

MAKERERE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
CONFERENCE PAPERS - JANUARY 1967.


- PART A - Economics
PART B - Political Science
PART C - Sociology
PART D - Plenary Sessions

THIS IS PART C OF THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS.

- 405 S.R. Charsley, Mak., - The Profitability of a Group Farm.
408 C. Davis, Makerere - The Strength of the Muller-Lyer Illusion
as a Function of Attentional Factors.
437 J.W. Haberson, Nairobi - Land Resettlement: ^{a development strategy in Kenya} Problem-in Post
Independence Rural Development.
412 E. Gerken, Makerere - Identity, Status and Prestige.
423 P. Marris, Nairobi - Problems of African Entrepreneurship
in Kenya.
430 J. Moris, Makerere - The Evaluation of Settlement Scheme
Performance: A Sociological Appraisal.
431 R.E.S. Tanner, Makerere - Criminal Statistics in E.A.:
Problems of Evaluation.
434 J. Van Velsen, Zambia - Procedural Informality, Reconciliation
and False Comparisons.
439 C. Widstrand, U.C. Dar - Development by Exhortation: A Study
of nation-building over the radio in
Tanzania.
406 R.E. Yeld, Makerere - Continuity and change in Kiga Patterns
of Marriage: An Analysis of Structural
Change in Kiga Marriage in the 1930's and
the 1960's.

Subscribers receive 4 envelopes, containing Parts A; B; C and D
respectively.

Write to the Research Secretary, MISR for further copies.
Single papers Shs.5/- or its equivalent, Part A, B, C and D
Shs. 15/- each.



Mr. S. R. Charsley,
U.E.A. Social Science Conference,
December 1966.

No.

THE PROFITABILITY OF A GROUP FARM

In a paper entitled 'Group Farming in Bunyoro, Uganda' presented to last year's S.S.C. Conference at Makerere, I discussed the idea of a Group Farm as it was seen in the current scheme in Uganda. I then examined the way in which it was working out in practice in one particular case. I there took for granted the central developmental aspect of the idea, that the Farm will develop into a stable community of Farm families, living on the Farm, providing the labour to work their land, and drawing their livelihood from it.

I did not get round to questioning this at the time partly because I then lacked data on how things really were developing to set against the idea. I merely accepted that this was the end towards which the Farms would progress. I did indeed qualify this to the extent of making the progress dependent upon the Farm's fulfilling its income promise, but this was hardly a real qualification since I firmly expected it to do so. I have now the record of the ensuing year and it is clear that my cheerful expectations have not entirely been fulfilled.

This paper is therefore an attempt to examine what has been going wrong; what this means in terms of the developmental idea; and briefly at the end, what could be done about it. Three major aspects are examined: income, turnover of members and settlement.

Before going further, however, I must outline briefly the history of the Farm and the general plan of its operation. It began as a fully-fledged Group Farm in the 1964/5 season, following the operation for one season of a small, local, group cotton-growing scheme on land cleared by hand by its members. There were about 20 members of this original group; membership was expanded when the Government moved in to 56. Many of these newcomers were not, in contrast to the original group, local people or people depending for their livelihood exclusively on farming. A further feature of the influx was that several people obtained control in practice, though not on the books, of more than one plot. 56 is therefore the nominal membership figure, and this remained practically the same in the second season which is the one primarily under discussion. In the current season membership has expanded again to 61.

This is one of the first generation of Farms, for long was regarded as a model, but it is small in comparison with most others. It also has other peculiarities, in particular that each member has a permanently allocated 15 acre plot. These plots are arranged in rows, and cultivation is in strips of single crops running across the successive plots. This is to facilitate mechanical operations which can be carried out continuously along the strips from one end of the Farm to the other. Each plot also includes a strip by the access track which is set aside for the house site and for the cultivation of food crops according to the individual plot-holder's requirements.

During the Farm's first season the only crop generally grown was cotton. The second (1965/6) season was thus the first in which a full cycle of cropping was carried through. As in the first season, three acres of cotton were grown per member. Preparation of the land, planting and spraying were all the responsibility of the Farm Manager, to be carried out mechanically and to be paid for by a block loan obtained, in theory at least, through the parent

Co-operative Society. Thinning, weeding, picking and sorting were the responsibility of the individual plot-holder, to be carried out with whatever labour he could obtain.

In addition to the cotton, 'minor crops' were grown in both the first and second rains. These were $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres of maize and $\frac{1}{2}$ acre of groundnuts in the first rains, and 2 acres of maize and $\frac{1}{2}$ acre of beans in the second. Again for these, the preparation of the land and the planting were the Farm's responsibility, and the care thereafter and harvesting the individual's.

In my first paper I showed how the role of the Farm Manager was necessarily of wide significance in the running of the Farm, in contrast to the idea of the role, which would restrict it to the provision of mechanical services.

Income

I begin by considering income, since I contended in my first paper that all other satisfactory development depended upon this. In the season under discussion the cotton price, on which the Farm primarily depends, was at the high level of 60 cts lb. The crop was initially heavy, but the late continuing rains caused some damage and made picking even more unpleasant than usual; the weeds continued to grow around the ripening cotton. Fear of damage to ripe cotton left in the field rapidly broke up the small amount of co-operation between members which there had been for previous operations. In the 1964/5 season 14 Farmers had picked co-operatively in 3 groups, but last season there was no co-operative picking at all after the first week or so. Thus every man was left to fend for himself.

In these circumstances, in spite of the high price, cotton incomes were no higher than those of the previous year.

Table I Initial cotton income

	1964/5	1965/6
Median value	Shs 1050	Shs 1032
Interquartile range	Shs 700-1200	Shs 520-1500

By 'initial income' I mean the value of the crop sold, less the amount repaid for the loan for Farm charges. These are principally for mechanical operations, but may also include other charges, such as for seed, dressing or sprays. No allowance is made for the labour which the Farmer himself must supply. It is therefore the income he would have received if he had done all the work himself or with his own unpaid family labour.

Table II Proportion of Farmers employing labour

	Additional kin	Casual labour	Monthly paid	Farm porters
Cotton harvest '64/5	55%	25%	14%	34%
Season before cotton harvest '65/6	-	57%	20%	6%

But in the first place, family labour is by no means necessarily free. As Table II shows, more than half of the Farmers brought in extra kin not normally concerned with the Farm to deal with the cotton harvest. These particularly, almost without exception, had to be given some reward for their services, but even other regular members expect and get monetary and semi-monetary rewards; i.e. if not money itself, at least clothes, the payment of

tax, etc. This is particularly so because of the obviously close link there is between the cotton the individual picks or sorts and the money that its owner receives for it. I have not the data to give an average cost of rewards and there certainly is not any typical set. I can merely give a few specimens to suggest the range.

Kin receiving, & amount	Total rewards	Initial cotton income
1. wife 60/-, sister's son 75/-, sister 20/-, father's mother 10/-.	165/-	450/-
2. sister 20/-, mother 10/-, mother's sister 5/-, brother 5/-.	40/-	700/-
3. wife 100/-, mother 30/-, father 20/-, wife's mother 30/-, wife's father 20/-.	200/-	730/-
4. wife 200/-, sister 200/-.	400/-	1120/-
5. wife 3 <u>gomas</u> (= 100/-)+50/-, brother 200/-.	350/-	1270/-
6. father & mother 200/-.	200/-	1530/-

Secondly, although family and kin are undoubtedly the most important sources of labour, there was also a good deal of recourse to straightforwardly paid labour. As can be seen from Table II I have distinguished three types. The one which the highest proportion of Farmers used, 1/3 of them, was 'Farm porters'. This is labour hired by the Farm Manager or the Co-operative Society and sent to help members who are not able to complete operations satisfactorily out of their own resources. They may be sent with or without a prior request from the member concerned. They were used both for picking and for sorting the cotton, and are very expensive as they are paid at the Government rate for porters, Shs 5/20 per day. The attraction of them was that they were available on credit from the Society, whereas other labour would require immediate payment, which was difficult until cotton had been sold.

Secondly, a quarter of the Farmers used casual labour at one time or another, usually paying 50 cts for picking a 4-gallon tin of cotton. This labour was mainly provided by Alur cash-cropping migrants settled around the edges of the Farm. And thirdly, a few members employed labour by the month, the current minimum rate for this being 35/-. Most of the monthly labourers at this time were Banyoro, though Rwandans from a nearby refugee settlement moved in subsequently.

One way and another, it is clear that there were very few Farmers who incurred no monetary cost in providing labour for the cotton crop. It is therefore essential to make some estimate of cost of labour to set against the initial income. In Bunyoro at least, the Farm is not worked by a collection of Farm families which can each be regarded as a single income unit.

The major easily costable items are:-

Weeding: casual labour @ 15/- per acre/time

3 acres, 4 times = Shs 180/-

Picking: casual labour @ about 4 cts lb

Farm labour @ about 8 cts lb

Sorting: Farm labour @ about 5 cts lb

say, 7 cts lb, both operations.

In costing the cotton labour there is thus a fixed element, like the Farm charges, which does not vary according to the amount harvested, and also a variable element. Combining both, an estimate of labour costs on the basis of the amount of cotton actually sold, has a median value of Shs 375/- (Interquartile range: Shs 307 - 418). This appears to be in reasonable harmony with the specimen 'rewards' quoted above, bearing in mind that the latter are exclusively for harvesting. It does not imply that

this amount of money was actually spent, though in some cases it certainly was; but at least it is clear that unless the initial income received by the individual exceeds his labour estimate by a fair margin, the crop has not been profitable. It therefore gives some measure of the 'real' profit or nett income: median of initial incomes less labour estimates =

Shs 660 (interquartile range: Shs 221 - 1015).

