

MONOGRAPHS IN THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT

No. 19

**AN EVALUATION OF
THE INTEGRATED RURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME**

Mohammad A. Qadeer

with the assistance of

Mohammad Rashid
Iftikharullah Babar



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FOREWORD

This study is the most comprehensive evaluation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme of Pakistan since its inception in 1972. The government had assigned a critical role to this programme in its overall rural development policy. As an objective assessment of the programme, the present study should be of immense interest to the policy-makers in Pakistan. The study should, however, attract a wider audience. The authors have evolved and applied a method of evaluation that can also be applied to other government programmes in Pakistan and other countries.

The methodology adopted in the study is simple but useful in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the programme in actual operation. Three steps in the evaluation technique need to be highlighted. First, the assumptions and objectives of the programme are analysed in detail. Criteria, both quantitative and qualitative, against which the working of the programme is evaluated are formulated. Second, primary data from selected *Markazes* are collected to assess the degree to which the programme objectives were realized. Finally, the effects of the programme on broader social goals such as people's participation, streamlining of delivery of public services to rural areas and increasing agricultural productivity are examined.

The findings of the study are many. These are competently summarized by the authors in the concluding chapter. Three general points need some emphasis, however. First, there is a widespread demand from rural communities for increased supplies of inputs and public services. Second, there is a need for co-ordination among government departments serving the rural community and availability of adequate resources for funding the increased supplies of inputs and public services. Third, lack of co-ordination among government departments and various public groups and shortage of resources inevitably leads to corruption and inequitable distribution of the benefits from the programme. The authors have found some evidence of these tendencies in the implementation of the programme.

The policy implications of the analysis are many. The programme needs increased funding and a general government support. There is a need for greater local level planning and for providing safeguards to assure the flow of benefits for the poorer segments of the rural population.

Keeping in view the limitations of data, the authors have done a commendable job. The study is a valuable addition to the literature on rural development in Pakistan.

M. L. QURESHI
Director

Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Islamabad

PREFACE

For countries like Pakistan, national development is synonymous with improvements in rural living conditions and modernization of rural production systems. Rural development has come to be regarded as an essential element of national development strategies in the third world. At any point in time one or other rural development programme is sweeping the developing countries often under considerable promotional efforts of international agencies and aid donors. In the early sixties, community development and self-help programmes were the favoured solutions of rural poverty. By the late sixties, rural works programmes were inspiring hopes of rural uplift. Presently, the Integrated Rural Development Programme has become the centrepiece of rural development strategies. Each programme is initially hailed as a 'break-through' in rural development and is greeted with optimism. On implementation, the optimism begins to fizzle out, though protestations about relevance of a programme continue. The demise of a programme is usually signalled by the talk of a new one. Pakistan's programmes of V-AID, Rural Works and agricultural development have successively followed, more or less, the same pattern.

It is not the rhythm of the rise and fall of individual programmes that is disconcerting. Rather, the relative insensitivity of a latter programme to experiences of an earlier one is the source of disappointment. It causes much waste of efforts through the repetition of mistakes and leads to the loss of public credibility about rural development. There are complex institutional and political reasons for the persistence of this pattern through a succession of programmes. From a planning point of view, one of the most obvious reasons is lack of systematic evaluations of these programmes. Not many of the bygone rural development programmes were adequately evaluated and there were few, if any, feed back mechanisms to monitor their outcomes. In view of this experience, it is imperative that the Integrated Rural Development Programme may be continually evaluated, so that appropriate measures could be taken to maintain the momentum of the programme. This study is an attempt to evaluate the programme.

This study is a concurrent evaluation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme in two provinces of Pakistan. Its basic aim is to assess the effectiveness of the Markaz concept as an instrument of the programme. After identifying significant programme objectives, the study proceeds to assess the degree to which these objectives are being realized. It also examines effects of the realization of objectives on broader social goals such as raising agricultural production, increasing people's participation and facilitating the delivery of public services to rural areas.

The study is based on a thorough examination of programme assumptions and objectives. It draws upon provincial programme data from

Punjab and the N.W.F.P. This information is complemented by in depth field studies of Markazes in each of the two provinces. The study was, essentially, completed in summer 1976. There are a number of methodological assumptions and procedures which underlie this study. Those have been discussed in Appendix-D. The findings of this study deserve to be taken into account by policy makers. It can be said that they are based on limited data from two Markazes, and therefore are not generalizable to the whole programme. Yet they point out such tendencies which if found pervasive should prompt a thorough re-examination of the premises and operations of the programme. This study has been sponsored by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. I worked as a short-term consultant in the Institute. Although this study constitutes a part of the Institute's on-going work on developmental issues, the opinions expressed herein are my responsibility. I am very grateful to have had this opportunity. There are a number of agencies and individuals who have contributed to the success of this project. I can only briefly mention some.

The encouragement and advice of Mr. M. L. Qureshi, the Director of the Institute, sustained this study through all the phases. I am very grateful for all his efforts. Many colleagues at the Institute helped resolve methodological and conceptual issues and facilitated my task intellectually as well as emotionally. Dr. Sarfraz K. Qureshi must be singled out for the support and help. Without the assistance of Mr. Iftikharullah Babar and Mohammad Rashid, the study would perhaps not have come to fruition. I am also indebted to the Advisory Research Committee of the Queen's University, Kingston, Canada and to the School of Urban and Regional Planning for the travel grant which enabled me to spend three months in Pakistan.

Officials of the federal and provincial ministries of rural development were very co-operative. The directors of integrated Rural Development Programmes in Punjab and the N.W.F.P. generously extended help in data collection. The Staff at Battal and Manawala Markazes not only patiently put up with long interviews but also helped in the field work. Their hospitality was heart warming. Twelve weeks of separation from my family was a hardship for all of us which my wife and children bore for my sake. Friends in Islamabad made my stay pleasant and comfortable. To all of them I owe gratitude.

All of us had sort of vested interests in this study. Only the people of Battal and Manawala areas had no perceivable benefits from such an undertaking. Yet they opened their hearts and homes to us. By submitting to our long interviews and by treating us as house guests, they reaffirmed human warmth and concern. To them this study is dedicated.

March 1977

MOHAMMAD A. QADEER
Kingston, Ontario,
Canada

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Chapter I

THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF THE INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

(a) Rural Development in Pakistan

Rural poverty and stagnation are the most intractable problems confronting the third world. An overwhelming majority of the people in the third world lives in rural areas eking out subsistence living from traditional agricultural systems. Without radical changes in rural economies and social structures, these countries will not be able to fulfill their ambitions to be prosperous and modern nations. The challenge of development lies in rural areas. This fact has been discovered only recently by the international community [World Bank, 1975].

Pakistan is a predominantly rural country. According to the 1972 census, about 74 percent of Pakistan's population was living in rural areas. Pakistan's economic development depends upon her success in improving rural living conditions and increasing agricultural production. This realization has remained, more or less at the forefront of national consciousness, though there have been temporary relapses from this realization. From *Dehat Sudhar* to Village Agricultural and Industrial development, popularly known as *V-AID*, a series of public programmes bear testimony to the national desire, if not commitment, to uplift the rural sector. Generally, these programmes have been disappointing. This does not suggest that rural areas have remained untouched by modern institutions and technology or they have not experienced any change. Over the past two decades, they have acquired new technologies and activities, shed off many old customs and beliefs and imbibed political consciousness. In talking about the disappointment of the rural development programmes, we are referring to failures encountered in quickening the pace of development through public programmes. What are the reasons for these failures? Answering this question will take us far afield from our present interest. There are few systematic studies of the past efforts to provide definitive answers. Some impressionistic accounts are available in official publications.¹

Presently, our primary interest lies in the current efforts of rural development popularly known as the Integrated Rural Development Programme. This study is an attempt to determine the effectiveness of this

¹Following are some commonly mentioned reasons for the failure of past rural development programmes in Pakistan:

- (a) Lack of co-ordination among government departments.
- (b) Single purpose programmes. (c) Untrained staff.
- (d) Failure to develop grass root leadership. (e) Domination by influentials and
- (f) Lack of supervision, research and evaluation public officials.

(Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Under Developed Areas) *Integrated Rural Development Programme—a revolutionary approach* March 1973, p.3.

programme. It is an attempt to find out whether the expectations associated with the current programme are likely to be fulfilled.

(b) The Integrated Rural Development Programme: Concept and Approach

The Integrated Rural Development Programme (to be referred as IRDP here on) is being acclaimed as a revolutionary approach. The United Nations Organization has become a strong protagonist of the IRDP and its member organizations have been active in promoting such programmes in the third world [United Nations, 1971]. Even if some allowance is given for the usual enthusiasm that the promoters of a new international concepts (and programmes) initially imbibe, there still remains some basis for regarding this programme differently from the earlier ones. It has some innovative features derived from the lessons of the earlier rural development efforts.

Programmes of rural development can be categorized into three types. First, there are the rural social reconstruction efforts with emphasis on social reforms and popular education. Such programmes are based on the assumption that rural backwardness is attributable to rigid social organization, traditional values and general unawareness. The second types of programmes are essentially agricultural extension efforts which presume that ignorance about modern agricultural practices is the basic cause of low production and consequently, rural poverty. The third set of programmes postulates that the development of physical and social infrastructures in rural areas is a pre-requisite for the modernization of rural areas. Of course, there have seldom been any programmes purely of one type. In practice, a certain degree of hybridity of programme is the rule. Yet the primary focus of the earlier rural development programmes have been on one or the other types mentioned above. By and large, those were single purpose, unisectoral programmes. The Integrated Rural Development Approach takes a comprehensive and systematic view of rural life.

Proceeding from a thorough understanding of the needs and problems of a rural area, this approach calls for simultaneous and concentrated efforts to develop the strategic sectors. Synchronizing in time and space of various sectoral programmes does not constitute an integrated approach. A programme qualifies to be called integrated if it has an interlinked and complementary set of activities whose combined effect constitutes a critical mass to jolt out a rural system from a low level equilibrium. Undoubtedly, few programmes, fashionably labelled as IRDP, meet this criterion. Be as it may, the IRDP is not an administrative concept; rather it is an analytical approach based on a systematic view of rural life. A few other elements have come to be associated with the concept of IRDP. To be meaningful, a programme of rural development must promote the welfare of the majority of the rural population which happens to be poor. Unless

programmes are specifically designed to serve interests of the poor, they are not likely to bring about a quantum change in rural living conditions.

This realization has emerged after uncertain results of twenty years of development planning. The World Bank has gone so far as to define rural development to be a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people—the rural poor [World Bank 1975, p. 3]. In the same vein, it has been realized that peoples participation in the decision making process for the development of an area is a necessary condition for the success of a programme. This realization has introduced the dimension of public participation in the concept of IRDP.

The IRDP is the latest addition to the catalogue of rural development programme. Its recentness is not a guarantee of its perfection. Undoubtedly, it incorporates experiences gained from the community development, the rural works and other similar programmes. These lessons constitute the empirical underpinning of the programme. The systematic outlook, comprehensive and multisectoral approach, specification of the target population, emphasis on people's participation and local leadership, spatial focus and priority given to the theoretically well grounded concepts. They lend credibility to the IRDP. Yet the programme is not free from conceptual inconsistencies.

The integrated rural development approach combines disparate postulates. Some are programmatic rules of thumb and others are abstract goals).² Its theoretical inconsistencies would have been a minor fault (of concern to theoreticians only) if they had not been accompanied by operational confusion. There is a sense of abandon in the use of the term Integrated Rural Development.

Almost, every variety of rural programme is being proffered under the rubric of the IRDP, as can be observed from Lale's account [Lale 1975:

²For example the following list of elements of the IRDP illustrates how specific means (items *iii, vi, vii*) are mixed with all embracing ends and platitudinous goals (items *i, ii, iv, v* etc.)

IRDP consists of:

- (i) A comprehensive approach responding to the problems of rural poverty and dualism ;
- (ii) a set of goals based on rational analysis of needs and including social and economic bases of well being and progress ;
- (iii) a pre-requisite agrarian reorganization, if necessary, that provides land tenure and land institutional framework suitable for labour intensive agriculture;
- (iv) rural action through area projects including proper mix of activities for each local area ;
- (v) regional approaches in defining project areas and making long term plans ;
- (vi) emphasis on building popular institutions, and especially co-operatives;
- (vii) administrative arrangements that foster good local government and popular participation.

Lawrence B. Moore. "The concept of integrated rural development—An international view" Government of Pakistan, UNDP and FAO : The International Seminar on *Integrated Rural Development*. Lahore November 3—10, 1973, p. 7.

pp.11]. These conceptual and operational ambiguities have prompted re-labelling of many existing programmes. Rutton describes these conceptual limitations in an apt line : IRDP "is an ideology in search of a methodology or technology" [Rutton 1975, p. 4].

The IRDP has been inspired by the systems approach. It professes to view a rural area as a socio-economic system and attempts to identify strategic elements around which appropriate programme might be formulated. This is a sound principle but it has seldom been followed. There are methodological difficulties of this approach that tax the patience of action oriented promoters of the IRDP. There is a wide gap between its Philosophy and practice. Almost every description of the IRDP dwells on its philosophy and has little to offer by way of operational measures. Many a times the IRDP means little more than a catalogue of sectoral programmes. A programme designed as a whole with the appreciation of sectoral linkages is a rarity.

At the plane of broader goals of rural development, some other limitations of the IRDP are revealed. Ultimately, the success of a rural development programme lies in generating a dynamic, prosperous and just rural society. Inequitable power structures and traditional economic organizations are the primary obstacles militating against the realization of these goals. To remove these obstacles, bold political and social measures are needed. The IRDP is essentially technocratic in spirit and approach. It is a gradualist's conception of rural development to be promoted through reformed existing institutions. Almost a quarter century of experience in promoting rural development indicates that incremental changes are appropriated by the traditionally powerful for their personal advantage and class benefit. The critical mass effect that the IRDP aspires to precipitate is seldom obtained through increased and concentrated inputs in conventional sectors. The IRDP needs a political strategy as much as a bureaucratic mechanism. And the former is precluded by the fact that the IRDP is conceived within the confines of the traditional roles of technocrats.

The conceptual and methodological limitations of the IRDP revealed by this critique remain a matter of intellectual quibbling as long as one is discussing the concept in abstract. An examination of a specific programme is necessary to determine the validity and relevance of the points raised above. Therefore, we turn our attention to the IRDP in Pakistan.

(c) The IRDP in Pakistan

The IRDP was formally launched in July 1972. In philosophy and timing it bears close resemblance to similar programme of other third world countries. Two types of influences seem to have shaped Pakistan's IRDP.

The primary influences are indigenous. Lessons of the V-AID and Rural Work Programmes underscored the desirability of a multi-sectoral and comprehensive approach. Shadab project has demonstrated that agricultural production can be raised by concentrated and co-ordinated application of fertilizer, seed, credit and advice. Comilla experiment followed by Daudzai pilot project have affirmed the viability of local groups planning and executing developmental decisions with the advice and support of public functionaries. The IRDP has rationalized these ideas and established an institutional framework for their implementation.

Pakistan's experiences have been reaffirmed by events in other countries. In early 70's there was a virtual explosion of ideas prompted by failures of the previous rural development programmes [Fisher 1975, pp 36-37]. These ideas converged into the then, new approach of Integrated rural Development. This international reaffirmation of Pakistan's thinking about evolving an integrated approach to rural development gave further impetus to the programme. An International Seminar on Integrated Rural Development jointly organized by the Government of Pakistan, F.A.O. and U.N.D.P. in November 1973 brought these two strands together.

Pakistan has devised a unique strategy to implement IRDP. Markaz is the key feature of this strategy. We will discuss the concept of Markaz, later; presently we shall analyze the objectives of the programme.

(d) Objectives of Pakistan's IRDP

There is a remarkable unanimity of views about the goals of rural development. Increasing agricultural production, diversifying the village economy, creating employment opportunities, improving rural living conditions and ensuring an egalitarian social structure appear on almost every list of rural development goals. Pakistan's programme have also been drawn with the same ends in view.

In looking for an authoritative statement of the IRDP objectives, one finds slightly differing versions in various publications. The objectives of N.W.F.P's programme are differently articulated and ordered than the goals attributed to Punjab's efforts. The federal government position is, perhaps, reflected in various papers prepared by officials of the Ministry of Rural Development.³ This search for a definitive statement of objectives is not a mere ideal curiosity. It was meant to provide criteria to evaluate the programme.

³There are some variations even in the statements of federal officials; for example, compare Sadiq Malik "Genesis of Rural Development in Pakistan". *Integrated Rural Development Review*. December 1975, Vol. 1; Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Rural Development p. 8. and Sadiq Malik "Integrated Rural Development Programme in Pakistan". Report of the *International Seminar on Integrated Rural Development*. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Rural Development. November 1973, p. 191.

Although a uniform statement of objectives could not be found, a set of common objectives could be abstracted from various accounts. These objectives have been divided in two categories; namely, (i) Ultimate and (ii) Instrumental. The former are assumed to be the end states towards which rural areas should be directed, whereas the latter are considered to be the operational goals whose realization will lead towards those end states. For evaluating the programme the instrumental objectives are more useful, because they can be turned into evaluational criteria. Chart I presents the two types of programme objectives.

Chart I
Objectives of the IRDP

<i>Ultimate*</i>	<i>Instrumental</i>
(A) Increasing economic growth and food production.	A1. Introduction of modern agricultural methods among small and medium farmers.
	A2. Credit, banking, transportation, marketing, storage facilities for small farmers.
	A3. Provision of farm planning and management services.
(B) Attaining satisfactory level of living.	B1. Provision of service infrastructure to deliver social and economic inputs.
	B2. Improvement of basic physical and social infrastructure.
(C) Reduction of migration from rural to urban area.	C1. Creation of labour intensive off-farm job opportunity.
	C2. Spreading urban amenities into countryside.
(D) Creation of viable local institutions and group dynamics.	D1. Popular participation in rural development.
	D2. Encouragement of local leadership.
	D3. Provision for co-operative farming.

Deduced from Sadiq Malik: "Genesis of Rural Development in Pakistan". *ibid* p. 8.

*Ultimate objectives might also be called national goals, whereas instrumental objectives may be equated with the programme purposes or outputs.

The emphasis on economic production is evident from the commitment to raise agricultural output and to diversify employment opportunities. The significance given to social development is reflected by instrumental objectives promising development of community infrastructure, spreading of urban amenities and mobilization of collective action. The decision making process has been given a place of prominence through the normative requirements of encouraging participatory decision making processes. By specifying medium and small farmers as the target group the programme also establishes an implicit welfare criterion. How these objectives have been incorporated in the concept of Markaz which is the main vehicle to implement the IRDP, we shall, now, explore.

