EVIDENCE REPORT
No **16**

Addressing and Mitigating Violence

Addressing and Mitigating Violence: Uptake Strategy

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August 2013

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List of Abbreviations

AMV	Addressing and Mitigating Violence
AVVP	The Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme
BU-NIAS	Bombay University – National Institute of Advanced Studies
CCYA	Center for Coordination of Youth Activities
CGG	Centre for Good Governance
CR	community relations
CRISE	Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA	Danish Development Cooperation
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation
DFID	Department for International Development
DGP	Director General of Police
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FINIDA	Finish Development Cooperation
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GR	Government Recommendation
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LIC	Low Income Country
MCMT	Mohalla Committee Movement Trust
MoYES	Ministry of Youth, Education and Sport
NAS	National AIDS Secretariat
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NSA	Non-State Actors
NSDF	National Slum Dwellers Federation
NYC	National Youth Commission
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Co-operation Directorate
ONS	Office of National Security
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PIPA	Participatory Impact Pathways Analysis
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SL	Sierra Leone
SNEHA	Society for Nutrition, Education and Health Action (Mumbai, India)
SPARC	The Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNRCPD	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

Research uptake: For the purposes of this report we will define uptake as the acknowledgement and use of evidence-based learning by those key stakeholders who we want to influence (i.e. whose behaviour or attitudes we are seeking to change).

The overarching purpose of the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme (AMV) is to generate useful analysis to tackle policy dilemmas relating to 'newer' forms of violence and organised crime. Across the contexts where we work, we will undertake a multi-level governance analysis with a multi-actor governance approach to better understand the contributions and possibilities for convergence between state and non-state stakeholder efforts in different policy spaces. An important goal of work across the AMV theme will be to increase the capabilities of partners and stakeholders in each of the contexts where we work to identify more effective ways of policy influence.

The Year One work focused on the two following sub-themes.

1. Strengthening core state functions and citizen agencies to mitigate and prevent routine forms of violence, as well as organised violence and crime (Nigeria and Sierra Leone).
2. Improving access to livelihoods, jobs and basic services in violent contexts, including in large urban settings (Maharashtra, India and Nairobi, Kenya).

The strategy is a working document that reflects uptake as an ongoing process which is responsive to emerging policy opportunities, learning and partnership activities. As the AMV programme progresses through years two to four, the strategy will be continually updated and strengthened through incorporating new approaches to knowledge uptake and dissemination based on ongoing learning.

1   Developing the uptake strategy

The development of the uptake strategy was an iterative process involving case study leads (IDS), partner organisations (in-country), IDS staff from Knowledge Services, Communications and the Impact Innovation strand of the Accountable Grant. The process was adapted from the Participatory Impact Pathways Analysis (PIPA) – ensuring a coherent approach across the case studies.

The core process involved envisaging and identifying the key actors in relation to influencing policy; their networks; their information needs (where they currently source information and the preferred format and language for programme outputs); and upcoming critical policy events and opportunities. This information enables us to produce targeted, relevant information for our key audiences.

The process revealed a set of common audiences at the global level; 'crossover' at the African regional level; and opportunities to link the programme of work with ongoing IDS research and communication activities in this field – enabling us to present a strong body of knowledge on newer forms of violence and organised crime. In contrast the unique social, political and economic contexts of each country-level study require tailored strategies for dissemination and engagement in order to target our policy messages and reach and influence the relevant stakeholders.

This document first details the specific country-level uptake strategies then presents a common approach to global communication and dissemination activities.

2   Partnering principles

IDS collaborated with in-country organisations in each of the case studies. Working with partners is a core part of IDS' approach to policy analysis activities across the Accountable Grant. Partnership is essential both to produce knowledge that is relevant and grounded and improve its communication and uptake. IDS recognises that work with partners should create opportunities to understand each other's strategic goals and interests; for dialogue, shared learning and knowledge exchange; for mutual capacity development and for knowledge co-construction.

However, partnering is a complex and negotiated process mediated by human relationships, access to resources, and skills. Therefore, the ways in which we approach and manage our relationships with partners should be based on a realistic assessment of different values and interests that come into play, as well as the complexities of building relationships in circumstances where power is often shared unequally. Imbalances of power may, for example, arise as a result of the ways that funding flows and how this structures accountability relations; through differences in resource access; and through differences in authority and voices of partners in various spaces.

Partners will have a wide set of experiences, motivations and expectations of partnering. It is important to account for these, as well as the different ways of working. At a practical level, working with partners is constrained or enabled by the structures, reach, capacity and reputation of the partnering institutions (including IDS), as well as by the sociopolitical conditions within which partners are embedded. At the outset, IDS and its partners should together come to a clear understanding of how partners can engage, what they can offer, what they need and how they see the work supporting or complementing their own strategic goals and interests. This will help to define clear expectations and, it is hoped, promote a sense of collective ownership of work that is undertaken.

Targeted uptake activities, led by partner organisations, can deepen and extend policy influence because partners have a grounded understanding of the formal and informal relationships that shape policy processes in their country; they have their own in-country networks that can be consulted to deepen and widen engagement with national and sub-national policy stakeholders. Thus, whilst arguably a complex process, partnering has clear perceived benefits for the quality of knowledge, its impact on policy processes and the outcomes of these, particularly in the local context.

Work on issues of violence and insecurity means additional constraints are often manifest in the context of the study itself. Analysis of violence, its causes and its many forms can put researchers, partners and other stakeholders at considerable institutional and/or personal risk. The particular policy setting – characterised by fluidity, uncertainty and insecurity – may also limit the ability of in-country partners to exert influence and promote consideration of policy evidence locally. It is critical to be aware of and responsive to the particular sensitivities experienced by local partners; this may be through appropriate use (or not) of logos, seeking alternative actors to promote policy analysis or by IDS assuming a greater role in taking on the role of independent international voice.

Whilst recognising that each context and relationship will be unique there is a need for IDS to apply some common principles to the way in which we partner in the AMV theme. By committing to a common set of principles for partnering, the AMV theme is seeking to:

- value relationships with partners beyond the specific programme(s) of work under the Accountable Grant;

- engender and build trust through sensitive partnering;
- create opportunities for dialogue and negotiation of the different interests and views of DFID, IDS and local partners.