Taking this cotton income for the moment as if it were the total Farm income, it may be compared with other local incomes.

Privately employed porter @ 35/- per month min.	= Shs 420/- p.a.
Secretary-Manager of Co-operative Society @ 85/-	Shs
per month	= Shs 1020/- p.a.
Government porter @ 130/- per month	= Shs 1560/- p.a.
Tractor driver @ 190/- per month minimum	= Shs 2280/- p.a.

It is clear from these figures that even with the cotton price as high as 60 cts lb, some third of the Farmers failed to do appreciably better than a local porter, employed throughout the year. The fact that many did in fact very much worse demonstrates that even these levels of income are not without risk. Incomes of Farmers in general are certainly not comparable with those of the paid Farm staff of porters, plot measurers and tractor drivers who work for them.

However, when compared with the results of local cotton growing- the only important cash crop in the immediate area- the results appear more favourable. I intended to obtain data on cotton sales for the people of one particular village from the Co-operative Society; without detailed knowledge of the actual people it is not possible to untangle the dead men and those who sell for others into meaningful figures. The Society concerned is the one to which the Farm also belongs. This would have provided some fairly definite income figures for comparison. Unfortunately there were difficulties about selling the crop to this Society, on account of bottlenecks in transport to the ginners, and in the provision of money for payment. A good deal of cotton was therefore sold to other neighbouring Societies, some of which even arranged transport. In these circumstances it became impossible to obtain useful figures. Nevertheless from the incomplete data I have available, it seems that average income per household in the particular village, calculated in a way to be comparable with the figures above, could not reach more than half the Farm level. There is of course, as on the Farm, a very wide range of variation, and much overlap of village with Farm incomes.

In addition the Farmers had the $4\frac{1}{2}$ acres of 'minor crops' grown primarily for sale. These undoubtedly made a definite contribution to real income in spite of the difficulties which beset them, but it is difficult to obtain any accurate idea of how big this contribution was.

To begin with, the first rains were insufficient and the maize and groundnuts grown then yielded poorly. The bulk however, at least of the maize, does seem to have been delivered to the Society; the Farmers have in theory an obligation to deliver the whole of their production. But then began difficulties in disposing of the crops which meant that there were long delays before the Farmers received payment. Unlike cotton these crops can be profitably disposed of other than by sale to the Society. Already with the first maize two Farmers failed to deliver any at all, and it seems probable that many people delivered only as many groundnuts as they thought would offset their loan; 35/53 Farmers delivered groundnuts to a value within \pm Shs 20/- of the amount of their loan.

When it came to the second rains maize, the delivery position had deteriorated badly. This was probably through a combination of the realization of alternative possibilities and because of the payment difficulties which were being experienced. There were then 17 Farmers who failed to make any delivery at all. Maize was eaten by the household - Banyoro generally only eat it fresh, on the cob - or it was made into beer at home, or it was sold, mainly again for beer making. The beer (bikwete) was either sold as such, used to employ labour, or made into waragi for sale. Groundnuts again were eaten, sold or used directly to pay labour. The Alur mentioned above work for money, beer or groundnuts. Only the beans, a small white variety, were not much favoured for local consumption, though some people did eat these also.

It seems to me impossible to disentangle the effects of these factors. The Farmers' understanding of the situation is that the yields were poor and the prices poor, and that they therefore even had difficulties in repaying their loans for the crops. They generally regarded them as unprofitable. There has indeed been so much trouble over the minor crops since that time that none at all were planted in the second rains of the current season. The figures that I have therefore appear to me to be largely meaningless. I simply note that the minor crop figures, such as they are, add about \$ 100 to the median value for initial cotton income, and almost nothing at all if an allowance is made for labour costs. In three cases however, the initial return for minor crops even exceeded \$ 600/-

I have discussed the general level of income, but one of the most fundamental considerations for evaluating the success of Group Farms for the members is that, as is perhaps almost universal with farming, average figures by themselves are not very meaningful; the average farmer hardly exists. Even if the average figure is satisfactory, many of the Farmers certainly did far less well. What is disturbing about the income figures is not so much their general level as their extreme variability and inconsistency.

After the first season I thought that I knew who were the effective Farmers and who the less effective. The incomes then seemed to show a healthy central tendency about the median value. This is shown by the fairly restricted interquartile range (Table I above). In the second season the range opened out considerably, to \$ 520 - 1500, not because of any polarizing of the good and the bad, but simply through a flattening of the distribution. Table III illustrates this change.

Table III. Those farming in both seasons, by income categories
(% ages)

	1965/6				
	\$ 1500 +	\$ 1000-1499	\$ 500-999	\$ 500 -	
\$ 1500+	6	6	8	2	21
\$ 1000-1499	10	15	8	8	40
1964/5					
\$ 500-999	8	8	6	10	31
\$ 500-	0	0	6	2	8
	23	29	27	21	

The main purpose of the Table however, is to show the inconsistency between the seasons: 31% of the Farmers moved into a higher category, 40% into a lower, and only 29% remained in the

Why this should be I consider below. Here I note only the problem of the fact that the Farmers in general have so far failed to develop a stable relationship to the Farm and the management of their plots on it. There is as yet little sign of a class of steady and competent Farmers developing to form a basis for the Farm as a successful long-term operation.

Turnover of members

A further fact pointing in the same direction is the high turnover of members in the season, a season indeed which should, in the high price of the cotton, have been most favourable to the Farmers. Table IV shows the bare figures for those leaving and for new members. If it is hoped that the members are gaining any beneficial experience from the Farm, it is clearly regrettable not only that so many should leave so rapidly but also that there is in consequence a high proportion (28%) of totally inexperienced Farmers again on the Farm in the succeeding year.

Table IV Farm membership in the succeeding year.

	'64/5	'65/6	'66/7
New members	37	3	17
Total members	56	55	61
Members leaving	3	11	(1 to date)
% age turnover	5	20	-

If it is asked who these leavers were, the only at all general factor to which I can point is their failure to make money. When the leavers' median income of \$ 332 is set against the general Farm median of \$ 1032, it is obvious that as a category they failed financially. But this does not in fact tell us much, for it does not necessarily mean that they left because they failed financially; they may have failed because they had decided to leave in any case, or both failure and leaving may have resulted from some third factor or set of factors. There was in fact no one reason for their leaving; they and their circumstances were highly diverse. There was no general disillusionment over the Farm; the leavers do not represent a faction; nor do they have any connection with Farm 'politics', of which in any case they are hardly any. An optimist in Group Farm management tends to see it as 'a weeding out of weak members', but as will appear, this is only true if made so by definition.

To demonstrate all this, I now cite briefly the circumstances of each of the 11 leavers, before commenting further on them.

1. Kwebiha;¹ a local man in his mid-20s, teaching at a school about 10 miles away. He had a motorcycle and much of the time commuted between the Farm, where he stayed with his wife and 17 year old sister's son, and the school. He had no established holding anywhere else, had built one of the best houses on the Farm and clearly intended to stay. But in neither season did he make any money: \$ 452 in the first year and \$ 423 in the second.

2.&3. Isike and Eymaro, father and son, neither of them ever living on the Farm. The father, a local government officer in Masindi, had already taken up land on the Farm site before the Farm itself started. He was persuaded into the Farm pattern as a member. He began building a substantial house but never completed it.

¹ Names are fictional

Initially one of his two wives lived on the Farm, with a full-time porter, and he himself visited 'every weekend, sometimes', being brought by a car-owning friend who was also a member. In the same house lived his sister, who looked after Byemaro's plot. This was virtually her's; Byemaro's role was limited to sending her money occasionally from his salary as a mechanic in Hoima. She would then employ labour with it, and give him a share of the cotton money in return. In the first season Isoke's cotton made \$ 940, and Byemaro's \$ 1001. But then things began to go wrong; the friend who had given lifts went to work elsewhere and the lifts ceased. Isoke did not feel able to get to the Farm in any other way, so his visits also stopped. His wife was ill, went home to recover and did not come back, except very briefly at the end. His second season's cotton income dropped to \$ 280. His sister stayed on alone for the cotton harvest and produced \$ 1245 from Byemaro's plot, but then she also left. Though reluctant for different reasons, the family had no alternative but to give up their membership.

4. Byabagambe: 21 years, unmarried and with virtually no history of employment. He made \$ 1184 in the first season but then apparently lost interest. Though he was usually sleeping on the Farm, in a tumbledown shack, he was rarely to be found there during the day and neglected his plot most of the time. In the second season his cotton income amounted to \$ 44.

5. Kasigwa: in his mid-30s, married and with small children, but still living and cultivating on his father's land near the Farm. He never lived on the Farm or built there at all; indeed all his plans were centred on building at home. Nevertheless he was a member of one of the few groups of Farmers who worked together regularly, and in the first season, in which he made \$ 1270, and the early part of the second he was doing well. But he vacillated between drinking too much and giving it up altogether, and when his wife left him, temporarily as it proved, he ceased to cope with the Farm. His second season's initial cotton income was \$ 241.

6. Byembandwa: The first chairman of the group when it began in 1963, and previously the leader of two local Co-operative Farming Societies. He did well in the first season: \$ 1673; but in the second was unable to cope with the Farm (\$ 241), through illness and perhaps approaching old age - he was about 65 years old. He never built more than a shack on the Farm, and though he sometimes stayed there, he had a proper home off the Farm nearby. He did not want to leave the Farm, but the committee considered that he was unable to manage and at the time he was too ill to resist successfully.

