that it was their lack of argumentative skill in German language that was mostly responsible for the community's disadvantageous social position. It was felt by many that if Muslims could argue well for their legitimate rights in the court, they too can enjoy their cultural and religious freedom. Nevertheless even this modern, rational and protestant ethic of the Germans ironically, enough, had failed to convince many religious Muslims who felt that too much of argument meant wasting a lot of energy which, being sensible, they were reluctant to do. As one Turkish respondent pointed out that "More than dialogue" the process had to offer a "platform for 'Streitkultur'" a kind of quarrel-culture where each side tries to justify their cultural behaviour. The following observation by one woman participant in the Dialogue perhaps best sums up the Turkish perspective as she narrated me her own experience: "mostly these dialogues are held to gather information from the Muslim members about their beliefs and practices and everyday behaviour, and their feelings towards the German society in general. It is a rather one sided process. The German side decides the theme, the agenda, the participants (i.e. including the invitees from the Muslim community), and since all of them are held in German language and are specifically on Islam, the onus is therefore on the Muslim members to make the Germans understand and explain the social and cultural practices of the Muslims, as and why they are practised. It is therefore the changed concept of minority i.e. from temporary dissenting opinion to that of rights claiming permanent social and cultural groups, that has put western liberal democracies in a

quandary as they grapple with a deep ambivalence of accommodating the 'cultural rights of its Muslim citizens'.

Speaking from the legal standpoint, the *Jus Solis* model of citizenship had initially presented Germany with the dilemma of defining the status of minority itself. The emergence of cultural rights claiming legal residents in a nation state where nationality status was solely reserved for the ethnic Germans have since influenced the changes in the citizenship laws of the country. The immigrants in question are mostly Turkish Muslim in origin, and Germany's discomfort with such naturalised immigrants reflects Europe's larger anxiety over granting cultural and social rights to its cultural 'minorities', for 'minority' was a concept that received acknowledgement only in the realm of nationality, i.e. national majority (as in linguistic majority) as against national minority (white Europeans but belonging to a linguistic group *other* than the dominant group that defines the nation state)⁸. Thus the assertion of minority cultural and religious rights from people of non-European (white) origin unleashed a whole new anxiety among the political leadership of present day Europe. Europe with its traditional wisdom of 'enlightenment rationality' finds the 'migrant culture' of its Muslim immigrants a misfit – the people who are 'lagging behind or belated in time, still to catch up with the modernity of their host culture'. Let me present this anxiety in the language of a television debate that concluded with a slogan of 'Assimilate or Alienate'. This slogan was Europe's message for its 15 million strong Muslim populations. So it was claimed by the CNN, in its programme, tellingly captioned, 'Europe's Identity Crisis', a television debate that was telecast from the location of the Davos Economic Forum meeting held in January 2006. All the distinguished participants in the programme (viz. political leaders representing the various member states of European Union) seemed equally concerned about how to make the Muslim population of Europe integrate into the European culture that is 'modern' and based on the values of democracy. Even Britain and Netherlands, who had claimed high moral grounds earlier on their more inclusive multi racial policies of citizenship and anti-discriminatory laws, joined the bandwagon. Revealing the limitations of policy of multiculturalism that evidently failed to tackle with the irrationality of racism and religious discrimination, Britain and

Netherlands asked their Muslim migrants to adapt to the modern European values in order to live in Europe. The Dutch Nationalist Party MP made it explicit on the CNN show that modern European values are supposedly those which are derived from the Christian tradition of humanism, compassion and, apparently, the Christian tradition of democracy. This blatant return to the Judeo-Christian project one may argue, surely betrays the much trumpeted political enlightenment of Europe, manifest in its Secular Republicanism.

The onus is therefore to problematize the 'secular' and 'democratic' discourse of liberal Europe today. It is imperative to make the case with a large body of conservative lawmakers, who display a mindset prejudiced with colonial stereotypes, for France, the idea of maintaining boundaries and defending national identities became particularly pronounced in a series of public debates over the issue of wearing of head scarf by Muslim women. In Germany on the other hand as an impact of the changed Citizenship Act of the year 2000, nearly one million new Muslim voters had unnerved the German political elites. As the idea of maintaining boundaries and defending national identities became particularly pronounced in France, Nilofer Gole, a scholar of Turkish origin based in Paris, had observed that in different ways these public debates contribute to problematization of the bond between the European and Muslim identities, the veil controversy she believes is a case of 'traditional Islamic identity' interrupting the modern public space of Europe with its 'veiled presence'.⁹ On the question of Liberal dilemma with difference i.e. Liberalism's discomfort with different worldview that falls outside the purview of 'enlightenment reason' Barry Hindess comes up with an interesting response in his essay, "Liberalism-what is in a name?" Hindess writes that Liberalism has largely been concerned with regulating the conduct of aggregate population, (and) those who behave differently due to cultural traits, are misfits for the state. The migrant minorities or even the minoritised indigenous when seen as cultures that are lagging behind the modernity of the dominant, it is expected of them that they modernise / secularise and homogenise with the mainstream in order to live in the west.¹⁰