2.1   Partnering in the context of the Accountable Grant

The Accountable Grant poses both challenges and opportunities for working with partners. The somewhat pre-determined nature of the case studies, the pre-defined outputs, and set of intended outcomes and indicators, limits the scope for generating a shared problem framing with partners, for identifying alternative and potentially more appropriate products or engagement strategies for uptake and influencing, and emphasises IDS' upward accountability. However, the multi-year nature of the programme provides a platform for IDS to build on and deepen relationships with existing partners, and explore relationships with new partners and actors in the areas in which it works. In addition, it provides DFID the opportunity to engage with new stakeholders.

The following principles will guide how IDS approaches partnership in the AMV theme.

1. We will be **TRANSPARENT** in communications with our partners. In particular, being clear about the pre-existing commitments (to DFID) and constraints within the existing programme framing and funding. We will also be transparent on our own agenda and positioning in the programme.

2. We will ensure there is **CLARITY** of roles, of named IDS staff and partners, the expected inputs and deliverables from IDS and partners and the timelines involved. We will keep open channels of communication to discuss any possible changes to the timing, expectations or deliverables of the work.

3. We will be **SENSITIVE** to partners' motivations, interests, goals and constraints in working with IDS. We will seek to understand each other and ensure that work is complementary and contributes to partner agendas. In addition, we will work to minimise any exposure to increased personal or reputational risk.

4. We will **VALUE** and respect partners' networks and connections recognising that partners have influence and approach influence in different ways.

5. We will be **FLEXIBLE** in managing difference. We will engage in dialogue throughout our shared project work to understand and manage difference in working cultures, language, and access to resources.

6. We will take a **SHARED LEARNING** approach to knowledge generation, valuing partners' different knowledge framings, perspectives and ideas, and being responsive by seeking to re-negotiate programme framings and understandings.

7. We will be **PROACTIVE** in establishing or extending our relationships as a basis for longer term interactions. We will seek to create opportunities for wider learning and knowledge exchange beyond the confines of the specific project(s) and build a shared understanding of personal and institutional skills, complementarities and goals.

8 We will aim to **IMPROVE** our understanding about how we learn with others, and how we partner. We will seek to better understand where and how we can add value in the partnering process and how we can foster 'good' partnering behaviour by seeking feedback informally.

3   Country uptake strategies

Each country case study has the following three pre-determined outputs.

- Main country case study report (10,000 words).
- A Summary Brief (1–2 page summary of the main report).
- Policy Brief synthesising case studies under each sub-theme (2–4 pages).

These outputs will be targeted at respective key audiences within each case study. In addition, other 'knowledge products' have been developed, such as audio-visual material, as part of respective country case study outputs which will enable uptake amongst key audiences to which such a format is appropriate.

The gathering of audio-visual content by members of the case study teams will also help to expand the reach and access of the knowledge generated to a wider set of audiences and which can complement the formal outputs. Work on these products is supported by in-country partners or by the IDS Knowledge Services and Communications staff. In all cases the teams are also committed to writing blogs and news items for dissemination through existing IDS networks and channels, as well as working with partners to reach the national and local media.

3.1   Sub-theme 1

Strengthening core state functions and citizen agencies to mitigate and prevent routine forms of violence, as well as organised violence and crime

3.1.1 Nigeria case study

Background

The current political (elite) settlement in Nigeria, which is centred on the access to, and distribution of, massive oil rents, blocks chances to address the underlying causes of conflict and violence in the Niger Delta. The region was pacified by the 2009 presidential amnesty and the DDR programme. There is less actual violence today than 3–4 years ago but the situation is unstable and the potential for serious violence to flare up again persists. Restive Delta youths and former foot soldiers of the militant groups are not being reintegrated into society and continue to face serious problems of unemployment, marginalisation and poverty. They are also being drafted into criminal organisations and militant groups that did not demobilise and which play a significant role in the rising business of illegal oil bunkering and trafficking. Further, the Joint Task Force of the Nigerian military continues to violate human rights and reportedly some of its officers participate in illegal oil bunkering, as do other elite groups at the local, state and federal levels.

Hence, in past years Nigeria has seen the broadening of its political settlement through the inclusion and co-optation of Niger Delta militant and criminal leaders, as well as state governors and likely community leaders who are benefiting from the increased oil revenue derivation that was established under the first 'democratic' government of President Obasanjo in 1999/2000; 13 per cent of revenue is now channelled back to the oil-bearing states from the federal account. Yet this broadening of the political settlement has not resulted in opening up space to address the grievances and socioeconomic problems and community/ethnic tensions in the Niger Delta. What has been achieved is the temporary pacification of the Niger Delta elites, including the militant and some criminal leaders, through a strategy of buying them off. This is an unstable equilibrium which can easily turn violent again, particularly if funds stop flowing or some elites feel that they are being short-

changed. Reaching this equilibrium has been helped by the fact that President Jonathan is from the Delta, but equally the equilibrium is challenged by the northern Nigerian elites of Muslim faith. Therefore, the Delta equilibrium is presently unstable.

President Jonathan's term will last until 2015 and it is to be expected that there will be heavy pressures from the North to ensure that he is succeeded by a northern president. This means there is relatively little time left for Jonathan to accomplish his objectives of cleaning up and modernising the country's oil sector, as exemplified by the establishment of the Petroleum Revenue Task Force in early 2012. It is impossible to say whether this more progressive agenda, which clearly is at odds with some big interests in the oil industry (including criminal interests linked to oil bunkering), would be held up by a northern government or indeed any other future Nigerian government.

Ideal situation

Ideally, the expanded political settlement that has been described above and which has a number of highly problematic features will be fundamentally changed in the sense that if other progressive elite groups – from the Delta, the Middle Belt and the North, that is, from across the country and all main ethnic-religious groups – are included and gain a seat and the upper hand in the negotiations between Nigerian elites on how the oil rents are to be distributed and invested, not for particularistic economic gain but for the common good. In addition, powerful groups at all levels of political authority that are currently blocking a more just, equitable and poverty-reducing distribution of oil rents, including militant and criminal leaders, as well as some elites at the federal, state and local levels, will, ideally, be separated from the political settlement and held in check by means of the democratic process and the rule of law. This process of changing the existing, problematic political settlement would take place at all levels of political authority (from local to federal), and would also include the multinational oil majors. They will support it fully and make all necessary concessions in terms of increasing the transparency of their operations and accountability *vis-à-vis* the Nigerian government and authorities, as well as accepting the inevitable financial losses.