7. Katabarwa: 21 years, and with about 2 years of agricultural employment before he decided to grow cotton on his own account. He came to the Farm with a wife but she left him after the first season. He lived on the Farm with his younger sister until she got married and left at the beginning of this year. His father was already dead. He decided that, for lack of anyone to help him, he could not manage to remain on the Farm. In any case he did not succeed in making much money in either season: \$ 695 for the first, and \$ 548 for the second.

8. Makuru: an important chief, he joined the Farm only at the beginning of the second season. He tried to get his brother's son, an ex-warder, to stay there to work the plot, but after a little experience of it he proved unwilling. Makuru had no alternative but to give up without even completing a season.

9. Barwogeza: a local shopkeeper in his late 20s, he had a rough shack on the Farm but never really lived there. He attempted to farm but rather expensively, frequently using porters. His plot was rocky and infertile and he lost a good deal of money. first season income \$ 526, second \$ 203, the latter at least being certainly insufficient to meet his labour costs. He was not interested in another plot which was offered to him, and his original plot was not re-occupied.

10. Byaru'anga: about 50 years, a retired minor chief. He was on the site from before the Farm and was persuaded to join in, but he was never very enthusiastic, not seeing any great advantage in the mechanical side and disliking the necessary regimentation. But he worked hard and did well in the first season: \$ 1682. He then began to build a shop. In the second season he received \$ 1049 and retired, his shop completed. He is the only case so far of someone leaving with a small amount of capital accumulated for a purpose outside the Farm.

11. Kajura: in his mid-30s, a top official of the Co-operative Union. He made the highest income on the Farm (\$ 2681) from his two plots in the first season. For much of the second season he was abroad and had to rely on two full-time porters, supervised from time to time by his sister. She could not spend long periods on the Farm as she was too much needed also by her own and his families at home. Under these circumstances, when he returned he found a decline; he had wished to set an example to the other Farmers but now found that on the contrary his plots were among the worst. In the second season he made \$ 1587 only from the two plots together. He decided that he had no time himself to remedy the situation and that he should withdraw.

It will be seen immediately that there are only two cases here of persistent failure to make money, Nos 1 & 9, and these are the only ones for which 'financial failure leading them to leave' is an at all reasonable account. To be noted rather is the fact of markedly declined income in 6 of the cases: 2, 4, 5, 6, 10 & 11. Reasons for the decline are suggested in each of the circumstances detailed, but in general it is a part of the pattern of inconsistency and instability referred to above.

The fact that 5 of the leavers were under 30 years old, and that these were 50% of all under 30s on the Farm, is also worth noticing. The median initial cotton income of these ten was \$ 485 and only two of them bettered the Farm median; one of these latter was indeed leaver No 3 whose plot, as I noted above, was in any case looked after by his much older aunt. The younger members do therefore appear to be in general weak, and this was also evident in the first season's results, though in a less pronounced form. This seems to be connected with a lesser willingness or ability to get the work done. I shall discuss it in the context of the provision of labour below.

Settlement

A third feature to note is that four of the leavers were people who never lived on the Farm and were employed at a distance from it. Two others were local people who did not live on the Farm itself. This latter category however, includes some of the most successful Farmers; and in the former, one of the four was in fact making money. Other members remain who are apparently successful in combining the Farm with full-time employment. Nevertheless absentees do obviously have certain difficulties which residents do not.

The most direct problem is supervision. The absentee must either find somebody who can be trusted to manage his land without eating up the whole of the profits, or he must pay frequent visits himself. This he may most easily do if he has a motor-vehicle, which at least 5 of the remaining absentees do have. If he has not, he may find it impossible, as did No 2, to go on with the Farm; but even if he has, this is of course an additional expense. He may in any case not have time for frequent visits, which was a part of the trouble for the two car-owners among the leavers, Nos 8 & 11.

Table V Age of resident holders and others by income categories

	\$ 499	\$ 500-999	\$ 1000-1499	\$ 1500 -
Resident holders	14	19	48	19
Others	24	28	17	31

The table shows a clear difference between resident holders as a category and all others, although medians and means for the two groups are not in fact very different. Whereas the former show a definite central tendency in their income levels, the latter do not. They may if anything be said to fall into two sections, those who performed below average for the Farm, and those rather far above it. Among the latter there are such people as the EAR & H official who is devoting energy and money to his land on the Farm and is now building the first block-built house there, in spite of losing the greater part of his last season's cotton in an accidental fire. This was after he had made special efforts to get it picked at the optimal time. He plans to retire onto the Farm.

While Group Farming is not of course primarily for such people, I may note in passing that in practice a Farm which has a few of them is likely to be very fortunate. They offer the best hope that a Farm really will become a centre of agriculture-based progress, and that it will be able to find from within itself the means to enlightened self-government as an independent, self-sufficient unit. Though it is always true that if absentees are bad, it is more difficult for the Committee to contact them and bring pressure to bear on them than is the case with residents, if they are good they are often very very good.

I have shown that residents are on the whole more consistent as Farmers than are the absentees. For this reason alone a trend towards increasing residence would be desirable. It would also tend to suggest that there was an increasing appreciation of the full-time nature of the Farm's demands and willingness to accept them. I did indeed predict in my earlier paper that settlement on the Farm would increase. It is therefore useful to examine the record of actual residence on the Farm as I have obtained it by monthly censuses between September 1965 and November 1966. This is set out in Table VI below.

Table VI	<u>Residence on the Farm by month.</u>											
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
<u>1965</u>												
Total plots									56	56	56	56
% not occup.									23	25	20	18
Adults per occup. plot									1.7	1.9	2.0	2.3
<u>1966</u>												
Total plots	56	55	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	
% not occup.	11	11	18	28	41	38	39	34	28	33	31	
Adults per occup. plot	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.2	

In the Table two measures of residence are adopted, the proportion of plots found unoccupied each month (those where nobody had slept on the preceding night), and the mean number of people over 16 years who had spent the night on each occupied plot. No distinction is attempted between residents and visitors; indeed it is the kind of situation where it would be very difficult to make any such distinction, at least without a large borderline category.

The pattern from both indicators is clear. It is of an increase in residence as the cotton season builds up and a decline once it is over. It is a distinctly cotton-based pattern, with a very distinct holiday period, with a very high rate of unoccupied plots, in the three months, May, June and July, when the cotton has been finally disposed of. Even these figures in fact do less than justice to the

desertedness of the Farm at this season since I have only counted the plots in multiple holdings as empty if there was nobody on any of them; e.g. for the purposes of the Table, two people in one house 'filled' four plots for several months of the year.

Even more significant however, than this seasonal desertedness is the comparison of the rates for September, October and November of the two years. The proportion of empty plots is markedly higher in the second year. This is not accounted for by the new plots, which in fact have shown a more regular occupancy than the old. Nor is it accounted for by the fact that members have left, since, as already discussed, the leavers included a high proportion of absentees anyway. It is that there have been very few new residents establishing themselves in the period, together with a tendency for others to stay there less.

What seems to have happened is that in the enthusiasm and exhortation of starting the Farm most of the Farmers built there and a majority started to live there, at least part of the time. But as I pointed out in my earlier paper, over half even of these maintained their previous home elsewhere and when the cotton season was over they went home. With a continuing failure to accept the full-time commitment to the Farm and with the reliance on hired labour, the locals at least found that they could keep the Farm ticking over while basing themselves more pleasantly and comfortably on their previous homes. The desertedness of the Farm indeed snowballed. At the best of times it remains only slightly more than a collection of diverse individuals, lacking important links with one another. When some of the few who were there started to go away, this inevitably increased the loneliness of those remaining and their feeling of insecurity. This was indeed accentuated by a number of robberies. The incentive to go home oneself, if one had a home to go to, was therefore strong. All of which contradicts the idea of how the Farm would develop.

The second indicator, the number of adults on each occupied plots, does however appear to offer slightly more encouragement. It shows slightly more people per plot than in the previous year and this may mean that those who are living on the Farm are tending to become more established there. On the other hand it may be simply a reflection of the fact that a number of plots on which one person only was staying before were now not occupied at all, being either worked from local homes off the Farm, or by means of periods of temporary residence. It seems that the latter is likely on the whole to be the more important explanation of the increase shown by this indicator.

Nothing disastrous has happened on this Farm. Yet many of the Farmers are not securing a good income, their performance is erratic, they have lost faith in the Farm's handling of the minor crops, too many people are leaving - though it should be stressed that there are plenty ready to take over from them - and though settlement has here been a part of the plan from the beginning, and residents are the steadier part of the membership, the amount of residence on the Farm is at best not increasing. These are all troubles which came up in the second season after a very promising first one. What happened?

The provision of labour

The season under discussion was the first in which the Farmers had to deal with more than one Farm crop at a time. The work of the first rains crops overlapped with the beginning of the cotton work, and the second rains with the rest of the cotton season, producing indeed a coincidence of harvests. The evidence is that people turned increasingly to hired labour to deal with this situation.

desertedness of the Farm at this season since I have only counted the plots in multiple holdings as empty if there was nobody on any of them; e.g. for the purposes of the Table, two people in one house 'filled' four plots for several months of the year.

Even more significant however, than this seasonal desertedness is the comparison of the rates for September, October and November of the two years. The proportion of empty plots is markedly higher in the second year. This is not accounted for by the new plots, which in fact have shown a more regular occupancy than the old. Nor is it accounted for by the fact that members have left, since, as already discussed, the leavers included a high proportion of absentees anyway. It is that there have been very few new residents establishing themselves in the period, together with a tendency for others to stay there less.