(e) Markaz Concept and Programme

Markaz is a geographical as well as an organizational concept. Geographically, it is a designated area (sub-region) extending over the territory commanded by 50 to 60 villages which is subjected to intensive public and private developmental efforts. Designation of an area as a Markaz makes it an organizational and administrative unit of the programme and makes it eligible for IRDP allocations.⁴

Administratively a Markaz is a field unit of the IRDP establishment. A village or small town is chosen as the centre of the Markaz area. The Markaz centre is envisaged to provide a spatial focus for the area and is meant to perform an integrative role by bringing together not only the officials of the rural development department but also functionaries of other nation-building departments literally under one roof in a building called a Markaz complex. The Markaz centre has a key role in the development of a Markaz area. It is meant to be a growth point which through commercial and industrial development would become a service town (Agroville) for the Markaz area. Incidentally, by now the dual referent of the term Markaz would have been obvious. It is used to refer to a Markaz area as well as to its central place (Markaz Centre).

A Markaz has a two-tiered organizational structure, both in administrative and local government terms. A Markaz is envisaged to become a unit of local government, but in the absence of elected local councils, the IRDP has promoted multipurpose village co-operative societies, to institutionalize people's involvement in development decisions. These societies constitute the base of local institutions and the Markaz Council forms

⁴The official definition of the Markaz concept is given in the following quotation. "To select a production area comprising 50 to 60 villages mostly with small and medium size farmers with a view of improving their socio-economic status by intensive rural development programme with an initial thrust to increase productivity by providing technical guidance, supervised credit, supply of inputs, machinery on hire, storage and marketing facilities etc., based on sound physical, organizational and institutional infrastructure, by intensification and commercialization of agriculture through a social co-operative system under total approach". Government of Pakistan: *Pakistan's Concept*. 1973.

the second tier. The organization of the Integrated Rural Development Department is similarly drawn. A project Manager is the executive head of the IRDP in the Markaz area. His staff includes co-operative, engineering and agriculture specialists. They help a project manager to organize and advise village co-operative societies and to perform various technical functions. The lower tier of Markaz functionaries is formed by development assistants in Punjab, Secretaries of *Dehi committee* in Sind and *Dehi karkun* in Baluchistan.

It is, also, evident from this description that the organization of the IRDP varies from province to province. The IRDP lays great emphasis on concentration of public services and know-how in Markaz areas. In this task, it relies on the nation-building departments to provide the necessary services and guidance. A project manager acts as a co-ordinator of their activities.

From various descriptions of Markaz, a set of basic elements of the Markaz concept can be abstracted.⁵ These elements can be assumed to constitute the core of Markaz as an operational programme. Following are brief descriptions of these elements:

- (a) *Centrality*: It is a basic constituent of the Markaz concept. By concentrating public offices and commercial establishments at the centre, Markaz helps integrate these functions. The centre is meant to provide an urban focus for the Markaz area and act as a growth point to spread modern technology, institutions and practices.
- (b) *Integration of Public and Private Services*: By designating the Markaz as a unit of development administration, the delivery of public services is channelled through it. By inducing public (and private) bodies to post their representatives at a Markaz and by assigning co-ordinative functions to the project manager, the programme hopes to bring about the desired integration of services.
- (c) *Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs*: Given a predominant role of agriculture in rural economy, special emphasis has been laid on increasing the agricultural output and incomes. The Markaz concept incorporates the notion of simultaneous and concentrated application of inputs such as credit, seed, fertilizer, insecticide, advice, storage and marketing, etc.
- (d) *Organization and Mobilization of People*: The Markaz specifically prescribes a participatory decision making process. This

⁵These elements have been deduced from the objectives of Markaz in NWFP and Punjab. See NWFP Department Local Government *PCI. Rural Development in NWFP 1975-1980* January 1975 and Directorate of Integrated Rural Development *Review of Progress 1972-75* Lahore, Punjab.

element has been institutionalized in the two-tiered structure of co-operative societies.

- (e) *Stimulation of Social Awareness and Training of Local Leaders:* This element is incorporated in the institution of extension and adult education and is institutionalized in the local leaders' training programme.
- (f) *Improving Living Conditions:* The Markaz concept recognizes the significance of better health, education and communication facilities. By laying emphasis on physical infrastructure development, Markaz provides a framework for this element of the concept.
- (g) *Specified Target Population:* The Markaz concept specifically aims to improve the socio-economic status of the medium and small farmers. The markaz concept combines strands of various theoretical and programmatic approaches, e.g., rural development approach, notions of growth point and postulates of regional planning particularly the strategy of promoting central places as regional foci, and philosophy of community development. Its eclecticism is both a strength and a weakness. The strength lies in its multi-sectoral and comprehensive outlooks which have been translated into sophisticated operational measures. On the other hand, there is a lack of focus and coherence in the concept which is likely to generate contradictions in the implementation of the programme.⁶

The Markaz concept discussed above has been operationalized differently by the four provinces. Each province adopted the concept to suit its institutional and physical conditions. Punjab's Markaz concept has been derived from Shadab pilot project. It lays emphasis on concentrating and co-ordinating agricultural extension services at Markaz Centre and promoting their use through persuasion and increased supply. The N.W.F.P. has adopted Daudzai model as the basis of her Markaz programme. Daudzai pilot project evolved a people-oriented approach in which public functionaries act as organizers, advisors and trainers of local leadership and the village co-operative associations assume planning and implementation functions. Daudzai model allows building of roads, irrigation channels and other public works through local initiative and includes provision of public funds for such projects. We will be discussing these models extensively in respective case studies. Presently the point of this description is that there are variations in the operational programmes of the four

⁶Somewhat similar criticism was voiced by participants in the international seminar at Lahore. Food and Agricultural organization: *Report on the International Seminar on Integrated Rural Development*. November 73.

provinces. The elements identified earlier, through, have been incorporated to varying degrees in all provincial programmes. For our purposes these seven elements serve as evaluational criteria.

(f) Programme Evaluation: Methodological Issues

The term evaluation has a deceptive familiarity. It appears to be a simple act of assessing a condition or an outcome according to established norm. Its complexities surface when these steps are consciously carried out and the judgements thus derived have to be objectively defined.

Broadly, programme evaluation can be defined as an act of measuring the performance of a programme (or project) against its promise. This process consists of three steps:

- (i) Measurement of performance or output.
- (ii) Judging outputs against stated objectives and/or standards.
- (iii) Assessing the changes brought about by the realization of objectives.

Each step is entangled in methodological problems. Programme outputs often turn out to be intractable if the rule of distinguishing between caused and coincidental effects is applied in observing and measuring them. Project analysts call this "with" and "without" rule. Mere "before" and "after" comparisons on selected indices do not prove that observed changes were caused by a programme. Rarely can one find conditions conducive to the observance of this rule.

Programmes forms a small segment of a stream of social and economic developments and it is seldom possible to establish adequate controls to isolate their effects. The second best solution to this problem is to ensure that the acclaimed results logically follow the programme effects. Construction of valid indices of change, quantification of observations and obtaining time series data, etc. are familiar problems of social measurement which also plague programme evaluation.

Judging outcome of a programme against some predetermined criteria is the second step in programme evaluation. It is a normative analysis which depends on the sensitivity of criteria. This raises a question about the nature and source of criteria. Normally criteria are derived from objectives. But this statement again begs the question. Programme objectives are vague and often incapable of yielding precise measures of their fulfilment. Thus, an evaluator has to understand conceptual and contextual basis of avowed objectives to deduce criteria. Finally, an evaluation should throw some light on the intended and unintended consequences of a project or programme on the system at large.

Another complication arises from the hierarchical structure of objectives. Programme objectives are linked to sectoral objectives which in turn dovetail towards social goals such as welfare, justice, growth etc. An evaluator has to establish the level of objectives by which outcomes will be judged.⁷ He can employ programme or sectoral or national objectives as criteria. This is a crucial methodological decision. Reliance on low level programme objectives as evaluational criteria fails to provide judgements about the social worthiness of a programme. Such an evaluation often results in the proverbial situation of counting trees but missing the forest, whereas higher order objectives may be so far removed from a programme that its impact (on them) would be barely detectable.

These methodological problems are dealt according to the nature of a programme and the purpose of evaluation. If the inputs and outputs of a programme can be measured quantitatively, then cost-effectiveness or cost/benefit type of analysis can be used with good results. Otherwise, logical analysis and iterative procedures can be applied to measure and judge programme performance. Such a procedure is outlined in Diagram I. The method outlined in this diagram suggests that programme outputs will be evaluated on performance criteria deduced from its objectives. The findings from this first round of evaluation are then further examined in the light of sectoral objectives or to uncover links between programme performance and social goals. It is a logical analysis which attempts to place the results of a programme in a broader context.

Positions taken on these methodological issues are also determined by the purpose and timing of an evaluation. A study can be undertaken to assess effectiveness of a programme or to determine its feasibility or to diagnose its problems. Similarly it can be ex-ante concurrent or ex-post to a programme. And timing of a study itself is indicative of its purpose.

In this section we have set down the basic parameters of an evaluational study. The specific features of our study on these parameters will be discussed in the next section.

(g) Scope and Method of Study

Almost every five years or so a new catchy programme sweeps through the halls of international agencies raising hopes to revolutionize rural areas but making little dent in rural poverty and misery. When one idea runs out its course another one arises to sustain planners' optimism. In early 60's Community Development was eulogized as a panacea for rural ills. Now one seldom hears of it. Today Integrated Rural Development

⁷There are two schools of thought about what constitutes an appropriate level of objectives. One holds that evaluation should stay close to the explicit objectives of a programme, while the other advocates appraising even national goals. O.E.C.D. *The Evaluation of Technical Assistance*. Paris 1969, p. 19.




Diagram 1

is the inspiration for hope. Will the cycle repeat itself? This is a depressing thought, but it deserves a fair-minded and objective investigation.

This study aims to evaluate the IRDP in Pakistan. As Markaz is the primary instrument of implementing the programme, the evaluation for all practical purposes will determine the effectiveness of this concept. It is not the purpose of this study to pass judgement about the success or failure of the programme. Rather it is to observe the programme in operation and assess its viability. The intent is to identify strengths and weaknesses of the programme. It is a diagnostic study meant to provide a feedback to promoters of the programme. This objective is all the more rele-

vant, because the study is being conducted concurrently with the programme.⁹ This study addresses itself to two broad questions:

- (a) Is Markaz fulfilling the functions assigned to it?
- (b) How have the people experienced the Markaz programme?
What benefits or difficulties do people perceive in this programme?

The first question requires obtaining detailed information about the accomplishments of Markazes from official sources. For example, it means collecting data about the numbers of co-operative societies formed, amounts of loans advanced and seeds distributed or public works schemes completed. These data are treated as indices of accomplishments.


To answer the second question, two in-depth case studies of Markazes, one each in N.W.F.P. and Punjab provinces, have been prepared. Two interview schedules were designed, incorporating questions about seven earlier identified dimensions of respective (provincial) Markaz concepts. These were used to interview representative community informants in four sampled villages of each Markaz area. These data have been analyzed and examined in reference to the objectives of the programme. The latter serve as evaluational criteria.

In the preceding sections of this chapter, the assumptions and conceptual framework of this study have been extensively discussed. To present an overall picture of the conceptual framework of this study these findings have been consolidated in Chart II.

The intended programme outputs (Col. III of Chart II) of a Markaz are taken to be indices of performance. For each of these indices, data have been collected. These data will be analyzed and assessed according to the criteria inherent in the element of Markaz concept (Column II of Chart II). The elements expressed in interrogative form serve as criteria. For example, we will judge the actual postings of departmental staff on the criteria on of whether this activity has promoted centrality in the Markaz area. As centrality itself is an expression of the objective to introduce modern agricultural practices, the findings from the above procedure will be further analyzed and assessed in terms of their contribution to those objectives Col. I of Chart II). These procedures will yield the necessary judgements about the effectiveness of Markaz as an instrument of the IRDP programme.

⁹The need for evaluation and feed-back studies was stressed by the members of the International Seminar in Lahore. See F.A.O. *Op. Cit.* p-30.

Chart II



Chapter II

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB

(a) Introduction

The Punjab's IRDP was bred in Shadab pilot project of Lahore tehsil. Its objectives, organization and procedures were initially worked out in the project area.¹ Within a year of its establishment (August 1971) the Shadab model was adopted for a province wide programme of Integrated Rural Development.

The main thrust of the IRDP in the Punjab is to improve agricultural production.² Its short term objectives envisage organization of co-operatives, preparation of production plans, delivery of seed, fertilizer and credit and construction of storage facilities. In the long run the scope of the IRDP is to be extended to such activities as farmers' training, establishment of feeder markets, development of agro-industries, low cost housing etc. The programme objectives are a curious mixture of specific organizational proposals (e.g. storage facilities) and philosophical goals (cultural self-reliance). Generally objectives merely spell-out institutional arrangements to implement the programme thus emphasizing means rather than ends.

The emphasis on means as objectives has bearing on evaluational procedures. On the one hand if achievements are to be measured against the given programme objectives then one would end up listing the organizations and institutions established under the programme. On the other a search for appropriate measures of programme outputs would lead one into the uncertain terrain of guessing the intents and purposes of the programme. Our methodological position on these issues was outlined in the first chapter. We have identified seven programme dimensions and a set of instrumental objectives to assess the effectiveness of the programme.

The influence of the Shadab model is also visible in the organizational set up of the IRDP. A Markaz is the basic organizational unit of the programme. It consists of an area office headed by a project manager (usually an agriculture graduate) who supervises a team of 5 to 10 development assistants (also agriculture graduates), 2-6 co-operative inspectors and an occasional engineering assistant. Each development assistant is assigned to a union council or an equivalent number of villages. The primary role of a development assistant is that of an extension agent.

¹Compare programme objectives given in Directorate of Integrated Rural Development Punjab "Review of Progress July 1972-March 1975. Lahore (Undated) pp 1-2 with Shadab pilot project. *The mother institution of Integrated Rural Development Programme*. PP 4-5 Printed at Lahore Caxton Printing Press (Undated).

²The objectives of the IRDP are described in appendix A.

He persuades and advises farmers in the use of fertilizers, new varieties of seed and modern farming practices. With the assistance of co-operative inspectors, he organizes multi-purpose co-operative societies. Village co-operative societies are conceived as citizens' forums to identify local needs and to meet those needs through mutual help and governmental assistance. At the apex of the co-operative structure is the Markaz federation constituted by the representatives of village societies.

The project office at the Markaz centre is the hub of public and private developmental activities. It co-ordinates functions and programmes of various nation-building departments, mobilizes the local population for co-operative action and dispenses advice and materials to raise agricultural production. These are broadly the structural features of a Markaz. How it actually functions will be examined later.

Table 2-1

Budgetary Allocations in Punjab

Allocations	1972-73 (Rs.)	1973-74 (Rs.)	1974-75 (Rs.)	1975-76 (Rs.)
Total for all Markazes ..	1400202	3220167	6574673	4039491
No. of Markazes ..	19	37	37	37
Average per Markaz ..	73695	80032	177694	109175

Source: Directorate of the IRDP, Punjab.

(b) The Programme in Operation

By June 1976, there were 38 Markazes operating in the Punjab. Over a period of four years (since July 1972) the programme has been extended to all districts of the province. In the first year of the programme 19 markazes were established, approximately one in each district; by the third year the number of Markazes had double [see Appendix B].

The mean population (1972) of a Markaz area in Punjab was 134,592. On the average a Markaz includes 53 villages and extends over an area of 129,055 acres, about 200 sq. miles.

The budgetary allocations are an index of public commitment to a programme. On examining the IRDP on this index, it was found that

the mean budgetary allocation per year increased up to 1974-75 but it declined sharply in 1975-76. It is too early to conclude that some disenchantment with the programme has set in. But this trend deserves to be watched carefully (Table 2-1).

An average budgetary allocation of about Rs. 1.00 to 1.25 lakh per year for a Markaz barely meets staffing expenses. There are no funds to stock seed and fertilizer, to maintain a fleet of tractors or to carry out minor civil works. This situation has turned Markazes into co-ordinative and advisory agencies whose credibility depends on their persuasive capabilities.

(c) Supply of Agricultural Inputs

To arrange for the supply of improved seed and fertilizer, has been a major activity of the Markazes. The provincial Directorate lists these as major accomplishments of the programme and supports such claims with data about quantities of seeds and fertilizer distributed every year. From this data two ratio indices have been computed. One measures the amount of wheat seed distributed for each acre of land cultivated under wheat. The second expresses the ratio of fertilizer distributed to the total cultivated area [Appendix Table B-1]. Notwithstanding biases of data collection, the ratio of wheat seed to the cultivated area under wheat is a more reliable measure than the ratio of fertilizer to total cultivated area. The latter should be expressed in units of chemical nutrients. A weight measure of the quantity of fertilizer is a very crude index of the nutrient inputs. With these caveats about indices, it may be observed that the average ratio of wheat seed per acre of cultivated area in wheat was 0.25 mds. whereas the rule of thumb of 1 md. of seed per acre requires it to be 1.00. This suggests that Markazes supplied 25 percent of the needed seed on the average, though the performance of individual Markazes ranged from 1 to 75%.

Given the fact that most of the farmers rely on their own farm produced seed, supplying 25 percent of needed seed is a notable achievement.

The ratio of fertilizer per acre of cultivated land was 0.12 metric tons. Crude as it is, this index shows Markazes had become a major channel for the distribution of fertilizer.

It must be mentioned that the distribution policies were based on a "first come first served" principle and there were no individual quotas for farmers in a Markaz area. It, therefore, means that some farmers obtained all their needed supplies from Markaz and others got too little or none. All in all, it can be deduced from these observations that Markazes were supplying a substantial proportion of agricultural inputs

in respective areas, assuming the accuracy of our assumptions about the figures.³

(d) Co-operative Societies

In the absence of local government institutions, village co-operative societies have been organized to articulate people's needs, represent local interests in public bodies and mobilize financial resources to undertake development projects. They are also meant to serve as channels for disseminating information, advice and modern farming practices among Markaz populations. Paradoxically, these functions were compromised to some extent, by making co-operative societies subservient to the Provincial Co-operative Department. This step is likely to reduce Markaz co-operatives to savings and credit institutions which have a long history of failures. Presently, we will examine the scope of co-operatives in the provincial IRDP.

Table B-3 of the appendix presents Markaz wise data about number of organized and registered societies, ratios of share to working capital and averages of share and working capital per organized society. A table of provincial averages on these indices has been abstracted (Table 2-2).

Table 2-2

Co-operative Societies Organized Under the IRDP

No. of Markazes	Av. No. of Organized Societies per Markaz	Av. No. of Registered Societies per Markaz	Ratio of Share Working Capital	Av. Share Capital per Organized Society	Av. Working Capital per Organized Society
38	35	26	0.27	Rs. 1600	Rs. 5860

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, Punjab.

Although there is a wide variation (range 3 to 80) around the mean for the province, the overall average for the number of organized societies,

³There is some ambiguity about the figures from which these indices have been computed. It is not clear if the amounts of seeds and fertilizers mentioned refer to the totals distributed in Markaz areas by all agencies or if they refer strictly to the quantities distributed through Markazes. Generally it is the practice of the IRDP progress reports to include almost every development that might have occurred in a Markaz area, irrespective of who was responsible, for these achievements. Anyway in computing these indices, we have taken a charitable view of the Markazes' achievements and have assumed that the reported amounts of fertilizers and seed were strictly those distributed by Markaz offices.