A new, pro-development and decriminalised political settlement will provide opportunities to increase governance capacities at all levels of political authority which, in turn, will enable the design and implementation of effective public policies to address socioeconomic grievances (such as youth unemployment, environmental destruction, and failing/absent social services, poverty), the public security gap and the problem of the privatisation of violence, the failure of the reintegration of militant fighters, and spreading crime (including illegal oil bunkering) in an integrated manner.

In sum, the new political settlement will enable Nigeria to address the underlying causes of (potential) violence in the Delta and beyond by allowing an increasing number of progressive elites at all levels of political authority, who have an interest in using the country's oil wealth for development and the common good, to strengthen governance capacity and effectively deliver public goods and services.

Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards achieving project vision

1. An awareness of the need to strengthen governance at all levels in Nigeria, that is, at the local, regional and federal levels, especially in the Niger Delta.

2. Recognition of the need to seriously tackle organised crime, corruption, and addressing the socioeconomic root causes of violence in the Niger Delta.

3. Improved ability to advocate and influence key stakeholders on the issues.

4. Recognition of the need to reform the post-1999 'oil-centred political settlement' through the inclusion of additional actors and the strengthening of governance at all levels, especially in the Niger Delta.

Table 3.1   Target audience, desired change and channels of influence (Nigeria)

Audience group	Changes needed (1–4 above)	Project strategy (how are actors involved/ mobilised?)	Output (in line with information needs)	Events, opportunities and dissemination channels
Federal government and political elites	1, 2, and 4	Invited to participate in roundtable Receive and share project outputs (Mar/Apr 2013)	Summary Brief	Had follow-up conversation with senior political advisor to President. Local NGO partner in discussions with Election Commission.
State-level governments and political elites in the Niger Delta	1, 2, and 4		Summary Brief	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable.
Local governments and community leaders in the Niger Delta	1, 2, and 4		Summary Brief Blog	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable.
Domestic/Delta-based militant leaders and heads of criminal organisations	1, 2, 3 and 4	Invited to participate in roundtable Receive and share project outputs (Mar/Apr 2013)	Summary Brief	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable.
Multinational oil companies	1 and 2		Summary Brief Blog	Follow-up conversation with official from Agip.
Delta CSOs	1, 2, 3 and 4		Summary Brief Blog	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable. Maintain active email contact.
INGOs/regional bodies/networks	1, 2, 3 and 4		Summary Brief Blog Main report	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable. Maintain active email contact with a number of organisations. IDS and Eldis channels.

Donors – particularly DFID	1 and 2		Summary Brief. Blog. Main report.	Utilise connections/ contact from roundtable. IDS and Eldis channels.

Table 3.2　Success indicators for audience engagement (Nigeria)

Audience group	Success indicators (how do we know if/to what extent we were successful?)		
	Expect-to-see	**Like-to-see**	**Love-to-see**
Federal government and political elites *Including:* Ruling People's Democratic Party and Action Congress of Nigeria – opposition party; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; Independent Election Commission	Formal participation in roundtable Read the output with some degree of interest	Follow-up on the materials outside of the roundtable on the issues being dealt with. Critical engagement with the outcome of the products.	Active use of case study products (e.g. brief) and network building during roundtable. Reflect seriously upon the policy options that are contained in the outputs – particularly in the view of how governance can be strengthened at the federal, regional and local level. Early and transparent preparation for the 2015 polls; sending committed and clear messages that polls will be held in accordance with electoral laws. Commitment measured through: interventions to reduce youth employment; reintegration of fighters; enhancement of social services in Niger Delta. Federal government takes seriously the root causes that have spurred violence in the Niger Delta; and shows commitment to tackling organised crime and corruption.
State-level governments and political elites in the Niger Delta (People's Democratic Party)	Formal participation in roundtable Read the output with some degree of interest	Action: open dialogue about the issues raised within the roundtable and the key messages of the research.	Evidence of new and progressive voices included in policy discussions about use of oil revenue.

Local governments and community leaders in the Niger Delta	Formal participation in roundtable Read the output with some degree of interest	Action: recognition of the need to seek and include other stakeholders in the Delta political process.	More inclusive and democratic processes evidenced by the emergence of new and progressive voices (political participation [in local elections]).
Domestic/Delta-based former militant leaders	Formal participation in roundtable Read the output with some degree of interest	Much more constructive role in the reintegration process of former fighters.	A positive contribution to the strengthening of governance: regional and local as a result of connections.
Multinational oil companies	Read the output with some degree of interest	Critical engagement with the outcome of the products.	Evidence of improved relationships with local communities re: community development and local security arrangements. Results in empowered local leadership (e.g. formalised local groups in dialogue with the oil majors) and de-escalation of violence at the local level.
Delta CSOs Examples: Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development; FOSTER	Advocacy with case study products in hand	Dissemination of case study outputs to several other CSOs and either strongly supportive or powerful key stakeholders. Use of the material (Brief) in own writing and reference (within a newspaper article or blog post) .	CSO not directly involved actively uses products for advocacy and bridge-building with other CSOs and groups, particularly either strongly supportive or very powerful groups.
INGOs/regional bodies/ networks active on Niger Delta affairs Examples: Democratic Stakeholders Network; Open Society Initiative for West Africa; Revenue Watch; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	Advocacy with case study products in hand	Outputs used within actors own policy analysis. The material (Brief) is used in actors' own writing or referred to in a newspaper article and/or blog post.	Outputs used within actors' own networks and distributed within other powerful networks.
Donors – particularly DFID	Formal participation in roundtable	Critical engagement with the outcome of the products.	See evidence of outputs in future policy and programming on these issues (citations, references, etc.).