What seems to have happened is that in the enthusiasm and exhortation of starting the Farm most of the Farmers built there and a majority started to live there, at least part of the time. But as I pointed out in my earlier paper, over half even of these maintained their previous home elsewhere and when the cotton season was over they went home. With a continuing failure to accept the full-time commitment to the Farm and with the reliance on hired labour, the locals at least found that they could keep the Farm ticking over while basing themselves more pleasantly and comfortably on their previous homes. The desertedness of the Farm indeed snowballed. At the best of times it remains only slightly more than a collection of diverse individuals, lacking important links with one another. When some of the few who were there started to go away, this inevitably increased the loneliness of those remaining and their feeling of insecurity. This was indeed accentuated by a number of robberies. The incentive to go home oneself, if one had a home to go to, was therefore strong. All of which contradicts the idea of how the Farm would develop.

The second indicator, the number of adults on each occupied plots, does however appear to offer slightly more encouragement. It shows slightly more people per plot than in the previous year and this may mean that those who are living on the Farm are tending to become more established there. On the other hand it may be simply a reflection of the fact that a number of plots on which one person only was staying before were now not occupied at all, being either worked from local homes off the Farm, or by means of periods of temporary residence. It seems that the latter is likely on the whole to be the more important explanation of the increase shown by this indicator.

Nothing disastrous has happened on this Farm. Yet many of the Farmers are not securing a good income, their performance is erratic, they have lost faith in the Farm's handling of the minor crops, too many people are leaving - though it should be stressed that there are plenty ready to take over from them - and though settlement has here been a part of the plan from the beginning, and residents are the steadier part of the membership, the amount of residence on the Farm is at best not increasing. These are all troubles which came up in the second season after a very promising first one. What happened?

The provision of labour

The season under discussion was the first in which the Farmers had to deal with more than one Farm crop at a time. The work of the first rains crops overlapped with the beginning of the cotton work, and the second rains with the rest of the cotton season, producing indeed a coincidence of harvests. The evidence is that people turned increasingly to hired labour to deal with this situation.

Table II above shows that the use of hired labour was far more general in the earlier and relatively slack part of the second cotton season than it had been at the peak of the previous season, the actual harvest. This was no doubt partly to do with the availability of resources with which to hire labour at the latter period, both money from the first season's cotton, and the minor crops as discussed above. But it did not apparently lead to a useful increase in production and is therefore almost certainly an unsatisfactory development, besides being at variance with the basic idea that the Farm would be worked primarily by the family labour resident on it.

From the beginning there has been a preoccupation in planning and management with this family labour and its sufficiency. The Farm Manager early attempted to find out what labour would be available by asking Farmers how many people they intended to have living and working on the Farm. This survey in fact had no practical purpose since he had no idea of how much labour would be required to work the Farm. It was purely the result of a preoccupation with this aspect; indeed it was just as well that it had no practical purpose, since the 'intentions' expressed in fact bore no relation to the event.

Again, one of my own initial objects in systematic interviewing on the Farm in the middle of the 1965/6 cotton season was to document a difficulty which I supposed must exist in providing sufficient labour. In fact I failed entirely to find any awareness of such a difficulty. This was partly because it was only I, but not the Farmers, who were under the spell of the idea that they would be working the Farm with their own family labour. They knew well that the effective supply of labour was not limited by those on whom they could call personally, but, much more elastically, by the resources they could devote to the hire of strangers. Thus, though it is tempting to suggest that the young did badly because their junior family status tended to mean that there were fewer people on whom they could call for help, this cannot at least have been a major factor. It may though have contributed to the difficulties of the young, as for example, in the case of leaver No 7, for whom it was probably accentuated by the failure to make much money in the previous season.

But the lack of awareness of difficulty did not mean that, even by the use of hired labour, all work was getting done satisfactorily. It seems rather that there is an absence of any compulsion experienced to tend the crops just because they are there and need attention if they are to do well. In general, agricultural work here seems not to be given a high priority in the allocation of time, and this is no doubt accentuated by the possibility of falling back on hired labour. A man feels that if he does not get round to weeding the cotton himself by the time it gets really bad, then he can always put a gang of Alur in, and they will finish it up in a day.

The idea of full-time, regular commitment to agriculture as to a job has not yet gained wide acceptance, while the idea of one big effort for the cotton largely has. In the first year the cotton season was virtually all that the Farm was, with corresponding success. In the second year the Farmers were asked something much more difficult, in effect to commit themselves the whole year round to making farming the first claim on their time. This I think was the real difference between the seasons and the main reason for the troubles of the second. A few Farmers were able and willing to rise to the new demands, but more became erratic and fell back increasingly on hired labour.

I have already contended that the possibility of hiring a big force occasionally is a factor opposing the development of a preoccupation with keeping up with the job. There are still other

factors in the way of the development of a full-time commitment, as in employment. In the first place, as my comparison with salary levels showed, income obtainable on the Farm is not high in relation to salaries. In the last season, with the cotton price at 60 cts, the potential income may have been sufficient; in the current season, at 40 cts, it must be very doubtful whether it is.

Secondly the Farm is unlike a job in that returns for work put in are both distant and uncertain. The idea very necessary to the commercial as opposed to the subsistence farmer that labour which turns out to have been unproductively spent on one crop will on average be balanced by labour on another crop which turns out to have been super-productive, has not yet appeared. The troubles were accentuated in the season under discussion by the difficulties in getting payment for minor crops; maize harvested in December 1965 was not paid for until June 1966 for example. This means that there is a serious discipline problem which is not there in employment; where work is not a way of life, it requires considerable discipline to work steadily without any compulsion purely in the hope of future rewards. And in Bunyoro work is distinctly not a way of life. This I think is the big difficulty with which such an all-in scheme has to contend.

Future action

If this is so and if it is judged that income levels in the future, i.e. crop prices, are likely to be sufficiently high to make it worth the attempt, then the need is to educate people into a new attitude to farming. Nothing can be guaranteed, but at least it would seem more sensible to spend money on attempting to change the Farmers than merely to decorate the landscape, as has recently been done at the Farm under discussion by the building of large main roads in circles around its two hills.

I therefore suggest that consideration should be given to the possibility of paying members weekly a small sum for 'subsistence' as an advance on the crops under production. This would be favoured by the Farmers and should have the effect of raising their standard of living and increasing their dependence on money and hence their interest in earning as much of it as possible. By making the Farm more immediately attractive it should also serve to attach members more firmly and more constantly to it. But the main advantage would be that the payments could be made conditional on whatever behaviour it was desired to encourage among the Farmers. Notably, residence could be a condition, and keeping up with work needing to be done. This would have the intention of establishing a preoccupation with keeping up and a habit of hard work, in the hope that the improved rewards obtained, together with the greater dependence on money, would ultimately make these permanent.

I will not go into the mechanics of such payments here, and perhaps there are other possible solutions. Let me finally summarize: I have shown that the developmental idea of a Group Farm as a collection of Farm families, living on it, providing the labour for it and getting their livelihood from it, is not here working out in practice. I have suggested that one of the main reasons for this is that the idea of full-time, all the year round commitment to agriculture is far less natural and obvious to Banyoro than it perhaps is to the Scheme's devisers and managers, and that introducing the idea was, and remains, therefore not without difficulty. I have finally suggested action which could be taken in an attempt to promote an attitude to Group Farming which its devisers had perhaps taken for granted.

No. 408

Clive M. Davis
U.E.A. Social Science Conference,
December 1966.

The Strength of the Müller-Lyer Illusion as a Function of
Attentional Factors.¹

1. This paper is not for citation or publication without the consent of the author.

The research reported here has been carried out under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, New York. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

The author is indebted to Dr. Julia A. Carlson, of Educational Testing Service, for collection of the U.S. data.

The Strength of the Müller-Lyer Illusion as a Function of Attentional Factors.

Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits, in 1966, reported wide cross-cultural variations in susceptibility to several geometric "optical-illusion", figures. In accounting for these differences Segall, *et.al.* invoked an empiricistic orientation derived from the theoretical work of Brunswick (1956). Brunswick's theory of ecological cue validity suggests that different habits of visual inference are learned under differing ecological conditions and subsequently, when a respondent is placed in an ambiguous setting, that is, one in which the normal ecological cues are not valid indicators of veridical perception, these learned inference habits may lead to non-veridical perception.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal extensively with the Segall, *et.al.* research findings, for those of you who are not familiar with them it may prove helpful at this point to quickly review the major hypotheses and the subsequent findings of this study. Three hypotheses are relevant: carpentered-world, foreshortening of receding horizontals, and symbolizing three dimensions in two. The carpentered-world hypothesis states that people living in highly carpentered, rectangularized environments learn the useful inference habit of interpreting acute and obtuse angles, as they appear on the retina of the eye, as actually representing right angles. The most obvious example is the top of a table. Looking at the top of a table it is clear that the four corners do not appear on the retina as right angles, when, in fact, the person living in the carpentered world knows that they are right angles. He, therefore, according to this theoretical approach, develops the useful inference habit of interpreting these acute or obtuse angles as right angles. Of course not all acute or obtuse angles do represent right angles and this the person also learns so that the probability of interpreting an acute or obtuse angle as a right angle is not one. When the person who has, however, learned this habit is placed in a situation lacking in the multiple cues normally found in his environment, in other words a situation which isolates this cue of acuteness or obtuseness representing a right angle, there will be a tendency for him to employ this normally useful habit. When, however, the acute or obtuse angles do not represent right angles and the inference habit is employed it will lead to non-veridical or inaccurate perception. In other words an optical-illusion, or a discrepancy between physical measurement, and psychological or subjective measurement will result.

Now, let us carry this reasoning to the cross-cultural level.