35 per Markaz, is impressive. It reflects a fair degree of success in setting up new co-operative societies. That about 28 percent fall in the average number of co-operative societies between the organization and registration stages may be an indication of the attitude with which the Provincial Co-operative Department responded to the initiatives of the IRDP.

These societies seem to have limited resources. An average share capital of Rs. 1600 per society indicates a low level of local savings. With credit from the co-operative bank, societies resources are replenished to bring the average working capital to Rs 5860. Still, these are not adequate financial resources to undertake major developmental works. Seemingly, the IRDP has succeeded in organizing numerous co-operative groups, but has not been able to raise enough resources to make them organs of local development. They remain small credit institutions.

(e) Physical Infrastructure

The IRDP in Punjab does not have any provision for undertaking construction projects. A Markaz is conceived as a planning and co-ordinative unit which depends on the people's works programme to implement its physical development proposals. Supposedly markaz proposals will be given high priority in the Annual district Works Programmes. This assumption, seemingly, is not borne out by facts.

Table 2-3 shows that IRDP had made very little contribution in the development of rural infra-structure. About twelve miles of pacca road per Markaz or one village in a Markaz obtaining potable water do not indicate any quickening of the developmental pace. It is not unlikely

Table 2-3

Selected Indices of Physical Development

Areas	Length of Pacca road per Markaz	Length of Katcha road per Markaz	No. of villages electrified per Markaz	No. of villages provided with potable water per Markaz
All Markazes with one or more projects	12.6 miles	21.3 miles	5.4	1.2

Source: Directorate of the IRDP, Punjab.

that 1 village out of 53 (average of Markaz area) may be electrified or 1 in 53 provided with communal water supplies under Rural electrification and Water Supply programmes. The IRDP does not seem to have brought any special benefits in this regard.

(f) Co-ordination of Public Services

A Markaz is conceived as an administrative unit to bring together the expertise of various Nation Building Departments and forge a co-ordinated system of public programmes to help the development of the area. Posting of departmental representatives at a Markaz is a pre-requisite for the emergence of such a system. Using postings as an index of the co-ordinative effort, Table 2-4 has been constructed to reflect the IRDP's accomplishments.

Table 2-4 shows that two types of functionaries were posted more frequently. One, the representatives of agriculture related departments and second, newly formed departments which were opening field offices, e.g., Family Planning, and Social Welfare.

The entrenched and powerful departments such as Revenue, Education and Local Government did not attain even 50 percent representation at Markazes. Furthermore, it must be understood that posting of a functionary did not mean that he had been exclusively assigned to a Markaz area. Often it meant adding Markaz to an existing jurisdiction. How much did posted representatives respond to Markaz needs is a qualitative question. Some answers to it will be forthcoming in the case study.

This brief analysis of the structure and accomplishments of the Punjab's IRDP reveals that the programme is essentially supplementing the market and public channels for the supply of agricultural inputs. It seems to have inspired some popular confidence, in the beginning, which is evident from the success in organizing village co-operatives. Yet many institutional and resource constraints have also been revealed by this analysis. The annual reports of Markazes credit to the programme made accomplishments which were only peripherally influenced, if at all, by the programme. Rural areas are undergoing development through various sectoral programmes and secular market and social trends. Therefore, to claim every new school or tubewell in a Markaz area as the accomplishment of the programme is not a valid assumption. Very few of these so called accomplishments will pass the "with" and "without" test.

This foregoing review of provincial activities describes the strategy and operational thrust of the programme. It reveals little about the functioning of Markazes and leaves unanswered questions about the effectiveness of the programme. These topics will be pursued through the case study of a typical Markaz.

Case Study of Manawala Markaz

Manawala is the name of a small town located on the main highway connecting Lahore and Lyallpur. It is situated at about 44 miles from Lahore and 22 miles west of Sheikhpura. The Markaz established in this area has been named after the town which serves as the centre. The Markaz extends over an area of about 120 Sq. miles, organized in 9 Union Councils, 29 main villages and 90 sub-villages. This is the heartland of the irrigated Punjab. About 86 percent of the Markaz area is cultivatable commanded land (71236 acres) irrigated by canals and tubewells.

The Markaz was established in October 1972 and it has been operating for the last four years. It is not a pilot project where special attention and resources are invested. It is accessible from but not too near Lahore. These features commended this Markaz for our case study.

Two types of data were collected for this case study. One set of information pertained to the operations and achievements of the project. The Markaz office records and interviews with Markaz officials and representatives of other nation building departments were sources of this data. The second source of data was a formal field survey of community informants in four selected villages.⁴ Twenty two interviews were carried out in these villages on a predesigned interview schedule. [Appendix-E.] This interview schedule included questions on each of the seven elements of the Markaz programme. The interviewees were specifically requested to articulate community sentiments in response to questions and refrain from giving, merely, personal opinions. Thus these 22 interviews represent collective responses of various interest groups in these four villages. Data obtained through these interviews have been primarily used to assess the impact of the Markaz on the local population.

The respondent's occupations and social statuses are presented in Appendix Tables B-4 and B-5. Occupationally, the respondents represented a cross-section of rural community [Appendix Table B-4]. About thirty two percent were engaged in high income pursuits such as *arhat* in nearby towns, big land owners, etc. The same proportion represented middle level rural occupations such as teachers, *Imams* and medium farmers etc. Village shopkeepers, small farmers and non-agricultural labour

⁴This is a deliberately chosen technique. Given the communal and familistic structures of Pakistan villages, it was assumed that sampling various community interests by identifying and interviewing their representative will be a valid and economical way to obtain data.

In selecting respondents, care was taken to find representatives of various social groups in a village. They were repeatedly reminded that their responses should not necessarily reflect their personal opinions but should mirror feelings of their particular group/caste. The interviews were conducted in a group situation. Often the recorded responses were consensual opinions of the group. These group interviews of community informants are not to be treated as a sample of individual households [Also See Appendix D].

constituted 13 and 22 percent of the respondents respectively. The respondents were predominantly (50 percent) influentials in their respective clans or villages [Appendix Table B-5]. Another 31.8 percent were intermediate level leaders, such as *Imam Masjid*s, literate village shopkeepers, etc. This bias towards influentials among the respondents is contingent upon our interviewing approach. We sought out community and interest group leaders as informants of respective group feelings. Among the respondents were also office bearers and members of Markaz sponsored Co-operative Societies. These procedures have lent a bias in the selection of respondents. But this bias will be, if anything, favourable to the IRDP.

(i) *Centrality* : By concentrating public services and commercial facilities at the centre, a Markaz is expected to establish a growth point and produce the momentum for rural transformation. The town of Manawala was the centre of the Markaz area. Apart from the Markaz offices, it had a bus stop, a *bazar*, banks, a dispensary, a carpet weaving training centre and numerous offices of the nation building departments. Did these facilities and services make Manawala a central place for the sub-region? Table 2-5 sums up modal responses to a battery of questions about the places where people went to obtain certain goods and services 'before' and 'after' the establishment of the IRDP. Any significant change in these shopping patterns indicates the reordering of central places in the region.

Column I of the table lists a hierarchical order of goods and services. The rank order increases going down the column. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 reveals a noticeable shift towards Manawala for agricultural supplies. It emerges as the centre for extension services and credit, etc. These were the most vigorously pursued activities of the programme. Interestingly, a mild decentralizing tendency is also visible. For banking and fertilizer/seed distribution, Panwan, a small roadside market had emerged as a centre after the IRDP. This is an indication of a secular trend of expansion and filtering down of banks and seed depots. Overall, Manawala did not attract many central functions except services directly dispensed by the Markaz. This finding is further confirmed by responses to another question. Respondents were asked to name services for which the people had been going to Manawala both before and after the IRDP. Their responses indicate that (i) there was little change in the nature of activities for which Manawala served as the centre; (ii) the detectible change pertained to the IRDP related services [Appendix Table B-6].

(ii) *Integration of Services*: Assignment of departmental representatives to a Markaz is considered to be the first step in attaining integration of service. Out of 24 departments whose representatives were expected to be posted at Manawala, 8 (33 percent) had functionaries in the area before the IRDP, 6 (25 percent) did not assign any one and 10 (42 percent) posted their officials to cover the area after the establishment

of the Markaz. Among the latter were four banks, and the departments of Social Welfare, Population Planning, Food, Malaria Eradication and Small Industries. Of these, five are commercial corporations

Table 2-5
Shopping Places

Goods & Services	Places			
	Before IRDP		After IRDP	
1. Groceries, meat & vegetables	Village	68.2%*	Village	63.6%
2. Clothes	Village	63.6%	Village	63.6%
3. Shoes	Village	27.3%	Manawala	40.9%
	Manawala	27.3%		
4. Fertilizer/Seed ..	Manawala	45.5%	Panwan	59.1%
5. Mandi	Village	31.8%	Manawala	54.5%
6. Repair of Machinery	Not in vogue/ Not applicable	36.4%	Manawala	63.6%
7. Agricultural Credit ..	Sheikhupura	45.5%	Manawala	59.1%
8. Extension Services ..	Not known/ Not in Vogue	31.8%	Manawala	27.3%
9. Dispensary/Doctors Services	Village	54.5%	Village	31.8%
10. Bank	Sheikhupura	31.8%		
	Panwan	31.8%	Panwan	50.0
11. High School (Boys) ..	Nathuwala/ Moham- madpura	36.4%	Nathuwala/ Moham- madpura	36.4%
	& others		and others.	
	Manawala	36.4%		

Source : The Village Survey.

*Percentages are Modal responses for each item. For example the most common response to the question, where do people buy clothes, was village; which was mentioned by 63.6% of the respondents.

expanding their facilities all around and the rest are new departments fanning out in the country side. Thus, favourably responding agencies were primarily seeking new territories to extend their activities. On the other hand, there was a predominance of established and bureaucratically secure departments among those who did not post representatives at the Markaz, e.g., revenue, Highways, Education, etc. Obviously the IRDP did not carry much weight with the entrenched bureaucracies. Yet their responsiveness to people's needs is a prerequisite for rural development. It was repeatedly said in interviews that if there was to be any change in public institutions, it must begin with *patwaris*, irrigation overseers and tubewell operators.

Does posting of departmental representatives at a Markaz achieve integration? It is possible that physical proximity may induce co-ordination among departments. But the integration is essentially an institutional quality. It must be incorporated in the departmental procedures. Bureaucracies are notoriously jealous of their functional preserves. Mananwala's experience bears it out. The Markaz was extended some co-operation by other departments in the beginning. As a Markaz official put it, the initial co-operation was forthcoming as a result of uncertainty about the powers of the IRDP. For a while, it appeared that the IRDP might become a super department. Once this impression was dispelled, the interdepartmental co-operation slackened if not disappeared. Initially, the representatives of the nation building departments used to turn up at meetings called by the project manager. Of late, the meetings have fallen in disuse.

Table 2-6
Improvement in Availability of Goods and Services

Goods & Services	Yes		No	
	Number	Percent- age	Number	Percent- age
Seeds	14	63.6	8	36.4
Fertilizer	15	68.2	7	31.8
Agricultural Advice	10	45.5	12	54.5
Drinking Water	2	9.1	20	90.9
Agricultural Credit	12	54.5	10	45.5
Livestock Care	4	18.2	18	81.8
Irrigation Water	1	4.5	21	95.5
Medical clinic	1	4.5	21	95.5
Bank	17	77.3	5	22.7
Co-operative Society	8	36.4	14	63.6

Source : The Village Survey.

Even when a departmental representative was posted at Manawala, it did not mean that Markaz area was his only concern. Often the Markaz area was added to a pre-existing functional jurisdiction. Similarly Markaz priorities had little bearing on the departmental plans. The officials of nation building departments at Manawala indicated that they were guided by their respective departmental goals and Markaz figured very little in their work. Markaz had failed to bring down inter-departmental barriers. This is also evident from responses to a question about the improvements in the availability of services.

Table 2-6 shows that the major improvements were registered only in the supply of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, advice and credit. As we have discussed earlier, Markaz did play some part in increasing the supply of agricultural inputs. But equally important were general market trends of increased demand and supply of these factors. This conclusion is also borne out by respondents, explanations for the reported improvements.

An overwhelming majority of respondents (86.4 percent) thought that Markaz was not responsible for the increased availability of services (Table 2-7).

Table 2-7

Reasons for Change in the Availability of Services

Reasons	Number	Percentage
I. Initiative of Markaz ..	1	4.5
II. Factors other than Markaz ..	19	86.4
III. No change/negative change ..	2	9.1
Total:	22	100

Source : The Village survey.

All this evidence adds up to the conclusion that the Markaz had only integrated agricultural services. In this sector also its contribution consolidated gains which were already underway. The multisectoral integration of services escaped the IRDP.

(iii) *Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs* : Manawala Markaz initiated a number of activities to provide various agricultural inputs. Apart from distributing seed, fertilizers and tree saplings,

tractors and threshers were rented out, credit and advice were made available, and a *mandi* (market) committee was established in Manawala. There are two note worthy features of these efforts. One, these were mostly on going activities which Markaz conveniently took over. Second, the scale of these operations was small compared to the need as well as demand. This point is well illustrated by the fact that in two years of operations, tractors were rented out for 413 and 494 hours respectively. This effort contrasts with the fact that in one village alone 14 tractors were available for rent and those were being run profitably; such was the business. Renting of tractors by Markaz was neither an innovation nor a significant contribution toward unmet demand. A similar pattern is evident in the establishment of *Mandi* at Manawala. The proposal had been initiated long before the IRDP by a local influential who had a vested interest in subdividing his land for commercial development. Markaz's contribution was limited to writing a few supportive letters.

What we had observed earlier is again validated. Markaz performed supplemental functions. It took over some on-going activities. Its activities were not guided by any plan or strategy to provide simultaneity and concentration of agricultural services. They were reactive rather than innovative.

There were some essential agricultural inputs whose simultaneous availability was much in demand, irrigation water being the most obvious of those. The respondents expressed exasperation at the irregularity of water supply from canals and tubewells. Yet Markaz did not initiate any organized and planned effort to regulate the supply of this essential input. From the Markaz's activities, one does not discern any pattern of concerted and inter-related effort. This is why the Markaz's impact on agricultural production was marginal, at best.

Table 2-8 shows that the majority of respondents (54.8 percent) thought that wheat production had registered increases of 25 to 100%. On the contrary about 21 percent indicated that the production had decreased to varying degrees. These two apparently contradictory response reflect the paradoxical situation in which some villages were caught. In the same village, canal irrigated lands were very productive, whereas land watered by SCARP tubewells was almost barren due to brackish or irregular supplies.

Reasons given to explain the increase of the agricultural yield varied, but better seed and liberal use of fertilizer were said to be the primary factors in improving production (Table 2-9). Other inputs such as advice, co-operatives and credit were considered to be minor factors

in increasing the yield. On the other hand, the fall in the yield in some cases was attributed to the shortfall of irrigation water supply (Table 2-9). The note-worthy aspect of these explanations is that the IRDP was held to be a marginal factor in bringing about improvements or causing short falls.

Table 2-8
Change in Wheat Production

Change			Number	Percentage
Decrease upto 25%	2	9.1
Decrease 25% and above	3	13.7
No change	1	4.5
Increase upto 25%	3	13.7
Increase 25% and above	12	54.5
No Response	1	4.5
Total :			22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Table 2-9
Reasons for Change in Wheat Production

Reasons			Number	Percentage
Better Seeds and Fertilizer	11	50.0*
Better advice and organization	2	9.1
Better Water Supply	2	9.1
Due to IRDP initiated changes/Markaz induced improvements.	2	9.1
Decrease due to short fall in water supply	5	22.7
Other reasons	3	13.6

Source : The Village Survey.

*These are independent responses to separate questions. They do not add up to 100 percent.

(iv) *Organization and Mobilization of People* : The co-operative movement dates back to 1905 in Punjab. Its chequered history of inaction and mismanagement inspires little faith in its effectiveness. The IRDP relying on co-operative societies to mobilize people, generate resources and initiate collective action to solve area problems.

How are co-operatives functioning under the IRDP. Manawala area had 52 co-operative societies ante-dating the IRDP. Since the establishment of the Markaz, 51 have been organized under the programme. This is an impressive organizational effort in a short span of four years.⁵

Table 2-10

Co-operative Societies in Manawala

	Societies (No.)	Members (No.)	Share Capital per Society (Rs.)	Working Capital per Society (Rs.)
Co-operative Societies before IRDP.	52	2335	2480	22747*
Village Co-operatives sponsored by Markaz.	51	1786	1261	2130
Markaz Federation	1	15	3750	3750

Source : Markaz Office Manawala

*Includes one banking union with large working capital.

To examine the possibility that Markaz sponsored co-operative societies might be fairing better than the older institutions, comparative data about the two sets of co-operative societies is presented in Table 2-10. It shows that Markaz co-operative societies had less working and share capital, on the average, than the ones formed earlier. Similarly Markaz organized co-operative societies had fewer members per society (35) than the older ones (42). Add to these findings the fact that all village co-operatives were organized by Markaz in the early years of the project. In the period 1974-76, not single new one had been organized. From these observations a pattern is discernible. The Markaz was initially greeted with some enthusiasm, at least among some sections of the local population. It might have been inspired by expectations of gains from a new programme. Once the programme's identity and approach became known, the familiar apathy set in.

⁵There was evidence that some of these Markaz sponsored Co-operatives were really societies established earlier which had been rechristened by the Markaz.

To determine whether Markaz sponsored co-operative societies were functioning as mobilizers of people and promoters of local actions, the records of two village co-operatives, randomly chosen, were examined. In both cases, the meetings were held at four month intervals on the average, and the decisions recorded in the minutes were either procedural or advisory in nature. Over a period of two and a half years, for which records were available, resolutions were passed requesting the project manager to arrange for the supply of seed and fertilizer. There was no mention of any other need or proposal. This performance does not indicate a promising start for the Markaz organized co-operatives.

The question of the co-operative's effectiveness as pursued in the village survey. The respondents were asked to indicate if they knew about the existence and activities of a Markaz sponsored co-operative society in their villages.

Table 2-11 shows that very few respondents (22.7%) knew about a Markaz sponsored co-operative society, though a majority (68.2) percent mentioned co-operatives predating Markaz. Incidentally, three of the four sampled villages had Markaz organized co-operatives. These responses indicate that Markaz co-operatives have remained preserves of a few persons.

Table 2-11
Knowledge of Co-operative Society

Knowledge	Number	Percentage
Know of a Co-operative Society not affiliated with Markaz	15	68.2
Know of a Markaz Sponsored Society ..	5	22.7
Do not know of any	2	9.1
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

The activities of Markaz co-operatives were not much different from what rural co-operatives have been doing for a long time. Giving of loans was the only activity (of the co-operatives) mentioned by respondents. A battery of questions about the activities of co-operatives drew out barely any response. Respondents repeatedly said that co-operatives have done

nothing, except to give credit to members and occasionally distribute seed and fertilizer. These responses do not communicate the sense that co-operatives were people's associations to mobilize resources and undertake collective projects. So blase was the reaction to the mention of co-operatives, that only 36 percent of respondents could name a member of a co-operative society or had some idea of a society's activities [Appendix Table B-7].