Managing the Misfits

The Baden Wuttemberg Questionnaire: Citizenship tests in Europe of late have become sites of major controversy, while in England questions are set to measure the level of integration with the British value system, in Netherlands the applicants are made to sit through films depicting homosexual relationship to gauge the reaction of some conservative Muslim applicants. In the southern German province of Baden Wuttemberg, a set of 'Muslim only' test had generated much controversy as some of the questions, directed to provoke the conservative Muslims, turned out to be uncomfortable zone of inquiry for Catholic Christians, as well. The Baden Wuttemberg Questionnaire nonetheless does provide a perfect documentary example of the liberal exercise of 'managing of misfits' in western democracies.

Let me briefly outline here the "Muslim only" citizenship questionnaire introduced by the Christian Social Union government in the south German state. What was an interior ministry order of the state became an example of how to make the new citizenship laws in the country as exclusionary (as well as humiliating) as possible. It made compulsory for all the Muslims in the state of Baden Wuttemberg applying for German citizenship to answer thirty odd questions in course of the application. The nature of the questions show without any doubt that the move was simply meant to segregate Islam as a religion, for they could have solicited conservative answers from any member of society including the Christians and Jews on several questions. A random sample of some of the questions will give a better idea. When roughly translated, they will read as the following:

1. What is your opinion on the following statement?

Democracy is the worst of all governmental forms, but it is the best that is available.

(Please note that both 'yes' and 'no' means accepting the premise that democracy is the worst form of government.)

2. What do you think of the statement? : the wife has to obey her husband and he is allowed to beat her if she doesn't obey him;

3. What do you think about men in Germany who are married to two women?
4. How would you react if your 18 year old son comes to you and declares that he is a homosexual and wants to live together with another man?
5. Do you judge it as progressive that men and women are considered equal in law? What should the state do in your opinion if men do not accept this?
6. Would you allow your daughter to go for swimming classes in school?
7. Do you think it is right for a man to lock up his wife or daughter in his house to prevent them from bringing shame to the family?
8. You must have heard about the attacks on September 11 in New York and later on in Madrid, do you see them as acts of terrorists or as acts by the fighters for a cause?¹¹

Questions such as these not only reflect a biased and rigid understanding of the Islamic cultural community but also goes on to confirm the 'Liberal' concern of regulating the conduct of aggregate population – for those who would behave differently due to cultural traits shall be marked as unfit for legal residentship of a federal province in Germany. The depiction of Islam in the prejudiced structuring of such questionnaires is clearly along the lines of Bernad Lewis and Samuel Huntington which have located Islam and modernity as simple binaries.

The Veiled story

The rise of religious fundamentalism in fact, has been seen by the many as an offshoot of the universal programme of western modernity. Nilofer Gole has often demonstrated that Muslim fundamentalists do share a preoccupation with modernity, for it is their major frame of reference and Islamists have critically and creatively re-appropriated it giving rise to new

discursive and social practices in non-western contexts. While arguing on the line of Islamic modernity, Gole feels women in Islam are also acquiring public forms of visibility, sharing with men the same urban, political and educational territories. The emphasis therefore should be on the inclusionary logic of borrowing, blending and cross-fertilization rather than the logic of exclusionary and binary (between traditional and modern) narratives of "western modernity. But as the Baden Wuttemberg Questionnaire shows that such intellectual discourse and critical perception remains very far from the dominant understanding of the lawmakers, who it seems still prefer the clash of civilizations theory.

The head scarf debate is one occasion that presents beyond doubt Christian Europe's discomfort with such Islamic practices that involve public visibility. However, there are interesting differences of opinion among the theorists of Islamic modernity on issues that involve the state regulation of religious life. As per one argument there is evidence to suggest that what is taking place through veiling or the Islamic scarf or *hijab*, is a practical encounter of modernity and women. Gole also argues that radical Islam in a paradoxical way is instigating a democratisation of religious knowledge; rejecting the *ulema* as the only religious authority. Democratisation theory further suggest that various actors today are allowed to lay a claim to the interpretation of Islam, ranging from issues of personal, social and political life such as the veiling of women and the penalty of adultery, as these are the subjects of controversy between competing political actors including female Islamists. S.N. Eisenstadt, Eickelman, Sudipta Kaviraj and Nilufer Gole in putting forward their argument of multiple modernities have explained the rise of religious fundamentalism as an offshoot of the universal programme of western modernity.¹² Their argument shows how the Muslim fundamentalists too share a preoccupation with modernity, which remains a major frame of reference. Examples from Turkey, Iran and Egypt, amply show that rather than simply returning to religious resources and withdrawing from modernity, Islamism shows the signs of an attempt to cross-fertilize the two. Emphasizing the power of borrowing and blending, Kaviraj and Gole