3.1.2 Sierra Leone case study

Background

From 1991 until 2002, Sierra Leone suffered a devastating civil war in which the civilian population suffered grave atrocities and infrastructure, including health and education, collapsed. In 2001, UN forces moved into rebel-held areas and began to disarm fighters. By January 2002, the war was declared over. Sierra Leone is viewed and described as a success story in terms of peace-building. However, the country remains one of the last on the Human Development Index and there remain significant internal threats to stability and peace, including wider structural issues linked to youth marginalisation and unemployment.

The current political settlement, involving political elites, traditional leaders, donors and multinational companies, is articulated around a political economy of diamonds and mining. The political settlement is maintained through the remobilisation of former combatants – affiliated directly or indirectly to parent political organisations – in electoral 'task forces' or 'squads' to mobilise voters and intimidate opponents through violence during election periods.

Forms of violence in Sierra Leone encompass gender-based violence, gang violence, violent property disputes, resource and labour conflicts, cross-border violence and political violence. This work builds on an existing evidence base on these forms of violence to better understand how core state functions can be strengthened to mitigate and prevent different manifestations of violence. In particular the work focuses on youth marginalisation.

Youth in Sierra Leone question redistributive benefits in relation to the current political settlement and have contested it through violent and non-violent means. The concerns of young people closely relate to land rights and what they consider to be their personal rights to dispose of property at the expense of older practices that subject property to the dictates and interests of 'customary authorities' that many view as corrupt. The radicalisation of youth – evident also in urban areas through the emergence of gangs in schools, universities and linked to music labels – shows how all these different levels of violence connect to political manipulation and economic disparities.

Ideal situation

In an ideal future violence is prevented (as opposed to mitigated) through an inclusive political settlement which enables equitable access to land by all citizens in the rural areas and promotes employment, training and education for all youth (not just ex-combatants) with a view to creating an economically stable and peaceful society. The Sierra Leone government is engaged with the CSOs and the youth of the country, listening and responding to the issues and experiences of the reality on the ground. Governmental and external flows of finance, policy or programming for violence prevention are responsive to the voice, needs and knowledge held by CSOs and citizens (as opposed to being driven by external agendas).

The work on violence prevention/mitigation in Sierra Leone is timely and relevant because 1) the UNIPSIL is developing an exit strategy on the basis of the recent 2012 elections, which were deemed to be successful; and 2) Sierra Leone has recently been re-categorised as a Low Income Country (LIC) rather than a post-conflict country. It is unclear whether/how this recategorisation will affect aid priorities and strategies for the country, which since the end of the war have been geared to build peace. Thus, there is a need to assess Sierra Leone's continuing transition, in order not only to prevent a relapse of widespread conflict but also to address newer forms of violence that have arisen.

Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards achieving project vision

1. Dialogue is initiated between stakeholders and there is an ability to make connections between the transition to LIC and the UNIPSIL exit and the continuing need to engage with emerging and new forms of violence, in particular those connected to youth marginalisation, unemployment and landlessness.

2. CSOs must take some form of ownership and play a key role in influencing the transition process from a heavily donor-influenced agenda to one which is more locally owned and responsive to the needs of citizens and in particular, youth.

3. In the absence of external programmes, civil society and national government increasingly take responsibility for violence prevention and integrate this work into their existing and ongoing programmes.

4. Donor awareness is increased of the need to continue the work on violence prevention through funding locally owned violence prevention strategies.

Table 3.3 Target audience, desired change and channels of influence (SL)

Audience group	Changes needed (1–4 above)	Project strategy (how are actors involved/mobilised?)	Output (in line with information needs)	Events, opportunities and dissemination channels
Donors in-country e.g. DFID, World Bank Social Fund, IDB, (and other donors contributing to multi-donor trust fund)	1 and 4	A number of donors were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief Blog on roundtable and output (with full report links)	Direct mailing with cover letter from CCYA and IDS Via international Web 2.0 networks e.g. Eldis.
Multilaterals, UNDP, UNIFEM, UN Integrated Peace Mission, UNICEF, etc.	1	A number of multilaterals were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief	Direct mailing with cover letter from CCYA and IDS.
National ministries incl. MoYouth, Employment and Sort, National Aids Secretariat, Office of National Security, National Youth Commission (NYC)	1 and 3	A number of government officials were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief	Direct mailing with cover letter from CCYA+IDS. Follow-up on roundtable by CCYA with organisational contacts in NYC.
Police community relations	3	Police CR were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief	Direct mailing to roundtable participants and invitees.

SL civil society: governance and conflict resolution focus e.g. Centre for Good Governance (CGG), Non-State Actors (NSA) non-violence platform	1, 2 and 3	Civil society representatives invited to roundtable. Direct engagement with CGG as roundtable mediator.	Summary Brief Blog on roundtable and on output (with full report links) Press Release	Direct mailing to roundtable participants and invitees. IDS partner – CCYA – is a member of the NSA network, can use this as a dissemination channel.
SL civil society: youth engagement and development agenda	1, 2 and 3	Civil society representatives invited to roundtable. Direct engagement at roundtable through CSO presentations. Case study partner is CCYA.	Summary Brief Blog on roundtable and on output (with full report links) Press Release	Direct mailing to roundtable participants and invitees. Partner CCYA utilise networks to disseminate blog.
SL country offices of INGO: Restless Development, Save the Children, Action Aid, SFCG, World Vision, Concern, IBIS	1, 4	A number of INGOs were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief Blog on roundtable and on output (with full report links)	Direct mailing to roundtable participants and invitees. Via International Web 2.0 networks, e.g. Eldis.
Academia in SL	1	Members of the academe were invited to the roundtable.	Summary Brief Full report Blog on output	Direct mailing of summary with letter highlighting e-links to full report. Via International W2.0 networks, e.g. Eldis.
Regional civil society groups e.g. OSIWA	1 and 4	Identified as stakeholders.	Summary Brief Blog on roundtable and on output (with full report links)	Direct mailing from IDS+CCYA. Via International Web 2.0 networks, e.g. Eldis.
Media in SL	1	Identified as stakeholders.	Press release with summary brief and links to e-report	Press Release with cover letter from CCYA.