(v) *Social Awareness and Local Leadership* : Rural development means raising people's consciousness about their rights, potentialities and developing local institutions to solve their problems. The IRDP incorporates numerous measures aimed at promoting local initiative and fostering indigenous leadership. Co-operative societies, model farmers and training of village leaders, are the more formalized forms of these measures. There are two levels at which people's awareness of Markaz can be observed: First their knowledge of the existence and purpose of the programme; Second, their understanding of and trust in the Markaz sponsored institutions to lead local development. To assess the first level of awareness respondents were asked: who knew about the Markaz in their villages. The modal response was that every body knew about the Markaz [Appendix Table B-8]. Undoubtedly Markaz programme was widely known. There was barely an information or communication gap. This fact itself is a testimony to people's awareness about what goes on in their area. This is further confirmed by the evidence presented in the Table below.

Table 2-12
Acquaintance of Markaz Officials

Response	Number	Percentage
Can not identify any official or know of their visit.	5	22.7
Familiar with officials but unaware of their visits.	1	4.5
Acquainted with as well as aware of official's visit to village.	15	68.2
No Response	1	4.5
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

A large majority of respondents (68.2 percent) were familiar with Markaz officials and had some idea of their visits to their villages. This observation has dual meanings. It shows people's awareness and it speaks of officials' success in making themselves visible. Incidentally, the Manawala Markaz annual reports claim that 1,18,000 farm visits were carried out in the past four years.

At the level of action, the Markaz was not faring very well. Its measures to institutionalize local leadership and to establish channels for disseminating modern techniques had, by and large, failed to take hold. We have already discussed limitations of the co-operative societies. They lacked resources and did not undertake any significant task. The framers of the IRDP conceived of co-operative societies in multiple roles. One of them was to serve as channels for transmitting public information and modern production techniques. For this purpose, leaders or office bearers of co-operative societies were to be given training and guidance at the Markaz. They were expected to spread this information in their villages. Similarly, model farms were meant to disseminate ideas through example. Officials of Manawala had conducted training and discussion sessions with the co-operatives' leaders and had set up 14 model farms. How much of this information had filtered down can be gauged from respondents' knowledge about and assessment of these practices.

Table 2-13

Role of Co-operative Society Members

Response	Number	Percentage
Don't know	1	4.5
Brings the Information	1	4.5
No Member	5	22.7
Does not bring the information	7	31.8
Not Applicable	8	36.4
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Only 4.5 percent of respondents indicated that co-operative leaders bring back information to their villages (Table 2-13). In fact, there seems to be some confusion about the purpose of the Markaz training. Among

the respondents were some secretaries and chairmen of village co-operative societies and some of them had neither attended the markaz training sessions nor talked about those with members of their societies and other villagers.

A similar diffidence prevailed about model farms. In the vicinity of the sampled villages, there were three model farms. Yet 81.8 percent of respondents said that they were not aware of any model farm in their areas. When their attention was drawn to this apparent contradiction, they explained it by saying that Markaz had not done any thing on those farms except to put a sign board. Undoubtedly those were progressive farms, but they had been there much before Markaz was established. This indifference to the presence of model farms is further reflected in Table 2-14.

Table 2-14

Influence of Model Farmer

Influence	Number	Percentage
No	1	4.5
Yes	1	4.5
No response	20	90.9
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

The preponderance of 'no response' is an indication of respondents' indifference to the existence of model farms.

This section has shown that people were aware of the Markaz programme but were unenthusiastic and indifferent towards institutional measures taken to foster local leadership and to heighten sense of self reliance.

(vi) *Improving Living Conditions (Infrastructural Development)*. The IRDP made no provision for carrying out minor civil works such as building village roads, water wells, etc. Yet promoting such development remained an objective of the programme. It was meant to be realized through the People's Works Programme. Markaz was conceived as a planning and co-ordinating agency. Its contribution lies in articu-

lating local needs and formulating an annual plan for the area which the People's Works Programme is to execute. Obviously it was assumed that Markaz proposals will carry weight with the District Works Council.

In Manawala, the process did not operate as conceived. The Markaz prepared a list of proposals for new schools, village roads, culverts, libraries, electrification of villages, etc. This list was just a catalogue. It had some estimates of costs but no explanation or documentation of priorities of the proposals. This annual plan was almost whisked aside by the District Works Council. None of the 42 proposals submitted by the Markaz were funded by the council in two successive years.

Contrary to apparent lack of credibility (and political clout) of the Markaz proposals are extensive claims in the Markaz annual reports about roads, tubewells, irrigation channel, etc., built in Markaz area. Apparently Markaz authorities deem it fit to take credit for almost any change occurring in the area. Usually such credit is not warranted. Most of these are normal developments which were merely coincidental with the Markaz. A case in point is the history of the establishment of carpet weaving training centre in Manawala. About 5-6 years ago, carpet weaving became a household industry in Manawala area in response to the market demand. It has become so popular that many farmers have taken up this activity. The spontaneity of this development attracted the attention of the Small Industries Department. They established a training centre. Files in the Markaz office contain some letters written to the Small Industries Department in support of the plan to establish the centre. Does this much activity earn the Markaz the credit for the establishment of the centre?

The annual reports of Manawala Markaz lay claims for lining water courses (23800 linear feet), distribution of tree saplings (63000), building of fish ponds (2), etc. Our study is not an administrative audit; therefore we can not comment on the authenticity of these claims. But one judgement can be given unequivocally that very few of these accomplishments can be shown to have occurred entirely with the Markaz. Markaz had played a supplemental and supportive role. Seldom was it the initiator of these proposals. And what it initiated was given little attention. Quite obviously Markaz was operating on a reactive and incremental basis. Its performance conveyed little sense of a planned and co-ordinated approach to area development.

Appendix Table B-9 shows that respondents ranked drinking water supply, school and roads as the priority needs of their area. This suggests that a formal plan for the area establishing a pattern of physical development, setting criteria for determining priorities and formulating policies for resource allocation (locally mobilized or granted) would be a very significant contribution from a Markaz, even if it does not assume respon-

sibilities to execute such a plan. The Markaz did not assume the role of an area planning and development agency. Instead its efforts have been sporadic, incremental and reactive to the initiative of other nation building departments. It has often taken on tasks that other departments find burdensome; e.g. distributing tubewell subsidy application forms.

(vii) *Target Population and Beneficiaries*: The medium and small farmers are especially mentioned in the IFDP as the target population. Similarly, improving the employment opportunities of the rural labourer is also an objective of the programme. From these two statements, it can be deduced that Markazes are meant to benefit the majority segment of rural population, *i.e.*, the poor and lower classes, and to avoid the usual pitfall of being co-opted for the benefit of the rich and the influential. Is Markaz realizing this objective? To answer this question, Table 2-15 is presented.

Table 2-15

Beneficiaries of the Markaz Projects

Beneficiaries	Number	Percentage
Big Land owners only	5	22.7
Medium and Small farmers only	4	18.2
Farmer (of all types) only	3	13.6
Everybody (farmers as well as non-farmers)	5	22.7
None	3	13.6
No Response	2	9.1
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

The bi-modal responses in Table 2-15 present a contradictory picture. On the one hand 22.7 percent respondents said that big land owner were the main beneficiaries of the markaz programme, whereas another 22.7 percent indicated that everybody benefitted from it. This duality of responses is partially explained by an observed correlation between a respondents role in the Markaz programmes and his response. Generally,

the secretaries and presidents of co-operative societies or persons connected with the Markaz said that everybody benefitted from the programme, while those without any affiliations with the Markaz, predominantly suggested that only the influentials and the land lords were the beneficiaries. The overall meaning of the responses recorded in Table 2-15 is that the farming community was benefitting to some degree from the programme. This seems plausible if benefits are defined loosely. The possibility of getting advice or seeds is a validly perceived benefit.

More light on the issue of the impact of Markaz on the opportunities of the poor is thrown by the data in Appendix Table B-10.

A majority of respondents (56.4 percent) thought that there was no improvement in the living conditions of the poor, while 36.4 percent indicated otherwise. By analysing explanations given to support respective judgements, we get a better picture of the role of Markaz.

Table 2-16

Reasons for Changes in Living Conditions of the Poor

Reasons	Number	Percent
No Change	12	54.5
More non-agricultural employment opportunities.	4	18.2
Increased incomes from agriculture ..	2	9.1
Other.. .. .	4	18.2
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

It is evident that whatever limited improvements that some respondent perceived in the living conditions of the poor, were not attributed to the Markaz Programme.

They were attributed to such secular trends as increasing industrial job opportunities, rising incomes through agricultural improvements, etc. Independent of these responses, it is known that carpet weaving had become a rage in Manawala area. In some villages, almost every house had a loom or two operating throughout the day. This has certainly increased the incomes of a large section of the lower classes. Markaz was merely a coincidental event in this respect.

In conducting the village surveys and talking to the Markaz officials, we became aware that persons involved with the project tended to share some common characteristics. Most of the office bearers of co-operative societies, model farmers, and other local leaders had striking similarities. They were, usually, persons with some schooling, often having a share in a business or holding a job yet maintaining roots in villages through ancestral farms. There were not many proverbial big landlords among them. There was a behavioural characteristic shared by most of those associated with markaz: they had thorough familiarity with governmental programmes, and knew the ways of dealing with public officials. This is the emerging rural middle class of *safaid poshes*. We could detect a continuity in their affiliations with rural development programmes that have come and gone. They constitute a readily accessible local leadership for programme be it V-AID or Rural Works and now IRDP.

Apparently a division of labour in leadership functions has emerged in rural areas. The traditional land lords have monopolized political offices and positions of national leadership, while the local affairs have fallen to the share of this new rural middle class. In Manawala, we were not alert to this possibility and therefore were not prepared to formally observe these patterns. By the time we became aware of the ring of *safaid posh* around the Markaz we had almost concluded village surveys. At the last moment, an effort was made to document this observation. For this purpose, information about the socio-economic background of the participants in a minor project of the Markaz was obtained. The markaz was setting up some demonstration plots to show the benefits of precision and levelling. There were twenty farmers who had accepted to get a few acres of their land levelled under this programme. Table 2-17 presents educational backgrounds of these farmers.

Table 2-17

Educational Attainments of Farmers Participating in the Precision Land Levelling Demonstration Project

Education	Number	Percent
5—9 years of Schooling	9	45.0
Matric	8	40.0
Post matric College/technical training ..	3	15.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : Markaz officials.

Although most of the participants were medium farmers, a majority of them had other occupations also. There were *arhatis*, shopkeepers, ration depot holders, public officials and *numbardars* among these participants in the precision and levelling project. Educationally, they were a distinguished group by rural standards. About 55 percent of these participants were matriculates or had higher educational attainments. Admittedly this is a small piece of evidence, but it shows the pattern of emerging rural local leadership. Presently it might be taken note of; we will further examine this hypothesis in the case study of a Markaz in the N.W.F.P. where field work was done subsequently.

Summary of Findings

The analysis of the provincial data and the Manawala case study suggest certain generalized conclusions about the working of the IRDP in Punjab. These are presented below.

- (i) The IRDP in Punjab is turning into an agricultural extension programme. Partially it was intended to be so, but its structure pre-empted opportunities of its ever developing into a multi-sectoral integrated development programme.
- (ii) The scope for the agricultural extension work has not been thoroughly analyzed. There is an emphasis on the delivery of the four inputs, *i.e.* seeds, fertilizers, advice and credit. In Punjab, the supply of these inputs is relatively adequate or at least does not present any unusual problems. A host of public and commercial channels have emerged to supply these inputs and farmers are generally aware of their beneficial effects. Thus, a Markaz becomes a supplementing agency for the supply of these inputs. The case study also revealed that there were other equally crucial agricultural needs, (*e.g.* irrigation water) whose supply problems were not even addressed to by the Markaz.
- (iii) The integrative role of Markazes seems to have remained largely unfulfilled. The programme in Punjab is manned by agriculture graduates. It has grown out of shadab model which was based on "input saturation" strategy. It has remained tied to the provincial Agricultural Department through formal and informal links. All these factors have distracted from its mission of comprehensive and integrated development. The co-ordination of activities of nation building departments at the Markaz level could not be achieved. It is a very elusive problem which is rooted in bureaucratic power struggles, resource constraints and departmental priorities. The IRDP had relatively poor credibility among other provincial departments and it has failed to obtain the co-operation of entrenched bureaucracies such as revenue, high ways and irrigation, etc. These

departments have a strong hold over the rural economy and without their participation, the integration of public services is incomplete. Yet it would not be necessarily obtained by making Markaz officials as the super-bosses. These problems have not been given enough attention in the formulation of the IRDP.

- (iv) Markazes inspired considerable enthusiasm initially (in the first year). This is evidenced from a number of indicators: upsurge in organization of co-operative societies, frequency of meetings, etc. Seemingly, the popular enthusiasm petered out after a short while. Perhaps, a misplaced emphasis on agricultural advice and credit combined with inattention to other aspects invested the programme with an aura of irrelevance or insignificance.
- (v) Various institutions promoted by the Markaz, (e.g. Co-operative Societies, model farms) have not fulfilled their proposed functions. They have not involved people on a large-scale or inspired their trust. Nor have these institutions acted as two way channels for the flow of information and ideas between public bodies and the general public. Their resources remained limited and activities primarily organizational.
- (vi) Markaz as a public programme is fairly widely known, but its benefits have not spread out. The Markaz Centre, Manawala town, did not show any tendencies to be a growth point and competing central places were also emerging in the area. The primary beneficiaries, what ever the few benefits, were farmers and they also were served in a sporadic and incremental manner. The Markaz attempted to lay the role of an expeditor of on-going public programmes. In the process, it got saddled with a variety of chores which drain its limited manpower and distract from its overall mission. For example in Manawala. Markaz staff was busy at various times putting together tubewell subsidy applications for individual farmers, or authenticating applications for credit cards, etc. These activities, were useful by themselves but they have little bearing on the overall objectives of the programme. Very little planning was evident at the provincial or Markaz level. The possibilities of making Markazes sophisticated and responsive units of local planning had been overlooked.
- (vii) It was observed, tentatively, that an emerging class of rural bourgeoisie had assumed local level leadership roles. They formed a circle around public officials and programmes and were strategically placed to obtain whatever little power or material benefits the programme conferred.

Chapter III

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE N.W.F.P.

(a) The Scope of the IRDP

The conceptual and institutional framework of the North West Frontier province's IRDP is similar to that of the Punjab, but it is significantly different in scope and emphasis. A Markaz is also the administrative unit of the frontier's IRDP. It is similarly organized in two-tiered parallel structures of government functionaries and citizen's associations. The frontier's programme differs from the Punjab's in at least one significant way. It sets aside funds and assigns officials to carry out land development and infrastructural civil works in Markazes. This thrust of the programme is a part of the strategy evolved at Daudzai.

Daudzai is a pilot rural development project run by the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development in the Daudzai police station of Peshawar Tehsil. Daudzai model, as it is popularly known, has an impressive ancestry. It draws upon the experiences of Comilla project and has evolved a three-pronged strategy through experimentation in Daudzai Thana.¹ The Daudzai approach of guided local initiative was adopted as the basis of the provincial IRDP in 1973—almost a year after the initiation of the pilot project. The provincial government has proceeded cautiously in introducing the programme. Only four Markazes were started in the first year (1972-73) and the new ones were established at a deliberate pace. The provincial government watched the evolution of Daudzai and other Markazes and did not formalize its plan of action till January 1975.² By this time, 14 Markazes had been established. One of these earlier Markazes, Battal, was chosen for the case study.

The objectives of the provincial IRDP are given in Appendix-C. The programme envisages that a Markaz will become a co-ordinative body for government departments at the local level. It provides for building of a Markaz complex where public offices will be housed together. It

¹The three main elements of the strategy are (i) choice of the jurisdiction of a police station as a Markaz extending over 140 sq. miles area and including about 50,000 people, on the average. This will be a unit of development administration served by nine departments and the Markaz staff; (ii) organizing co-operative societies in villages to propose and execute civil works and to serve as credit and training institutions; (iii) training of village cadres as extension agents. A detailed description of the evolution of Daudzai project is given in: Shoaib Sultan Khan *Daudzai Project*. Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar, January 1975.

²A proposal outlining scope, phasing and procedures of the IRDP was formalized in January 1975. See Department of Local Government, Rural Development, Co-operatives, Social Welfare and Tourism *PCI*. Rural Development in N.W.F.P. 1975-80.

emphasizes organization and mobilization of people through two tiered co-operative societies and by training local leaders. It lays stress on the planning and development of physical infrastructure by co-operative societies with technical and financial assistance from the Rural Development Department.

A Markaz will take five years to mature, according to the provincial plan.³ The first phase of Markaz development will be comprised of preparatory work such as staffing, surveys and construction of the office complex. The second phase will include organization of co-operatives, initiation of infrastructure development and promotion of agricultural extension. By the third year, a Markaz will enter the third phase wherein all activities will be intensified and broadened. This plan of Markaz development serves as the guide for the frontier's IRDP. The provincial government has formulated an ambitious programme of establishing 110 Markazes, each incurring an expenditure of about Rs. 6.8 million (68 lakhs) over a period of five years.

Table 3-1
Proposed Expenditure per Markaz Over a Five Years Period

Items	Amount (Rs.)
Buildings	700,000
Equipment and Transport	150,000
Markaz Staff	736,000
Departmental Staff	836,000
Co-operative organization grant	400,000
Infrastructural works	3,200,000
Co-operative Credit Capital	800,000
Total :	6,822,000

Source: PCI p. 8.

The scope of the IRDP is evident from the proposal to spend about Rs. 1.7 million every year per Markaz. Furthermore, it may be noted that almost half of the expenditure will be incurred on infrastructural

³Ibid. p. 7.

works which indicates that civil works will be a major component of the programme. Does the effort match the intentions? To answer this question, we will examine budgetary allocations of the programme.

(b) Budgetary Allocations

Although the provincial plan proposes a budget of Rs. ten lakh in the first year and Rs. fourteen lakh each year thereafter, the actual expenditures have been less than half of these, on the average (Table 3-2).

Table 3-2
Expenditures on Markazes

Categories	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Total provincial* Expenditure	Rs. 1,400,000	2,000,000	1,610,000	19,300,000
No. of Markazes**	5	9	15	34
Av. expenditure per Markaz	Rs. 280,000	233,333	1,073,666	567,647

Sources : *Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance—*Revised Budgets*.
**Directorate of Rural Development N.W.F.P.

Not only average expenditures per Markaz have lagged behind the proposed budget, but also they show a downward trend since 1974-75. After a quantum jump to Rs. 1.07 million (ten lakhs) in 1974-75 from Rs. 0.2 million (2 lakhs) for the two earlier years, the average expenditure per Markaz fell to Rs. 0.56 million (five lakhs) in 1975-76. Is this an indication of sagging provincial Commitment? What may be noted is that similar phenomenon was observed in Punjab.