therefore are of the opinion that, instead of universalizing the project of European modernity (that breeds fundamentalism) western modernity should actually be pluralized as it expands and spreads to newer sites of culture.

This approach, while strongly urging the western modernity project to become plural and more inclusionary, retains at the same time the relevance of the master plan of European modernity. Saba Mahmood on the other hand, would like to question the very tenet of western liberalism when she argues that if the 'principle of freedom of conscience' makes secularism central to liberal political philosophy, then liberalism's regulation of individual and collective liberties for the sake of strict separation of religion and state, in turn violates peoples' right to religious freedom, and contradicts a core commitment of democratic governance. Mahmood thus points at the ironic situation where a self avowedly secular state like France must define what religious and non-religious attire is in the public domain, which is something, as she rightly pointed out, that is normatively considered matter of personal choice.¹³ This line of thinking receives its major sustenance in the writings of Talal Asad. Commenting on the secular liberal state's regulation of religious life Asad says that it should not be taken as any exception to the norm of liberal rule, but exception in the Carl Schmidtian sense of an "exercise of Sovereign power" i.e. it is the sovereign power which always has the prerogative to suspend the rule of law and decide unilaterally about the state of exception. In other words, the exercise of sovereign power necessarily translates to exclusive authority to define exception. Asad argues that even though secularism presupposes mutual independence of political power and religious life, nonetheless it is the state that has the power to make certain decisions that affect religious practices and doctrine.¹⁴ Partha Chatterjee in his observations on 'rule by exception' contests that there always have been deviations from the 'desired normative structures' of western political theory. Liberalism, when seen from the standpoint of colonial difference would come as an ideology of justifying the civilizing missions of the colonial west. Modern empire building that began in the 19th century and continues till present (Iraq war and after), Chatterjee argues, is actually based on liberal laws. Hence 'exceptions' are not new to the norm of liberal rule but rather exceptions were always made

by sovereign laws or the sovereign authority, to the desired normative structures.¹⁵ And if we go by the exception structures in each country, then we perhaps should reset the normative norms of Citizenship and Secularism as practiced in its exclusionary form. Finally, it seems that Europe's discomfort with Islam other than the 'secular' 'religious' divide arises from other sources too. Scholars like Joseph Fontana has shown how the 'European Identity' was, to begin with, created in opposition to infidels or barbarians, and in defence of Christianity against Islam, and today the process of unification has undoubtedly accentuated the ethnic diversity in Europe. With further expansion of the European Union and the independent existence of Muslim Bosnia, Kosovo, as well as millions of Muslim residents acquiring citizenship under the changed laws as in Germany, the trend of changing demographic structure of Europe is fundamental and irreversible. The problem with Europe today is not that it is not multi religious, but that it does not *consider* itself multi religious.

The Logic of the Political Economy

The political economic explanation may however suggest that the overwhelming reason that propel the lawmakers in contemporary Europe to engage with the 'cultural other' and their practices in the public sphere, is largely because of the racialised profile of its blue-collared workforce. The one single factor that the blue-collar job holders in present day Europe (be it the Turkish *parallel gesellschaft* in working class localities of Berlin and Hamburg or the Morroccan and Algerian working class clusters in suburban Paris or the Pakistani locality in Bradford, UK), all have in common is the racial and neo-Nazi ire that they attract from their white unemployed neighbors. The changing racial profile of the blue-collar job holders in Europe, some would say, goes on to explain this deep rooted social malaise. The coloured and mostly Muslim profile of its working class population perhaps would not have been a great cause of concern if the white European middle class had remained a fixed category. It is the changing composition of the working class population in western Europe ever since the fall of Berlin wall that is largely fuelling much of the social apprehensions and consequent racial ire against the coloured working class in present day Europe. As both skilled and unskilled labour from the former Soviet block of east Europe made themselves available in the job markets of the west

that too at a much cheaper price than their counterparts in the west, immigrants of non-European origin provoked impassioned political outcry against the alleged violation of core European values. Values such as equality of sexes and rationality, which the lawmakers were certain, would get violated by a Muslim immigrant if granted cultural right.