When, for two different cultures, the strength of this inference habit differs, or the probability of interpreting acuteness or obtuseness as a right angle is less for one culture than another, and, when representatives of both cultures are placed in the ecologically unrepresentative situation, the likelihood of employing this habit will be greater for the representative of the culture with the stronger habit than for the representative of the culture with the relatively weaker habit. Hence, one cultural group should be more susceptible to the illusion than the other.

Specifically, Segall, et.al. predicted that people living in highly carpentered environments e.g. "Europeans" would be more susceptible to this type of illusion than would "Non-Europeans" living in a relatively uncarpentered world. They employed two figures to test this hypothesis; the Müller-Lyer and the Sander-Parallelogram, both of which can be explained in terms of the foregoing reasoning with regard to interpreting as right angles, angles which are acute or obtuse on the retina. Their findings support their prediction. The three "European" groups in their sample, U.S. college students at Northwestern University, residents of Evanston, Ill., and a sample of South African whites, were the most susceptible of the 17 groups tested for these figures.

Turning to the second hypothesis; foreshortening of receding horizontals, the suggestion is that people who live in relatively open environments learn the habit of interpreting what appears on the retina of the eye as a short vertical line as representing a horizontal extending away from them. An example would be a furrow of a plowed field. On the other hand, the person living in a relatively compressed environment, such as a forest or an extremely mountainous area would interpret a vertical retinal image as representing a vertical in the environment. When representatives of these two cultures are placed in an ecologically unrepresentative situation in which it is impossible to tell whether a vertical line is representative of a vertical or a horizontal, the field dweller would be more likely to interpret the line as a horizontal than would the forest dweller. When, in fact, the vertical does not represent a horizontal extending away from the subject such a habit would lead to inaccurate judgment since there would be a tendency to over-estimate the actual length of the vertical. Segall, et.al. employed two versions of the Horizontal-Vertical illusion figure to test this prediction and once again the results offered general confirmation of the theory. The Banyankole of Uganda, one of the groups living in the most open environment of the sample, were most susceptible to these illusion figures. The Evanstonians and Northwestern students, living in an environment less open than the Ban-

yankole, but certainly not as compressed as the tropical forest environment of the Bété of the Ivory Coast, fall near the middle of the 17 samples, while the Bété fall at the bottom, or were least susceptible to the illusion.

The third hypothesis, symbolizing three dimension in two, refers to the relatively widespread communication habit of symbolically representing the three dimensional world in two dimension, by the use of painting or photographs for example. The suggestion is that in groups where this habit has been learned the strength of the various illusions should be enhanced, since all four of them are based, in part, on the employment of such a habit.

A final word about the Segall, et. al. study, which will, I hope, lead me back to the subject at hand. The different ordering of the 17 samples on the different types of illusion figures quickly rules out such all encompassing explanations as simpleness of mind (whatever that might mean), or educational level per se as the causal factors. Something much more complex is going on.

Let us return now to the present experiment. In spite of careful instructions and a variety of controls employed by Segall, et. al. in an attempt to eliminate artifactual differences from their data, it was clearly impossible to rule out all other potential interpretations. For example, findings employing the Müller-Lyer figure have been shown to be a function of attentional factors. Gardner and Long, 1961, for example, demonstrated that very brief instructions to concentrate on the horizontal portion of the Müller-Lyer figure led to a significant decrease in the strength of the illusion. Could it be that the reason the Segall, et. al. African samples obtained lower illusion scores than the "European" samples on the Müller-Lyer illusion was due to a selective attention factor which led them to disregard the angled lines and isolate the horizontal lines more successfully than the "Europeans"? If this were found to be the case, it would still remain, of course, to specify the reasons for this difference and it might well be that one would be led back to an ecological differences explanation so that such a finding would not necessarily be in contradiction to the Segall, et. al. findings, yet it might help to clarify the situation. Nevertheless, it is a plausible hypothesis that selective attention could have been a factor in producing lower illusion scores for the African samples than for the "Europeans" and is a hypothesis which can be directly tested. It is to this question which the experiments reported below are directed.

If the lower magnitude of the Müller-Lyer illusion for the African samples was produced by differences in attention which led them to ignore the angled lines at the ends of the horizontal lines,

- 4 -

then further instructions to specifically ignore those lines should not lead to a further decrease in the magnitude of the illusion. If, therefore, it could be demonstrated that specific instructions to ignore the angled lines does lead to a reduction in the strength of the illusion for the African samples, some evidence would be offered that the original differences found by Segall, et.al. were not an artifact of selective attention differences.

METHOD

Data from five samples of subjects (Ss) have been collected, three in Uganda and two in the U.S. For ease of discussion I shall refer to these as five separate experiments, although each employed the same design and only two different sets of materials were used.

Experiment 1

Subjects: 66 adult male members of the Banyankole tribe in Western Uganda were tested.

Materials: The twelve Müller-Lyer test stimuli and the four comprehension-check stimuli from the Herskovits, Campbell, and Segall (1956) booklet were employed. (These are described in detail elsewhere, so will not be discussed here. However, for those not familiar with them, Figure 1 in the Results section will indicate their important properties.) It is important to note here that these figures were two-color figures, the horizontal lines being red and the angled lines being black. Additionally, the angled lines did not connect with one another or with the horizontal lines.

Procedure: The data were collected in conjunction with an interview which lasted approximately two hours. Near the half-way point of the interview the S was told he would now be presented with some drawings and would be asked some questions concerning them. He was then presented with the comprehension-check stimuli of the booklet. If he answered these correctly (all Ss did) he was then given one of two sets of instructions. Instructions A were as follows:

In this figure (4th of the comprehension checks) you see, at the ends of each red line, black lines which are at an angle to the red lines in such a way that they look something like an arrowhead. For one red line the arrowheads point inward, toward the line. For the other red line, the arrowheads point outward, away from the line. Now I am going to show you several more pages with figures like this. I want you to tell me which of the two red lines between the arrowheads is longer. Do you understand?

Instructions B, as they differed from A, were:

...to show you several more pages like this. But, I want you to concentrate very hard on the red lines. Try to ignore the arrowheads or angled, black lines. This is difficult to do, but I want you to direct your attention only to the red lines. Try not to see the arrowheads at all. I want you to tell me which of the two red lines is longer. Do you understand? Remember, try to ignore the arrowheads. (These instructions were adapted from Gardner and Long, 1961.)

The twelve test stimuli were then administered (Trial 1). In addition to asking the S to respond by saying "left" or "right", he was also asked to use his right or left hand to indicate the side on which the longer line appeared.

Then several more items of the questionnaire were asked and answered. Approximately five minutes after the first administration of the test stimuli, the S was told,

Now, I would like for you to look at these figures again. This time (for those who had received Instructions A first) I want you to concentrate very hard on the red lines..... And (for those who had received Instructions B first) this time look at the entire figure. Do not try to ignore the arrowheads at the ends of the red lines. Remember, tell me which of the two red lines is longer. Do you understand?

Presentation of the stimuli then began with comprehension item 4 and proceeded through the 12 test stimuli (Trial 2).

Half of the Ss received Instructions A first, followed by Instructions B (Group 1), and the other half received Instructions B first, followed by Instructions A (Group 2).

Subjects were allowed as much time as they desired to make their decision, but equal decisions were not allowed. If an S said "equal" he was told that in each case one of the two lines was really longer than the other and that he would have to make a choice as to which line it was that was longer.

The stimuli were presented at a distance of from four to five feet from the S and about a foot below eye level.

Experiment 2

Subjects: 40 adult, male, unskilled employees at Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey, were tested.

Materials: The materials employed were the Herskovits, et al. stimuli of Exp. 1.

Procedure: The relevant procedure was identical to that of Exp. 1. The task did not, however, come in the middle of a two hour interview, nor were the questions between the first and second presentation of stimuli, (Trial 1 and Trial 2), the same as those of Exp. 1.

Experiment 3

Subjects: 76 male African students enrolled in the first year sociology course at Makerere University College were tested.

Materials: A set of 24 test stimuli and four comprehension-check stimuli were employed. Hereafter referred to as the Davis stimuli, complete specification of the dimensions of these stimuli is given in Table 1. Table 1 indicates the length of the horizontal line for each of the 24 $\leftarrow\rightarrow$ segments and the percentage discrepancy between the length of that line and the length of the horizontal in the typically over-estimated segment ($\rangle\langle$). Percentage discrepancy is determined by subtracting the length of the $\rangle\langle$ horizontal from the length of the $\leftarrow\rightarrow$ horizontal, dividing

that figure by the length of the $\rangle\text{---}\langle$ horizontal and then translating to a percentage figure by multiplying by 100. Taking stimulus number 10 as an illustration, the percentage discrepancy figure of 08 indicates that the length of the horizontal in the $\langle\text{---}\rangle$ segment was 8% longer than the length of the horizontal in the $\rangle\text{---}\langle$ segment of the illusion figure. The angle of divergence for the angled lines ^{from the} horizontal was 45° and 135° for the $\langle\text{---}\rangle$ and $\rangle\text{---}\langle$ segments respectively. The angled lines were all 20 mm in length.

TABLE 1
Dimensions of the Davis Müller-Lyer Stimulus Set

Stimulus No.	Length of the horizontal of the $\langle\text{---}\rangle$ segment in millimeters	Percentage Discrepancy
1	57	-07
2	59	-03
3	60	-02
4	61	00
5	62	02
6	63	03
7	64	05
8	64	05
9	65	07
10	66	08
11	67	10
12	68	12
13	69	13
14	70	15
15	71	16
16	72	18
17	74	21
18	75	23
19	77	26
20	77.5	27
21	81	33
22	84	38
23	87	41
24	90	46


The length of the horizontal of the $\rangle\text{---}\langle$ segment was, for each stimulus, 61 mm.