Table 3-3
Budgetary Allocations and Expenditures

Categories	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77
Budgetary Allocation	Rs. 1,500,000	2,100,000	24,000,000	31,700,000	15,000,000
Change over previous year	—	+40%	+1050%	+32%	—52%
Expenditures (Revised estimates)	Rs. 1,400,000	2,100,000	16,100,000	19,300,000	—
Expenditure as percentage of allocation	93.3%	100.0%	50.3%	60.9%	—

Source : Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance—*Revised Budgets*.

It may be hypothesized that organizational problems might have hampered utilization of budgetary allocations. Table 3-3 controverts this argument. It shows that the programme used up almost total allocations during the first two years. The expenditures were half of the allocation in 1974-75 but then that year the allocation increased by 1050 percent over the previous year. The absorptive capacity of the programme is evident from the fact that in 1974-75 the expenditures increased by 666 percent over the previous years. Against these trends, the fall in allocations—both average and absolute—in the last two years does point toward some downgrading of the IRDP in provincial priorities. How has the programme performed so far? This question leads us to examine provincial data on co-operative, and works programmes.

(c) Markaz Co-operative Societies in the N.W.F.P.

The IRDP relies heavily on village co-operative societies to fulfill its objectives. They are envisioned as people's organizations responsible for initiating and implementing developmental works. The Conventional role of co-operatives as thrift institutions has also been retained. These societies will be channelling advice and training for village cadres. Thus, co-operative societies become a key functional unit of the IRDP. Some indices of their operations are presented in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4
Co-operative Organizations in the N.W.F.P.

Markazes (No.)	Villages (No.)	Co-operative societies (No.)	Average savings per society	Average Grant available per society	Average Credit given per society
15*	1027	481	Rs. 849	Rs. 7941	Rs. 16246**

Source : Directorate of Rural Development.

*Data relates to Markazes in Operation by June 1975

**The average was computed with the number of Co-operative societies which actually obtained credit (88) as the denominator.

Knowing that there could have been more than one co-operative society in a village, 481 societies in 1027 villages suggest that less than 40 percent of villages were organized under the IRDP. These are adequate but not overly impressive results of organizational efforts.

Although members' contributions were relatively meagre (Rs. 849 average per society), government grants and credit added to the financial resources of co-operative societies. Still their finances were not adequate to allow them to undertake a commercial or industrial venture.

On the other hand, village co-operative societies were executing civil works in Markazes. This activity became the primary function of co-operative societies. Some idea of the scale of these operations can be gained from Appendix Table C-1. The table shows that for the 15 Markazes in 1975-76, the average expenditure in civil works per Markaz was Rs. 370388. What kind of development was undertaken with these funds can be observed from Table 3-5.

Table 3-5
Works Programme 1975-1976

Communication		Irrigation		Flood Protection		Sanitation	
Av. No. of schemes per Markaz	Av. Cost per Scheme (Rs.)	Av. No. of Schemes per Markaz	Av. cost per scheme per Markaz (Rs.)	Av. No. of Schemes per Markaz	Av. Cost per Scheme (Rs.)	Av. No. of Schemes per Markaz	Av. cost per Scheme (Rs.)
4.2	20628	10	17294	3.8	36940	2.5	17450

Source : Directorate of Rural Development, N.W.F.P.

Note: Data for previous years was not available.

*In computing average Number of schemes per markaz, only those Markazes were included which had executed one or more schemes.

Irrigation and flood control works were the most common schemes (Table 3-5).⁴ On the average about 20 schemes of various kinds were underway in a Markaz in 1975-76. This suggests a fairly high—volumes of construction work being undertaken in a Markaz by co-operative societies. It is, therefore, logical to expect that co-operative societies would be mostly pre-occupied with planning and execution of civil works.

(d) Co-ordination of Public Services

This element of the IRDP has been operationalized in the form of getting the nation building departments' representatives posted at Markaz centres. The programme offers some inducements to promote interdepart-

⁴This preponderance of Irrigation and flood control schemes is the outcome of a provincial policy to allow only land development works and prohibit undertaking of any social welfare schemes (schools, dispensaries etc.) under the IRDP. See Directorate of Rural Development. *op. cit.*

mental co-operation in this respect. At every Markaz centre, an office complex is proposed to be built to accommodate representatives of other departments. Also the provincial plan proposes an expenditure of Rs. 0.8 million (8 lakhs) over five years period for each Markaz to supplement departmental budgets so that they may recruit additional staff to post at Markazes. These inducements have had positive effects.

The seven departments for which data were available attained high levels of performance in posting functionaries at Markaz centres (Table 3-6).

Table 3-6

Posting of Departmental Representatives at Markazes, 1975

Department	Posts	Percentage filled
Agriculture	60	76.6
Revenue	60	98.3
Education	45	100.0
Health	75	100.0
Animal Husbandry	15	93.3
Co-operative	45	97.8
Forest	43	95.6

Source : Directorate of Rural Development N.W.F.P.

In quantitative terms, it indicates an adequate co-ordination of public functionaries; whether the qualitative effects were also as sanguine is not so evident. In fact there is some evidence to the contrary.

The posting of a functionary does not mean that he works full time on Markaz projects. Often the Markaz assignment is an additional charge for a public official. It is more a matter of accommodating the Markaz in existing departmental jurisdictions. This is, even, recognized by the directorate of rural development. It explicitly states that "departmental functionaries will be involved in extension programmes under the rural development programmes and will continue to pursue their respective departmental programmes" (Department of Local Government 1975, p. 13).

The IRDP assumes that availability and accessibility of public functionaries at Markaz centres will bring forth supplies of public services in response to demands of people. This assumption is the basis for stressing

posting of departmental representatives at Markaz centres. But posting of departmental functionaries brings forth the issue of co-ordinating their activities. And in this respect, the experience so far has not been very encouraging.

In Daudzai, the Project Manager was given authority to administratively supervise the activities of departmental representatives. This one measure aroused so much hostility among nation building departments that the project itself was put jeopardy. [Sultan Shoab Khan 1975, p. 17]. Wisened by this experience, the IRDP now expects departmental functionaries to follow their own programmes and just be available at Markaz centres to impart training to local leaders. Thus, there is no horizontal integration of public services at the Markaz level. At best they can be described to be co-existing.

This review of the provincial programme shows that it has had a long gestation period. It was formally launched in June 1973, but the framework of the programme was not finalized till Jan. 1975 (Musharraf 1975, p.1). In parenthesis it might be mentioned that a side effect of this long gestation period has appeared in the form of paucity of data.⁵ There have been some positive effects of proceeding cautiously in defining the programme.

The N.W.F.P. programme is conceptually sound and it incorporates a viable strategy. How it has worked out ? This question will be pursued through the case study. Generally, the methodology of the case study is the same as described in the previous chapter. Only the interview schedule had to be redesigned to reflect specific measures and emphasis of the N.W.F.P. programme [See Appendix-F].

Case Study of Battal Markaz

Battal is a small town (pop. 5413 in 1972) in Mansehra Tehsil of Hazara district. It is the centre of a Markaz which includes 50 villages of four Union Councils. It is a mountainous region of limited agricultural potential and poor industrial base. The communication network is threadbare. There are few *pacca* roads and large sections of the Markaz area are accessible only by mule or on foot. The famous silk route is the only highway going through the area. A few secondary roads branch of this highway leading to Daddar, Baffa, etc.

The choice of Battal Markaz for the case study was guided by the same criteria which were applied in Punjab. The Markaz was established in April 1973 which meant that it had been operating for more than three years at the time of this evaluation. It was not a pilot project, rather it was a typical Markaz of the provincial programme.

⁵Daudzai pilot project is an exception to this observation.

The topography, physical resources, climate and cultural patterns vary widely in the NWFP. One would be hard put to find a representative area in the province. This is why the case study approach has been adopted. We are observing the programme in operation and will be assessing effectiveness of the approach and organization of the programme. To the extent these features are invariant, our findings will be relevant to the programme as a whole.

The methodology employed in the case study was described in Chapter II. The same procedures were followed in selecting interviewees. Community informants from four villages were interviewed. The data about the Markaz activities were obtained from official records and office files.

The four villages selected for the field work were representative of the area. The mean distance of these villages from Battal was 11.3 miles and their average distance from the closest *bazar*/village was 3.4 miles. Two villages were located at 2-3 miles from the highway on a *katcha* road. One was about 15 miles from the highway on a ravel road and the fourth village was high up on the mountain accessible by foot only.

The respondents (community informants) interviewed for this study were mostly from middle or upper-middle class occupations. The average (mode) respondent was a farmer-owner or farmer-*cum*-shop-keeper or professional [Appendix Table C-2]. It must be mentioned that the land holdings in this region were small. According to the IRDP bench mark surveys the average farm size was 8.2 acres. Thus the influentials in this region were seldom full time farmers. They comprised 35 percent of our respondents.

If the socio-economic profile of the total population is used as a criterion, the predominance of middle class influentials among our respondents suggests a bias. A certain degree of this bias was unavoidable because influentials predominated among informed members of village communities and also were dominant among office bearers of co-operative societies whose inclusion among interviews was necessary to obtain information about the operations of the programme. The direction of this bias will be favourable to the programme. The magnitude of this bias was not over-whelming: About 65 percent of respondents were medium and small farmers, non-agricultural labour and petty shopkeepers [Appendix Table C-3].

(i) *Centrality*: Battal has a Bazar where people from nearby villages have been coming to buy provisions and goods for a long time. It also has had a dispensary, a high school, a bank and a police post predating the establishment of the Markaz. The IRDP has brought a few public offices and has attracted some activities to Battal. A Markaz office complex was under construction at the time of the field work. Through these measures, the Markaz expects to invest Battal with new functions

and make it a central place for the area. To assess the effectiveness of these measures, Table 3-7 presents the relevant data.

Table 3-7
Shopping Places

Goods and Services	Places			
	Before IRDP		After IRDP	
Groceries, meat and vegetables.	Village	(50.0%)	Village	(45.0%)
Clothes	Battal	(45.0%)	Battal	(35.0%)
Shoes	Battal	(45.0%)	Battal	(40.0%)
Dispensary/Doctor services	Chattar bazar	(30.0%)	Chattar bazar Battal	(30.0%) (30.0%)
Bank	Battal	(45.0%)	Battal	(35.0%)
Fertilizer/Seed	Battal	(35.0%)	Village Battal	(35.0%) (35.0%)
Mandi	Village	(50.0%)	Village	(50.0%)
High School (Boys)	Battal	(60.0%)	Battal	(60.0%)
Agricultural (Credit)	Mansehra	(45.0%)	Battal	(45.0%)
Extension Services	Not Reported	(35.0%)	Village	(35.0%)
	Village	(30.0%)	Battal	(30.0%)

Source : The Village Survey.

*Percentages in parenthesis are modal responses for each item. For example, the most common response to the question, 'where do the people buy clothes' was Battal which was mentioned by 45.0% of the respondents.

Table 3-7 shows that the IRDP has not affected the pattern of central places of the area in any significant way. People seemed to be going to, more or less, the same places to obtain various goods and services after the establishment of the Markaz as before this event. Two mild trends are detectable in the pattern of obtaining agricultural supplies.

There is a shift from Mansehra to Battal for obtaining agricultural credit. The modal response (45 percent) reflects that Battal had emerged as the centre for this service after the IRDP.

At the same time, fertilizer, seed and extension services were seemingly becoming available directly in villages. This is an understandable decentralizing trend. Agricultural inputs, in general, are being delivered at farmer's door steps by various public and private agencies. Proliferation of seed and fertilizer depots and farm side agricultural loan programmes are some of the obvious secular trends in this direction. If the Markaz has contributed to this trend, its share is almost indistinguishable from other public activities.

Battal has not emerged, so far, as the hub of the Markaz area. The significant central functions acquired by it, recently, were Markaz offices. In reply to a question about the role of Battal before and after the IRDP, the respondents indicated that Markaz offices were the only new functions added to Battal [Appendix Table C-4].

(ii) *Integration of Public Services*: This element of the programme is articulated in the policy of getting representatives of the nation building departments posted at Markazes. At Battal, six departments (Revenue, Agriculture, Education, Animal Husbandry, Co-operatives and Health) had posted low-level functionaries since the middle of 1973. Quantitatively, it is 66 percent fulfilment of the target (nine departments) in postings. But posting is only a necessity and not a sufficient condition to bring about the integration of services. What did the six posted representatives contribute to the Markaz programme? This question deserves to be investigated.

A variety of evidence suggests that these representatives pursued their respective departmental programmes and did little to effect a co-ordinated delivery of public services.

The Markaz staff was vocally dissatisfied with the present arrangements. In the absence of some authority vested in the project manager to co-ordinate the activities of departmental functionaries, the Markaz staff felt that they were not receiving any significant assistance from these officials. There had been few interdepartmental meetings and Markaz officials knew very little about the activities of the other public functionaries. Furthermore, the posted representatives were merely relocated from other jurisdictions. Their work assignments and programme priorities remained almost unaltered. They followed their departmental programmes and paid little heed to the Markaz programme.

It also needs to be pointed out that the representatives of nation building departments were low-level functionaries with limited powers and

competence. Dispensers or veterinary assistants could not be expected to plan and execute developmental decisions at their own initiative.

To find out the impact of the presence of these functionaries on the supply of public services, pertinent questions were asked respondents. Responses to probings about changes experienced by people in the supply of various goods and services are presented in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8
Improvements in Availability of Goods and Services

Goods and Services	Yes		No	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Seeds	6	30.0	14	70.0
Fertilizer	12	60.0	8	40.0
Agricultural Advice	14	70.0	6	30.0
Drinking water	1	5.0	19	95.0
Agricultural Credit	13	65.0	7	35.0
Livestock Care	5	25.0	15	75.0
Irrigation water	7	35.0	13	65.0
Medical Clinic	4	20.0	16	80.0
Bank	14	70.0	6	30.0
Co-operative Society	18	90.0	2	10.0

Source : The Village Survey.

The table shows that people had not experienced any marked improvements in the availability of medical, drinking water or educational facilities. This observation further validates the impression that posting of departmental functionaries was not yielding the desired effect of improving the supply of their respective services. The availability of fertilizer, agricultural advice and credit were felt to have improved noticeably (Table 3-8). These were many interacting factors contributing to this

situation. But these improvements were not attributable to the efforts of the functionaries of the nation building departments *per se*.

(iii) *Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs*: This element of the Markaz concept is essentially an application of the notion of "integration" specially to the agriculture sector. It assumes that consciously planned efforts will be made to regulate the delivery of agricultural inputs. In Battal, there was little evidence of such a plan.

There were some segmental attempts to improve agricultural services. Field assistants were posted in four union councils, village co-operative societies nominated model farmers, credit and fertilizers became readily available with the opening of depots and banks in the Markaz area. There were independently occurring events which coincided temporarily. Their coincidence had a positive effect on agricultural production; at least respondents felt that way.

The respondents felt that per acre yield of Maize, the primary crop of the area, had substantially increased (Table 3-9). In explaining the reasons, respondents singled out the increased supply of fertilizer as the main factor for these improvements. They recognized the role of better seed in raising the yield, but expressed dissatisfactions about its supply.

Table 3-9
Changes in the Yield of Maize

Changes	Number	Percentage
No increase	2	10.0
Increase of less than 25 percent	1	5.0
Increase of 25-100%	15	75.0
More than 100% increase	2	10.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Battal is a hilly area whose agriculture is rain fed and labour intensive. Farm holdings are small (8.2 acres on the average). Here agricultural development would depend on crop planning, application of fertilizer,

insecticides, use of better seed and introduction of better farming practices. Markaz did not develop a plan or strategy to provide these inputs in a systematic way. Respondents also confirmed this observation by indicating unawareness of any Markaz sponsored agricultural development efforts. Even village model farmers were regarded more as office bearers of co-operative societies than progressive agriculturists who could demonstrate innovative practices. Agricultural improvements were coincidental to the Markaz and not 'caused' by it.

(iv) *Organization and Mobilization of People* : The function of organizing and mobilizing people is assigned to co-operative societies in the IRDP. They have been conceived as surrogates of local councils in the absence of representative local government. Co-operative societies are expected to articulate community needs, to mobilize local resources (savings) and to plan and execute village developmental projects. Apparently, other roles of co-operative societies have been overshadowed by one activity to plan and build minor civil works.

In Battal Markaz, there were almost as many co-operative societies as villages. These societies could mobilize very small amounts of savings from their members—average share capital per society was Rs. 467 (Table 3-10). Even with public loans, the average assets of a co-operative society were about Rs. 8,000. This is a small amount to undertake any significant project.

Table 3-10

Co-operative Societies in Battal

Co-operative Societies (No.)	Members per Society (No.)	Average Share Capital per Society* (Rs.)	Average loan advanced per Society** (Rs.)	Average outstanding loan per Society (Rs.)
50	32	467	7609	7347

Source : The IRDP office, Battal

Note : *Average based on data for 23 societies.

**Average based on data for 25 societies.

On the other hand these societies were spending Rs. 10,000 to 20,000 per year on public works under the Markaz programme. The contrasts between the meagre resources available for credit and enterprise and relatively abundant opportunities to make use of public funds for civil works partially explains the basis for the dominance of the latter function. This fact is further borne out by the respondents.

There was great fervour to form co-operative societies in villages. Although there were already 50 co-operative societies in the Markaz, new ones were still being formed and seeking recognition from the Markaz staff.⁶

The village survey revealed that activities of Co-operative Societies were also widely known. About 75 percent of respondents knew about the frequency of meetings of their respective village societies [Appendix Table C-5]. Obviously, there was wide spread awareness about the benefits of forming co-operative societies.

To get an idea of what were these perceived benefits, respondents were asked to indicate the significant decisions made by their village co-operative societies.

Table 3-11

Decisions of Co-operative Society

Decision*	Number	Percentage
Public works/Schemes	14	70.0
Advice/training	3	15.0
No response	3	15.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

*Only one respondent had mentioned multiple decisions. His first mentioned response was taken into account.

The co-operative society meant, primarily, the execution of works or what respondents called "schemes". Seventy percent of respondents cited schemes as the significant contributions of their village societies. Similar identification of co-operative societies with public works is evident from responses to the question about their accomplishments. Appendix Table C-6 indicates that respondents could recall only the construction of civil works (roads, irrigation channels) as the accomplishments of their societies. The only other response was an occasional mention of training as an activity.

From the above analysis, a pattern can be discerned. It seems that co-operative societies were more popular as an instrument of obtaining

⁶During one week's period of our field work, two groups approached us to seek help in getting registered by the Markaz. In one case, a petition describing elaborately the ceremonies performed to inaugurate the co-operative group and bearing fifteen signatures was produced over night.

public funds for local civil works. The collective as well as individual benefits associated with such undertakings captured people's imaginations. The Markaz staff had to promote the first few co-operative societies; thereafter they multiplied with the momentum of the perceived benefits.