The available data in Germany clearly indicates that out of the total number of foreign workers in Germany, the Turkish Muslims constitute only 26 percent, whereas migration from the east and south of Europe constitute more than 37 percent. Having to share the limited job opportunities, including the much depleted social security network, has made the Europeans reticent about extending the equal opportunity provisions to the non Europeans.¹⁶ If the economic logic and politics of globalisation restrain the Europeans from opposing economic integration, the 'clash of culture' theory here comes handy to ideologically oppose the inclusion of Muslim migrant workers into the European system. The growing diversity of ethnic and religious composition of the European states with possibilities of further expansion of the Union and the independent existence of Muslim Bosnia and Kosovo, along with millions of Muslim residents acquiring citizenship under the changed laws, as in Germany, the trend of changing demographic structure of Europe is fundamental and irreversible. 'Europe's identity Crisis' as the title of special CNN programme had suggested therefore clearly emanates from its growing diversity. The discomfort in dealing with this diversity, I would like to argue, acted as a catalyst in Europe's apparent desperation in holding on to its Christian and white identity especially in relation to the non-European and non-Christians in Europe. Still viewed as late immigrants, the Muslim population has in fact been present in Europe for over a long time. Several generations of North African, Arab, Turkish and Indian Muslims have been born in France, Germany, and Britain. It is on record that Germany produces its foreigners, the data has shown that there has been increase in the number of German Muslims by birth and not by immigration till as late as in the year 2000. As Nezar Al Sayyad, a distinguished scholar in Arabic history has put it, "many Europeans fail to recognise that Islam is now a European religion as well". Five centuries after the expulsions of Muslims and Jews from Spain, Europe is once again

becoming a land of Islam albeit for a minority of European population. It is important to note that although many Muslims may resist the Euro-American post-industrial culture, they nevertheless also thrive in the infrastructure of globalization, which is but a product of advanced capitalism¹⁷. And there has been no development to suggest that the Muslims in these European countries have refused to be law-abiding citizens. On the contrary, there are enough indications that Muslims in Europe strongly favour political integration while rejecting cultural assimilation. They are even promoting what has been described often as liberal forms of Islam, or Euro-Islam as some may like to put it. Abiding by the rule of law and endorsing the European idea of citizenship while opposing policies of cultural assimilation. The challenge for them is of course to translate this recognition into new forms of citizenship.

III LIBERALISM AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

As stated earlier in marking out the Muslim subject in a western democracy this paper, in effect, tries to understand 'secular' and democratic Europe's constraints in accommodating a sizeable population of Muslim immigrants as its naturalised citizens. It is been largely observed that the encounter between two cultural codes, i.e. modern and those practices that fall outside the purview of historically-congruent modern-time and hence predates the European notion of secular modernity, has particularly unsettled the notion of homogenous public with new forms of visibilities of Islam. The conspicuous presence of religious Muslims either in form of *hijab* (veil of a woman) or a tall minaret of a mosque in the European public space is leading to widespread anxiety, as for instance the political debate in Germany on the incompatibility of 'religious' Muslims' behaviour in 'secular' polity. The questions that hover uppermost in the minds of the lawmakers are such: while voting in federal elections which denomination of Islam and its clerics would influence the minds Muslim voters? Or how can they allow a female school teacher wear a scarf in school – for then she would be imbibing regressive ideas of gender inequality into her students; or even whether a minarets of mosque should be allowed to be built as it may mean an endorsement of 'militant religious movement' of Islam. It is these policy moves of the European lawmakers that is transforming the public debate to open binaries of *either* immigrant workers and their Islamism *or* the well integrated children of the Republic: African Muslims who are modernised enough to be called as 'French of immigrant origin' or the very well integrated Muslims in Germany as Deutsch Turkische (the German Turks). It looks like that "we need to give up our culture and religion" to be able to be called a citizen of a Republic - as one Belgian of Lebanese origin had observed commenting on the issue.¹⁸