The four comprehension-check stimuli were similar to the Herskovits, et.al. comprehension-check stimuli in size with the

exception of figure 3, in which the angled line on the side opposite of the longer horizontal line was extended to be longer than either of the horizontal lines. This was done in order that one could determine whether or not the person was responding to the longest line in the figure or to the longest horizontal line in the figure.

Other differences between the Herskovits, *et.al.* and the Davis figures that are important are that the Davis figures contained all black lines, the angled lines converged with each other and with the end of the horizontal lines, and the figures were presented on 8½ by 10½ in. pages. The Herskovits figures were red and black, the lines did not converge and they were presented on 5x7 in. pages.

Procedure: The instructions and procedure were essentially the same as for Exp. 1. One difference was that in the instructions of Exp. 1, wherever the words "red line" appeared, the words "horizontal line" were inserted. Also, the task between trials, the completion of a questionnaire on test-anxiety occupied a minimum of five minutes and an average of approximately eight minutes. Further, each S sat four feet from the stimuli. The stimuli were presented at eye level and were constantly illuminated by a 60 watt light three and one-half feet from the stimuli and slightly to the right of the S.

Actually, two sets of identical stimuli were employed rather than only one set used twice, as in Exp. 1. The difference between the two sets was only in the ordering of the stimuli and the relative position of the two segments of a particular figure. In determining the order of presentation of the 24 stimuli, two sets of numbers from 1 to 24, Set 1 and Set 2, were drawn at random, employing a random numbers table. Subsequently, for each figure, the relative position of the two segments was chosen at random with the restriction that for no more than three stimuli in a row could the two segments be in the same relative positions and that for the 24 figures, 12 would have the  segment on the right side and 12 would have that segment on the left side. Set 2, with the stimuli ordered according to the second set of randomly drawn numbers, reversed the position of the two segments for any given stimulus from that used in Set 1.

Half of the Ss received Set 1 first, and half received Set 2 first, independent of instructions.

In this and subsequent experiments employing these figures, response to the second comprehension-check stimulus was occasionally incorrect. When this occurred, the S was first asked to indicate the side he meant by pointing with his right or left hand.

Frequently (no record was kept of the Ss for which this was true) the problem turned out to be one of saying, for example, "right" but actually pointing to the left. If this was the case the S was reminded that we wanted him to use his right and left as the reference point, rather than the right and left of the assistant who was holding the figures and facing him. Additionally, he was asked to use his right and left hand to indicate the side on which the longer line was located.

For other Ss, the concept "horizontal" was not at first clear. These Ss were then told that they were only to consider the straight lines which went parallel to the edge of the page, not the lines which went at angles. They were then asked again which horizontal line in figure 2 was longer and all Ss were able to choose correctly. However, a few Ss then went on to choose the wrong line in figure 3. They were reminded that we were only interested in the two horizontal lines and asked again. If they were still incorrect a presentation of at least the first set of stimuli was carried through as a matter of courtesy, but the data of such an S was not included in the sample. Elimination of this type was necessary only in three or four instances in Exp. 4.

Experiment 4

Subjects: 130 adult, male members of the Banyankole tribe were tested.

Materials: The Davis stimuli were employed.

Procedure: The procedure was like that of Exp. 3 except for the task between trials, which took only an average of four minutes, the amount of control over the exact distance of the stimuli, the height of the stimuli relative to eye level, and the illumination of the stimuli. The distance varied from four to six feet, averaging about five. The stimuli were almost always from one to two feet below eye level and illumination varied with the setting and the day, but the stimuli were always well lighted.

Immediately following the presentation of the second set of Davis stimuli, the Herskovits, et.al. stimuli were presented to each S. The only further instruction was to indicate for these figures which red line was longer.

Experiment 5

Subjects: 26 male students at Princeton University were tested.

Materials: The Davis stimuli were employed.

Procedure: The procedure was similar to that of Exp. 3. (precise details of the between trial task and illumination are not yet available to me.)

RESULTS

Experiments 1 and 2

Of the 66 Ss in Exp. 1 to whom the stimuli were presented, 14 of these were eliminated from the analysis. Twelve were eliminated for having two or more Guttman errors in their protocols (Guttman, 1947) for either Trial 1 or Trial 2. (See Segall, et.al. for a discussion of this procedure and the rationale behind it. Suffice it to say here that this procedure serves to eliminate most Ss who, for one reason or another, misinterpreted the task or responded with a detectable bias not related to perceptual differences.) One S was eliminated due to an error in the administration of the stimuli whereby he did not receive every stimulus figure. The final S eliminated was a "good" S selected at random from Group 2 in order to produce equal Ns per group, a condition necessary for the type of analysis employed.

The data were analyzed by means of a Lindquist Type II Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). (Lindquist, 1953). The means on which this analysis was based are contained in Table 2. The non-significant F of .004 for the interaction between Instructions and Trials (in other words, the difference between Groups) allowed comparison of the main effects for Instructions and Trials. The F of 2.41 for Instructions indicated the \bar{X} of 3.77 for Instructions A was not significantly higher than the \bar{X} of 3.56 for Instructions B ($_{.05}F_{1,50} = 4.04$). Nor was the F of .498 for Trials significant.

Table 2

Mean Number of Illusion Responses for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Presented separately for Instructions and Trials

		Trial 1	Trial 2	\bar{X} over Trials
Inst. A	Exp. 1 (Bany.)	3.85	3.73	3.77
	Exp. 2 (U.S.)	5.47	4.40	4.94
Inst. B	Exp. 1 (Bany)	3.62	3.50	3.56
	Exp. 2 (U.S.)	4.93	4.87	4.90
\bar{X} over Inst.	Exp. 1 (Bany)	3.73	3.62	3.66
	Exp. 2 (U.S.)	5.20	4.64	4.92

For analysis, 10 Ss were eliminated from Exp. 2; seven due to two or more Guttman errors and three "good" Ss, randomly selected from Group 2, to produce equal Ns per group. The means on which the ANOVA was based are also included in Table 2.

The F of 1.39 for the interaction term, Instruction by Trials, was not significant ($_{.05}F_{1,28} = 4.20$). The F of .017 for the main effect of Instructions was also non-significant. The F of 5.06 for Trials, however, was significant at the .05 level, indicating a decrease in the strength of the illusion from Trial 1 to Trial 2.

These results, therefore, for both Exp. 1 and Exp. 2, fail to confirm the prediction of a weaker illusion being produced by specific instructions to ignore the "arrowheads" or angled lines.

Additionally, a comparison between the two experiments was made, by means of a Lindquist Type IV ANOVA. There were no significant interaction effects, justifying comparison of the main effect differences between the U.S. and Banyankole samples. The F of 23.87 was significant ($_{.05}F_{1,78} = 4.00$) indicating that the U.S. group with an \bar{X} of 4.92 was more susceptible to the illusion than the Banyankole group, whose $\bar{X} = 3.66$. The main effect for Trials also produced a significant F of 5.73, indicating a decrease in illusion strength over trials.

As a further aid in interpreting the data from these experiments the proportions of illusion responses to each item for Instructions A and Instructions B and for Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 were computed. Illustrated graphically in Figure 1, this analysis supports the finding of the Type IV ANOVA that the U.S. sample was more susceptible to the illusion than the Banyankole sample. The point of subjective equality (PSE) for the U.S. sample, averaging over Instructions, is 16.0, while that of the Banyankole is 9.1. The PSE, of the percentage discrepancy point at which 50% of a given sample would have perceived the comparison stimuli to be equal, is determined by dropping a perpendicular from the 50% level of each curve to the abscissa. Within both the U.S. and Banyankole samples there is also evident a definite trend for Instructions A to produce a greater proportion of illusion responses than Instructions B, a finding in line with the prediction. It is not possible to test the significance of the difference between PSEs, however, and it must be recalled that the difference between the mean number of illusion response for Instructions, for both experiments, was not significant.

(Insert Figure 1 about here)




FIGURE 1 Proportions of Illusion Responses as a Function of Percentage Discrepancy for Experiments 1 & 2 and Instructions A & B

Finally, Guttman reproducibility coefficients (Reps) were computed. This is an index of the extent to which the actual response patterns of a sample of Ss can be reproduced, given only the total score for each individual in the sample, or, in other words, a measure of response consistency. For the 65 Ss of Exp. 1 to whom all stimuli were presented the Rep was .975. For the 40 Ss of Exp. 2, the Rep was .977. Perfect reproducibility is 1.00.

Experiments 3,4 & 5.

Of the 76 Ss tested in Exp. 3, two were eliminated for having highly inconsistent response patterns containing seven or more Guttman errors. The more stringent Segall, et.al. criterion for elimination was not employed. The basic reason for this was the Ss were being asked to compare as many as five figures within a range of 10% discrepancy as compared to two figures in the Hershovits, et.al. stimuli, and it seemed much more likely that two or more errors could be the result of the difficulty of the task, not just artifactual biases. Additionally, if the Segall, et.al. criterion had been applied more than 50% of the Ss would have been eliminated. Since setting an acceptable limit is largely arbitrary, the major analysis of this experiment was performed on the sample size of 74. However, an additional analysis was done, in which the 11 Ss in the sample who had four or more Guttman errors on any single trial or a total of 5 or more errors on the two trials were eliminated. This analysis is briefly discussed below.

As in Exp. 1 & 2, the initial analysis consisted of a Lindquist Type II ANOVA. The means are summarized in Table 3. The F of .46 for the interaction between Trials and Instructions was not significant. Comparing Instructions A with Instructions B, the F of 6.30 was significant beyond the .05 level ($_{.05}F_{1,72} = 4.00$) indicating that Instructions B, to ignore the angled lines, led to a decrease in the strength of the illusion for the figures employed in this experiment and confirming the initial prediction. The F of 2.98 for Trials was not significant at the .05 level.