(v) *Social Awareness and Local Leadership* : Apparently the Markaz programme was widely known. This awareness of the programme is a reflection of people's consciousness about their rights and opportunities. Thus the apathy that one encounters in villages is not entirely the result of peoples' unawareness. The absence of purposive action is equally responsible for the rural blight. The IRDP established a framework to initiate actions and to foster leadership. This function is also assigned to co-operative societies.

The leaders of co-operative societies are expected to educate people and act as the liaison between the public officials and the masses. In turn, they are trained by public functionaries and for this purpose formal arrangements of holding training sessions at Markaz centres have been institutionalized.

In Battal, village cadres consisted of Presidents, Manager and Model farmers of village Co-operative Societies. Eight training sessions were held in 1975-76 wherein Markaz staff gave lectures.⁷

According to the office records, these sessions were attended by 51 model farmers and 56 managers and Presidents. The fact that these leaders were getting training was widely known. Eighty percent of the respondents of the village survey knew about the training programme of the Markaz (Table 3-12).

Table 3-12

Knowledge about Leader's Training

Training	Number	Percentage
Yes	16	80.0
No	4	20.0
Total:	20	100.0

Source: The Village Survey.

⁷Each person attending a training session was eligible to receive Rs. 8 as honourarium.

Similarly about 85 percent of respondents either knew about or were informed of the activities of Markaz officials [Appendix Table C-7].

These observations dispell the common stereotype that villagers are ignorant and uninformed about the possibilities around them. Obviously it was not awareness that needed to be aroused. The challenge was to deepen and channelize this awareness. This brings us to the question of whether the leaders were sharing (with people) the information imparted to them at the Markaz centre.

Table 3-13 reflects an unenthusiastic response to the above question. Only 35 percent of respondents observed that co-operative leaders formally inform and advise people.

Table 3-13

Leader's Role in Disseminating Information

Role	Number	Percentage
Do not hold meetings and inform people	6	30.0
Hold meetings and inform people	7	35.0
Do not know/No response	7	35.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

It must be noted that formalized training is an unprecedented practice in Pakistan's history of rural development. Often a leader's role implies a prestigious position enabling one to command other's loyalties and obedience. In Battal, a conflict between the old and the new conceptions of the leader's role was evident. Co-operative society leaders had not assumed the educator's role in earnest, but they were also not, yet, succeeding in establishing their hegemony over people. The pervasive awareness about the beneficial features, such as schemes, of the Markaz programme was a check on the leader's ambitions and command.

A visible change of leadership pattern was evident. The Markaz programme had brought forth a new breed of leaders. We will, later, examine their socio-economic characteristics. Presently we might note the changes that had occurred.

Table 3-14 shows that respondents had divided opinions about this question. Fifty-five percent thought that the traditional village elders were continuing to run village affairs, whereas 40 percent felt that the leadership was passing into the hands of co-operative society office bearers. Obviously the resources placed at the disposal of co-operative society leaders were giving them some leverage in village affairs. This change was not without rancour and factional conflicts. We have little evidence to throw light on the performance of the new leaders and to make judgement about the effects of these Markaz induced changes. Our impression is that the change is in line with the overall trend in Pakistan. The power and influence is passing into the hands of bourgeoisie and the hold of the aristocracy and feudal lords is declining. From the rural development perspective, the new leadership does not promise to be any move altruistically inspired then the old establishment.

Table 3-14
Change in Leadership Patterns

Change	Number	Percentage
No significant change	11	55.0
From old elite to co-operative society leaders	8	40.0
No response	1	5.0
Total:	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

(vi) *Improving Living Conditions Through Infrastructural Development:* For people of Battal, the terms Markaz, Co-operative Society and development schemes were synonymous. The infrastructural development project were pre-eminent in the Markaz programme.

Table 3-15
Budget Allocations, Battal

Year	Establishment	Contingencies*	Total
1973-74	Rs. 94,000 72%	36,000 28%	1,30,000 100%
1974-75	Rs. 2,25,000 21%	8,30,000 79%	10,55,000 100%
1975-76	Rs. 77,000 10%	6,92,000 92%	7,69,000 100%

Source : Project Manager, Battal.

*Contingencies include allocations for infrastructural development and co-operative credit.

By the second year of the programme, contingencies were being allocated 80-90% of Markaz budget. Civil works consumed 50-60% of the contingency allocation. The scale of infrastructural development work can be gauged from the fact that in the two quarters of 1975-76, about 3.5 lakh rupees were spent on such schemes. Furthermore, 37 other schemes were being financed, under the world Food Programme. Thus, about 50 civil works of one or the other kind were underway in Battal in 1975-76. The average expenditure per scheme under the IRDP budget was Rs. 27050.⁸ This also explains, partially, the fervour with which co-operative societies were being organized in Battal. These schemes are implemented by a committee chosen by a co-operative society. It is, therefore, inescapable that many persons would be allured to co-operative societies by possibilities of personal gains.

To find out what people knew about the infrastructural development activities of the Markaz, respondents were asked to indicate the nature of facilities built under Markaz schemes.

Almost all respondents could mention one or more facilities under construction in and around their villages. Roads were more frequently mentioned—55 percent of respondents indicated that roads were being constructed in their areas. The provincial policy of prohibiting construction of social welfare schemes is also evident by the absence of schools, street paving and similar works from the Table 3-16. In contrast to the

Table 3-16

Facilities Built by Markaz

Facilities	Yes		No	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Roads	11	55.0	9	45.0
Drainage, Irrigation ..	7	35.0	13	65.0
Bunds, flood control dams ..	4	20.0	16	80.0
Culverts, bridges ..	4	20.0	16	80.0
Drinking water	1	5.0	19	95.0

Source : The Village Survey.

provincial policy, respondents thought that the foremost felt need of their villages was the supply of drinking water [Appendix Table C-8]. This shows up an inconsistency in the programme. On the one hand, people's participation in decision making is stressed and on the other official policies pre-empt the scope of such decisions.

⁸This average is based on the expenditure data for 14 schemes.

Another aspect of the infrastructural development programme must be pointed out. The responsibility for planning and designing about 50 schemes of varying types fell on one man—the Markaz engineer. No matter how competent a person may be, it is unlikely that one person can adequately look after such a volume and variety of engineering works. This is liable to result in poor designs which if further compromised in construction are likely to result in shoddy and unreliable work. In Battal, this was already beginning to be evident. Unfinished roads which were crumbling, culverts that had been washed away and *bunds* which remained incomplete were to be commonly heard about. The infrastructural development in Battal was proceeding without an overall plan. It was essentially a conglomeration of individual schemes. And one could not be very sanguine about the maintenance of what was being built. Co-operative societies had limited resources and out of these, they were expected to bear maintenance costs. The developmental activity in Battal bears many resemblances to the erstwhile Rural Works Programme.

(vii) *Target Population and Beneficiaries:* The IRDP is meant to serve the welfare of medium and small farmers and agricultural labour. From the nature of Markaz activities, it can be deduced who were primary beneficiaries. First, we will present the respondents' impressions.

Table 3-17 indicates that respondents felt that the benefits of the IRDP were widely spread. The modal response (55 percent) was that

Table 3-17

Beneficiaries of the IRDP

Beneficiaries	Number	Percentage
Big land lords only	1	5.0
Medium and small farmers only	3	15.0
Labour only	2	10.0
Everybody	11	55.0
None	3	15.0
Total:	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

everybody had benefitted from the IRDP. These responses must be interpreted in the context of the situation in Battal. There the term IRDP meant developmental schemes and those were considered beneficial by everybody. Village communities hoped to obtain certain facilities, the poor could expect temporary employment, leaders could hope to exercise power as well as disburse funds. Thus, it is valid to expect that everybody would benefit, to some degree, from the IRDP. The existence of these expectations was confirmed by other data.

Table 3-18

Living Conditions of the Poor

Condition	Number	Percentage
Improved	16	80.0
Not Improved	3	15.0
Uncertain	1	5.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

In response to the question about the changes in the living conditions of the poor, the respondents overwhelmingly (80 percent) indicated that those have improved during the last few years. The reason given for those improvements referred to general awareness of rights, increased job opportunities—including those in Markaz schemes—and outmigration of labour. Most of these factors were merely coincidental with the Markaz programme. The Markaz has heightened expectations of benefits by generating some short term developmental activity.

The leaders of co-operative societies constituted a group that directly benefitted from the Markaz programme. We have already observed that they constituted the emerging middle level rural leadership. This group is comprised of persons with unusual characteristics for a rural area. Data about occupations, education and land holding of co-operative society presidents and Managers were collected through the Markaz office. Table 3-19 presents an occupational distribution of village leaders.

Large proportion (almost 75 percent) of co-operative societies, leaders were men of two worlds : their ancestral roots were in villages and in farming and their personal stakes were in towns in the form of jobs,

shops and contacts: They were *sofad posh* which could be described as rural bourgeoisie. By social status, a majority (46 percent) belonged to the class of village influentials [Appendix Table C-9]. One way to maintain influence in a village is to have access to public officials. Thus, it seems that a symbiotic relationship had emerged between the Markaz officials and leaders of co-operative societies. The leaders needed the schemes to expand their power base and the officials needed their support to get some projects underway. This mutual dependence is likely to lead to an appropriation of the programme benefits by the leaders and other members of the *sofad posh* class.

Table 3-19

Occupations of Presidents and Managers of Co-operative Societies

Occupations	Number	Percentage
Shopkeepers/farmer owners professionals	34	45.9
Medium farmers owners/ex-serviceman, <i>Imams.</i>	22	29.7
Small farmers, tenants	18	24.4

Source : Markaz office, Battal.

Summary of Findings

Preceding sections of this chapter present a number of observations about the workings of the IRDP in the frontier province. These observations have been derived from the provincial data as well as the case study of a Markaz. From these observations some generalized findings and conclusions can be abstracted which, in the strict methodological sense, should only be attributed to Battal Markaz. On the other hand, the case study is also meant to suggest some general tendencies which might serve as hypotheses for further investigation. With this purpose in view, we present below a resume of the main findings of this chapter.

- (a) The frontier province's IRDP has been modelled after the Daud-zai pilot project. It employ the strategy of aided and guided local initiative. There are three main planks of this strategy; namely :
 - (i) assembling public functionaries at the Markaz centre and, thus, making their services readily available to the people;
 - (ii) Organizing village co-operative societies to act as local

groups for planning and building physical infrastructure with public grants and to serve the credit demands of villagers;

- (iii) promoting local leadership through training and demonstration. The functionaries are meant to be advisers, trainers, mobilizers and expeditors. They are not initiators and executors of developmental proposals. Village co-operative societies are supposed to be the prime movers of the IRDP. This is a unique strategy in the sense that public resources have been put at the disposal of an *ad-hoc* local group, *i.e.* a co-operative society.
- (b) The programme was slow to take off and it had a relatively long gestation period. The provincial government observed the progress of Daudzai project before fully embracing the approach. But there are some inexplicable indications of the lagging commitment to the IRDP. Within a year of formulizing the programme (Jan. 1975), the provincial budgets for the IRDP was reduced.
- (c) The effectiveness of the IRDP depends upon the proper functioning of co-operative societies in various roles. As far as the formation of co-operative societies is concerned, people have responded with enthusiasm. Once the programme became known, little effort had to be invested to organize co-operative societies. What has caught people's attention is the possibility of obtaining public grants to undertake civil works. This function has overshadowed all other objectives of co-operative societies. They have mobilized very limited local resources. As a source of credit they have remained minor contributors. As channels of disseminating new ideas, co-operative societies have not, even, made any notable efforts.
- (d) The building of physical infrastructure as an activity has captured the Markaz programme. This is the most widely known activity of the Markaz and there is visible fervour among villagers to organize themselves into co-operative societies so that they may be eligible to undertake schemes. These schemes are being undertaken without any comprehensive area plan or sense of priorities. Even the technical design and supervision are likely to be, understandably, inadequate because a large number of unrelated projects are being planned by one engineer. This fact alone raises some doubts about the quality of work. Given the tradition of expecting personal gains from public works, it will not be surprising if all this construction activity does not turn out to be another Rural Work Programme.
- (e) The objective of integrating public services is being realized if measured in terms of public functionaries posted at Markazes.

But if the criterion of co-ordinated public effort is applied to the results of these postings, then the Markaz has not succeeded in providing a cohesive framework of public services. Low-level public functionaries posted at Markazes continue, by and large, to operate independently following their departmental programmes and attending to their usual duties. They lack necessary competence, authority and responsiveness that are required to tackle local developmental tasks.

- (f) Markazes have done little to formulate area wide plans and tap local resources. The activities are undertaken in isolation from each other and without any comprehensive strategy of physical or resource development. Similarly concerted efforts to raise agricultural production, an objective of the IRDP, require some planning. This is also missing from Markaz programme of action. The programme relies on model farmers and co-operative societies as the initiators of agricultural improvements. Their performance does not match their responsibilities. Whatever improvements have been registered by the agricultural sector were coincidental to the IRDP.
- (g) The Markaz in the N.W.F.P. seems to be evoking enthusiasm among villagers. The people are aware of possibilities offered by Markaz which they interpret to be building of civil works—or schemes as locally known. Apart from the wide spread awareness of the programme they are equally widely shared expectations of obtaining gains from these schemes. The labour expects short term employment, the community hopes to get a road built or well sunk, the leaders expect to exercise power and disburse public funds. The Markaz programme has brought out a special class of persons as local leaders. They are semi-commercialized and urbanized members of the rural middle class whose felicity in dealing with public officials has proven to be an asset. They form a circle around developmental programmes and successfully re-orient those to their advantage. Whether the same will happen to the IRDP remains to be seen, but all portents point in that direction.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

The Integrated Rural Development Programme is an expression of the public commitment to bring rural communities into the mainstream of modern life by improving their productive capabilities and by expanding their health, education and infrastructural facilities. This programme follows a series of public efforts, such as V-AID, Rural Works, etc., addressed to the development of rural areas. The fact that each ineffective programme in time leads to the formulation of a new one indicates the depth of need and the intensity of public commitment to promote rural development. The IRDP is the most recent of such public efforts.

There is a consensus about the broad goals of rural development: that is, to raise production and incomes and to improve living conditions. Similarly the sense of urgency about these goals is widely shared. It is the question of how to realize these goals that divides opinions and leads to different approaches. The IRDP incorporates the most recent and internationally popular notions about rural development.

It is based on a demand and supply model of public services. Rural communities as consumers are encouraged to organize themselves in co-operative groups to demand and receive a co-ordinated set of public services supplied by government departments. The Rural Development Department is supposed to facilitate and mobilize the supply of the required services. This model assumes that simultaneous increase of material and service inputs in rural production processes will jolt them out of low-level equilibriums and set them on the path of economic development and social change. Implicit in this assumption is faith in the relevance and effectiveness of public services. What if government departments do not offer adequate services or may be inefficient or corrupt! Such common occurrences have not been taken into account in conceptualizing the Integrated Rural Development approach, even at a theoretical plane. Pakistan's IRDP also suffers from this conceptual lapse and ignores lessons of the earlier programmes in this respect.

The IRDP in Pakistan has been in operation since July, 1972. Although it is too young to register substantive gains on indicators of rural incomes and welfare, yet it is old enough to be submitted to a 'concurrent evaluation' for assessing the validity of its approach and assumptions. This study carried out such an evaluation. It has assessed the effectiveness of the Markaz as an operational unit of the programme through field studies of two Markazes: one in Punjab and the other in N.W.F.P. This evaluation is meant to assess the viability of markaz operations and to determine the impact of the programme on income and

welfare of communities in the Markaz areas. The two broad questions to which this study is addressed are:

- (i) Is the Markaz fulfilling the programme objectives ?
- (ii) How do Markaz programmes affect people of the area ?

As a concurrent evaluation, this study should help to identify strengths and weaknesses of the programme.

Formulation of the approach and methodology of this study presented a number of problems. The IRDP lacks an authoritative statement of objectives. Numerous and slightly varying versions of the objectives were not the only handicaps. There is a certain degree of vagueness and injudicious mixing of 'means' and 'ends' in these statements. These limitations not only make difficult the task of an evaluator but also may have introduced dissipative tendencies in the programme. The latter is evident from Markaz progress reports. Almost every public or private developmental activity occurring in Markaz areas is being claimed to the credit of the IRDP without any regard to the actual contribution of the programme. This practice may appear to be an innocuous public relations device to project an enlarged image of the accomplishments of the programme but in fact it is a symptom of the vagueness of the programme.¹ We have dwelt on this practice to point out problems faced in formulating criteria for evaluation. This problem was solved by deducing a set of instrumental objectives of the programme from various statements and abstracting seven dimensions along which the performance of the programme could be measured. These abstracted objectives and dimensions constitute the conceptual framework of this study.

To observe the operations of the programme first hand, it was decided to develop in-depth case studies of two Markazes—one each in Punjab and the N.W.F.P. Manawala (Punjab) and Battal (N.W.F.P.) were the oldest Markazes in their respective provinces, other than Daudzai and Shadab pilot projects. The latter were purposely excluded from this study. We wanted to study Markazes which were representatives of the programme in matters of resources and administrative attention. Obviously pilot projects receive special treatment on both these counts.

The findings of these case studies combined with the analysis of programme data obtained from provincial directorates provide a reasonable basis to arrive at tentative judgements about the effectiveness of the programme. In the strict methodological sense, our conclusions are

¹The difficulties arising from this vagueness or 'lack of consensus' have also been observed by Wanasinghe, a U.N. advisor. See H. S. Wanasinghe, "Report of an Advisory Mission . . ." United Nations, ESCAP, pp. 6-7. (Mimeographed).

valid for the two Markazes studied in this evaluation. Yet to the degree they were representatives of respective provincial programmes, our findings are generalizable. In the following discussion of the findings, we have attempted to maintain a stance that conclusions are valid for Manawala and Battal, except wherever corroborative provincial data extend the scope of these conclusions. They should be read with this qualification in mind. The significance of our case studies lies in suggesting hypotheses and providing empirical insights for further investigation or re-examination of programme assumptions on the part of policy makers.

The main findings of the two case studies are presented in Table 4-1. These have been abstracted from concluding sections of Chapters II and III. Among the seven dimensions on which the programme has been evaluated, only two reflect a noticeable impact of the programme. One aspect in which the IRDP shows a certain degree of achievement is the initial success in prompting the formation of village co-operative societies. This success was observable in both Markazes. It signifies a general willingness of rural communities to associate with any public developmental effort. This conclusion is further supported by the finding that there was a high degree of general awareness among populations of the two Markaz areas. Perhaps it is, now, a pervasive condition in much of the rural sector of Pakistan.

Table 4-1 also shows that in Battal, civil works were the most common and visible feature of the IRDP and in Manawala, agricultural extension constituted the main thrust of the programme. These are the main successes of the programme. On most of the other dimensions, our case studies revealed that the programme was having little impact. As an overall conclusion, it can be said that in Manawala the IRDP had turned into a supplemental, not primary, agricultural input supply programme and in Battal (N.W.F.P.) it had become a local PWD. It was observed that the programme had not, at least yet, realized a promised, multisectoral and integrated approach. What specific contribution has it made towards various objectives? This question will be answered in the following sections.