Integrated Islam

Taking reference from the Zidane episode in France it is important to note that the notion 'much integrated children of the republic' is not always contested by the Muslims in Europe. Proponents of Euro-Islam are in fact oriented towards a similar idea. Euro Islam according to Bassam Tibi, is the effort to devise a liberal form of Islam acceptable both to Muslim

immigrants and to European societies, i.e. an Islam amenable to European ideas of secularism and individual citizenship. *In other words, Euro Islam is Islam that is culturally adjusted to secular European societies.* As a proponent of this liberal Islam Tibi points out that Euro-Islam is directed against both ghettoization and assimilation, and the sentiment is well appreciated by mostly the white collared Muslim professionals in Europe. Commenting upon the political initiatives on Dialogue with Islam, Kenan Kolat, a civil right activist and one of the leading interlocutor representing the Turkish organisations in Germany, also felt that Dialogue was better than Integration. At least 'they are hearing us', he said and he thought that one must utilize these platform to acquire Double Citizenship for Turkish Germans a facility other EU member nationals enjoy. Kolat also felt that the German societal reality was multicultural in every respect it was the politics of integration that was mono cultural. His sentiments found support in Seyran Ates, a first generation migrant woman lawyer in Berlin. "I am still being referred as a Turkish Lawyer, she said, whereas I am just a lawyer and a German citizen who is proud of her Turkish origin and culture". Fatih Akin, Nawid Kermani, Georges Khalil, Zafar Zenocak, are all such intellectuals who write and perform in the German language and stand for a cultural citizenship. And it is not only a feature restricted to few individuals only, there exist a new generation of Turkish youth commonly known as 'dritte generation' or third generation, who habitually speak *Kanaksprach*, a new hybrid dialect of German and Turkish. While this generation might resist assimilation but one is not very sure how far they have been successful in refuting the perception of a ghettoized generation or *parallel gesellschaft* from the minds of their white counterparts.

Muslim Europe: A Space of Resistance?

In face of the current multicultural critique Euro Islam or Integrated Islam – as I would like to call it – is a cultural phenomenon that has relative acceptance within liberal and secular Europe. Provided the Muslims do not tread the interstitial zone of cultural difference. The argument of cultural difference draws upon the writings on culture from the standpoint of colonial difference that shows a way of thinking 'culture' outside authenticity and outside the logic of the binary of either/or, i.e. traditional/

modern; part/whole/; outside/inside and difference/assimilation – the binary logic and language in which most debates about multiculturalism are usually cast. The theory of ‘in-between-ness’ help us to understand social formations of migrant minority (immigrant workforce in the west) and minoritised indigenous (those uneven and unequal social groups at the arrival of liberal modernity or nation state in a society) as ‘temporally disjunctive’. Which is to say that these migrants and the minoritised are neither contemporaneous with the modernity of dominant or host culture, nor simply ‘out of date’ or lagging behind that modernity. They are temporally in-between.¹⁹ Interstitial zones are also described as borderlands. And talking of treading the interstitial zone, Nezar al Sayyad points out that Muslim Europe is a more grounded example of such ‘quintessential borderland’. According Sayyad, borderlands are places of incommensurable contradictions – i.e. contradiction in temporality. A notion of cultural time which includes both the consciousness of liberal modernity as well as the time that predates the arrival of liberal individualism.

The argument thus is that policies of ‘assimilation’ and integration’ primarily draws its sustenance from the fact that Liberalism essentially believes in a non-differential concept of cultural time. Liberal ideals of liberty, equality and justice assumes common time and shared terrain for all social groups. The sharing of equality is genuinely intended, but only as long as we start from a historically congruent space and time – a historically congruent modern time of post enlightenment society, characterized by liberal individualism, logic of capital and of course the nation-state. On a more critical ground, it can be argued that it is *not that* Liberalism does not recognise racial, religious or sexual differences and social discriminations emanating out of it – but there is a recurrent problem with its notion of equality, in its assumption of common time and shared terrain for all the social groups. Taking up the head scarf controversy as an instance, Nezar-al-Sayyad writes that if one were to step back just a hundred years in history it would have been very unusual in the liberalising France of late 19th century to ban a conservative form of dress, very common in the rural hinterland. So what explains this dramatic change? As modernity, or post industrial European culture finds ‘migrant culture’ behind or belated in

time, i.e. to say still to catch up with and conform with the modernity of national culture, the immigrant workforce find itself in a temporal disjunct of minority culture that is neither contemporaneous with the modernity of the host culture but not lagging behind that modernity either. The Cosmopolitanists too would point out that Liberalism's limitations lies in its inability to recognise the temporal in between-ness of culture, national or other wise. The non-national minority cultures of skilled immigrants, expatriates and most importantly the migrant workers in the host countries, it may be pointed out, do not speak for their nations but they certainly do assert their 'difference within' i.e. their being different from the dominant culture that defines the culture of a national space (viz. *Laicite* in France and *Leit Kultur* in Germany).