Table 3.4   Success indicators for audience engagement (SL)

Audience group	Success indicators (how do we know if/ to what extent we were successful)		
	Expect-to-see	**Like-to-see**	**Love-to-see**
Donors in-country e.g. DFID, World Bank Social Fund, AFB, IDB, (and other donors contributing to multi-donor trust fund)	Donors are present at the roundtables. Actors read the summary brief and share amongst staff.	Donors engage in dialogue with local actors – particularly CSOs. Evidence of openness and public dissemination of information regarding their role in violence mitigation strategies in SL.	Increased funding of new CSO programmes of work on violence prevention. Violence mitigation strategies are part of the country-office budget.
Multilaterals; UNDP, UNIFEM, UN Integrated Peace Mission, UNICEF, etc.	Actors are present at the roundtable. Actors read the summary brief and share amongst staff.	An enhancement of the existing channels between the programme staff and the UN (concrete engagement over the exit strategy for UNIPSIL).	Official discussion takes place with the national government and other donors.
National ministries incl. MoYES, NAS, ONS	Actors are present at the roundtable. Actors read the summary brief and share amongst staff.	Actors have some form of engagement with the brief (critical; citations). Actors make links with CSOs (working groups) and they construct a dialogue.	National ownership increases in terms of conflict prevention (effect on livelihoods and inclusion). Programme design touches upon the issues – attribution because the baseline is currently at zero.
Police community relations	Actors are present at the roundtable. Actors read the summary brief.	New information is fed back to the public by the police – widening access to information regarding violence. Working groups form with CSOs to tackle the issues together.	Youth marginalisation and violence is better reflected in policy discussions in these target areas.
SL civil society: governance and conflict resolution focus e.g. CGG, NSA Platform	Actor present at the roundtable. Actors read and share the summary brief.	Increased awareness of the topic and a follow-up workshop. Working groups form with national government organisations to tackle the issues together.	Actor continues to organise meetings as a means to access more powerful actors.
SL civil society: youth	Actor present at the roundtable.	Working groups form with national	Actor organises meetings as a means to access more powerful

engagement and development agenda	Actors read and share the summary brief.	government organisations to tackle the issues together.	actors.
SL country offices of INGO: Restless Development, Save the Children, Action Aid, SFCG, World Vision, Concern, IBIS	Actor present at the roundtable. Actors read the summary brief.	Relay the report on their website (evidence of further dissemination).	INGO has new programmes that address new forms of violence because current donor programmes are fairly limited (participation in the planning process).
Academia in SL	Academics are present at the roundtable. Actors read and share the summary brief.	Engaged: direct involvement in addressing new forms of violence through programmes. Academics share the information within other networks.	Academics are better equipped to consider the security environment in SL: facilitation between multilaterals (funders and donors and government) on topic – policymaking bodies.
Regional civil society groups e.g. OSIWA	Engages with SL civil society.	Attends future workshops, events.	Funds specific programmes
Media in SL	Runs a story on the issues.	Investigates further through follow-up with CCYA; links story to the UNIPSIL coverage.	Does a series of grassroots interviews with youth on these issues.

3.2   Sub-theme 2

Improving access to livelihoods, jobs and basic services in violent context – including in large urban settings. Expanding access to services, and economic opportunities for the poor.

3.2.1 Nairobi case study

Background

Insecurity is an endemic phenomenon in Nairobi with complex social and political characteristics. Different forms of violence include murders, rape, kidnappings and carjacking by criminal gangs, assassinations and reprisal attacks associated with political and commercial interests, vigilantism and mob justice, extra-judicial killings, and small-scale 'terrorist' attacks by extremists. These various forms of violence are testament to the extreme inequalities that characterise everyday life in Nairobi and failures to provide adequate security and safety for the poor. Rent-seeking and protection rackets are commonplace in many poor neighbourhoods of the city, where informal structures and processes involving a variety of non-state actors are the important providers of 'security' and

other public services. Neglect of the urban poor in the provision of basic services has allowed illegal non-state groups to proliferate and exercise a growing predatory control over the poor. Even in cases of dispute settlement, the poor have limited recourse to formal redress mechanisms and often have to rely on private violence to enforce their claims and rights.

Deeper problems that contribute to the proliferation of non-state violent groups and insecurity in Nairobi include high levels of unemployment amongst the youth, exploitation by political and business elites, and the failure of national and local authorities to provide basic services in poor areas of the city. The provision of public goods and services and strengthening of access to economic opportunities for an expanding youth population are vital elements of a wider-ranging strategy to address violence and strengthen security for the urban poor in Nairobi. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence as well as policy statements by senior Kenyan government officials have also pointed to better service delivery and access to economic opportunities as essential elements of a strategy to reduce violence. Yet violence in poor neighbourhoods tends to be treated as a narrow policing problem and law and order issue, even though the police are reviled and widely seen as contributing to everyday insecurities that affect the poor, such as through harassment, arbitrary stop and searches and seeking bribes from public transport operators.

Ideal situation

- Reduction in violence affecting poor urban neighbourhoods.
- Delivery of reliable basic services for the urban poor by the state and non-state (legal) partners.
- Greater access to work and economic opportunities for the urban poor, and particularly young people.
- Opportunities for innovative community and state approaches for providing services/public security are promoted.
- Fewer opportunities for illegal groups to prey on the urban poor.
- Policy stakeholders at multiple levels of government and in different sectors work in a coordinated fashion to address violence.

Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards achieving project vision

Ensure that the outputs are widely disseminated through all available networks and IDS channels for maximum effect, in order to:

1. Increase awareness of the linkages between youth unemployment, inadequate public services (specifically electricity, water and sanitation) and organised crime and violence.

2. Encourage a desire for coordinating efforts between key actors (across different sectors) and improve their understanding of why previous coordinated efforts aimed at resolving these problems have not worked in the past.

