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
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John E. Anderson
U.E.A. Social Science
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PRIMARY SCHOOL LEAVERS IN RURAL AREAS

An enquiry into the occupations and activities of male primary school leavers in the Kikuyu and Tetu locations of Central Province Kenya.

One of the most perplexing features of the developing nations is the rural primary school leaver. He has become a paradox of great interest and speculation. Briefly, it appears that while his years of formal education may prepare him to be more useful in the essential nation building roles of small scale farming and rural development, they also whet his appetite for secondary education and wage employment in the modern urban sector, so scarce in the early stages of development.

Exacerbated by population growth and the falling school age, yearly waves of young primary school leavers apparantly meet frustration as they search to fulfil their early hopes, but little is known of how they actually occupy their time. This paper attempts to look at the experiences of two very small groups in the Central Province of Kenya.

In Kenya in 1965 with approximately 50% of the requisite age group receiving primary schooling, 150,048 pupils, enrolled in St.7 and the remaining St.8 classes, left school.[1] So far only very general estimates have been made of the destinations of primary school leavers. The Education Commission Report made a rough calculation of the distribution of the 1964 school leavers and a C.C.K. working party followed this by attempting a more detailed assessment of the 1965 output.[2] The activities of these primary school leavers formed an important part of the work of the recent Kericho Conference and the enquiries described in this paper were undertaken to provide background material for this conference. Time did not permit a widespread investigation but it was felt that a small case study would be useful in giving detail to the general assessments which had been made. The enquiries which this paper describes attempted to trace two small groups of primary school leavers, to look at the type of occupations they have eventually undertaken and to enquire more closely into the lives of those who had remained at home without the hoped for secondary education or wage employment. While the results cannot be considered nationally representative, it is beleived that they offer details and insights about the lives of young people living in the rural areas described.

METHODOLOGY

The areas which were selected were the Kikuyu area of Kiambu district, and the Tetu location of Nyeri district. Whilst it was appreciated that they offered different rural settings the reason for their selection was that the writer had personal contacts in these places and some knowledge of local conditions. Different experiments were tried and in each case the primary school was used as the basis for analysis.

1. A written questionnaire was given to the Standard 7 class of three primary schools in each area.[3] The questionnaire was designed to question the pupils about employment aspirations, their knowledge of the educational and employment structure of the country and the type of help they looked for when they left school in order to give a background for the later work.

1. Ministry of Education Annual Summary 1965 p. 21.
2. Report of the Kenya Education Commission and 'After School What', the report of the CCK/CCEA working party.
3. The schools used were:

Kikuyu		Tetu	
Kikuyu -	Thogoto Primary School	Tetu -	Giathakwa Primary School
	Thirime Primary School		Wandumbi Primary School
	Mai-a-hii Primary School		Kiriti Primary School

The questionnaire was first pilot tested in January 1966 at two schools in the Kiambaa district of Kiambu and a revised version was then given to three primary schools in each of the selected areas. The questions were in English but a Kikuyu speaking supervisor was present to help with difficulties. The results of these questionnaires have been tabulated and used but they should be treated with caution. Primary school children have great difficulty in expressing their views correctly in English. There are tendencies to give quick answers, to try to please, to copy from neighbours, to miss items out and so on. Nevertheless, as general guide-lines, such questionnaires did provide useful information about the hopes and beliefs of pupils about to leave school.

2. A second experiment was to try and trace a group of Primary school leavers for a given year, in this case 1964. The method used was first to question the headmaster and teachers at the school, and then to question the pupils of Standards 6 & 7 and to compare results. Each boy's name was mentioned and all the various responses recorded. In the great majority of cases it soon became clear who really knew what had happened to the boy in question. A pilot-test was carried out in Kiambaa and then a very careful study in Tetu during which a local investigator went to each boy's home to check information if there were any doubts. This may seem a very rough and ready method but I beleive it was remarkably accurate. During this enquiry the investigator, a local teacher, visited the home of every school leaver who was residing there and interviewed the leaver and his parents. He also visited the schools and talked to the headmaster and teachers about school records.

A similar enquiry was tried with 1964 leavers from Thogoto School at Kikuyu. As many as possible of the leavers were traced and a special tea party was organised to which all the male leavers from the school still living at home without employment or secondary education were invited in order to be interviewed. It was intended to use this technique as no permanent interviewer could be employed in the Kikuyu area. In fact no further schools were investigated in this way, but during the course of the discussions with the leavers from Thogoto school the two interviewers, Mr. Job Watene, a temporary teacher at the Alliance High School and myself, were asked to start a class for local school leavers. After the necessary negotiations a class was started in March 1966, although it was stressed from the beginning that the class would have a "club" atmosphere, that there would be no attempt to work for examinations and that academic subjects would only be taught because of their usefulness or interest. English and Arithmetic have been given a commercial slant and subjects like simple Economics and Current Affairs have been included and are very popular. This "club" was first operated at Thogoto Primary School but has now been transferred to the Institute of Adult Studies, and teachers from the Alliance Boy's High School and the Institute are giving classes. The attendance at the club has varied and changes in membership have occured, but a hard core has remained and although this changes as older members find employment or move away, the club has gradually grown. Two girls have now found their way in.

This venture has provided a very useful contact with a group of Primary school leavers and one of the rules of the club has been that each student should keep a diary which has been marked each week. This has kept the students writing in English, has provided a basis for English corrective exercises, and of course has provided some very useful insights into the activities of young men in the Kikuyu area. It is from these diaries and general conversations with club members that the description of teenage life in the Kikuyu area has been built up.

It is generally assumed that approximately two thirds of Primary school pupils are boys and one third are girls and that the important age period is 7 - 13. However areas differ. In some areas, Nyeri and Kiambu included, nearly all the children go to Primary school and there is a relatively young school population; in others a much smaller percentage go to school and there is an older primary school population. The ages of the pupils in the Standard 7s' questioned ranged from 11-19 for both boys and girls and were mostly clustered between 13 and 16.

One of the significant features of this age level in Standard 7 is the paradox of opportunities for leavers. The younger pupils are much more acceptable to secondary school principals but are too small for paid employment, whilst the reverse is true for the older pupils. As the school entry age falls so the "gap" between leaving primary school and being old enough to find employment widens.[1]

This section of the paper considers the primary school pupil about to leave school. It is recognised that the "unschooled" are just as great a consideration but they have not been taken into account in this paper because in the areas studied they do not form a large group. The emphasis in this account is given to boys rather than girls because the thinking which gave rise to this study assumed that boys posed a more urgent employment problem. Girls however are considered at various points and it has become clear that in terms of aspirations the girl school leaver is every bit as hopeful and determined as her male counterpart.

The aspirations of the pupils about to leave primary school have been the focus of much interest and a number of detailed studies have been made recently in East Africa.[2] Only a brief look is taken here and it is focused mainly on the knowledge of the school leaver about the job market he is going into and the degree of realism with which he prepares for his probable lot.

The pupils ranked seven of the major alternatives which face them after leaving school as follows:

1. Government aided secondary school
2. Training Couses, (e.g. E.A.R. & H., E.A.P. & L., Police, etc),
3. Government Trade Schools
4. Private Secondary School (Girls marked employment as highly
5. Harambee Secondary School as this type of secondary education)
6. Employment
7. Work at home on father's land.

The question was badly phrased in that the obvious first choice was put at No. 1 and the least popular at No.7 but even so the results clearly confirmed the overriding popularity of the government secondary school and the unpopularity of work at home. The intermediate rankings were much less clear cut but in general education was preferred to direct employment, underlining the assumption that some form of education or training offers access to better jobs. However, both boys and girls seem to prefer the prospect of government training couses and government technical and trade schools to private secondary schools or harambee schools, suggesting that a safe 'blue collar' training is preferable to a doubtful 'white' one. This was confirmed in interviews. In many cases girls preferred direct employment to less secure educational possibilities.

1. The concept of the "gap" and its complications is explained in the Report of the CCK/CCEA Working Party "After School What?"

2. See D. Koff 'Education and Employment Perspectives of Kenya Primary Pupils'
J.B. Heijnen 'Results of a Job Preference Test' (Standard 8 pupils, Mwanza, Tanzania)
Both these are Kericho Conference Papers.

A second question, somewhat more projective in approach, asked pupils to choose the best of four possibilities and to give their reasons. The results are given below:

Boys	Kikuyu				Tetu				Total
	M	Tho	Thi		W	K	G		
1. Harambee School	32	25	20	77	21	9	7	37	114
2. Get a job	7	15	7	29	24	22	9	55	84
3. Land on Settlement scheme	7	6	3	16	7	19	6	32	48
4. Work on father's farm	1	0	0	1	0	3	2	5	6
TOTAL	47	46	30	123	52	53	24	129	252

Girls	M	Tho	Thi		W	K	G		Total
1. Get a job	9	17	7	33	19	24	6	49	82
2. Harambee School	16	15	14	45	8	6	10	24	69
3. Land on settlement scheme	3	5	3	11	0	6	2	8	19
4. Work on father's farm	3	0	0	3	1	0	2	3	6
TOTAL	31	37	24	92	28	36	20	82	176

They confirm the interest in secondary education but offer an interesting comparison with the desire for employment. Overall, girls preferred employment to Harambee school education, one of the reasons being that they felt that fathers were less likely to pay fees for them. But there was also a significant difference between the two areas, employment being more popular in Tetu with both boys and girls than Harambee school education. This is difficult to understand, but it seems to lie in the greater sophistication in the Kikuyu area, where so many people are employed in Nairobi. Boys particularly are more aware of the difficulties of getting a job and the need for some form of further education, no matter how doubtful, in order to improve job prospects. Pupils in Tetu, less aware of these difficulties, are apparantly still seeing Harambee school education as an alternative to immediate employment, whilst in Kikuyu boys are more likely to regard it as a pre-requisite. It must also be mentioned that Harambee schools in the Kikuyu area are generally more developed, better equipped and staffed than those in Tetu. The reasons given for choices, showed a remarkable degree of realism. While Harambee education was still selected because "I want to get more education to become an important man", many pupils rejected it because of the cost or preferred employment because of the need to give immediate help in the family. One boy illustrated the dilemmas "Because we have no farm I want to get a job, because my father like me to get the job. He can not get the money (for fees) because harambee secondary school is not good." The interest in land on a settlement scheme, whilst not great, at least points to some recognition of the need to rely on agriculture and a latent interest in farming. The nineteen boys from Kiriti school emphasised the importance of land the basic need for food, and more specifically "because I can grow cash crops", and "because I want to be a farmer." The boys and girls choosing to work at home were perhaps a surprise but tend to confirm the interest in farming where it is profitable. The one boy in the Kikuyu area comes from a family running a market garden. Three of the boys in Tetu come from families with farms growing cash crops and two of them mention the returns these crops bring. One boy wanted to work with his father and the sixth partly misunderstood the question, assuming that he would be given land. The three girls from Kikuyu had fathers with large farms (50, 17, 8 acres) and the three girls in Tetu all came from farms growing cash crops.

The job preference question asked: "If you cannot go to a secondary school what type of job available to primary school leavers would you most like to do?" and "Why do you think you will like this job?" A table of the selections follows:

BOYS

KIKUYU		TETU	
Mechanic/Engineer	30	Teacher	37
Teacher	18	Police	15
Farmer	18	Driver	14
Clerk	15	Mechanic/Engineer	14
Driver	9	clerk/typing	14
Railway (EAR & H)	5	EAR & H	8
Musician	4	EAP & L	5
Navy	3	Shopkeeper/Trader	5
Agriculture Instructor	2	Army	4
Dresser	2	Dresser	3
Traffic Warden	2	Agriculture	3
EAP & L /Electrician	2	Veterinary	3
Salesman	1	Post Office	1
Artist	1	Book Keeping	1
Office Boy	1	Surveying	1
Bus Driver	1	Navy	1
Electrician	1	Carpenter	1
Tailor	1		
Police	1		
Mason	1		
Plumber	1		
Priest	1		
Businessman	1		
Manager	1		

GIRLS

KIKUYU		TETU	
Nursing	45	Nursing	38
Teaching	25	Teaching	36
Clerk/Typist	10	Clerk/Typist	13
Farming	4	Police	1
Tailor	3	Trader	1
Nursery	1	Agriculture	1
Musician	1		

In asking open ended questions it was hoped than an insight into pupils' knowledge of the job market as well as his preferences would be shown. The results shown in the table must be treated with caution as copying obviously took place and the interpretation of obscure choices was necessary. It is clear that girls are just as job-oriented as the boys, though the range of choice is less. In general the most popular choices for boys were teacher, mechanic/engineer, clerk and driver. The main reason for the popularity of these choices seems to be that they are occupations which do not involve heavy physical labour and can be obtained without further education. The popularity of mechanic/engineer is very interesting for it is only recently that Africans have been able to apprentice themselves to this trade and opportunities are still limited. Nevertheless boys seem to realise the value of mechanic's skill and the ability to handle his tools clearly has prestige.

The reasons given for choosing jobs provided some interesting insights into pupils' thinking but showed an unfortunate lack of understanding about the training necessary for jobs and procedure for obtaining them. In a very large number of cases a regular salary is the first and foremost consideration and the reason given for selecting

all types of jobs. A second common reason is to help people, children or the government, and a third was the opportunity for further study. Turning to more specific reasons:

(a) Teacher

"It is because I am going to be employed quickly."

"I shall be given further training."

An untrained teacher's post is clearly much sought after for these reasons: Teaching also offers security and is not considered hard work.

"I can do it even when I am old."

"It is not very hard." "It is an easy job."

This sentiment was repeated several times for the most popular jobs - "hard work" is clearly seen as monotonous or strenuous physical labour.

(b) Mechanic/Engineer

Several boys wished to be engineers because of the high pay, but they were hazy about the details. "Engineer" and "mechanic" in many cases meant in reality motor mechanic.

"I would like to be an engineer...... to be one who can tell the noise of a car then say what is wrong with it."

"I like this job because it is not hard to be trained."

"Even those who are not educated can do it."

Yet a mechanic's job clearly has prestige and interest:

"I like this job because if I know about it I will be able to make something important."

(c) Clerk

Clerking is popular but not unduly so and it is interesting that other more specialised "white collar" jobs are identified: typist, office boy, "Office master' and book keeper, although ironically one of the commonest reasons for choosing these types of jobs is because it was felt that they did not require further education beyond the skill of typing:

"It is work I can do with my little education."

(d) Farming, Agriculture, Veterinary

Surprisingly farming was much more popular in Kikuyu than in Tetu, possibly because the pupils of Kikuyu realise how much harder it is to get other forms of employment and because land is so scarce they value farming more greatly. The difficulties of land shortage were mentioned frequently and the need to "get money by farming." Others show a rural sentiment: "Many Africans are farmers.", "Because I know farming." One does not get the impression that there is a general dislike of farming, only perhaps a dislike of the hard physical labour involved.. Beyond this, a latent interest in farming shows through, although it is only strong where good cash returns are being made.

The straggling distribution of the less popular choices shows up the uneven knowledge of the job market. Often such jobs were chosen because of a relative's influence. One girl in the pre-test gave a clue by selecting the East African Railways because "My sister works there and she can employ me." Girls tended to give more altruistic reasons for their selection of nursing and teaching and also mentioned such comments as:

"I like looking after little children."

The income provided was important and so was the status. Nursing was seen as a job in which "You don't get free time but it is a good job." It also had value in that "I can learn hygiene and help my family."

A final question asked for the leavers' views of their prospects:

"Now think carefully. It is difficult to get a place in a secondary school or to get a job. What do you think you will be doing one year after you leave school?"

This question is clearly loaded because of the attempt to get the children to think at the right level. In Kikuyu 50% of the boys and 58% of the girls and in Tetu 86% of the boys and 95% of the girls gave answers such as "helping my parents", "farming at home", or "looking after cattle", although many also contained provisos about "studying at home" and "doing correspondance." Few of the pupils gave definite answers about looking for work; very few thought they would have a job. Some, mainly in Kikuyu, mentioned the possibilities of repeating and the need to study at home because"my father has no land." One boy outlined his programme:

"I will first be borrowing books from friends who are a class ahead and then I will be studying hard and during my resting time I will be helping my parents with any work at home."

In summing up expectations it is apparent that school leavers do have a fairly realistic attitude to the lives they are likely to lead after school, albeit a disappointed one. There is the full realisation that education leads to a better job and must be sought either in or out of school. All types of jobs are eagerly sought though a weather eye is kept for educational/promotional opportunities involved. In respect of agriculture, there is an ambivalent attitude; an underlying respect for land and farming skill lingers in many young people and can be aroused (witness the 4K clubs) but unless agriculture can demonstrate powers to provide more than a subsistence living it cannot compete with regular income jobs and in areas where families are large and land is over-committed or unavailable, it is a non-starter.

WHERE DO SCHOOL LEAVERS GO?

In its assessment for 1964 the Kenya Education Commission calculated that of the 103, 400 school leavers 11.5% went to secondary school, 3.5% found some form of training course, and 19.5% entered wage employment, leaving 65.5% with "no prospect of wage earning employment or further education." [1]

Since 1964 changes have taken place. Training course selectors and employers are now increasingly using a year or two's secondary education as a criterion to separate possible candidates from the great mass of K.P.E. holders. [2]

1. Kenya Education Commission Report. Vol. 1. .p.135

2. The introduction of the Kenya Juniour Secondary Certificate will almost certainly increase this tendency.

Teachers Colleges select older candidates who already have some experience as untrained teachers, the tendency to repeat primary education is more pronounced and the provision of unaided secondary schools has increased greatly.

A pilot study of two schools in the Kiambaa area of Kiambu, about 15 miles from Nairobi, where market gardening flourishes, showed that of 119 male school leavers (1964) traced at the end of 1965 7% were in aided secondary schools. 23% in unaided secondary schools and 32% were repeating primary school. 4% had found local wage employment as market attendants or on farms and 5% had found jobs away from home mainly in Nairobi. 17% were living and working at home and 2% had gone to live with relatives. This figure would probably have been larger if the 8% untraced could have been found. A final 2% were accounted for in prison and a mental hospital. A full survey was then carried out from April to June 1966 in the Tetu location of Nyeri. All 203 male leavers (1964) from four schools were traced. The table below shows the activities of these boys approximately 16 months after they had left school:-

	1st Attempt at KPE in 1964	Repeating KPE in 1964	Total	%
1. Education				
Aided secondary schools Form 2 (1966)	5	19	24	12
Form 1 1966 (repeated St. 7 in 1965)	7	4	11	5.5
Unaided secondary schools Forms 1 & 2	29	20	49	24
Government & Commercial Training Courses	0	0	0	0
Primary Schools (i.e. repeating St.7 in 1966)[1]	26	6	32	15.5
2. Wage Employment				
Living at home & going to work	4	2	6	3
Living away & going to work[2]	8	4	12	6
3. NO Wage Employment				
Living at home	33	15	48	23.5
Living away with relatives	15	2	17	8.5
4. Other				
Family moves from the area	2	0	2	1
Lost contact with home	2	0	2	1
	131	72	203	100

1. One boy was repeating St.6.

2. Only one boy amongst those working had completed a training course. He had become a police constable.

Briefly, the destinations of primary school leavers can be divided up into a few convenient groups:

1. Secondary Education

(i) Government maintained and assisted schools.
(ii) Unaided mission schools - normally older schools of reasonable standard that have not received grants in aid.
(iii) Unaided harambee (community self selp) schools, offering education to Kenya Junior Secondary Certificate and in some cases to School Certificate.
(iv) Unaided private schools and commercial colleges - these are run for profit and usually offer a very inadequate education aiming at School Certificate. The commercial colleges vary from those offering courses up to School Certificate level plus some book-keeping and a little typing, to those offering sketchy typing lessons for perhaps an hour a day for a few weeks.

Of the 203 students in Tetu who left school in December 1964, there were approximately 42% occupied in some form of secondary education in May 1966. It should be noted that some of those going to private schools or harambee schools (particularly private schools) tend to drop out, but others remaining at home may decide to enrol a year later.

2. Primary Education

In many parts of Kenya there is an understandable desire for pupils to try to repeat Standard 7 in the hope of either getting a K.P.E. Certificate or better grades and consequently a secondary school place. This matter is largely left in the hands of the Headmaster although it is understood that Standard 7 places must not be denied to regular pupils and Standard 7 classes must not be overcrowded. In fact, repeating goes on to a very large degree and some children repeat Standard 6 and lower forms in order to better their chances. Repeating three and four times is not unheard of, particularly in the case of younger boys who stand a good chance of eventually getting a secondary school place. [1] At the beginning of each school year many primary headmasters are faced with large numbers of anxious parents but in fairness to them they generally try to adopt a policy of selecting the better and younger pupils. It is in their interest to do so, of course, because much of their work is measured in the local community by the number of secondary school places that the school obtains. Of the 203 boys who took K.P.E. in Tetu in 1964, 36% were repeaters and in 1966, 25 boys were still repeating Standard 7, 6 for at least the second time and one was repeating Standard 6 as he was a very young student.

1. One Tetu boy was traced who had repeated 3 times eventually getting a place at a government secondary school.

3. Training Courses

1. Government Technical and Trade Schools.

There are at present 7 of these schools which take in students at the K.P.E. level and offer 2 year courses leading to the Government Trade Test Grade 3 and 3 year courses leading to the Grade 2 Test.

2. Departmental Training Courses.

These include the P3 Teacher Training Courses run by the Ministry of Education Teacher Training Colleges and courses run by such orgainisations as the Police Training School and the Training Hospitals.

3. The National Youth Service.

This recruits a number of post primary boys in each district annually.

4. Voluntary and Commercial Training Schools.

These are training schools run by various private companies and voluntary agencies e.g. The East African Power and Lighting Company Training School and the Christian Industrial Training Centre.

In general, these courses are very popular and there is strong competition for places which are hard to find. Of the 203 boys leaving school in 1964, only one found such a course. He trained to be a policeman.

4. Employment

In both the Kiambaa and Tetu studies 9-10% of the leavers had found employment and the majority of these had had to leave home to do so. Further investigations showed that in most cases employment had been secured through relatives or other personal contacts although one or two boys had simply been lucky.

5. Living away with relatives

It is understandable that school leavers, hoping for employment should go to live with relations who have homes in urban areas. In some cases they go to act as temporary servants, but often they walk the streets making up a sizeable proportion of the urban unemployed, in some cases becoming a disruptive influence in the life of their urban relatives. In the Tetu study, 8% of students were living away with urban relatives without employment in May 1966.

6. Living at Home

The lives of those students who remain in the rural areas (living at home without any regular form of paid employment or schooling) is the concern of the last section of this paper. In fact, the numbers and the samples taken in these studies is surprisingly small; in approximately 14% in Kiambaa and in Tetu approximately 24%

PRIMARY SCHOOL LEAVERS IN RURAL AREAS: WHAT DO THEY DO?

Very often it is assumed that the teenager living at home is unemployed, doing nothing, frustrated and a sourse of political discontent. "Doing nothing" is an enhelpful and inaccurate generalisation used to cover a lack of knowledge. A closer look at these young people shows that whilst their lives are far from full, they do engage in a broad range of activities.

Two attempts have been made to look at these activities. The first has been composed from a review of the diaries of the Thogoto Young Adults Education Club members and the events discussed during interviews and conversations. The second as a record of the interviews with 47 of the 48 school leavers in Tetu.[1]

KIKUYU

From the outset is must be recognised that in the rural area, life is lived at a much slower pace than is accepted by city dwellers. The very nature of an existance where one needs to walk half a mile for water, a mile to get to one's garden and where one needs to spend a whole day waiting for a ten minute interview with a District Officer or health assistant spells under-employment. Travelling is difficult; buses to Nairobi are haphazard and one needs to walk to most local destinations. Shopping is a time-consuming process. Because money is so short, very small quantities are purchased, for instance cigarettes and sweets are sold singly, tea and coffee in 2 oz. packets, and often items are purchased just before they are used. A good example of the time taken to do things is the process of washing clothes. Nearly every boy washes his own clothes. He starts by going to the shop to buy soap, he then returns to his home to collect his clothes, and walks to the river. It is not normal practice to bring water to the home for this purpose because carrying water is very heavy work. He washes his clothes and then has to wait for them to dry. He then returns home and prepares to iron them. He heats charcoal, puts it in the iron, and finally completes his work. If a lot of walking is involved this can take a whole day. "At about a quarter to one I started washing my clothes, I finished washing them at almost eight."

Given this general proviso of under-employment, the pattern of the young adult's life depends largely on the amount of land available for family use and the size of the family. Girls are seldom left without a job to do. Besides working on the land there are all the household tasks of collecting wood, fetching water, washing utensils, and of course looking after younger children; if not their own younger sisters and brothers, the children of older sisters and brothers. In poorer homes, young adult girls often go to look for work as house servants at very low rates of pay.

> "I went to look for a job to Mr. X. He gave me work in the house. I worked 'till evening. I went home to help my mother. I went to take water. After that I went to see my friend. She told me that she was sick, but any way after two weeks she will be alright. Then I went home. I took my highway book seven, I did maths."

This little passage shows clearly some of the influences in the life of an eighteen year old girl living with her widowed mother on a small piece of borrowed land. It is not surprising that girls react against this type of existance and want to run away to towns. Not far from this girls home, four young women live together running a brothel. This is of course an exception. The normal route for escape is seen as education and a job, and it accounts for the strong employment aspirations expressed by the girls in Standard 7.

[1] One boy proved to be a permanent invalid and was not interviewed

Though for the majority, the final destination will be an early marriage, and the unavoidable duties of running a home.

The life of the young man is perhaps easier. He is expected to work on the home farm but, where the farm is small the work is limited, and is of course affected by the seasons. When work on the family garden is fineshed there are a variety of other jobs. In some cases boys have small pieces of land they can use for themselves and among the diary keepers of the "Thogoto Young Adults Education Club" there are several teenagers who keep rabbits and hens. Selling eggs at 20 cents each in the market is a slow process of making money but it does mean a steady supply of pocket money. The main problem is raising the initial capital to buy the chickens.

Casual labour-especially in the digging and harvesting seasons- is relatively easy to obtain and if a boy needs money badly enough he will look for it.

The table below was prepared from the pilot interviews with 12 of the 19 Standard 7 School leavers (1964) from Thogoto School who were known to be living at home without further schooling or permanent employment

No.	Age	KPE Result	Acres of Family Land	No.of Bros.	Father Emplyd	Worked at home last mnth	Obtained casual work last mnth	Own Agri-cultural efforts	choice
1	17	P(R)	0	3	Yes	No	No	Nil	Sec Sch.
2	19	F(R)	2	6	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nil	Sec Sch.
3	17	F	½	4	Yes	No	No	Nil	Land
4	18	F	½	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nil	Sec Sch.
5	19	F	1½	6	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hens	Empty
6	20	F	1	2	No	Yes	Yes	Nil	Land
7	17	F	1	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nil	Sec Sch.
8	19	P(R)	0	1	Yes	No	Part time job as gardener		Land
9	18	F	1	4	No	Yes	Yes	Nil	Sec Sch.
10	20	F	0	2	Yes	No	Yes	Nil	Sec Sch.
11**	18	F	1½	5	No	Yes	Yes	Hens	Land
12	17	F	1	2	No	Yes	No	Nil	Sec Sch.

** Member of the Thogoto Young Farmers Club.

This table sttempts to summarize a number of the important factors related to the occupations and income of school leavers. It shows the age and educational level of the leavers, the sources of family income, the attempts they make themselves to find work, and finally the choice they would make if offered:

1. A place in a Secondary School
2. A piece of land on a settlement scheme
3. Regular employment in a factory

In several cases the dependence of the leaver upon his family and his father's income is clearly shown. The lack of land available in this area is also very clear and the ratio of land to brothers is frightening.

For a more detailed view, some of the entries of one of these young men (No. 5) in his diary are reproduced below.

31st March.	Thatched mother's house, and spend rest of day reading.
1st April.	Casual job digging 8 - 4.30 for 2/50 plus lunch.
2nd "	Dug lines for maize and potatoes in family farden. Went shopping and studied in the evening.
3rd "	Went to Church, then visited friends.
4th "	"I was at home all day for making studies and did some work, I built somewhere to keep my chickens and fed them also. We have no garden except a small one which we have borrowed about 1.5. acres, that is the reason why I am not working because we have fineshed digging it".
5th "	Went to see a friend who goes to Kikuyu School and spent most of the day talking, warned his friend to work hard to get into secondary school. Then reflected on his own education. "I have done it very well and I work very much because I don't want to be failed in K.P.E. exams." "I am glad if I can speak English well and know how to write it."
6th "	Washed clothes and then read in the afternoon. "In the evening I was going for a walk to listen to the radio what it had said. Then I heard the news and therefore I went home full of thoughtfulness of what I should be? I took some books and read and read till I went to sleep."
7th "	"In the morning I woke up and said my prayers at 6 o' clock then I washed my face. Then I took my book and started cramming. I wrote some words which were difficult for me to understand."

These comments were chosen because they show such insights. Only a few of the diaries are this reflective, but these words do convey a very good impression of the type of lives which the diaries show. I have not had time to make a detailed content analysis of the diaries but under a number of headings below I have tried to pick out some of the important features which show through in a preliminary reading.

<u>HOME and FAMILY</u> Most of the boys still live with parents. Fathers and mothers are responsible for providing their food and shelter. In return every boy works on the garden, runs errands and carries out general maintenance at the home. The boy is usually held responsible for clothing himself and finding his own pocket money. Tensions increase between parents and boys as the boy gets older and wants to control his life but cannot find the money to do so. If money is earned by casual labour it often is spent on household purchases such as sugar and paraffin. Most boys clearly retain respect for their parents and other senior relations, although one boy commented with irritation about uncles who abused him. Visiting relations is common and important. Regular journeys are made to Nairobi and Limuru to see uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters. Where the visit is to an employed person the boys often comment on the small financial gifts they receive. In some cases the boy remains for a longer period. Two club members have gone to live in Nairobi with an uncle and a brother and have left the club, whilst others have had periods away helping relations with their

digging. One young man found work in an uncle's shop and another found employment on a European's farm in Limuru where his father is labourer. Visits to and from relations are clearly joyous occasions in the family life and account for much of the leisure time. Weddings followed by the family parties are commented on with gusto.

AGRICULTURE Working in the garden is accepted as commonplace and while there is some aversion to the strenuous manual labour involved, most of the comments are about the lack of land.

The presence of the rains during the months when these diaries were written had an effect on the activities mentioned. Most boys spent several hours a week in the gardens, digging, planting and weeding. One boy had the regular task of milking the family's cows and selling the milk, others comment on their duties of looking after cattle and sheep. Two boys keep hens of their own and sell eggs two more have rabbits, and others mention selling and buying cattle at the local market.

Several boys belonged to the "Thogoto Young Farmers club," a self-help scheme run on 20 acres of the Presbyterian Church land by Thomas Haller an American Agricultural Missionary. 20 boys spend three days a week working on the land and doing classes on practical and theoretical agriculture. They are paid 4/- a week for their work with the promise of a share of the profits when crops are sold. The boys show enthusiasm for their studies and comment freely on their activities at the club.

> "First of all I dug the lines of maize three feet wide from line to line. I dug about twenty lines of maize. Then I dug another line of potatoes two feet wide."

Particular interest is shown when visits are arranged. The Sigona Smallholding Settlement Scheme provoked interest because of the prospects of the settlers

> "The agricultural advisor showed us the farms of the farmers who have improved very much on their farms in mixed farming."

Whilst agricultural work may not be their ideal, the boys are clearly aware of its possibilities. During a film show on farming in England, a very knowledgeable discussion on the merits of the quantity of milk given by Fresiens as against the quality given by Guernseys developed. If land were available one feels that many of the boys would want to become farmers, would work hard and would learn more. Several have commented on the lack of suitable agricultural instruction manuals for their standard of English.

CASUAL WORK Casual work does not appear to be too hard to find although most of this work is agricultural and was clearly affected by the rains during this period. Nearly every boy has been able to obtain one or two days work a week and several work regularly for the same man. Jobs include:

> Digging gardens, planting maize, mending cattle kraals,
> Helping with house construction, and digging latrines.

Some boys travelled further and obtained jobs in bars, shops, hotels in Dagoretti and Kibera, and a few went occasionally to Karen to work in the gardens of larger houses. Local pay varies from 1/50 cents to 3/50 cents per day with or without food. The day normally lasts from 7-30 am. to 4-30 pm. Work in bars and shops is better paid. One boy received 7/50 cents per day from an Asian shopkeeper in Kibera.

EDUCATION All the boys show an interest in education. They are fully aware of the need to pass K.P.E. and if they have failed, would like to re-sit the examination. Each one is attracted by the possibility of a secondary school yet when questioned they showed very little faith in the ability of the local Harambee school to get students through the School Certificate. In some cases, boys have started at Private High Schools in Nairobi but have fallen out because of lack of fees. It is necessary to recognise that secondary education is not only important for what it may lead to but for the status it offers here and now. A Secondary school boy, no matter from what school, has a clear and respected role. Less is expected of him in the garden, parents are more proud of him and girls are more likely to be attracted by him. Old school blazers are very popular garments, for clothes carry status. Boys complain about having to buy shorts (rather than long trousers) because of lack of money.

Some boys work hard in class and at their diaries, others do not. They find academic work a struggle and make little effort. Most boys claim to study on their own but this varies. One boy who is very able, plans a daily timetable and intends to take the Kenya Junior Secondary Examinations as a qualification to study for School Certificate.

> "The rest of the day I was studying. First I did maths from "General Arithmetic for Schools." Then I did a bit of Biology. Lastly I read "Tales from Shakespeare" by Charles Dickens (Lamb) until six in the evening."

Others merely mentioned "I did my studies." A number is enrolled in Correspondence Colleges but submit work infrequently because of lack of money.

Reading is clearly popular for its own sake and most boys mention reading.

> "I came in at half past seven. I got my book as usual and read from page 28 to page 32 and I went to bed because I was tired."

Books which appear to be most popular are stories which convey excitement. Special mention was made of "Chaka the Zulu", "Xhosa Folk Tales" and books on Kikuyu folk lore. Simply written thrillers are also very popular, but many boys will try to read any sort of book they can get hold of. Newspapers are very scarce but are read avidly when they can be procured.

SEARCHING FOR EMPLOYMENT Occasionally boys make trips into Nairobi. One boy went to Kamiti Prison for an interview for the prison service but was turned down because of his height. Another was absent from class one week because he had been staying with a friend and visiting the Labour Excahnge in Nairobi. He had spent several days waiting and finally returned because he "was hungry". Sometimes boys write for jobs which they see in the East African Standard but this is not common because jobs for K.P.E. level are not often advertised and in any case a "grape vine" operates so that once a boy has failed to receive a reply to his letter the others know that there is little point in writing.

ENTERTAINMENT Entertainment includes walking with or visiting friends, occasionally visiting a picture show in Dagoretti market or Kikuyu, occasionally playing the juke boxes at these market places and dancing to them. Divisional football matches are watched and three boys mention playing in matches.

The club football games are enjoyed thoroughly.

During the athletic season, a number of teenagers competed in the local district sports and two or three train quite hard at the local Teacher Training College where facilities are offered to them. A large number went to see Kipchoge open a new athletics track at the local day secondary school and several went to see him run in Nairobi.

A number of the boys drink local beer, one was recently imprisoned for drunkeness. Several smoke when they can afford it. Few boys have radios in their homes and have to go to shops to listen to them. They comment that radios are only found in the richer homes!

To a large extent the type of entertainment depends on money. If one has some, one spends it on bus journeys, juke boxes, pictures, sometimes shown at market centres and if not one joins one's friends at home and all sit and talk. Many days go by in this manner before there is another spree.

Often entertainment is as much conditioned by the capacity to enjoy oneself as to the facilities available. The description below is taken from a Georaphy essay describing a local village:

> "Boys and girls of Gikambura are not lazy and you can always see them with jembes on their shoulders but there are some who like always to kill their days sleeping outside and waiting to disturb others in the harvesting period.
>
> There are clubs for old men which are opened every day. For young people there is one hall where they turn over, some Saturdays and Sundays for a dance. When they are there they have fun like kids and nobody cares if the other's parents are famous or not.
>
> My best friend in that village is a boy called Geof whose father is a newspaper man. We stay together all we can and just laugh our heads off together at the other funny things that happen. We know lots of the same girls and boys and usually aged between sixteen and twenty. Sometimes we go out on dates together and sometimes alone. I have to admit I love living in Gikambura. It is a wonderful place for a teenager. The only trouble is that its all so much fun, its hard to think of anywhere else for my future happiness and thats all."

<u>RELIGION</u> Most boys claim to be regular church attenders and I have seen several going to church on different Sundays. One or two are particularly keen, having been affected by one of the local evangelical "drives" that occur from time to time. Nearly every boy begins his day: "I got up and said my prayers." Perhaps this is because the area from which the boys come is very near to what was once the Central Mission of the P.C.E.A. Church.

This has been a brief survey of the contents of diaries and conversations with their writers. It is difficult to assess how accurate the information is as one suspects that boys deliberately try to create favourable impressions and that there is also a tendency to tell "hard luck stories". Certainly the appearance of most of the boys does not suggest abject poverty. No attempt has been made to assess political attitudes but some

generalisations can be suggested. While the boys accept their existence it is clear that the very nature of their lives involves the under-employment of their talent and a dampening of their endeavour. They accept the problems of their present way of life but each boy is preoccupied in trying to find his way to a new standard of life which he knows is possible. There is little overt hostility to any particular group or person. A few have expressed the view that it is a government responsibility to find work, but most have some appreciation of the Governments economic difficulties.

They were very interested in the "little election" and were divided and vocal in their support. An element of tribalism could be detected but few took the proposals for free land and free education at face value. No direct questions were asked, the information was gleaned solely from overhearing conversations. No mention of political leanings has been offered in any of the diaries.

TETU

Although the tribal traditions and the pattern of life are similar to those in the Kikiuyu area, the people of Tetu live in conditions which differ in certain respects. The population is less dense, the distance from Nairobi is very much greater and cash farming is much more advanced. It is not intended to make close comparisons between the two areas because of the different character of the surveys but some of the effects of these differing conditions do show through.

FAMILY LIFE

Of the forty-seven boys interviewed twenty-nine came from monogamous families but only four families had more than two wives, the highest number being five. The father of this family had the largest amouht of land, thirty two acres, and also ran a bus and a shop. Family size was large in nearly all cases. Only four had less than three brothers, although several of the brothers had moved away from home and established themselves with farms or businesses of their own. They were often helping either by finding work, providing money for correspondence courses, or promising fees for further education. In two cases where parents were dead the boy was living with a brother.

The importance of the family to the boys was very clear. Only one boy had become a serious disturbance in his family and was not prepared to do the work required of him. Others hoped that their fathers would help them by providing fees, or allowing them to have land of their own. They had frequently been disappointed but this had not aroused antagonism. In many cases it was clear that the boy played an important role in the family's prosperity, particularly where a special effort was being made with cash crops or grade cattle. Labour is important and a 17 year old boy is a vital part of the family's labour force where land is available and the family shows enterprise. In several cases, where fathers were dead, the boy was fully occupied, sharing with his mother the responsibilities of running a farm and educating the younger children. The place of the boy in the family is very important in defining his responsibilities. A relatively large number of the boys interviewed were born among the first three children. Boys born later in the family presumably are more likely to be helped with employment or further education by the older siblings. In two cases boys had been left with their mothers because of some form of family break up.

LAND, AGRICULTURE AND WORK

Much of the farming which a family undertakes depends on the amount and quality of land available. The following table shows the distribution of land amongst the immediate families concerned:

Acres	Families
0	5
0-3	9
3-6	12
6-9	14
9-12	5

However the use of the land differed greatly and clearly depended on the drive of the senior members of the family. Twenty-five of the families had planted cash crops (coffee, tea or pyrethrum) and most of the others with land made money by selling vegetables locally. Twenty-nine families had grade cattle, and most of the others had local cattle and sheep. Three families had pigs. A rough estimate, based on the number of days worked during the month previous to the interview, showed that twenty-four of the boys were more or less fully occupied at home, whilst most of the others did important part time work on the farm. Only in six cases had boys undertaken casual labour in the previous month; in five cases farming and in one case as a builder's labourer in Nyeri; yet casual work was fairly easy to find. Payment averaged at 2/50cents a day. One boy helped a brother with his taxi, a second helped a brother who sold charcoal, others visited brothers and uncles on the nearby Mweiga settlement scheme and helped with work. The majority of the boys hoped eventually to find work and said they were constantly on the look out for wage employment, but one sensed that the degree of urgency differed, depending on the work to do at home. Ten had been away to live with relatives and friends in urban centres, in the hope of obtaining employment, but had returned. Twenty-one had registered with labour exchanges, twenty in Nyeri and one in Nakuru. Two boys had had jobs in local shops but had lost them when the shops had gone bankrupt. Only a few boys had taken up work on their own initiative. Two were members of 4K clubs and had projects, with rabbits and one boy had 62 hens from which he was getting good returns. Several boys had asked for land to use for themselves but only one had been allowed this. He was growing and selling vegetables.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Of the forty-seven boys, fifteen had been repeaters and twenty-three had passed the K.P.E., eleven having repeated to do so. Four boys had K.P.E. with one 'A' or two 'B's'in English and Maths,(Fairly near to the standard required by an aided secondary school), but no boy had refused a place at an aided secondary school. Many boys initially claimed to be studying at home but this was checked by the interviewer asking to see the books being used. Of the boys from Wandumbi School, one with a good K.P.E. (A-,C-,B), was working regularly and had a good supply of books. He hoped to take the Kenya English test and eventually Cambridge School Certificate. Three more had some books and made limited efforts. The remainder had no books and admitted that they did not work, some even said that they had no time. Others occasionally borrowed primary school text books from brothers and sisters. One boy had lost much of his English and could only answer questions in Kikuyu. In most cases attempts had been made to repeat. Two boys had dropped out from a local harambee school and a third had returned from a private secondary school in Nairobi because of lack of fees. One boy had been to extra mural classes in Nyeri. In terms of vocational training, one boy had taken a teagrowers course, two were doing B.T.C. correspondence courses in radio engineering and typing respectively, and two went to Nyeri to learn typing from a friend who was a typist and was teaching them out of office hours. One boy, whose brother owned a taxi, was learning how to drive and another was apprenticed to his father as a tailor.

Education is still an important factor in the lives of school leavers but as they become engaged in other activities interest wanes or becomes diverted into more practical forms of training. Only ten of the forty-seven questioned chose secondary education and only three could be said to be making a real effort with their own academic studies, although several were learning more practical/vocational skills. By and large it was the more able pupils who remained interested in studying. The others soon give up.

A final question asked these pupils which they would prefer:

a place in a secondary scheme	10
a job in a factory	33
a plot of land on a settlement scheme	4
	47

The results as shown against the choices suggest that whilst the glamour of education fades after leaving school wage employment is still seen to be the major avenue to personal security and eventual independence.

To give a fuller picture of the results of this study and to show more clearly the relationships between the various factors in individual lives brief case studies of the 15 leavers from Giathakwa School are included as a final part of the paper.

1. 18 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First attempt.

This boy's father is dead. He is the oldest son at home and helps mother to manage the land. There are 12 acres of land, but most of this is rented out to other families at 100/- per acre per annum. There are 2 grade cows and 4 local cows, half an acre of land is planted with cash crops. Maize, beans and potatoes are sold in the local market and the family has planted some tea. In the early part of 1965 he went to Nyeri daily to look for employment but now seldom goes because he is so busy at home. He is responsible, with his mother, for handling the family finances and paying for younger children's school fees. He has completed a seven day tea growers course run by the Agricultural Department.

He chose a job in a factory.

2. 16 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. C B+C+ Second Attempt.

Comes from a relatively wealthy family. One brother is a Police constable, a second is at a Government secondary school. The father is on the primary school committee and is a Church elder. The family has 8 acres of land, most of it paddocked and 6 grade cows. The father attends courses at Wambugu Farmers Institute regularly. The boy visited a brother-in-law in Nakuru for one month in 1965. He helps his father, looking after cattle and is doing a correspondence course. His labour is probably needed at home at present, but he will probably get a place in a harambee school eventually.

He chose a secondary school place.

3. 16 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First Attempt.

He is the eldest son. His father has 6 acres of land and has recently planted coffee. He sells maize, beans and potatoes in the local market. He has 1 grade cow and 4 local cows. He owns a hotel at Kamakwa near Nyeri and is mainly concerned with the running of this. The boy did apply to Nyeri Labour Office for a job and spent two weeks at his father's hotel but now is fully occupied at home on the farm, and is interested in the work. During his leisure time he plays football.

He chose a job in a factory.

4. 17 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. - D,B-,D. First Attempt.

He is the eldest son. His father has four acres of

/land

land, growing maize, beans etc. There are 3 local cows and milk is sold locally. The boy visits Nyeri occasionally to look for work but spends the remainder of his time working at home. He wanted to go on with his education, applying to repeat, but claimed his father had no money.

He chose a job in a factory.

5. 16 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First attempt.

His parents are dead. He lives with his brother who has been loaned a small piece of land and keeps pigs and burns charcoal. He helps his brother and works as a casual labourer when jobs can be found. He tried to repeat K.P.E. but could not get a school place. He visits Nyeri and has applied at the Labour Office. He hopes to go away to look for employment.

He chose a job in a factory.

6, 16 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First attempt.

The father owns 6 acres of land and grows coffee, potatoes and beans. He has 2 grade cows and 2 sheep. The boy is the second born child of the family and is required at home to help with the farm. He works regularly at home and does not do casual work. His father provides for his needs but does not give him a regular salary. The boy tried to repeat K.P.E. but was refused a place. He hopes to do further studies in the future.

He chose a job in a factory.

7. 18 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. Second Attempt.

The parents have eight acres of land and sell local crops. There are no cash crops or cattle. The elder brother is a Tribal Police corporal. The boy lives with his parents who are old and cultivates the garden. He hopes to go away when he gets enough money to try and look for jobs. He does casual labour, building houses when work is available, and has already been to Mweiga and Nyeri to look for a job.

He chose a job in a factory.

8. 18 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. D,B,C+. Second attempt

His father is a farmer with six acres of land, growing tea, maize, beans and potatoes. He owns 3 grade cows and 1 local cow. The boy is the first born and works on the farm. He has been to Nyeri and has applied to the Labour Office there. He would like to look for a job but at present he is needed at home to work on the farm, although his father will not allow him to have any land of his own. He is interested in scouting.

He chose a job in a factory.

9./16 Years Old Passed K.P.E. C,C-,B-. First attempt

The family has eight acres of land, growing tea, maize, beans, potatoes and vegatables. There are 3 grade cows and 3 pigs. The father is a member of the North Tetu Farmer's Co-operative Society. The produce of the land is sold to the local market. The boy looks after the cows and spends some time studying privately. He has tried to repeat K.P.E. and has attemtpted courses with British Tutorial College. He hopes to be able to sit for K.J.S.E. and S.C. examinations. He has never left home to look for work.

He chose a place in a secondary school.

10. 16 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. B,B,C+. Second attempt

The family has 1.5 acres of land with maize and beans for the local market. The father is a charcoal seller at Mweiga. The boy is the first born and works at home with his mother. He sometimes goes to Nyeri but does not look for casual work because his father lives away and the boy manages the home with his mother. He gets no personal money for there are other children at school and fees have to be paid.

He chose a job in a factory.

11. 16 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. C+,C+,C+. Second attempt

The family has four acres of land, growing coffee, beans and potatoes. There is 1 grade cow and 1 local cow. The father is a member of the Co-operative Societies. The boy is the first born and goes to Nyeri regularly. He has applied to the Labour Office. He lives at home with his parents, digging and looking after cows. He tried to repeat K.P.E. and has attempted courses with British Tutorial College. He does not do casual work because of his duties on the home farm.

He chose a job in a factory.

12. 16 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. D,B+,C. Second attempt

There are five acres of land growing coffee, vegatables, maize and beans. The family own 2 grade cows and 3 local cows. The boy is the second born. He has applied for a number of jobs. His home is near Nyeri so he goes there often, sometimes to the Labour Office. He lives with his parents at home and helps in cultivating and looking after cattle. He tried to repeat K.P.E. and has done some studying through British Tutorial College. He hopes to sit for the Kenya English Test next year.

He chose a place in a secondary school.

13. 17 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First attempt

The family owns six acres of land, growing pyrethrum, beans, maize and potatoes. There are 3 grade cows and 1 local cow. The father is a member of two Co-operative Societies. The boy claims to be satisfied staying at home with his parents, but his father complains that he does little work. He is noted by the local population for being a trouble maker and has been jailed once for stealing from a school office.

He chose a job in a factory.

14. 16 Years Old. Passed K.P.E. C-,B,C+. First attempt

The family is relatively prosperous. There are eight acres of land, four are used for cash crops, growing coffee, pyrethrum, maize, beans and potatoes. There are 4 grade cows and 1 local cow. The father attends agricultural courses regularly. The boy, first born of the first wife, lives at home with his parents picking pyrethrum and coffee. He gets money for all his needs. He is interested in scouting and hopes to start studying at home using correspondence courses.

He chose a place in a secondary school.

15. 16 Years Old. Failed K.P.E. First attempt

The family's father is dead. The boy is the first son of the first wife. She has ½ an acre of land for growing subsistence crops. The second wife lives in Mweiga on a

/settlement

settlement scheme but does not help this part of the family. Both the boy and his mother work as casual labourers when work can be found at an average of 3/- per day. The boy went to Nakuru for two months where he stayed with an elder step-brother and applied to the Labour Exchange. He now goes regularly to Nyeri to find work and is registered at the Labour Office. He hopes to start work on a correspondence course with British Tutorial College and says his elder step-brother, a police constable, will help him.