(a) The IRDP and Agricultural Development

To increase agricultural yields and improve methods of production is a primary objective of the IRDP. A number of instrumental objectives have also been set up to promote this objective; for example, supply of seed, fertilizer, credit, mechanization of agriculture, etc. Under the IRDP, the key to the realization of these instrumental objectives is the 'posting' of appropriate public functionaries at Markaz centres and through them, hopefully, making available necessary public inputs. The results of this strategy, as observed in two Markazes, are not very reassuring. There are two steps involved in this process and shortfalls could be observed at each. First, the programme elicited a relatively poor response from Nation Building Departments in terms of postings

Table 4-1
Summary of Findings from Case Studies

Programme Dimension	Manawala (Punjab)	Battal (N.W.F.P.)
Centrality	No significant Change in Manawala town's role except for the location of Markaz offices.	No significant change in Battal village role except for the location of Markaz offices.
Integration of Public Services	Not many departmental representatives posted at the Markaz.	Many departmental representatives seconded to Markaz. No significant change in availability of services.
Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs	Markaz supplementing market channels for the supply of seed and fertilizer. Many essential farming needs remained unattended. Farm planning non-existent.	Little visible effort to deliver agricultural inputs. Farm planning non-existence.
Organization and Mobilization of People	Initial success in setting up or adopting existing co-operative societies. Little follow-up and petering out of enthusiasm.	Co-operative societies very popular and more being demanded. These are <i>ad-hoc</i> groups mainly interested in obtaining public funds for civil works.
People's Awareness and Local Leadership	Fairly high level of general awareness about rights and needs. The IRDP is only a coincidental factor in the emergence of this feeling.	High level of awareness. Considerable interest in Markaz civil works. Most of the co-operative societies' leaders belong to the rural bourgeoisie. Generally they are small shopkeepers-cum-farmers with some education and considerable influence.
Improving Living Conditions— Infrastructural Development	No civil works undertaken on behalf of Markaz. Health, education, welfare services expanding generally and incrementally. The IRDP has not given any special stimulus to these efforts.	Numerous schemes of building village roads, field terracing and water supply under way. Health, education and welfare services not much affected by the IRDP. No overall plan for civil works.
Target Population and Beneficiaries	Farmers in general are beneficiaries, though middle class and influential persons benefitting more directly.	Possibilities of general public benefitting from some civil works. More direct benefits for leaders of co-operative societies.

of their functionaries at Markazes. The response was poorer in Punjab than in the N.W.F.P. There was a predominance of new and expanding departments (such as Social Welfare, Family Planning, Education, etc.) among those which posted representatives at Markazes. Entrenched and powerful bureaucracies (such as Departments of Revenue, Irrigation, Health) were unresponsive to the demands of the IRDP. Second, the posted functionaries were, often, low-level subordinates who lacked resources, authority and skills to undertake developmental works. They made little impact on Markaz areas and even their presence at Markaz centres was not known to large proportions of area populations. This is an indication of their ineffectiveness.

The remoteness of public services is not the primary cause of their non-availability to rural areas. It is generally known that paucity of resources, poor organization, outmoded attitudes and, many times, corruption have been the main impediments in the supply of public services. The two Markaz studies further confirmed this observation. Thus the mechanism through which the IRDP is hoping to increase agricultural production is ill conceived. It ignores the realities of current administrative practices.

Our Markaz surveys indicate that the agricultural yields have been increasing for the past five or six years. A certain momentum of change in the agricultural sector has been attained with the introduction of new varieties of seeds and fertilizers. This trend predates IRDP and has not been given another impetus by the programme. Numerous public corporations and commercial establishments are selling seeds, fertilizers, and offering facilities for agricultural credit. The supply of conventional agricultural inputs has been increasing without the intervention of the IRDP. It is, thus, supplementing other channels of supply. And in many ways, it is a redundant effort.

On the other hand, there are agricultural needs which are equally important but have remained unattended. A case in point is the problem of irrigation water in Manawala. The unreliability of the SCARP tubewell water supply was mentioned many times as a basic obstacle in increasing agricultural yields, but the Markaz had done little to alleviate the situation. It suggests that the IRDP's agricultural improvement programme consists of a 'package' of services which are made available irrespective of their relevance and demand.

To sum up our conclusion of this section, it may be said that agricultural production processes are undergoing changes under the influence of farmers' initiative and variety of public and private channels of supply. The IRDP has not made any notable contribution to this trend, it has coasted along with it.

(b) Farm Planning and Incomes, Non-Agricultural Job Opportunities

To promote farm planning for the introduction of modern agricultural practices and thereby increase production and incomes is a stated objective of the IRDP. Complementing this is the objective of expanding job opportunities in non-agricultural sectors. These objectives are meant to be realized through systematic local planning. The two case studies indicate that local planning was a neglected function in the IRDP.

Both in Manawala and Battal, the IRDP was a 'packaged' programme dispensing materials and services conceived by respective provincial directorates. In Manawala, distribution of seeds, fertilizer, agricultural credit and advice were the primary activities of the programme. In Battal, the IRDP became, predominantly, a construction agency for civil works with public funds. There was no systematic assessment of local needs and little was done to formulate area-wide strategies of development. Area-wide planning in any form, agricultural or infrastructural, was absent in both Markazes. Thus the IRDP remains a set of sporadic and contingent activities. A road here or a culvert there do not add up to a coherent and integrated development programme. Similarly seeds and fertilizers without water or crop planning remain isolated sectoral efforts.

Without guidance and discipline of local plans, the two Markazes could not initiate new productive activities which might have increased job opportunities. Nor was any systematic line of action devised to change farming practices. It must be mentioned that rural economies of the two Markazes were being diversified, weakly though, through secular forces of commercialization, public investment, etc. For example, in Manawala, a vigorous carpet weaving cottage industry has emerged spontaneously. The point being stressed here is that the IRDP did not take any systematic measures to reinforce and accelerate these secular trends.

The co-ordinative role of Markazes remained an administrative nightmare. Even in the period from 1972 to 76, the relationships between the Rural Development Department and the Nation Building Departments were redefined many times. The pendulum has swung from a 'supervisory-co-ordinative' role given to the IRDP officials to a state of co-existence of the IRDP and other departments at Markazes. The former situation is not tolerable to the entrenched and powerful departments and the latter arrangement fails to bring about the necessary integration of public services. An objective and participatory local plan could have offered another instrument of co-ordination, but this possibility has been overlooked.

(c) Infrastructural Development and Improving Living Conditions

Apart from low incomes, rural poverty is also manifested in the inadequacy of community facilities and services, such as water supply, hospitals,

schools, roads, etc. The process of rural development must simultaneously increase the levels of income and community facilities. The IRDP seek improvements in both these sectors in compliance with the currently accepted physical doctrine of the development theory.²

The programme incorporates two measures to make public facilities and services available in Markaz areas. For physical infrastructure, such as village roads, water supply, flood dams, etc., the IRDP proposes to undertake developmental works, directly or with the assistance of the People's Works Programme. The soft services, such as health, education, social welfare, etc., are to be made available by bringing representatives of respective government departments to Markaz centres. We have earlier touched upon the effectiveness of the two measures. Presently we will discuss our findings about these efforts.

In Punjab, a markaz has neither financial nor technical resources to undertake physical development projects. A Markaz submits proposals for the required projects to the District People's Work Councils for approval and execution. Thus, it is merely a need assessing agency. To accomplish this task systematically a Markaz should initiate surveys of local needs and resources, obtain people's participation to assess priorities and prepare a comprehensive area-wide plan of civil works and perform feasibility studies of individual projects. This is essentially a planning function and, as discussed earlier, it was given low priority in formulation of the IRDP.

Manawala Markaz proposals sent to the District Council, consisted of a list of proposed schemes without any intimation of priorities and with unsubstantiated cost estimates. It was merely a laundry list of projects. There was no indication of why these projects were thought to be necessary. It is no surprise that for two successive years, not one of the Markaz proposals was accepted by the District Council. The point to be appreciated is that the Punjab's IRDP was dependent upon the People's Works Programme for physical development and the latter proceeded under a different set of political and administrative priorities.

In the Frontier Province, a Markaz was expending about Rs. 300,000 annually, on the average, on civil works. About twenty civil works projects were underway on the average in a Markaz every year. These figures indicate a fair level of physical development activity. We are not in a position to judge the utility and durability of these works. One should err on the side of caution in assessing the impact of civil works, given the infamous history of such efforts in general and the lessons of

²Myrdal articulates this position in these words: ". . . improved levels of living are a precondition for higher labour input and efficiency and, generally, for changes in abilities and attitudes that are favourable to rising productivity." Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. I (New York : Pantheon, 1968), p. 57.

the Rural Works Programme in particular. There are some obvious difficulties which prompt an observer to be skeptical about the worthiness of Markaz projects. One engineer was single-handedly supposed to design and supervise the construction of 20 different schemes. Obviously Markaz projects would have been proceeding under severe technical and administrative constraints.

In Battal, a sense of public largesse about funds budgeted for civil works could be detected. A large proportion of schemes consisted of terracing of fields—directly benefitting land owners. Of course, there were numerous road and water supply schemes under construction which may or may not bear community-wide benefits. At this point it must be said that the visible enthusiasm for civil works in Battal was directed at getting a scheme going and obtaining funds for it rather than on giving attention to the economic and social feasibility of such a proposal. A select group of small businessmen, retired officials, and semi-urbanized farmers was at the forefront of proposing and executing civil works in local leaders' roles.

There is a uniformity of approach between the Punjab and Frontier programmes in the delivery of 'soft' public services. Both assumed that posting of representatives of health, education or welfare departments at Markazes will, somehow, make respective public services available to area populations. The two provinces differed in the degree to which their programmes succeeded in obtaining the representatives posted at Markazes. The Frontier met with greater success though, as pointed out earlier, the pattern of posting was similar in both provinces. Relatively new and expanding departments responded to IRDP's requirements to a greater degree than the entrenched and power-wielding departments (Police, Revenue, Public Works, etc.).

There are many limitations of deducing the effectiveness of the IRDP from successes or failures of postings. Many of these postings were auxiliary charges given to low-level functionaries, already present in the area. But this is a minor point in the context of other factors bearing on the issue of availability of public services. It is generally known that Public services are scarce in rural areas for want of resources, and are inaccessible because of the authoritarian outlook, lack of accountability, incompetence and corruption pervading public bureaucracies. These are well-known facts. By merely reshuffling some low-level, ill-equipped functionaries, the IRDP is not likely to increase significantly the supply of public services. A dispenser without medicines and an education officer without schools can be of little help to the local populace. These remain the limitations of the IRDP's approach.

For this study, a measure of centrality was devised to obtain people's response to the availability of public services and commercial facilities at Markaz centres. Both Battal and Manawala field surveys revealed

the places where people had been going to obtain public services. Residents of surveyed villages continued to go to cities and towns, where they had been going before the IRDP, for health, education and other services. This observation suggests that the postings have had little effect on the availability of these services from the residents' point of view.

The conclusions of this section can be summed up by the observation that the mechanism adopted by the IRDP to increase the supply of public services were proving to be ineffective in Markazes studied for this evaluation. The ineffectiveness can be attributed to simplistic assumptions of the programme, lack of resources and neglect of essential ground work in the form of local planning. There were secular trends towards 'filtering down' of public services and development of infrastructure which in turn were bringing about a change in the living conditions. The IRDP was, at best, an ancillary source of these changes.

(d) People's Participation and Local Leadership

To foster people's participation in the development of their area and to promote local leadership are avowed objectives of the IRDP. Since the dissolution of Basic Democracies, there are no elected local bodies in Pakistan. In the absence of representative local government institutions, the IRDP relies on *ad-hoc* local groups constituted as multi-purpose co-operative societies. A two-tiered structure of co-operative societies, village and Markaz level, has been devised for Markaz areas. They are meant to serve as channels to communicate local needs and provide an institutional base for local action. The latter function is further reinforced through training of local leaders.

In Pakistan, co-operative societies are generally considered to be ineffective, graft-ridden and cliquish organizations. They have very poor credibility among people. Thus the IRDP-sponsored co-operative societies begin with a reputational handicap. The results so far do not dispell this image.

In Punjab, despite an initial success in getting co-operative societies established, the performance of these institutions has not been promising. In comparing the programme-sponsored societies with similar older institutions we found that the average paid-up and working capitals of two types of co-operative societies were not much different. In Manawala, there were no visible distinguishing features of Markaz co-operative societies.

In Frontier, co-operative societies execute civil works with public funds. This is a unique role and it has generated considerable enthusiasm which is reflected in the sustained demand for forming new co-operative societies.

In Battal, Markaz officials had continued to be besieged by rival groups to be recognized as co-operative societies, even in the third year of the programme. Evidently the eligibility to get public funds had much to do with this popularity. The term co-operative society in Battal was synonymous with a construction enterprise. Our survey revealed that execution of civil works was the most commonly known function of co-operative societies in Battal. One striking revelation in Battal was that overwhelming proportion of the co-operative societies' leaders were local businessmen, semi-urbanized farmers or petty officials residing in ancestral villages. They are typically representatives of rural bourgeoisie. One of their prime assets is their familiarity with government procedures and felicity in cultivating acquaintance with public officials. These characteristics enhanced their acceptability as local leaders. It was this group which dominated Markaz co-operative societies. This pattern was detected, too late, to be formally investigated in Manawala. But in Battal, this could be documented with the data about the socio-economic characteristics of the co-operative societies' office bearers.

It can tentatively be concluded that the IRDP has attracted the same class of rural bourgeoisie *sofad posh* which normally appropriate any public development programme. In this case, the voluntary association with a co-operative group further reinforced cliquish tendencies. Co-operative societies were *ad hoc* functional groups which could seldom be credited with local representativeness. Whatever little benefits the IRDP confers, most likely those are being appropriated by the middle and upper classes.

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Appendix A

Objectives of the IRDP, Punjab

(A) Short-Term

- (i)** Formation of Farmer's co-operative Associations one in each village federating at the Markaz Farmer's Cooperative Association.
- (ii)** Preparation of production plans which emphasise optimum crop combinations.
- (iii)** Establishment of model farms one in each village and one at the Markaz level in order to demonstrate to the farmers the modern techniques of production.
- (iv)** Supply of agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, farm implements, and also farm machinery, irrigation facilities.
- (v)** Providing credit to the farmers on the basis of the suggested production plans.
- (vi)** Storage and marketing facilities that involve market committee and the farmer's co-operative associations at the village as well as at the Markaz level.
- (vii)** Farmer's training programme emphasizing farm management techniques.
- (viii)** Imparting social education and encouraging cultural self-reliance activities for inculcating a spirit of self help.

(B) Long-Term

- (i)** Transformation of farmer's associations into production co-operative and finally to social co-operatives.
- (ii)** Establishing training institutions for the farmers and the farms leaders to disseminate improved knowledge and skill among majority of the people in the rural areas.
- (iii)** Establishing local or feeder markets at the Markaz for ensuring reasonable price to the farmers and paying the way for market oriented economy.
- (iv)** Encouraging savings for increased farm investments.

- (v) Introducing mixed farm enterprises such as poultry, milk production sheep raising etc., to ensure increased incomes to the farmers.
- (vi) Planning and execution of the Peoples Works Programme for building necessary physical infrastructures.
- (vii) Preparing and executing of low cost housing schemes wherever necessary.
- (viii) Encouraging cottage industry and agro-allied industries based on local raw material to off-set the problems of open and disguised un and under-employment in the rural areas.
- (ix) Developing agro-service sector at the Markaz so as to encourage socio-economic and commercial activity.
- (x) Establishing vertical and horizontal coordination from project to national level. Establishment of vertical and horizontal co-ordination of the base-level activities within the over all economy.

Appendix B

List of Markazes in Punjab and Their Population

S. No.	Name of Markaz	District	Markaz Population in 1972
1.	Bahtar	Campbellpur	36,866
2.	Ikhlas	Campbellpur	63,145
3.	Daultala	Rawalpindi	102,062
4.	Chauntra	Rawalpindi	60,000
5.	Dhudial	Jhelum	86,527
6.	Choa Saiden Shah	Jhelum	98,417
7.	Jalalpore Jattan	Gujrat	102,000
8.	Mong	Gujrat	62,805
9.	Whando	Gu'ranwala	80,000
10.	Mansoorwali	Gu'ranwala	122,370
11.	Manawala	Sheikhupura	99,350
12.	More Khunda	Sheikhupura	169,800
13.	Chung	Lahore	194,000
14.	Kanganpur	Lahore	48,376
15.	Satrah	Sialkot	110,490
16.	Marakiwal	Sialkot	64,686
17.	Rajana	Lyallpur	110,000
18.	Thikriwala	Lyallpur	123,149
19.	Bhagtanwala	Sargodha	112,872
20.	Kot Moman	Sargodha	83,395
21.	Bhowana	Jhung	81,380
22.	Garh Maharaja	Jhung	58,900
23.	Kamar Mishani	Mianwali	155,133
24.	Kundian	Mianwali	97,290
25.	Hujra Shah Moqem	Sahiwal	151,532
26.	Harappa	Sahiwal	89,207
27.	Lar	Mu'tan	150,000
28.	Katcha Khoo	Multan	106,201
29.	Sher Sultan	Muzaffar Garh	89,995
30.	Sanawan	Muzaffar Garh	82,006
31.	Kot Chutta	D.G.Khan	114,012
32.	Umer Kot	D.G. Khan	50,436
33.	Dharanwala	Bahawal Nagar	78,500
34.	Madrasa	Bahawal Nagar	71,845
35.	Noor Pur Naurang	Bahawalpur	82,405
36.	Dera Bakha	Bahawalpur	53,203
37.	Zahirpir	Rahim Yar Khan	73,640
38.	Al'ahabad	Rahim Yar Khan	70,291

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, (Punjab).

Appendix Table B-1
Distribution of Agricultural Inputs in Punjab

S. No.	Markaz			Improved seed distributed per acre of cultivated land Under wheat	Fertilizer distributed per acre of total cultivated land
				(MDS)	(M. Tons)
1.	Chung	0.19	1.29
2.	Kanganpur	0.26	0.12
3.	Manawala	0.44	0.18
4.	More Khunda	0.78	0.10
5.	Whando	0.30	0.16
6.	Mansoor wali	0.25	0.15
7.	Satrah	0.09	0.05
8.	Marakiwal	0.37	0.38
9.	Daultala	0.00	0.01
10.	Chauntra	0.14	0.01
11.	Bahtar	0.13	0.01
12.	Ikhlas	0.05	0.01
13.	Dhudial	0.19	0.01
14.	Choa Saidu Shah	0.00	0.00
15.	Jalalpur Jattan	0.19	0.07
16.	Mong	0.15	0.06
17.	Bhagtanwala	0.23	0.11
18.	Kot Moman	0.15	0.04
19.	Rajana	0.15	0.08
20.	Thikriwala	0.15	0.10
21.	Bhowana	0.21	0.12
22.	Garh Maharaja	0.51	0.72
23.	Kamar Mashani	0.04	0.02
24.	Kundian	0.06	0.02
25.	Lar	0.33	0.19
26.	Katcha Khoo	0.30	0.03
27.	Hujra	0.75	0.23
28.	Harappa	0.44	0.10
29.	Sher Sultan	0.32	0.10
30.	Sanawan	0.09	0.01
31.	Kot Chutta	0.54	0.08
32.	Umer Kot	0.73	0.01
33.	Noorpur Naurang	0.33	0.02
34.	Dera Bakha	0.76	0.03
35.	Dharanwala	0.56	0.06
36.	Madrissa	0.08	0.02
37.	Zahirpir	0.05	0.01
38.	Allahabad	0.07	0.12
Average:				0.25	0.12

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, (Punjab).