3. Challenge attitudes around 'slums' not being part of the city.

4. Share successful examples of technical innovations and the development of youth opportunities.

Table 3.5   Target audience, desired change and channels of influence (Nairobi)

Audience group	Changes needed (1–4 above)	Project strategy (how are actors involved/mobilised?)	Output (in line with information needs)	Events, opportunities and dissemination channels
Central and local government	1, 2, and 3	Invited to participate in roundtable Receive and share project outputs (Mar/Apr 2013)	Main report and Summary Brief Editorial collaboration (media)	Direct mail to partner contacts. Kenyan media.
Civil society	1, 2, and 3		Summary Brief Audio slideshow	Through partner networks and their contacts.
Community groups and activists	1, 2 and 4		Summary Brief Audio slideshow	Direct mail to partner contacts.
Kenya National Police	1, 2, 3 and 4	Ongoing meetings between researchers and key police officers (already working with them on another project)	Summary Brief Editorial collaboration (media)	Via regular ongoing meetings Kenyan media
Private sector (electricity and water companies)	1, 2, 3 and 4	Partner contacts have good working relationships with Kenya Power, Lighting Company & Nairobi Water and Sewerage Co	Summary Brief Audio slideshow	Meetings set up via Umande and Pamoja Trust (who have contacts in these companies).
Donors/ researchers engaged in urban Kenya – in-country	1 and 4	Partner has contacts with UNHabitat; USAID represented at roundtable; IDS has contacts with DFID and FCO Horn of Africa	Blogs and social media Main report and summary brief	Organise a 1-to-1 consultation to investigate how research fits in with their thinking.
Donors/ researchers engaged in urban Kenya – international	1 and 4	IDS has contacts with DFID Fragile States, European Commission, Chatham House, Rift Valley Inst., Royal Africa Society and UNDP	Blogs and social media Audio slideshow Main report and summary brief	IDS channels (email lists, website, social media channels) DFID channels (e.g. R4D). Other channels (e.g. African Arguments blog hosted by Royal African Society). Media (e.g. AllAfrica).

Table 3.6   Success indicators for audience engagement (Nairobi)

Audience group	Success indicators (how do we know if/to what extent we were successful?)		
	Expect-to-see	**Like-to-see**	**Love-to-see**
Central and local government	Participate in roundtable and read the summary briefs	Officials read the full report and critically reflect on its recommended actions. Officials are available for follow-up formal and informal discussions.	Active use of case study products (e.g. brief) and network building during roundtable. Renewed will and commitment to implement coordinated efforts to improve security for the urban poor through more widely available public goods and services as well as training and work opportunities, particularly for young people.
Civil society	Representatives participate in roundtable and read the summary brief Advocacy using policy analysis	Civil society officials consulted during project use the analysis to instigate new discussions amongst wider spectrum of civil society stakeholders. National civil society actors in Kenya become more conversant in policy discussions on addressing violence and policing matters.	Effective civil society engagement with government and policy stakeholders involved in addressing violence in poor neighbourhoods. More regular consultations and knowledge sharing between community organisations, government officials, and representatives of utility companies.
Community groups and activists	Participate in roundtable as well as neighbourhood-level consultations to verify policy understandings and proposed actions to address violence	Use policy analysis to leverage innovative local responses, such as through invitations to relevant meetings and new contacts with political–administrative officials and representatives of utility companies.	Evidence in the form of policies and investments that promote innovative responses by community organisations. More regular consultations and knowledge sharing between community organisations, government officials, and representatives utility companies.

Kenya National Police	Representatives participate in roundtable and read the summary brief	Critical engagement with the outcome of the products. Greater official understanding of the connections between violence and wider problems of youth unemployment and poor service provision.	Attitudes have changed around 'slums not being part of the city' as a result of attending roundtable, reading project outputs and ongoing engagement with partners. Evidence of willingness to be involved in joined-up efforts to address violence in poor neighbourhoods.
Private sector (electricity and water companies)	Representatives participate in roundtable and read the summary brief	Critical engagement with the outcome of the products.	Attitudes have changed around 'slums not being part of the city' as a result of reading project outputs and ongoing engagement with partners. Evidence of efforts to develop new approaches to extend services in poor neighbourhoods.
Donors	Participate in roundtable and read the summary brief	Critical engagement with the summary brief and full report.	New programming drawing on findings of policy analysis, particularly including support for innovative local-level initiatives in Nairobi's poor urban areas.
Policy analysts and scholars working in/on urban wellbeing and violence	Participate in roundtable and read the summary brief	The material (briefing) is used in actors' own writing or referred to in a newspaper article and/or blog post.	Outputs used within specialist networks focusing on delivery of services and/or provision of security in urban areas, as well as distributed to wider policy networks on addressing violence.

3.2.2 Maharashtra (including Mumbai) case study

Background

In India, the state of Maharashtra currently has the largest number of urban Indians, 50.8 million, while Mumbai, its capital, is predicted to become the third most populous city in the world with 25.8 million inhabitants. Many poor people in urban India are cut off from service delivery such as safe water, electricity, garbage disposal, drain clearance and so on. As a result, a large proportion of the population live in overcrowded spaces, with poor housing conditions, and are subject to diseases and environmental hazards. The poor are also denied access to education and health. Inadequate employment or under-employment are equally widespread and are a cause for concern as Indian families massively invested in the education of their children – thus creating a large feeling of relative deprivation.

It is important to recognise that urban impoverished areas in India also tend to be sites which are consistently afflicted by outbreaks of civil violence, and in this, Maharashtra has become one of the states most affected by this violence. Whilst rioting has fallen consistently since the 1990s across India, Maharashtra stands as an exception, currently experiencing approximately 6,000 riots per year, spread across the state.

Violence-prone neighbourhoods suffer acutely from widespread vulnerability and a lack of access to services. Because the state fails to distribute public goods and services in poor areas, these are provided largely on informal and extra-legal platforms and so are likely to exclude the poorest. Yet the sort of platforms that operate and distribute resources has been shown to directly impact the likelihood and extent of civil violence, as some of the actors involved take an active part in 'institutionalised riot systems'.

Although riots predominantly happen in impoverished urban areas, there is a lack of understanding of the linkages between civil violence and vulnerabilities, both in terms of policy and research. At best, the efforts to improve the security of vulnerable urban populations include physical insecurity at the margin (focusing on social, economic or legal insecurity), whereas law and order agencies fail to encompass violence in their broader social and economic contexts.