He chose a piece of land on a settlement scheme.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to suggest the need to review the present situation amongst primary school leavers; their knowledge, their aspirations, their education, their interests and their activities. A number of tentative experiments and their results have been presented, not in an attempt to offer any conclusive evidence but in order to give clues to questions which might be asked.

There is clearly a need for action to provide meaningful occupations for primary school leavers. Primarily the problem is an economic one but the plans to meet it will need to involve educational and community development measures as well. In planning these a careful understanding of the present situation is needed. The history of African education warns against the danger of working from assumptions.

Some of the glamour of the secondary school may be fading, the realities of the agricultural economy are becoming more apparent but the desire to find a stable role in the adult community remains. In talking to teenage school leavers one does not so much sense bitterness but rather one is conscious of enthusiasm changing to apathy as it meets disappointments and confusion.

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TWO HUNDRED INDEPENDENT CHURCH MOVEMENTS IN EAST AFRICA: A SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION

Sixteen centuries ago, the scholar Jerome surveyed the rapid advance of the schismatic Donatist Church among the North African Berber and Punic populations and reported that it had become the religion of "nearly all Africa". Today's observer of the vast proliferation of ecclesiastical schisms in Africa - 4,684 at the latest count, 200 of which are in East Africa - might well be excused for reaching a similar conclusion.

A Phenomenon Unprecendented in History

It is in fact the case that schisms from foreign mission bodies in Africa have been taking place for the last hundred years on a scale unparalleled in the entire history of Christianity. These independent church movements, founded either by direct separation from parent churches, or, in a few cases, under the initiative of African leadership outside the missions, are now found in some thirty-three African nations, with a total of almost seven million adherents drawn predominantly from 270 different tribes in all parts of the continent south of the Sahara.

This extraordinary phenomenon, which has thus been observed in one-third of the tribes of Africa, is at present completely absent from the remaining two-thirds. Further, almost all of these known secessions, from the smallest involving a single congregation to the largest involving nearly a million adherents, have arisen out of a remarkably similar pattern of background circumstances in each of the ethnic groups concerned, yet in most cases without conscious links or visible coherence.

Most of these movements have emerged spontaneously in areas that have been subjected with intensity to Christian missionary activity for several decades. The tempo of their occurrence and expansion across Africa has been increasing for the last century since 1862, and shows no signs of abating. In fact, the size of the movement as a whole is now comparable to both the entire Protestant and Catholic communities on the continent.

Moreover, this massive proliferation is figuratively speaking only the top of the iceberg - hundreds more of such indigenous movements of renewal or protest remain in embryo inside the Protestant or Catholic churches at varying depths without as yet having broken surface in schism. Nevertheless, conditions within the historical churches remain sufficiently inhospitable for the movements to break off at a present rate of over 100 per annum.

East Africa as a Representative Region

East Africa (by which is meant here the nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) may be regarded from our point of view as a region fairly representative of the continent, roughly a ten percent sample of independency in Africa. The population of East Africa is about one-tenth of Africa, as is the number of its nations; its 104 tribes form about ten percent of the Africa total; and its 700,000 adherents of separatist churches compose ten percent of the total in Africa. Although this paper is primarily a study of East African independency, it should therefore be noted that it is typical of the situation across the entire continent.[1]

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1. The data for this paper were assembled during a larger study of independency in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

The Present Extent of Independency in East Africa

The present distribution of independent church bodies in East Africa may be examined in detail in Appendix A, where they are grouped under the major tribes in which each occurs. The location of these thirty-three tribes is then shown on the map in Figure I, which gives the overall view of East African independency in relation also to its immediate neighbours.[1]

It will be seen that these tribes fall roughly into seven groups or chains. The area with the densest concentration of movements is Western Kenya, with a total of one hundred distinct bodies of which sixty are registered with the Kenya government. Most of their 400,000 adherents are from the Luo and Luhya tribes.[2]

The second densest area is the territory of the Kenya Highland Bantu, where some forty-five bodies exist with about 200,000 adherents, mostly Kikuyu, Meru and Kamba. Thirdly, there is a chain of seven involved tribes across Southern Uganda, in which separatism flourished in the past. In 1921 there were 100,000 persons involved; today only a few thousands are left, although the threat of large-scale secession is constantly being raised. A fourth chain exists in West Nile, the product of an unorganised but ongoing movement now a decade old.

Three chains have originated in Tanzania, though with nowhere near the same numerical size as those in Kenya and Uganda. The Southern Highlands has seen movements since 1925 among the Nyakyusa, which form the northernmost part of a big central African chain not discussed in this paper. A sixth chain links six tribes east and south of Lake Victoria: independency is weak in its southern tribes with only some 5,000 adherents among the Gogo, Nyamwezi, and Sukuma, but there are at least 10,000 separatists in the northern part of this chain, mainly among the Luo in North Mara district.

The seventh of these chains embraces the adjacent tribes Haya and Rundi, with some 24,000 adherents in four bodies, stretching from Bukoba to Bujumbura.

Altogether, East Africa claims today some 655,000 separatists: 10,000 in Uganda, 20,000 in Burundi, 25,000 in Tanzania, and the rest - the third largest number in any African territory - in Kenya. Membership statistics for a selection of the larger independent churches are given in Appendix B, which also indicates from the colourful names of these bodies something of the rich and dynamic nature of these religious movements.

Review of the Literature

Such a fascinating phenomenon has naturally attracted numerous observers, and there is a very extensive literature on African independent church movements numbering some 150 books and articles. For East Africa, however, the coverage is extremely sparse. Only six primary studies exist so far in published form, and these together with a handful of others are briefly annotated at the end of this paper.

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1. The unit employed in this analysis is the "tribal unit" or tribe-within-a-nation. In most cases this is identical with "tribe", but where a national frontier divides a tribe (e.g. Maasai) it becomes in the analysis two tribal units, MAASAI-1 and MAASAI-2. The definition of tribe and the classification used here follow the only complete listing in existence, namely that in G.P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

2. The Luhya are termed WANGA in Murdock's classification.

It should be noted at this point that the term "independency", which first appeared in print in 1904 after a Johannesburg conference on South African separatist churches, is used somewhat loosely in the literature and in varying senses. As a result, it was necessary for the purpose of this analysis to define the term with some precision, and this definition is given here in Appendix E.

Disparate Causes or a Common Cause?

A preliminary examination of the East African independent churches leaves one with the impression that we have here a mass of disparate and unrelated movements, the causes of which are as numerous and different as are the colourful personalities who lead them. Observers have naturally tended to emphasise local causes, which vary widely from case to case - personal friction, racial incidents, ambition, missionary paternalism, resurgence of tribal customs, political and economic crises, and so on. The most recent study by Welbourn and Ogot (1966) is an excellent example of this analysis in terms of the local situation. From such considerations have grown various attempts to apply typologies constructed in other areas of Africa under which the divergences of these bodies have been classified; the best known of these are the Ethiopian/Zionist/Messianic scheme from South Africa, due to Sundkler;[1] and the Orthodox/Aladura/Syncretistic scheme from Nigeria, due to Parrinder.[2]

However, whilst the presuppositions of historians have led them to emphasise the differentia of these bodies, those of sociologists have led them to concentrate more on the similarities and parallels in these movements. On closer examination, these are somewhat striking, and lend weight to the supposition that the entire movement has certain basic causes in common.

The Background Correlates of Independency

During the present analysis it was found that out of a large number of ethnographic, social and religious factors studied, eighteen correlated significantly with the presence of independency in a tribe. These were then formed into a scale which was found to be an accurate predictor of the strength of separatism in a given tribe.[3] It was then noticed that in each of the tribes involved there are always (a) certain factors representing the strength of traditional African society and religion, e.g. the polygamous structure, or the ancestral cult; (b) certain factors representing the strength of European colonial impact, e.g. high literacy or the presence of white settlers; and (c) certain factors representing the strength of missionary impact, e.g. publication of vernacular scriptures, or high missionary density; and so on. This therefore indicates that there is here a basic cause common to the entire movement of independency, namely the clash of three impinging cultures, the traditional, the colonial and the missionary. Where this culture clash has been strongest - for example, among the Kikuyu - independency is strongest; where a tribe has been studiously protected from the shock of culture clash - as among the Maasai - independency is absent. From this point of view, therefore, we may speak of independency as a single phenomenon with a common cause.

The Tribal Zeitgeist

At this point it became evident that the empirical scale was measuring religious tension or pressure in a tribe, namely the climate of opinion unconsciously affecting thought and action. For this reason, the scale was termed a measure of the tribal zeitgeist. In Figure I, values of the zeitgeist derived

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1. This is set forth in its latest form in V.E.W. Hayward (ed.), African Independent Church Movements (London: Edinburgh House, 1963) p. 71.
2. This typology, given in E.G. Parrinder, Religion in an African City (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) has not been developed as far as Sundkler's.
3. See the scale and explanatory notes in Appendix D.

from Appendix D are given for a number of tribes. These vary from a value as low as 3 (the Kindiga of Tanzania) to as high as 16 (the Kamba of Kenya); only one other tribe in Africa has a higher value than this, namely the Zulu of South Africa with 17 of the possible 18 factors. It will further be seen that in no tribe with less than six factors has independency been produced, and that every tribe with more than twelve factors has already become involved in the movement. The higher the zeitgeist, the greater the possibility of involvement.

This therefore offers one explanation - a sociological one, which supplements the equally valid historical ones- for the high concentration of independency in Kenya, but the complete absence of it over large areas of Tanzania. The zeitgeist in most Kenya tribes is higher than in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa; but in Tanzania it is lower than in many other nations. A large part of the explanation lies in factors 10-13 of the zeitgeist: Tanzania is one of several countries where vernacular translations of the scriptures - essential to the full understanding of the biblical message by the tribe concerned - have been subordinated to versions in the linguae francae, in this case Swahili and English.

A Root Cause Common to the Movement

It can be shown that as the zeitgeist in a tribe increases, this biblically-informed climate of opinion produces a growing sense of a discrepancy between the scriptures and the practices of the missions. In many cases, this has become centred on the biblical concepts of agape (love) and philadelphia (brotherly love) and their vernacular counterparts. African Christians have discerned a failure on the part of missions to demonstrate towards them these central biblical concepts, and this may be seen as one root cause common to all movements across the continent and in East Africa in particular. It has resulted in an African determination to reform mission Christianity, resulting in several cases in East Africa in a separatist church specifically named to emphasise the biblical virtues lacking in the missions: e.g. the JoHera (People of Love) among the Luo, the African Brotherhood Church among the Kamba, the Peace and Mercy Church among the Kipsigis, the Christian Brotherhood Church among the Wanga, and so on.

Independency and the Establishment

For half a century now in East Africa, the independent church movement has been expanding and growing in influence. This may be demonstrated in several ways. In the first place, there has been the struggle to obtain secular status from reluctant governments. Under British rule, only some dozen movements in Kenya were granted registration; but since Independence in 1963 this number has increased rapidly until by 1966 over seventy bodies had been registered.

Secondly, a drive for ecumenical recognition has begun and grown in momentum over the last decade. As elsewhere in Africa, the separatist churches have directed a steady stream of applications for membership to the various ecumenical bodies co-operating with western churches and missionary societies. Whilst the Christian councils of Tanzania and Uganda follow the practice of almost all councils in Africa in not permitting such bodies to join, the Christian Council of Kenya by contrast has the highest number of such churches as members (seven) in the whole of Africa.

If such applications are turned down, bodies have then applied direct to the major international councils. The Tanzania National Church in 1966 applied for membership to the All Africa Conference of Churches (in which the only East African independent body is the African Brotherhood Church); as did the federation of independent bodies registered under the name East African United Churches and Orthodox Churches Communion. Meanwhile, the Church of Christ in Africa has become in 1966 the first separatist church in Africa to join the International Council of Christian Churches.

But lastly, if all such ecumenical feelers are rebuffed, the independent churches have shown that they can organise powerful rival Christian councils. The federation just mentioned is an influential body claiming forty member

churches in East Africa. The emergence of this counter-establishment is an important la.dmark in the growing influence of independency on the East African scene.

The Dynamics of the Movement

Using the scale of religious tension in Appendix D, it is possible to measure how the zeitgeist has grown in a given tribe over the last hundred years or so. It has in fact grown steadily over the years in all East African tribes; in none has the zeitgeist decreased or remained static for long. On average, nearly one new tribe a year in East Africa has become involved in independency since the year 1914.

It is an interesting fact evident from Figure I that all tribes with independency are physically adjoining. The table in Appendix C (The Spread of Independency by Chains) illustrates how the movement has spread over the last half century. The idea of independency seems to pass from tribe to adjacent tribe; yet there is little deliberate or conscious about the process, for movements in adjacent tribes are usually quite different in doctrine and practice, reflecting more the tenets of their parent missions than of neighbouring independent bodies.

By examining each of the eighteen component factors on the scale, it may be deduced that the zeitgeist will continue to grow for several decades to come. This means that some ten new tribes over the next decade will become involved in separatism; and if this rate continues, two-thirds of all East African tribes will have separatist churches by the end of this century.

Whether or not the historical churches are able to accept them as partners, it is clear that the independent churches are on the crest of a vast wave of expansion that is making them into a major force in the rooting of Christianity in the soil of East Africa.

A Provisional Assessment

Bearing in mind that East African independency is only a microcosm of a much larger movement across the whole continet, it is possible to make a provisional assessment. Virtually all these two hundred bodies are characterised by a definite acceptance, often under new and original African forms, of the centrality of the historical Jesus as Lord and Saviour. In varying degrees, three basic ingredients are found in every movement: (1) a central confession of Christ as Kyrios (using the traditional vernacular term for chiefship or lordship), (2) a marked resurgence of traditional African custom and world-view, and (3) a strong affirmation of their right to be both fully Christian and fully African, independent of foreign pressures.

What appears therefore to be happening across the continent, and in particular in East Africa, is that the independent churches, working quite spontaneously and in the main independently, are engaged in a massive attempt to synthesise the apostolic kerygma with authentic African insight, based on biblical criteria derived from the vernacular scriptures. Beyond the tragic spectacle of schism after schism, therefore, one can sense the emergence of a genuinely indigenous renewal of Christianity in terms that can be understood by African society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON EAST AFRICAN INDEPENDENCY

The published primary material on East African independency and related subjects is very sparse. Only six of the works listed here deal primarily with independent churches; the others mention it in passing only. This brief bibliography, which does not pretend to be exhaustive, also includes studies of the mission churches and of non-Christian religious movements.

Beecher, L.J. "African Separatist Churches in Kenya," World Dominion, XXXI, 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1953), 5-12.
Brief description of movements from standpoint of Anglican missions in Kenya.

Bushayija, S. "Indifférence religieuse et néo-paganisme au Rwanda," Rythmes du Monde, IX, 1 (1961), 58-67.
The absence of independency in Rwanda is partly due to religious indifference combined with the political quarrels of recent years.

Kenyatta, Jomo. Facing Mount Kenya: the Tribal Life of the Gikuyu. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938.
This classic discusses early Kikuyu separatism and its causes at several points.

Nyangweso. "The Cult of Mumbo in Central and South Kavirondo," The Journal of East Africa and Uganda Natural History Society, 38-39 (May, August, 1930).
First movement of reaction to mission among the Luo and Gusii, 1908 onwards.

Schlosser, K. Propheten in Afrika. Braunschweig: Albert Limbach, 1949.
Four of the 68 prophets described in some detail are from East Africa.

Taylor, J.V. The Growth of the Church in Buganda. London: S.C.M. Press, 1958.
Describes the background of the East African Balokole revival in Uganda.

Warren, M.A.C. Revival: an Enquiry. London: S.C.M. Press, 1954.
Detailed investigation and assessment of the Balokole revival by mission head.

Welbourn, F.B. "Independency in East Africa," The Ecumenical Review, xi, 4 (July, 1959), 430-436.
Brief review of the situation up to 1958.

______. East African Rebels. London: S.C.M. Press, 1961.
The most detailed account to date of movements in Kenya as well as Uganda.

______. East African Christian. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Several movements are discussed in the context of the religious situation in East Africa, Christian and Muslim.

______ and B.A. Ogot. A Place to Feel at Home: a Study of Two Independent Churches in Western Kenya. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
Origins and development of the Church of Christ in Africa, and the African Israel Church.

Whisson, M. Change and Challenge: a Study of the Social and Economic Changes among the Kenya Luo. Nairobi: Christian Council of Kenya, 1964.
Contains brief overall account of Luo independent churches since 1914.

Wilson, M. Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Two independent churches described (pp.167,171-3,219-20,222).

APPENDIX A

DATA AND SOURCES ON INDEPENDENCY IN 33 TRIBES

Data and sources are given here for all East African tribes with independency analysed in this report. The classification and spelling of tribes follows Murdock (Africa, 1959). Tribes reported on in the literature are referred to by one source author with date. The usual name of a movement is given first, followed if necessary by a translation in brackets. Membership figures given usually refer to the whole church or movement in question, and often include members of other tribes since many movements are multi-tribal. Movements in a sub-tribe (after Murdock's classification) are included under the major tribe name.

Abbreviations

TRIBE	= name of tribal unit (tribe within a nation), usually identical with tribe
ZEITGEIST	= position of tribal unit on scale of religious tension (0-18 factors)
fw	= field work by present author, usually inspection of church records or government registration applications, or interviews with church officials, local observers or sociologists
c	= approximately
( )	= translation of vernacular name into English or French
or	= alternative name (not just a translation)
(ex)	= parent body from which split occurred, or from which founder came
( )	= name of founder, prophet or leader
;	= link between phrases describing the same movement
.	= end of notes on one movement, beginning of notes on another
Et al.	= and several other movements
Etc.	= and many other movements
Etc.etc.	= and innumerable other movements
q.v.	= which see
initials	initials are sometimes used for brevity, shortly after full name
members	= adult members of a body
adherents	= total community including children

TRIBE ZEITGEIST SOURCE MOVEMENTS, FOUNDERS AND DESCRIPTIONS

ALUR fw 1955 The Praisers, or the Trumpeters (ex Church of Uganda, Africa Inland Mission); groups of Balokole (revivalists) broke off in several parts of West Nile and Southern Sudan; not an organised split, rather a continuous seceding and rejoining the Church. Also LUGBARA, MADI (q.v.)

GANDA 13 Welbourn 1961; fw 1914 Bamalaki, or KOAB (Katonda Omu Ainza Byona) (Society of the One Almighty God)(ex Church Missionary Society)(Joswa Kate Mugema); also known as the Kitala sect; 91,740 adherents by 1921; 56,952 by 1930; 1966, about 1,000 left; anti-medicine, resistance to vaccination and inoculation. 1925 Christian Army for the Salvation of Africa (Reuben Spartas). 1929 African Orthodox Church (ex CMS)(Reuben Spartas), known after 1946 as African Greek Orthodox Church; 1931, 1512 adherents; 1936, 5000; 1946, 10,291; accepted into Greek Orthodox Church 1946; 1960 serious disagreements with Ecumenical Patriarch over autonomy; 1966, 7000 members in 18 congregations in Uganda, with 23,000 in 60 congregations in Kenya, and 2 congregations in Tanzania; see KIKUYU and WANGA. 1961 Diocese of West Buganda (ex Church of Uganda); two thirds of diocese follow bishop Festo Lutaya, who refuses to retire; archbishop appoints bishop Stephen Tomusange as commissary of the house of bishops; 1966, only two deaneries not yet returned to parent church.

GISU fw 1948 Dini ya Misambwa; see SUK.

GOGO 15 fw 1956 Tanganyika African Church (ex CMS)(Benjamin Lisase); two Anglican clergy secede with 40 congregations; 3000 members at its height; anti-Balokole origin; bishop died, second pastor married second wife, 1965 readmitted to Anglican Church; most won back by tireless pastoral work of Anglican archdeacon Filemon Chidosa; 1966, TAC applies for membership of All Africa Conference of Churches, claiming 14 congregations. See also NYAMWEZI.

GUSII-1 12 fw 1963 Maria Legio (Legion of Mary Church)(ex Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Kisii); bulk of schism was LUO (q.v.), but hundreds of GUSII were baptised in Tabaka Parish, many catechumens also left.

GUSII-2 11 fw 1965 Maria Legio spreads among the Kuria.

HAYA 11 fw 1954 Church of the Holy Spirit (ex Evangelical Lutheran Church); one of the very few Balokole (revival) groups to secede; from 1945 onwards, rebelled against organisation and clergy; three leaders ordained by Anglican priest; 4000 members at its apogee; one of the few separatist churches in Africa to be largely won back through sympathetic handling; 1962, half and one of leaders returned to ELC; 1966, 2000 members left.

APPENDIX B

MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS FOR A SELECTION OF CHURCHES

Notes:
1. Most figures are supplied to governments by the churches concerned.
2. All figures are of adherents (total community), unless followed by m (= full members).
3. Major tribe refers to that chiefly involved, either in membership, origin, traditions or in tribal affiliation of founder or present leadership.
4. Sources are mainly church records or government registration applications.
5. For further details on any church, see Appendix A under the tribe concerned.

NAME OF CHURCH	YEAR BEGUN	MAJOR TRIBE	ADHERENTS	(Date of estimate)
BURUNDI				
Eglise de Dieu au Burundi	1962	Rundi	20,000	1964
KENYA				
Nomiya Luo Mission	1914	Luo	51,806	1964
African Orthodox Church	1935	Kikuyu	25,000 m	1965
African Israel Church	1942	Wanga	60,000	1965
Dini ya Misambwa	1943	Suk	10,000	1965
African Independent Pentecostal Church	1944	Meru	1,000 m	1966
African Brotherhood Church	1945	Kamba	30,000 m	1966
African Christian Church & Schools	1949	Kikuyu	7,800 m	1962
Church of Christ in Africa	1957	Luo	56,000 m	1965
Peace and Mercy Church of East Africa	1962	Kipsigis	1,000 m	1966
Legion of Mary Church	1963	Luo	90,000	1963
Tana River Independent Church	1965	Pokomo	2,000 m	1966
TANZANIA				
Church of the Holy Spirit	1954	Haya	4,000 m	1960
Tanganyika African Church	1956	Gogo	3,000 m	1960
Tanzania African Church	1958	Nyamwezi	2,000 m	1966
African Catholic Legio	1963	Luo	300	1966
UGANDA				
Society of the One Almighty God	1914	Ganda	91,740	1921
			56,952	1930
			c 1,000	1966
African Greek Orthodox Church	1929	Ganda	7,000 m	1966

APPENDIX C

THE SPREAD OF INDEPENDENCY BY CHAINS IN 33 EAST AFRICAN TRIBES, 1914-1966

CHAIN NAME	TRIBES[1]	INVOLVED TRIBES, WITH DATE OF FIRST SECESSION[2]
1. UGANDA	5	1914 Ganda, 1915 Teso, 1917 Nkole, 1920 Soga, 1935 Lango
2. WESTERN KENYA	10	1914 Luo-1, 1930 Wanga, 1943 Suk-1, 1948 Gisu, 1955 Suk-2, 1958 Luo-2, c1960 Nandi, 1962 Kipsigis, 1963 Gusii-1, 1965 Gusii-2
3. CENTRAL KENYA	6	1921 Kikuyu, 1929 Meru, 1945 Kamba, 1959 Teita, 1962 Shambala, 1965 Pokomo
4. SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS	1	1925 Nyakyusa
5. TANGANYIKA	4	1925 Sukuma, 1956 Gogo, 1958 Nyamwezi, 1965 Shashi
6. BURUNDI	3	1954 Haya, 1959 Rundi-1, 1965 Rundi-2
7. WEST NILE	4	1955 Kuku-2, Madi, Alur, Lugbara-1

Notes:
1. This is the number of tribal units (tribe-within-a-nation) within the chain.
2. Tribes in a chain are arranged in chronological order; no date means same date as previous entry.
3. For further details on a particular tribe, see Appendix A.
4. Chains 1,2,5,and 6 have now joined, forming a cluster of 22 adjoining tribal units.
5. Chains 1,4,and 7 are joined with chains outside East Africa not dealt with in this analysis.

APPENDIX D

THE TRIBAL ZEITGEIST: A SCALE OF RELIGIOUS TENSION FOR A TRIBAL UNIT

A. IN TRADITIONAL CULTURE:
   1. Is this a Bantu tribe?
   2. Is it over 115,000 in population?
   3. Is polygyny general or common, and not limited?

B. IN TRADITIONAL RELIGION:
   4. Is the ancestor-cult important?
   5. Is there an earth goddess?

C. IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD:
   6. Did colonial rule arrive more than 100 years ago?
   7. Have white settlers occupied tribal land?
   8. Is the national per capita income over shs.500/- per year?

D. IN THE MISSIONARY PERIOD:
   9. Did the missions arrive more than 60 years ago?
   10. Have scripture portions in the vernacular been published?
   11. Has the New Testament been published?
   12. Has the Bible been published?
   13. Was the New Testament published more than 60 years ago?
   14. Is Protestant missionary density in the nation more than 22 ordained missionaries per million population?

E. IN THE CURRENT PERIOD:
   15. Are Muslims in the nation less than 70 percent?
   16. Are Protestants in the tribe 20 percent or over?
   17. Are Catholics in the tribe 20 percent or over?
   18. Is there independency in any adjoining tribe?

TRIBAL ZEITGEIST = total number of affirmative answers to these 18 questions

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Notes:

1. The position of any tribal unit (tribe-within-a-nation) on this scale = the number of factors present = the number of affirmative answers at any given period of time.
2. This scale was constructed empirically from those factors correlating significantly with independency. Various forms of weighting could have been given to the factors; here, we choose the least complicated (equal weighting) because scale values can then be worked out rapidly by mental arithmetic.
3. After its construction, detailed investigation showed that the scale could be interpreted as: (a) a measure of the socio-religious zeitgeist in a tribe at a particular date - that is, of the climate of opinion unconsciously affecting thinking and action at that time; or (b) a measure of (to use various metaphors) the religious pressure, temperature, voltage, potential, tension or strain in the tribe; or (c) a measure of the strength of the culture clash in the tribe between three impinging cultures - the traditional, the colonial and the missionary.
4. The arbitrary numbers in nine of these questions were chosen because each broke the sample into two roughly equal groups, of which it could then be stated that the group for which the answer to the question was affirmative was more prone to independency than the group with a negative answer.
5. The figure in No.14 is that usually taken to represent adequate density of missionary occupation in Africa.
6. Nos.16 and 17 refer to total adherents of the churches, not only adult members.
7. These factors are not all independent. Some are related: e.g. an affirmative answer to No.12 implies affirmatives to Nos.10 and 11 also. But each factor makes its own unique contribution to the scale.

APPENDIX E: THE DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENCY

In this analysis, independency is defined with some precision as follows:-
the formation and existence within a tribe or tribal unit of any organised religious movement, even as small as a single organised congregation, which claims the title Christian in that it acknowledges Jesus Christ as Lord, and which has either separated by secession from a mission church or an existing African independent church, temporarily or permanently, or has been founded outside the mission churches as a new kind of religious entity under African initiative and leadership. A tribe is defined as having independency when it has produced this phenomenon from within its own tribal ranks on its own tribal territory, rural or urban, and in the main under its own tribal leadership, or has contributed significantly within its own territory to a similar movement originating in another tribe. In other words, we are here examining the spontaneous generation of independency within the tribal milieu.

TRIBE	ZEITGEIST	SOURCE	MOVEMENTS, FOUNDERS AND DESCRIPTIONS
KAMBA	16	fw	1945 African Brotherhood Church (ex Africa Inland Mission & Salvation Army)(Simeon Mulandi); 18,500 members in 1959, with 71 congregations in 18 parishes; 1964, 22,827 members; 1966, 30,000; no polygamists admitted. Kenya African Church; 1961, 493 members. 1961 African Independent Church of Kenya (ex Africa Inland Mission)(Isaac); begun near AIM Machakos; 1964, 670 members. 1964 Church of Living God; 560 members. 1964 Church of East African Society (ex African Brotherhood Church); 1965, 472 members. Etc.
KIKUYU	14	Kenyatta 1938; fw	1921 Daudi Maina's Church (ex CMS); three villages near Fort Hall; Maina ordained 1937 by archbishop Alexander. 1929 Watu wa Mungu (People of God)(ex Church of Scotland Mission), also called Arathi (Prophets, Dreamers), now known as Holy Ghost Church of Kenya. 1929 Karinga (Genuine,Orthodox) (ex CMS & CSM)(Johana Kiraka). 1929 KISA or Kenya Independent Schools Association, and Independent African National Church. 1930 African Independent Pentecostal Church. 1935 African Orthodox Church; 1965, 25,000 members. 1949 Kenya African Church Society. African Christian Church & Schools (ex Africa Inland Mission)(Elija Batia); took almost all 50 mission churches and schools among Kikuyu; 1962, 7,800 members, 14,000 adherents in 21 centres; member of Christian Council of Kenya. Etc.etc. Total bodies registered 1966 about 20; grand total about 30 distinct organisations.
KIPSIGIS	10	fw	1962 Peace and Mercy Church of East Africa (ex Seventh-day Adventist Church); polygamous and sabbatarian; spreading in Kisii Highlands; 1966, 1000 members. 1964 Africa Gospel Unity Church (ex World Gospel Mission)(Dishon arap Kesembe); moderator of mission church Kesembe suspended by mission, due to actions as member of Balokole; secedes with 300 members at Bomet.
KUKU-2		fw	1955 The Trumpeters; see ALUR.
LANGO	7	Welbourn 1961; fw	1935 African Orthodox Church (ex CMS)(Disani Atuca Atim); 1946, 3967 members in 20 congregations; 1964, 4500 baptised members in 30 congregations.
LUGBARA-1		fw	1955 The Trumpeters; see ALUR.
LUO-1	12	Welbourn 1966; fw	1914 Nomiya (God has given me a vision) Luo Mission (ex CMS)(Johana Owalo); 1964, 51,806 members. 1934 Dini ya Roho (Religion of the Holy Ghost)(ex CMS)(Alfayo Odongo); a movement within the Anglican Church that did not secede till after the murder of Odongo in a burning hut. 1948 Christian Universal Evangelical Union (ex CMS)(Ishmael Noo); Balokole schism. 1952 Dar (Separation or Migration)(ex CMS); large-scale unorganised Balokole secession. 1952 Dini ya Mariam (Religion of Mary)(ex Roman Catholic Church)(Mariam Ragot); three attempts made at formation, but suppressed and proscribed. 1957 JoHera (People of Love), or Church of Christ in Africa (ex Anglican Church, Diocese of Maseno)(Matthew Ajuoga); 7 clergy, 130 congregations, 16,000 Anglicans secede; by June 1958, 20,000; 1959, 40,000; 1965, 53 clergy, 600 congregations, 56,000 communicants, or 75,000 baptised adherents claimed; joined Christian Council of Kenya, then after quarrel International Council of Christian Churches. 1960 Nyamgutu (Inner Circle Love)(ex CCA)(bishop Meshak Owira); disagreement between the two CCA bishops; 1965, 1000 members, registered as Holy Trinity Church in Africa, Diocese of Masogo. 1963 Maria Legio (Legion of Mary Church)(ex Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Kisii)(prophetess Gaudencia Aoko); estimated adherents in 1963, 90,000; member of East African United Churches. Etc.etc. 1966, total bodies 50 (31 registered), with estimated 230,000 adherents among LUO.
LUO-2	11	fw	1958 JoHera. 1963 Maria Legio. See LUO-1. 1963 African Catholic Legio (ex Legion of Mary Church); 1966, 300 adherents in North Mara. Also Akuo, Roho Misanda, Nomiya. Etc. Total about 14 bodies North Mara.
MADI		fw	1955 The Trumpeters; see ALUR.
MERU		fw	1929 African Independent Church (ex Church of Scotland Mission)(Johnstone Mkiambati); in south Meru. 1944 African Independent Pentecostal Church (ex Methodist Missionary Society)(Johana M'Lululi); 1966, 1000 MERU. African Church of the Holy Spirit. African Christian Church of East Africa; 1966, 600 members. Et al.
NANDI	9	fw	c1960 a dissident (ex Africa Inland Mission) formed a congregation and attempted Anglican link-up.
NKOLE		Welbourn 1961; fw	1917 Bamalaki, or KOAB (see GANDA); by 1918, many congregations had sprung up among the Nkole; in 1930, 22 parish chiefs were members; adherents still exist, though very few in numbers.
NYAKYUSA	11	Wilson 1959; fw	1925 BaNgemela, or Last Church of God and of His Christ (ex Church of Scotland Mission)(Silwani Ngemela). 1927 African National Church (ex CSM)(Paddy Nyasuru). African Lutheran Church. Etc. In 1938, these bodies had a total of 8577 members.
NYAMWEZI	8	fw	1958 African National Church (ex Moravian Church); linked up with GOGO schism (q.v.); 1966, known as Tanzania African Church (Ugenge), files application for membership of All Africa Conference of Churches, stating 14 congregations.

TRIBE ZEITGEIST SOURCE MOVEMENTS, FOUNDERS AND DESCRIPTIONS

POKOMO fw 1965 Tana River Independent Church (ex Methodist Church in Kenya); the original Neuekirche Mission was removed in 1939 because German, tried to return after War although Methodists had taken over; 1965 disaffection increases, four Methodist villages secede, apply for registration though not yet granted; 2000 members.

RUNDI-1 11 fw 1959 large secession of Bahutu teachers (ex Mission Evangelique des Amis: American Quakers) at Kivimba; due to mission prohibition of sweet beer; many took second wives. 1962 Eglise de Dieu au Burundi (ex Eglise Anglicane du Burundi: Church Missionary Society)(Eustace Kinama), or Kinamaites; a Bahutu tribal secession involving 80 percent of the EAB in southern Burundi; 250 congregations, 3500 communicants, 8000 baptised, total 20,000 adherents, especially near Lake Tanganyika; obtained personnalite civile (registration), but became involved in political struggle, accused of subversion, proscribed; 1966, worship services ceased, church disintegrates, many return to EAB.

RUNDI-2 fw 1965 Mungu Mwema (God is Good)(ex Pentecostal Mission) among Hangaza sub-tribe; polygamists baptised.

SHAMBALA fw 1962 two congregations broke off (ex Evangelical Lutheran Church, Northeast Diocese) as protest against German bishop, who was subsequently forced to leave the country; schism then healed.

SHASHI fw 1965 Maria Legio spreading; see LUO. Lake region south of Kenya border now has 10,000 separatists, mostly LUO.

SOGA Welbourn 1961; fw c1920 Bamalaki, or KOAB (see GANDA); by 1930, 2258 Bamalaki (ex CMS), i.e. 0.6% of all SOGA, though up to 2.4% in Bukoli area. 1935 African Orthodox Church (ex CMS), spread from Buganda; many members (African Greek Orthodox Church) by 1966. 1965 Anglican secession threats, separate cathedral constructed in Jinja.

SUK-1 6 fw 1943 Dini ya Misambwa (Religion of the Ancestral Spirits)(Elijah Masinde, ex Friends African Mission); a marginal movement on the edge of independency as here defined; nativistic prophets living on mount Elgon; many Suk involved, together with Vugusu (Kitosh), sub-tribe of WANGA (q.v.); 50,000 members when banned by government in 1948; 1965 Daniel Waswa crucifies self on cross; now granted registration, 4000 members claimed, probably 10,000. c1960 one congregation (ex Africa Inland Mission) secedes at Marakwet.

SUK-2 fw 1955 Dini ya Misambwa; brought in by Suk immigrants from Kenya.

SUKUMA 11 fw c1925 Kutola Mhali (The Polygamous Church)(ex Africa Inland Mission), or "A.I.M. the Second"; due to dispute over vaccination with mission; 1965 still in existence with one elderly bishop, though very small.

TEITA fw 1959 Mwanguvu (People of Power)(ex Anglican Church, Diocese of Mombasa)(Solomon Kitololo); ordained pastor seceded with other Balokole from Waongovu (main Balokole or Saved Ones); about 400 persons involved. Church of Christ in Africa, in Voi. African Brotherhood Church. See LUO, KAMBA.

TESO Welbourn 1961; fw 1915 four Bamalaki congregations (see GANDA); by 1930, almost died out - only 7 members left.

WANGA 13 Welbourn 1966; fw 1930 several secessions after 1927 outpouring of Holy Spirit at Kaimosi. Lisanga (ex Friends African Mission). 1934 Dini ya Roho (see LUO). African Holy Spirit Church (ex FAM)(Jacob Buruku); by 1966, Red Cross Africa Church in Kenya. 1942 Huru Salvation Nineveh (Independent Salvation Nineveh) (ex Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada)(metropolitan bishop and founder David Kivuli); 1946, 651 members; 1957, 4933; 1965 under name Dini ya Israel (African Israel Church) claims 60,000 adherents. 1943 Dini ya Misambwa; Kitosh sub-tribe (see SUK). 1950 African Divine Church (ex PAC)(Saulo Chabuga). African Interior Church (ex Church of God USA); 1956, 3464 members; 1962, 4539 members. African Orthodox Church later African Greek Orthodox Church; see GANDA). 1965 Sinai Church of East Africa (ex African Israel Church)(Paul Masambu). African Holy Zionist Church. African Lutheran Church. Judah Israel. Lost Israelites of Kenya; 1500 members. Christian Brotherhood Church. Etc.etc. 1966 total about 40 distinct bodies (21 registered).

FIGURE I: INCIDENCE OF INDEPENDENCY IN 33 EAST AFRICAN TRIBES

Notes: 1. Tribe classification and spelling follow Murdock 1959.
2. Numbers are values of the tribal zeitgeist (Appendix D).
3. - - - - = international boundaries.
4. [hatched oval] = tribe with independency (defined in App.E). For further details, see Appendix A.

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L. Berry,
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LAND SYSTEMS AND DATA STORAGE PROBLEMS IN EAST AFRICA

East Africa in common with most other developing areas is finding that as plans for development programmes are formulated, planning and analysis are often hindered by lack of readily available data. Information is usually needed on a range of subject matter varying from basic scientific data on soils, vegetation, hydrology, to socio-economic data. In many cases data are available but in such a scattered form that retrieval is almost as much work as reexamination of the primary evidence. Very often the information is not available on the appropriate regional scale, it is either generalised over too large an area or not precisely located.

There are many aspects of this general problem and in this paper I would like to concentrate mainly on the questions of what sort of areal precision we need for our data; what are the best units on which to base the collection of that data, and what methods of storage and retrieval of data might best be employed.

Data is at present collected in a wide variety of ways; census data based on census areas (with sample census data based on the same units) is the main source of basic information on population and related topics. In the 1957 census in Tanganyika these TSA'S (Territorial census areas) were not mapped in detail and the problem of mapping enumeration areas for the next census is currently engaging much thought (see Mr. Thomas's paper to this conference). The two sets of data will not relate to the same basic units and will thus lose some of their comparative value. Limited social surveys carried out by Government agencies, commercial firms or academic research workers also provide very valuable basic material but once again they are rarely related to the same or comparable areal units. Ecological, soils work and agricultural studies derived from Government research; EACSO based research studies from visiting teams (of many different lengths of stay) and university based research suffer from similar handicaps. We have no basic framework into which we can fit information except rather large scale administrative units. These units form the basis of most of our official statistical data though in Tanzania at least it is not always easy to get, say agricultural information at district level or even at regional level with very much accuracy.

It is obvious, I think, that in such broadly based questions there is no single answer, and the problem will look different taken from the view-point of the various disciplines. In this context we should also be asking ourselves what are the relevant sorts of data that we wish collected and which we hope to relate areally. Do we need our data in a form in which we can extrapolate and deduce readily; what is the minimum area on which we can safely base any sampling we hope to carry out? On these and other questions we can expect conflicting answers

Some statistics have most significance at the national level and are mainly used for comparisons on an international scale, (the GNP, per capita income etc.) But governments both here and in more developed countries are becoming more aware of the need for precise information on the regional distribution of production, development potential, population and so on within the country. Much of development economic planning can only be properly designed and implemented with a true appreciation of aspects of regional and physical planning. I think therefore there is a strong case to be made for a planned collection of data and for some definition of its areal significance.

In Tanzania at present most data is gathered on the basis of some sort of administrative unit; a region, district, division or sub-division or ward. Census enumeration areas are used periodically. The administrative network has considerable practical advantages as the administrative officers at all levels can supervise the collection of data and relate the significance of the data to conditions within the working unit of administration. In East Africa the location and boundaries of districts are well defined on maps and we can determine easily the area with which we are dealing. The lower units of administration in Tanzania, the division and sub-division and the village development committee areas have not been very clearly defined and have not so far been plotted on maps. Districts are generally too big to accurately locate many types of information except in a very general way and if we are to gain the most benefit from the existing administrative units in Tanzania they will need to be more closely defined. Districts are much too big to form the unit in any sampling study and any smaller units are not yet well enough defined for this function. In East Africa with its pattern of densely populated 'islands' separated by sparsely populated areas, often based (at least in part) on distinctive physical differences, our sampling unit must be fairly small.

All administrative units do however present a number of problems as the long term base for collection of data though they must always be one of the units for which information is grouped. The two major problems are that administrative units tend to be changed rather rapidly and changes

during time are very difficult to assess if the basic units of data collection are also changing, and that administrative units tend to vary considerably both in size and suitability for basic units. They are not always genetic units in any sense though some may have tribal, physical or other bases.

I would now like to look at the possibilities of two other types of unit of data collection which have been recently applied in East Africa. These are the Land System units, based mainly on an analysis of physical features of the landscape and grid units based on a arbitrary division of the area. Mr. Thomas in another paper will present an analysis of enumeration areas and localities as basic units.

Theoretically we could think of a number of physical and social genetic units which might provide the basis of data collection. Basic social divisions such as the TANU 10 house cells in Tanzania, other political divisions and in some areas tribal divisions have provided the unit of many sociological studies. A priori it would seem that many of the problems which affect administrative divisions also affect genetic social divisions. They tend to change fairly rapidly, and they also of course tend to overlap if based on tribal, linguistic or other similar affiliations. Recent work on pre-development studies has often concentrated far too heavily on basic data collection in the physical sciences and has comparatively neglected social studies. It is therefore important that if at all possible, basic units in the physical sciences should be relateable fairly readily to units used by the social sciences.

The main theme of research work in the physical sciences has been to define land units of a broadly uniform nature. These units have ideally been thought of as providing the basis of field and laboratory study and also of potentiality of development. The main body of early work in this field has been carried out in the research programme of the division of Land Research of the CSIRO[1] organisation in Australia. Work of a similar type is now in progress at the Soil Science Laboratory, Department of Agriculture, Oxford and related studies have been carried out at the Land Resources division of Directorate of Overseas Surveys, London, the tropical section the Road Research Laboratory, U.K. and a number of other agencies.

Australian work has been based on surveys which attempt to provide a basic inventory of the land resources of a considerable area. The study area may vary between 10,000 and 140,000 square miles on the mainland of Australia and 2,500 to 4,000 square miles in the more mountainous, more forested areas of New Guinea. Before the survey little was known about the areas concerned and available mapping is rudimentary.

Work is usually split up into periods of air photo and library study and periods of sampling and traversing in the field. Field parties are usually multi-disciplinary involving botanists, pedologists, geologists, and geomorphologists. This work attempts to delimit land units known as LAND SYSTEMS and to describe and assess these units in terms of their land resources. Land Systems are defined as areas each with "its own characteristic combination of land forms, soils and vegetation and consequently its own potential and own reaction under any given set of conditions"[2].

In Australia land systems with recurring patterns of land characteristics are usually mapped at scales of between 1:250,000 and 1,000,000. Using the report from which the above quotation was taken as an example we find that the Hunter Valley, 8,500 sq. miles in extent has been broken down into 43 land systems which average about 200 square miles in size but vary from 4 square miles to 1383 square miles in area. In mountainous areas land systems tend to be small and the pattern complicated but in plateau or plainland areas they are much larger and simpler. Thus in a study of the Alice Springs area[3] 88 land systems were mapped in an area 144,000 square miles in extent.

This type of mapping in Australia thus produces a base on which the development possibilities can be assessed and upon which social and economic data could be superimposed though as far as I know this has not yet been carried out with the same thoroughness.

In the last few years the Soil Science laboratory of the Department of Agriculture at the University of Oxford has been working on a similar programme though with some modifications in approach. They are experimenting with procedures which rely even more on the aerial photograph interpretation though most of their workers have already had considerable field experience in the areas being studied or in contiguous areas. If these people are available and if there is a useful literature on the areas concerned much delimitation of land systems can be carried out in this way though later field checks are usually necessary.

Having defined the land system and produced a map with the tentative limits of the various systems it is necessary to summarise the data available for each land system. Within each system there is by definition a recurring pattern of the soils, vegetation and landforms. Each land system can thus be described in terms of the land facets which form it. A land facet is the smallest unit of description being defined as "a part of the landscape which is reasonably homogeneous". A flat valley floor, a series of smoothly sloping even hillslopes, a river terrace; are examples of typical facets. The number of facets within a land system is usually small, normally about 5 or 6 and these can be described most easily in the form of block diagram.

The Oxford group of workers has been experimenting with this approach in East Africa. A draft land systems map of Uganda has already been prepared mainly based on the field experience of Mr C. Ollier formerly of the Uganda Department of Agriculture. A land system map of part of Kenya is being prepared, and one of northern Tanzania is also under way. The Uganda map is not yet published but approximately 95 land systems have been distinguished in this area of 91,134 square miles each land system averaging almost 950 square miles. The Musaka land system is illustrated in figure 1, and this block diagram illustrates the main facets within that land system. In the recording method used at present the block diagram is printed on the outside of a small folder which contains two typical air photographs of the system, annotated if necessary. The rear side of the folder may contain information on soils, vegetation and climate of the land system and an index to the most important literature on the area (figure 2 attached).

The land system unit thus provides a convenient pigeon hole in which to place available data about the physical features of piece of country. Information on the soils, agriculture or engineering properties related to one part of a facet within this land system can be assumed to be generally applicable to other parts of that facet elsewhere in the system. It is important therefore that data is related to facets. Experiments have established that this system of storage and retreival of data has some important uses; it has been utilised in road surveys where much time is saved by using land systems and facets as the basis of sampling for engineering properties. It can also be utilised for soils and water supply characteristics which are closely related to the facet characteristics.

Obviously in development programmes many other factors are involved but the basic land use potentiality will vary considerably from one land system to another and these should certainly form one of the bases of land use and development studies.

The other method which has been used recently in Tanzania is to set up an empirical system of units which can be readily used in computer calculations. Stanford Research Unit working on the Tan-Zam road link studies, devised one such system for this project and suggest its extension to other work in East Africa. They used a map grid with 10 km. squares as the basic framework for their study and all data was assigned to its own 'box' on the grid. It was suggested by the team that a scheme of input and output calculations for particular development purposes

could be made for each square and various theoretical models could be derived from these. In a more generalised study groups of the basic units could be made up to form 100 km squares. This sounds a simple and workable system but some snags develop when this is applied on a large scale. Firstly there is the mathematical problem involved in fitting a grid system to the curved surface of the earth. If it is extended for a long distance gaps appear between squares or distortion occurs. This can be remedied but it makes the whole thing less simple than it first appears. The other problem is that the boundaries of the grid are not easily defined in the field as they are not related to features which occur on the earths surface. This may not be a handicap to a visiting team with good methods of fixing location but must be a problem to most local and other workers. Another snag is that as the grid is quite arbitary it is likely to cut across many basic physical or social units and the rather mechanical use of the grid method might lead to some strange results. There is little possibility of extrapolating the physical data beyond the results obtained and as population totals in grids will vary widely, they will not provide good sampling units for sociological data.

The great advantage of the grid system is its simple build up into units of different scales for different purposes and its simple form as an aid to computer analysis, and as a basis for sampling areal data. However units such as land systems and census areas or village development areas can quite readily be resolved into simpler models for the basis of calculation and for simulation exercises. They do have the problem that they have different areas, but for sociological data the enumeration areas in Tanzania with their similar population number will be roughly equal units.

The most important conclusion I wish to draw is that it is urgently necessary that information on regional aspects of development in East Africa be coherently organized and readily available for development studies. Regional development programmes are becoming an integral part of our planning and we soon need to look at the whole question of land use potential in the context of local development possibilities. It is probably impractical to suggest that all workers should attempt to use the same basic units for study programmes for widely different purposes but it is obviously essential that any units are clearly defined and readily related to other units across fields of study. This seems to be a field in which University could well take a lead, in attempting to outline and experiment with various possibilities and coming up with some firm proposals. It would seem feasible in Tanzania

for instance to organise physical data on the basis of land systems and sociological data on the basis of unit enumeration areas as suggested by Mr. Thomas in his paper for this meeting. What is essential is that both of these systems be accurately mapped so that they could be correlated one with another. In most cases the enumeration areas would be smaller than the land systems so that data from a number of enumeration areas would be relevant to any one land system. One of the most important results would be that we could use these units as sample study areas on a district basis and set up a coherent data store based on these two parameters. Possibly similar conclusions might be reached with regard to Uganda and Kenya and the more uniform our approach to this problem the more worthwhile the results.

NOTES: 1. Commonwealth Scientific Industrial and Research Organization, Australia.

2. General report on the Lands of the Hunter Valley. Land Research Series No.8 CSIRO Australia 1963 p.9

3. Lands of the Alice Springs area Northern Territory; Land Research Series No.6 CSIRO Australia 1962.

Figure 1. The Masaka Land System. Block diagram and basic data (not duplicated).

Figure 2. Facet data for the Masaka land system.