Table 3
Mean Number of Illusion Responses for Experiments 3,4 & 5, Presented Separately for Instructions and Trials.

		Trial 1	Trial 2	\bar{X} over Trials
	Exp. 3 (Mak.)	17.3	16.7	17.0
Inst. A	Exp. 4 (Bany.)	18.8	17.9	18.4
	Exp. 5 (U.S.)	18.7	18.2	18.4
	Exp. 3 (Mak.)	16.4	15.9	16.2
Inst. B	Exp. 4 (Bany.)	18.5	17.0	17.8
	Exp. 5 (U.S.)	17.5	15.7	16.6
	\bar{X} over Inst.	Exp. 3 (Mak.)	16.8	16.3
	Exp. 4 (Bany.)	18.7	17.5	18.2
	Exp. 5 (U.S.)	18.1	17.5	17.5

The second ANOVA for this set of data was based on 62 Ss, eliminating the 11 discussed above on the basis of Guttman errors and one "good" S selected at random. The only difference between this analysis and the foregoing was that the Trials effect was also significant. This elimination procedure did have the additional effect of raising the \bar{X} for Instructions A to 17.5 and for Instructions B to 16.8.

Thirty-two of the 130 Ss tested in Exp. 4 were eliminated from the analysis. These included seven Ss in the sample who had five or more Guttman errors, 13 Ss who responded by choosing either the $\rangle\text{---}\langle$ segment or the $\langle\text{---}\rangle$ segment on every stimulus of a set, suggesting they had not understood the task, and two Ss eliminated at random to produce equal Ns.

The initial Type II ANOVA resulted in a non-significant interaction F of .33. The F for Instructions was 5.75, significant at the .06 level (${}_{.06}F_{1,106} \approx 3.69$), again supports the prediction that instructions to ignore the angled lines leads to a decrement in the illusion. The F of 18.73 for Trials, significant beyond the .05 level also repeats the previous significant decrease in illusion strength from the first to the second trial. The mean values of these data are in Table 3 also.

For the 130 Ss of Exp. 4, the Herskovits, *et. al.* figures were also presented, following the presentation of the two sets of Davis stimuli. For all 130 Ss the \bar{X} was 5.71 and the PSE was 8.5.

At present data has been collected and analyzed for 26 Ss in Exp. 5. (It is anticipated that the total N will be about 50). The F for interaction between Instructions and Trials was .56, not significant. The F for Instructions was 6.68, significant beyond the .05 level (${}_{.05}F_{1,24} = 4.26$). The F of 2.77 for Trials did not reach the .05 significance level. The means for these data are also contained in Table 3.

When the collection of data for Exp. 5 is complete a Type IV ANOVA similar to that for Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 will be carried out. At this point, if the U.S. sample continues in its present trend, it appears likely that there will be an over-all significant difference between the three samples. Since it also appears likely that there will be an interaction between Trials and the three samples of Ss, to get at this difference between the samples it is more appropriate to compare the Trial 1 data for the three groups. Looking at these means in Table 3, the highest mean is that of the Banyankole sample at 18.7 while the lowest mean comes from the

Makerere sample at 16.8 and the U.S. sample falls nearly between the two, at 18.1. The significance of these differences will be tested when data collection has been completed.

As in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2, the proportion of illusion responses to each stimulus was computed. These are summarized in Table 4. It should be noted that the PSE differences are small, but for both the Banyankoke and U.S. samples, they are in the predicted direction. For the Makerere sample the difference is slightly in the opposite direction. Both the U.S. and Banyankole samples have PSEs higher than the Makerere sample, a difference which is also reflected by the means.

See Table 4

Finally Reps were computed for each sample. For the Makerere sample of 76 Ss, the Rep was .951. For the Banyankole sample of 130 Ss the Rep was also .951 and for the U.S. sample of 26 Ss it was .945.

Table 4

Proportions of Illusion Responses for Experiments 3,4,& 5, Presented Separately by Instructions.

Percentage Discrepancy	Instructions A			Instructions B		
	Makerere	Bany.	U.S.	Makerere	Bany.	U.S.
-07	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	.96
-03	1.00	1.00	1.00	.99	1.00	1.00
-02	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
0	1.00	.98	1.00	.97	1.00	1.00
02	1.00	.99	.96	.97	.96	1.00
03	.96	1.00	1.00	.99	.96	1.00
05	.99	1.00	.92	.93	.97	.92
05	.97	.98	1.00	.99	.99	.96
07	.93	.98	1.00	.95	.97	.92
08	.99	1.00	1.00	.95	.99	.92
10	.91	.96	.96	.85	.94	.92
12	.88	.91	1.00	.88	.89	.81
13	.82	.89	.88	.88	.85	.77
15	.88	.90	.85	.86	.91	.81
16	.84	.87	.92	.69	.86	.77
18	.77	.82	.81	.62	.73	.65
21	.61	.81	.88	.59	.70	.54
23	.47	.68	.54	.49	.61	.54
26	.36	.47	.69	.34	.41	.54
27	.34	.61	.46	.26	.51	.46
33	.07	.26	.27	.15	.31	.08
38	.08	.16	.12	.04	.09	.00
41	.04	.07	.12	.03	.08	.00
47	.00	.00	.04	.00	.02	.04
PSE	22.5	27.2*	26.7	22.8	26.7*	26.5

* Determined by dropping a perpendicular from the line between percentage discrepancy point 23 and percentage discrepancy point 33.

DISCUSSION

In general, the results confirm the prediction that specific instructions to ignore the angled lines in the Müller-Lyer figure would lead to a decrement in the strength of the illusion. Support is offered therefore, for the conclusion that the original Segall, et.al. findings with regard to the Müller-Lyer illusion were not artifactually produced by selective attention differences between the "European" and "non-European" samples.

The results of the two experiments employing the Herskovits, et.al. figures failed to confirm the predicted instructions difference, although the findings were in the predicted direction. However, the failure to find a significant difference for these figures was not unexpected and can not be interpreted as negative evidence. The major reason that this failure to find a difference was not unexpected was that the predicted difference was anticipated to be relatively small, but the Herskovits, et.al. figures are not particularly sensitive to small changes. This is because the stimuli are separated, one from another, along the percentage discrepancy dimension by a discrepancy of seven per cent at the point where the Banyankole PSE falls, and six per cent at the point where the U.S. sample falls. Because of this it was decided that to provide an adequate test of the hypothesis a new set of figures, which covered the range of per cent discrepancies more completely, would be necessary.

An additional concern about the appropriateness of employing the Herskovits, et.al. figures to test this hypothesis was the fact that they employed separate colors for the horizontal lines and the angled lines, and that the angled lines did not converge with one another or with the horizontal. Both of these factors should make it easier to isolate the horizontal line, or selectively attend to the horizontal, and minimize any effect that further instructions to ignore the angled lines might have. It was because of these factors that the Davis figures employed only black lines and did connect the angled lines with each other and the horizontal.

In interpreting the findings of these two experiments it is important to note that for neither the U.S. sample nor the Banyankole sample was the difference between instructions significant. Had it been found that the U.S. sample did have a significantly lower illusion susceptibility under Instructions B, but that the Banyankole sample did not, support for the hypothesis that selective attention differences could have produced the Segall, et.al. results would have been offered. The fact that both groups performed similarly, even though the prediction being tested was not confirmed, supports the validity of the Segall, et.al. interpretation.

Comparison between the data of the present experiments and the

original Segall, et.al. data for the U.S. and Banyankole samples also provides some evidence of the reliability of the measuring instrument, particularly since more than six years has intervened since the Segall, et.al. data were collected. From the present experiments, the Instructions A-Trial 1 data provide comparable information to the Segall, et.al. data. For the Segall, et.al. data for the U.S. sample (Evanston) the $\bar{X} = 5.36$ and the PSE = 20.3. For the data of Exp. 2 the $\bar{X} = 5.47$ and the PSE = 18.5, the mean being slightly higher and the PSE slightly lower. For the Banyankole data the Segall, et.al. $\bar{X} = 3.45$ and PSE = 9.3. For the Exp. 1 data the $\bar{X} = 3.85$ and the PSE = 10, both slightly higher than the original. Although these differences have not been analyzed statistically, the general indication is that the two sets of data are reasonably comparable.

Turning now to the experiments which employed the Davis stimuli designed to provide a more precise test of the predicted differences between instructions, the results of all three experiments confirmed the prediction. This aspect of these data, therefore offers clear positive support of the Segall, et.al. interpretation of cross-cultural differences and negative support for the hypothesis that the differences could have been produced by attentional differences leading to an isolation of the horizontal by the "non-European" samples.

While answering the question this experimentation set out to investigate, several other questions were raised. First, and easiest to cope with, is the question of why there was an increase in susceptibility to the Davis figures, as compared to the Herskovits, et.al. figures. For example, the PSE of the U.S. sample on the Davis figures, Instructions A - Trial 1 was 26.5, as compared to the U.S. sample (Northwestern) PSE of 16.2 on the Herskovits, et.al. figures. It should be recalled that the empiricistic type of the theoretical orientation would explain the occurrence of the Müller-Lyer illusion in terms of a learned visual inference habit which leads a person to interpret the figure as representing a three dimensional figure in which the angled lines represent, not acute or obtuse angles, but right angles. On this basis, any cues which would enhance the possibility of making this type of inference should increase the strength of the illusion. Employing lines of a constant color and actually connecting the angled lines with the horizontal are both such factors. An additional difference between the Herskovits, et.al. figures and the Davis figures which also should enhance the illusion effect for the Davis figures was the size of the page on which the stimuli were presented. The 5 x 7 in. pages for the Herskovits, et.al. figures brought the figures much closer to the

edge of the page than did the $8\frac{1}{4} \times 10\frac{1}{2}$ in pages of the Davis figures, a factor which could have provided an S with additional cues by which to judge the actual length of the horizontals and thereby increase his accuracy.