Yet the impacts of the processes of urbanisation (such as compulsory land acquisitions and mass slum relocation programmes) on the physical vulnerabilities of evictees are not well known. In particular, how the experience of eviction relates to the *physicality* of urban vulnerability (including risk of injury or death, exposure to crime, violence, fear, and the lack of protection by and from the law) is not well documented. This gap is likely to exert adverse consequences on policy as recent research on informal settlements has shown that the urban poor often have to step outside the law in order to gain access to land and housing so that primary illegality becomes the source of several other, mostly negative, encounters with law enforcement agencies.

Ideal situation

The ideal situation would be one where citizens in low-income urban areas have the ability to reach out to municipal and neighbourhood-level civil society institutions to strengthen safety and security. In this context the slum panchayat model is the primary 'neighbourhood-level' institution and the conduit for community concerns/demands. 'Panchayati Raj' is a decentralised form of governance in South Asia where each village is responsible for its own affairs. The urban form in slum areas – and a much newer initiative – is ergo dubbed 'slum panchayat'.

Ideally, safety goals would originate from slum dwellers themselves, and as such encompass all relevant types of violence and insecurity that people face. Different stakeholders would respond to these in an accountable manner, and with the active participation of the citizens.

Further, the interdependence between poverty/vulnerability on the one hand, and safety on the other hand, would be acknowledged by both development and security actors, thereby exploiting previously untapped areas of cross-intervention, and preventing problematic approaches to either. As an example of the former, enhancing service provision can be done in a way that both meet the needs of the people but also reduce tensions between households, communities or even within households that may arise from a lack (and/or unequal) access to key resources. Youth employment is another case in point. As an example of the latter, aggressive policies of slum upgrading or slum relocations, enacted without citizen participation have the potential to both undermine welfare as well as create tensions and increase the potential for violence.

In sum, in the ideal situation, the evaluation of safety issues would not be left to the appraisal of
external actors alone, and interventions would take place before tensions erupt into major bouts of violence. The links between violence and development goals would be acknowledged and exploited for policymaking. Policymakers would be both more apt to work together across remits and with the population.

Changes (in practice, knowledge, attitude, skill, policy) that contribute towards achieving project vision

1. Recognise the potential of slum *Panchayats* to be effective local community actors, that is, a conduit for state (police) collaboration. This model has been piloted in several neighbourhoods, so the change we would be looking to support/foster is its recognition in neighbourhoods/informal settlements where it has not yet been implemented.

2. Understand strong linkages between security (crime) and development – and new linkages between crime and riots.

3. Appreciate the extent and nature of insecurity in the slums – policies/state interventions have not recognised the fluid/changing nature of insecurity, nor that variability in urban insecurity (high degree of variation longitudinally and spatially).

4. Recognise the need to generate new evidence for effective policy formulation on two specific areas – the effect of slum upgrading (and relocation) on physical insecurity; and the linkages between civil violence and vulnerabilities (riots predominantly happen in impoverished urban areas).

Table 3.7   Target audiences, desired change and influencing channel (India)

Audience group	Changes needed (1–4 above)	Project strategy (how are actors involved/mobilised?)	Output (in line with information needs)	Events, opportunities and dissemination channels
Police	1, 2, and 3	Invited to participate in roundtable Receive and share project outputs (Mar/Apr 2013) *Also:* • follow up in-depth interview with DGP Anami Roy on Slum *Panchayat* • subsequent police training workshops to be run by SNEHA – local partner	Summary Brief	Direct mail to named officers • MCMT Trustees (retired heads of police) • Police Commissioners Office Current initiative to get Government Recommendation (GR) – aim to feed research findings into this process
Slum Dwellers *Panchayat*/ Slum Dwellers Federation	3	Roundtable briefing and summary of research findings have been developed into a booklet and given to Slum Panchayat leadership. Invited to participate in roundtable. Receive and share project outputs (Mar/Apr 2013).	Community film	Community film screening
Media	1, 2, and 3		Press release –Local translation	
Indian Civil Society – (NGOs working with police, etc.)	1, 2, and 3		Summary Brief Blog Community film	Through partner networks and their contacts
State government	1, 2, and 3		Summary Brief	Direct mail to named officers
Donors/ researchers (both national, international) engaged in urban India	1, 2, 3 and 4		Main Report Summary Brief Blog	Utilise IDS and partner personal contacts. IDS Blog, Eldis channels DFID channels (e.g. R4D) Other channels (e.g. African Arguments blog hosted by Royal African Society) Media (e.g. AllAfrica).

Table 3.8   Success indicators for audience engagement (India)

Audience group	Success indicators (how do we know if/ o what extent we were successful?)		
Primary audience	**Expect-to-see** *Access to outputs*	**Like-to-see** *(dialogue) Some form of uptake – but not by the government*	**Love-to-see** *Government recommendation on paper – or other most powerful actors using the outputs*
Police *Specifically:* - MCMT Trustees (retired heads of police) - Police Commissioners Officers	Actors have access to outputs (number of actors at the roundtable).	A dialogue is started between the police and the *Panchayats.*	A dialogue is started between the police and the Panchayats that directly influences policy methods and existing practices. Police use the briefs produced as a result of the roundtable. [Conflict resolution strategies are discussed – not necessarily legalised – but recommended as a result of the dialogue at the round table].
Media *Specifically:* - beat journalists - opinion editors - crime desk	Actors have access to outputs (number of actors at the roundtable). Media outputs (stories) are made accessible in an increased number of languages.	Media outputs (stories) are published by journalists – or used – in local media houses. (Direct i.e. have contacts)	Media outputs affect the prestige or reach of the newspaper outlet (increased readership of the newspaper). Journalistic practices change amongst actors as a result of output. (Indirect i.e. through intermediary).
Slum *Panchayats* (informal/ formal) Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF)	Actors have access to the outputs (number of actors at the roundtable). A DVD is produced and made accessible to actors (number of DVDs distributed).	An action that was otherwise unlikely to take place occurs as a result of the DVD (measured through attribution questions). *AND/OR* Actors are mobilised as a result of the DVD or roundtable discussion (a visible action that was otherwise unlikely to take place can be seen).	An action occurs as a result of your DVD (otherwise unlikely to occur) and is presented in the national media; discussed amongst the police; or other influential actors (measured through attribution questions with pre-defined influential actors). *AND/OR* Actors are mobilised, and this influences additional/existing political narratives (measures through instances mentioned in media; local government).
Advocacy organisations on	Actors (researchers) have access to	A secondary 'output' occurs by actors with access to the outputs or who were otherwise unlikely to act	The government use the findings from the academic outputs