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Martin R. Doornbos
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PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN UGANDA: SOME PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS

Ankole and Toro are two neighbouring kingdoms in the Western Region of Uganda. They are divided kingdoms. In the past decade or two each of them witnessed the emergence of a protest movement which challenged some fundamental assumptions of hierarchy and subordination on which their political structures had traditionally been based. These movements represented reactions against established orders which were, or which were at least considered to be, too inflexible to allow for smooth accomodation of demands for participation by new political groups. They fed on resentment against disproportionate allocations of chieftainships and other sinecures, against differential distribution of educational opportunities like bursaries and other advantages in upward social mobility, and against burdens of taxation felt to be unequal, especially if considered against the benefit obtained in return.

Underneath these claims were deep-seated grievances over alleged inferiority and contemptuous treatment accorded to particular segments in the plural societies of Ankole and Toro. In the last instance, however, the emergence of the Bairu movement in Ankole and the Rwenzururu movement in Toro is to be accounted for by the effects of the spread of education, a relative rise and equalization of incomes largely due to the diffusion of cash-crops grown by peasant farmers, and a general infusion of more egalitarian values, which all militated against a continued acceptance of social and political inequality.

Notwithstanding the close vicinity of the two kingdoms, the Bairu and Rwenzururu movements originated independently of one another and have - indicative enough of the district-centered basis of politics in Uganda - never been linked up together, nor to similar manifestations of protest elsewhere in the country. They overlapped in time, since the Bairu movement was over its peak by the time when the Rwenzururu movement was in its infancy. Though in earlier years there had been a series of comparable incidents and organizational activity as a prelude to the eruption of conflict in the two district-kingdoms, these led up to a movement which only gradually grew and dwindled in strength in Ankole, but to a belated, sudden and severe outburst of enmity in Toro. Though they had their roots in basically identical factors of social inequality, the movements eventually split their societies along quite different lines. Because of these different cleavages, the movements ultimately found themselves pressing for increasingly divergent demands. Nonetheless they had built on similar grievances and on the outset had had virtually identical goals. Though in part their emergence had been induced by the introduction of similar mechanisms designed to widen the extent of popular participation in decision-making, in Ankole these mechanisms were capable of accomodating a substantial part of the demands and to that extent contributed to political integration of the society. In Toro, however, these mechanisms proved inadequate to cope with the challenges they had helped to unleash and consequently broke down under the ensuing strains. Since a significant measure of adjustment was achieved in Ankole, the Bairu movement against Bahima overlordship has become little known outside that kingdom, whereas in Toro, when originally similar

demands had not been satisfactorily met, the Rwenzururu movement rapidly evolved from an internal Toro affair to a major national concern with even some international implications.

Over time the two movements developed rather comparable divisions within themselves. But whereas the continued existence of a disgruntled element of the Bairu movement does not seriously impede the effective exercise of authority and the formulation of some integrative policies, the proliferation of the hard core of Rwenzururu continues to pose a major obstacle in the way of any normalization of governmental functions, let alone political integration.

II. The Bairu Movement

Judging by semantics alone, the Bairu movement in Ankole had to be integrative. Depending on the extent to which Bakiga, Baganda and other immigrants into Ankole have been assimilated, the term Bairu (sing. Mwiru) refers to approximately 85-95% of the Ankole population, which totals about 800,000. The term is not without some ambiguity, since it denotes both an ethnic group, the peasant class, and "serfs", which traditionally were considered to be coterminous. As a differentiation of these meanings has not developed, the pejorative implications make the term rather unpopular with most inhabitants of Ankole. Only very few people in the vanguard of what, for lack of a substitute, still has to be called the Bairu movement, have taken the step of using the word Mwiru with a sense of pride. More usually people prefer to speak of themselves as Banyankore, though often they go on to specify that they mean "pure" Banyankore, a subtle difference which seeks to reaffirm legitimate political and social rights for the "original" inhabitants. The identification with Ankole seems crucial, however, even if at times some people may have wanted to claim Ankole for the Bairu to the exclusion of others.

Possibly as a reaction to this, the Bahima have in recent years also identified themselves increasingly as Banyankore. Since they have lost power, their minority position (about 5% of the population), their social aloofness from the Bairu, as well as recollections by the latter of their past domination, tend to keep them on the alert for possible discriminatory measures. Social distance is still very great, which is illustrated by the fact that intermarriage hardly takes place. Some of the more irreconcilable Bairu also hold the view that since the "Hamites" (a term uncritically borrowed from an earlier generation of anthropologists) are invaders who entered Ankole some 500 years ago, they should go back to where they came from. At least outwardly, therefore, the Bahima seek to tone down their exclusive identity and arrive at a common denominator, just like the Bairu but for different reasons. Contemporary lack of appeal of the terms Bairu and Bahima thus has the effect of strengthening the unifying qualities of the word Banyankore.

But it is not just in words that the Bairu movement was led to be integrative. Bairu and Bahima were spread throughout most of Ankole, though not in equal proportions, with Bahima in superior positions and Bairu on the whole in subordinate status. This made it compelling for the Bairu to first press for equality in status, later for an exchange of leadership roles. Rather than seeking their own kingdom, structural conditions caused them to bring about pressure for absorption into the existing political hierarchy.

Did it, in retrospect, necessitate a movement which aggregated forces and exerted influence to achieve this absorption? Perhaps the sheer increase in output of educated personnel, the composition of which had since the late 1940's come to approximate more closely the actual proportions of Bairu and Bahima in Ankole, would eventually have led to the same results. Besides, in the post-war years the Protectorate administration had started to initiate policies which, by themselves, would eventually bring about wider popular participation in the affairs of government. Bairu, however, considered they could not rely on such autonomous mechanisms, since they felt conscious efforts were applied to keep them out of influence. After all, the Bahima were believed to have been the first to organize themselves to defend their interests where these clashed with those of the ascending Bairu. Moreover, it has not been common for dependent populations to readily assume an ultimately democratizing outcome of colonial legislative measures.

Judging from actual happenings in the 50's, the role of the Bairu movement appears to have been one which supported, strengthened and accelerated trends towards increasing Bairu participation and influence which were already under way and may thus in some critical instances have helped the process to get over the hump. Beside this, the movement should be considered as a natural corollary of the emergence of the Bairu as a politically conscious group and as a consummation of their slowly gained emancipation. If it had not achieved anything else, the psychological satisfactions and the heightened self-confidence with which it infused its members should still be considered as a major function of the movement.

The framework of conflict in Ankole - some contrasts with Rwanda

But was pressure for integration the only alternative open to the Bairu movement? In neighbouring Rwanda a comparable, though by no means in all aspects similar, ethnically stratified society became involved in a violent revolution during which Bahutu abruptly threw off Batutsi overrule. The Bairu movement in Ankole, while at times it may have been imbued with revolutionary zeal, has at no point been involved in any serious clashes, nor did it intend to be so. There were no demonstrations, no fights, no imprisonments, and it actually never came to mobilizing the peasant masses. (As a matter of fact, it appears that when the Bairu movement had swollen to its most inclusive size, it became too unwieldy to be very effective.)

There is a strong inclination to assume that the Rwanda situation was more serious than that in Ankole and consequently led to a revolution. However, for some time the Ankole dissensions were probably at least as severe as those in Rwanda and may nonetheless not have led to a similar sudden avalanche partly because the issues were handled in a different way, and

partly because some factors made it possible to handled them differently. As late as 1956, for example, the Omugabe of Ankole, upon his return from a visit to Rwanda, held up ethnic relationships in that country as an example to the Banyankore:

> "In Ruanda, there are three types of people, namely Bahutu, Batutsi and the Batwa. They work together in cooperation and .... their motto is 'Omuguha gw'enyabushatu' (a ropewith three strands) representing these classes of people in Ruanda. You will all agree with me that no country should expect progress if there is lack of cooperation and disunity. Division and hatred engineered by subversive elements in a country exhibit a gloomy picture and their ends are fatal. I should like you to be 'Omuguha gw'enyabushatu'. That is when we shall achieve Ankole's will as a nation."[1)]

In contrast to Rwanda, however, comparatively smooth integration was achieved in Ankole. In contrast to Rwanda, too, there had not been in Ankole a sudden realization of the changes of time and a subsequent abrupt transfer of political support from one group to another on the part of administrative and clerical authorities. Instead, the introduction since 1945 of various new ordinances governing the powers and compositions of district administrations in Uganda allowed for piecemeal but progressively increasing participation by the Bairu in Ankole affairs. These measures continued to satisfy demands and continued to wet appetites: hence a fairly constant strife which for some years seemed graver than in Rwanda, but no rapid culmination into a violent outburst.

But other conditioning elements, which were not available in Rwanda, also led in the same direction in Ankole. The numbers of Batutsi (approximately 15%) were larger than those of the Bahima in Ankole. Besides, these Batutsi appear to have been spread out more evenly than the Bahima were, and a larger proportion of Batutsi was found in a directly hierarchical position vis-a-vis Bahutu subordinates than there were Bahima in respect of Bairu. The majority of Bahima in Ankole still lead a pastoral life detached from and disinterested in the affairs of government, and it has in fact only been a surprisingly small chiefly class of Bahima who have managed to hold on to the key positions during the first half of this century. Most of the pastoral Bahima, moreover, had left for Buganda during the critical years of transition (late 40's till early 60's) due to the encroachment of tsetse fly in large parts of Ankole. (It must be doubted, however, whether their presence in Ankole would have made much difference; in previous centuries their superior military skills had made them a formidable force to be reckoned with and had, indeed, formed the basis of their hegemony, but these qualities never became a factor or even a consideration during the last two decades.) For these various reasons, the Batutsi political elite was stronger and more strongly entrenched than the Bahima ruling group. The Batutsi were powerful enough to put up a resistance, the Bahima were in a sense too weak to be thrown off.

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1) Speech by Rubambansi the Omugabe at the Opening Ceremoney of the Eishengyero of Ankole, 17 January, 1956.

Equally important, however, was probably the fact that in a closed system like Rwanda there was hardly any choice for the incumbent elite but to try and maintain its position, and no choice for the Bahutu leadership but to press to become at least part of this elite. In Ankole, however, many people, Bahima as well as Bairu, who found or who would have found their way blocked to positions in the local establishment, were able to find alternative employment in the wider universe of Uganda and East Africa. Its forming part of a larger entity thus made it possible for much of the steam to be let off from the Ankole political system.

The contrasting evidence from Ankole and Rwanda suggests that ethnically divided sub-systems within larger, national frameworks are in a better position to reach political integration <u>within</u> themselves than are 'national' plural societies, since the actual or possible spill-over to the national center of part of the educated class competing for elite positions in sub-systems is likely to result in a diminuation of tension in such sub-systems.

<u>Origins and limitations of the Bairu movement</u>

Did the nature of the framework in which the Bairu movement came to operate suggest that its aims could be obtained in an easy walk-over? Certainly the above factors alleviated the situation if compared with that in Rwanda. But the Bairu movement cannot be considered to have at all stages put up a unified force which assumed control of affairs and took possession of the spoils as a matter of course. Several factors, some of its own making, perhaps some engineered by its opponents, and some a matter of plain objective conditions, thwarted its effectiveness. Indirectly, the resulting frustrations also accounted for a fairly continuous high level of tension.

When, in the early 30's, a handful of educated Bairu took the daring initiative of discussing matters of common concern like merit as criteria of appointment into the public service, they did so, purposely, under the cloak of a "C.M.S. Association Club", which was essentially Protestant. In 1940, when Bahima students at the Protestant Mbarara High School founded an organization called "Kamwe Kamwe" ("One by one", an abbreviation of a Kinyankore proverb "One by one together makes a bundle"), the Protestant Bairu students at that school reacted by establishing an association called "Obutsya Nibwira" (from another proverb which, significant for the modest aspirations of the time, means "The daughter will equal her mother"). When, in 1949 and shortly after the first Mwiru Enganzi (chief minister) had been installed, some Bahima students at M.H.S., probably influenced by others, wrote a letter to the Omugabe protesting against the encroachment of Bairu on positions to which they considered themselves the rightful inheritants, this again sparked off strong reactions mainly among Protestant Bairu. Though Bairu consultations had been held with varying frequency before that time, it is probably from this point onwards that one can rightfully speak of the existence of a Bairu movement. Incidentally, it was also after this incident that the Bahima Association came about, which had as its main aim the defence and furtherance of Bahima intersts in Ankole.

During its various stages of development the Bairu movement consisted to a large extent of nightly meetings of prominent Bairu (with many teachers among them) from different parts of Ankole. They came together to discuss common problems and interests, work out solutions and strategies and, as the name implies under which the movement became most widely known, Kumanyana, "to get to know each other." Through these leaders who represented, and served as a link with various areas and sub-groups in Ankole, the Bairu movement was able to reach a substantial part of the population, which could thus effectively be kept in touch with the general line of thinking. Meanwhile, particularly in times when it was not fully preoccupied with immediate issues, its meetings served as much as a mutual help society concerned with the improvement of standards of living, educational progress and the general well-being of its members, as they constituted a political organization. It also maintained a fund, Mutasu ('For the future'), out of which school fees for needy students were paid.

Though the scope of its activities was Ankole-wide, the Bairu movement attracted its following to a large extent from the central and more heavily populated parts of the kingdom. This central location made it easier for people from these parts to attend meetings than for others from more peripheral areas. But the centrally situated counties of Ankole like Shema, Igara and parts of Rwampara and Kashari are also the areas where the cultivation of coffee and other cash-crops has for a long time been undertaken successfully. Especially in Shema and Igara the population consists almost wholly of Bairu, and among them there exists a greater spirit of independence and radicalism than can be found in other areas of Ankole. Most of the militant Bairu leaders who have come on the scene since the 40's have been from these areas, and most of these even attended the same primary school at Kabwohe in Shema. Finally, due mainly to historical accidents, these central areas also happen to have rather larger proportions of Protestants than of Catholics. Catholics, are more predominant in outlying counties of Ankole such as Bunyaruguru, Buhweju and Ibanda.

In its antecedents and from its actual inception, the Bairu movement was thus mainly a Protestant affair. Only a few Roman Catholics are said to have been involved in its meetings from an early date on. It was not until the time of the first election of an Enganzi by the Eishengyero, in 1955, and during a short time afterwards, that Catholics and Protestants participated equally in the endeavours of the Bairu movement. Yet Catholics number more than 50% among the Bairu and they had been discriminated against more clearly in, for example, the allocation of jobs than Protestant Bairu had been. Their differences with the Bahima, who are virtually all Protestant insofar as they have been Christianized, are much wider than those of the Protestant Bairu, who had been in contact with Bahima in school, church, and to some extent in government.

Is it a paradox that it was the Protestant Bairu and not the Catholics who stood up against Bahima overrule? The proposition has often been made that

conflict will be less between groups which share one or more over-arching values than between groups who are dividend along a more cumulative set of criteria. Why then does not this hypothesis hold true in Ankole, where Protestant Bairu have their religion in common with the Bahima, and Catholic Bairu are distinct from the Bahima not only in ethnic but also in religious respects?

One is tempted to think, with Max Weber, that there was an element in the nature of the two religions which made the Protestants more militant, the Catholics more submissive. Though theirs was not the "King's religion", Catholics have been more respectful of the Omugabe's authority than Protestant Bairu. The latter at one time titled their leader Ruteremwa ("He who cannot fail"), which in royalist circles was taken to suggest superiority ever the king. Many of them regard Bagyendanwa, the royal drums and traditionally the source of all power, as no more than a piece of wood, and the kingship itself as a reminder of Bahima domination.

Probably, however, it was in large part the very closeness of contact itself, which prompted the Protestant Bairu, and not the Catholic Bairu, to challenge the privileges accorded to the Bahima. Because of the greater degree of communication between them, the Protestant Bairu could be more easily sensitized to the relative advantages given to their Bahima schoolmates, fellow congregationists, and colleagues in government service. Catholics, on the contrary, who were largely absorbed in their own affairs, had by and large been out of touch with what went on at the center of the political system. Partly out of unawareness and partly for lack of perspectives they have long tended to accept their second class citizenship as a fact of life.

Equally important, though not unconnected with their better chances, was that Protestant Bairu on the whole appear to have been comparatively more advanced than Catholic Bairu in matters of educational attainment. They also tended to achieve relatively greater financial prosperity due to the cultivation of cash-crops. Generally Protestants displayed a greater achievement orientation than Catholics. More Protestant than Catholic Bairu felt that they could improve their standards of living further if they were given a chance, but believed that failures to do so were often due to obstacles put in their way by Bahima influentials.

The pattern of interaction of variables of ethnicity and religion in Ankole thus points to the need for a more complex thesis than one which merely states that greatest conflict will occur where there are greatest differences. Conflict can occur between groups which have lesser differences amongst each other, and may leave groups which are distinct in additional respects relatively unaffected. This is the case if factors of social mobilization happen to bring closest competition between closest groups.

Ethnicity or religion are no doubt of crucial importance as determinants of the nature and depth of conflict. Other elements being equal, conflict may indeed be more severe in cases of greater cumulation of cultural differences than in cases with more overarching values. Ethnicity, religion, language and race easily introduce and augment emotions and irrationalities surrounding conflict.

But more often than not conflict between groups is ultimately not spurred by the distinguishing properties and symbols which divide them, but by relative differences in educational achievement, economic prosperity and general social and political advancement underlying them. Conflict is likely to occur and increase where, on these criteria, changes take place in the social distance between groups. Challenges to the leadership position of an ethnic or religious sub-group are more likely to come from the group which has come closest to it in achievement at various levels, no matter in what way or how much or how little it is culturally different from it, than from the group, whatever its differences may be, whose extent and relative speed of social mobilization do not give it the motivation and perspective to enter a competition for additional political and social benefits.

Ethnicity, religion and party politics in Ankole

Whereas the Bairu movement drew its main strength from the Protestants, this fact eventually also entailed its weakness. Catholics were induced to join the Bairu meetings in the mid-50's, when the fullest possible pressure seemed required to get a Mwiru Enganzi elected. They reluctantly came in, though in the expectation to get their fair share in the rewards once a Bairu administration would have taken office. Disenchantment started when they felt that Protestants still reaped most of the benefits, for which, in order to win them, they had given their support. Protestants, on the other hand, considered that it was they who had borne the brunt in the movement for Bairu advancement, that they had more qualified people readily available to take up positions, and that amongst themselves there was a clearer need to distribute rewards than among the Catholics.

Catholics subsequently became disgruntled and defected from the shortlived joint Bairu camp. The victories of the Bairu movement were thus followed shortly by a dwindling of its energy.

During the latter half of the 50's the Bahima saw their position going downwards as well. With the increasing politicization of affairs in the immediate pre-independence period they looked for allies and found them in the Catholic Bairu. In the late 50's a coalition grew between Protestant Bahima and Catholic Bairu, which eventually found its organizational basis in the Democratic Party when it branched out into Ankole. They won the first general elections held for the Eishengyero and as a result formed the government from 1961 till 1963, when it was replaced by the Uganda People's Congress.

After 1960 the Protestant Bairu gave their support in large majority to the UPC. The UPC had come about as a merger between a wing of the Uganda National Congress and the Uganda People's Union, the latter of which had had its basis mainly in the Western Region. Since political parties in Uganda originated largely at the center, it had taken some sorting out before the local complexities of the districts had found their expression in party rivalries. The UPU and the UNC had to some extent been cutting across ethnic divisions, but in the final analysis their membership was probably too small and their leadership too impermanent to make this fact a very meaningful one. However, since in the late 50's and early 60's the probable size of election returns became a major consideration in political calculations in Ankole, and

since the bulk of voters, constituted by the Bairu, started to be organized increasingly along religious lines into the DP and UPC, it became imperative for the leaders of both parties to try and tip the balance. The largely Catholic Bairu DP had Bahima support, which the Protestant Bairu UPC now felt it needed as well and which it was prepared to pay a price for.

Henceforth ethnic rivalries were played down, partly by calculation, but partly also because some key personalities who had longstanding reputations of trying to bridge Bairu-Bahima divisions had found their way into or behind UPC circles. A minor and accidental factor was that some of the Bahima leaders of the UPU had, after the merger, naturally switched over to the higher echelons of the UPC in Ankole.

In spite of these circumstances the UPC was not able, however, to attract any substantial amount of Bahima votes, but it did keep some influential Bahima among its leadership. It was a curious anticlimax to find, after all the efforts to mobilize the Bairu during the preceding decade, a significant part of the leadership of the Ankole DP as well as of the UPC in the early 60's in the hands of Bahima, and four Bahima among the six M.P.'s returned by both UPC and DP to the National Assembly in 1962.

In view of the longstanding lack of empathy between ethnic groups in Ankole it is not surprising that some suspicions and friction should have developed in both political parties, though most pronounced and openly so within the UPC. As a matter of fact, there is among Bairu a widely held theory that Bahima deliberately stirred up Catholic-Protestant and DP-UPC rivalries so as to keep the Bairu divided, and then, distributing themselves over the two parties, subsequently managed to gain control over both, all as part of a grand design to perpetuate their political influence. There are also some issues connected with land tenure and the allocation of development resources which some Bairu feel have been handled in such a way as to give disproportionate privileges to "those who have fallen into things," many of whom are Bahima.

Leaving aside the merits of these charges, it is a fact that they add fuel to further articulation of Bairu agrievances. As a result, a continuation and revival of the Bairu movement can be found in one of the factions which at present divide the UPC in Ankole. For the leaders of this group the remnants of the movement attract as a ready-made source of political supprt.

The UPC group in office feels, on the contrary, that times have changed and that the issue of the day is no longer one of all-pervasice Bahima domination. They consider that cooperation and understanding are necessary and possible between Protestants and Catholics, Bairu and Bahima, and that accentuating their mutual differences will in the long run work to nobody's advantage but to the detriment of the whole.

It is clear that the nature of the Bairu movement has changed considerably over time. As an emancipatory movement, building solidarity and self-confidence, it contributed positively to the integrity of Ankole society. Though originated and carried forward mainly by Protestants, in its earlier stages it could with some justice purport to speak for all Bairu. At one time it did represent most Bairu, Catholics as well as Protestants, but after disagreements developed over the distribution of rewards, it shrank back to its basis of the more militant Protestant Bairu. From its more general concerns over the needs for improvement in standards of living it became increasingly involved in pressing for spoils for its more fervent followers, and finally developed into an expression of rather narrow factionalism. Emancipation and integration being achieved in most respects, the temptations of using surviving feelings of dissension as a basis for political support have induced it to demand total victory, and total defeat. But the enemy is now largely an imagined one.

"They have killed the animal, and they now want to eat it," as a critic said.

III. The Rwenzururu Movement

Rwenzururu means "The mountains of heavy rainfall" and is the Rukonjo name for the range, since Stanley's time called Ruwenzori or Mountains of the Moon, which lies along the border of the Republic of Congo and the Kingdom of Toro in Uganda. Its precipitous terrain, its climate and vegetation form a sharp contrast to those of the gently hilly parts of Toro which begin east of its slopes. Northwest of the massif, also on the Congo border, are the plains of Bwamba which stretch into the Ituri forest. The Bakonjo of the mountains and the Baamba of the plains have both maintained contacts with segments of their tribes which are situated in neighbouring Congo. Together they number about 35% of the population of Toro, which now totals over 400,000.

In recent years Rwenzururu has become the name of a movement which pressed for a separate district for Bakonjo and Baamba. Since June 30, 1962, it has also been the name of a secessionist state, the Rwenzururu Kingdom Gvernment. But the word Rwenzururu signifies more than that. It is a symbol with strong emotional appeals, repeated in songs and legends, and encompassing an entire range of attitudes of opposition against Toro rule. There are sharp differences in opinion and policy between various sections of Bakonjo and Baamba, yet most of them subscribe to the label of Rwenzururu to designate each of their particular sets of political aspirations. Thus, whereas in Ankole the word Bairu is avoided, in much of Toro the term Rwenzururu is a password. Moreover, while terms like Ankole and Banyankore have some integrative quality to t em, the opposite is true for "Toro" and "Batoro". Bakonjo and Baamba are regarded as, and have long been led to regard themselves as different from Batoro. Calling themselves Batoro would at present be inconceivable to them. To Rwenzururians Toro is now the Batoro's kingdom (to most Batoro as well), with which they prefer to have as little to do as possible, and whose legitimacy they dispute.

The pattern of distribution of the population in Toro and the conditions of the terrain which formed the habitat of Bakonjo and Baamba were quite basic. Territorially the Bakonjo and Baamba had long been living separately from the Batoro. Only in recent decades, when Bakonjo had come down the slopes of Ruwenzori to cultivate cotton and when a number of Batoro had moved to Bwamba to start growing coffee, had day to day contacts between Bakonjo and Baamba on the one hand and Batoro on the other become more frequent. Yet Bakonjo and Baamba had in many ways been treated as different, separate and inferior, and if anything, the limited increase in contacts had accentuated these attitudes. The historical traditions of Bakonjo and Baamba, which do not contain evidence of effective submission of their areas to the Abakama of Toro at any time before the arrival of the British, also affirm the previous separate existence of the three tribes. Thus the history as well as the location of the peoples concerned could easily bring the idea of a separate district to mind when dissatisfaction over the association with Toro mounted and led to a breaking-point. Later, when the Toro government had proved to be quite inflexible in the face of Bakonjo and Baamba aspirations, and the central government indicated it could not, on grounds of national unity, give in to the demands for a separate district, it was the special characteristics of the habitat of Bakonjo and Baamba which made it possible for them to declare themselves independent. The Ruwenzori mountain areas are extremely inaccessible; effective administration had never become established in the higher altitudes and, in a sense, anybody could set up an independent government there without facing the consequences for some time.

Other factors being equal, indications from the limited case experiences of Ankole and Toro are that systems of domination by one ethnic group over others, whose structures of social and political stratification are undergoing rearrangement causing increased demands for political participation by members of the dominated group(s) to be made, are in a better position to achieve political integration if members of the ruling class and the dominated strata are in close physical and social proximity throughout the territory of the system than in cases where members of a territorially separate sub-group, from which most incumbents of elite positions are drawn, exercise authority over other territorial sub-groups which constitute a dominated class.

Isolated existence of ethnic sub-groups within the same political framework decreases the possibilities for bridging mutual misunderstandings and leaves few checks on the development of distorted stereotypes about the other groups. Isolated existence of mutually antipathetic sub-groups also increases the possibilities and hence the temptations, for organized hostility.

<u>Back ground to conflict</u>

The chances for reconciliation were, therefore, more limited to begin with in Toro than they were in Ankole. Yet a radically different approach to the issues by the Toro authorities might have made it possible to maintain the minimum of rapport which was essential if a lasting solution to the conflict was to be achieved. If for instance, they had shown their preparedness to substantially increase the number of Bakonjo and Baamba in government positions, as well as the amount of bursaries, medical facilities and other social benefits to be awarded to them, Bakonjo and Baamba might well have abstained from their subsequent escalation of demands. Essential, too, would have been a genuine appreciation of the grievances involved and a

A skirmish about some of these words was actually one of the incidents which brought the Rwenzururu crisis out into the open. Whe prior to independence consultations took place in the Constitutional Committee of the Toro Rukurato on the contents of the future constitution for Toro, Bakonjo and Baamba leaders (who had only belatedly been admitted to these discussions) insisted that the new Toro constitution should explicitly recognize Batoro, Bakonjo and Baamba as the three tribes of Toro. They also demanded that one should speak of the Kingdom of Toro rather than of Toro Kingdom, - a desideratum which the subtlty is even harder to grasp than its modesty. The Toro establishment could not see its way to granting parity in recognized status for Baamba and Bakonjo, however In response to this refusal the leaders of these two tribes staged a walk-out from the proceedings, followed by a boycot of the Rukurato by most Bakonjo and Baamba representatives.

Whereas up till early 1962 Bakonjo and Baamba still acknowledged the legitimacy of the Kingdom of Toro, their bids for equal status thereafter passed through a rapid evolution until, less than a year later, they claimed not only their own areas but the whole of Toro as the territory of Rwenzururu Kingdom. Unfulfilled demands for parity in Toro thus led to parity in stakes in legitimacy on Toro. An account of traditional history was readily accepted in which the Batoro came in the 1830's as invaders from Bunyoro into Rwenzururu under the rebel prince Kaboyo (and according to which they did not split off Toro from Bunyoro on the basis of the population found there, which is a more generally accepted interpretation). This invasion would have had the effect of pushing the Bakonjo into the mountains and separating them from the Baganda to which they consider themselves remotely akin. (It is true that in language and customs the Bakonjo have more in common with the Baganda than they have with the Batoro, though so far no satisfactory explanation for this connection has been found). The present position of Rwenzururu is, therefore, that Rwenzururians were the original inhabitants of Toro, which Batoro must vacate by moving back to Bunyoro. To affirm this claim, the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government has appointed its nominal chiefs for counties in Toro which are far off from the areas under its immediate control, an arrangement which is remarkably similar to that of the Toro Kingdom Government whose chiefs in the Bakonjo and Baamba areas are virtually without functions but who are maintained primarily to give substance to Toro's de jure authority in the areas.

The form of cleavage in Toro

Was there some inherent 'logic' in the Toro situation, leading -- unlike Ankole, where pressure for integration seemed to be dictated -- to demands for a separate district and ultimately to the establishment of a secessionist government? One cannot possibly argue that there was no alternative, but nonetheless a variety of conditions made these steps emotionally and perhaps also tactically the ones finally adopted.

willingness to regard Bakonjo and Baamba as equals rather than as inferiors to Batoro.

Instead, when for example, the request for a separate district came up before the Toro government, it "was dealt with in a most obtuse and insensitive manner. Even when the moderate leaders of the Baamba/Bakonjo made approaches to the Toro Government, they were met with intimidation and high-handedness."[2]

The deadlock in constitutional discussions and in a range of other matters which arose between the Toro government and the Bakonjo and Bamba leadership does not need to be related here. Suffice it to say that after the Toro government had let its change for repprochenent slip by unutilized, positions taken on both sides rapidly evolved to extreme rigidity,and in the process the Rwenzururu movement received another major impetus.

But other factors had surrounded the emergence of the Rwenzururu movement as well. The Sebei in the Eastern Region of Uganda, had for long been in a remarkably similar position with regard to the Bagisu in Bugisu District as the Bakonjo and Baamba were in respect of the Batoro. During the period of office of the D.P. government in Uganda from 1960 to 1962 Sebei was granted separate district status. This had helped to open the eyes of the Bakonjo and Baamba to the vision of having their own district. After a visit to their areas of the DP leader, Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka, the impression had been left, rightly or wrongly, that a DP government would further their case for a separate district, provided that they would give their support to the DP in the next general elections of 1962. They did, but the UPC won and, moreover, the Independence Constitution made it infinitely more difficult to change the existing boundaries of districts. It is probable that the Bakonjo and Baamba had awakened to the idea of a separate district half a year or more before, they would have had a fair cchance of getting it. During the pre-independence period, as well, the Bakonjo and Baamba had witnessed Toro political leaders make quite exaggerated claims for Toro's future status in Uganda. Toro had strong demands for a real federal relationship to the center, partly because it was anxious to keep royalties from the Kilembe copper mines to itself, partly because it wanted to see its Omukama accorded the same privileges as the Kabaka of Buganda received. To stand by its claims, at one point the demand was made that "Toro be recognized as a nation first", before any consideration was to be given to the nature of its relationships to the rest of Uganda. In another effort to add substance to their pressures for federalism, they opened a campaign for the recovery of areas, comprising the larger part of the province of Kivu in Congo, which were "lost" in the Anglo-Belgian boundary settlement of the beginning of this century. Such bids for enhanced greatness and increased autonomy directly involved or Baamba and Bakonjo but without their having a say in it. No doubt these left their impression on members of these tribes, who had been entertaining hopes for

2) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Recent Disturbances among the Baamba and Bakonjo People of Toro, Government Printer, Entebbe 1962.

emancipation and social rehabilitation but had only belatedly stumbled on the possibilities of a separate district as a cure-all for their grievances.

Origins and Development

Much of the groundwork and early agitation for the Rwenzururu movement took place in Bwamba county. Apart from the Bamba, a few pygmees, and some small groups of mixed ethnic origin, there is in Bwamba one sub-county which is predominantly populated by Bakonjo. It is from these Bakonjo living in Bwamba that much of the ferment entering into the movement originated. Though from the early days on there have been some Baamba in the vanguard of the movement, most of the leadership has always been, and over time became increasingly more so, in the hands of Bakonjo. Most of the symbols, songs and communications of the movement are also in Rukonjo.

In 1954 a small group of Bakonjo led by a primary teacher Isayah Mukirane started the Bakonjo Life History Research Society. Whereas Toro customs and traditions had long been at a certain premium and were, to some extent, emulated, this Society was certain the first formal undertaking of the Bakonjo to look inward and to revive recollections of their own history and culture. Its relative lateness can be taken as significant for the slow educational advancement which the Bakonjo had had. Its very existence was no doubt indicative of wider and deeper reflections being given to the role and status of Bakonjo in Toro society. The effects of the society, limited though it may have been in the numbers of people it reached, were to infuse more self-awareness and pride in its members. Its major pre-occupation was, inevitably, with past and present relationships between Bakonjo and Batoro. Elder tribesmen contributed traditions of lost independence and vivid memories of incidents inflicted upon Bakonjo throughout the earlier decades of this century. There is little doubt that an immediate and natural result of the work of the Research Society was an awakening and heightening of Bakonjo grievances against Batoro. The Bakonjo Life History Research Society, thus whose chairman was to become leader, President and later King of Rwensururu, constituted a direct antecedent to the Rwenzururu movement. A great deal of soul-searching went on between the foundation of the Bakonjo Research Society and the beginnings of the Rwenzururu movement. In early 1962, when Rwenzururu was a fact, it had its basis in Bwamba. Bamba were induced to join and fight together with Bakonjo for a separate district. They came into the movement partly because they had been subject to the same ill-treatment as the Bakonjo, and partly because they hardly had a choice. The Ruwenzori range separates them from Toro proper and an easily blocked escarpment road would have formed their only access to armed government protection, if they had wanted or needed it. Staying aloof might easily have proveked the more militant Bakonjo to engage in punitive raids upon the Baamba.

Nonetheless, when defections started to occur from the movement, these involved to a great extent Bamba. And after the central government, in 1964, had taken over the administration of government services in the Bamba and Bakonjo areas from the Toro government, there was particularly in Bwamba a progressively ready acceptance of the role of the central government's Administrator. It was perhaps partly also because of a relative lack of response, though probably primarily for strategic reasons, that by the time Rwenzururu entered its more demanding, illegal and violent stage later in 1962, Isayah Mukirane had transferred its headquarters from Bwamba to a place in Busongora, on the other side of the mountain and in the heart of Bakonjo country. In sum, Bakonjo, proved on the whole to be stronger supporters for Rwenzururu, the movement which had originated amongst themselves, than the Baamba were.

But not all Bakonjo. It was only at relatively few moments that the movement could be said to have been representative of the large majority of Bakonjo. On the whole these were the times when there was also more general support among the Baamba for it. Particularly in the beginning, when indignation was strong over the Batoro's blunt rebuffs, and expectations high for the ultimate granting of a separate district, was there a fairly general subscription to the principles and goals of the movement all along the mountain. During the initial periods of violence in 1962, when the organization proved itself capable of combining a high level of tactical mobility with centralized leadership in sending down waves of raiding parties from quite unpredictable spots into Batoro areas, was there much tacit but a great deal of active popular support for the movement. Men, women and children then all had their part in what was widely considered a just war.

However, the very decision by the Mukirane faction, taken when other central Rwenzururu leaders were in jail, to establish a government in mountainous seclusion, hide out in Congo for some length of time, and adopt armed resistance as a means of achieving their goals, caused a crack in the movement in latter half of 1962 which it would no longer be able to heal again and which would only grow in depth. Henceforth Rwenzururu still meant opposition against Batoro rule, but it covered strategies of militant rebellion and methods of diplomacy and conciliation. Later, when the Uganda government had taken over the responsibility of administering the areas concerned, the issue became far more complex than point-blank resistance against Toro domination. Many, if not yet most, of the people on the Ruwenzori considered that since the major goal had been the removal of the Toro administration, their coming directly under the wings of the central government was an acceptable solution to this end, particularly in view of the promises for increased development which had accompanied the take-over. The intransigance of the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government, however, had caused it to go beyond a point of no return. It had demanded

nothing but a separate district and was not prepared to enter negotions about anything short of that. While first it had been willing to remain within Uganda if this status was given, it soon declared itself independent after it had found the central government likewise opposing its claims. Efforts to conciliation proved abortive, and any form of two-way communication came to a complete standstill. Mukirane was crowned King of Rwenzururu, and af. the exalted position he and his government had assumed it would have meant no less than moral and political defeat as well as a collapse of the image among their immediate followers if they had given in for what clearly would be less than district status. Besides, in any form of political integration it would not be the hard core of Rwenzururu who could expect to be called upon to fill posts in the Toro district administration, but rather the Bakonjo and Baamba leaders who from the beginning on had shown their preparedness to arrive at some compromise. From their point of view, the choice became one between holding on to the kingship, ministerial offices and other self-created sinecures, however unreal these are as seen from the outside, and being dropped off along the way, or possibly ending up in prison.

The Rwenzururu government, therefore, carried on, but its basis of support progressively shifted from popular acceptance to maintenance by force and exploitation. So much had their popular image suffered that when in 1964 a general flare-up of violence occurred, considerable numbers of Bakonjo apparарently were still found prepared to assist the chasing of Rwenzururu leaders whom they had started to regard as a greater danger than either central government or Toro authorities. During the earlier stages of the secessionist regime it had directed its actions of violence primarily on Batoro living down the mountain. But with an increase of security forces acting as a buffer between them, and with on some occasions massive and rather brutal retaliations on the part of the Batoro, their acts of hostility became directed more and more towards Bakonjo living further down the slopes (and at a few times towards Bamba) than against the Batoro who had been the original target. The purpose of these raids upon their own people was to ensure continued loyalty to the Rwenzururu regime, to inflict punishment for any form of cooperation with other authorities than themselves (i.e. when people paid their taxes through the Uganda government agents) and, perhaps above all, to levy tribute needed for the maintenance of their government. Rwenzururu gangs have been forcefully taking money, food, goats and so on from Bakonjo in the lower mountain region. The victims of this, most of whom had in the beginning of the movement shared in the grievances about discriminatory treatment which had been their lot, have only seen a worsening of their situation during the last four years. Many of them have had one or more relatives killed. For a long time their crops have been neglected, destroyed, or found no market. Medical facilities, scarce though they were in the past, shrank to a point which gave fair play to epidemics visiting the area. Schools, so much needed to uplift the Bakonjo and Baamba,

were closed down for prolonged lengths of time. Desperate efforts of the Rwenzururu government to maintain the barest minimum of these services have almost invariably failed. The promises they hold out are dim and people are tired of the years of misery. With three competing hierarchies of chiefs in their areas (central government, Rwenzururu, and Toro) they are confused and have no desire but for peace. The Rwenzururu government is crumbling surviving on minority support, and indications are that it gets increasingly fragmented into a loosening alliance of big chieftainships, particularly so after the death of its Omukama Kibanzangha, Mukirane, at the end of August, 1966. Yet it tenaciously holds on to the imagery of its independent state, which it is rapidly adorning with neo-traditional titles, a hereditary monarchy, and its own God of Rwenzururu. It is able to do so partly because of the protective conditions of its terrain. But among other reasons, it is probably also allowed to do so because an action to finish it might at this moment still have the effect of solidifying and increasing its support. It no longer produces a major security challenge. Its victimized population carries a heavy burden, but they may have to bear the brunt in shaking it off.

IV. The Rwenzururu movement, like the Bairu movement, at one point was truly representative of most of the people it stood for. The Bairu movement, originated amongst Protestants, came to include Catholics at the peak of its existence, but Catholics were the first to drop out and subsequently divisions grew among Protestant Bairu themselves. Likewise, the Rwenzururu movement, which originated amongst Bakonjo, also encompassed Baamba at the height of its support, but Baamba defected more rapidly than Bakonjo did, and later on dissensions widened between Bakonjo amongst each other.[3]

Both movements were at their greatest strength and popularity when the issues were simplest and clear-cut; this was also when they could elicit strongest emotional support. The Bairu movement dwindled down after it had seen its major aims fulfilled. This was before independence. It dwindled in the process of dividing the spoils.

The Rwenzururu movement disintegrated before it had achieved the goals it had set itself and after independence. Its targets had been too high and its fragmentation in part occurred out of a realization that their pursuit had become futile.

Both movements were based on the peasantry, whose grievances they expressed and whose emancipation they sought to advance. In Ankole, however, these peasant masses were never to any significant extent activated, whereas in Toro their mobilization became a major feature of the movement. Rwenzururu was more clearly a peasant revolt than the Bairu movement was, or needed to be.

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3)(It is of interest that most of the leadership of the Rwenzururu movement has a Protestant background, similar to that of the Bairu movement; this again suggests a greater Protestant propensity for militant protest, even in situations far removed from the area of origin of the idea of the Protestant Ethic. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that Protestant-Catholic interaction has been a significant variable within the Rwenzururu movement.)

Both movements were led in considerable part by teacher-politicians, products of their time and incipient elites of their ethnic groups. It is the interests of their class, in representation and influence, chieftainships and other sinecures, bursaries and school expansion, which commanded a high priority among the pursuits of the movements.

Structural factors have been of prime importance in determining the different outcomes of the two conflict situations. But certainly these were not solely responsible for the divergent results. The demands had been based on similar grounds; disproportionate allocation of benefits and treatment of particular ethnic sub-groups as less than full citizens. They could have been dealt with in the same way, but they were not. As a result, the Bairu movement will be forgotten, while Rwenzururu will reach the history books.

No. 4 .
Hall.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING IN UGANDA : THE BUGANDA EXPERIENCE, 1963-66.*

By

Malcolm Hall

1. Introduction

Planning for development is now fully accepted by most developing countries and emphasis has now moved to an exploration of more sophistica and effective planning procedures. One improvement which is currently receiving a great deal of attention is that of regional planning, as it claims many potential advantages o er the aggregated national approach. Regional plans are able to focus on local problems and have the advantage that the planners are more familiar with the available resources and constraints.

Tensions will arise, however, both between the regions themselves and between individual regions and the central planning body as inevit there is competition for scarce resources and perhaps different regions may favour conflicting strategies for development. As regional plannin organisations evolve, they may also come into conflict with the existing regional administrations as these may be unfamiliar with planning techniques, by nature conservative and likely to be resentful of any implied criticism or suggestions which involve radical departures from existing policies.

This paper seeks to examine some of the major events which have occured since the inauguration of the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning in 1963 as part of the Buganda[1] Government. It seeks to illustra the success of the Ministry's proposals and to indicate a planning structure which could strengthen the formulation of the next national plan. Unfortunately many of the experiences of planning in Buganda will be of limited applicability to other regions setting up planning structures, but despite the rather unique nature of Buganda it is hoped that some useful lessons have emerged. The paper is confined to a description of agricultu planning within the Buganda Region, although it will be necessary to ref from time to time to the overall planning machinery through which sugge tions for agricultural development were channelled.

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* I wish to acknowledge the kind assistance of Mr. B. Muwanga, Ag. Dire , Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Buganda Government and his staff for making available files and documents. Mr. D.G.R. Belshaw, Senior Lecturer in Agricultural Economics, read the draft and made several valuable comments and suggestions.

1. Throughout the paper the terms'Buganda Government'and 'Kabaka's Government are used synonomously.

2. Administration and Financial Organisation in Buganda[1]

Whilst no region can claim to be typical, Buganda is certainly les typical than others. It is necessary therefore, to preface any paper concerned with aspects of development in Buganda with a description of the special position which the region holds within Uganda. Buganda is the metropolitan province of Uganda, containing the capital city of Kampala and the seat of Government in Entebbe. Much of Uganda's industry and potential industrial development lies within the region, either around Kampala or on the Buganda bank of the Nile at Jinja. Buganda has been constitutionally priviledged since the 1900 Uganda Agreement which was regarded by the Baganda as a freely negociated treaty under which they accepted British protection at their own request. The favoured position obtained in 1900 was subsequently reinforced by the Dundas Reforms of 1944; these terminated the system of direct Protectorate Government cont through the medium of provincial and district commissioners and substitu a policy whereby the Resident and his staff merely gave advice to the Kabaka's Government. The 1955 Buganda Agreement accorded the Kingdom an even greater degree of independence as the previous ultimate sanction o the Protectorate Government, that of withdrawing recognition from the Kabaka, was sacrificed in order to place him above politics. The right to dismiss his Ministers was reserved but this proved to be too destructive a weapon to be used in minor skirmishes. It was also impossible / this means for the Protectorate Government to exert effective authority as the real power continued in the hands of the Kabaka and the Lukiko (Buganda Parliament).

The Uganda Relationships Commission[2] reporting in 1961 recognised the unique nature of Buganda's position when it stated,"With her large size, fertile territory, central situation and effective administration, and h

1. For further information on the constitutional, administrative and po structure of Buganda before independance in 1962 see:-

   (a) D.A. Low & R.C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955. (University Press 1960

   (b) L.A. Fallers, The King's Men, Oxford University Press 1964.

   (c) D.E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda; a Study in Bureacr Nationalism, Prineeton University Press 1961.

2. See the Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission under the C n-ship of The Earl of Munster, Government Printer Entebbe, 1961.

readiness to profit from education and culture, Buganda has for long been the natural leader among the tribes in Uganda. She is the only tribe capable of forming a province, the other provinces each contain four districts which are more or less tribally distinct. Buganda, therefore, has always occupied a special position, secured by treaty rights with Britain in the form of the Agreements of 1900 and 1955." As the commission had been appointed to consider the future form of government in Uganda, its recognition of Buganda's status and current position was, not surprisingly, reflected in the 1961 Buganda Agreement and the 1962 Uganda Constitution.

The 1961 Agreement provided that Buganda should be "united in federal relationship with the rest of Uganda in accordance with the institutions of Uganda and Buganda" and this provision was embodied in the 1962 Uganda Constitution which ratified most of the concessions made in the Agreement. The Constitution reflected the peculiar political evolution of Uganda by determining that the country would consist of Federal States, Districts and the Territory of Mbale. The 1966 Constitution is substantially the same in this respect except that the term 'Federal States' has been deleted and replaced by the word 'Kingdoms'. When the Buganda Planning Commission was inaugrated in April 1963 the Region was still as described in the Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission: "Buganda is thus a state within a state enjoying a considerable degree of independence - - - - - - The relationship has become an incongruous compound of administrative dependence and political independence."

The administration of Buganda was, to a certain extent, the responsibility of the Buganda Government which had been given authority in the 1955 Agreement to take over the running of junior secondary education, dispensaries and rural hospitals, agriculture and veterinary services, as well as sharing responsibility for community development services and maintaining a police force large in comparison with other Kingdom or District forces.[1] This responsibility was perpetuated in the 1961 Buganda Agreement and embodied in the 1962 Uganda Constitution with little change except that even greater responsibility for health and education was transferred from the Central Government. There were, however, many posts in these transferred services filled by officers seconded from the Central Government and a greater part of the public services were still provided either by the Central Government or by East African High Commission (later renamed the East African Common Services Organisation).

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1. These departments and services are often referred to collectively as the 'transferred services'.

The three traditional ministers of the Buganda Government are the Katikiro (Prime Minister), the Omulamuzi (Minister of Justice) and the Omuwanika (Minister of Finance). After the partial decentralisation of services in 1955, these ministers were supplemented by three others, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Education and the Minister of Natural Resources and, after the 1961 Buganda Agreement, a Minister for Local Government. In practice, there has been a tendency for Ministers to concern themselves directly in executive matters rather than confining their attentions to the formulation of policy. As a consequence senior civil servants tended to become frustrated and ineffective. The Report of a Commission of Enquiry into the Kabaka's Government Finances, published in 1961, referred to this situation when it stated, "that mainly for historical reasons, political ministers, notably the Katikiro and Omuwanika, often assume responsibilities properly belonging to their own Permanent Secretaries, thereby undermining the authority and efficiency of the Buganda Civil Service". This state of affairs was further aggravated by the fact that the Kabaka's Ministers seemed to make decisions with little regard for their economic aspects but rather with the object of enhancing the prestige of the Buganda Government.

The pre-emergency[1] Lukiko (Buganda Parliament) had a maximum membership of 93. It was composed of a Speaker, the six ministers and six nominees of the Kabaka, the twenty county chiefs and sixty elected members, twenty of these being chosen by county councils. The majority of Lukiko members were inclined towards a traditional outlook and had "natural tendencies as a tribal assembly to lag behind public opinion in Buganda generally." [2] The following statement made by the Speaker of the Lukiko in January 1963 illustrates the attitude of many Lukiko members of that time. "Imported systems of government which provide for the equality of all men will only serve to destroy the Kingdom of Buganda." [3]

The fact that the senior civil servant administrators in the rural areas of Buganda, the twenty saza (county) chiefs, were active in politics as ex-officio members of the Lukiko meant that field administration was neglected and the execution of Buganda Government policy, as well as the day to day running of government business, was often run down and neglected. The chaotic state of the Buganda administration of 1961 was aptly summarized by the Uganda Relationships Commission when it concluded that "Obsession with tribal and political matters rather than the daily work of government, coupled with the inherent disabilities of the existing system, is undoubtedly having

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1. 'Pre-emergency' here refers to the period before the declaration of the State of Emergency in Buganda in May, 1966.

2. Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, op. cit., p. 35

3. Mr. E.M. Kalule speaking to the Lukiko, 22nd January, 1963.

a serious effect on her administration." There is little evidence to indicate that this state of affairs changed significantly during the life of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development; the 1965-66 Nkangi Government was, however, an improvement on its predecessors.