The debate over the issue of 'integration' of Muslim immigrants into European culture, or the challenge that the European project of modernity faces in its encounter with non-assimilative Islam is perhaps best represented in the views of Fatih Akin, eminent German film maker of Turkish origin. On being asked whether he agreed with the popular proposition that immigrants in Germany should integrate themselves into modern European culture by dropping their traditions, Akin said that his answer was somewhere 'in between'. "Personally, I stand in opposition to tradition, but I am also loyal to tradition. I don't say that everything is wrong. I would like to keep a lot of things from the Turkish heritage, and some I would not like to keep because I don't accept them"²⁰ Views such as Akin's could make the German lawmakers more attentive towards the layered and hyphenated identity of their Muslim citizens, or even better, make them aware of a Muslim Europe, where French-Muslim, the German-Turks, and the British-Muslims, Indonesian Dutch make Islam an European religion as well. The hyphenated identity points towards the cosmopolitan idea of *being both*, as trans-border communities it can be argued that that the migrant minorities are turning their otherness or alterity into conditions of ethical life at the level of culture and collective life, while being at the same time active participants in the procedures of political and juridical citizenship. Muslim Europe therefore is often pointed out as phenomenon of third space of resistance.

While my study shows that such a third space surely exist in Germany, it remains to be seen whether the conservative law makers takes cognisance of this third space in shaping the political and economic projects of Germany. The hyphenated identity of Euro Islam in Germany is much palpable in the fields of literature, films, music, and cuisine of the land. *Eingewandereten literatur* or the immigrant literature is an integral part of the German literary scene today. Several authors of Turkish and Iranian origin are writing best selling novels in German; a Turkish-German film, directed by one of Germany's most talented filmmaker, Fatih Akin, has become the first German film in 18 long years to get the coveted Berlin Film festival's Golden Bear award in 2004. Yet, as the political leadership of present day Europe finds its Muslim immigrants lagging behind or belated in time still to catch up with the modernity of their host culture, the average political discourse, unfortunately is still revolving around 'Integration' and 'Assimilation'. Concerned mostly with how to make the Muslim population of Europe integrate into the European culture that is 'modern' and based on the values of democracy: in France, the idea of maintaining boundaries of French political culture i.e. secular republicanism became particularly pronounced in a series of public debates over the issue of wearing of head scarf by Muslim women in public space. While in Germany there was a sudden urgency to hold dialogues with its Muslim population as the sheer number of nearly one million new Muslim voters had unnerved the German political elites as they were not sure how the "religious" Muslims would behave in a "secular German" polity. Even Britain and Netherlands, who had claimed high moral grounds earlier on their more inclusive multi racial policies of citizenship and anti-discriminatory laws, have asked their Muslim migrants to integrate with modern European values in order to live in Europe.

Thus making one wonder *what kind of resistance Euro Islam actually can pose only by asserting their opposition to assimilation*. If its concern is confined to remaining better adjusted to secular European societies while practicing a liberal form of Islam then it certainly can contribute well towards multiculturalism. But then even in multicultural societies like Britain and Netherlands new citizenship tests are increasingly being designed to measure the level of integration of its applicants into the

'modern European values' taking the argument back to 'Liberalism's mission of managing the misfits' by regulating the conduct of aggregate population, and those who behave differently due to cultural traits are taken as misfits for the state.

The imperatives of the argument of Muslim Europe therefore, I would suggest prod us further to promote Border thinking instead of working towards a brand of Euro Islam that retains its priority of upholding the ideals of secularism and liberal individualism.

Border thinking

That cultural difference cannot be understood within the liberal framework of universalism is an argument that is coming up strongly among the critics of Liberalism. It is a thesis that argues for looking at cultural difference from the exteriority of modernity i.e. from the exteriority of the historically congruent modern time characterized by the logic of capital, liberal individualism, and the nation-state. In an increasingly trans national world, border thinking as proposed by Walter Mignolo, is an epistemological understanding upon which critical cosmopolitanism shall be articulated, critical cosmopolitanism that thinks from the standpoint of colonial difference and from the exteriority of modernity (coloniality).²¹ Exteriority does not however mean remaining untouched by capitalism and modernity, but remaining in touch with pre-modern as well. That is the other option beyond both 'benevolent recognition' and 'humanitarian plea for inclusion'. A critical and dialogical cosmopolitan conversation which refuses to take blueprints or master plans to be imposed worldwide. Muslim Europe, one can argue as a 'quintessential borderland' should also engage in border thinking as an epistemological understanding that will challenge the blueprint of an universal project and promote 'pluri-centrism instead. While representing the site of Muslim Europe as the quintessential borderland, Sayyad also contends that in the post-national global times, borderlands no longer simply occupy the margins or the periphery but they have moved firmly to the centre or the core. In keeping with this position in his essay, 'Interrupting Identities', Kevin Robins observes that 'Modernity' has become a kind of 'tradition' for Europe which is to be remembered and revered, while keeping itself open for revision or reinvention. As 'History'