Appendix Table B-2
IRDP Agricultural Services in Punjab

	Length of Roads		Villages Electrified (No.)	Villages provided Potable Water (No.)	Feeder Markets (No.)	Seed and Fertilizer Depots (No.)	Tractors Rented out (Hours)	Buldozers Rented out (Hours)
	Pucca (Miles)	Katcha (Miles)						
Achievements	340	405	199	16	24	134	20335	5100
No. of Centres Achieving	27	19	37	13	18	35	38	17
No. of Centre without any achievement	11	19	1	25	20	5	0	21
Average per Achieving Centre	12.6	21.3	5.4	1.2	1.3	3.8	535	300

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, (Punjab).

Appendix Table B-3

Performance of Co-operative Societies in Punjab

S. No.	Name of Markaz	Organized Societies (No.)	Registered Societies (No.)	Ratio of Share to Working Capital (No.)	Average Share Capital per Organized Society (Rs.)	Average Working Capital per organized Society (Rs.)
1.	Chung ..	78	78	0.45	760	1706
2.	Kanganpur ..	16	4	0.17	478	2790
3.	Manawala ..	47	22	0.42	717	1735
4.	More Khunda ..	11	11	0.31	2441	7976
5.	Whando ..	61	61	0.10	1381	14230
6.	Mansoorwali ..	39	24	0.24	916	7382
7.	Satrah ..	95	46	0.60	856	1437
8.	Marakiwal ..	12	—	—	—	—
9.	Daultala ..	72	60	0.18	479	2674
10.	Chauntra ..	14	3	—	—	—
11.	Bahtar ..	39	32	—	—	—
12.	Ikhlas ..	23	15	0.10	391	3783
13.	Dhudial ..	43	40	0.10	770	7738
14.	Choa Saidu Shah ..	10	4	0.06	274	4830
15.	Jalalpur Jattan ..	44	44	0.09	1173	12549
16.	Mong ..	25	17	0.97	888	920
17.	Bhagtanwala ..	53	53	0.11	2123	19183
18.	Kot Moman ..	18	7	0.12	1161	13356
19.	Rajana ..	67	58	0.54	2686	4966
20.	Thikriwala ..	24	15	0.11	2222	19547
21.	Bhowana ..	64	46	0.13	1876	14082
22.	Garh Maharaja ..	21	12	0.11	2022	18425
23.	Kamar Mishani ..	26	15	0.12	764	6289
24.	Kundian ..	10	7	0.23	660	2850
25.	Lar ..	54	41	—	7966	—
26.	Katcha Khoo ..	11	7	—	1827	—
27.	Hujra ..	80	64	0.37	1109	3056
28.	Harappa ..	21	4	0.43	61	143
29.	Sher Sultan ..	24	24	0.18	2320	13269
30.	Sanawan ..	5	4	0.70	2520	3600
31.	Kot Chutta ..	33	22	0.19	1190	6230
32.	Umar Kot ..	5	4	2.10	6460	3200
33.	Noorpur Naurang ..	63	53	0.20	927	4718
34.	Dera Bakha ..	21	21	—	825	—
35.	Dharanwala ..	72	67	0.84	3417	4057
36.	Madrissa ..	3	1	—	1000	—
37.	Zahirpir ..	25	12	0.43	2069	4769
38.	Allahabad ..	8	5	0.34	2081	6106

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, (Punjab).

Appendix Table B-4
Representatives of Nation Building Departments

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Total Markazes in Punjab	Agricultural officers posted	Veterinary officers posted	Social Welfare officers posted	Population planning officers posted	Co-operative Deptt's CI CSI posted	ADBP officers posted	Education officers posted	
No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	
38	28 73.7	34 89.5	22 57.9	29 76.3	22 57.9	22 57.9	11 28.9	
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Local Govt. officers posted	WAPDA officers posted	Food Inspectors posted	Health officers posted	Forest officers posted	Revenue officers posted	Malaria officers posted	Fisheries Deptt. officers posted	Soil Conservation officers posted
No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %
15 39.5	19 50	12 31.6	24 63.2	23 60.5	13 34.2	12 31.6	8 21.1	8 21.1

Source : Directorate of the IRDP, (Punjab).

Appendix Table B-5

Informant's Occupation

S.No.	Occupant	Number	Percentage
1.	Arhtis/shopkeepers, Big farmer owners	7	31.8
2.	Ex-Servicemen/Medium farmer owner/Teacher	7	31.8
3.	Small farmer owner/small entrepreneurs	3	13.7
4.	Non-Agricultural Labour	5	22.7
Total:		22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table B-6

Informant's Status

S. No	Role	Number	Percentage
1.	Influentials/Initiators	11	50.0
2.	Opinion Makers/Disseminators	7	31.8
3.	Followers	4	18.2
Total:		22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Note :- (a) Influentials/Initiators include big land owners, Shopkeepers in near by Towns, *Nambardars*, Ex-B.D. Chairmen, Retired officials, School Teachers and elders of predominant *Baradari*.

(b) Opinion Makers/Disseminators, include Medium farmers, Village Shopkeepers, *Imam Masjid*.

(c) Followers, include Small owner farmers, Tenants, Non-Agricultural makes and *Kamis*.

Appendix Table B-7
Shift Towards Manawala

Goods and Services	(Yes)		(No)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Banking	3	13.6	19	86.4
Buying and Selling	4	18.2	18	81.8
IRDP related Services	6	27.3	16	72.7
Government Services	1	4.5	21	95.5

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table B-8
Information about Village Society Members

Response	Number	Percentage
No Member	8	36.4
Could name a member but not his name ..	1	4.5
Could name a member and his activities ..	7	31.8
Don't Know/No Response	6	27.3
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table B-9

Awareness of IRDP

Category	(Yes)	
	Numbers	Percentage
Almost Everybody	9	40.9
Rich and Educated only	2	9.1
Most of the farmers only	7	31.8
Some Selected farmers only	4	18.2
Total :	22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table B-10

Needs of the Village

S. No.	Needs	1st Mention (Yes)		2nd Mention (Yes)		3rd Mention (Yes)	
		No.	Per.	No.	Per.	No.	Per.
1.	Fertilizer/seed	1	4.5	3	13.6	2	9.1
2.	Co-operative Society	1	4.5	4	18.3	—	—
3.	Drinking Water	7	31.8	—	—	4	18.3
4.	Roads	2	9.1	7	31.8	5	22.6
5.	School	7	31.8	4	18.3	6	27.3
6.	Dispensary/Hospital	—	—	1	4.5	—	—
7.	Irrigation Water	—	—	—	—	3	13.6
8.	Others	4	18.3	3	13.5	2	9.1

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table B-11

Change in Living Conditions of Poor

S.No.	Response	Number	Percentage
1.	Not Improved	12	54.5
2.	Uncertain	1	4.5
3.	Improved	8	36.5
4.	Improved for Agriculture/labour only ..	1	4.5
Total:		22	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix C

Objectives of the IRDP in North West Frontier Province

- (i) To establish a Centre (Markaz) of development administration for a conveniently small area (a police station area in NWFP) To construct here office building and a residential colony to accommodate all departmental representatives. To promote coordination between the departmental and local institutions like cooperatives and self government.
- (ii) To establish Local Government Council at union level and markaz level. To locate the markaz council at the centre and coordinate its work with the departments through a local government official (at present called Project Manager) and an elected Chairman of the council.
- (iii) To plan and complete the physical infrastructure for the area, roads, drainage, irrigation, land improvement and electrification.
- (iv) To make organisation and mobilization of the village people as the chief concern of the centre To create for this purpose, the self government councils, and a two tier cooperative system (village primary cooperatives and markaz federation).
- (v) To train intensively and continuously many cadres of local leaders (councillors, cooperative managers, model farmers, project committees, teachers, etc.).
- (vi) To promote extension education and servicing by all nation building departments through village institutions, especially cooperatives.
- (vii) To create a strong and viable structure of cooperative credit for the majority of farmers (most of them small) in the shape of the two tier cooperative system, the primary villages societies and the markaz federation. To promote thrift, saving and investment, alongwith credit, to collect equity capital and aim at self-financing and self-management. To coordinate the extension and servicing activities of the department with cooperatives. The federation's function will be to coordinate, train and supervise, alongwith banking. The village cooperatives, in most cases, will be entrusted with the execution of infrastructure works.
- (viii) To add gradually other blocks (e.g., machine workshop and tractor station, tube-well drilling and maintenance section, cooperative

processing unit, agro-industries). The emphasis will be on the growth and expansion of the cooperative sector, financed and controlled by the majority of small farmers.

(ix) As the villages become better organised and more productive, to expand the health and education programmes, *e.g.*, establish a school board to organise alongwith the existing institutions, literacy, youth and women programmes.

(x) Integration with Regional Planning and Agrovilles.

Appendix Table C-1

Works Expenditures in the N.W.F.P.

S. No.	Name of Markaz	Expenditure (1975-1976) Rs.
1.	Toru	288221
2.	Kulachi	444934
3.	Darbana	304850
4.	Ghazni Khel	203189
5.	Bilitang	365524
6.	Akora Khattak	674600
7.	Bari Kot	535008
8.	Mohri Bedban	344000
9.	Battal	366663
10.	Drosh	553051
11.	Khawaz Khela	230175
12.	Daudzai	834580
13.	Top	222156
14.	Dir	219233
15.	Doabe	279234
	Total :	5555818
	Average :	370,388

Source : Directorate of Rural Development, Peshawar.

Appendix Table C-2

Informant's Occupation

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Shopkeepers/Farmer owner/Professionals	11	55.0
Small farmer owner	8	40.0
Tenants	1	5.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table C-3

Informant's Status

Status	Number	Percentage
Influentials/Initiator	7	35.0
Disseminators/Opinion maker ..	9	45.0
Follower	4	20.0
Total:	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

- Note* :— (a) Influential/Initiators include Big land owners, Shopkeepers in nearby towns, Ex-B.D. Chairman, Retired Officials, School Teachers etc.
 (b) Disseminators/Opinion makers include Medium farmers, village shopkeepers, *Imam Masjid*.
 (c) Followers include Small farmer owner, Tenants, Non-Agricultural labour and *Kamis* etc.

Appendix Table C-4

Shift Towards Battal

Goods and Services	Yes		No	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Banking	0	0.0	20	100.00
Buying and Selling	1	5.0	19	95.00
IRDP related services	11	55.0	9	45.00
Government Services	1	5.0	19	95.00

Source : The Village Survey

Appendix Table C-5

Meetings of Village Societies

Response	Number	Percentage
Don't know	1	5.0
Infrequently	1	5.0
Regularly	15	75.0
Not Applicable	3	15.0
Total :	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table C-6
Accomplishment of Co-operative Societies

Accomplishment	1st Mention (Yes)		2nd Mention (Yes)		3rd Mention (Yes)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Drinking Water	1	5.0	—	—	—	—
Irrigation Water	3	15.0	2	10.0	1	5.0
Roads	8	40.0	—	—	—	—
Co-operative Society	—	—	1	5.0	—	—
Co-operative Loans	—	—	—	—	—	—
Flood Control <i>Bunds</i> /Dams	—	—	3	15.0	1	5.0
No Response/Nothing	8	40.0	14	70.0	18	90.0
Total:	20	100.0	20	100.0	20	100.0

Source: The Village Survey

Appendix Table C-7
Information about IRDP Officials

Response	Number	Percentage
Don't know	3	15.0
Heard of them/know them	8	40.0
Know and informed	9	45.0
Total:	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table C-8

Needs of Village

S. No	Needs	1st Mention		2nd Mention		3rd Mention	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1.	Co-operatives/others	2	10.0	3	15.0	5	25.0
2.	Electricity ..	2	10.0	1	5.0	1	5.0
3.	Irrigation Water ..	1	5.0	5	25.0	2	10.0
4.	Drinking Water ..	10	50.0	4	20.0	3	15.0
5.	Road	5	25.0	3	15.0	2	10.0
6.	Street Paving ..	—	—	4	20.0	4	20.0
7.	Dispensary ..	—	—	—	—	2	10.0
8.	School ..	—	—	—	—	1	5.0
Total:		20	100.0	20	100.0	20	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.

Appendix Table C-9

Status of Society Office Bearers

S.No.	Status	Number	Percentage
1.	Influential/Initiator	34	45.9
2.	Disseminator/Opinion maker	24	32.5
3.	Follower	16	21.6
Total:		74	100.0

Source : The Village Survey.:

Note :— (a) Influential/Initiators include Big land owners/Shopkeepers in nearby towns/*Nambardars*/Ex-B.D. Chairman/Retired officials/School teachers.

(b) Disseminators/Opinion Makers/include Medium farmers-Village Shopkeepers/*Imam Masjid*/Ex-*Patwari* etc.

(c) Followers include Small farmer owners/Tenants/Non-Agricultural workers and *Kamis* etc.

Appendix D

Research Methodology

Evaluation Approach

The methodology of this study is determined by the nature of the programme it purports to evaluate. The IRDP is an instrument of organizing local populations and co-ordinating public services. Its aims are broad *i.e.* seek income and welfare changes in the rural sector. Yet the measures undertaken by the programme are only vaguely related to these broader goals.

The operational objectives have not been clearly spelled out. Even a consistent statement of objectives was not to be found. The methodology had to be designed within these parameters.

At the outset, it became obvious that the evaluation was going to be a study in the 'efficacy' of the programme and not its 'efficiency'. The former being a goal achievement test and the latter being the conventional economic analysis *i.e.* cost/benefit (Freeman 1970 : 81). This decision was necessary because the programme does not have well defined material inputs and correlated outputs whose values might be used as indices of costs and benefits. To clarify the nature of goals and to derive a set of instrumental objectives for evaluation, various statements of the programme were analyzed and seven instinct elements identified to serve as the analytical guided data collection and assessments. Findings were logically analyzed to determine whether the programme was helping to realize broad income and welfare objectives. This is not an uncommon procedure for the evaluation of such programmes.

Another methodological issue was whether to set up control areas matched with Markazes to be studied and then by comparison to derive conclusions about effects produced by the programme. It is a text book procedure for evaluation, though it is seldom applied in social research. Anyway, our decision to opt out of this procedure was guided by some logical reasons. The difficulties of matching control and experimental areas are well known. It is also obvious that time series data of significant social indicators must exist to obtain desired results for such a procedure. It is almost an exception where one finds such preconditions fulfilled. Even in countries like U.S.A. and Canada very few programmes are being evaluated under such experimental procedures. Apart from these limitations there is a question about the nature of the programme being evaluated.

The IRDP is not a programme with substantial material inputs which must have produced noticeable effects on Social outputs. If one was testing

the effect of new seed or fertilizer, one is dealing with a situation where a well defined input is related with a measurable output. In such conditions, an experimental design is a valid procedure. But in a programme aiming to promote people's participation, or integration of public services or enhance centrality of a town, input-output relations are not precise enough to allow an experimental design. These are organizational norms whose realization is assumed to be beneficial in contemporary developmental ideology. Thus, the evaluation of the IRDP is essentially a task of assessing the realization of a set of norms. It has to be a linear, ex-post facts procedure. Our point is that the nature of the programme is such that it could not have admitted an experimental design.

Field Procedures

Two Markazes chosen for the in-depth study were meant to be the representative of the programme efforts. The choice was based on two criteria (i) a Markaz should have been in operation for 2-3 years to allow the programme to take hold (ii) a Markaz should not be a pilot project which receives greater attention and resources. Battal in the N.W.F.P. and Manawala in Punjab were among few Markazes in respective provinces meeting these criteria. The choice was, obviously, purposive as well as representative.

Within each Markaz four villages were selected for field surveys. In each case the selected villages had been included in an earlier base line survey. Among those selected were villages of varying accessibility and social mix. Taking into consideration, the specific programme elements of each province, two interview schedules were prepared (and pretested) to obtain data about the feelings and experiences of various caste/class groups in sampled villages. It must be noted that our focus was on group rather than individual reactions. How *Zamindars* or *Kamis* or *Sheikhs* as a group felt and thought about the Markaz? and what they felt to be its benefits or disutilities for them. These questions were sought to be answered for a group in each village through an informant.

To choose an informant, the social structure of a village (*i.e.* caste/class mix) was initially outlined and care was taken to include representatives of all significant groups. At this point, it must be emphasized that this is a methodological departure from interviewing procedures commonly outlined in text books. Social Scientists trained in western liberal tradition tend to base their data on opinions of and experiences of individuals obtained behind the veil of seclusion and secrecy. This procedure is valid only for social structures characterized by high degree of individualization and atomization. In Pakistan, particularly in its rural areas, an individual is almost inseparable from his kin/class group. In villages, it is rare to find an individual interviewee coming forward alone for an interview. Most of village social surveys are done in group settings, yet the pretense of having obtained individual responses is maintained without questioning the basis of such a requirement. Freire has indicated

that learning and thinking is a group experience in the third world countries [Freire 1970]. To accept that group is the basic unit of opinions and experiences for public affairs and to design research instruments on this basis is a more realistic approach for rural studies in Pakistan. This study made the choice consciously. It preceded to tap collective opinions by asking respondents to articulate feelings and experiences of their reference groups (Kin, *Baradari*) and, wherever feasible, by encouraging some group discussions before identifying the consensual response. In one sense, it has made explicit the group influence which normally remains submerged in social science practice in rural Pakistan.

Overall, there is a bias in this study towards respondents and groups associated with the IRDP. This bias should favour the IRDP. As the evaluation reveals that the programme have had a very modest degree of effectiveness, it must thus be read that the programme might have been less effective than what has been concluded, because of the favourable bias in the selection of respondents. Certainly the programme could not have been more effective than what the study suggests.

Notes:

Freeman, Howard. (1970) *Social Research and Social Policy*. New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

Freire, Paulo. (1970) *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York, The Seabury Press.

Appendix E

Interview Schedule, Manawala

Village	Persons Interviewed
Nathuwala	6
Walipur Bura	5
Lagar	5
Mohammad pura	6
Total :	22

Appendix F

Interview Schedule, Battal

Village	Persons Interviewed
Malookra	6
Bajna.. .. .	6
Bai Bala	5
Sachan Kalan	3
Total :	20

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