These weaknesses in administrative structure were exacerbated by the cabinet changes which were such a regular feature of political life in Buganda during the existence of the Ministry. The Omulamuzi, L. Basudde, resigned to join the U.P.C.in late 1963 followed by A.K. Mayanja, then jointly Minister of Education and Minister of Economic Planning, in mid-1964. Late 1964 saw the fall of the whole cabinet led by the Katikiro Michael Kintu, as a result of Buganda losing the 'Lost Counties' Referendum.[1] The succedding government of Mayanja-Nkangi was only sworn in during January 1965 and this cabinet contained a majority of the conservative ministers who had held positions in the Kintu Government. The period also saw a major shift in the political structure of Uganda as the severance of the Kabaka-Yeka-U.P.C. alliance in late 1964 heralded a deterioration in relations between the Buganda and Central Governments.

The financial status of the Buganda Government as it was laid down in the 1962 Uganda Constitution differed little from the provisions of 1955 Agreement. Schedule 9 of the Constitution, which contained the crucial financial provisions, was, however, remarkable for its phraseological opacity and it was later scathingly demounced in a Uganda High Court judgement of 1964: "The language used in this singularly ill-drawn schedule, particularly in Paragraph 1 does not, to say the least, attain to that degree of precision desirable of being attained by the Parliament draughtsmen". The ill-defined nature of these financial provisions prompted the Director of Planning for the Kabaka's Government to suggest to the Katikiro that "history will surely show that the Uganda Constitution will be regarded as a text-book example of a bad Federal Constitution." [2]

The 1962 Constitution provided for a contribution from the Central Government to supplement the independent revenue of the Buganda Government (mainly graduated tax receipts) in order to help it to run the transferred services. This contribution comprised 50% assigned revenue made up of a

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1. The 'Lost Counties' issue concerned several counties in Northern Buganda which were claimed by the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The 1962 Constitution provided for a referendum to determine the future of two of the disputed counties, Buyaga and Bugangazi. Further claims have been officially discouraged by a Uganda Government statement of 1966 which ruled out changes in the status of the remaining counties.

2. Letter from the Director of Planning to the Katikiro, April 1965.

proportion of various taxes raised in Buganda and 50% statutory grant from the Central Government . The actual contribution fluctuated greatly and proved to be a great drawback in trying to formulate Buganda's development budgets and plans as it was sometimes in arrears and always very uncertain.[1] This uncertainty was partly resolved in October 1965 when the Kabaka's Government won an appeal against a previous High Court decision and was given the right to count non-African graduated tax received in the Kingdom of Buganda as part of its independent revenue. The Government, on the other hand, was upheld in its contention that it should not pay the full increment of the rising cost of Kabaka's Government services. The then Uganda Prime Minister, A.M. Obote, commenting on the judgement stated that his government refused to continue "signing a blank cheque" for the Kabaka's Government and blamed the previous uncertainty on the vagueness of three words in Schedule 9 (1) of the Constitution which stated that the Central Government should contribute towards "Buganda's financial requirements." During the period under consideration, rising recurrent expenditure swallowed both independent sources of revenue and the contribution from the Central Government leaving no provision for the improvement of services or for capital expenditure. There is no doubt that the execution of development proposals formulated by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development was severely handicapped by a shortage of finance in the Kingdom; this was even more than usually frustrating in view of the fact that the Kingdom generated a more than proportionate share of Uganda's wealth.

The executive powers of the Buganda Government over the transferred services were very vaguely defined and capable of at least two interpretions. Section 14 (1) of the Order in Council 1962 did not specify what was meant by "administer the transferred services." It could have meant that the Kabaka's Government was wholly responsible for all aspects of running transferred services - policy, administration and laws provided "that they do not conflict with Uganda Laws," or conversely, it could have meant that the Kabaka's Government was merely a delegated administrating authority carrying out Uganda Government policies and fiats. The latter interpretation was naturally that favoured by the Central Government and this led to difficulties in executing plans for the development of these services in Buganda. On the other hand, this section of the Constitution was unsatisfactory to the Central Government as it was committed to subsidise the Buganda Government but was given

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1. Indeed, a satisfactory financial relationship has yet to be worked out, so that long term planning in Buganda is still almost impossible to undertake.

little control over the way in which its contribution was spent. The only provision for Central Government control of the Kabaka's Government expenditure was that before the submission of the annual estimates to the Lukiko, the Omuwanika should send them "to the Minister of the Government of Uganda responsible for finance and the Kabaka's Government shall consider the observation of the Minister on those estimates."[1] This provision, whose implications were also vague, seems to have been ignored in practice. The suspicion which was shown by the Central Government were partly justified by the many financial irregularities and misallocation of expenditure which had been taking place in previous years, To the extent that they continued to exist irregularities had the effect of reducing the potential benefit from the already inadequate sources of revenue whilst they also ensured that Central Government contributions to the Buganda Government would not be increased without guarantees of greater financial control.

. The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in the Buganda Government

The first public news of future planning activities was reported in early 1963 when the Minister of Education in the Kabaka's Government - A.K. Mayanja - stated that an economic expert was to be recruited to a post of Permanent Secretary rank and was to work in the future Ministry of Economic Development. On the initiative of Mr. Mayanja, an initial meeting of the Buganda Planning Commission was called in April 1963 and C.M.F.Bruce was appointed in the following month as Director of Economic Planning. His post was financed by the British Ministry of Overseas Development after backing from the Kabaka Yeka Finance Minister of the Kabaka Yeka/U.P.C. Central Government. For a time there was no real Secretariat and the Ministry was not even formed; upon formation it was placed under the aegis of the Ministry of Education and for a considerable period it consisted solely of the Director, a secretary and a messenger. Today, the Ministry consists of an acting Director and two economists, plus supporting office staff and has achieved substantial de facto recognition in the three years of its life. After February 1965 it was supervised by the Katikiro's Ministry and as the Katikiro also became the Chairman of the Planning Commission, resolutions from this body were much more powerfully represented in subsequent meetings of the Council of Ministers.

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1. 1962 Uganda Constitution, Schedule 1, Constitution of Buganda (Section 32 (4))

The planning machinery formed in Buganda is schematically illustrated in Diagram One below:



An additional component was added in January 1965 when a link was established between the Buganda Ministry of Economic Planning and the Central Government's Planning Bureau, when a 'Planning Co-ordination Committee' was formed to promote liason between the two planning bodies. The Ministry was advised by the Buganda Planning Commission and its various sub-committees, the membership of which consisted of people from various spheres of life in Buganda. The membership and terms of reference of the main Commission and the Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry Sub-Committee are given in Appendices One and Two.

The planning process which eventually evolved was extremely satisfactory as far as Buganda was concerned. Suggestions were received by the Ministry of Economic Planning from the various ministries, or alternatively they could be generated from within the Ministry itself. These suggestions were transformed into memoranda by staff of the Ministry and each memorandum was then considered by the appropriate sub-committee and passed on to the main Commission meeting along with suggested modifications, views and comments. Also, the sub-committees generated their own proposals which were then similarly discussed, or again the sub-committees handled in greater detail matters referred to them by the main Commission. If approved by the Commission, the modified memorandum would then be submitted to the Council of Ministers whose chairman, the Katikiro was also (after January 1965) chairman of the Planning Commission. The Council of Ministers could reject the memorandum, but if it was accepted the Ministry of Economic Planning would incorporate any financial proposals into the annual capital development bulget.

The latest stage in the procedure was evolved only in 1965 when the Ministry won the right to prepare this budget. Previous to this change, ministries were supposed to submit separate proposals for capital expenditure but in fact rarely did so, so that the budgets had not been split into proposed capital and recurrent expenditure. This situation was changed on 25th October, 1 1965 when Circular EP/C/12 was sent to all Permanent Secretaries, the Chief

Judge of Buganda and all departmental heads informing them of the procedures described above. The recipients were instructed to estimate the cost of all new projects and the expansion of old ones; to split costs into recurrent and capital components and to state the expected revenue, if any, arising from the expenditure. Even if project estimates had been approved by the Lukiko; Ministries or departments had still to obtain clearance from the Ministry of Economic Planning. This was to confirm availability of funds and to check on any revision of priority which may have been advised by the Ministry and confirmed by the Council of Ministers. The Director of Economic Planning was directed to issue clearance certificates to the Treasury, authorising expenditures for the project in question only if he was satisfied with it. The above procedure might seem to be elementary, but the formulation of a standard method of incurring expenditure represented a financial revolution in Buganda and a major victory for the planners. There is little doubt that this mandatory procedure would have enabled the Central Government to take a more favourable view of its financial contribution to Buganda and allowed the gradual evolution of a more satisfactory method of calculating Central Government assistance. Unfortunately, the May 1966 Emergency occured too soon after the reforms for any significant changes to become apparent.

4. Institutional Reforms for Accelerated Development

(i) Statistics and Economic Planning Procedures

On his appointment, the Director of Planning realised that the necessary background information for planning was missing and priority was therefore given to remedying this defect. Research and Statistics were designated as Phase 1 in Commission Memorandum No. 2 compiled early in 1963 to outline a programme for the development of Buganda's economy; the compilation of an Economic Survey was suggested as Phase 2 in the same document. In fact, planning material in a number of fields has recently become available e.g. the FAO Census of Agriculture for Uganda, a Household Expenditure Survey of Buganda Coffee growers is about to be published and a large-scale farm management survey of Buganda is well under way. The Buganda Planning Commission did encourage these projects but was not directly responsible for any of them. It did, however, provide help and funds towards a Cambridge University sponsored investigation of land tenure in Buganda.[1] Nevertheless its major achievement was the compilation and production of an Economic survey of Buganda.[2] This provided the background to the detailed economic planning of the Kingdom including a consideration of the

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1. See H.W. West, The Mailo System in Buganda, Govt. Printer, Entebbe, 1964

2. The Economic Development of the Kingdom of Buganda, Part 1, Economic Survey: A Report to the Kabaka's Council of Ministers by the Buganda Planning Commission, Uganda Bookshop, 1964.

relevant constitutional, political, social, financial and institutional factors. The report contained an analysis of the factors inhibiting a faster rate of economic growth and made recommendations for the removal of development constraints and for providing the preconditions for future economic growth. This document was far ahead of any regional, or indeed national analysis yet seen in Uganda but it was unfortunately not followed by the original Phase 3, the compilation of a 5-Year Plan for Buganda (see below).

(ii) Land Tenure Reform

The land tenure structure in Buganda must be one of the most complicated in existence and it has been considered by many experts as providing a severe constraint to agricultural development in the Kingdom. With the Uganda Agreement of 1900 traditional forms of tenancy were destroyed by the creation of three new forms of tenancies; Mailo, Crown Land and Ekibanja. The creation of Mailo (derived from the English word mile) tenancies was an attempt to introduce the British concept of freehold tenure into Uganda. Mailo comprised about 9,000 square miles of some of the most fertile land in the Kingdom, the remaining 9,000 sq. miles of waste and uncultivated land was vested in Her Majesty's Government. The British, therefore, pleased approximately four thousand influential and powerful in Baganda by allocating them mailo land but in doing so sacrificed the traditional land rights of the mass of the population. This incredible transformation of traditional land tenure may have been carried out with the best of intentions but it was planned with the minimum of information. "At no time during these negotiations does any consideration seem to have been given to the customary forms of land tenure then prevailing in Buganda - - - Little notice was taken of old rights of occupancy (by the new allotees) and the claims of the old bataka (clan heads) were repeatedly brushed aside. No one considered the position of the bakopi (peasants) and their customary and hereditory rights were degraded to tenancies at will upon privately owned land."[1]

The situation of the peasant was improved by the Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 which guaranteed undisturbed occupation of land "sufficient to support a tenant and his family providing they made statutory payments to their mailo landlord. The law introduced a new concept to Buganda - these tenancies could be bequeathed, and there was no provision for the revision of rents. The passing of the law meant that there were seven main types of tenure in the region; official mailo[2] (belonging to an office rather than an individual), ordinary mailo, busuulu tenancies,

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1. West, op. cit., p. 11
2. Official mailo has recently been abolised by edict of the Central Government.

sub-tenancies on busuulu holdings (still existing de facto), temporary occupation lease holders on Crown Land.* (Public Land after 1962), leasehold and freehold (the last two are mainly large old-established non-African commercial estates). This system of a rigid rent restriction at 1928 levels had become an anachronism because of mailo sub-division, increasing pressure on land and the increasing commercialisation of agriculture.

The Planning Commission and the Agricultural Sub-Committee devoted a large proportion of their time to the question of land reform and a series of memoranda were produced on various aspects of the problem. Perhaps the most clear cut reform and the one on which there was unanimous agreement within the Commission was the abolition of official mailo. The Commission proposed that the holders of official mailo should receive upgraded salaries in lieu of land and that land should be invested with the Buganda Land Board. However, this reform would probably not have passed through the Council of Ministers and even if it had, the 20 saza chiefs in the Lukiko might have raised enough support to reject it. Certainly, this was exactly what had happened in 1962 when such a motion was rejected in the Lukiko by 45 votes to 27; this gave impetus to the Bawejjere (common man) movement whose widespread support indicated that the abolition of official mailo would meet the wishes of the majority of Buganda.

A much less straightforward problem was that of the system of busuulu tenancies on mailo land. Since these tenancies had no official title they could not be used as loan security and at the same time the holdings were scattered over most mailo estates thus preventing landlords from developing a large scale agricultural undertaking unless they got rid of their tenants resorting to a series of costly and time consuming legal manoevres.

The Commission's land proposals were published in the "Economic Survey of the Buganda[1]. Of the various alternatives considered, the Commission finally favoured the solution of creating a new form of land tenure for the tenant holdings. This was a type of freehold but provision was made for a consolidated annual payment to tha landlords. The existing tenants would be given legal titles and their farms could then be bought and sold and pledged as security, thus creating a market in land and providing the means to inject capital into agriculture. Failure to make the annual payment or foreclosure on loans with the land as security would lead to a public auction of the land. This provision was designed to soothe the fears of those who thought that too much land would pass to non-Africans following loan defaults. The fear of land alienation is still very strong in Buganda, despite the fact that since the Land Transfer Ordinance of 1906 no non-Africans have been able

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1. Op. cit., p. 18, 19.

* Often refered to as T.O.L.s

to purchase freehold land in Uganda without permission from the Governor and this permission was seldom forthcoming.[1] The Commission felt strongly however, that the Baganda were hypersensitive on the issue and recommended an end to, or a relaxation of, the 'racial discrimination' which had prevented foreign controlled capital being used to develop agriculture and had depressed the market price of mailo land. No satisfactory means of consolidating the mailo estates was suggested although the market in land created by the reforms would have aided this process. It was recommended that no new busuulu tenancies were to be created so that all mailo land would eventually be held in a form of freehold. The system of temporary occupation licences on Public Land was also considered to be outdated as the present rent of Ss 10 per year had been fixed in 1928 when few cash crops were grown and was it-irrespective of acreage farmed. Since the 1962 Constitution had guaranteed possession of their land until such time as an overall Land Tenure Reform Bill was passed by the Buganda Government, the T.O.L. holders were in a strong position. The Buganda Land Board had no authority over farming standards and the derisory rent represented a large shortfall in potential revenue to the Buganda Government. It was recommended, therefore, that T.O.L. holders should be encouraged to convert to contractual leaseholds and that leasehold titles could be bequeathed. Besides other advantages, this would have given the Buganda Government a higher revenue from initial leasehold purchase and from higher rents. The suggested changes would have created a dual system of freehold and leasehold, leaving mailo landlords (many of whom had purchased their land rather than inhereting it) with the opportunity of buying out tenants if they wished to consolidate and expand. A consideration of these reforms was delayed by the Council of Ministers, probably because they were politically dangerous and might have caused serious disturbances. They would have offended people who had bought tha mailo title of their busuulu holdings from their landlords and also the T.O.L. holders who would have been forced to pay higher rents for a less secure tenure.

The Planning Commission eventually realised that sweeping reforms would not be passed and did /put strong pressure on the Council of Ministers. Instead they hoped to achieve a steady improvement in the tenure situation by adopting a strategy of successfully recommending a series of relatively minor changes. It was still considered essential to introduce some sort of general Land Tenure Reform Bill to the Lukiko as the legality of any change in the system of Public Land Tenure was dependant on this, due to the inexplicable linking of mailo and Public Land tenure in Section 24 of the Uganda Independence Order in Council.

/not

1. Only 3.2% of the land area of Buganda is owned by aliens.

The previous suggestion of abolishing official mailo was retained in the proposed Bill as well as the recommendation that no new busulu tenancies should be created. It was also suggested that tenancies already in existence should cease to be heritable and tenants were to be encouraged to buy the mailo titles to their land. Provision was to be made in the Five Year Plan to provide for loans for this purpose. The Ministers were also requested to relax the ban on non-Africans owning land. Even these milder reforms were delayed by the Council of Ministers and no decision was taken before the Buganda Emergency dissolved the Lukiko.

5. Major Agricultural Achievements of the Ministry of Economic Planning.

(i) Agricultural Development Companies

The Planning Commission vigorously advocated the development of "nucleus estates"[1] as a major spearhead of agricultural development. It was felt that the diversification of agriculture could be speeded by the development of improved production techniques and marketing channels for a series of minor crops and that the expertise and capital necessary to achieve this end could best be generated within a framework of plantations or estates. There was no committment to any one type of large-sclae agriculture, but the encouragement of non-African investors to establish partnership with Africans to develop outgrower schemes linked to a main estate having central processing facilities was viewed with approval, as was the establishment of Agricultural Development Companies by the Kabaka's Government. Planning Commission Memorandum No. 17 listed the following advantages of the proposed development of private estates on land leased from the Buganda Land Board, perhaps with Kabaka's Goverment financial participation.

1. Help would be given to farmers without any recurrent expenditure on the part of the Government.
2. The Government's capital expenditure would be limited by the extent of private enterprise participation.
3. Model African farms (outgrowers) would be established and the experience of these African farmers would gradually have radiating effects on surrounding farmers.

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1. 'Nucleus estates' is a term used to describe the system whereby a central farming unit is linked to a number of smaller peasant holdings. These outgrowers receive advice, planting material and other inputs from the centre. They in turn market their produce through centralised processing and marketing channels and receive a revenue net of the costs of services provided.

4. The Kabaka's Government would obtain income from its shares in the Companies and the rent from the leasehold land.
5. Farmers could be encouraged to help each other, they would be encouraged to take shares in the Company and eventually the company might be turned into a Producers and Marketing Co-operative.

Largely owning to shortage of development capital and qualified presonnel the Kabaka's Government made little headway along these suggested lines. The necessary machinery was formed, however, when Buganda Investment Coporation Ltd. came into existence early in 1965 with a subsidiary company BIC Estates Ltd. - which was an agricultural development company[1]. This company, whose main shareholder was the Kabaka's Government, purchased an 800 acre coffee estate with the intention of encouraging the wet processing of robusta coffee and of developing new crops. It has been singularly successful and has developed a lucrative business in the irrigated production of vegetables for air freighting to Europe. This initial success was almost certain to raise the interest of private investors and, in time, the proposed network of nucleus estates might have developed.

(ii) The Agricultural Development Plan 1966-71

It was envisaged from the start that the Planning Commission would work towards the formulation of an overall 5 Year Development Plan which could be incorporated within the framework of the Uganda Government's 1966-71 Plan. Commission Memorandum No. 40 laid down a strategy for the Buganda Plan based on an examination of papers discussing aspects of the Uganda 15 Year Perspective Plan 1966-81[2,3]. Recognition was given to the fact that Buganda's share of public investment would be less than her share of the G.D.P. and was unlikely even to equal her share of total population. In view of this fact, it was decided to co-operate with the Central Planning Bureau in an endeavour to influence the size, shape and content of the Central Government's development plans. Priority was to be given in the Kingdom's own planning to those projects which seemed profitabble but which were ommited from the Uganda Plan. It was also planned to attempt to persuade the Buganda Government to drop prestige projects, to avoid resource wasting duplication of

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1. Actually the subsidiary was formed before the parent company.
2. P. Clark, The Rational and Use of Projection Models for Uganda, E.D.R.P. No. 39.
3. P. Clark and B. Van Arkadie, Development Goals for the Uganda Economy in 1981. E.D.R.P. no. 42.
4. ibid., p. 29 (43)

Government services and to accept the recommendations contained in the Economic Survey.

To achieve a worthwhile integration with the Uganda Plan, the Buganda Plan should have been approved by the Lukiko in early 1965. Unfortunately delays in policy decision by the Council of Ministers, prevented the submission to the Council of a proposed plan and the resignation of the Director of Planning in July 1965 reduced the tempo of tha planning process.

Progress with the formulation of a plan for the agricultural sector of the Buganda Economy, however, outstripped that of the other sectors. Emphasis was placed on the diversification of agriculture because of the low price and gloomy market outlook for robusta coffee and not much brighter outlook for cotton. Sundry recommendations for diversification were presented in a Commission Memorandum of February 1965 and after consideration by the Agricultural Sub-Committee they were examined by the Planning Commission one month later. Most of the suggestions in the original memorandum were approved and were eventually incorporated into the draft Agricultural Department 5-Year Plan,

These proposals were sufficiently advanced to be discussed in August 1965 at one of the three meetings of the Planning Co-ordination Committee composed of representatives of the Kingdom and the Central Governments. The publication of the Uganda 5-Year Plan 1966-71 showed that some, seemingly sound suggestions had been ignored, some had been accepted and others could not be traced because of the lack of detail in the published Plan.

The Buganda Plan for Agriculture recognised that professional training and fundamental research was the responsibility of the Central Government and concentrated on improvement in extension and advisory services primarily designed to forward the fundamental aim of diversifying Buganda agriculture. Increases in the acreage of tea, cocoa and arabica coffee were advocated to be synchronized with an active discouragement of further robusta coffee planting. A examination of the Uganda 5-Year Plan indicates that these particular suggestions were only partially accepted. The target for téa in the Uganda Plan is 42 million pounds of made tea by 1971, which is that indicated in the Uganda Tea Survey Report 1964[1]. This report seems to have wholly accepted and all its recommendations included in the Plan, implying that the recommendations in the Buganda Plan for tea development in the Ssese Islands and other ecologically suitable areas in Buganda have been ignored. The basis for the original Tea Survey recommendations was that that much of Buganda was heavily populated, of low fertility as a result of long period of cropping and that "a restoration of the coffee price would probably lead them (The Buganda growers) to desert tea". Besides betraying profound ignorance of the world coffee situation this reasoning ignored the social welfare benefits of introducing a new crop in an area which was heavily dependant on a depressed crop. Dense planting of robusta coffee was, paradoxically, given as a reason for not introducing a programme of tea expansion. The Ssese Islands

1. Uganda Tea Survey 1964. Government of Uganda and Commonwealth Development Corporation June 1964.

were dismissed as a potential development area though the mission did not visit them.

Plans to expand the Buganda cocoa acreage were fairly well advanced with a specialist cocoa field officer and adequate nursery capacity. The apparent research station success of interplating cocoa among robusta coffee with the aim of removing the coffee at a later stage made it seem that a satisfactory replacement crop had been discovered. This initial optimism, however, disappeared when cocoa prices turned sharply downwards in 1964 and trouble was experienced with cocoa wilt disease. The Plans advocacy of a cautious approach to cocoa expansion, was therefore, fully justified in these circumstances.

Better processing methods to produce a higher priced, wet processed robusta were planned by the Commission and reflected in the Uganda Plan's provision for forty new wet-processing factories. The Buganda emphasis on a drive to uproot robusta and replace it with arabica and a suggested programme of new planting in the higher areas of Buganda was however neglected in favour of arabica plantings in Western Uganda, Bugisu and Sebei. Minor crop development was also virtually ignored in the Uganda Plan although a Buganda outline for research and development was available.

Many of the suggestions incorporated in the Buganda Agricultural Draft Plan and later adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, in the Uganda Plan contained implications for a higher level of staffing with various crop specialists. Unfortunately for Buganda, the scarcity of Kingdom Government finance precluded direct recruitment on a large scale and existing levels of staffing were inadequate. It is likely that the agricultural sector of the Uganda Plan will run into serious manpower constraints and the main shortage will be that of specialists required. by the diversification drive. Nevertheless it may be concluded that the advanced stage of Buganda's Agricultural proposals was largely influencialin attracting a greater share of the national allocation of resources to the Kingdom than would otherwise have been the case.

6. Failures of the Ministry of Economic Planning

The Katikiro's circular instructing the various Ministries to submit all capital development proposals to the Ministry of Economic Planning and the arrangements for consultations with the Finance Ministry on recurrent expenditure, represented a great advance after several disappointments, Perhaps the greatest triumph for political prestige over economic rationality was the Ndaiga Settlement Scheme which started in 1963. This was a large scheme designed, ultimately, to cover several thousand acres of land and to accomodate at least 40,000 families. The scheme was situated in Buyaga County, one of the 'Lost Counties' where the Baganda were greatly outnumbered by Banyoro. Since the Constitution had provided for a referendum on the future of Buyaga

it was hoped to build up the population of Baganda by bringing in large numbers of ex-servicemen as settlers. The land was very fertile and lay in a belt of high, well-distributed rainfall but the site was extremely remote from the main centres of population (c. 200 miles from Kampala). The programme for resettlement was placed by the Kabaka under the direction of the Minister of Health and Works. The Ministry of Economic Planning was first consulted on the proposal in May 1963 and a proposed development outline was drafted by the Director of Planning. Detailed allocation of expenditure was never worked out as it soon became apparent that much of the expenditure had already been incurred. In September 1963, only four months after the initial contact with the Planning Ministry, it was announced by the Minister of Health and Works that one hundred village settlements had been erected, six thousand people had been settled, a 15 mile grade II murram road had been constructed and a start had been made with the building of a new port on Lake Albert. Records of the scheme are either secret or non-existent but it has been estimated that at this period, when the Kabaka's Government was experiencing an increasing and seemingly unsurmountable overdraft, over £100,000 was spent on Ndaiga. This investment was of course lost when the people of Buyaga voted in late 1964 to join Bunyoro.[1] A recurrence of the Ndaiga fiasco was almost perpetrated in Buwekula in 1965 when the Ministry of Natural Resources sanctioned otherwise unauthorized expenditure on yet another settlement scheme to house and settle refugees from Ndaiga. Similar supplementary estimates, usually after the expenditure [had been incurred,] were finally prevented by the Circular Instruction of October 1965.

Similar, politically-motivated, expenditure was involved in the purchase of the Buganda Government ginneries. This was a political move designed to counter any popularity gained by the Central Government because of its policy of handing over private ginneries to co-operative societies. It was argued by the majority of the Cabinet that the Buganda Government should buy some of the 46 ginneries in the Kingdom and hand them over to saza councils who would use the resulting profits for social welfare schemes. A Buganda Planning Commission Sub-Committee, which was especially formed to consider the proposed purchase, was of the opinion that since the purchases would simply represent a transfer of resources rather than stimulating new economic activity they should be accorded a low priority rating. It was pointed out that the purchase could lead to losses as the Central Government was pursuing a policy of increasing the throughput of co-operative ginneries by progressively cutting the quotas of non-co-operative

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1. The Buganda settlers were prevented from voting in the referendum by an enactment restricting voting to those residing in the two counties before July 1962.

∠had been incurred,

ginneries. These warnings were ignored by the Cabinet which authorized the purchase of 7 ginneries at what the Baganda Planning Commission Finance Sub-Committee later described as grossly inflated prices. A further ginnery was bought in 1964 in the 'Lost Counties' and of course it was itself 'lost' a few months later.

The hasty nature of the decision may be deduced from the fact that no provision for ginnery purchases was made in the 1964 Budget Estimates. Instead a sum of over £73,000 was passed as a supplementary estimate in December 1964 to meet commitments already entered into. These commitments included a large bank loan which was raised without the approval of the Lukiko and therefore contravened Schedule 7 (1) of the 1962 Constitution. Many of the ginneries did indeed make losses as forecast and two are now silent and therefore cannot be sold to co-operatives. At present the Buganda Government is managing the remaining ginneries which are all running with a reduced throughput. It has been advised to reduce the ginnery prices and underwrite the losses involved in order to transfer them as quickly as possible to co-operative societies.

7. An Assessment of Agricultural Planning in Buganda:

Although several instances of political forces over-riding the decisions and recommendations of the Planning Commission have been cited, reasonable progress was made in the three years of existence. This progress was remarkable when it is considered that planning was an alien concept to Buganda and the new Ministry was grafted onto unreceptive stock. The Commission had three different chairman and dealt with a constantly changing cabinet including three different Ministers of Natural Resources. The Ministry of Economic Planning was supervised by two successive Ministries and its Director left after only two years, thus aggravating the already serious staffing situation. Much of the initiative and the continuity of ideas was in fact provided by the members serving on the Planning Commission and its Sub-Committees in a private and unpaid capacity. Nevertheless, in many spheres and particularly in the agricultural sector the Commission made several advances.

It created conditions whereby the costs and benefits of proposed projects were analysed by civil servants and politicians previously used to spending as a result of whims and fancies. It produced memoranda on many aspects of the economy out of which would have emerged a completed Development Plan. A revised draft of the Agricultural Sector Plan was sufficiently advanced to act as a blue-print for Central Government Planning of Buganda agriculture. B.I.C. Estates has provided the framework for a series of agricultural estates which could transform local agriculture by providing capital and expertise in a highly efficient manner. A much greater proportion of total Buganda Government capital and recurrent expenditure was set aside for agricultural development in the 1965-70 estates than in the previous quinquennium.[1]

1. The Ministry of Natural Resources received a 67.7% increase

While these achievements were won in the face of numerous difficulties, an analysis of the Ministry and its problems indicates several ways in which improvements could have been made. The federal relationship of Buganda with the rest of the country during the period under consideration complicates the application of the lessons learned but does not render them entirely useless. If the Ministry had been legally created as a separate entity with its own Minister and a Director who was a designated Permanent Secretary it would have received greater recognition and respect in the Lukiko. It is also likely that it would have built up a strong organisation more quickly. Power to sanction capital expenditures should have been awarded immediately and a formal procedure for consultations on recurrent expenditure should have been formulated. The machinery for co-ordination of policy with the Central Government planning machinery, although eventually formed but did not have sufficient time to function properly.

Even with these internal reforms, the Ministry of Economic Planning could not work very efficiently under the financial and administrative arrangements existing between the two governments. Many of the difficulties were a function of Buganda's federal relationship and could not be removed without a sacrifice of federal rights or alternatively an unacceptable increase in Buganda's independence. Assuming a continuation of the federal relationships and a failure to increase available finance the best strategy for Buganda would have been to have handed back some of the transferred services which are not directly productive, such as police, health, and education. This course was put clearly to the Katikiro by the Commission but was rejected. Simultaneously all aspects of the remaining services could have become the responsibility of the Buganda Government. This would have enabled it, for instance, to fix agricultural prices and marketing policies, to formulate credit and subsidy programmes and to recruit staff directly. On the other hand, a return of all transferred services would possibly have been preferable i.e. the present situation. Here, the value of decentralised regional economic planning would suggest the creation of an entirely new and homogeneous planning structure for the whole of Uganda. The Buganda Ministry of Economic Planning would then be absorbed into the Central Government planning team but the Planning Commission and its sub-committees should be retained. Each region in Uganda could also create similar bodies, although it is doubtful whether they could match the calibre of the Buganda membership, and each Regional Commission would have a planning economist employed by the Central Government as Secretary. The desirability of local planning was stressed in Uganda's First Five-Year Plan[1] but few

1. Uganda Government. The First Five - Year Development Plan 1961/62-1965/66. Govt. Printer Entebbe 1963.

results could be perceived even in the Second 5-Year Plan. It was clear, however, that the planners were aware of this weakness when they stated that it was hoped to integrate locally planned development more fully into the Third Plan. This aim will be realised more quickly with the creation of posts for agricultural officers in charge of economic evaluations and planning at the district level. These men could perhaps act as a sub-committee to the Regional Planning Economist-cumSecretary of the Regional Planning Commssion.

Such organisations would improve the effectiveness of future planning but will not of themselves obviate future tensions between regions or between individual regions and the Central Government. These conflicts are inevitable as each region will believe that it should have a larger share of total development expenditure . In addition,the wealthier regions such as Buganda will resent any suggestions that their progress must be slowed down in order to release resources for the poorer regions. These future problems were hinted at in the Second Plan[1]: "A plan should take into account the geographical structure of the economy besides the sectional structure. If necessary the geographical structure of a plan may have to be altered so as to reduce disparities, always provided any loss of overall growth is carefully weighed against the benefit in equality"

This pragmatic approach to national development was reflected in the fact that the embryonic Buganda Veterinary Services 5-Year Plan was incorporated into the national Plan and was accorded an even greater financial and manpower allocation than was requested. The loss in overall growth arising from the stagnation of the Buganda dairy industry was obviously too high a price to pay whereas the diversification of Buganda agriculture away from coffee did not present enough tangible benefits to offset the prevailing attitudes which largely influenced the final plan. The ability of regional planners to maximise local growth is obviously circumscribed by national considerations but planning is a continuous process and must be intimately integrated with plan execution. This involes the creation of an adequate regional economic and administrative infrastructure to implement the projects which have been allocated and to constantly revise and modify decision concerned with their implementation. Whilst Buganda Planning Commission could not have been expected to radically alter the Central Plan, it did endeavour with some success to create favourable regional conditions for development. Its experience should at least indicate the kinds of difficulties likely to be encountered by the other Regional Planning bodies which it is hoped will soon be instituted

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1. Work for Progress. The Uganda Second Five-Year Plan, Govt. Printer Entebbe 1966.

Appendix One

Terms of Reference for the Buganda Planning Commission

Having regard to the over-riding importance of providing opportunities for the fullest possible development of the people of Buganda materially and culturally:

(a) to examine the human and natural resources of the Kingdom and to prepare an integrated economic development plan or series of plans for Buganda, which should be co-ordinated with any plan for the whole of Uganda, and to provide in such plans a detailed examination of the problems of economic development in all its aspects in the fields of economic activity shown below;

(b) to suggest measures designed to increase production, productivity and the national income of Buganda, having regard to the necessity to diversify the economy of Buganda through the introduction of new manufacturing, mining, trading, commercial and industrial enterprises;

(c) to suggest measures to provide for full employment or better employment facilities for the work force of Buganda, taking into consideration the increase in population during the period of the Plan;

(d) to ascertain the skilled manpower needs to Buganda for the next ten years, and to recommend the best ways of satisfying those requirements;

(e) to suggest the proper fields of economic activity in which the Kabaka's Government can participate directly, and the fields of economic activity to be reserved for the private sector;

(f) to suggest incentives for the establishment of new enterprises or the re-organisation of existing enterprises which will contribute to economic development and to examine and suggest means of financing the establishment of such enterprises;

(g) in particular to take action on the specific matters shown against the following fields of economic activity.

Agricultural, Livestock, Fishing and Forestry:

1. to examine the production, marketing and processing activities in this sector;

2. to examine the factors affecting the supply, use, ownership and value of non-urban land and water resources;

3. to examine the supply of and the demand for capital and credit in the agricultural sector;

4. to examine the origins and circumstances of the rural labour force and the factors affecting its skill and efficiency;

5. to examine factors affecting evolution and adoption of new techniques and activities, and the need for formal research and use of its results;

6. to examine the supply of skills and management ability including the role of agricultural education, and to suggest possible alternatives to the present structure;

7. to examine the organization and methods of government departments concerned in this sector, including manpower, technical assistance and training implications;

8. to examine the efficiency of marketing, processing, transport and storage facilities;

9. to examine and report on the economic and technical feasibility of any specific project, technique or scheme which will contribute to or further the economic development of Buganda.

Appendix Two*

MEMBERS OF THE BUGANDA PLANNING COMMISSION.

Present Members :-

Owek. A.D. Lubowa - Acting Chairman,
W. Senteza-Kajubi, M.A. (Chicago) - Deputy Chairman.
D.G.R.Belshaw, M.A. (Cantab), Dip. Agric.Econ. (Oxon).
Sir Ronald Bennett, Bart.
D.P. Ghai, B.A., B.Phil (Oxon), M.A. (Yale).
P.M. Jayarajan, M.A. (Cantab), Bar-at-Law.
H.S.K.Nsubuga, B.Vet.Med.(London),M.R.C.V.S.,Dip.Vet.Sc.(EA)
E. Kironde, M.A. (Cantab).
A.S.N. Kiwana, A.M.I.C.E., A.M.I.Mun.Eng., A.M.I.H.E.,B.I.C.
R. R.J. Mukasa, B.Sc.Econ.(Wales), M.A. (Cincinnati).
D.O. Ocheng, M.P., B.A.Econ(Wales), Dip.Agric. (E.A.)
Dr. Y.B. Semambo, L.M.S. (E.A.), M.B.Ch.B., D.P.H.
C.E. Tamale-Ssali, B.Sc. (Leeds), D.I.C. (Mining Geology).
C.M.F. Bruce, M.A. (Oxon) - Secretary.

Professor P. Clark, M.A. (Colorado), Ph.D. (Harvard) - Consultant.

Past Members :-

R.C. Shah.
A.K. Mayanja M.A.(Cantab), Bar-at-Law.

MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL.

Present Members :-

G.A. Kassim Lakha;
J.W.Kibuka Musoke;
Rev. E. Kibirige
A.S. Lubwama
M.N. Mehta, M.P.;
S.B. Kayanja;
G.L. Kigundu;
P.M. Koppiker;
Jayant Madhvani;
R. Streeter.

Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry:-

D.G.R. Belshaw;
D.O. Ocheng, M.P.
A.S. Kanabi-Nsubuga
M.N. Mehta, M.P.
P.M. Koppiker
S.B. Kayanja
G.L. Kigundu
R. Streeter;
C.M.F. Bruce (ex officio)
G. Fennel (Secretary)

J.

* The membership of the Commission and its Sub-Committees was first published in the Economic Survey.

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Dr. G. H. Mungeam.
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December 1966.
PL 1-4

KIKUYU AND MASAI RESPONSES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE

In this paper an attempt is made to examine the responses of the Kikuyu and Masai peoples to the establishment of administration in the East Africa Protectorate (which became the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1920). The period that is examined is roughly that from the establishment of the Protectorate in 1895 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Although it can be argued that organised political protest movements did not break out in the Kenya until 1920s, with the formation of the Kikuyu Association in 1920 and the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921, yet it is submitted that an understanding of this earlier period is vital if the emergence of these protest movements in the twenties is to be rightly understood. Indeed, the early period is entirely relevant if these movements are to be seen in historical perspective and not merely understood as the immediate reaction to the local grievances of 1919-20. For the grievances that gave rise to the protest movements did not simply spring from the particular events of the immediate post-war years -- the issue of the so-called 'Northey Circulars' with their implications of compulsory labour, the establishment of the kipande system,[1] and the doubling of the Hut and Poll taxes. The grievances were in reality long-standing and deep-seated. For a proper understanding of the protests of the twenties, and all that stemmed from these, we must turn back to the earlier period from 1895 to the first World War which saw the initial contacts made between Africans and Europeans and which witnessed the creation of deep-seated grievances. For it is maintained that it was these deeper grievances that, although suffered in comparative silence for many years, eventually came to the surface and burst out in the twenties when the stimulus of the further unpopular measures was applied.

In this paper the study of African responses to British rule has been restricted deliberately to two tribes, the Kikuyu and the Masai. This has been done for several reasons. First, as two of the most prominent tribes on the direct route from the coast to Uganda, the Kikuyu and Masai felt the initial impact of British administrations more heavily than most other tribes in the Protectorate,[2] as British control was extended into the interior to protect first the road and then the railway to Uganda.[3] Second, as agriculturalists and pastoralists respectively, they represented the two main ways of life pursued by the tribes within the Protectorate. Third, the inter-action with the British of both the agricultural Kikuyu and the pastoral Masai may be studied at Fort Smith, Kikuyu, one of the earliest British stations on the route to Uganda. Fourth, in their separate responses to British rule they provide certain fascinating contrasts in attitude, for by the 1920s it was becoming clear that protest movements came primarily from the Kikuyu, with little or no participation by the Masai. Yet when the Protectorate was first established British administrators expected exactly the reverse to be the case. The warrior tribe of the Masai, with its reputation for raiding and war, was the tribe that was feared and the tribe with which conflict was expected.

Even before the Protectorate had been established the warlike qualities of the Masai were well known. European travellers had been slow to move inland along the direct route from Mombasa to Uganda, as they had been put off by Arab stories of the ferocity of the Masai.[4] It was not until 1882 that a European, G. A. Fischer, managed to reach as far as Lake Naivasha, although at that point he was turned back by the Masai ; and only in the following year did the first European, Joseph Thomson, reach Masailand, cross the Rift Valley and enter the highlands.[5] Early British officials in the Protectorate certainly feared Masai opposition. Sir Arthur

Hardinge, the first Commissioner, forecast in April 1897 that the Masai would cause trouble when the railway reached the area bordering Fort Smith, and would have to be taught obedience in 'a short, sharp struggle'.[6] Sir Charles Eliot, Hardinge's successor, in 1901 still feared the Masai and wrote: 'I regard the Masai as the most important and dangerous of the tribes and I think it will long be necessary to maintain an adequate military force in the districts which they inhabit'.[7] By contrast, serious resistance from the Kikuyu was not really expected. Measures were taken to protect the railway when its construction parties passed through the Kikuyu country near Fort Smith, with John Ainsworth (the Sub-Commissioner Ukamba Province) providing additional police to patrol the line.[8] But the threat from the Kikuyu was not regarded as serious, and there is no evidence to show that major conflict was envisaged with the Kikuyu.

In the event, however, the Masai and the Kikuyu did not fulfil the roles expected of them. Indeed, the roles were reversed. For the expected military resistance of the Masai did not materialise, and throughout the initial period of contact the Masai produced no active opposition to the entry of the British. By contrast the Kikuyu, whose military prowess was not taken seriously by the British administrators, actively opposed the establishment of British rule and resisted in a series of short sharp encounters. Here surely is a paradox which must be explained. A study of the years immediately before the first World War reveals a further paradox. By this time the Masai had good cause to resent British entry, as they had twice been moved from their lands. Yet their resentment came to be expressed not by force of arms but, surprisingly, through the Law Courts in an action brought by the tribe against the Attorney General of the Protectorate.[9] On the other hand the Kikuyu, who had first opposed the British, had by 1914 apparently acquiesced in the new regime. Kikuyu 'chiefs' were providing active collaborators with the British, particularly with respect to Hut Tax collection and labour recruitment. There were growing signs, however, that such collaborators were not necessarily representative of the Kikuyu area whole, and beneath the surface there were indications that resentment was already growing. This was even recognised by some of the British officials, one of whom (a District Officer at Kiambu) described the Kikuyu reaction to the British administration as 'a sulky acquiescence in our rule'.

By the early twenties, with the emergence of definite African protest movements, the contrast in attitude between the two tribes was even more marked. The Masai, having lost their court case, appeared to be contracting out of the political struggle, and showed a haughty indifference to the British administration. By contrast, the Kikuyu were becoming increasingly active in the political realm. Why did these two tribes react in ways quite contrary to what the British officials had first expected? Why, in particular, did the warlike Masai offer no tangible resistance to the introduction of British rule, and by the early twenties appear to be largely indifferent to political protest movements? Why, on the other hand did the Kikuyu, from whom no resistance had been expected, forcefully oppose the initial British entry, only to join in apparent co-operation a few years later? And why, when co-operation at the official level appeared to be developing, did further opposition develop, this time in the political sphere? For possible answers to these questions we shall take each tribe in turn, and examine in a little more detail their responses to British rule in the initial years of the Protectorate. For in this early period, it is suggested, lies the clue to their later contrasting attitudes to the protest movements of the twenties.

To turn first to the Masai, one is immediately struck by their failure to provide the expected military opposition to British entry.

There are several possible explanations for this. In the first place, it seems likely that the British assessment of Masai power may well have been exaggerated. For the evidence suggests that Masai power had, by the 1890s, already passed its zenith. It is quite possible that the attacks of the Masai upon their neighbours, and upon passing caravans, may have been exaggerated deliberately by Arab traders anxious not to lose their monopoly of trade in the interior. Certainly it seems clear that the Masai attacked chiefly for cattle, and there is evidence to show that trading continued between the women of the Masai and the Kikuyu even while the moran (warriors) were raiding and fighting.[11] More significantly, in the 1880s the ravages of small-pox and cholera had considerably weakened Masai power, and serious outbreaks of pleuro-pneumonia were attacking the precious herds. Perhaps most important of all, the Masai were divided amongst themselves. Instead of being able to present a united body against the European newcomer, the Masai had in fact dissipated their strength by indulging in a series of feuds between different sections of the tribe. The sections were led by separate laibons -- ritual experts with prophetic powers -- who also came to influence the conduct of warfare. Supremacy had gradually been achieved by the sub-tribe of the Purko under their laibon Mbatian, who by c.1884 had apparently achieved a position of unrivalled pre-eminence. When Mbatian died in 1890, however, the succession issue immediately became acute and fighting broke out between two of his sons, Lenana and Sendeyo, at the very time when British influence was being established.[12] Indeed, Francis Hall, one of the first British officers at Fort Smith, found that instead of being opposed by the Masai in the neighbourhood of the fort he was able to offer aid and protection to Lenana, who by 1894 was being seriously harried by his brother.[13] In the months that followed Hall deliberately developed his friendship with Lenana, and used his warriors as something of a private army for his own defence, and for attacks upon hostile Kikuyu.

The success of these early contacts between the British and the Masai was enhanced by the impartial decision of Hall's superior, John Ainsworth, in absolving the Masai from blame for the death of Trader Dick in November 1895. The Masai appear to have been impressed by Ainsworth's decision that the Masai, in killing Dick, had acted in their own defence, and that Dick had only himself to blame for attempting to seize Masai cattle.[14] From this time forward the Masai appear to have placed growing confidence in the decisions of British officials. For their part, the officials refrained from attempting to assert too great a control over the Masai, and were prepared to turn a blind eye to Masai raiding that they were powerless to stop, with Ainsworth admitting to Hardinge that : 'we are not strong enough to fight the Masai on their own ground'.[15] Rather than attempt to coerce the Masai, the British concentrated upon winning their friendship and building up Lenana as a loyal supporter of the new order. This, of course, suited Lenana well. With his prestige restored through association with the newcomers, and with his herds increasing through his successful raiding operations with Hall, Lenana had good reason to continue his co-operation with the British.

This policy of co-operation paid off handsomely during the years when British control was gradually extended throughout the Protectorate. After Lenana's breach with Sendeyo had been healed in 1902, Masai warriors were regularly employed as 'levies' on British punitive patrols and expeditions. They were generally allowed a share of the booty, usually in the form of cattle, sheep and goats, that they had helped to capture. By the time that the system of levies was stopped, in 1908, the Masai had profited richly from their co-operation. While the amount of captured stock cannot be calculated exactly, as warriors from other tribes were also employed and as some of the stock was normally sold to defray expenses, it seems likely that the Masai gained a considerable share of the 28,693 cattle and 64,853 sheep and goats captured in punitive expeditions from 1902 to 1906 alone.[16]

This co-operation with the British, and the apparent confidence of the Masai leaders in British good faith, seems to have been the decisive factor in the Masai's willingness to agree to the first Masai Move of 1904. By the treaty of that year the Masai of the Rift Valley agreed to vacate their lands and to move to Laikipia, a plateau to the east of the Rift Valley. Pro-Masai officials, who had previously stood up for the Masai against the incursions of European settlers, supported the move on condition that the Masai's rights to their new lands were permanently safeguarded by treaty. The permanence of the whole arrangement was emphasised by a clause which stated : 'We (i.e. the Masai signatories) would, however, ask that the settlement now arrived at shall be enduring so long as the Masai as a race shall exist, and that European or other settlers shall not be allowed to take up land in the settlements'.[17]

At first the confidence of the Masai in the advantages of the move seemed to have been fully justified. Officers in charge of the Laikapia reserve, who were recognised as being in sympathy with the Masai peoples, reported that the Masai were settling down well in their new surroundings.[18] Their flocks and herds multiplied, and by September 1911 it was estimated that the Masai possessed as many as 200,000 cattle and 2,000,000 sheep.[19] The reasons behind the agreement of the Masai to the second move(1911), however, are less clear. Despite the scepticism that has been expressed about the authenticity of Lenana's dying wish that the Masai should forsake Laikipia for an enlarged southern reserve,[20] it is quite possible that Lenana genuinely desired the second move. For when large sections of the Masai had moved to Laikapia, Lenana himself had been kept at Ngong near Nairobi, and after several years' separation was in danger of losing his influence over the northern sections. Far less obvious is the reason why the pro-African officials in the Protectorate supported the idea, at a time when it was becoming increasingly obvious (in the Protectorate, if not in the United Kingdom) that settler pressures lay behind Governor Girouard's desire to secure a second move. It is strange, to say the least, that men such as Ainsworth and Hobley, who had earlier stood up for the Masai against settler pressures under Eliot, should willingly have leant their support to renewed pressures under Girouard. Yet such was the substance of the charges brought before the Secretary of State in a private letter -- almost certainly written by Norman Leys, a Government Medical Officer -- presented before the move.[21]

Whatever the reasons for the support of the officials, it seems clear that the majority of the Masai of the northern reserve genuinely opposed the move. But their opposition, far from being expressed by armed force, was expressed first by attempts to return to Laikipia, once the move had begun. When these attempts failed they then turned, somewhat surprisingly, to an appeal to the courts. Here the influence of European sympathisers played its part, for according to Leys (in his subsequent book) 'at least two Europeans, one of them an official and the other a settler, advised them to appeal to the Courts of Justice'.[22] The appeal failed, on the technical grounds that the Masai were not British subjects and owed no allegiance to the Crown, and that the treaty of 1904, being a compact between two sovereign states, was not cognizable by any British court.[23] But after the second move was completed, the Masai seem not to have continued their opposition in any active form. They simply ignored the half-hearted attempts of British administrative officers to recruit them as 'donkey boys' during the war, and continued their pastoral way of life with a haughty indifference to European ways, so that in 1919 the administration had to admit that 'the Masai problem had not yet been tackled'[24] Thus, after an initial period when the British had managed to turn the Masai warriors from potential opposition to active co-operation, the Masai were left largely to their own devices and to the continuation of their traditional pastoral way of life, moved around but unencumbered by heavy administrative demands.