is created out of cultures in relation and interaction, in other words, through interrupting identities Border thinking thus is a necessary condition for a dialogic cosmopolitanism that will lead towards "diversality" instead of towards a new universality of European Enlightenment. The incomplete universalism of western political theory is further enunciated in 'different modernities' shaped by practices and institutions in modern states in non-western societies. In Asia and Africa communities of ethnic groups, tribes, castes and religion while adapting to the ideas of 'citizenship in a modern nation state' also retain their pre-modern group attachments, especially so in their strategic politics of autonomy and representation.²² It is the social attachment to a group or ethnicity or adhering to everyday practices and lived traditions that demand a wider engagement of philosophical and moral inquiry into community life; rather than limiting the concept of community to a mere governmental category in the descriptive ethnography of the non-western world. Faced with the fatal notion of self contained European culture and the absurd notion of uncontaminated culture in a single country, Homi Bhabha places his argument of culture's in-betweenness. An argument that helps us comprehending the partial culture of the minoritised indigenous or the migrant culture as 'temporally disjunctive' that rejects the binary of traditional and modern and hints at being both.²³

Returning to the Zidane story, as I conclude, I would suggest that the predicament of Europe over its Muslim population is best described through its experience of what I call the Zidane Effect. Notwithstanding Zidane's unprofessional act of rage costing France its glory on the stage of world football, a great majority of the French population remained a Zidane supporter. *The xenophobic outpour was countered with the republican argument that players of the national team epitomised the category of "good Africans" and that they are the much integrated children of the French republic.* But the national debate that followed in the French public sphere, I would suggest took the debate beyond 'republicanism and its well integrated children'. It took the debate in the realms of cultural 'other'. The otherness or alterity that brings in conditions of ethical life at the level of

culture and in collective life. As non-national minorities the Migrant minorities (like the minoritised indigenous) are in fact representing a minority culture that infuses the concept of difference in the assumed unity of national cultures (republicanism). The symbolism in Zidane's defiance underlined the non-conformism – to the modern civic rules and rational behaviour – as he refused to seek an apology for his action on the field. Talking to the public media Zidane addressed the children saying that his action on the field should not be emulated by them. He however did not offer an official apology to the French public for his 'irrational' behaviour. For he had felt more than his action, it was the perceptions of the law makers about non-whites; immigrant workforce; and the Muslims that instead had called for a public apology. The political positioning that Zidane took in his conviction certainly did induce an ethical spirit in the national debate. The significant words of the then President Jaques Chirac to Zidane reflected a third space or a position in-between polarised societies and culture, and hence merits a mention here. The President said "I have special thought for Zinedine Zidane.... You are a virtuoso, a genius of world football... you are *also a man of heart, of commitment and of conviction*, that is why France admires you and loves you".²⁴ It is important to remember that matters of heart and conviction, at the cost of rational and professional behaviour are matters more close to ethics and at times, to sacred values, albeit manifested differently in different space and culture.

Postscript

As I was admitting my sense of unease at western liberal democracy's discomfort with its religious Muslim population over an informal chat with a scholar at the Institute of Modern Orient, obviously summing up my impressions on the entire debate on 'Integration to Dialogue'... and not to miss 'the dialogue for integration', Dr. Oesterheld had a simple explanation to make, "Unlike south Asia" he said, "Europe has never lived with Islam", — a debatable point to scholars of European history, but nonetheless one can say that a period spanning five centuries in the post Renaissance Europe is a long time indeed. But the statement surely made me think about living with Islam in India, lately Euro-American scholars are often pointing towards this 'achievement', that is how India has accommodated or lived with Islam for over a long period of time. Characterization such as this brings to mind some obvious questions: was not Mughal India a site for one of the most glorious Muslim empires in the world? Does it not make the region a Muslim India as well? A recent observation by Maulana Madani, a scholar on Islam and the grandson of M. Hussain Madani (author of the book 'Composite Nationalism' that refuted the Two Nation Theory), I believe, sustains the arguments of critical cosmopolitanism in no uncertain terms. In a public meeting in Delhi soon after the Batla House encounter in Jamia Nagar, Maulana Madani while urging the policy makers to stop minoritising the Muslims, emphasised that Muslims are not helpless tenants in this country. 'We too are owners', he said, 'this country belongs to us just as much as it belongs to the Hindus'. I would like to conclude with how he restated his claim in Urdu, "*Yehi jeeyenge yehi mareenge par, hamara khayalat alag honge*" (we are the inhabitants of this land however, our worldview may always differ from those who prefer assimilation with the ideals of western liberal democracy). Perhaps it is to make this diversity a universal project, border thinking becomes a necessary epistemology of cultural difference in a post national world.