urban planning (SPARC CSO)	academic outputs. Actors have access to the outputs (DVD). The number of channels to alert actors to outputs increases.	(monitoring the qualitative increase in political rallies; subsequent gathering; protest).	Actors are mobilised, and this influences additional/existing political narratives (measures through instances mentioned in media; local government).
NGOs working with police (SNEHA)	Actors have access to the outputs.	Actors use/reference outputs as part of training material.	IDS team is directly involved in planning/formulating police trainings.
State government *Specifically:* • State Home Minister's Office • Municipal Commissioner Office • Local Corporators	Actors have access to the briefs (qualitative affirmation). Invitations are sent to an increased number of/a qualitative important selection of offices for National Municipalities. Actors come to the roundtable .	A dialogue starts between actors and researchers (evidence that actors have made time to engage with briefs).	New dimensions of conflict resolution are discussed; specifically Slum *Panchayats* are recommended as a conduit between state and citizen – not necessarily a legitimising action.
Donors (interested in topic): IDRC, DFID International researchers	Donors/ international researchers have access to outputs (briefs).	Donors/international researchers download briefs from the IDS website / request the output directly.	Uptake – commissioned evaluations/written terms of reference/approaches to the problem change as a result of research outputs (citations). Funding of the programme increases.
Secondary audience	Access to materials through other sources. Framing question: Can we find traces of our work in what it is that the actors do?	Other actors are sent the outputs (reports, briefs) directly by our immediate boundary partners.	Feedback mechanism: other actors are influenced as a result of our outputs, which trigger processes of accountability and learning.
National research organisations *Specifically:* Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi. Tata Institute for Social Sciences. BU – NIAS.	Aware research is happening. Access materials.	Engage with the material. Find traces of research outputs in their work (cited).	Directly build on project's research.

3.3   Forthcoming work to be added for future 'sentinel outputs'

Future outputs will be incorporated into this working document and will inform the approach of the uptake strategy as the programme progresses. Apart from case study reports and policy briefs the AMV theme will generate a wide range of other outputs including an impact evaluation, a summary report/typology, as well as blogs and other web content. These will require bespoke plans to promote the uptake of policy analysis and findings that are developed.

Future outputs will build on work undertaken thus far, and allow us to present a coherent body of work in new and innovative ways.

4 Global dissemination plan

Dissemination of theme outputs to a wider, global set of actors will allow access to, and uptake of, content by a range of users and potential 'influencing targets'.

The outputs will be available as PDF soft copies online on the IDS site, Open Docs repository and Eldis, with a dedicated static link (that links to the PDFs). Policy briefs will be printed and disseminated in hard copy. These different formats allow us to target different audiences using various means and are supplemented by the blogs, audio or visual products and news items prepared by the case study teams.

As well as country-specific stakeholders there are common audiences across all case studies that will be targeted with products from across the theme. These include:

- *General networks:* Policypointers; Relief Web.
- *Conflict and security networks:* Peace and Collaborative Development Network; Global Consortium on Security Transformation; IANSA.
- *Specific conflict NGOs:* International Alert; Saferworld; Small Arms Survey; Swiss Peace; Conciliation Resources; International Rescue Committee; Oxford Research Group; The Berghof Foundation; Peace Brigades International; Interpeace; Peace Direct.
- *Research/academic:* CRISE; Crisis States Research Centre; McGill University; GSDRC; Institute for Public Policy Research; EU Institute for Security Studies; Geneva Centre for Security Studies; SIPRI.
- *Bilateral/multilateral*: DFID *(particularly the Fragile States and Conflict Team)*; USAID; Irish Aid; SDC; NORAD; IDRC; DANIDA; FINIDA; WHO (UN – AVVP programme); OECD-DAC; UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery; GIZ; UNRCPD; UNICEF.
- *Development agencies:* Oxfam; ActionAid; Christian Aid; Quaker International
- *Philanthropic Foundations:* Ford Foundation; McArthur; Rockefeller; Mott; Hewlett-Packard; Gates.

In addition, IDS Central Communications has recently undertaken a number of targeted dissemination activities with outputs that explore conflict, security and violence themes. As such there are dedicated lists and established channels that can be exploited, for example:

- policy actors in Brussels and Westminster;
- NGO networks and groups (e.g. Bond conflict policy group);
- key (conflict) academics and researchers;
- active and influential civil society actors.

This strong crossover with current IDS research outputs will enable us to cross-reference and promote this theme's work and present a coherent body of evidence on particular issues and locales. We have also identified forthcoming work from IDS researchers where ongoing links and cross-referencing can be sustained e.g. a forthcoming Tomorrow Today report covering related issues in Sierra Leone and Kenya.

Standard dissemination channels include:

- Networks' Listservs; regular e-newsletters and websites (overview and key messages and website link and/or PDF).

- Mail outs to donors, NGOs, academics.
- Eldis, including the website; community site and Reporters.
- Blogs e.g. IDS Governance blog; the IDS site and Eldis site and community groups;
- Dissemination at events (workshops, conferences, etc.).
- IDS channels, including Yellow Monday; main site; intranet; Twitter; research fellows.
- DFID channels and website pages e.g. R4D.

5 Monitoring uptake and impact

The Impact Innovation team were involved in the development of outcome indicators in the process of drawing up the uptake strategies at the country level. They will continue to engage with the theme by designing appropriate methods to capture and monitor the outcomes identified for the various audiences and to learn from the process in order to inform the future strategies developed for forthcoming products and cases.

This will be complemented by data gathered through the monitoring process of the Accountable Grant more broadly, which will be in line with the log frame indicators developed for each theme.

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