The Masai had been feared by the British, but the expected clash had never come. By contrast, the Kikuyu were not regarded as a serious threat, yet in practice they put up far more active opposition to British rule. In most of the main Kikuyu areas where the administration was established (Kiambu, Fort Hall, Nyeri) British authority had first to be established by force of arms. There are several possible reasons why this opposition arose, and why the views of the British officials were so wide of the mark. First, contemporary European observers seem to have misjudged the relative power of the Masai and the Kikuyu. A certain mystique which was attached to the Masai moran may have blinded Europeans to the fact that Masai power had probably reached its peak before the British officials appeared, while the authority of the Kikuyu may well have been increasing. Certainly in the 1880s it seems that, in the rivalry between the pastoral Masai and the agricultural Kikuyu, something of a stale-mate had been reached, with the Masai retaining their traditional hold upon the plains, but with the Kikuyu increasing their control over the hill country bordering Masai areas.[25] It is arguable that with the threats posed to the Masai by the ravages of disease and by their own internecine warfare, their position of military power might well have been overcome by the Kamba, who by the early nineties may well have been poised for a successful attack upon their rivals (and hence, it may be argued, the entry of the British may quite fortuitously have bolstered a waning Masai power). But whatever the exact relationship of the tribes at the time of the British entry, there is no doubt that the Kikuyu presented greater military opposition than the British had first considered likely.

In the area of Kiambu, British officials (working first for the Imperial British East Africa Company) soon came under attack. In the Kiambu area, the first British station (at Dagoretti) was attacked and burnt down in 1890 by Wyaki, the local Kikuyu leader. Another station, named Fort Smith, was soon built on a neighbouring site, but this too suffered heavy attack, and in January 1893 was described as being 'practically in a state of siege'[26] The reason for this hostility seems to lie in the history of the Kikuyus' first encounters with the Europeans, and leads to a consideration of the second main reason for Kikuyu opposition to British entry -- the suffering inflicted upon the Kikuyu by the first Europeans to pass through their country.

In 1887 the Kikuyu had suffered heavily at the hands of Count Teleki and Lieutenant Hohnel, when the former's caravan had forced its way across Kikuyu country.[27] Subsequently, after the establishment of Fort Smith, the agents of the Company had embarked upon a series of raids to secure grain and, on meeting resistance, had followed up with a series of small 'punitive' expeditions. When Sir Gerald Portal passed through the station, on his way to Uganda, he had no hesitation in condemning the Company's agents for their behaviour, and blamed them for bringing the attacks upon themselves : 'by refusing to pay for things', he wrote, 'by raiding, looting, swashbuckling, and shooting natives, the Company have turned the whole country against the white man!'[28] Relations slowly improved after Francis Hall had taken over control of the station, although in his first months at the fort he also embarked upon a series of small punitive expeditions.[29]

Examples of the severity of British methods are also to be found in the areas of Fort Hall and Nyeri. In Fort Hall the Sub-Commissioner, S.L.Hinde (an officer who had previously seen active service in the Congo), was allowed a comparatively free hand in expeditions against the Muraka and Iraini sections of the Kikuyu, and put down local opposition with severity. Indeed, in the expedition of February 1904 against the Iraini the estimated number of Kikuyu killed was deliberately cut down from 1500 to 400 by the Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, as he feared that Hinde might get into trouble if such a large casualty list reached England.[30]

In Nyeri district there was considerable fighting at close quarters after a British column led by Lieutenant Meinertzhagen had crossed the Aberdares from the west, and only after the local Kikuyu had been defeated was a station established in 1902.[31]

This initial period of Kikuyu military opposition did not last for long. It could scarcely have been expected to do so when the Kikuyu were ranged against the force of modern firearms. But it seems likely that the memory of these early British expeditions lived on, and the severity of the methods used by the British may well have contributed to the subsequent growth of political opposition to the colonial regime. At the same time, however, it is important to note that this initial opposition was not overcome solely by military means. More subtle methods were also used, often with considerable success. From the evidence of Francis Hall's letters it appears that the Kikuyu around Fort Smith were considerably divided amongst themselves in the 1890s when Hall was establishing himself, and he deliberately set out to develop a policy of divide and rule. Not only was he thus successful in establishing himself around the fort; he also found a Kikuyu willing and anxious to collaborate with him in the person of Kinanjui, an individual of apparently obscure origins who in later years became the leading Kikuyu 'chief' in the area. The secret of Kinanjui's success lay in the fact that he presented himself to the British as a potential leader at the very time when the more traditional leader, Wyaki, had been deposed and imprisoned for attacking Hall's predecessor (Purkiss) in 1892. Hall, isolated and on the defensive to begin with, quickly made friends with Kinanjui whom he described as 'my Fidus Achetes... The Kikuyu chief who lives just alongside and has always been loyal to Europeans'[32]

The explanation for this development seems to be two-fold. Kinanjui does not appear to have been accepted in any sense as a traditional Kikuyu leader, but he was anxious to secure influence and power and, after earlier associations with the British, was shrewd enough to see that he might enhance his own position by association with newcomers. On their side the British, with their preconceived ideas of finding chiefs in Africa, were anxious to find individuals through whom they could work, even when, as in the case of the Kikuyu, the tribe did not normally possess chiefs in the sense of one clearly defined and permanent leader, but relied upon a system of elders in what was essentially a fragmentary society.[33] When an individual such as Kinanjui presented himself as a potential supporter of the new order, the British did all they could to foster the relationship. In Ainsworth's words: 'The Administration naturally gives all encouragement to any strong individuality, and does what it can to increase his power so long as he is loyal'.[34]

Kinanjui was only the first, and the most prominent, of the Kikuyu of Kiambu to throw in his lot with the new order. From the time of Hall's early contacts other individuals accepted posts with Government. Thus by 1909, when an analysis of local 'chiefs' was made in the Kiambu Political Record Book, it is apparent that many of the leading 'chiefs' began their years of authority in the 1890s, seeing service with Hall and Ainsworth.[35] Not a few appear to have begun their lives in comparative poverty, and only gradually became wealthy and powerful, mainly through the British connexion. Almost all seem to have secured their official status through the practical test of their loyalty to Government rather than to any position in Kikuyu tribal society.[36]

This creation of something of an official Kikuyu 'establishment' meant that the Protectorate government was able to make its administrative demands felt the more effectively,

particularly in the realms of Hut Tax collection and labour recruitment. To collect Hut Tax, a system had been evolved by 1909 (though subsequently modified) whereby collection was made in the first instance by the local elders, who then passed the tax on to the chiefs. The latter toured the districts and were paid a commission on the amounts they collected.[37] Chiefs were also used in co-operation with European administrative officers in the recruitment of labour. Amongst the Europeans, opinions varied as to the degree of compulsion that should be used in encouraging Africans to go out to work. In the period up to 1912, at least, most agreed that a certain amount of encouragement might legitimately be given. Of these, the Hon. C. Dundas was not untypical. When giving evidence to the Native Labour Commission of 1912-13, Dundas openly stated that he tried to influence chiefs to encourage Africans to go out to work and told them that 'their capabilities were gauged by the number of boys (a term used to describe all male Africans workers including adults) voluntarily leaving the Reserves in search of employment'.[38] It is scarcely surprising that considerable force was used by some of the chiefs -- a fact that was openly admitted by some of those who gave evidence to the Commission. Muraru wa Ngururu, for example, told how he had supplied 50 out of 120 workmen needed for the Magadi Soda Works 'by sending out his spearman and asking for volunteers'.[39] Although most of the work was for European employers, there were cases of the poorer men being compelled to work for the more powerful chiefs themselves, of whom Kinanjui was the most conspicuous example.[40]

Thus in the years immediately before 1914 the Kikuyu were already feeling the hand of Government not simply through the demands of Europeans officers, but also from those Kikuyu who had chosen -- for whatever reason -- to throw in their lot with the new regime. In addition to the growing demands for Hut Tax and labour, however, a third factor had increasingly aroused the resentment of the Kikuyu -- the factor of lost land. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal in any detail with this most important topic, which has already considered minute attention in the investigations of the Kenya Land Commission 1932-33, and more recently in the work of M.P.K. Sorrenson.[41] Here it is sufficient to emphasise that the Kikuyu, together with the Masai, had borne the initial impact of the entry of European settlers in 1903, and had surrendered land to the newcomers. From that time forward the question of lost land provided a source of constant complaint -- a complaint that was set out explicitly in a remarkable document surviving from the year 1912. The document, entitled 'The Kikuyu Point of View', provides one of the first written accounts of African grievances, summarising the views of some fifty Kikuyu interviewed by a British District Officer, M.W.H.Beech, Assistant District Commissioner at Dagoretti.

According to Beech, the elders who were interviewed expressed appreciation of certain aspects of life under the British, especially the peace they enjoyed. But they were critical of the recently-introduced Poll Tax, and especially of the European settler community : 'The Europeans', they complained, 'possess our lands ... Europeans want our men to work for such long periods at a time, they cannot help their families in the Reserve.' They complained that they were heavily fined for the slightest trespass on European land, and that not infrequently they were turned off land on European farms which they had been given as allotments, after they had first improved it. The Missions and the towns were also blamed. The elders alleged that the young men who returned from work in the towns were spoilt for work at home-- 'they are different men'. Many of those who attend mission schools expected wives to be found for them when they returned home, and yet in the opinion of the leaders they had done no work for the tribe to deserve wives. When Beech asked why they did

not bring their complaints, especially over land problems with the settlers, to the notice of the D.C., they replied : 'We are afraid ; we think all white men must think alike'.[42]

From the above discussion it seems evident that there were marked differences in the responses of the Kikuyu and Masai to the establishment of British administration in the East Africa Protectorate. As has been briefly shown, after the failure of their court case against the government the Masai seemed willing to contract out of any further struggle against the British authorities. Despite the fact that they had suffered the double removal from their lands they remained largely indifferent to the new order. Part of the reason for this seems to be that, although they had lost land, they had been compensated with considerable areas in the enlarged southern reserve. Unlike the Kikuyu, they had never suffered the death and wounding of hundreds of their young men in early conflicts with the British. Although the laibon Lenana had thrown in his lot with the British, they had not seen the emergence of an administrative order of chiefs and headmen, working in co-operation with the British, and even the direct control of British administrative officers had been more nominal than real. Thus they had never experienced the full demands of hut tax collection, or been forced out on to the labour market.

Above all, the Masai had been able to keep their traditional tribal structure virtually intact. Despite the advent of the British, the old way of life continued much as before. It is at least arguable that, faced with a possible decline at the time of the establishment of British rule, they had positively benefited from the new order, by being preserved as a tribe, and by being able to recoup their earlier losses in cattle. Hence, in the key period of political awakening after the First World War they lacked a sense of deeply-felt grievance. The renewed pressures of the European community for an increased labour supply after the war largely passed them by. Without a long-term sense of grievance, or the stimulus of heavy political demands in the immediate post-war period, it is scarcely surprising that they showed little interest in the growing protest movements of the twenties.

In direct contrast to the Masai, by the early twenties the Kikuyu had felt the full impact of European rule and nursed deep-seated grievances. They had lost men in battle ; they had seen a body of collaborators emerge who appeared to be working in support of the new order ; they had been made to pay Hut Tax ; they had been forced out to work ; they had lost land without adequate compensation. During the war, large numbers of men had been lost in the service of the Carrier Corps,[43] involved in a war in which they had no direct interest. With such heavy and unprecedented demands, it was small wonder that the old tribal society was beginning to crack.

By the end of the war it seems that these deep-seated grievances, reinforced by the sufferings of those who had served in the Carrier Corps, were being felt so strongly that only a spark was needed to transform apparently passive acquiescence into active political protest. Such a spark was supplied in the renewed demands for labour in the Northey circulars, in the imposition of the kipande system, and in the doubling of the Hut and Poll Taxes, all within the space of a few months. It was scarcely surprising that these final demands upon the Kikuyu people led directly to their active participation in the protest movements of the twenties.

Thus, in the event, African protests came to be expressed in a manner very different to that originally envisaged by the first British officials. With the formation of the Kikuyu Association in 1920 and the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921

opposition had come, not from the Masai whose warriors had been expected to oppose the British and who had twice been moved from their lands, but from the Kikuyu, from whom little opposition had initially been expected, and with whom a measure of early co-operation had apparently been achieved. Such is the paradox which, it is suggested, can more readily be understood when the history of this earlier period of British administration is examined.

G.H.Mungeam.

University College,
Nairobi.

December 1966.

NOTES

1. The kipande was a card bearing finger prints that adult males were compelled to carry under the new system of African registration.
2. The Nandi, who strongly opposed the building of the Uganda Railway, were included in the Uganda Protectorate until 1902 when the Eastern Province of Uganda was transferred to the East Africa Protectorate.
3. Construction of the Uganda Railway began at Mombasa in December 1895. The railway reached Kisumu, on the shores of Lake Victoria, in 1901.
4. F.J.Jackson, Early Days in East Africa (London, 1930), p.130.
5. J.Thomson, Through Masailand (London,1885), passim.
6. Hardinge to Hill, Private, 25 April 1897, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, series 107, volume 77.
7. Report by H.M.Commissioner on the East Africa Protectorate, Cd. 769 (1901), p.5.
8. Ainsworth to Lloyd, 31 March 1899 ; Ainsworth to Crauford, 31 May 1899, 'Ukamba out 1899', Nairobi Archives.
9. Judgement of the High Court in the Case brought by the Masai tribe against the Attorney-General of the East Africa Protectorate and Others, Cd. 6939 (1913).
10. G.A.S.Northcote (Assistant District Commissioner, Kiambu) to Hobley, 27 May 1914, Kiambu Confidential Correspondence 1910-19, Nairobi Archives.
11. M.W.H.Beech, 'The Kikuyu Point of View', 12 December 1912, Dagoretti Political Record Book 1908-1912, Nairobi Archives.
12. For a discussion of the Masai in the later nineteenth century, D.A.Low, 'The Northern Interior, 1840-1884', History of East Africa, vol.i, (Oxford,1963), 301-318
13. A graphic account of Hall's experiences is given in a series of letters which Hall sent to his father in England, at approximately monthly intervals. For a description of Hall's early dealings with the Masai see especially the letter of 28 October 1893 and 12 February 1894. The Hall Papers are preserved in Rhodes House, Oxford.
14. Ainsworth to Hardinge, 3 December 1895, enclosure in Hardinge to Salisbury, 19 December 1895, F.O. 107/39.
15. Ainsworth to Hardinge, 23 December 1895, enclosure in Hardinge to Salisbury, 9 January 1896, F.O. 107/49.
16. Minute by Lobb, 29 May 1907, on Jackson to Crewe, 17 April 1907, and Sadler to Crewe, 9 May 1907, C.O.534/5.
17. Stewart to Lansdowne, 5 September 1904, F.O.2/839. Enclosure 1 contained the proposed agreement, as a 'Provisional Memorandum'. A printed copy of the agreement, headed 'Agreement dated 10 August 1904, between His Majesty's Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate and the Chiefs of the Masai Tribe', is given as an appendix in Correspondence relating to the Masai, Cd.5584 (1911).

18. 'Short History of the Masai Reserve', Laikipia Annual Report 1910-11, Nairobi Archives.

19. Girouard to Harcourt, 30 September 1911, C.O.533/90.

20. Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, doubted the accuracy of Governor Girouard's reports and minuted, 'Sir P. Girouard must have telepathically inspired Lenana's dying wish'. ' Girouard to Harcourt, Telegram 15 March 1911, and minute thereon by Harcourt, 16 March 1911, C.O.533/85.

21. The Colonial Secretary was warned in a private letter, dated 3 February 1910, addressed to Gilbert Murray from an author within the Protectorate. The letter is filed in C.O.533/72.

22. C.Leys, Kenya (London, 3rd edition, 1926), p.129.

23. Cd. 6939 (1913). See also 'Further Correspondence (17 July 1911 to 20 July 1914) relating to the Masai', Colonial Office Confidential Print, African, No.1001.

24. G.R.Sandford, An Administrative and Political History of the Masai Reserve (London, 1919), quoted in Leys, op.cit., p.132.

25. Low, 'The Northern Interior 1840-1884, 'History of East Africa, i, 302-3.

26. Portal to Rosebery, 31 January 1803, F.O.2/60, quoted in M. de Kiewiet Hemphill, 'The British Sphere, 1884-1894', History of East Africa, i, 417.

27. L. von Hohnel, Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie, (London, 1894), 286-361.

28. Portal to Lady Portal, 3 February 1893, Portal Papers, quoted in Hemphill, op.cit., p.417.

29. For accounts of these expeditions, see the letters of Hall to his father for 1893 and 1894, Hall Papers.

30. R. Meinertzhagen, 'Intelligence Report on the Operations against the Irryeni Tribe in the Kenya Province during February and March 1904', 17 April 1904 ; Major Pope-Hennessy to Meinertzhagen, 21 April 1904. Both in the Meinertzhagen Papers, Rhodes House. For a personal account of operations around Fort Hall see also R.Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary 1902-1906 (Edinburgh, 1957).

31. Details are given in Meinertzhegen, op.cit., pp. 66-74, and H. Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles,(Aldershot,1956), p.204.

32. Hall to Colonel Hall, 10 June 1894, Hall Papers.

33. Kikuyu society was organized in a system of age-grades, and elders were chosen from those men who had retired from warriorhood, and reached the age of eldership, J.Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, (London, 1938), p.188. The Kikuyu system of government as a whole is discussed in chapter IX, pp.186-230.

34. Reports relating to the Administration of the East Africa Protectorate, Cd. 2740 (1905), p.33

35. Kiambu Political Record Book, Part ii, Section (c), 'Chiefs and Headmen (Names, record and personal character)', Nairobi Archives.

36. Karanja wa Mariti, for example, was described as 'a gentleman amongst the Kikuyu, always willing to assist the Government', Ibid.

37. H.R.Tate, 'Administrative History of Kiambu District', n.d., Kiambu Political Record Book, Section i(Part i), Nairobi Archives.

38. Evidence submitted by Hon.C. Dundas, Native Labour Commission 1912-13, part i, pp.61-62.

39. Ibid. Evidence of Muraru wa Ngururu, pp.238-9.

40. Ibid. Evidence of Kamau wa Kabiana, pp.234-5, and Mbatia wa Gicheru, p.235.

41. Report of the Kenya Land Commission (Nairobi, 1933), and especially vol. i of the Evidence. See also M.P.K.Sorrenson, 'Land Policy, Legislation and Settlement in the East Africa Protectorate 1895-1915', unpublished Oxford D.Phil. thesis (1962), chapter XII.

42. M.W.H.Beech, 'The Kikuyu Point of View', 12 December 1912, Dagoretti Political Record Book 1908-12, Nairobi Archives.

43. For a study of recruitment of men for the Carrier Corps, see Donald C. Savage and J.Forbes Munro, 'Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate, 1914-1918', Journal of African History, VII, 2 (1966), pp.313-342.

No. 428.

SOME SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF LAND SETTLEMENT IN KENYA

by

WILSON NGUYO

(Egerton College)

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on a Special Project research paper bearing the title "An Economic Study of the Mweiga Settlement Scheme" presented for the B.Sc. Agriculture Part II examination at Makerere in March 1966. Research in the field had been conducted in the period May-June 1965. The work was an attempt at assessing how far the Settlement Programme has been successful in fulfilling the objectives for which it was originally intended when it was conceived. The actual study consisted of a farm management survey carried out in a space of five weeks, of 26 of the 321 settlement plots comprising Mweiga Settlement Scheme as at 30th June 1964. This meant that input-output data for the whole of the farming year under study (1st May 1964-30th April 1965) had to be obtained in two or three farm visits.

This immediately raises the question of the validity of any conclusions based on the assumption that such data is a valid representation of a whole year's performance. However, the error is considerably diminished when two features of this scheme are noted. Firstly, a considerable proportion of the farm inputs was financed through a development loan whose expenditure was easily followed by reference to the loan register. A notable exception here is the labour input. But, as will be shown later, over 75% of all labour was, on average, provided by the family and, as the settlers were originally landless and unemployed, family labour may be considered to have an opportunity cost close to zero except in terms of leisure. Secondly, the only cash-earning enterprises of any importance in this Scheme were Dairy, Pyrethrum and Potatoes and, while all the potato crop was sold by farmers individually, all pyrethrum and over 90% of the dairy products were marketed through the Mweiga Co-operative Society Ltd. It was therefore possible to obtain fairly accurate data on pyrethrum and milk sales from the Co-operative Society records. The overall loss of reliability arising out of the procedure followed in the collection of information is, of course, difficult to calculate accurately, but it is estimated to be sufficiently small to allow the broad conclusions drawn from the study to be largely acceptable.

Since the original survey a further brief survey of employment and labour aspects of the Mweiga Settlement Scheme was done in August-September 1966. Information gathered in this second study will be used to augment the data collected in the first study.

This paper, like the work on which it is based, is intended to offer, to the extent the available information allows, a brief and rather

generalized survey of the performance of the Settlement Programme against the original aims. It is hoped that at a later date, a more complete report containing details of the research methodology and the nature of the data collected will be prepared. Here, only the more important results of the study will be presented.

THE AIMS OF LAND SETTLEMENT

In initiating Land Settlement, the government was motivated not only by economic forces, but also by the social and political conditions prevailing at the time. In fact, it is the socio-political factors that were mainly responsible for precipitating the whole idea of Settlement. The main Settlement policy aims put forward by the Government were:[1]

1. To increase the development of these areas and so increase production. It was estimated that each scheme at maturity (and the majority of the schemes are expected to reach maturity between 1966 and 1971) would show approximately 50% increase in production over that obtained by the former owners of the land involved. Since this area produced the greater proportion of the income accruing to the Agricultural Sector, this increase in productivity would be of significant economic importance.

2. To increase the opportunities of employment and therefore ease (a) the acute population pressure in some areas, (b) the socio-economic problem of unemployment. It is expected that ultimately 36,000 families will be settled in the Settlement Schemes and that, on the average, each Settler will employ one other person. The total absorption of the land under these schemes would be 70,000 families, which represents 100% increase over the labour previously employed.

3. To effect a rapid and orderly transfer of land ownership of European-owned farms to Africans. This was not only desirable but essential both socially and politically in the light of the new political developments.

It is the intention here to examine settlement policy against these objectives to see how far they are being met. But before proceeding further it may be desirable to refer briefly to the types of Settlement Schemes found in Kenya.

TYPES OF SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

In order to further the above aims in the most effective way, both from the socio-political aspect and from the economic point of view, it was considered desirable to have more than one type of scheme. The different types of schemes would accommodate various classes of farmers, in differing classes of land, making allowance for differing levels of farming skill and experience as well as differing capital positions. The following are the types of schemes most commonly recognised:

1. The Yeoman Farmer Scheme for experienced farmers with substantial

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[1] Kenya Government: Economic Development Plan 1964-70.

capital of their own, with a target income of £200-£250 above subsistence. Farmers in this type of Scheme provide about 22% of the total costs of Settlement excluding administrative costs. Settlers are required to have £500 of their own.

2. The Co-operative type of Scheme where individuals form themselves into a Co-operative Society, contribute money and buy one or more farms. The farm so bought is farmed co-operatively as a unit. This type of Scheme is considered desirable where subdivision of the former large scale farms is considered unsuitable on economic grounds.

3. The Small-holder type of Scheme which is again subdivided into two classes:
   (a) Low Density Schemes: These are limited to land which was previously under-developed and are intended for settlers with some agricultural experience and some capital of their own. The farms have a target income of £100 above subsistence and farmers provide 13% of the total costs of settlement excluding administrative costs. Settlers are required to have £100-£250 of their own in order to qualify for this type of scheme.
   (b) High Density Schemes for landless and unemployed Africans with a target income of £25-£70. Apart from being landless and unemployed, no other qualification is required, and the only money required of the settler is Sh120/= for payment of stamp duty and registration fee. The settler is not required to contribute anything towards the cost of settlement.

Of the three broad types of Settlement Schemes described above, the last one, i.e. Small-holder Scheme, is the most important one, both in terms of the number of settlers and total acreage. Within this class, the High Density Scheme in particular accommodates the greatest number of people and, in fact, covers the largest acreage of all. It is therefore appropriate that the case study on which this paper is based should have been conducted on a High Density Scheme, namely, Mweiga.

THE MWEIGA SETTLEMENT SCHEME

Situated in the Nyeri District of Central Province, this scheme is in the high potential land earmarked for High Density Schemes. The standard size of a plot was 7 acres, the size needed to achieve a target income of £25 per annum above subsistence, in what is considered to be class I land. Where land did not measure up to class I, extra acreage was allowed for in order to ensure, as far as possible, that all plots were identical in their economic potential. The major cash-earning enterprises in this scheme are Potatoes, Dairy, and Pyrethrum, while maize, beans as well as potatoes provide food for subsistence.

Settlers started arriving in June 1962 and continued arriving until January 1964. However, over 80% of all settlers had arrived by December 1962.

The settlers were largely illiterate: only 57% of the men and 4% of the women had reached Std. 6 and 50% of all women had never been to

school. Farming experience was also lacking, with 40% of all settlers having had no previous agricultural experience of any description. Of the others, 25% had been employed in former European farms and 35 had cultivated small plots of their own or belonging to relatives. Despite this, only 2 farmers' wives from the 26 farms studied had attended farming courses at the Farmers Training Centre at the time this survey was conducted.

There is a co-operative Society which handles the marketing of milk and pyrethrum and maintains cattle dips and a few water dams in the scheme. The Co-operative Society derives its income from a 20% cess on milk and pyrethrum and from membership shares which cost Shs20/= per member.

The Farm Resources

Each settler was equipped with a parcel of land, some family labour and a considerable amount of borrowed capital.

Most farmers employed family labour and only a small amount of casual labour, but a few farmers made considerable use of hired labour. The following table illustrates the situation.

Table 1. DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN HIRED AND FAMILY LABOUR.

NUMBER OF FARMS	PROPORTION OF LABOUR PROVIDED BY	
	Hired Labour (%)	Family Labour (%)
5	0	100
6	1-9	91-99
1	10-19	81-90
2	20-29	71-80
2	30-39	61-70
8	40-49	51-60
2	More than 50	Less then 50
Avg. of 26 farms	25	75

On the whole, labour was not a limiting factor and more labour was available than was actually used on the farm. In estimating labour availability, no conversion factors were used as these would have complicated the estimates considerably. In any case, women work nearly as hard as men and children were only mainly used in herding of cattle and pyrethrum picking, tasks which they can perform as well as adults. However only big children were considered in estimation of labour. It was assumed that in one year,

(a) The farmer works 312 days (6 days per week for 52 weeks).
(b) The wife works 156 days (4 days per week for 39 weeks).
(c) Hired labourer works 286 days (5½ days a week for 52 weeks).
(d) School child works 130 days (week-ends and school holidays).

The amount of labour available per year for each farm was then calculated to be 1014 man-days regular labour and 101 man-days casual labour on average, giving a total of 1115 man-days. This labour was provided by men, women, and children in the proportions 58% men, 30%

women and 12% children.

Hired labour was paid in cash. Casual labour was either on a daily basis or on a task basis. On a daily basis, casual labour was paid at the rate of Shs2/= per man-day but there was considerable variation as far as tasks were concerned. Monthly wages for regular labour ranged from Shs20/= to Shs60/= plus food and housing.

The capital position of the farmer is best illustrated by looking at Table 2 below.

Table II. CAPITAL INVESTMENT and PERCENTAGE RAISED FROM LOAN: AVERAGE OF 26 FARMS (as at 30th April 1965).

ITEM	INVESTMENT (SHS)	% RAISED FROM LOAN (SHS)
Land	4000	100
Livestock	1787	58
Buildings	1304	45
Fences	562	57
Tools and Equipment	323	52
TOTAL	8016	75

Land represents the greatest capital asset of the settler, accounting for 60% of all his cash investment as at 30th April 1965. Most of this capital was derived from loans at the very high rate of interest of 6.5% per annum.

The Major Farm Enterprises

A summary of inputs and outputs of the major farm enterprises is presented in Table III below.

Table III. FARM INPUTS AND OUTPUTS BY ENTERPRISE: AVERAGE OF 26 FARMS

ENTERPRISE	INPUTS			OUTPUTS					
	Land (Ac.)	Labour (Man-days)	Variable Costs excluding labour (SHS)	Total Annual Output	Unit of Count	Gross Output (SHS)	Gross Income (SHS)	Gross Margin per Acre (SHS)	Gross Margin per Man-day (SHS)
PYRETHRUM	0.54	90	20	*862	LB	284	264	487	3.20
ENGLISH POTATOES	2.5	237	1165	154	BAGS	4620	3455	927	10.50
MAIZE	0.89	64	4	5.6	BAGS	196	192	213	3.40
BEANS	0.54	35	3.50	1.75	BAGS	105	102	182	5.40
DAIRY	2.9	187	296	297	GAL	1092	796	265	6.90

*Lb. wet flowers per 0.54 acre.

Farmers in Mweiga Settlement Scheme are advised to follow the following farm plan in order that they may achieve the budgeted farm targets:

1.0 acre Pyrethrum
1.0 acre English Potatoes
1.0 acre maize interplanted with beans

0.5 acre homestead and vegetable garden
0.5 acre fodder crops
3.0 or more acres grazing
7.0 acres

It will be seen that while for other enterprises the acreage targets have been reached and even exceeded in case of, for instance, Potatoes, the acreage for pyrethrum is far from being attained. The main factors operating against pyrethrum are:

(1) It is not a food crop and cannot be consumed in case of food shortage.
(2) Most farmers were unaware of its profitability up to the time of this survey.
(3) Shortage of planting material.
(4) Planting material from seed when available gave a large number of blind plants which produced no flowers and therefore lowered yield per acre.
(5) The fact that apart from milk, pyrethrum is the only other product from which a cess is levied to finance the Co-operative Society. This is probably the most important factor and it is noteworthy that when I visited Mweiga last during August-September, a large number of settlers had uprooted their pyrethrum and replaced it with English potatoes. These farmers felt they were subsidizing those farmers who produced potatoes as the latter were not levied any cess.

Variable costs shown in growing pyrethrum represent the cost of planting material at the Settlement Board's price. Neither fertilizers nor pesticides were used on pyrethrum and under these conditions, returns of Shs487/56 per acre per annum and Shs3/18 per man-day were obtained. If all labour were to be hired at the prevailing rate of Shs2/= per man-day, labour costs would amount to Shs336/= per acre per annum, leaving an overall annual margin of Shs151/=. Clearly under the prevailing yield levels and ruling prices, pyrethrum is a profitable crop. Control of pyrethrum thrips and improvement of cultural practices should even enhance the profitability of the crop.

English potatoes represent the most popular crop at Mweiga. The crop takes only 4 months to mature and two crops are normally grown annually. It is the only crop where fertilizers were substantially used and this, together with the usual seedrates of 8 bags per acre at Shs30/=-60/= per bag of seed potato, raised variable costs considerably. Even with all this, potatoes were the most profitable crop on the scheme, with a gross margin per acre of Shs927/= and gross margin per man-day of Shs10/50 on average. One farmer achieved a gross margin per acre and per man-day of Shs[illegible]563/= and [illegible]7/70 respectively. This explains why this crop is so popular at Mweiga. However, it is threatened by bacterial wilt which has been spreading rapidly and whose only real check is crop sanitation and effective crop rotation.

Twenty per cent of all potato crop was consumed on the farm or

etained as seed. The rest was sold for cash.

Maize and beans were predominantly subsistence crops. Only 2 of the 26 farmers studied sold any maize and only one sold beans. Maize had a gross margin per acre of Shs213/= and gross margin per man-day of Shs3/40. The corresponding figures for beans were 182 and 5.40 respectively. But when labour is paid at current wage rates (Shs2/= per man-day) the returns are reduced to the dismal figure of Shs45/= and Shs62/= for maize and beans respectively per acre.

Dairying was the only major commercial livestock enterprise. A considerable amount of labour was used for herding where fencing was incomplete. Seventy per cent of all labour was spent on herding, feeding and watering (the corresponding Nyeri District average is 50%). Only 60 of the 321 farmers had water on their farms and the others had to take their cattle to the river, sometimes a time-consuming process where cattle have to travel by road for up to 2 miles. If each farmer had a direct access to the river instead of walking along the road, no farmer would need to travel more than 3/4 of a mile to the river. This problem could be further ameliorated by having catchment tanks. It was surprising that, of the 26 farmers studied, only one had catchment tanks in a scheme where houses re over 90% roofed with corrugated iron sheets.

However the enterprise was still profitable with a gross margin per cre of Shs265/= and a gross margin per man-day of Shs6/90. It is to be noted hat the yields per cow were low at 297 gallons. This was mainly due to the high proportion of dry cows amongst the herds. When only those cows in milk during the year were considered, the yield per cow increases to 496 gallons. On average 33.5% of all milk was consumed either by family or by stock.

There was a small acreage of coffee and about 3 farmers in the whole scheme kept pigs. A few farmers had some sheep while nearly all had some poultry. But the contribution of these enterprises to overall farm incomes was very little and it is not intended to discuss them here.

he Farm Incomes

A summary of farm incomes is presented in Table IV below.

Table IV. FARM INCOMES NET OF FAMILY CONSUMPTION

INCOME GROUP	NET FARM INCOME (SHS)	NET INCOME PER ACRE (SHS)	GROSS RETURN PER ACRE (SHS)
Average of 8 farms with highest income	3464	483	626
Average of 9 farms with medium income	1620	158	328
Average of 9 farms with lowest income	-27	-3	139
Average of 26 farms	1594	200	354

There was, in fact, considerable variation of income from farm to arm, but the figures in Table IV are sufficient to indicate the differences in income within the various groups of farmers. While the 8

farmers with highest profits had a net farm income of Shs3464/=, the 9 farmers with lowest farm incomes made a net loss of Shs27/=. The middle income group was close to the average.

There were various causes for this variation in income. In the first instance, the high income farmers consumed a smaller proportion of their farm output than the lower income farmers. The following table illustrates the situation.

Table V. SUMMARY OF FARM PRODUCE CONSUMED: VALUE IN SHS.

INCOME GROUP	TOTAL FARM PRODUCE CONSUMED (SHS)	GROSS FARM OUTPUT (SHS)	PROPORTION OF FARM PRODUCT		PROPORTION OF FARM PRODUCE WHOSE ORIGIN IS	
			CON-SUMED (%)	SOLD (%)	ANIMAL (%)	PLANT (%)
Average of 8 Farms with Highest Income	980	5876	16	84	29	71
Average of 9 Farms with Medium Income	1589	4643	33	67	22	78
Average of 9 Farms with Lowest Income	1022	2725	40	60	14	86
Average of 26 Farms	1197	4360	30	70	21	79

It is difficult to make definite conclusions from the above table but it may safely be pointed out that high consumption value with no corresponding high output was associated with low farm incomes. An interesting aside here is the association of income with nutritional standards. The implication of relatively lower percentage of farm produce of animal origin consumed by the lower income group is that this group consumed, on average, less milk, meat and eggs than their high income counterparts - that is, nutritional standard declined with poverty.

This high consumption was, as might be expected, associated with the size of the population on the farm. It would appear that the greater amount of labour available with more people on the farm did not achieve sufficient productivity to offset the high consumption of produce.

Another factor contributing to low incomes was low overall farm productivity, and, in particular, yield per acre of the major cash crops, namely, Pyrethrum and Potatoes. Milk output did not have a definite trend. Table VI below summarises the situation.

Table VI. AVERAGE YIELD PER ACRE FOR MAIN CASH CROPS AND TOTAL MILK OUTPUT PER FARM.

INCOME GROUP	TOTAL MILK OUTPUT PER FARM (GAL)	POTATOES YIELD PER ACRE (BAGS)	PYRETHRUM YIELD PER ACRE (LB. WET)
8 Farms with Highest Income	809	53	1600
9 Farms with Medium Income	1182	41	1162
9 Farms with Lowest Income	526	33	964
Average of 26 Farms	840	41	1228

The productivity of dairy enterprise was much influenced by the

number of dry cows compared to those in milk. With Pyrethrum, the main reason for low output was that the crop was either not yet mature or too old to give a good crop. The rate of picking and the frequency of blind plants on the pyrethrum plot as well as the standard of weeding also influenced output. Still some farmers spaced their plants too widely and yields per acre were thus below what could be achieved.

The yield of potatoes was much dependent on the rate of fertilizer use and the presence or absence of Bacterial wilt disease. Potato Blight was uncommon but waterlogging was a major factor depressing yields in a few cases. The standard of weeding and earthing up did also influence yields.

Income levels were also much affected by the acreage devoted to Potato and Pyrethrum crop (the main cash crops). The following Table summarises the situation.

Table VI: ACREAGES DEVOTED TO DIFFERENT MAJOR CROPS

INCOME GROUP	POTATOES (ACRES)	PYRETHRUM (ACRES)	MAIZE (ACRES)	BEANS (ACRES)	PYRETHRUM + POTATOES (ACRES)	MAIZE + BEANS (ACRES)	ALL CROPS (ACRES
Highest 8	3.3.	0.7	0.7	0.4	4.0	1.1	5.1
Next Highest 9	3.2	0.4	0.7	0.7	3.6	1.4	5.0
Lowest 9	2.0	0.6	1.1	0.6	2.6	1.7	4.3
Mean of 26	2.5	0.6	0.9	0.6	3.1	1.5	4.6

It would appear there was a close relationship between the income group and the combined acreage devoted to Pyrethrum and Potatoes. Farmers who had larger acreages of Pyrethrum and Potatoes had higher incomes than those whose acreages of those crops were small. It was found that although there was no definite correlation between the date of arrival on the scheme and income, most of the late arrivals were in the lower income group with lesser acreages of Pyrethrum and Potatoes. In fact of the 4 farmers who incurred net losses, 3 arrived a year or more after the first arrivals while the fourth farmer arrived early but had employment outside the farm.

Another possible guide to an understanding of the factors influencing farm incomes is the pattern of farm expenditure. The following table shows the pattern of farm expenditure in relation with income.

TABLE VII: FARM COSTS AND INCOMES

INCOME GROUP	FARM COSTS (SH.)						FARM INCOMES (SH.)			
	CROP EXPENSES	LIVESTOCK	LABOUR EXPENSES	CAPITAL DEPRECIATION	LOAN REPAYMENT	TOTAL FARM COSTS	NET FARM INCOME BEFORE LOAN REPAYMENTS	NET FARM INCOME AFTER LOAN REPAYMENTS	NET INCOME PER ACRE	RETURN ON FIXED CAPI-INVESTMENT
Average of 8 farms with Highest Income	361	225	238	191	478	1437	4942	3464	483	49
Average of 9 farms with Medium Income	248	339	288	155	555	1493	2175	1620	158	23
Average of 9 farms with Lowest Income	293	327	390	153	545	1731	518	-27	-3	0
Average of 26 farms	275	284	336	173	501	1569	2456	1594	200	23

A number of features are immediately discernible from the above table. Firstly, decline in farm incomes was in general associated with an increase in farm costs. Secondly, farm incomes were positively correlated with crop expenses and negatively correlated with labour expenses. In other words greater expenditure on crops led/led higher incomes while use of more hired labour depressed returns. The favourable effect of greater expenses on crops is explained on the grounds that such expenses were mainly associated with the use of fertilizers and purchase of good quality seed for the potato crop which thus raised yields and subsequently higher returns. The effect of hired labour is less obvious but it was evident that more hired labour was associated with greater labour expenditure on capital work such as fencing and building which did not have immediate direct returns and, in a few cases at least, greater family leisure. Low incomes were associated with greater livestock expenses. This is understandable because no feed supplements other than mineral salts (and pig feeds for one farmer) were bought for use on these farms, and extra expenses were therefore associated with more veterinary expenses and repeated inseminations which did not effectively increase milk yields. The column on capital depreciation seems to show that high income farmers had more capital items. This is probably because such farmers could more easily afford these items on account of the high income they were enjoying.

It is to be noted that loan repayments represent the greatest single item of expenditure. In fact, outputs remaining the same only two farmers make net losses on their farms when loan repayment element was disregarded while the number of farmers making losses is doubled to 4 and their losses greatly magnified when this item is included in the costs.

The other factor that may be considered is labour use. A summary of labour used in these farms is given in Table VIII below. It would appear the only observable relationship is between the labour

TABLE VIII: SUMMARY OF LABOUR USE DURING THE YEAR (MAN-DAYS)

INCOME GROUP	ALL LIVE-STOCK	ENGLISH POTATOES	PYRETHRUM	MAIZE	BEANS	OTHER CROPS	TOTAL	PROPORTION OF LABOUR PROVIDED BY	
								FAMILY %	HIRED LABOUR %
Average of 8 farms with highest income	185	291	113	61	18	6	674	75	25
Average of 9 farms with Medium Income	219	275	70	60	41	14	679	76	24
Average of 9 Farms with Lowest Income	189	205	89	84	36	32	635	74	26
Average of 26 Farms	202	237	90	65	35	18	647	75	25

employed on the potato crop and farm incomes. Greater consumption of labour on the potato crop resulted in higher incomes. There is no definite association between the proportion of hired labour used and the level of income on the farm. However, where family labour was not the sole source of man-power the terms of employment of hired labour were important. It was generally found that on the whole hired permanent labour was more costly than casual labour. Assuming that both permanent and casual labour worked at the same rate, the actual costs one man for one month would, on average, be as follows:

(a) Hired Labourer:
    26 working days per month @ 2/- per man-day = sh. 52.

(b) Permanent Labourer:
    Ration: 2 tins of potatoes @ sh. 30 per bag = shs. 10
    ½ tin maize @ 35/- per bag = " 3/-

1/3 tin beans @ sh. 60/- per bag	= shs.	3/-
milk, sugar, salt, etc.	= "	20/-
Monthly wage (sample average)	= "	40/-
Total		76/-

Difference between causal and permanent labourer = 24/-

It can be seen that with the rather modest estimates of what a permanent labourer would consume in a month, a considerable difference exists between the magnitude of the costs involved in the two types of employment. Moreover, as well as having free rations, often dining with the family, the permanent labourer also enjoys free housing. Even ignoring other benefits, a monthly loss of sh. 24/- (or an annual loss of sh. 288) is rather large on farms of this size and income level.

Of course the benefits of the casual labour just pointed out depend on the availability of such casual labour. There are on the whole, 74 landless families presently living at Mweiga Settlement Scheme. These families depend mainly on employment by the scheme farmers, and it is an established fact that they prefer casual employment to permanent employment. The reason for this preference mainly lies in the fact that they would like daily wages so that they can buy food and other necessities.

<u>Labour and Land - Which is more limiting</u>?

It has already been shown that the farmer at Mweiga Settlement Scheme had under his command an average of 1115 man-days of labor, 104 of which was casual labour. In Table VIII above, it was noted that the farmer employed 647 man-hours of work on his farm. It can therefore be seen that under average conditions, the farmer had a superflous labour supply. However, it may be noted that labour peaks occur in February - March and October each year. During these periods, there may be labour bottlenecks, but by judicious use of casual labour these may be overcome. In short labour was not considered to be limiting at Mweiga in the year under study.

Turning to land, it was found that the average stocking rate per farm was 1.2 Livestock units per acre (grazing pasture and fodder crops); the highest possible stocking rate at Mweiga. In fact all the 8 farmers in the high income bracket utilized every inch of their land and the only room for expansion was, for a few of them in the "freeland" adjoi - ining their land. But this freeland was normally too steep for effective utilization, 61% of all farmers studied utilized close to 100% of their utilizable land and on questioning, only 2 of the 26 farmers studied felt the land they had was adequate for them.

It is therefore felt that under these circumstances, land was relatively more limiting than labour and farmers should therefore seek to maximise returns to land rather than returns to labour.

<u>COMPARISON OF FARM PERFORMANCE WITH SETTLEMENT BUDGET</u>

So far consideration of farm performance has been done with no reference to any particular standard or measure of success. To gauge the economic success of these farms, however, it is necessary to

compare the incomes achieved with the target incomes anticipated in the Settlement budget. Below is given the settlement budget in full.

SETTLEMENT BUDGET

Category A Plots: Average size 7 acres - Class I Equivalent.

Assumptions 1. The family will derive subsistence from 2 acres of maize beans and potatoes.

2. The equivalent of 3 adult labour is available from the family.

Estimated Annual Income:

	sh.
400 lb. pyrethrum @ sh. 2/- per lb.	800
½ acre potatoes @ 35 bags yield @ 12/- per bag	420
120 gallons milk @ sh. 1/50 per gallon	180
70 lb. butterfat @ 2/50 per lb.	175
(Estimated yield per cow = 300 gallons per year skim milk retained for subsistence).	
Total Income	1,575

Estimated Annual Expenditure

	sh.
Loan repayments	679
Expenditure on cow	60
Sprays for pyrethrum and Potatoes	200
Tools and Equipment	100
Total Expenditure	1,039
NET ANNUAL PROFIT	sh. 536/-

It should be realized that this budget was intended as a broad guide to farm organization and flexibility was allowed for in the light of experience. Secondly, this budget was designed with the object of allowing the majority of farmers to achieve it so that the average farmer would have no difficulty in exceeding it. The average results obtained in this survey will now be used for camparison of farm performance against the budget. The figures used will be output net of home consumption.

COMPARISON OF ACTUAL RESULTS WITH BUDGET

ITEM	BUDGET (SHS.)	ACTUAL RESULTS (SHS.)
REVENUE: Pyrethrum	800	264
Potatoes	420	1850
Milk and Butterfat	355	720
Other (Cull cows, eggs, maize etc.)	-	359
TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUE	1575	3163
EXPENDITURE:		
Loan repayments	679	501
Expenditure on livestock	60	284
Crop expenses	200	275
Tools, Equipments, Depreciations	100	173
Labour	-	336
TOTAL ANNUAL EXPENDITURE	1039	1569
NET FARM INCOME	536	1594

This comparison shows that the average farm performance exceeded that anticipated in the farm budgets almost threefold. This is one of the most spectacular achievements Settlement has achieved and Mweiga was at the time of this survey, considered to be one of the best High Density schemes in the country. However, a few points should be noted. Out of the 26 farmers studied, 20 achieved and in fact exceeded the target income while the remaining 6 failed dismally to achieve the target and, in fact, made a loss. Secondly while the actual Annual Revenue shown above was supposed to be output net of home consumption, more allowance would have to be made for such items of consumption as sugar, salt, fat and the like which the farmer would not produce on his farm, so that net income should be somewhat less than the figure given. If a figure of sh. 300/- is allowed, it will be seen that the average farmer has still got a net income of Shs 1269 which is still more than double the target income.

A few other features in the above comparison deserve mention. Firstly there was considerable deviation, on the whole, from the budgeted farm plan, the potato enterprise was expanded out of all proportion to the budget plar Pyrethrum was just about a third of the budgeted target. The dairy enterprise was also considerably greater than anticipated, and there was another source of revenue which was not foreseen in the plan, namely, the sale of cull stock which had proved infertile, a little maize and beans and some other vegetable Secondly, inasfar as the potato enterprise was concerned, this deviation was to the advantage of the farmer since this was the most profitable crop. Thirdly the divergence from the plan in connection with pyrethrum operated against the farmer inasfar as this was associated with greater production of low yielding less profitable maize and beans.

CAMPARISON OF PRE-SETTLEMENT AND POST-SETTLEMENT RETURNS

The Pre-settlement returns are the average returns of all the farms now comprising the scheme. Using the overall average returns obtained from this survey for the 26 sample farms, the following results were obtained:

Post-settlement gross output per acre	=	Shs 354/-
Pre-settlement gross output per acre[2]	=	" 110/-
Increase in output, Post-settlement over Pre-settlement	=	" 244/-
Percent increase in production - Post-settlement Over Pre-settlement	=	" $\frac{244 \times 100}{110}$
	=	221.8%

It will be seen that the increase in productivity of Mweiga area as a result of conversion of the orginal farms into a High Density Scheme was spectacular. However it should be noted that the acreage considered in calculating the gross return per acre in this survey was less than the total acreage of the original farms because the steep valley slopes were not included in the settlement scheme acreage

2. Department of Settlement, Kenya: Annual Report 1963 - 1964 pp. 22 - 23.

These steep sl pes were however, included in the pre-settlement acreage considered and they also provide extra grazing (as free land) for scheme settlers. The survey results showed that about 35% of all the settlers in the scheme had some free land averaging about 13.8 ac res each. This is equivalent to 4.8 acres for all settlers in the scheme. When returns are worked out taking this into account, the increase in gross returns per acre becomes sh. 208. The increase in gross output per acre as a result of creation of a settlement scheme becomes sh. 92 or 83.6%.

There may be error on either side in arriving at this figure, but what it is intended to show here is the fact that there has indeed been substancial increase in productivity of the land as a result of conversion into a Settlement Scheme. The government's target of 50% increase in productivity has even been exceeded.