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Endnotes

- ¹ Quoted from various news reports and analyses that followed the World Cup Final on July 9, 2006. Prominent among them "The man who deserves a red card" *The Economist* (London), July 15, 2006; "Celebrating Zidane" *Guardian Newspapers Ltd*, reprinted in *Frontline* (Madras), July 28, 2006; "Flawed genius flashes ugly side" *The Telegraph* (Calcutta) July 11, 2006.
- ² See Dipankar Gupta, "Secularization and Minoritization" in D.L. Seth and G.Mahajan (eds) *Minority Identities and the Nation State*, (N.Delhi 1999) p.49.
- ³ To know the debate better please refer Veit Bader, *Secularism or Democracy?: Associational Governance or Religious Diversity* (Amsterdam, 2007).
- ⁴ Arjun Appadorai, *Fear of Small Numbers* (Durham, 2004) pp.60-62.
- ⁵ See Partha Chatterjee, "Community in the East" in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33 No. 6, February 7-13, 1998. pp. 277-282.
- ⁶ See Mollica Dastider, "Minority Identity, Majoritarianism and the Political Response in India and the West" in *India in the Age of Globalization*, (New Delhi, 2004) pp.
- ⁷ Johannes Kandel, a leading Inter-Cultural Dialogue coordinator in Germany and member of the Social Democratic Party, in conversation with the author in Berlin, December 2005. Also see Johannes Kandel in Reinhild Traitler (Ed) *In the Mirror of your Eyes, Report of the European Project for Inter-Religious Learning*, Zurich and Beirut, 2004, p. 113.
- ⁸ Rudd Kupmanns "Germany and its Immigrants and Ambivalent Relationship" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 25 No. 4 October 1999. pp 627-647.
- ⁹ Nilufer Gole, "Islam Resetting the European Agenda" *Public Culture*, Vol.18, No.2 Winter 2005, pp. 11-14.
- ¹⁰ See Barry Hindess "Liberalism – Whats in a name?" in Larner and Walters (ed) *Global Governability*, (London, 2004) pp. 26-27.
- ¹¹ The debate this 'Muslim only Questionnaire' had generated was followed by the Berlin Daily *Die Tageszeitung*. Please refer the 30 January, 2006 issue of the same.
- ¹² As pointed out by S.N. Eisenstadt that when observed from close, the fundamentalist religious movements evince characteristics of modern Jacobinism, even when combined with very strong anti-Western and anti-Enlightenment ideologies, they have attempted to appropriate modernity on their own terms. See *Daedalus* Special Issue on "Multiple Modernities", Winter: 2000.
- ¹³ See Saba Mahmood "Secularism, Hermeneutics and Empire" in *Public Culture* 18:2, 2006. pp. 324-345.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Partha Chatterjee makes this argument in his paper "Lineages of Political Society" presented in his late seminars and particularly at the Conference on "The Rule of Law and Democracy" as a member of the team of 'Indian-European Advanced Research Network' which had met at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, January 14-15, 2010.

¹⁶ The Report prepared by Goldberg, Andreas, Sen, Faruk (1999) *Deutsche Türken-Türkische Deutsche? Die Diskussion um die doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft* had carried the details statistics of the Turkish legal residents in Germany. Lit Verlag, Munster.

¹⁷ Nezar Al Sayyad and Manuel Castells (eds) *Muslim Europe or Euro Islam*, (California, 2002) pp. 9-10.

¹⁸ Anne Marie Autissier's presentation on the representation of immigrants in French print media at the Workshop on Migration, organised by MCRG, Calcutta, December 2009.

¹⁹ It is not that liberalism does not recognise racial or sexual discrimination-it has been in the forefront of those struggles – but there is a recurrent problem with its notion of equality... when liberal discourse attempts to deal with cultural respect into recognition of equal cultural worth, it does not recognise the disjunctive, borderline temporalities of partial minority cultures.

²⁰ Interview of Fatih Akin in a Web Magazine Qantara.de. "I stand in opposition to Tradition" http://qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php?

²¹ Walter Mignolo, "Many faces of Cosmopolis: Border thinking and critical Cosmopolitanism" in Carol Breckenridge et al.edited *Cosmopolitanism* (Durham, 2002) pp. 156-186.

²² Chatterjee, op.cit., 5.

²³ Homi Bhabha, "Culture's in Between" in David Bennet (ed) *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity* (London, 1998), p. 30.

²⁴ President Chirac quoted from the The Daily Telegraph Agencies Reports, published in *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, July10, 2006.

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