CREATION OF EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL IN THE SCHEME

The breakdown of employment on the scheme as at 31st August 1966 was as shown in Tables IX (a) and IX (b) below.

TABLE IX: EMPLOYMENT ON SETTLEMENT FARMS (321 PLOTS)

DESCRIPTION	NUMBER	%
Settlers with members of nuclear family on farm only	34 v	10.6
Settlers with unpaid relatives only	38	11.8
Settlers with paid relatives only	8	2.5
Settlers with paid relatives as well as hired labour	22	6.9
Settlers with unpaid relatives and hired labour	121	37.7
Settlers with hired labour and no relatives	97	30.2
Settlers with unpaid non-relatives on the farm	1	0.3
Total No. of Settled plots	321	100

TABLE IX (b) REGULAR RESIDENTS ON THE SCHEME WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

CATEGORY	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	TOTAL	% OF TOTAL EMPLOYEES
Relatives employed regularly	20	14	3	37	17.4
Non-relatives employed regularly	122	39	15	176	82.6
TOTAL REGULAR EMPLOYEES	142	53	18	213	100.0
					% OF TOTAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS
Unpaid Relatives	168	245	263	676	76.8
Unpaid Non-Relatives			1	1	0.0
TOTAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS ON SCHEME FARMS.	310	298	282	880	100.0

It will be seen that the total number of persons living on the scheme farms on a regular basis was 880, and only 10.6% of all settlers did not accommodate any persons outside the nuclear family on the farm.

Those settlers who did not employ or support on their farms persons outside their nuclear family had, on the average, larger families than the average farmer.

It will also be seen that the percentage of total farm residents who were members of the extended family was on the whole quite high and by far the greater proportion of it (76.8% of all the farm residents) received no cash wage. These individuals assisted the settler on his farm and they in turn were allotted small plots on which they grew their own crops. In the case of children, payment was in form of food and clothing only and they were mainly employed on cattle herding.

Besides the 880 permanent residents there was a large number of people who came to seek casual employment particularly in pyrethrum picking and also in potatoes at harvest seasons. It was not possible to work out the total number of man-days of casual labour employed over one year by the settlers, but it is known that there were (and still are) 74 landless families (squatters) living on the scheme whose livelihood was mainly dependent on casual employment by scheme farmers. In addition, people come from outside the scheme during labour peaks to seek casual employment. Even if the people from outside the scheme are discounted, it will be seen that, assuming the average family size of 5 persons accepted in Kenya today, the squatters add another 370 to the 880 regular farm residents to make a total of 1250 persons who are not members of the nuclear family whose livelihood is derived from the Settlement Scheme farms. In short, each of the 321 scheme farmers supports, on average, another 4 persons on his land.

Besides those persons whose livelihood is derived directly from the scheme, another lot of people have obtained indirect employment benefits from the scheme. The following was the situation as at 31st August, 1966.

DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
Settlement, Agricultural and Veterinary Staff	13
Social and Security Services staff	14
Shopkeepers, hotel-keepers, Transporters etc.	22
Co-operative Society employees	17
	66

There are, in addition to these 66 people, other people who come to buy produce, particularly potatoes, during the harvest season.

It will thus be seen that although farmers at Mweiga Settlement Scheme did not achieve the stipulated government objective of employing one other person (family unit) on their farms, the whole scheme came very close to doubling the number of families over those actually settled. Inasfar as Mweiga Settlement Scheme is a High Density Scheme, this was a remarkable achievement indeed. What it indicates is that when all types of schemes are combined together, the government's objective of doubling the number of persons supported on the former "White Highlands" will have been achieved.

One other favourable aspect of the settlement Programme illustrated by Mweiga is the large average family size of the scheme farmers. The 26 -settlers sample studied showed an average family size of 7 persons whereas the average family size in Kenya is held to be 5 persons. This means that the settlement scheme farmers have

(a) a large supply of family labour and therefore have greater chances of success without having to employ hired labour. This is important as settlers were selected from the poor landless and unemployed
(b) no tendency to leave the scheme because of the heavy family responsibilities.
(c) have been relieved of the great strain of having to support a large family while they are landless and unemployed.

SOME UNFAVOURABLE SOCIAL ASPECTS:

A peculiar feature common to settlement schemes of this nature is the general lack of social stability emanating from a greater proportion of young to old people than is usually the case in normal communities. In the 26 farms studied, the age distribution was as follows:

55 years of age or over	;	3.4%
45 years of age or over	:	8.1%
Below 45 years of age	:	91.9%

While the corresponding figures for Nyeri District were not available, it is held that the proportion of old people is substancially greater than that prevailing at Mweiga. Though not adequately substanciated, this fact does offer possible explanation for the apparent tendency of Mweiga community to drift, albeit slowly, from the traditional Kikuyu customs rather faster than the more balanced society outside the schemes. For instance, whereas the presence of tribal elders in the older part of Nyeri District is the established order, such elders are hardly heard of at Mweiga. A possible explanation for the presence of proportionately more young people is the fact that in some cases, settlers married a second wife on obtaining a settlement plot while some young men married just before or after entering the scheme. It is also to be noted that very old men (over 55) were not very willing to go to settlement schemes unless they go there with the help of a son. In addition, most of the employees on these scheme farms were energetic young persons rather than old men and women with a low working capacity.

Two causes of discontent amongst the settlers also deserve mention. Firstly, the administration forbids brewing of beer within the scheme, although consumption of commercial beer is allowed, many settlers feel that commercial beer is far more costly than home-brewed beer and see no reason why this is not allowed. Secondly, it is illegal to introduce native cattle and sheep on the scheme. In a few small localities, cattle and sheep have died in relatively large amounts considering the small number of animals small plots in this type of scheme can contain. East Cost Fever and Anaplasmosis were the main killers. Settlers feel that in these areas, exotic sheep and cattle are unsuitable and native stock should be introduced for their gradual grading up.

The Agricultural and Veterinary officials have rejected this view, and feelings amongst the settlers were running quite high at the time of this survey. The co-operative Society has taken the case and cited many animal deaths to support it. To mention but two examples, one settler lost the only two cows he had and another lost one cow and five sheep. Although from the economic stand-point the Agricultural planners are right in rejecting native stock, the settlers appeared to have a strong case.

SETTLEMENT AS AN ANSWER TO OVER POPULATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

From the results obtained at Mweiga, it would appear reasonable to expect that the government's objective of doubling the population supported on this land over pre-settlement situation is likely to be realized. If this is accepted, then, an additional 36,000 families or 180,00 persons will be absorbed in the settlement schemes.

Kenya's population was estimated to be 9,104 in 1964 and it is now probably close to 9.5 million. At the currently held population growth rate of 3 per cent per annum, the annual population increase should be about 280,000 persons. It is clear therefore that the Settlement Schemes would be unable to absorb even one year's population increase, let alone provide a long term solution to the overpopulation -- unemployment complex. In actual fact, by providing a better living for persons who would be surviving with great difficulty, settlement tends to accelerate the pace at which overpopulation sets in by increasing the population growth rate not only within the scheme itself but also in those areas from which population is transferred to the schemes. In fact, there is a danger that some of the High Density settlement schemes may turn into pockets of over population just as severe or even more severe than that which originally gave birth to the idea of settlement. In short, settlement schemes do not offer any real solution to the overpopulation over-employment problem. They only offer a transient amelioration to the problem and the only long lasting solution will be the effective use of all land resources so that the human carrying capacity of the land is increased.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the inception of Land Settlement in Kenya much criticism has been levelled on the Scheme on economic grounds[3] as well as on settler selection criteria[4]. How far is this criticism justified and to what extent does settlement fulfil its policies?

In economic terms, Mweiga was a successful scheme. Not only have the budgeted targets been achieved and exceeded in this scheme, but there has also been considerable increase in production over pre-settlement production level. But it must be realized that this economic success has been achieved at a very high cost to the nation in terms of capital and manpower resources. The level of staffing of extension services at Mweiga was found to be by far more intensive than that found in the neighbouring old African areas of Nyeri District. This has indeed been the case with all High Density Settlement Schemes, whether successful or not.

A few other schemes such as Endarasha, Observation Hill, Island Farms, Sotik and Ol Kalau are said to have achieved a large measure of success. But there are also those schemes which appear to be doomed to fail no matter what is done. Among these are those in the Kinangops, Ua[illegible]enyiro and Waraza. These schemes are situated on land which should never have been used for High Density Schemes as it is only suitable for extensive farming. It is also said that some of the new large scale African farmers are not making much success out of farming. In looking at the whole situation in the Settlement Schemes however, it must be realized that there are hardly any examples in the world where such a programme, involving settling such a large number of people with no previous experience, has been achieved with the same rapidity and degree of success. One can hardly find a scheme which has completed the 4 years needed to reach maturity, and yet, there are examples of schemes which have realized the economic targets planned for them. As for the opportunity costs of the funds employed in the execution of the programme. I am not qualified to discuss here. But it is doubtful whether such funds would have been equally easily forthcoming from the foreign donors if they were needed to finance alternative projects.

In Socio-political terms, Settlement has been a great success. All through Kenya's History prior to independence, the land question has been the central political issue, particularly in the densely populated central Province. All the political unrest leading up to the Mau Mau uprising was intimately associated with land. Long before independence overpopulation was already evident in certain areas. The process of "Land consolidation and Enclosure" resulted in the emergence of a landless class which, aggravated by the already serious countrywide unemployment situation, posed an acute national problem. In Nyeri District alone, the Farm Economic Survey unit[5] estimated there were 8,500 landless families in 1962. It was therefore not unexpected that the masses should associate independence with land for the landless and a means of living for the unemployed. It was therefore logical that the government,

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3. See, for instance, a series of articles by Leslie Brown in the Kenya Weekly News (in Particular No. 2036 February 19, 1965).

4 D.M. Etherington; Land Settlement in Kenya, Policy and Practice. East African Economics Review Vol. 10: No. 1 1963.

5 Farm Economic Survey unit: Some Economic Aspects of Agricultural Development in Nyeri District, 1962. Report No. 21 August, 1964.

in an effort to meet the people's most ardent aspirations, should hit on the idea of resettling Africans on lands from which they have for long been excluded. It was recognized that only a small proportion of the poor and landless would be absorbed this way, but the fact that this was done has led to social satisfaction and political stability far out of proportion with the actual alleviation of the landlessness and unemployment situation.

All in all, settlement has achieved a large measure of success. In material terms, this success may not be very marked. But the socio-political steam has been largely let out if the economic steam still remains in the kettle. When the dictates of political or social ideology run counter to those of the most economically effective use of resources, a balance must be struck somewhere and I believe the Kenya Government has struck the right balance. Without Land Settlement, it is doubtful whether the former European land owners would not have been scared out of farming by social and political unrest that has now been averted.

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THE EFFECTS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL QUALITY ON SECONDARY SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT

This paper is a chapter from a monograph, to be published shortly, on the efficiency of present methods of selection for entry to secondary school in Uganda. The sample studied consists of 881 pupils, making up about 95% of the African candidates who sat the selection examination (Junior Secondary Leaving Examination, or JSLE) in 1960, and the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate Examination (CSC) in 1964. In other chapters, relationships between performance in the two examinations are analysed, and various possibilities for improving selection discussed.

The CSC marking system works in the opposite direction to most marking systems: a low grade aggregate indicates good performance, and a high grade aggregate poor performance.

There is one further possibility for improving the effectiveness of senior secondary selection which can be explored with the data available. Some junior secondary schools are much more successful in the JSLE than others. In most years as many as half the pupils from some junior secondary schools are accepted for senior secondary education, while from other schools no pupils are accepted. This suggests that the mark a candidate obtains in the JSLE depends largely on the quality of the junior secondary school he has attended. If this is so, a pupil from a school where teaching has been poor should have better academic potential than a pupil with the same mark from a more successful school. It thus seems possible that selection could be improved if junior secondary school quality were taken into account, particularly when selecting among borderline candidates.

To some extent, of course, these variations in average JSLE performance among schools are due to differences in the pupils rather than to differences in the quality of education. The most important reason for pupil-differences is likely to be previous selection. Some junior secondary schools are better known than others, or have the reputation of being more successful, and hence can be more selective in choosing entrants from primary schools. A few schools receive applications from as many as three or four primary leavers for every place, while others have unfilled places. Previous achievement, however, is not always the only criterion for selection. Many junior secondary schools tend to give preference to pupils from their own primary section, or from an associated primary school, and, until recently, religious denomination was an important factor. From the limited data available it seems that there is only a moderate relationship between the extent to which a school selects its entrants and its average performance in the JSLE.

The pupils in different junior secondary schools may vary in other ways which may be relevant for JSLE performance. In some schools, for example, they may tend to have better health, or to be more highly motivated, than in other schools, particularly when different districts are being compared.

In developed countries, an important reason for inter-school differences in academic performance is variation in the socioeconomic status of the families from which the pupils come. This is much less significant in Uganda, where in most rural and peri-urban elementary schools the majority of pupils are the sons of small farmers. Until recently, few African pupils attended urban elementary schools. In any case, results from another project at present being completed by the writer indicate that in Uganda low socioeconomic status is not consistently correlated with poor academic achievement, as it is in Britain and America.

Although differences between pupils undoubtedly contribute to the inter-school variations in average JSLE performance, differences in standards of teaching and equipment are probably much more important. Elementary schools in Uganda are remarkably uneven in quality. This can be illustrated by some data from the project just mentioned. The sample for this project included three junior secondary schools

in a relatively prosperous coffee growing district of Uganda. The schools were all within the same county, and all within twenty miles of each other. They were all day schools in rural areas, and all drew most of their pupils from the surrounding villages. More than two thirds of the pupils in each school were the sons of small coffee growers. Despite these similarities, the schools varied widely in their examination achievement. The most successful school had an average total mark of 112 in the 1963 JSLE, the least successful 66, and the remaining school 101. The range is nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviations. The differences cannot be accounted for by previous selection. The best and the poorest schools were both non-selective; each selected 40 entrants from 50-60 applicants, mostly from their own primary sections. The middle school was more selective, accepting 80 entrants from 200-250 applicants, probably because it was the oldest and best known school in the area. It is virtually certain that the variations in examination performance are due almost entirely to differences in the quality of the education offered at the three schools. Some possible reasons for these quality variations will be discussed later in the chapter.[1]

The significance of school quality for JSLE success can be further illustrated by data from the Karamoja district of Uganda. Most of the people in this semi-arid district are cattle-keepers, although they also grow subsistence food crops. In some areas where the rainfall is higher, cattle are less important, and cotton growing has become popular. Nearly all the pupils at the three junior secondary schools in the district are boarders. The schools are all non-selective; in fact, in order to fill their available places, they all draw 40-50% of their entrants from outside the district, mainly from cotton-growing areas

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[1] Because the sample for this project consisted of less than 20% of the junior secondary schools in the district, most of the schools visited were widely scattered and hence not as closely matched as these three. If all schools in a more restricted area had been visited, it is highly probable that similar variations in JSLE performance in larger groups of matched schools could have been demonstrated.

in the neighbouring districts of Teso and Acholi. Nevertheless, the schools are not as closely matched as those just discussed. In one school the proportion of pupils from predominantly pastoral groups is as high as 49%, while in the other two schools it is only 27% and 18%. There is no evidence, however, that the pupils from pastoral backgrounds are any more successful in the JSLE than those whose families are mainly cultivators, or vice versa, so these differences are unlikely to have any marked effect on the inter-school variations in examination performance

Table XIII: Karamoja Mean JSLE Marks and Reasoning Scores

School	Mean Mark, 1964 JSLE	Reasoning Tests	
		Non-verbal (Ravens)	Verbal (Analogies)
School 1	139.0	25.87	10.00
School 2	112.2	22.68	8.77
School 3	105.4	27.22	9.87
Total sample:			
Mean	115.43	26.27	9.72
S.D.	33.85	9.77	2.36

Table XIII gives the mean scores obtained by pupils in the three schools in (a) the 1964 JSLE, (b) a non-verbal reasoning test (Raven's Progressive Matrices) and (c) a verbal reasoning test (a specially devised analogies test, using only words familiar to eighth year pupils). It will be seen that there are wide differences among classes in average JSLE performance. The most successful class has a mean mark about one standard deviation higher than the least successful. These differences in achievement, however, are not paralleled by differences in measured reasoning

ability. In the verbal reasoning test, the pupils from the least successful school obtain only marginally lower scores than the pupils from the most successful school, while in the non-verbal reasoning test, the least successful school has the highest mean score. There can be little doubt that the variations in JSLE achievement among these three schools are due for the most part to differences in teaching efficiency, and not to differences in the intellectual aptitude of the pupils.

The next step was to devise a measure of junior secondary school quality for our main sample. This was derived from the marks obtained in each school by all pupils who sat JSLE, in the Mathematics and English Language papers. Comprehension and Essay marks could not be used, because records were incomplete. The Mathematics and Language means for each school were totalled, and the composite mean was treated as a junior secondary school quality score for all pupils from that school. For those pupils who were selected for senior secondary entrance, the JSS quality scores ranged from 56 to 135, with a mean of 103.72 and a standard deviation of 16.48. It should be remembered that these quality scores are, of course, to some extent contaminated by the effects of previous selection and other non-quality factors.

The multiple regression analysis for CSC grade aggregate discussed in the previous chapter was then repeated, but with the addition of JSS quality as a fifth independent variable. It may be recalled that the two main purposes of this analysis were to determine firstly, how the four JSLE papers should be weighted to give maximum prediction of the school certificate result, and, secondly, what the multiple correlation between the JSLE total mark and CSC grade aggregate would be, given optimum weighting of the JSLE papers. From the data we have just discussed it was anticipated that JSS quality would enter the regression equation with a negative coefficient, and that the multiple correlation would increase substantially. If such a result were found, it would indicate that secondary school entrants from low-quality junior secondary schools, with their relatively

high but underexploited intellectual potential, tended to be more successful in the school certificate examination than pupils with the same selection marks from better schools. That is, pupils from poor schools whose performance in the JSLE was well below what they were capable of, made good some of their handicap when they got to senior secondary school and reached a level of performance more in keeping with their intellectual potential. Such findings would have suggested that selection could be improved by taking account of JSS quality, giving preference, when choosing among pupils with similar marks, to those from poorer schools.

It was found, however, that the inclusion of JSS quality in the multiple regression equation had virtually no effect on the level of CSC prediction. The standard regression (beta) coefficient for JSS quality was only one-fifth as large as the coefficient for English Essay, the weakest JSLE predictor, and it was positive rather than negative in sign. The increase in the multiple correlation was infinitesimal - from .3804 to .3807.

These results established clearly that the JSS quality scores could not improve CSC prediction, at least over the full selected sample. Nevertheless there still seemed a chance that the school quality scores might be useful in selecting borderline candidates. To check on this possibility, mean CSC grade aggregates were calculated for pupils according to their total JSLE marks and JSS quality scores. These means are set out in Table XIV. The JSS quality scores are divided into three categories. The "high quality" category consists of 211 boys from schools with quality scores of 114 and over, the "medium quality" category of 356 boys from schools between 94 and 113, and the "low quality" category of 198 boys from schools where the quality score was 93 or lower.[1]

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[1] The cutoff points were placed as close as possible to the 27th and 73rd percentiles. This is the most efficient way of dividing a distribution into three parts (Flanagan, 1952).

Table XIV: Mean CSC grade aggregate by JSLE total mark and JSS quality

JSS quality	JSLE total mark						
	148-157	158-167	168-177	178-187	188-197	198-207	208-217
High (114+)	(34.50)	35.16	31.36	28.33	28.30	28.68	23.68
Medium (94-113)	33.97	32.03	32.18	26.86	25.48	26.10	-
Low (- 93)	33.54	35.62	30.74	29.88	27.17	22.90	(18.50)

Means based on subsamples of 5-9 are bracketed; where n is below 5 no mean is given.

It can be seen at once that among borderline candidates the quality of the junior secondary school makes no difference to the school certificate result. Boys with JSLE marks between 148 and 157 were very slightly more successful if they came from low-quality schools, but this trend is reversed among those with marks between 158 and 167. At the other end of the JSLE scale, however, the differences are in the expected direction, although they are not large enough to be statistically significant. Among the handful of pupils from inferior schools who succeeded in obtaining very high marks in the selection exam, thus transcending the effects of poor teaching and lack of competition from classmates, school certificate performance is rather better than it is among pupils from superior schools with similar JSLE marks. The 16 pupils from low-quality schools with JSLE marks between 198 and 217 (the two top categories) have a mean CSC grade aggregate of 21.25, as compared with only 26.50 for the 39 pupils from high-quality schools with JSLE marks in the same range. Over the rest of the JSLE scale, however, junior secondary school quality is quite unimportant in determining school certificate performance.

A possible explanation for these unexpected results might be that boys from low-quality junior secondary schools tend to get poorer senior secondary education than boys from high-quality schools with the same selection exam marks. This might happen if headmasters of the better known and more popular senior schools tend to give preference to candidates from the more successful junior schools, when choosing among pupils with similar marks. We therefore examined the relationship between the quality of the junior secondary school a pupil comes from and the quality of the senior secondary school he enters. To determine senior secondary quality, a graph was prepared plotting, for each school, the average JSLE mark obtained by the 1961 intake against the average CSC grade aggregate obtained by the same pupils at the end of their senior secondary course in 1964. These points were then compared with the smoothed regression of CSC grade aggregate on JSLE total mark for the full sample. This gave us a measure of the change in achievement of the pupils in each senior school between the selection examination and school certificate relative to the full sample, and provided a more sophisticated measure of senior secondary quality than had been available for the junior secondary schools. It was found that the 21 schools grouped themselves rather conveniently into three categories:

(a) For seven schools, the mean CSC grade aggregate was at least 2½ points better than might have been expected from a knowledge of the average mark obtained by the pupils in the JSLE, and of the relationship between JSLE total mark and CSC grade aggregate in the full sample. These schools were classified as being of <u>high quality</u>. In one such school, for example, the mean JSLE mark of the 1961 intake was 172.2, which is a little below the full sample mean of 176.08. Judging from the CSC regression line, we should expect these pupils to average about 31.0 in school certificate, about one point below the sample mean (30.03). In fact, however, their CSC mean was as high as 25.2, or nearly five points better than the sample mean, so that their achievement status, relative to the status of pupils in other schools, improved considerably over the four years of their senior secondary education.

(b) For another six schools, average CSC performance

was $2\frac{1}{2}$ points or more poorer than would be expected from the average JSLE mark of the intake. These schools were classified as being of <u>low quality</u>.

(c) The plots for the remaining eight schools clustered fairly closely around the CSC regression line, indicating that average CSC performance was about as good as would be expected from the average JSLE mark. These schools were classified as being of <u>medium quality</u>.

It is interesting to note that only three senior schools would have been classified differently if we had simply taken the mean CSC grade aggregate for each school as our criterion of quality, with cutoff points $2\frac{1}{2}$ marks above and below the sample mean. This is because, as we have already seen (Chapter III), pupils who enter the most selective schools tend to show the most improvement in performance.

Senior secondary quality was then correlated with junior secondary quality. There was a clear tendency for the two variables to be positively associated: that is, boys from high-quality junior schools tended to be accepted by high-quality senior schools, and boys from low-quality junior schools by low-quality senior schools. But this was due entirely to the fact that boys from high-quality schools have, on the average, higher JSLE marks. When JSLE mark was held constant, the differences disappeared completely. Hence a pupil from a poor junior school has just as good a chance of entering a high-quality senior school as a pupil from a good junior school, <u>if he has the same JSLE marks</u>. Several of the most successful senior schools showed, in fact, a marked preference for pupils from low-quality junior schools, particularly when selecting among borderline candidates. There is thus no evidence to support the hypothesis that the failure of boys from low-quality junior secondary schools to improve their relative academic status while at senior secondary school is due to their receiving, on the average, poorer secondary education than boys from high-quality schools with similar selection exam

marks.[1]

Let us briefly recapitulate the argument so far:

1. The average mark obtained by different schools in the JSLE varies widely. To some extent the variations in exam performance are due to differences in the pupils, but differences in school quality are probably more important.

2. Hence the mark a pupil will obtain in the JSLE largely depends on the quality of the school he enters. If he enters a high-quality school his mark is likely to be much better than if he enters a low-quality school, probably by as much as one standard deviation, regardless of his ability.

3. It should thus follow that when pupils <u>with similar JSLE marks</u> are compared, those from low-quality schools will have better academic potential than those from high-quality schools.

4. Given similar marks in the JSLE, there is no difference in the quality of the senior secondary education received by pupils from high-quality and low-quality junior secondary schools. Hence it might be anticipated that after four years senior secondary schooling, pupils from low-quality junior schools, with their unexploited intellectual ability, would achieve better school certificate results than boys with the same JSLE marks from more successful junior schools. This expected result, however, was <u>not</u> found. With JSLE mark held constant, there was no difference in the CSC performance of boys from high-quality and low-quality junior schools, except among those

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1 For a reason that is not clear, medium quality senior schools show quite a marked tendency to prefer pupils from the more successful junior schools, in contrast to both the high quality and the low quality senior schools. This should not have any systematic effect on the relationships being investigated.

with the very highest JSLE marks. That is, pupils who had received poor elementary education, and whose JSLE performance was therefore below the level they were capable of, failed to make good their handicap when they went on to senior secondary school.

One conclusion suggested by these results is that tests of intellectual aptitude may have little validity as predictors of senior secondary performance. This does not necessarily follow from the observed patterns, however. The relationships among JSLE total mark, CSC grade aggregate, JSS quality, and measured aptitude are likely to be complex, and until data are available on all four variables from the same sample it will not be possible to untangle them.[1] Studies in Britain have repeatedly shown that aptitude tests taken as part of the eleven-plus selection examination are better predictors of subsequent grammar school performance than achievement tests, and it is difficult to see reasons why the results should be different in an African sample. Until we have a direct measure of the relationship between aptitude test scores at JSLE level and school certificate performance four years later the question must remain an open one.

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[1] If measured aptitude did prove to be a good predictor of CSC performance, the relationship pattern among CSC grade aggregate, JSS quality, and measured aptitude would be as follows, JSLE total mark held constant:

	JSS quality	Aptitude test score
CSC grade aggregate	0	+
JSS quality		–

Such a pattern is quite possible; in fact, in another study, of factors affecting JSLE performance, a relationship pattern which seemed even more inconsistent was found. (Somerset, 1965, pp. 9-12). In order to explain the former pattern, however, it would be necessary to examine the nature of the variance shared by the aptitude test with CSC grade aggregate on the one hand, and with JSS quality on the other.

The evidence for the second conclusion is much more compelling. The results suggest strongly that the effects of inferior education at the primary and junior secondary levels are largely irreversible. The relative performance of many pupils from poor schools does, of course, improve between the selection examination and school certificate, but this improvement is just as likely to occur if the pupil comes from a superior school. Hence, when we are considering the average performance of groups rather than the specific performance of individuals, it seems that the quality of the instruction pupils have received in their first eight years of schooling sets a limit to the level they will reach in the school certificate examination. Pupils who have learned to use their intellectual capacities effectively during their first years at school generally continue to do so as they progress through the educational system, whereas those who start senior secondary school with a handicap of eight years' inferior education usually fail to make up the leeway.[1]

It is difficult to estimate the likely effects of poor elementary education on the quality of school certificate output, because we do not know to what extent the JSS quality scores are contaminated by non-quality factors, but at a very rough guess it seems probable that if the teaching in the low-quality schools has been as effective as it was in the medium-quality schools, the average school certificate performance of pupils from poor junior schools would have been at least 4 or 5 grade aggregate points better. Such an improvement would have had a substantial effect on the overall school certificate results, particularly on the numbers gaining first class certificates.

It should be remembered, too, that the JSS quality classifications we have used are relative to this sample only. Even among the schools we classified as being of "high quality", probably only a few would compare favourably in standards of teaching and equipment with typical elementary schools in developed countries. If, as our results suggest, the quality of elementary schooling has permanent effects on subsequent educational attainment, most Uganda pupils taking

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[1] Almost exactly the same result was found among the girls. (See Chapter VI).

secondary school courses are likely to be at a considerable disadvantage compared with pupils taking similar courses in, say, Britain or America. There may thus be tremendous scope for improving high level educational attainment through providing better elementary education.

In a country such as Uganda, where there is an acute shortage of well-qualified elementary teachers, it is to be expected that there will be wide variations in teaching efficiency from school to school. It is noticeable, however, that the schools with the best-qualified teachers are by no means always the most successful. Other factors, such as commitment and enthusiasm, are probably more important. Without a full-scale study it would be impossible to document the significance of these less tangible qualities, but their effects can be seen in many aspects of the school programme. For example, in a number of the schools visited while collecting research data for another project it was found that virtually no use was made of the school library. The books were often kept in a locked cupboard, and borrowings per pupil averaged only one or two per annum. Most of these libraries were ill-equipped, and in some the stock consisted mostly of obsolete textbooks. But lack of money to buy books was not always the reason for poor standards. One school had received a box of new books six months previously which had not yet been unpacked. In other schools, by contrast, the library was in constant use, and borrowings ranged up to 15 and 20 books per pupil per annum. In one of the most successful (although non-selective) schools, the library contained several thousand books, mostly simplified English readers, and on both days of our visit there were long queues of pupils waiting to change books after school hours. Although this school was in one of the most isolated areas of Uganda, the library subscribed to the Kampala English language newspaper.

Similar differences can be seen in the use schools make of the school garden, and of equipment for science and physical education. Some schools have quite elaborate collections of scientific apparatus which are obviously never used, while other schools carry out a full programme of simple scientific experiments, often with modest equipment. In one school an enthusiastic teacher had constructed a comprehensive set of playground equipment, including a

climbing frame, horizontal bars, and swings, using local timbers. The equipment was in regular use, both during physical education classes and in play periods. On our second visit a year later, however, the teacher had left and the equipment had been dismantled.

One factor which, perhaps more than any other, tends to determine the quality of a school is the efficiency of its headmaster. During our school visits it was noticeable that where a headmaster was competent, and had a sense of involvement in doing his job well, this was reflected in most aspects of the school's work. The morale of the assistant teachers and pupils was usually high, the school garden and library were usually well run, the school meal tended to be nutritious and well prepared, and examination results were usually good. If, on the other hand, the headmaster was inefficient and lacking in concern for the progress of his pupils, the school and grounds tended to have a generally run-down appearance, pupils and teachers were often absent from their classes, and examination results were usually poor. These effects were particularly noticeable in areas where visits from education officers and inspectors were infrequent.

Although our results were unexpected, they are, in fact, consistent with a growing body of evidence from investigations carried out in recent years. Workers such as Hebb (1949), Ferguson (1954), Hunt (1961) and Bloom (1964), have argued that the variety and quality of the environment provided for children or young animals largely determines their ability to learn in later years. In Harlow's (1949) phrase, the young individual must "learn how to learn"; he must learn how to cope with new situations quickly and efficiently. In other words, he must learn how to behave intelligently. The more varied and complex the situations likely to be encountered in adult life, the more important it is that the growing individual develop a wide repertoirs of coping responses.

In an experiment described by Hebb (1949, pp. 298-299), for example, the maze learning ability of white rats reared as pets and rats reared in laboratory cages was compared. He found that the pet group, which had had experience of a wider environment

during development, not only scored higher than the cage reared group in the initial testing (which might have been due to their being tamer and more used to handling), but also learned more quickly as the testing continued. The animals which had been reared in the richer and more complex environment were more efficient at problem solving as adults than those reared in the restricted environment. In a later experiment Hymovitch (1952) demonstrated that the younger the rats are when they experience the more favourable environment, the more marked is the improvment in adult learning.

The relevance of these and similar findings for our understanding of the development of human ability is still in dispute. Many workers continue to stress the importance of genetic factors (e.g. Kallman, 1953; Burt and Howard, 1956). Nevertheless the evidence that adult learning skills can be improved by bettering the environment in which children are reared has led Havighurst (1961) to suggest tentatively that "the production of mentally superior people is more a matter of social engineering than of the discovery and exploitation of a rare natural resource".

Under what circumstances, then, are children most likely to develop effective learning skills? One important condition suggested by the results we have discussed is that their environment should present them with a series of varied and challenging materials and experiences. But more than this is needed. Children should be encouraged to develop an active, exploratory approach to this environment, so that they learn to discover and exploit its potentialities largely through their own efforts. Further, (perhaps this follows automatically from the previous conditions) learning should be enjoyable, so that the gaining of competence and knowledge comes to be seen as desirable for its own sake, rather than as simply a means of passing examinations or avoiding punishment. Bertrand Russell summed this up perhaps better than anyone else when he wrote (1926, p. 203): "Throughout education, from the first day to the last, there should be a sense of intellectual adventure. The world is full of puzzling things which can be understood by sufficient effort. The sense of understanding what had been puzzling is exhilarating and delightful; every good

teacher should be able to give it ..... Few joys are so pure or so useful as this".

Before they begin school, many children will have already started to develop these desirable attitudes and approaches to intellectual experience, because of the help they get from their home environment. Others, particularly from the lower socioeconomic groups, will have developed attitudes less conducive to intellectual growth. For these less favoured children particularly, the nature of the early contact with formal education is likely to be critical in determining whether they "learn how to learn" effectively. The American programme "Operation Head-start" is based on the assumption that the poor educational performance of children from under-privileged families is due more to the intellectual impoverishment of their out-of-school experience than to deficiencies in intellectual potential. The programme aims to compensate for this handicap by providing such children with opportunities for satisfying and varied intellectual experience in nursery and infant classes. The African child from a low income family will probably be much more highly motivated to succeed than his American counterpart, but for both the contrast between home and school is likely to be abrupt, and for both, educational success is likely to depend heavily on the quality of the school environment and the skill of the teachers.

The data presented in this chapter have policy implications. In Uganda, as in most newly independent African nations, it has been necessary to give the highest priority to expanding secondary and university education, in order to train Uganda citizens in sufficient numbers to take over professional and administrative jobs from expatriates, and to provide a basis for economic development. The number of entrants to senior secondary courses rose from about 2,000 in 1960 to over 6,000 in 1965, and by 1971 should reach nearly 8,000. The intake into higher senior secondary (post-school certificate) courses has increased even more sharply: from 118 in 1960 to 575 in 1965, and a projected 900 in 1971.

This rapid expansion is, of course, essential to Uganda's economic growth. To some extent

however, it has necessarily been achieved at the cost of slower development of the elementary system. It is probably true that the quality of senior secondary education provided in Uganda is, on the average, at least as good as it is in most developed countries. It is certainly true that undergraduate univerisity education is better than it is in many developed countries. Elementary education, on the other hand, is inferior. Most teachers in Uganda's aided primary and junior secondary schools have been trained, but only a quarter of the men and less than a quarter of the women reached JSLE level or higher before starting their training (Uganda Education Statistics, 1965, Table A7). Moreover, because of the need to prepare pupils for the primary and junior secondary leaving examinations, most of the better qualified teachers are concentrated in the upper primary and junior secondary classes. The youngest children are thus usually taught by the teachers with the lowest qualifications. This is often justified by arguing that because the material to be learned in the first few years at school is simple, it can be taught satisfactorily by teachers whose own education did not continue past primary level. Children in infant and junior primary classes, however, are not only learning how to read and write, but they are also learning basic attitudes to intellectual experience, which, we have argued, may be crucial for the development of efficient learning at secondary school and later. If this is the case, infant teachers need to be at least as skilled as those teaching older children.

It is not, of course, meant to imply that an under-qualified teacher is necessarily a poor teacher. Some of the most skilful and enthusiastic teachers the writer has met were among those with low formal qualifications who had had the opportunity to attend in-service refresher courses. A great deal could be done to improve the quality of the elementary teaching force by providing more such courses. A teacher with classroom experience is likely to benefit more from training in teaching methods than a pupil straight from school, but perhaps more important than this is the effect in-service training can have on morale and professional commitment. Many teachers, particularly in the more remote areas, complain that after they finish their basic training they receive little further professional advice and encouragement. They often feel that their services are not valued, and that there is

little incentive for them to try to improve their teaching skills. This sense of professional isolation probably contributes as much to poor teaching standards in Uganda's elementary schools as any other single factor.

The quality of education available to children in their early school years is reduced further in some areas by the shortage of places in aided primary schools. In these areas large numbers of privately run "nursery" schools have often sprung up, to prepare children for entry to primary school. The teachers are nearly always unqualified, and, with some notable exceptions, standards are very low. At least a few primary school headmasters have found it necessary to conduct informal selection examinations to choose among the large number of applicants from these schools.

Elementary schools are for the most part inadequately equipped as well as poorly staffed. A few teachers, particularly some of those who have attended refresher courses, show imagination and resourcefulness in using locally available materials,[1] but in general, primary schools fail to provide children with the opportunity to explore and exploit the potentialities of a varied and intellectually challenging environment, and thus to develop a wide repertoire of effective approaches to problem situations.

If children were given this positive kind of intellectual experience during their early years at school, they might not only "learn how to learn" more efficiently, but they might also be more likely to provide impetus to social change and innovation when

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[1] Such as bottle tops or large seeds for number work, newspaper and magazine cuttings for reading, and clay and banana fibre for the development of manipulative and perceptual skills. In another study it has been shown that junior secondary pupils from poorly equipped schools often have difficulties with pictorial perception, and that this is frequently associated with poor performance in the junior secondary leaving examination. (Somerset, 1964, p. 6, preliminary results only).

they leave school. Whether they continue with their education past elementary level or not, pupils who have been encouraged to seek solutions to problems and to explore for themselves the possibilities of situations will probably be more receptive to new ideas and ways of doing things than pupils who have been taught simply to remember information passively received and to reproduce it accurately in examinations. At the moment educational development planning is mainly concerned with the numbers of pupils reaching the various attainment levels, from completion of the primary course to university graduation, but the possibility that the contribution of education to economic and social development is determined as much by <u>what kind of education</u> children receive as by <u>how much</u> they receive should not be overlooked.

It is sometimes argued in support of the present policy of giving lower priority to elementary school development than to secondary school and university development that senior secondary entrance is already highly selective, and that more than enough junior secondary leavers with the capacity to pass school certificate are available. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that, provided the senior secondary entrants are up to a certain minimum standard and have the necessary intellectual potential, any shortcomings resulting from deficiencies in their elementary education can be made good at secondary school. Our findings, however, suggest strongly that this is not so. If a pupil is to reach a standard of attainment in school certificate close to the best of which he is capable, he must receive good education throughout his school career. Superior education at the secondary level cannot compensate for inferior elementary education.

If these findings are valid, they have relevance for educational development planning. They indicate that investment in the improvement of elementary education is likely to give rise to benefits consisting not only of better attainment among primary and junior secondary pupils, but also of better performance in the school certificate examination and perhaps also at higher levels. No matter how selective the senior entrance examination may be, the returns to any given level of investment in secondary education will to some extent depend on the level of investment

in elementary education. This will be particularly apparent when the elementary school system is markedly inferior to the secondary system, as it is in Uganda and most other developing countries.

For the moment, the bias in favour of secondary school development is justified by Uganda's immediate manpower needs. The elementary school system, despite its weaknesses, is certainly good enough to produce large numbers of pupils capable of achieving adequate school certificate passes after another four years education. Our results suggest, however, that many more pupils would have achieved really outstanding results if they had received better elementary education. In the long term Uganda, like every other nation, must be concerned to provide the conditions under which pupils of exceptional mental calibre have the opportunity to develop their potential fully, and ultimately to reach the highest levels of intellectual attainment. While the discrepancy between the quality of elementary and higher education remains so marked, it seems unlikely that this goal will be achieved for more than a minority of such pupils. The fact that, despite the handicaps, so many pupils do achieve outstanding results in school certificate and higher examinations is impressive evidence of the intellectual potential which remains so far unexploited in Uganda's school age population.

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Garry Thomas
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THE TRANSFORMATION APPROACH AT A TANZANIA VILLAGE SETTLEMENT

Introductory [1]

It is hardly conjecture to suggest that when President Nyerere, in December 1962, introduced to the National Assembly his proposal for a program of village settlement as a means for transforming the rural areas of Tanzania (then Tanganyika), he was responding to the frustration that the new nation's politicians and planners were feeling when faced with the pressing problems of the rural areas and the dilemma of making real to them in social and economic terms, the achievement of political independence of the year before. To the traditional "improvement methods" of the extension agencies -- broadly speaking, the Divisions of Agriculture, Veterinary Services, Community Development, Cooperatives and Health -- had been added a national call for self help which had evoked innumerable projects variously coordinated by the District and Regional Development Committees and the political party, TANU, and supervised by the relevant members of the hierarchies which extended down from each. Despite the enthusiasm that was espoused for self help, the projects successfully completed and money saved, and despite the accomplishments of the extension agencies, what was deemed necessary was a more radical and comprehensive approach to rural development -- what has been called "transformation" as opposed to "improvement."

Village settlement, as the primary and perhaps only instrument of the "transformation approach," initially meant "villagization" as opposed to "resettlement" (i.e., the regroupment of subsistence farmers living in sparsely populated areas rather than the relocation of farmers from areas of land hunger to newly-opened unpopulated areas)[2] and the social and economic reasoning and the scope of the changes expected were made explicit by the President: until and unless peoples living in patterns of dispersed settlement come together to form new villages

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1. In attempting to write an introductory statement, however brief, on the stages through which the Tanzanian village settlement program has passed, from a distance of 500 miles from Dar es Salaam, I have had to draw on the papers and reports of other members of the Syracuse Village Settlement Project for both official statements and, to an extent, interpretations, in particular John Nellis; also an unofficial paper by a former Treasury economist, Peter Landell-Mills, entitled "Village Settlement in Tanzania: an Economic Commentary," University College, Dar es Salaam, Economic Seminar 1965-66, Paper No.2, November 1965.

2. Raymond Apthorpe, "A Survey of Land Settlement Scheme in East Africa" (mimeo) paper read at conference of East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala, January 1966, p.1.

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> we shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water; it will be quite impossible to start small village industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the town for all our requirements and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we should never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead.[3]

In addition to the economic and social rationale -- the desire to bring added wealth to the rural sector primarily through the means of modern agricultural methods and to alter the style of life through the increased accessability of social services -- one can imply a political goal: concentrations of population in the throes of social change can be brought more effectively into the authoritative communication network of the political system than dispersed populations living in traditional modes and patterns of settlement. A final expectation of the village settlement program was that a settlement scheme could be regarded as a model of the "new" or "transformed" Tanzania and therefore its "demonstration effect" should be realised in the areas contiguous to the scheme's borders. During the seventeen months that elapsed between the first announcement of the village settlement program and the introduction of the Five Year Development Plan to the National Assembly in May 1964, resettlement schemes were added to the original proposal of villagization, the first two such schemes on plains below over-populated mountain areas and projected schemes in soon-to-be controlled river valleys. The social and economic rationale behind these schemes is similar to that already stated (with the major exception that here one would be dealing more with the problem of disguised unemployment than under productivity) but it can be hypothesized that the political motivation was of even greater importance: that of alleviating land pressure in already over-crowded areas anticipating and hopefully nullifying a potentially politically explosive situation.

In proposing the village settlement program, the President acknowledged that the schemes would be costly and would have to be carefully planned, and he cautioned the nation that he did not expect people to begin immediately to live in villages.[4] Outside advice was sought on how best to begin a program which was to effect the desired rural transformation and a large percentage of the money was raised abroad in the form of loans and grants. Locally an inter-Ministerial body known as the Rural Settlement Commission was established under the Vice President's Office with the Village Settlement Agency as the planning and implementation body under its direction. While the schemes were to have definite social development goals, the greater emphasis was placed on the schemes being economically and commercially viable units with the social service benefits in a sense being"earned" by the hard work of the settlers and the new wealth the schemes produced. Despite the caution urged by the President (in turn reflected by the Village Settlement Agency which initially planned nine pilot schemes), there resulted what has been termed

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3. Tanganyika Government Printer, President's Address to the National Assembly, 10th December, 1962, Dar es Salaam, pp. 17-18.

4. Ibid.

a "national urge" for village resettlement, and before the first pilot scheme was off the ground, less than a year after the President's announcement, there were a number of settlements initiated at the District - and Regional levels. It was even ually realized that however desireable and educative a small scale but intensive pilot village settlement program might be, it would be impossible to resist pressure from the different parts of the country for government support and the Rural Settlement Commission set out guidelines for the establishment of local schemes, the conditions underwhich they would be supported at all and the degree to which the government could render limited assistance. At the same time it was realized that a more ambitious pilot program would have to be initiated and the Five Year Development Plan called for establishment of 68 such schemes by 1969, each with approximately 250 families. In introducing the Five Year Development Plan to the National Assembly, the President reaffirmed the importance of the village settlement program and projected its impact and effect through three development-plan periods:

> New settlement schemes will be established all over the country, as fast as the shortage of capital allows, for they are expensive things... We expect by 1980 to have about one million people living and working under these conditions .... The effect of this settlement will be far reaching, for planned settlement does not only mean farms. It also means roads, commerce, and some local industris, as well as schools for the children and health centres to help enjoy the life they are creating .... I hope that nothing I have ever said of these new settlement schemes leads people to believe that the settlers are going to to have everything they want from the beginning. They will not. They will be pioneers, and that is always hard. Buty they will be working out the future of our country.[5]

In this announcement it seemed that official account was being made of the "assisted" settlement schemes as the more expensive, more intensively planned and supervised pilot scheme program would not be able to expland at such a rate as to accommodate the approximately 250,000 families the President envisaged living on settlement schemes within 15 years.

Still it was the nine pilot schemes which commanded the larger part of the attention and resources, both manpower and financial, during the first two years of program implementation, especially Upper Kitete in Mbulu District, begun in October 1963, and Rwamkoma in Musoma District, begun shortly thereafter. Inquiries were made early into the possibilities of having the pilot schemes supplied with electricity and having air strips built, films were made, the Upper Kitete guest book reads like an international (as well as Tanzanian) Who's Who and it is said that President Nyerere was made an honorary settler at Rwamkoma (which is in his home District). By September 1965 (which might be considered the high-water mark), in addition to the nine pilot schemes, the Village Settlement Agency (by now in the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water and soon to be the Dvision of Settlement) had absorbed seven former

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5. Tanganyika Government Printer, Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, Dar es Salaam, vol. I, pp. x, 21.

Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation schemes and had planned and was providing some of the finance and staff of approximately six "assisted" schemes. Again as of September 1965, six of the nine pilot schemes had a planned capital expenditure of £ 1,100,000 for a planned 1200 families (the projected statistics for the other pilot schemes are unknown to the researcher nor is the actual expenditure for the rest of the schemes known) and 25 schemes of all types called for 4,375 families of whom approximately 3,825 had been recruited and were living on the respective schemes. The Five Year Development Plan set aside £ 13,500,000 for the 68 projected settlement schemes (or approximately 13.5% of the Government developmet budget for that period), this for an estimated 15,000 families The greatest part of this amount, however, was regarded as a loan to the settlers on the schemes bearing 5% interest and repayable in annual payments over 25 years. Only the provision of a water supply was to be subsidized by the Government (and this by only25%) and the District Councils were expected to staff and furnish the other social services (i.e., the school, dispensary, community development work, etc.).[6]

As early as June 1965, official reservations were being expressed reflecting a re-thinking of the nation's village settlement program. The President brought the matter to the National Assembly's attention in the following manner:

> Settlements are making good progress but we have learned a number of lessions from this early experience. In particular, we intend to reduce the capitalization of these villages. To burden the farm with very heavy debts at the outset, and at the same time, to make it appear that Government can provide all services, is not the best way of promoting activity. In (the) future we shall increasingly help by providing the economic services, leaving the development of the social services in the form of housing, etc., to the initiative and energies of the farmers as their work brings its return. The individual no less than the nation must learn the lesson of greater self-reliance. [7]

The early provision of social services, it must be recalled, had been part and parcel of the transformation approach meaning that it was transformation approach as well as the financing and timing of the social services that was being reconsidered.

Re-thinking and reconsideration had become disenchantment by early 1966; farmers on settlement schemes reported refusal to work (and in one case the Field Force had been called in to ensure that a pilot settlement' crop be picked and graded properly and on time) had concerned officials and a critical report by a foreign economic commission invited to evaluate the progress of the implementation of the Five Year Development Plan led to radical curtailment of the whole village settlement program and a

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6. Most of the data and all of the September 1965 statistics used in this paragraph are taken from Landell-Mills, op. cit.

7. Mwananchi Publishing Co., President's Address to the National Assembly, Tuesday, 8th June, 1965, Dar es Salaam, p.5.

transfer of the bulk of the unspent funds initially ear-marked for village settlement to another sector of the economy. Second Vice President Kawawa in April 1966 brought the dialogue on the improvement/transformation approach nearly full circle when he remarked that the Government had concluded that the pilot schemes had been heavily over capitalized, in some cases over-mechanized and that the pilot scheme farmers

> in general show far less enthusiasm and are less hard working than 'settlers' in 'spontaneous' and unassisted schemes; they are full of complaints and expect (the) Government to give them everything.

He then announced a decision that had been under consideration for several months:

> In (the) future, it has been decided that, instead of establishing highly capitalized schemes and moving people to them, emphasis will make it possible to benefit more people at less cost than the previous village settlement.[8]

While no new pilot village settlement schemes would be started and some would be handed over to local authorities, those schemes which were deemed to be economically viable would be "consolidated" and continued, but usually with less staff and economic assistance. To date, one scheme has been closed down and three were turned over to Regional authorities. In addition to maintaining the remaining schemes, the Division of Settlement is charged with the planning, initial administration and limited financing of rural development projects under the new policy -- what the Division refers to as the "new approach" village settlements.

There remain, of course, approximately twenty settlement schemes under the Division of Settlement's authority, eight of them pilot schemes, and although the financial support fo most of these schemes has been drastically cut in relation to the amount of money and staff initially allocated, a few have been hardly affected by the recent policy changes and could still be called transformation efforts. Notable amongst these is Upper Kitete Village Settlement, and a brief case study of this scheme follows, focusing upon the areas the Second Vice President singled out as the major reasons for abandoning the village settlement program -- bad economics on the part of the Government and the growth of a dependency ethic amongst the farmers -- but dwelling upon other major areas as well.

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8. Tanzania Information Service Press Release, "Address by the Second Vice President, Mr. R. M. Kawawa, at the Opening of the Rural Development Planning Seminar at the University College, Dar es Salaam, on Monday, 4th April, 1966, " mimeo., pp. 3-4.

UPPER KITETE : BACKGROUND TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Upper Kitete Village Settlement is located in the northern-most extremity of Mbulu District in the North Iraqw Division, sub-Division of Mbulumbulu, 50 miles due west of Arusha, 95 miles by road. The North Iraqw Division, which includes the Karatu and Oldeani wheat estates (alienated land formerly owned by European farmers and now largely owned by Asians), is one of the country's most productive agricultural areas, its major crop being wheat. Between 1960 and 1965, while "estate wheat" production figures for Mbulu District rose from 1146.6 tons to 6535.71 tons, "native wheat" production rose from 765.33 tons to 8790.12 tons and the vast majority of this wheat (both "estate" and "native") was grown in the North Iraqw Division. Today the African-grown wheat in the Division makes up between 35-40% of the total wheat grown in the nation as opposed to a figure of 6% in 1960. This expansion can be attributed in small part to the Extension Division of the Ministry of Agriculture but most of all to the Tanganyika Farmers' Cooperative Association, the agent for the National Wheat Board, which has, in recent years, made a practice of giving seed wheat, empty gunny sacks and diesel fuel on credit, a sum of approximately £250,000 having been out in loans to African farmers in Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions as of 31st July, 1966 and certainly half of this has gone to wheat farmers in Mbulu District.

The nation's new wheat growers and beneficiaries of this credit are the Iraqw, a Cushitic-speaking, patrilineal people who are by tradition and remain today, mixed agriculturalists. As recently as four or five generations ago, the Iraqw were concentrated in a relatively-small area around Kainam, southeast of present day Mbulu town, but as their population began to increase and more recently under the protection of two colonial flags, the tribe began expanding its territory mainly at the expense of its pastoral neighbours, the Masai and the Barabaig. The land holding system that evolved required that the youngest son inherit his father's land intact while his older brothers would "colonize" new land on the periphery of Iraqw-settled areas. It has only been very recently that the natural geographic boundaries have been reached in the north and east, these the forests of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and the 2000 foot escarpment of the Rift Valley that bound the North Iraqw Division.

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9. Hans Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1964, pp. 28-29. Six bags of wheat produced per acre would seem to be a fair average figure, although in "good years" a farmer will get a yield of 8-10 bags per acre and this year, while the long rains crop yielded between 5-6 bags to an acre (due to wheat rust), one local farmer harvested 180 bags of wheat from 10 acres planted for the short rains. The mean yearly profit of Shs.600/- to 750/- (from a 12-15 acre holding) in the North Iraqw Division compares very favourably with figures of net agricultural cash income of an average coffee/banana farm (three acres) on Kilimanjaro: Ruthenberg reports approximately Shs.300/- (Ibid., p.27) and a calculation based upon data supplied by the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union indicates Shs.362/30 (United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry in Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam, 1966, Appendix B, p.63).

The Iraqw now face the rather peculiar and very fortunate situation whereby some of their best agricultural land (the high volcanic soils along the forest's edge) is both relatively sparsely settled and only recently opened to cultivation -- quite the reverse of the situation confronting several other Tanzanian tribes emersed in the cash crop economy. In contrast to the Chagga and Meru, for example, whose mountain homelands support populations of 200-300 per square mile, there appear to be between 10-15 families per square mile in Mbulumbulu sub-Division of the North Iraqw Division with an average holding (of arable land) of nearly 20 acres and a mean holding of between 12-15 acres. A person's full acreage is normally put into production at least once a year (there is no crop rotation schedule and the higher areas are double cropped) and a yearly average wheat yield of 6 bags per acre on African farms in the Karatu area has been estimated; 9 as 5 bags per acre are required in order to cover all costs, and as a bag of wheat sells for approximately Shs.50/-, average family cash income in the area averages out at Shs.50/- multiplied by the number of acres in wheat production.

The settlement in 1963 of an area known as Upper Kitete marked the close of the next to last of the Iraqw frontiers in the north (the last area, lower and very stoney, is the Lake Manyara Hotel area, known locally as Kilima Moja-Chemchem, and the last of its land was given out in June/July 1966). The village settlement's elongated 6500 acres stretch for ten miles along the top of the Rift Wall until it meets the forest to the north; its immediate neighbours to the west of the scheme are amongst the richest landholders in the area, holding between 20 and 160 acres. Geography and a buffer of local wealthy farmers, then, mitigate against either the scheme's expansion or "demonstration effect". The site, however, was the only unopened land in the Division suitable for a village settlement and would, it was thought, have the advantage of being a progressive, basically Iraqw wheat scheme in Iraqw wheat country.

The village settlement on this frontier is in fact made up of three "villages", the main village housing the 50 farmers who arrived in October 1963, the staff quarters, work shop, most of the farm machinery and the social services. The second group of 50 farmers, who arrived in August 1964, are divided into two villages, 40 living in one village and ten living in the other, five miles and two miles respectively from the service center. The farmers who applied for places in the settlement scheme were for the most part the less fortunate, the younger men, expecially, the victims of a land holding custom which has failed to adjust to the realities of a now-closed frontier. All were recruited from the two northern-most Divisions of Mbulu District and all but seven are of the Iraqw tribe. Of the 46 farmers on whom there is selection date (in part unrarified), four reported having no land or access to less then one acre, 14 had been borrowing between one and five acres (usually three year agreements), 26 owned between two and four acres and two owned between five and ten acres (one of whom was already living on scheme land); fifteen admitted to owning cattle, one as many as ten but the mean response of these was two; in the recent past, twenty-two had worked as labourers (earning between Shs.70/- and 100/- per month) mostly on European estates in North Iraqw Division, five had worked as domestic staff for Europeans, there was one carpenter, one mason, and two tractor drivers (one making Shs. 180/- per month), the remaining 15 having never worked in the wage-earning sector; eleven admitted to having cash to bring with them (between Shs.10/- and 200/-); six had no foodstuffs, while most of the rest had between one and seven gunny bags (maize, beans and millet) and only six had enough food to last 12 months. The date suggests, then, that unlike settlement scheme recruits from areas of high population density (and presumed disguised unemployment), all of these farmers were productive and were earning cash incomes, the main attraction in joining a village settlement being land of one's own and a share in the wealth earned on the scheme land under cultivation.

Strictly speaking, this was a resettlement scheme although its recruits were themselves from areas of low population density and again, unlike most resettlement situations because they had been living productive (if largely landless) lives, the "opportunity cost" to the nation would be as high as one would expect in a villagization-type settlement and additionally the settlers would need to be well compensated for income opportunities forgone;[10] a "better life" on a government scheme had to be related more to a better economic situation than to the provision of social services, specifically more land for private homestead plots and a high target income figure.

This is precisely what did occur: Kitete settlers were given three acre plots on which to site their houses and plant their subsistence gardens (as opposed to one acre on most schemes) and, after the first year's harvest, were the only pilot scheme farmers to receive the official target income of Shs.2000/- (falling short, however, of verbal projections of Shs.3000/- to 4000/- due to the fact that the scheme wheat crop failed to cover production costs, yielding only 4½ bags to an acre). Similarly, the second year harvest yielded only 5 bags to an acre this enough presumably to cover crop costs but not the additional overheads of a government-run scheme,[11] the losses were capitalized for the second year running and the farmers' subsidized "dividends" were reduced to Shs.1360/-. This year's harvest of 6½ bags to an acre, coupled with reduced overheads and subsidized salaries, have brought the scheme a legitimate profit for the first time in three years, but after deducting the anticipated farmer dividend of approximately Shs.1350/-, little if any will remain for a start in the repayment of the capital loan (estimated in September 1965 at 90,000[12]). And similarly,

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10. A brief general note on "opportunity cost" under different-village settlement conditions can be found in Landell-Mills, op. cit.

11. Recurrent costs for 1964/65 were estimated at nearly Shs.450,000 of which less than half were costs attributable to crop production. Landell-Mills, op.cit., p.10.

12. Ibid., Appendix, p.25.

in the provisional 1966/67 estimates, when for the first time the Division of Settlement intends to apply a formula to the "gross scheme surplus"in order to begin repaying the capital loan, on the basis of a 6½ bag per acre estimated yield, the farmers will receive dividends in the neighbourhood of Shs.1135/- and one may calculate that the Government will receive back approximately the sum it has allocated to the scheme for the purchase of new equipment and livestock and the construction of buildings during this fiscal year.

Despite the fact that Upper Kitete is admitted to have been over-capitalized, at one time over-staffed and two economists have suggested that it is over-mechanized, and despite the fact that it conceiveably won't begin repaying its capital loan until its fifth year, the scheme is held in high esteem by officials in the Division of Settlement and one Treasury economist, has urged that the scheme open up its remaining arable land faster than planned (necessitating the provision of more machinery) and projects an optimistic farmer dividend (on the basis of eight bags of wheat to an acre) of more than Shs.2500/- per year after deductions for capital repayment. It is safe to say, then, that if to date Kitete has been an economic failure, it is considered amongst the most successful of the village settlement failures and given optimal wheat growing conditions (which it has not had during its first three years), it could be an economic success.

When the Cabinet decision was made to suspend the village settlement program and close down or transfer to other authorities those schemes which did not appear to be economically viable, Division of Settlement planners were confronted with three alternatives in the case of Upper Kitete: they could close the scheme, they could drastically cut back expenditure and reorganize the scheme (substituting, for example, ox-ploughing for tractor cultivation) or they could attempt to recover costs by injecting limited amounts of additional capital. The first alternative was ignored, perhaps because of the facts that a rather impressive plant had been built, a new community, which evidenced a high sense of permanancy, had been established and where, in 1963, there was largely virgin soil, in 1966 there were 1200 acres of wheat producing nearly 3% of the total wheat grown in the country. Strong arguments had been put up by the Manager opposing de-mechanization as "retrogressive" and making soil conservation measures difficult to implement. The decision was therefore made that while money would be under tighter control, to the degree that redundant machinery existed on other schemes, Kitete would receive what was necessary to rapidly increase her acreage under production, and where other forms of investment seemed economically sound (such as speculation on the cattle market), the money would be provided in what amounted to short-term loans. At the same time, two earlier commitments and goals of the original village settlement program were honoured, one a non-economic investment (but costly in managerial time) being a very honest effort to convert Upper Kitete (and all other schemes) into settler-run, multi-purpose cooperatives, and the other an uneconomic investment in permanent settler housing involving an initial loan to cover the cost of building between 35-40 houses before the end of fiscal year 1966/67. These two investments in the social spheres, together with those Government - and District Council-financed social services already available on the scheme such as a community development worker, a dispensary staffed by a Senior Rural Medical Aid, a midwife and a dresser, a two-classroom school, a piped water supply, and a maize grinding mill, amount to a re-affirmation of faith in the "transformation approach".

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13. Garry Thomas, "Effects of New Communities on Rural Areas -- The Upper Kitete Example", (mimeo), paper read at the Seminar on Rural Development, sponsored by Syracuse University and University College, Dar es Salaam,held 4-7 April, 1966, in Dar es Salaam.

In a previous conference paper on findings at Upper Kitete and its immediate surrounds, the present failure of the scheme to meet the political, social and "demonstration effect" criteria, implied or stated as the rationale for the village settlement program, was discussed [13]. Mentioned in the analysis were the facts that despite the capital investment and the large-scale provision of social services/ammenities, the new authority structure and the concommitant local political organization, the modern physical context is a facade and the "life style" (including such intangible indecis as patterns of assembly, interaction and dispersal, the types and adjudication of disputes, the socialization of the young, etc., as well as such physical criteria as the condition of house and garden) differs little from that of people living outside the scheme, aside from the fact that the women have more leisure time and the men have less (in that there is necessarily regimentation during the five and one-half hours a day during which time they work for the scheme). Despite that fact that many national, regional and district leaders have visited the scheme, especially during its first two years, "political penetration" is hardly evidenced in the vast majority of the farmers lives and they remain generally apolitical, aware of the Government as their benefactor -- as the Area Commissioner likes to tell them, "Remember it wasn't a lorry or Landrover that brought you to Kitete; it was TANU" -- but rarely showing any sense of being a part of it. And for geographical and economic reasons, the "demonstration effect" has not been apparent, although a number of scheme services and institutions do attract informal, but hardly educative, interaction. The brief time period, the "unsophisticatedness" of the farmers, an absense of inspirational and social leadership (at the district and scheme-level) and a lack of deliberate "cultural disruption" (implicit in the "transformation approach") were identified as the bases for the failure to effect social and political development. In order to justify the amount of capital already spent, spread the investment over more than 100 families and neutralize the factors which mitigate against Kitete's "demonstration effect," it was suggested that a deliberate formalization or institutionalization of the scheme as a focal point or "central place" be attempted, such as the basing of extension - agency staff (responsible for more than the scheme) at Kitete, opening a TANU branch with its TYL and UWT components, the use of the scheme as a farmer training center for the North Iraqw Division and the sponsoring of agricultural field days. To date, little has happened at the scheme to alter these judgments of earlier this year or the conclusions drawn.

FARMER ATTITUDES TOWARD UPPER KITETE

This final section is devoted to a more extensive comment on how Upper Kitete farmers themselves work and behave within the context of their village settlement and note to what degree the scheme represents to them an improvement over their pre-Kitete existence or when compared with Iraqw life that goes on outside the settlement.

Probably the most significant fact about the village settlement to the Kitete farmer is the fact that it is a wheat farm that is worked communally. This fact is mentioned by different people when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the scheme, it means that people are required to work approximately equal time on scheme work, it means that everyone receives the same size dividend from the Division of Settlement, and it sets them apart from people living outside the scheme. A communal scheme was necessitated by the crop and the fact that the entire operation is mechanized (with the sole exception of land clearing) and it did not seem feasible from an agricultural or management point of view for the scheme's 2000 arable acres to be divided up into 100 privately-owned plots. The communal ownership of land and equipment also was attractive from an ideological point of view (although this had no bearing on the decision) and the President, after visiting Kitete early in 1964, told the farmers that he would be happy if other schemes would follow the Kitete example. Despite the President's being impressed, however, Upper Kitete is the only wholly communal settlement scheme under the Division of Settlement's control, undoubtedly because agricultural rather than ideological considerations were deemed paramount and no other village settlement is as highly mechanized.

The Kitete farmers recognize this necessity and agree that it is much easier to farm the 1200 acres presently under cultivation without consideration as to whose land is where, they note that it avoids quarrels over possible inequitable locations of plots or who gets the use of the machinery when, and there is, at present, no pressure to divide Kitete into private holdings. The only time that land division has been suggested to the researcher was when two of the more conscientious farmers noted that if each person had his own plot it would force everyone to work hard, the lazier people would quit the settlement and better people could be recruited. The logic implied here is that the harder a person works on his land, the more he can earn from it. This reasoning is fallacious as long as one is dealing with a crop such as wheat rather than maize beans or millet; the average farmer outside the scheme, having 12-20 acres of wheat but no farm machinery, has comparatively little physical work to do. His work (aside from tasks associated with his cattle and food crops) is reduced to that of a "farm manager" whose job it is to make decisions on what seed varieties to plant, whether or not he can afford to spray for weeks and negotiate for the use of other people's machinery (tractors to plow, harrow and sometimes plant and spray, combines to harvest and lorries to carry his wheat).

On the other hand, the argument put forth does reveal the major weakness of a communal settlement and one mentioned by both industrious settlers and local farmers who are familiar with the scheme: communal work at Upper Kitete has a tendency to bring the level of individual endeavour down to the lowest common denominator of work output and enables farmers to take advantage of "the system." People note, for example, that they used to work harder during the first year of the scheme than they do now and that if they were to hire people to do the same jobs they would use far fewer people. The tractor drivers and turnboys, 26 of 27 being scheme farmers, have recently won the right to continue receiving 40 days of "leave" (compared to most other people's twelve days) because their work was harder and more demanding and not because they work any longer hours as was originally the case. Many industrious settlers interviewed say they would waive the benefits of the scheme's social services, good housing and other benefits and trade places with a farmer living outside the scheme

owning 15 acres of land, if offered the opportunity. The fact remains, however, that this alternative was not and is not available to any of those who joined Upper Kitete and, even if it were, it is improbable that, in the near future or under present conditions, any of Kitete's farmers would opt out; expressions to the contrary are reflections of legitimate frustration but not of sufficient intensity to provoke an exodus. There are distinct and admitted advantages to living on the scheme:

First, the settlers do have land of their own;
Second, the above-noted social services and benefits are definitely appreciated;
third, farmers do lean new skills, the best example being that perhaps as many as fifty will be trained as tractor drivers;
fourth, absenteeism is considerably higher than would be tolerated on a commercial estate (abated by the fact that a person is allowed an infinite number of days of sick leave each year); this is an advantage not only to the hypocondriacs and the lazy but to those who have "bad luck" or unavoidably miss work for long periods yet their absence is not missed, the work gets down, the scheme profits are unaffected and are still gets his full divident;
finally, settlement scheme farmers have much easier access to credit than outsiders, (the £900 per farmer capital debt aside), both as a whole, as when a plane is hired on a moment's notice to spray army worm, and individually for expenditure as diverse as the building of brick houses, the plowing of homestead plots or the renting of a scheme vehicle in case of emergency.
All of these advantages have been expressed in one way or another by most of the farmers.

Another major reason (rarely stated) why even the most industrious of farmers at Upper Kitete would not leave the village settlement at present is that there is ample scope for individual enterprize during the hours of the day when one is not required to do work for the scheme either on the three acre household plots or in business ventures outside. The household plots were set aside ostensibly for the growing of food crops but most made some money and two farmers will earn more from growing beans and finger millet on their private plots than they will make from the wheat crop dividend issued by the Government. In addition, certainly more than half of the farmers have cattle boarded with relatives (selection data to the contrary), some have built up their herds since joining the scheme and most, given money and the choice, would rather invest (speculate) on cattle than bank their cash, the rate of return per year (assuming a zero mortality rate) being in the neighbourhood of 65% compared to Barclays' 4%. Finally, many settlers have been able to borrow land at a normal rent rate of one bag of wheat per acre from outside farmers who are unable to put their land into production. As long as the rains are good and there are poor (but landed) farmers with whom one can bargain, as long as the "the system" remains lenient and not too great demands are put on people's time, Kitete's entreprenuers can use the scheme as a convenient "business address" and will not consider leaving; and as long as the land holding patterns remain as they are in the District, there is really no place for those who would want to leave, except to return to a diminishing wage-earning sector that provides even less security than Upper Kitete.

Under-productivity in communal work is identified by only a handful of farmers at Upper Kitete as a problem and in fact, as noted, work output is high when compared with the work-day of many outside farmers. A more universally expressed complaint about living on a Government-run scheme

is the addition of another variable in the determination of individual income -- the Government itself -- and the feeling of uncertainly and insecurity that this variable necessarily elicits. An outside farmer, who plants twelve acres of wheat, has a fairly exact idea as to what his crop costs are, he has no unknown overheads, and by September (or October at the latest), when the harvest is in the bags are counted, he knows his profit or loss for the year. Upper Kitete's farmers have only the vaguest ideas about what crop costs and overheads they are to pay, or how these are calculated, and no idea about the size of the capital debt (except that it is "very large") or the method or length of time of repayment. Furthermore, because most of the accounting is done by the Division of Settlement in Dar es Salaam and because certain decisions remain to be made as to what overheads and capital costs are to be subsidized, the payment of the farmers' incomes is invariably late. This year, for example, the farmers have received a first and second payment amounting to Shs. 1000/-, they have been promised a third payment of approximately Shs. 350/- but thus far have received no authoritative accounting report. In the absense of explainations and with knowledge that crop yield was higher and with overheads commonly thought to be lower (mainly due to the substitution of scheme tractor drivers for Government-paid ones), there is a feeling that they are at best "like sheep in the dark" not knowing what to expect and at worst that the Government is cheating them.

In fact, while the farmers are lamentably kept "in the dark", because of distance and a mix-up in accounts, the Government is not cheating them. If anything, it would seem that because of its strong socialist ethic, and especially in the absence of the necessary accounting information, the Tanzania Government comes down fairly consistantly on the side of its "little people," especially the farmer; mistakes are written off, losses are absorbed by the Government and when there are profits, the temptation is to give them to the farmer rather than use in repaying the capital loan. The question can be legitimately raised as to whether the Government can run so called "commercial ventures" (such as village settlements) on a commercial basis. Nor does the Division of Settlement encourage economic behaviour on the part of the settlers, if Kitete's farmers were made to believe that additional efforts on their part would either net them more income or pay off the scheme debt faster or both, it is likely that they would agree. As it is, the farmers are engaged in a series of maneuvers which will, if successful, increase the size of their homestead plots or allow them to use scheme land entirely for their personal benefit. Even if unsuccessful, their vigorous attempts show the primacy they accord to the "private sector" and the low priority they attach to debit repayment.

Despite the fact that Kitete farmers have been allowed a private sector and that it can yield considerable income, despite the fact that during the first two years at least they have received incomes dispro-portionate to crop yields and despite the fact that until now they have not been made to begin repayment of capital loans, there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction and tension at the scheme which is not entirely linked to uncertainties related to the scheme debt or accounting procedures but is still related to money. Most people admit that during the first two years of the scheme, at least, they earned more cash income than they ever earned before. On the other hand, they note that the cost of living is higher at Kitete and because of the demands of Kitete's work schedule they have less mobility and cannot visit their richer relatives to supplement their incomes as people say was frequently the case prior to joining the scheme. The tension that exists over the "shortage of money" also is prompted by the above-mentioned access people have to Government credit; when a payout of Shs. [illegible],500/- was made in early December 196[illegible], nearly Shs. 30,000/- was paid back to the Government for debts incurred and after personal debts to the manager and to masons who had built farmer's houses were repaid, the farmers received an average net income of approximately Shs. 440/-. Another cause of the tension that exists due

to the perceived lack of money is the fact that the majority of the farmers neither budget nor consume wisely, and this past year most of the farmers had no cash left from their dividend by June, seven months after the payout, a planned revolving fund of nearly Shs. 2000/- collected from the farmers for use in emergencies* stopped "revolving" at about the same time and from then until September/people began selling wheat from outside fields or surplus from their harvest, Kitete farmers borrowed from the Manager (the first choice) or the farmer entreprenuers who always had cash (but/always willing to loan). This year the prospects are even worse. The Manager has decided not to force people to open bank accounts as has been the case before (rejecting an authoritarian position on the matter as "paternalistic") which means most likely that people will run out of money earlier and will turn to the Manager for a personal loan instead (this a perpetuation of another form of paternalism -- the Bwana Mkubwa syndrome). In short, at a time when President Nyerere is calling for sacrifice and greater self-reliance on the part of the individual and is stating that work, not loans, are what develop areas and nations, farmers at least one village settlement are thinking of themselves as wards of the Government or children of the Manager, and are instinctively, it seems, thinking of themselves as wage earners rather than farmers. Those requests of the farmers that they be more fully informed of the economic situation are very legitimate forms of complaints and the Division of Settlement realizes now that it should have involved the farmers earlier in economic decisions (as they are presently attempting to do). This aside, the attitude that the Second Vice-President felt existed generally at Government settlement schemes -- the growth of a welfare or dependency mentality -- is very much present at Kitete.

*when

were not

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The budgeting of £100,000 for a scheme involving 100 families seems excessive now when costs are compared with present benefits; Kitete's wheat yield and equality over the past three years has been no better than tha that of the North Iraqw Division generally (although it is reasonable to expect it to do so in the future), it has put money into soil conservation measures that probably will not demonstrate their worth for 20 years, and at present, the social and infra-structure benefits of an improved road, piped water, a new dispensary and Primary School, farm machinery and good, permanent housing seem a small return on the investment, especially when it is realized that at least half the land now under cultivation would have been settled and farmed by now through normal Iraqw encroachment or colonization at almost no Government expense, had Kitete and planned settlement not been introduced. As has been mentioned, the political and social development goals of the village settlement have barely begun to be met and in these ways, the people who have settled Kitete are living noticeably the same sort of lives as those outside the scheme. While it is questionable whether the original village settlement program would have survived the Government's economic cutbacks had the social, political and "demonstration effect" goals (but not the economic goals) shown signs of achievement -- had the settlers not developed a dependency ethic and "complained" -- the fact remains that these goals assumed a low priority in implementation; in short, ideological considerations were ignored. This meant that when the program was evaluated, the only criteria worth weighing was the economic, and largely on the basis of a low benefit/cost ratio over a short three year period, the planned extension of the village settlement program was virtually abandoned with the exception of those existing schemes whose crops made them particularly viable economically.

The revision of the village settlement programe, finally raises the question about the status of the transformation approach to rural development in Tanzania (and indeed in new nations generally). In principle, the so-called "new approach" village settlements to be inaugurated this year by the Division of Settlement are little different than the Increased Productivity Schemes of another period which coordinated the activities of various extension agencies or the development projects sponsored by the District Development Committees which have been an on-going and variously effective phenomenon almost since Tanzania received her independence. Perhaps in practice the Division's alternative supply of manpower and finance will achieve more consistant and startling results in "traditional villages" but the program can hardly be consigned to the "transformation approach" rubric. The proposed river-basin settlements are no longer planned, although this is an area where controlled rather than random settlement could perhaps be most beneficial.[14] Presumably some Regional and District settlement schemes will continue but, re-settlement or villagization alone does not constitute rural "transformation" and presumably these will remain under-financed and to a large degree development will depend upon the farmers' enthusiasm for self-help. The Ministry of Agriculture has initiated a program of "block farming" in various parts of the country where Co-operatives own and rent out tractors to groups of farmers who cultivate on a communal basis but the goals are economic -- increased productivity and more wealth in the rural sector -- and social development is left to chance and/or the Community Development Division; the same can be said for a wheat expansion program in Mbulu District initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture and administered by a sub-committee of the District Development Committee where 200 acre blocks of new land were given to individual progressive farmers who agree (in writing) to follow stringent regulations outlining the farming system and animal husbandry technics to be practiced. The Government, then, seems to have fallen back on the "improvement approach" on the probably correct (but largely un-researched) assumption that the benefit/cost ratio in extension work is more favourable than thatofthe transformation projects, what is tantamount to admitting there is no such thing as certain, quick and economically feasible "rural transformation." Given manpower shortages, however, extension work and social services can only be provided where concentrations of population are available, and given the fact that largely the same conditions exist in December 1966 as in December 1962 when village settlement was deemed the answer, it again meansthat even "rural improvement" is an uncertain, slow and relatively expensive operation.

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14. This is a view shared by economist Landell-Mills, though cautiously with the necessary proviso that "proper attention (be) paid to planning, experimentation and detailed pre-investment studies." _Op. cit.,_ p.22.

No. 425.
Dowring.

INCREASING CROP PRODUCTION IN TANZANIA

by W. Warrell Dowring

If the objectives of the Tangaryika Development Plan (1) are to be realised it is essential to maintain a steady rise in the production of crops. Throughout Tanzania this is an accepted fact and energetic steps have been taken to ensure that this increase is achieved. But as the more obvious obstacles to development are removed others appear and have to be faced and overcome. It is evident that the provision of financial aid, careful planning and co-ordination, efficient administrative organisation and an adequate Extension Service are all important adjuncts in the campaign to make farmers grow more. They are all forms of assistance which may or may not be provided depending on considered decisions by those in authority. Wrong decisions, which reduce the effectiveness of these forms of aid, can be criticised and corrected. A second group of factors, such as climate, the availability of land and world prices paid for farming products are not subject to the same control: fortunately for Tanzania, climatic conditions are not unfavourable and there is fertile land sufficient for the present population. Also, although world prices will probably fall in the short run the decline will not necessarily be sudden or disastrous. A final factor is the attitude of the individual farmer to the call for an increased output for him. His effort will depend not only on the assistance he is offered but also the effect of various incentives and the norms of the society in which he lives.

During the past year the success achieved in increasing production is nothing short of spectacular. According to a recent economic review during the first four months of 1966 the value of cotton exported was over 100 per cent more than in the comparable period for 1965 and coffee exports during the same period have increased by 31 per cent (2). These are significant increases and they concern the two most important cash crops produced by African peasant farmers. Although favourable climatic conditions may be partly responsible for these good figures it is also true to say that much of the success must be attributed to support for the farmers given by institutions and pressure, ranging from exhortation to compulsion, from the political leadership.

It is when a comparison is made with Kenya and Uganda that it becomes noticeable that a much greater effort is being made by political leaders in Tanzania to urge farmers to increase their production. Such pressure might be necessary for one of two reasons: either because the cash returns offered are insufficient to cause the farmer to make greater efforts without further encouragement, or because he is not interested in obtaining an unlimited amount of wealth for conspicuous consumption in the future. At present, the returns from growing cotton or coffee compare favourably with those in Kenya and Uganda unless (as in Morogoro Region) production costs are above the average: and if the second reason is relevant one can only say that the farmers attitudes are conditioned by a variety of factors constantly changing as a better educated generation joins the farming community.

It can be expected that the best time to seek a social mobilization to increase production occurs in the first few years after Independence when national unity, which has been evolved

for one purpose can be utilised for another and it would be interesting to know to what extent any of the various measures described below are adopted elsewhere. Some kind of official action is evidently necessary to supplement the stimulus of material gain. Such action takes the form of oral persuasion to encourage the farmer to act in his own self-interest or the attempt to provide a non-material ethos to justify social mobilization. If the individual's material gain is an advantage for the community as a whole it becomes anti-social to remain poor unnecessarily and coercion can be legitimised and justified. Alternatively, it can be argued that in traditional African society self-interest is identified with the family, the clan and the village. If self-interest is the motivation for individual effort, this is not necessarily bad according to the standards of the Tanzanian concept of African socialism: what has been criticised is the accumulation of wealth for the benefit of the individual alone, or a few close relations. Whenever possible the enterprising farmer is singled out for praise. For example, on 9th December, 1966 at a parade to mark the anniversary of Independence, President Nyerere presented cups and farming equipment to the best farmer respectively from each Region. It has never been suggested that these farmers were doing other than working in their own interests although it is emphasised often enough that increased production of those crops which produce foreign exchange is in the interest of the whole community. It is clear that in Tanzania there is no inflexible socialist doctrine and it is therefore possible to speculate on the effect of current ideologies in the context of development and come to different conclusions. But the various measures which can be, and are, taken to further the policy of increased productivity, can be described and should be evaluated.

President Nyerere, in his speech on 'Ujamaa' made it clear that in Tanzania possession of land would only be permitted providing it was put to good use. (3) This is consistent with the traditional customary land tenure law in many parts of the country. Where shifting cultivation was practised and the land was sparsely populated it was the duty of the 'great commoner' who allocated land to find a place for a new settler. If a dispute arise subsequently because someone else claimed he had already been allocated the same land, the courts would require him to produce evidence that he had made good use of it in the recent past. These traditional rules have been retained in that the whole tenor of recent land legislation has emphasised that the peasant farmer has a right to use land but not to own it. Freehold title has been abolished and land can now be compulsorily transferred from owners to occupiers if the latter have been, or could be, made responsible for development (4). Furthermore it is noticeable that there is no mention of land tenure in the recent series of declarations of customary law (5) and it seems clear that it is intended to make more frequent use of the sanction of eviction if farmers fail to make the best use of the land they occupy.

Something more positive is needed to achieve quick results and it was decided that local government institutions could play an important role in encouraging development. Under the Native Authority Ordinance in colonial times legislation always existed to compel a farmer to grow sufficient food to support himself and his family. With the introduction of District Councils this provision was incorporated into the Local Government Ordinance. This measure was insufficient to increase agricultural production, and in 1962 the law was amended to give increased powers to local authorities.

Introducing the amending Bill in the National Assembly, the Minister for Local Government and Administration said as follows:

> "..... the object of the Bill is to give District Councils power to ensure that the policy of our people's Government is complied with by the few who, for no reasons, wish to avoid their obligations.
>
> ... /The Bill/ enables Councils to pass by-laws requiring farmers to grow specific acreages of main crops and will apply to both food and cash crops...
>
> Since the request for these powers has come from the people themselves through their Councils, the responsibility for enforcing the provisions of by-laws will rest on the shoulders of the Councils. It is intended that the Village Development Committees and the village executives of the Councils should be the main instrument for enforcing by-laws where this is necessary." (6)

By the end of 1966 slightly less than one-third of the district councils had introduced by-laws making it compulsory for farmers holding land under customary law to grow at least one acre of a cash crop as directed by an authorised officer. In most cases the by-laws allow for penalties of a fine of £10 or two months imprisonment or a combination of the two. Several people, notably in Songea and neighbouring districts have been prosecuted and punished for contravening these by-laws.

Until now, enforcement of these laws has not been the result of initiative by the Village Development Committees, as envisaged in the Minister's speech. Instead, it has usually been left to the local Executive Officers (7) of the council to institute prosecutions, acting on orders from the Regional and Area Commissioners. They, in turn, have to rely on the information supplied to them through the District Agricultural Officers. Much, therefore, depends on the attitudes of the local Executive Officers who find themselves required to shoulder two separate tasks: firstly they are employees of the district council responsible for seeing that tax is collected and that the local government services function properly: secondly they are the agents of central government required to further the policy of increasing production. It is not easy to effect a compromise between these roles and officials who can combine qualities of leadership with clerical efficiency are not likely to be attracted by the salaries a local authority is able to pay. Their task is made more difficult in those districts where they have replaced representatives of traditional authorities: the qualification of education or of services to the Party does not automatically engender the respect and deference paid to ascribed status.

The importance of the problem is recognised and a process of re-organisation is in progress. The membership of the Village Development Committee has been changed so that all, or the majority, of the members are leaders of the 'ten-house cells' introduced in 1964: furthermore if a proposal in a recent Government White Paper is implemented, the Village Development Committees will be given statutory recognition (8). These changes may improve the situation in that the 'directive elite' will no longer be employees of the local authority and therefore, in theory the servants of the public: instead, the initiative for increasing production and getting people to work on self-help projects will rest with the Committee itself: much will depend on the type of persons who have

been selected as cell-leaders, the methods they employ, and the training they can absorb from the Community Development staff.

Finally, another form of coercion can only be described as administrative action. Recently much publicity has been given to the use of the sanction of restricting the open sale and consumption of locally brewed beer until the Regional and Area Commissioners are satisfied that some particular effort called for from the farmers has been forthcoming. In a country where brewing is so easy and control so difficult and the legislation itself makes enforcement complicated, it might be doubted at first whether this measure has any effect. It can be supported for two reasons: firstly, it demonstrates that the government is prepared to take action to support the drive for productivity and exhortations are not empty words. Secondly, it seeks to involve the whole community in the policy of increasing production and without this involvement social mobilisation in the cause of modernisation is unlikely to succeed. Against this point it might be argued that to cause inconvenience to the majority to put pressure on a minority causes irritation and, unless town bars are also closed, it emphasises the difference between the privileged urban dwellers and the less fortunate farming community.

From this short description of the measures taken to increase production it can, I think, be concluded that positive direction is necessary and the efforts being made by political leaders in this respect cannot be dismissed as a manifestation of a wish to find a raison d'etre for the Party. And yet, if farmers are not imbued with the desire to extract the maximum profit from their operations or are reluctant to increase their earnings unless exposed to threats of sanctions, it raises the question of whether the co-operative movement, the institution which plays the key role in this campaign for increased production, is not in need for far more radical re-organisation than is likely to take place.

The principles of co-operation are well known and the legal framework within which societies operate is similar in all Commonwealth countries. The Rules are designed to give the maximum independence of operation to the societies themselves with an elected committee responsible to the members. While the societies were solely concerned with marketing the produce of farmers voluntarily associated, it was possible to leave them to succeed or fail as the case may have been. This situation can no longer be permitted for several reasons; firstly, the introduction of compulsory marketing rules whereby all produce must be sold through co-operatives; secondly, the growth of services whereby farmers can hire tractors for ploughing at the fixed charge per acre or obtain fertilisers when required for cash or on credit; thirdly, the transfer of responsibility to societies for granting and recovering the loans which are often so necessary for increasing production. Thus the societies now provide services of such importance that they cannot be permitted to fail: at the same time, if they are badly managed the industrious farmer member finds that much of his reward has to be withheld from him in order to make good mismanagement by those who run his society. This state of affairs not calculated to encourage him to grow more and it is significant that most of the criticism of the recent Report on the Co-operative Movement (9) has been directed to the failure of the committee to offer practical suggestions for increasing the share of the proceeds of the sale of produce paid to the farmers. Both in the Report and elsewhere much attention has been paid to the training of more competent staff but this will not wholly solve the problem unless the ordinary members are sufficiently informed and businesslike and can control the committees who take the important decisions.

It has been argued that co-operation is an ideal, teaching comradeship and thrift and does not consist of organisations for the purpose of gain only (10). There is no objection to the introduction of a mystique into the institution but at the same time whole-hearted support for ideals is unlikely to provide sufficient appeal for farmers unless they are assured that they are getting a fair return for their hard-work. Without this support the democratic principles, on which the organisation of societies is based, are not appropriate and firmer control from the centre is necessary.

The growth of the scope of operations has placed a greater strain on the staff and much of the Report was taken up with recommendations for improvements. The staff problem can and will be solved: but the attitudes of society members and those in authority to the use of tractors and the granting of credit facilities are harder to understand and in the long run present a far greater problem.

In the White Paper setting out Government's reply to the Report (11) it is stated that management of tractors is a matter for the organisation which has to pay for them, and, "this is cardinal principle which cannot be abandoned." The onus is thus put firmly on the Unions or Societies which operate the tractors although there is little evidence that the difficulties in running such a service are appreciated. Although elsewhere it has been shown often enough that the use of tractors is uneconomical, the cardinal rules for operating a tractor service are not complicated and can be summarised as follows:

an efficient accounting system, the imposition of charges based on running costs, wages and amortisation, an efficient maintenance service, an annual average per tractor of not less than 250 acres, adequately trained drivers and finally, the right of the manager to refuse to accept unprofitable work. These rules may be unpalatable but the alternative is to subsidise inefficiency by increased payments by the farmers who make use of the service or balance the books by reducing payments to all farmers irrespective of whether they hired a tractor or not.

Two examples of the difficulties encountered in assessing the correct hire charges illustrate the problem of running a service on a break-even basis.

In September 1966 Mr. A.S. Mtaki, Junior Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives announced in Singida that the hire charges for the forthcoming season would be reduced from Shs 75/- per acre to Shs 50/-: no reasons were given for the introduction of the vastly reduced charges (12). Although the Minister was careful to say that the decision was taken by the Co-operative Union, making the announcement himself carries the implication that his Ministry is willing to share the responsibility for the change. More recently the Regional Development Committee, Morogoro also announced reductions in hire charges from Shs 80/- to Shs 65/-. The reason given was reported as follows:

> "It was found most farmers could not benefit at the old rate because they had to meet insecticides and spraying costs." (13)

It must therefore be assumed that at present financial considerations are not of paramount importance and it remains to be seen whether the statement in the White Paper is accepted as a principle to be observed. For although the use of tractors may

lead to financial difficulties there is no doubt that it is by the introduction of mechanised ploughing that increased yields of cotton have been obtained. It is the shortage of labour at the time of preparing the land for planting which limits the acreage the peasant can grow: by the use of a tractor the farmer with an average size family can weed and harvest a crop from double the acreage he tended previously and there is no doubt that the increased use of tractors is one of the major reasons for the increased yields of cotton. It remains to be seen whether the co-operatives will be able to repay the loans they have taken to purchase tractors and to maintain them in a serviceable condition in the years to come.

There are many advantages in making the Co-operative societies responsible for the distribution and recovery of loans to farmers. Not only ought members of societies be able to judge whether fellow members are credit-worthy but also recovery of instalments through the society should save time and expense. In theory the procedure is simple enough: if a borrower is behind on his repayments the society will deduct the amount due when he offers his produce for sale. In practice this might not be possible if the borrower's payments from the society are less than the amount of the arrears on his loan. It is assumed that if this is the case the other members of the society if they are made to bear the loss, will bring pressure to bear on the defaulter. In the context of peasant communities Firth considers that the social and moral pressure which can be exerted on a defaulter constitute an important sanction (14). This might be true as far as a small group is concerned but it is probably not so effective in the case of a co-operative society. Firstly, there are so many other expenses, some justified, others caused by mismanagement, which result in deductions from the growers gross profits. Secondly, while the controversial system of making only one payment is followed it is difficult for the average farmer to discover what amount his society, and the Union of which his society is a part, retain to cover expected expenses.(15) What is certain is that criticism to be effective must be informed: since this is difficult to achieve control by the pressure of members' opinion is at present out of the question and other means have to be sought.

A similar problem has always existed in local government and it is interesting to see how it has been met. In Tanzania the English system of local councils was adopted, based on the principle that management of local affairs shall be handed over to elected representatives of the community concerned. In the English system, if the representatives mismanaged affairs two things would happen: the electorate would replace them with better men and the District Auditor, a representative of the central government, would ensure that those who misused the authority's funds would be surcharged and compelled to make a refund to the authority. This arrangement would not have been entirely suitable for local conditions: firstly, it was not at all certain that the electorate as such consisting in the majority of residents paying a flat rate of tax would be overly critical of mismanagement by their representatives and secondly District Auditor control is essentially ex post facto and we cannot afford to let funds be misused in the hope of a day of reckoning for the wrong-doers in the distant future. A solution has been found, in the case of District Councils, by giving the Regional Commissioner extensive powers of financial control and general inspection. This ensures that the councils remain solvent, but it does little to educate public opinion and to encourage a sense of participation. Control once started has to be continued and the development of responsible and responsive councils is accordingly delayed.

Like the local authorities, the co-operatives supply essential services and the country cannot afford to see them fail. More detailed control might ensure that they remain viable but it would reduce them to the status of agencies for Marketing Boards. There can be no half measures in this matter: society members if they are dissatisfied will either blame their committees or the Government depending on where they are told the responsibility lies. It is here that the importance of the second payment must be stressed: without a fair distribution of profits it is impossible for the members to judge whether their society is functioning correctly.

A way out of this dilemma might be to encourage a closer association between local authorities and co-operative societies. For example in Yugoslavia and India, it is reported, (16) social and economic advancement is an important function of local government and it is evident that this function is taken seriously in both countries. To cite two examples, in Yugoslavia the commune, the unit of local government can intervene in cases where co-operative societies are mismanaged and in India the supporting services, such as the provision of insecticides and fertilisers are administered by the Panchayati councils (17).

The policy making body for district development was integrated with district councils in 1963. There might well be a case for further integration by relieving co-operative institutions of some of the administrative work they have been given and as far as possible reducing them again to marketing organisations. Farmers will then be in a better position to judge whether their societies are being managed as they would wish. Confidence in this respect is just as important as encouragement by the various means suggested above.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (Government Printer, Dar es Salaam). The Plan only deals with development for the mainland part of the United Republic of Tanzania.

2. Tanzania Monthly Statistical Bulletin, July 1966 (Government Printer, Dar es Salaam), p. 2.

3. Dr J.K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: the basis of African Socialism. Tanganyika Standard (1962).

4. The Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases A ct 1963 and the Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Regrant) Act 1966.

5. Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order, Government Notice No. 279/63: further orders, making slight amendments, followed.

6. Tanganyika Hansard, 25 September 1962, Col. 101.

7. The chief official employed by a district council is called the Executive Officer: the council's area is organised for administrative purposes into Divisions, in which the council's representative is the Divisional Executive Officer: subordinate to him are the Village Executive Officers, sometimes termed Assistant Divisional Executive Officers.

8. Government White Paper No. 1 of 1966, para. 5.

9. The Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, 1966.

10. Svrridge and Digby, A Manual to Co-operative Law and Practice (Heffer 1958), p. 8.

11. Government White Paper No. 3 of 1966 (Government Printer, Dar es Salaam), p. 20.

12. Tanzania Information Service Press Release dated 9.9.66.

13. The Standard, 3 November 1966.

14. R. Firth (ed.), Capital Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies (Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 32.

15. Government White Paper No. 3 of 1966, p. 7.

16. E.C.A., Report on Local Government Study Tour 1963 (U.N. publication, mimeo, E/CN 14/UPP/17)

17. Ibid. p. 10 and p. 18.

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UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI.

A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN THE EMBU DISTRICT OF KENYA

By

E.R. WATTS.

1. INTRODUCTION:-

This study gives some preliminary results of a wider survey being conducted in Embu District by the writer and J. R. Moris. One of the main concerns in this survey is to evaluate the effectiveness of Agricultural Extension in Kenya as a whole. Embu District has been selected for a detailed study at the farmer level for reasons given in a paper presented to a Makerere Rural Development Research Seminar.[1] In particular it should be noted that Embu has a wide range of altitude (2,000 - 6,000 ft), and farming patterns. Whilst the upper part of the District is entirely consolidated and relatively progressive the lower part has a traditional pattern of agriculture which has changed very little over the past thirty years.

Since to some extent this survey is evaluating Government Departments it should be emphasized that it will attempt to maintain a constructive approach. The writer is grateful for the co-operation of a wide range of government officials, farmers and commercial representatives. It is hoped that some of the information collected will be as useful to them as it will be for teaching extension at Makerere.

While it is appreciated that extension work in rural areas is ideally done with a multi-disciplinary approach this paper will be confined to Agricultural Extension. By this is meant the informal education of farmers in order to promote agricultural production and profitability.

The paper will be primarily descriptive in the sense that it will describe the structure, functioning and effectiveness of extension work at the farmer level. It is considered that there is a considerable need for such a study since there is

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(1) E.R. Watts:- "The Evolution of Extension" RDR Paper No. 17, Makerere University College, Faculty of Agriculture.

evidence that research workers, planners, and teachers have very little idea of what actually happens in the field.[1]

II. AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN EMBU DISTRICT:-

Agricultural Extension in the African areas of the country dates from the Mid 1920's and in Embu the first experiments with new crops like cotton, groundnuts and wheat were made in 1924. The Deputy Director of Agriculture summarised the 1926 organisation of his Department in relation to African farming areas as follows:-

"(1) Under the central direction provincial training and seed farms are being established. The European officers in charge act also as advisers to the Administration, and Supervisors of the native instructors in locations.

(2) Attached to the Institution are trained native instructors in charge of Demonstration plots showing improved cultivation, a model rotation, the value of good seed, new implements. These instructors are visited regularly, the condition and extent of crops, incidence of drought and disease is noted for administative information.

(3) The best pupils from the Provincial training farms to proceed, if desirous, to a higher training establishment at the Laboratories near Nairobi, to supply the demand for teachers and instructors.

(4) European Supervisors to organise Agricultural Societies in reserves, assist in the annual district Shows, to make the customs, crops, and general agricultural welfare of the inhabitants of his Province his sole interest. At the same time to see to the introduction of more useful food crops and crops of economic importance."[2]

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(1) For example, "How to grow more maize per acre" - a handout for the Maize Marketing Board Stand - Nairobi Show - September, 1965. This advises farmers to get fertilizer advice from their District Agricultural Officer. As will be shown later, farmers have very little contact with DAO's since their main responsibility is administration.

(2) E. Harrison (Deputy Director of Agriculture) "Native Agriculture in Kenya, Improvements, etc." - a paper read at the 1926 Nairobi Agricultural Conference.

The first Agricultural Supervisor for Embu was appointed in 1925 and he was made responsible for an area stretching from Fort Hall to Meru. In 1927, a 20 acre seed farm was started in Embu and free seed issues were started. Much time and energy in the early years was devoted to the dry, lower areas of the District endeavouring to combat famine caused by locusts and drought.

A circular issued by the Department of Agriculture in 1931 attempted to define the functions of Agricultural Officers. It was made clear that they were under the general direction of the District Commissioners. The main extension methods specified as suitable were Agricultural shows, Demonstration Plots, advice by Agricultural Instructors, and the adoption of progressive farmers. The circular also established the importance of report writing. A daily diary had to be submitted and monthly reports prepared covering correspondence, crop reports and forecasts, etc. A monthly letter of advice was to be sent to the "Provincial Commissioners, all Administrative Officers and other centres of Government or Educational activy". The letter was intended "to draw attention to any details of Agricultural practice that are applicable to the following month, and also to any other matters, such as marketing, etc., on which propaganda is desirable."

It is clear that even before the issue of this circular many Agricultural Officers were disillusioned about the possibility of educating existing farmers. Harrison's paper[1] makes it clear that the Department was already tending to abandon the idea of persuading or educating farmers. The general attitude was a negative one of preventing burning, cultivation of steep slopes, etc., and at this stage there was little emphasis on improving productivity or the introduction of cash crops. These negative altitudes were re-inforced by Maher's report on soil erosion in the Embu Reserve.[2]

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(1) E. Harrison - p.6 para. 4. "One would prefer to say nothing about the disappointments with the old people under the system of suggestion, they will try to obey an order but will merely smile at a suggestion unless of course, it suits them".

(2) C. Maher. "Soil Erosion and Land utilisation in the Embu Reserve" Pub. by Dept. of Agric. (duplicated only) 1938

The trend from the 1930's on was to introduce agricultural bye-laws compelling the adoption of new practices. Thus in 1935, Mbere (lower Embu) farmers were compelled to plant up to 1000 sticks of cassava per family.

Appendix I outlines the main extension efforts in the District since 1926. It will be noted that throughout the early period there were rapid changes of emphasis. Amongst the crops introduced into the District between 1924 and 1956 are the following:- Groundnuts, cotton, wheat, barley, cassava, mangoes, avocadoes, paw paw, cashew, coffee, boston beans, fox tail millet, green grms. pigeon peas, coconuts, sun flower, caster, sisal, geranium, wattle, English potatoes, tobacco, garlic, linseed, gum Arabic, onions, edible canna, custard apple, oranges, Madagascar butter beans, avocado pears, kweme nuts and Flax. Of the 32 crops listed, only about half are grown to any extent at present. Cashew, to take but one example, appears to have never been developed seriously despite having being introduced in 1929 and reported on favourably in 1942. A few thriving trees can be found today at Nyangwa, Kirima, Siakago and Kirie. However, it appears that no one knows what to do with the nuts, which are thrown away.(1) If this crop had been developed it could today have been both a valuable cash crop and an insurance against the failure of annual crops in the dry areas of Mbere.

One of the factors contributing to the rapid changes in emphasis and methods is undoubtedly the high rate of transfer. In the 40 years since an Agricultural Officer was first posted to Embu there have been at least 25 people in the post of DAO. The average length of posting is thus 1.6 years, although individuals have, of course, held the post for longer periods. Progress is most noticeable when one man has held the post for more than 2 years. It should be noted that there have been 3 different DAO's over the past two years.

It will be seen from the above that although the emphasis on agricultural extension as a distinct function is comparatively new extension work has been carried on for a long time. However, as the U.S.A.I.D. Report points out, there has been "little distinction......... between educational, regulatory and strictly operational aspects of the Ministry of Agriculture Programs"(2) To this one might add the service aspect in

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(1) Information obtained by Mr. C.J. Nyaga of St. Marks College from Mr. Julius, Mutembei, Divisional A.I. 1926-1957.
(2) A.H. Maunder. "Agricultural Extension in Kenya" A report prepared for the Govt. of Kenya and U.S.A.I.D., 1962.

providing farm plans, producing planting material and spraying crops.

III. THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF EXTENSION SERVICES:-

Agricultural extension is far from being solely the work of the Department of Agriculture. Appendix II lists the main extension agencies operating in Embu District. Particularly important contributions are made by the Cotton Board, BAT(Kenya) Ltd., KTDA, and The Co-operative Societies. It should be noted that the latter were until very recently in sole charge of extension for the most important crop in the District - Coffee. In this paper, however, we shall concentrate mainly on the Agricultural Department.

The structure of the Civil Service is well known and the District Agricultural Department follows the usual pattern. The pyramid has a broader base than most other Departments.

Fig. 1:- THE TECHNICAL STAFF PYRAMID - EMBU DISTRICT - AS AT 31-12-65.



It will be noted that out of 114 Technical staff in the Department, 84 have in fact had virtually no training in Agriculture. Yet, as is shown in Fig. 2, the Junior Agricultural Assistants are, as far as the farmer is concerned, his main source of contact and an important source of information.

..... Fig.2/

Fig. 2. EXTENSION CONTACTS OF 77 NEIGHBOURS OF "PROGRESSIVE" FARMERS.

Number of visits by Extension Staff	81
Farms visited by Extension Staff at least once/annum:	73%
Farms visited by Extension Staff more than once/annum	25%
Grade of staff visiting:- District Agricultural Officers	1%
" " " " Assistant " "	1%
Technical Assistant	37%
Junior Agricultural Assistant	60%

The fact that 73% of Upper Embu farms (in what approximates to a random sample) are visited annually is impressive and is a reflection of the extremely high staffing rates in Kenya. Upper Embu has a staffing rate of approximately 1 member of the Agricultural Department to every 200 holdings.

In the United States a "local agricultural agent covers an average of 1000 farms" and in the Netherlands approximately 400 farms of over 7.5 acres are covered by each extension officer.[1]

It must, of course, be emphasised that a Junior Agricultural Assistant has had virtually no training in agriculture and cannot in any sense be equated with an extension officer in a developed country. However, even the trained staff (T.A. and above) ratio of 1 : approx. 800 holdings compares quite favourably with other countries. It is clear from Appendix III that the Junior Agricultural Assistant is an important source of information (approximately 30% of maize practices learnt from field staff). He therefore has a sound claim for inclusion in the channels of communication.

..... CHANNELS/

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(1) J.M.A. Penders. "Comparative Extension Studies in the N. Atlantic area"Chapter in "Rural Extension at the Crossroads". Pub. by Inter. Agric. Centre. Wageningen, 1963.

IV: CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION:-

The main purpose of this paper is to describe how information passes to the farmers. Appendix III gives the immediate source of information for maize practices only. If similar material could be obtained for all the crop and livestock enterprises it would reveal a wide variety of information sources. The following is a diagrammatic representation of the more important channels through which information passes to the farmer. It should be noted that Appendix III indicates (in the case of maize) that roughly two thirds of practices are learnt through the activities of the Agricultural Department.

Fig. 3:- CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.



One point clearly shown in Appendix III is the key position of the Farmers Training Centre. Thirty per cent of farmers indicated that they had learnt practices from FTC staff. Moris[1] has already pointed out the advantages that the FTC has in providing a more direct link with the farmer. A serious limitation of a Civil Service type extension organisation

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(1) J.R. Moris "Farmer Training as a means of Rural Development" R.D.R. Paper No.28, Faculty of Agriculture, Makerere University College.

is that there tend to be too many links in the chain. It will be noted in Fig. 3 that both the private firms and the specialised boards provide much more direct links with the farmer.

Extension is only one facet of the work of the Agricultural Department in the field. Appendix IV indicates that Technical Assistants only spend about one quarter of their time on extension duties. This figure is optimistic as no attempt has been made to distinguish between time spent advising farmers and time spent gossiping, etc. It is interesting to note that even in the latest Annual Report(1) of the DAO there is no specific mention of extension work. Under Part III - Field Services, the headings are::

1. Progress in improved farming (Farm Layout, Grade Cows, Improved seed, Loans to farmers)
2. Soil and water conservation;
3. Irrigation;
4. Agricultural education (General, Young farmers clubs, Home Economics);
5. Marketing.

It is interesting to note that in Appendix III there is no indication that farmers learn actual farm practices through mass media or through the activities of the commercial firms. No farmer mentioned either of these sources although of course firms like KTA and Twiga have taken part in field days organised by the Department. However, these organisations may be more important as sources of more general information.

In the large scale farming areas of Kenya Mr. Ware-Austin has pointed out(2) that African farmers do not "have the same channels of communication as the previous European owners." It would seem to be generally the case that they rely more on direct personal contact with extension staff. As an educated and experienced farming group develops this situation will undoubtedly change.

Communication is not solely concerned with advising farmers. Statistics was collected about sources of information prior to the Embu Farmers Day held on January 22nd 1966. In fact, local

..... publicity/

(1) Embu District Dept. of Agric. Annual Report 1965.

(2) W.D. Warw-Austin - quoted on p.21 of "Farmer Training Institutions in East Africa" pub. by FAO, Rome, 1966.

publicity in the form of posters had been inadequate and field staff were heavily relied upon to inform people. This comes out clearly in the following Figure.

Fig.4 ATTENDENCE AND INFORMATION ABOUT EMBU FARMERS DAY.

	"Neighbours" Sample	"Progressive" Sample
Attendence:(% of Farms with 1 or more members that attended)	35%	63%
Source of information:(% mentions of following sources)		
Agricultural Officer	0%	9%
Technical Assistant	27%	25%
J.A.A.	13%	15%
Friends/Neighbours	18%	0%
Poster	10%	0%
Not Specified	32%	50%

The usefulness of mass media and in particular the monthly newspaper "Ukulima wa Kisasa" depends very largely on the educational level of farmers. In the "neighbour" sample only 32% of "farmers" had no formal education; 31% had received at least 8 years education. There should therefore be a good case for improving and increasing the use of mass media.

One advantage of the more direct link with the farmer is that it reduces the risk of the farmer being mis-informed. Channels for communication as complex as in Fig. 3 give ample opportunities for the giving of wrong advice. One blatant example was an Embu farmer who had been advised to plant his maize at exactly twice the recommended population. Such over planting could have very considerably reduced the farmers yield.

An important aspect of the educational level of farmers is its relation to the education of their advisers. 13% of farmers in the "neighbour" sample had received more education than a J.A.A. and 32% had received approximately the same education. As farmers become better educated it is important that the educational standards of extension staff be raised. Even amongst the Technical Assistants there are some that have had less than 8 years schooling. The value of refresher courses is limited by the fact that some of the older T.A. staff cannot understand English.

The effectiveness of field staff in extension is related to some extent to their mobility. The fact that T.A.'s spend 20% of their time travelling is largely unavoidable as they all have bicycles. In the case of J.A.A.'s however, only 50%

have bicycles. This has the effect of both increasing the time spent travelling and restricting coverage of their sub-location. It should also be noted that over the past few years there have been repeated cuts in financial allocations for travel. For much of the year work is severely curtailed by the immobility of staff.

V. THE PREPARATION OF ADVICE TO FARMERS:-

Maize was selected for special attention in the survey because:-

(a) It is a staple food and is grown in all parts of the District;

(b) At the time of the survey there was considerable interest in increasing maize production;

(c) Over the past 2-3 years much of the extension effort has been devoted to maize.

(Of the 22 method demonstrations carried out by the J.A.A.'s interviewed over a 6 month period 9 were on maize).

(d) Embu was to become a centre for the production of hybrid maizes in the medium length rain season areas; it is important that other practices such as spacing and fertilizer are improved before hybrids are introduced.

Advice to farmers on maize growing is based on what are termed "Standard Recommendations". These were normally drawn up on a district basis and it was once the intention that every district should have a set of recommendations covering all the main agricultural enterprises. The latest recommendations for Embu District also cover Central Province and Meru District.

The preparation of recommendations for farmers is one of the most important functions of the Department of Agriculture. Yet one finds wide variations in the care with which they are prepared. The latest Embu recommendations[1] do not even mentioned the need for applications of Super-hosphates fertilizer in the main maize growing areas (Star and Lower Kikuyu Grass Zone). Comprehensive and carefully prepared recommendations as contained in "Maize Cultivation in Nyanza Province"[2] have never been prepared for Embu District.

..... The/

(1) Ref. No. 1/66 "Standard Embu A.R.S. Recommendations" 9/3/66.
(2) "A Guide to Maize Cultivation in Nyanza Province". Bulletin No. 1 of the Kakamega Experimental Station, 1961.

The decisions on what to recommend to farmers are difficult decisions involving many factors. As pointed out by Belshaw and Hall, there is a need for more research "in the process of applying research-derived recommendations to the Farm."(1) It is also vitally important that there should be consultation on this matter between field and research staff. At present, because this matter falls somewhere between research and extension, thereis a tendency for it to be overlooked. This is in fact one of the weakest sections of the channels of communication between the research worker and the farmer.

Because of the complexity of the question of drafting advice there is a general disinclination to accept responsibility. A very useful duplicated booklet entitled "Method Demonstration Plans" has been produced by the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture to assist field staff in preparing demonstrations. In the preamble there is a clause which states that the "Extension Training staff does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of the information."(2) Later it suggests that the DAO should be asked to check the details. There would appear to be a dearth of people equiped to make these vital decisions.

One vital point concerning channels of communication is that communication should not all be downwards. There is little indication from the survey at present that the farmer has an opportunity to convey his problems to the research worker. One out of nearly 100 farms visited reported having been visited by a research worker during the previous 12 months.

VI. MAIZE PRACTICE ADOPTION:-

A detailed study of maize growing practices has been undertaken on 96 farms in Upper Embu to determine:-

(a) How far farmers are adopting what is recommended; and
(b) Whether they are getting commensurate results.

As yet only a few results have been obtained and no attempt has been made to correlate with attendence at F.T.C. courses, etc. Briefly the results are:-

1. Date of planting;- It is recommended, particularly in drier areas, that maize be planted dry before the onset of the rains. Of 157 plots inspected in August, 1965, 26% were claimed to have been "dry" planted. Of the remainder 33% were planted

...... 1-3 days/

(1) D.G.R.Belshaw & Malcolm Hall "The analysis and use of agricultural experimental data" p.19, a paper produced for The Agric. Econ. Conf., Nairobi, Jan. 1965.
(2) "Method Demonstration Plans" Min. of Agric. & Anim. Husbandry, Kenya. 1965.

1-3 days after the first rain and 40% 4 days or later.

2. Previous cropping:- It has long been recommended that maize be grown in a rotation with grass and other crops. The information collected has not been fully analysed but only 1% of the maize plots followed grass.

3. Spacing/Population:- The recommendation is a spacing of 3ft x 1ft with 1 plant left per hole giving a population of 14,500 plants per acre. In the survey plants were counted in an area of 100 sq. yds. Such an area should ideally have approximately 300 plants. Results of the survey were:-

Fig. 4: MAIZE PLANT POPULATIONS - "NEIGHBOUR" SAMPLE

Average Population/100 sq. yds.	278
Range of populations	45- 583
Under 175	16.8%
175 - 224	15.1%
225 - 274	16.0%
275 - 324	22.7%
325 - 374	16.0%
375 - 424	5.9%
Over 424	7.6%

Thus perhaps a quarter of the total had a population approximating to the recommendation. The trend was towards too low rather than too high a population.

Other practices:- Information has also been collected about mixed cropping, cultivation, weeding, harvesting and marketing. Of 61 plots with recorded yields, 48 had received fertilizer dressings.

VII. FARMERS RESULTS:-

It is undoubtedly true that unless farmers themselves get better results when they adopt new practices they are unlikely to continue such practices. Judged on this basis it would appear that there is general satisfaction with what is being taught. Most farmers are aiming at the ideals of dry planting, the use of fertilizers and regular weeding. There have over the past years been remarkable increases in yields recorded on experimental plots at Embu.

..... Fig. 5/

Fig. 5: MAIZE YIELDS ON EMBU SEED FARM AND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH STATION.

	Bags/Acre
1930	8 (Chester County)
1936	5.8 (Muratha)
1938	6 Short rains (Muratha)
1939	1.2 Long rains
1941	3.6 Short rains) (Muratha)
	10.8 Long rains)
1964	28 bags/acre.

N.B. Yields for the 40's and 50's have not yet been abstracted from the files.

There are virtually no records of maize yields on farmers plots in Embu District although the Embu Agricultural Research Station states[1] that local yields are between 3-5 bags per acre. These figures appear to be based on visual impressions and are probably an under-estimate.

In the case of the neighbour sample some difficulty was experienced in getting yield data since plots were not ready for harvest at the same time. Some farmers were also unwilling to have their crops harvested by the enumerators. The following results are therefore based on only 61 plots.

Fig. 6: MAIZE YIELDS OF 48 WITH FERTILIZER PLOTS ON "NEIGHBOUR" SAMPLE FARMS.

	200 lbs Bags/Acre.
No. of Plots Recorded	48
Average Yield	19
Lowest Yield	6
Highest Yield	29

Even when the limitations[2] of these figures are taken into account these make impressive reading. It would appear that the adoption of improved maize growing practices has resulted in substantial improvements in yield. There is still a wide

...range/

(1) Notes for DAO's visit to Embu A.R.S., 1965.
(2) Limitations of maize yield figures:-
  (a) Only 48 plots used;
  (b) Some farmers refused to have their plots harvested;
  (c) 1966 Long Rains was a particularly good maize season;
  (d) The neighbour sample came from the 4500 - 6,000 ft zone which is the best zone for maize growing;
  (e) Yields were calculated from 100 sq. yd. plots.

range of yield but the best farmers are getting yields as good as those on the Research Station.

Since suitable hybrid maize seed is shortly to be supplied to Embu farmers it is extremely important that other practices be improved first. The results of this survey show that approximately one quarter of Upper Embu farmers would benefit from the use of hybrid maize at present.

VII. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:-

1. A study of the history of extension efforts since 1926 reveals that progress has been slow until comparatively recently.
2. This slow progress has been due to:-
   - (a) Rapid transfers of staff;
   - (b) Frequent changes of policy and extension methods;
   - (c) Inadequate basic education of the majority of farmers;
   - (d) A general negative approach;
   - (e) A disciplinary approach through agricultural bye-laws.
3. Maize growing campaigns over the past 2-3 years have produced substantial results in terms of the adoption of improved practices and subsequent yields.
4. Roughly one quarter of farmers in the sampled area are following detailed recommendations for spacing, date of planting, etc. Others are aware of the need for these practices but are unable to carry them out for various reasons.
5. Maize yields in the sampled area have substantially increased from an average of 3-5 bags/acre to 15-20 bags in a good year.
6. In the work of the Department of Agriculture there is little distinction between educational, regulatory, and service functions.
7. Educational work and particularly extension work is a neglected function in that it occupies at the most about one quarter of the time of field staff.
8. A separation of staff between these functions and some closer connection between field and F.T.C. staff would improve the effectiveness of extension.
9. The present structure of the Department of Agriculture field staff results in:-
   - (a) the least qualified personnel having the greatest contact with the farmers;
   - (b) a high risk of poor advice being given due to the complex channels of communication;
   - (c) A high proportion of the time of qualified personnel being spent on administrative and financial matters.

10. As expounded in detail by Dumont[1] there is the question of whether a Civil Service structure is suitable for a rural extension service..

11. The Junior Agricultural Assistant grade of staff are performing a useful function with virtually no training. Further investment in training for this grade of staff should show high returns.

12. It is noted that farmers in Embu District rely for their information either on personal contacts or courses at the F.T.C. There is no evidence as yet that mass media are an important channel of communication.

13. Since approximately one third of farmers have received 8 years or more of education there will be increasing scope for the ;use of mass media in the future.

14. T.A. and J.A.A. staff spend at least 20% of their time travelling. All staff should be given bicycle loans in order to ensure a minimum of wasted time and a wide coverage of their area.

15. From a study of "standard recommendations" currently in force it is thought that insufficient care is taken with their preparation. It is thought that this is one of the weakest sections in the chain of information from the research worker to the farmer.

VIII. SUMMARY:-

The paper gives some preliminary results of a wider survey being conducted in Embu District by the writer and J.R. Moris. One of the main concerns of this survey is to evaluate the effectiveness of Agricultural Extension in Kenya as a whole. The paper gives an outline of the main extension efforts since an Agricultural Supervisor was appointed to the District in 1925.

The structure and organisation of extension field services is described. It is pointed out that at present, the field services are required to carry out several separate and to some extent contradictory functions. The suitability of a Civil Service structure for rural extension work is questioned. It is also demonstrated that at present about 60% of farm visits are made by untrained staff.

The channels of communication between the research worker and the farmer are examined. One of the weakest sections is thought to be the preparation of recommendations for farmers. It is noted that at present there is little information passed to farmers through mass media.

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(1) R. Dumont. "False Start in Africa" Andre Deutsch. London. 1966. p. 202 - 210.

15 tentative conclusions are made mainly in the form of practical suggestions for improving the extension service. However, the paper gives several examples of successes under the existing structure. In particular, improvements in maize cultivation standards and resultant yields are reported.

ERW/WLK. 8.12.65.

APPENDIX I.

IMPORTANT EXTENSION DEVELOPMENTS IN EMBU DISTRICT - 1925-1966.

YEAR	DEVELOPMENT/EMPHASIS	METHODS USED. ETC.
1925	Agric. Supervisor appointed	
1929	Ox cultivation seed supplies	12 Demonstration Plots
1930	Irrigation in Lower Embu	Instructors to have "model gardens".
	4 Instructors specifically assigned to advise farmers	Advice to individuals Barazas in locations
1931	Food crops/Tree planting in lines.	Demonstration Plots
1933	Compost pit digging Ox-ploughing	Method demonstrations " "
1935	Soil Conservation	(Demonstrations/Meetings (Leaflet in Kikuyu.
1937	Abortive national anti-goat campaign.	Posters proposed
1942	Nutritional emphasis to School gardens.	School gardens.
1943	Soil Conservation and Afforestration.	No mention of methods used.
1946	Scheme for introducing Angora Goats - Mbere.	(Later abandoned)
1951	(Grazing Improvement (Loan Scheme (Max. 1000 shs)	Radio Broadcast.
	Use of Manure	Individual instruction/ Supervision.
1954	(Rural youth training (centre opened; (Young Farmers Clubs formed (by Community Development	Youth Organisation/Training
1956	Rural Youth Training Centre closed	
1957	Land consolidation campaign - Embu District	(Meetings/Barazas (Ration/News papers (Taks in Prisons.
1958	(YFC's all ceased to exist (Show organised by Community (Development	Agricultural/Show/ Competition.
1959	Agric. Show held	Agric. Show/Competition
	(not held since)	(Abandoned due to lack of Government subsidy)
1960	Potato Growing Campaign	
1961	(Embu FTC completed (Ukulima wa Kisasa imported	Farmer Training. Agricultural News papers
1962	(Agric. Dept. starts 4K Clubs (Destocking/Grazing Control (Phosphate fertilizer on maize (Coffee Management	Youth Organisation/Training Barazas (no result) Field Day (Demonstrations of hay making, etc.)
1963	Sisal cutting	Field Days.

APPENDIX I (cont'd)

YEAR	DEVELOPMENT/EMPHASIS	METHODS USED, ETC.
1964	Cotton Campaign - re-introduction.	(Demonstrations/Posters (Loans for Fertilizer & (Insecticides.
	Home Economics - Wives course	Farmer Training.
1965	(Maize - Fertilizer emphasis (Mexican 142 Pea Bean	(Result Demonstration (Method Demonstration (Loan Scheme.
1966	Embu Farmers Day	Demonstrations/Field Days
	Maize-Fertilizer & Cotton continued	Demonstrations

EXTENSION AGENCIES

EMBU DISTRICT 1966

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

1. Ministry of Agriculture & Animal Husbandry

   a) D.A.O. & Field Staff,
   b) D.L.O. & Field Staff,
   c) Farmers Training Centre,
   d) Agricultural Research Sta.
   e) Range Management

2. Ministry of Education

   Secondary School Agricultural Teaching (Kangaru School)

3. Ministry of Health

   a) Health Visitors Training Centre
   b) Anthrax campaign

4. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

   Provincial Information Office

5. Ministry of Co-operatives and Community Development

MARKETING BOARDS AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

1. Cotton & Lint Seed Marketing Board

   (Cotton Expansion Scheme)

2. Kenya Tea Development Authority

   (Tea Growers Scheme)

3. Agricultural Finance Corporation:

   (Advice on loans, etc.)

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

1. Kenya Farmers Association

   a) Embu Farmers Store
   b) Field Days

2. Meka Estates
   (Sisal growing)

3. BAT(Kenya) Ltd.

   (Tobacco Growing Scheme)

4. Kitui Ginners:

5. Twiga Chemicals:

   (Demonstration fertilizer plots)

6. Kleenway Chemicals

   (weed control dem.)

7. Shell Chemicals

   (Demonstrations on eelworm control)

8. Banks:

   (Financial Advice to Farmers)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. District Training Centre

   (in conjunction with Community Development)

2. Embu County Council:

   a) Demonstration Farms(Ishiara)
   b) Various Agric. services
   c) Primary School Rural Science
   d) Control of Forest Areas. etc.

3. District Administration

   a) Chiefs Barasa's
   b) General co-ordination

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND OTHERS

1. Extra-Mural Department
   Univ. College Nairobi
   (Lectures on Farm Management)

2. Agric. Soc. of Kenya

   a) Field Days
   b) Young Farmers Clubs
   c) Agricultural Shows

3. Anglican Church

   a) Model Farm at St. Marks College.
   b) Week-end course for farmers

4. Co-operative Societies

   a) Responsible for Coffee Extension
   b) New Crop Introduction (Mexican 142 Pea Bean & Macadamia)

N.B. THESE ARE ONLY THE MOST IMPORTANT AGENCIES.

Appendix III

EMBU DISTRICT

INFORMATION SOURCES FOR MAIZE GROWING PRACTICES

Farmers in the "Neighbour" Sample were asked from whom they had learnt about the following practices. The table gives a summary of their replies.

Information source specified	Good Seed	Early Planting	Spacing	Fertilizer	Insect Control	Weed Control	Boma Manure	Total	%
Neighbour	8	14	11	16	13	4	13	79	21
Traditional knowledge or parents	14	3	-	-	-	6	8	21	6
Formal Education*	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	-
Experience	4	4	-	-	-	6	8	22	6
									33
Agricultural Department:-									
FTC Staff	17	15	23	19	15	12	7	108	29
Research station	4	1	5	3	2	-	3	18	5
Individual field staff:-									
AO & AAO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
T.A.	12	9	10	9	7	6	6	59	16
A.A.I.	5	5	6	7	8	2	4	37	10
Combination (demonstration, field days, etc.)	3	3	5	4	5	5	3	28	7
								374	100

* Included St, Marks College and Jeanes School, Kabete.

APPENDIX IV

HOURS/WEEK SPENT ON DIFFERENT DUTIES - based on 19 time-tables kept by 9 T.A.'s employed on General Duties in Embu District

November 1965 - March 1966

	% aver. week
A. Agricultural Services	
i) Farm Layouts	11.8
ii) Organising 4-K Clubs	.3
iii) Recruiting for FTC	.7
iv) Farm Supplies (seeds, fertilizers, etc.)	6.3
v) Spraying, dusting of crops, etc.	4.2
vi) Loan applications	1.9
	25.2
B. Extension Work:	
i) Method Demonstrations	.7
ii) Result Demonstrations, trials, etc.	1.3
iii) Instructing or advising individual farmers on farms	17.9
iv) Addressing meetings or barazas	4.4
v) Visiting 4-K Club projects, etc.	1.3
	25.6
C. General:	
i) Non-agricultural meetings	1.4
ii) Collecting and distributing wages	3.6
iii) Staff meetings and meetings with other departments	8.1
iv) Office work, report writing, etc.	7.3
v) Collecting information	1.7
vi) Travel	18.9
vii) Attending Refresher Courses & Farmer Courses at FTC	3.9
	44.9
D. Enforcement of Laws, etc.	
i) Soil Conservation inspection	.6
ii) Collection of loans, FTC fees, etc.	2.6
iii) Checking use of loans and management of grade cattle	1.1
	4.3

APPENDIX V

NOTES ON SAMPLING AND QUESTIONNAIRES

1. It should be noted that the writer is primarily an agriculturalist rather than a sociologist or economist. This may colour the approach to this study.

2. The work on which this paper was prepared was only completed in September and it has not been possible to fully analyse the questionnaires.

3. The questionnaire which has been used for most of the tables in the paper was one entitled "Maize Practice Adoption Survey".

4. Explanation of terms:-

   "Progressive" Farms: The Embu ATC students who were used as enumerators were already employed on 19 "Progressive" Farms. The questionnaires were therefore first put to these farmers.
   "Neighbour" Sample : All farms adjoining the "progressive" farms (77 in all) were taken as an approximation to a random sample over the Maize/Coffee growing area lying between the 4,500 - 5,500 ft. contours.

5. Distribution of Farms:- The above procedure gave a good distribution throughout the area. The average size of farm in the "neighbour" Sample was 8.3 acres which is slightly larger than the average for 3 out of the 4 locations in Embu Division. The range of acreage was from 3.0-37 and 22% of the "neighbour" farms were under 5 acres.

6. Definition of "Farmer": 47% of husbands in the "neighbour" sample had some form of employment outside the farm at the time of questioning. If this employment precluded the husband from carrying out day to day management then the wife was considered to be the farmer.

7. Number of Visits:- Since the enumerators were living and working on the "progressive" farms they were able to obtain a detailed insight into these farms. Other farms were visited 2 or 3 times for the purpose of maize population and yield calculations.

8. Other questionnaires: Other questionnaires which have not yet been analysed were put to grade cattle owners, 4-K Club members, owners of Macadamia Nut trees and various grades of staff. The analysis of time spent on various jobs by T.A.'s is based on detailed time-tables kept by them.

APPENDIX VI

SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT EMBU DISTRICT

1. Population & Areas:

a) EMBU DIVISION

EMBU DIVISION	POPULATION	AREA (sq. miles)
NGANDORI	25,406	40.93
KAGAARI	22,270	59.40
GATURI	21,172	58.43
KYENI	16,329	36.90
	85,177	195.66

b) MBERE DIVISION:-

MBERE DIVISION	POPULATION	AREA (sq. miles)	
EVURORI	13,277	145.60	
NTHAWA	9,272	152.28	
MAVURIA	15,713	302.06	1962 Census Figures
MWEA	5,717	287.00	
	43,979	886.94	

2. SIZE OF HOLDINGS (EMBU DIVISION ONLY)

LOCATION	No. OF HOLDINGS	AVERAGE SIZE
NGANDORI	5,268	4.9 acres
KAGAARI	5,180	7.4 acres
GATURI	5,116	7.3 acres
KYENI	3,683	6.4 acres

3. LAND USE : (From 1966-70 Development Plan)

Agricultural Land Grade I	163,000 acres
Agricultural Land Grade II	460,000 acres
Agricultural Land Grade III	-
Game Reserves and National Parks	5,000 acres
Forest	43,000 acres
Other reservations	2,000 acres
TOTAL	673,000

4. RAINFALL:- EMBU A.T.C. RECORDS Annual average in inches

Year	Annual average in inches
1961	61.70
1962	42.43
1963	66.67
1964	53.37
1965	44.32

a) Rains start fairly regularly about the middle of March and the middle of October each year.

b) The range of rainfall in the District is from about 70-80" near the forest to about 10-20" near the Tana River.

5. ALTITUDE/ECOLOGICAL ZONES*:-

ALTITUDE	ECOLOGICAL ZONE	SUITABLE CASH CROPS
6,500 - 7,500	High Bracken	Tea, Pyrethrum
5,500 - 6,500	Kikuyu Grass)	Coffee, maize, pea beans
4,500 - 5,500	Star Grass)	macadamia
2,000 - 4,500	Grass Plains	Cotton, tobacco, sisal

* Adapted from E.S. Clayton "Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies."

APPENDIX VII



Embu Town(District
& Provincial H.Q.)
Runyenjies(Embu Division H.Q.
- Ngandori,Gaturi,Kagaari & Kyeni Locations)
Siakago(Mbere Division H.Q. - Mwea,Mavuria
Nthawa and Evurore Locations)

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DINI YA MSAMBWA*: A RE-ASSESSMENT

This paper attempts to analyse, in so far as it is possible to do so on the strength of available evidence, the various aspects of the D.Y.M. - its origins, aims, activities, achievements, if any, and the Government's reaction to the movement. Unfortunately, owing to the shortage of time, it was not possible to interview the various personalities involved in this drama. Consequently, the paper is entirely based on official records in the Kenya National Archives. It should be added, however, that this is merely part of a much wider research project which, it is hoped, will be completed in due course.

The D. Y. M. Originated in Bukusu (1) among the northern section of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya known as the Babukusu. It was led by Elija Masinde, a former Friends African Mission adherent. In 1935, at the age of about twenty-five, he clashed with the leaders of that denomination over his decision to take a second wife. Despite a threat of excommunication by the Mission, he married a second wife, left the mission, and started a new sect - the D.Y.M. (2)

Up till 1942, Elija had been employed as an askari kanga by the local Tribunal. Then, after quarrelling with the President of the Tribunal and refusing to obey orders, in 1942 Elija was sacked. In the preceding years he had distinguished himself as a footballer and had even played for Kenya against Uganda. (3)

As a religious movement, the D.Y.M. would appear to have incorporated several features from different religious denominations. For example, among other things, the sect was characterised by the use of the Bible and the Prayer Book (a C.M.S. and F.A.M. influence), the cross (an R.C.M. influence), the growth of beards and the wearing of turbans (Islam influence etc.), the drum (Salvation Army influence?), and references to Were (God) and the sacrifice of animals (the influence of the traditional Misambwa religion).(4)

Official sources suggest that the new sect was relatively innocuous until 1944 when it became openly anti-European and anti-Government. This appears to be corroborated by the views of Donisio Makimayu, one of the earliest adherents of the movement. His account of the origin and aims of the sect is quite illuminating. According to Donisio, the D.Y.M. was "a pure" religion founded to bring all people together in the worship of God "irrespective of tribes". As such, he argued, it was non-political and any violence committed by its adherents was merely to bring the sect to the notice of the Government. (5)

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* Hereafter referred to as the D.Y.M.

(1) Note that Ingham - "A History of East Africa", p. 407 -, V.Harlow and E.M. Chilver-"History of East Africa", II, p.383-, and D.H.Rawcliffe-" The Struggle for Kenya", pp.28-29- wrongly associated Elija Masinde and the D.Y.M. with the Suk.

(2) Rawcliffe, op.cit.

(3) DC/NN. 10/1/5.

(4) DC/NN.10/1/5.

(5) Ibid.

As already stated, Donisio's account of the origin of the sect is extremely illuminating. In 1942 he had a dream: "The sky lit up and there appeared Jesus Christ and two Africans, one of whom was wearing on his chest medals like football awards." Thereafter Donisio left his employment in the Trans-Nzoia and devoted his time telling everyone his experience. Before that, however, he had approached Father Paullard of Kibabi Mission who told him that the dream was "a good thing and that having had this vision he should from then on follow in the footsteps of Christ".

Though Donisio had never met Elija nor heard of him before his dream, when he met him in 1947, he at once recognised him as one of the Africans who had appeared in his dream wearing medals. He thought the second African in the dream was one Joash who was later deported with Elija. From then on, Donisio became Elija's second in command. (6) And so the sect became more and more mystical as its leaders claimed seeing visions.

It would thus appear that among the adherents of the D.Y.M. there were, at least, some people who were devoted to it purely as a source of religious inspiration and salvation. Thus, describing Donisio's attitude to the sect, the local District Commissioner commented:

> The religion itself he claims to be a pure one, the service a simple one of singing hymns, reading the Bible and a sermon. Why the name 'Msambwa' was given to it is that theirs was an attempt to return to the teachings of the Bible in its literal sense, and as both Moses and Abraham are described as having offered sacrifices, the same practice, which is a Kitosh [Babukusu] custom, was adopted and so the name. (7)

This view of the movement appears further to be borne out by a number of other facts. In the first place, the adherents of the D.Y.M. regarded Mount Elgon as Sayuni and paid regular visits thither. Secondly, they referred to the sect as the "Anglican Church of Israel" and to themselves as "the children of Israel". Of equal importance is the fact that they made frequent references to the Bible - Acts 24:16, Romans 1:7 and 2:1-8; Luke 17: 30-37, John 16:1-3; and Corinthians 5:1.

Further evidence of the significant role played by the Bible (especially in its literal sense) and the ancient customs of the Babukusu is to be found in the incident of 19th September, 1947. On that day Elija addressed a large meeting estimated at about 4,712 at Chetambi near Lugulu, sacrificed a sheep, cut up its meat, and fed it to those present. (8) This was clearly reminiscent of similar acts by Christ, Abraham, and leading Jewish elders whose history is recorded in the Bible.

It would, however, be naive to suggest that the D.Y.M. was a purely, or even largely, religious movement. Had that been the case the Administration would not have got so frightened about it for it had recognised the Nomiya Luo Mission, a purely religious sect centred in the Luo country, as a genuine religion. This is in no way to suggest that the Administration was always ready to welcome new sects by Africans.

As early as 1943 incendiarism had been reported in Bukusu. On 9th June 1943, for example, oxen used by the Agricultural Department had been deliberately let loose from their pen at night. Again In October of the same year three shops owned by Africans at Kimakungi market were burnt. By 1945 several houses including the Chief's new banda and the Agricultural Officer's house had been burnt. By the same date too a portion of the Agricultural Officer's residential plot and the site chosen by him for an implement store had been deliberately ploughed up. Although the Administration suspected Elija and his followers, the actual culprints were not known.

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(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.

By May 1949 similar cases of arson were already being reported in the Cherangani, Hoey's Bridge, and Kitale areas outside Bukusu. Here again the culprits were not known although the Senior Superintendent of Police for the Rift Valley felt that the "cases are undoubtedly the work of the Dini ya Msambwa, having regard to their threats to burn Europeans off their farms in the dry season". (9)

As already said, as yet there was no direct evidence to associate these activities with the D.Y.M. movement. Be that as it may, from 1944 onwards, Elija and his followers became openly anti-Government and anti-European:

> Open subversive talk seems first to have occurred on about 17.4.44 when three men (Elijah, Wenani and Wekuke - of whom more anon) were hailed before the location baraza in connection with an assault on Chiefs T.R. who were serving conscript labour summonses. These men made certain subversive statements in open baraza, and then refused to obey Chief Amutalla's order to sit down and be quiet. (10)

Broadly speaking, the trend of events appears to have been as follows. On 24th October 1944, Agricultural Instructor Gideon visited the area where Elija and many of his followers lived to give instructions. Thereupon Elija and two of his lieutenants, Wekuke and Wekunda, "violently threatened him" not to come there. Three days later, Wekunda refused to accept a conscription summons and on 30th October 1944, "the local Liguru and two of his men were violently assaulted and injured" on their way to serve conscription summonses on Elija by the latter and ten of his followers.

The above incidents led to the arrest of Elija, Wekuke, Wekunda, and Wenani. On their way to Kakamega (under arrest) Elija is said to have shouted out threats to the Indian traders at Kimilili: "I go now - but I shall return" and "You and all non-natives will go soon and permanently". Both in the Tribunal court and in the District Officer's court the accused are alleged to have been "truculent". In 1945 Elija was certified insane and sent to Mathari Mental Hospital. (11)

During Elija's absence in hospital, the movement appears to have been led secretly by Wekuke Sitawa with whom he had been convicted in 1944. There is ample evidence to suggest that despite the absence of its leader, the D.Y.M. movement continued to be openly defiant of authority. For instance, on 30th September 1946, Assistant Inspector of Police Stewart of Eldoret and a party of police visited Kimilili market checking up cattle for stolen stock. The local people obstructed them "to such an extent that it was considered politic for the Police party to withdraw".(12)

Nevertheless, it was not until after Elija's return in 1947 that the movement assumed the now familiar characteristics of large political rallies. Soon after his release Elija addressed meetings advocating the eviction of all Europeans, a return to old customs, the manufacture of weapons for use against Europeans, and, as before, the cessation of conscription. Addressing a meeting of about 400 people at Kimaliwa on 13th July 1947,

> He said that Europeans would have to leave from the country and that an African King, Governor and Administration would have to be appointed. (13)

Earlier, on 14th July 1947, his lieutenant, Wekuke Sitawa and three others had patrolled Kimilili township in turn demanding that the Indians reduce prices and, furthermore, that they give invoices for all goods purchased.

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(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid
(13) Ibid.

Again on 12th October 1946 propaganda meetings had been held at Kimilili and Broderick Falls to discuss the working conditions of labourers employed by Indians in the two areas. Parties of five or six people afterwards visited Indian shopkeepers laying down "conditions regarding hours of work, housing, and perquisites such as cups of tea during working hours etc". They also threatened to withhold supplies of milk, fuel, eggs, etc. from employers "unless their conditions were met". It was further reported that people went into Indian shops in the two areas and took goods "for which they refused to pay and are very abusive and truculent". (14)

And so the situation continued to deteriorate. On 7th October 1947 Elija refused to appear before the District Commissioner at Kimilili on the false pretext he was unwell. Next month ten men accused before the Location Advisory Council of prohibiting children attending a mission school at Musemwa were freed through the intervention of Mr. Pascal Nabwana whose oratory swayed the elders. Pascal Nabwana was the President of the Bugusu Union. Immediately the accused men left the baraza, they boasted that "they had beaten the Chief thanks to the assistante of Nabwana". By 9th February 1948 the Roman Catholic Mission at Kibabi had been entered by a crowd of between 700 and 1,000"singing, dancing .... unbalanced and disorderly and they told the Mission people that they were to leave, otherwise they would be killed". However, they left without causing any material damage. By this date too the District Commissioner had dispersed a crowd of about 500 men and women "in complete frenzy" at Sangalo. (15)

And so dark clouds continued to gather on the horizon. At a meeting addressed by Simiyu Mutoro on 9th February 1948 at Mahonge Matis, it was decided to go to Malakisi the following day to find out why the police were there:

> The preacher at the meeting .... stated that they would have to fight Europeans if there were any with the African askaris. It was further preached that the bullets fired on them would be water and could not do them any harm. (16)

Thus day by day the climax moved closer and closer. And when the ill fated day came on 10th February 1948, a big crowd left Mahonge Matis and arrived at Malakisi as had been agreed the day before. They arrived singing

> Europeans have long troubled us; we now have got our own God. Let us go forward, we are not going to be stopped by these people, they are nothing. The Europeans are troubling us, it is better if we kill them.(17)

At last the climax came. It came when the police opened fire killing eleven people and wounding sixteen. Six days later Elija Masinde was arrested and deported to Lamu where, to the chagrin of the Nyanza provincial administrators, he distinguished himself on the football ground as "Kapteni Masinde". (18) Thereafter only small meetings were held secretly at night. Anti-Government activities did not cease immediately. For instance, on 5th December 1949, a boundary mark was removed at Lwandeti in Kabras and the following day one Eriya Rukuva hoisted the D.Y.M. green flag and two letters containing anti-Government material at Kimilili.

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(14) DC/NN. 10/1/2
(15) DC/NN. 10/1/5
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.

There is ample evidence to indicate that the D.Y.M. movement was not confined to Bukusu and to the Babukusu alone. Indeed its meetings and activities were repeatedly reported in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu (Kitale, Hoey's Bridge, Cherangani, etc.) where, it must be added, there were many Babukusu farm labourers. The sect's activities were also reported in the Kabras area of Baluyia and, outside Buluyia, at Mombasa* and in neighbouring Bugishu across the Uganda border. In this last district twelve meetings appear to have been held and another six were scheduled to take place. The attendance at these meetings varied between 255 and 5,898.(19)

Details of suspects repatriated from the Trans-Nzoia between 9th April 1949 and 2nd September 1949 further support the view that the D.Y.M. was, at least, supported by some non-Babukusu people. Of some 186 repatriated males during the period in question, there were 121 Babukusu, 37 Bagishu and Sebei, 12 Abakabrasi, 7 Teso, 6 Abawanga and Abashisa, 2 Abanyala (Navakholo), and 1 from either Idakho or Isukha. The same sources suggest that a few of the Kony and the Suk were also involved in the movement.(20)

It would be difficult to establish any link between the D.Y.M. and the Bugusu Union led by Pascal Nabwana. Pascal himself was at one time arrested but later released due to lack of sufficient evidence by the prosecution. In spite of that the Administration continued to believe that the Bugusu Union was associated with the sect and that it "probably furnishes its brains". This was repeatedly denied by Pascal who was always eager to explain to the authorities the social and economic aims of the Union - the building of schools, the sending of children to institutions of higher learning abroad, the establishment of a co-operative society, etc.

Though Pascal said publicly on several occasions that "There is nothing bad in Dini Msambwa. This religion should be allowed to go on", he persistently denied having anything to do with it. At one time he even dared the authorities to call a public meeting and there, in the presence of everybody, make their accusations and prove them - for he was fed up with their endless suspicions. As the authorities had no concrete evidence on which to proceed, they did nothing of the sort. As one administrator confessed, he had nothing against Pascal as a person - "unless it be" that he tended to be a little too much on the "perfect" side! (21)

As will already be evident, the D.Y.M. movement owed its origin to a variety of factors - religious, political, social, cultural, and even economic. Of the religious factor enough has already been said. All that need be added is that there appears to have been a genuine desire on the part of the adherents of the sect to found a new religion that would be in keeping with the traditions and aspirations of the people. The new religion, it was hoped, would have "one object only the worship of God. The reason for its being started being the fact that ... the missions were not practising what they preached". (22) As a religious movement, therefore, the D.Y.M. would seem to have been the response of the local people to the hypocrisy of the missionaries, their "fleecing" of the poor, their intolerance and lack of understanding of, and sympathy for, the African way of life - particularly the African's customs - and, more immediately, the excommunication of "a large proportion of the more advanced and Christianized Africans" on grounds of polygamy. (23)

Yet if the foregoing is true, it is equally true that the D.Y.M. provided a means of giving expression to the nationalistic sentiments of the Babukusu. This has already been established by Elija's favourite theme - the eviction of all Europeans by 1950 and the establishment of an African Government. But this view was also shared by many of the adherents of the movement. For instance, at a meeting held in Trans-Nzoia on 12th June 1948,

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* DC/NN.10/2

(19) DC/NN.10/1/5

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Ibid.

> / Wanyoni / preached to them that all squarters and labourers should not work for Europeans, should not be afraid of troubling Europeans and of spreading the Dini ya Misambwa everywhere. They must keep on praying to God to give them good luck and strength for removing the Europeans back to their home land in Europe from Africa. (24)

It is apparent from all this that religion and politics were closely intertwined. In their political pronouncements and aspirations and in their desire to rid themselves of European oppression, the D.Y.M. adherents seem to have never tired of invoking God's assistance. Hence such thematic songs as

> Oh Baba jua,
> Oh Baba jua,
> Wasungu wanatusumbua (25)

and

> Were Baba yetu tusaidie
> Wazungu waende kwao
> Maina wa Lugali
> Wachie wa Wanaumbwa
> Mutonyi Bukerembe wasaide. (26)

The final evidence of the extent to which the religious and nationalistic aspirations of the D.Y.M. adherents were closely linked is to be found in the theme of a small meeting of 50 people held in Mombasa on 28th August 1948. Addressing the meeting, Girison Anyanga is reported to have said thus of Elija and the D.Y.M. :

> He is the father and mother of our religion, and we must never leave our religion until we die. It does not matter what the wazungu do to us, they can imprison us, deport all of us, but we must never desert our religion which was started by Elija. (27)

The word "wazungu" in this context means the Government and the Government had banned the D.Y.M.

Current social injustices definitely influenced both the origin and course of the movement and gave it a social complexion. Among other things, the grievances included the low wages (nine to ten shillings a month) for farm workers and other labourers, the long hours of work and the unsatisfactory housing situation. Of equal significance was the hostility with which the Government's conscription policy for the forces and European farm areas was regarded, the unpopularity of the soil conservation works and of the compulsory uprooting of Mexican Marigold in the shambas (a thing which was not done in European farm areas), the compulsory taking of cattle during active service, the carrying of the identity card, and, finally, the strength of a vague desire to revert to the old customs. To these must be added other grievances - the high prices, the failure of the local Indian traders to supply invoices for all goods purchased, and claims to land in the Trans-Nzoia occupied by European farmers. The social nature of the movement may further be illustrated by two facts. First, at one time there

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(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid : Oh Father, Oh Father, know that the Europeans are oppressing us.

(26) Ibid : Were (God), our Father, please come to our aid so that Europeans may return whence they came (their country). Maina wa Lugali, Wachie wa Wanaumbwa, Mutonyi Bukerembe, please help.
Note that apart from Were (God), the other names belong to important ancestral spirits.
(27) DC/NN.10/1/2.

was talk of withholding supplies of milk, fuel, and eggs from Indian employers at Kimilili and Broderick Falls if they did not accept the improved working conditions laid down by the workers. Secondly, in the settled area of Trans-Nzoia there was a threat by labourers "to go slow" or to strike altogether unless wages and other working conditions were improved. In a number of cases the threat to strike was carried out and minor concessions were given. (28)

As has been said, the Government did not get worried until 1944 when the D.Y.M. became openly defiant of authority. From then on the authorities embarked on a ruthless scheme to stamp out the sect, for they feared it might get out of hand and spread to other areas. Furthermore, they were determined to see that "no link-up is allowed to become established between Mau Mau and the DYM". Accordingly, the sect was proscribed and all non-official meetings were banned. In exceptional circumstances permission might be given for certain societies to meet. To bring the situation under control, police were stationed at Malakisi. (29)

By October 1952, the local District Officer was still saying that "Anti-DYM work is No. 1 priority with the Police and takes precedence over anything but the most serious crime". (30) Yet the sect was not easily contained despite the harsh sentences - three years hard labour and a reporting order for five years. In the case of fanatical members a restriction order was recommended. Furthermore, in 1949 the Government introduced the system of issuing passes to all Babukusu (and later the Teso, Kony, and Abanyala of Navakholo) leaving the district to take up employment in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu areas. Nor was that all. For in the same year compulsory paid labour was introduced to keep the young men busy and therefore free from mischief. They were engaged in public works such as the building of roads. As a further deterrent, collective punishment was applied in cases where acts of violence had been committed by unknown persons in a particular area. Finally, to keep the Trans-Nzoia area free from D.Y.M. elements, all suspects were repatriated - 186 in all by 8th September 1949.(31)

To recapitulate then, the D.Y.M. appears to have been started as a protest against a variety of grievances, both real and imaginary. Behind its formation were religious, political, social, and economic grievances which combined to give it shape, form, and force. To many of its adherents the D.Y.M. appears to have been a genuine attempt to find an alternative religion consonant with the teachings of the Bible and the traditions of the people. It was an attempt to get away from many of the teachings, prohibitions, and, it would appear, the hypocrisy of the missions. It was, equally, the people's reaction to the many political, social, and economic frustrations. It was, finally, as one of its original adherents described it, "the malic /malilio/ of an oppressed people". (32) And the "oppressed people" wanted an African Government and social justice based on their own traditions. If it achieved nothing else, at least it drew the attention of the Government to the above grievances.

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(28) DC/NN.10/1/5; DC/NN.10/1/2.
(29) DC/NN.2/6
(30) Ibid.
(31) DC/NN.10/1/5
(32) Ibid.