The second and more complex question raised by these data is the failure to replicate the cross-cultural differences between the U.S. and Banyankole samples found by Segall, et.al. Referring back to the Instructions A-Trial 1 cell in Table 3, the condition which provides data comparable to the Segall, et.al. data, it will be noted that there is virtually no difference between the mean value for the Banyankole sample, 18.8, and the U.S. sample, 18.7. One would have predicted, however, both on the basis of the theory and the previous results, that the U.S. sample would have been significantly more susceptible to the illusion than the Banyankole sample. With regard to the Makerere sample ($\bar{X} = 17.3$) it would have been predicted that it would be less susceptible than the U.S. sample but more susceptible than the Banyankole sample. This is because they live in an environment, and were most likely raised in an environment, relatively more carpentered than the "typical" Munyankole, yet relatively less carpentered than the "typical" American university student. The relative ordering of the U.S. and Makerere samples is in line with this expectation, but the Banyankole sample is out of line with both of the others.

Are there any grounds for interpreting this apparently conflicting finding? At this point, I know of none. One is, of course, immediately led to consider methodological differences and differences between the materials and while, in the present case, it is possible to speculate at some length about the effects these might have had, none of this speculation has any direct bearing on this issue, as I see it. The most obvious "out" would be to suggest that somehow the task was not communicated adequately to the Banyankole Ss. The data, however, do not bear this out. These Ss appeared to understand what to do and, in fact, did produce consistent and statistically significant differences between the two types of instructions, a difference which would have been highly unlikely if they had not understood the task in the first place.

Without laboring the point further, probably the most fruitful way of beginning to get at this issue, will be to test other samples, who would be predicted to be minimally susceptible to the "Müller-Lyer" illusion, employing the Davis figures. This would provide some information as to the reliability of the findings of the experiments reported here and perhaps provide further clues as to the nature of the problem.

SUMMARY

In an effort to investigate the possibility that the cross-cultural differences in susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion reported by Segall, et. al. (1966) were produced by selective attention differences leading the "non-European" samples to more effectively ignore the angled lines in the figure, or isolate the horizontal lines; and, hence, display less susceptibility to the illusion than the "European" samples, two sets of experiments were conducted. The specific prediction tested was that instructions which specifically called for ignoring the angled lines would produce a weaker illusion than instructions which did not call for ignoring the angled lines, independent of the cultural group being tested.

Employing the stimulus figures used by Segall, et. al., the first set of experiments compared the performance of a U.S. sample of Ss with a sample of Baryankole tribesmen in Western Uganda for both types of instructions. For neither sample of Ss did the instructions to ignore the angled lines lead to a significant decrement in the strength of the illusion. This was interpreted as supporting neither the specific prediction being tested nor the hypothesis that selective attention differentially influenced the samples of the Segall, et. al. study.

The second set of experiments employed a set of Müller-Lyer stimulus figures specifically designed to test the prediction. Three samples of Ss, African students at Makerere University College, Baryankole tribesmen, and American students at Princeton University, were tested. For all three samples instructions to ignore the angled lines led to a significant decrement in the strength of the illusion. These data were interpreted as supporting the specific prediction and failing to support the selective attention hypothesis. Both sets of experiments, therefore, offer evidence that the Segall, et. al. findings were not artifacts of selective attention differences which led to the ignoring of the angled lines by one type of culture, but not by the other.

The second set of experiments did not, however, replicate the previous findings of significant cross-cultural differences in susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brunswik, E., Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1956.
- Gardner, R.W., & Long, R.I., Selective attention and the Mueller-Lyer Illusion, Psychol. Rec., 1961, 11, 317-320.
- Guttman, L., The Cornell technique for scale and intensity analysis, Educ. psychol. measmt., 1947, 7, 247-249.
- Herskovits, M.J., Campbell, D.T., & Segall, M.H., Materials for a cross-cultural study of perception, Evanston, Ill., Program of African Studies, Northwestern Univ., 1956.
- Lindquist, E.F., Design and Analysis of Experiments in Psychology and Education, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1953.
- Serall, M.H., Campbell, D.T., & Herskovits, M.J., The influence of culture on visual perception, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1966.

Land Resettlement and Development Strategy
in Kenya

John W. Harbeson

The transfer of land in the former "White Highlands" from European to African occupation has been fundamental to the transfer of political power in Kenya. The political importance of this resettlement did not derive solely from the desire of African nationalist leaders to remove European Settlers from land allegedly stolen by them, or from the need to mitigate the threat to political stability posed by growing numbers of landless, unemployed Africans. Of equal or greater political importance has been the opportunity the resettlement program afforded European settlers to escape the feared consequences of African rule.

The political and social significance of land resettlement does not end with the transfer of political power but extends to the post independence drive for development. Since independence the emphasis on settlement schemes has been on equalling or surpassing the production and employment levels set by the previous European farmers, thus to confound widespread pessimism about the economic prospects of the schemes. In this paper I shall argue that political and social considerations are as important to the post independence economic success of settlement schemes as they were in the initiation of this land transfer before independence. In the first section I shall try to show the role of land resettlement in the de-emphasis of these social and political considerations; in the second, to show the consequences for settlement of this de-emphasis.

Resettlement and the Transfer of Power

The three phases in the evolution of the settlement program have been directly related to the important changes of political mood that have marked Kenya's transition to independence. The first phase was the "low density" program agreed upon in principle at the 1960 Lancaster House

Conference and implemented in 1961. These schemes were scattered throughout the highlands on high potential, underdeveloped land. Settlers were required to possess farming experience and some working capital to qualify for plots from which they could expect to derive £100 of income after subsistence and loan repayments. These schemes reflected both the policies and the problems of European inspired multi-racialism in Kenya. By scattering schemes throughout the highlands and making use of high potential-underdeveloped land, "low density" settlement contributed simultaneously to racial integration in agricultural areas and agricultural development. But the program accommodated only a limited number of comparatively prosperous African farmers, very little relief of rural unemployment was undertaken, and it strongly reflected the European objectives of diminishing the force of African nationalism and making possible substantial continued European farming in the Highlands.

The "low density" program became inadequate almost as soon as it was initiated because the dimensions of African landlessness and unemployment increased, exacerbated by increasing European uncertainty leading to near cessation of development and decreased employment on European farms. Independence was to come sooner than expected, and the long range objectives of multi-racialism were displaced by increasing European right wing demands for U.K. funds to assist both European farmers wishing to sell and emigrate and those seeking insurance against post independence expropriation. Great Britain responded in July 1962 with the "million acre" program of "high density" settlement for an additional 30,000 Africans, required to be landless and unemployed, on plots capable of producing £25 to £70 net income. The third phase, begun concurrently was initially undertaken for humanitarian and security reasons to enable elderly, incapacitated, and isolated farmers to sell their farms. Many have been sold to individual farmers rather than subdivided for settlement schemes in order to maintain economies of scale. Since independence such transfers have continued either to individual farmers or to groups of settlers farming as cooperative societies.

Together, the three phases have accommodated 35,000 African farmers and about one-third of the European settlers. The schemes have extended the "spheres of influence" of all major tribal groups, although the Kikuyu have

benefitted most. 40% of the total cost of £22,000,000 has been met by British government grants; the remainder by loans from the World Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the West German Government and the British Government.

Land resettlement contributed to important strategy changes by African leaders during the transfer of power partly because of the awkward position in which the settlement program placed them. Initially, the African leaders said that resettlement was acceptable but not as a final realization of nationalist goals regarding land, that settlement could not preclude "further changes" after Uhuru. Thus they tried to steer between accepting a program inspired by officials and European leaders whose motives they distrusted and maintaining the support of lower echelon politicians whose free land demands most of them knew were excessive. They did not discourage settling Africans in the Highlands but observed the "low density"^{schemes}/aided landed, not landless, Africans. African leaders approved the removal of established racial land barriers but were wary of attempts to demobilize African nationalism before its principle objective, political independence, had been achieved. Most leaders saw the inadvisability of expropriating European farms but many found it politically difficult initially to present this view to their followers. This ambiguity in the African position heightened the fears of right-wing Europeans, and strengthened their hand in London and within the European community at the expense of the multi-racialism advocates. This influence led to the second phase or "high density" settlement.

This new and much larger phase of resettlement helped draw African leaders away from maintenance of nationalist policies and toward reconciliation with European adversaries of African nationalism, toward a new spirit of non-racialism. As independence approached, African leaders increasingly realized their own interests lay in de-emphasizing further resettlement. Nationalist pressures had enabled right-wing Europeans to secure a program substantially increasing the financial burden on the future African government and diverting development funds away from African areas to the European Highlands. If the political necessity of a second million acre scheme were proved to the U.K. Government by Europeans, the resulting financial obligations to the U.K.

Government and the priority which European interests would gain over those of farmers in the African areas could only weaken the independent African government and the prospects of post independence political stability.

Gradually, therefore, African leaders decided that political stability would result from territorial stability rather than territorial expansion of African areas, from economic development of existing rather than new African areas. Territorial expansion had both political and economic costs. Politically, the departure of European farmers removed the buffer between the large and small tribes, expanded principally the land of larger, densely populated and therefore land hungry tribes, and recognized nationalist land claims -- but at the cost of heightening fears of smaller tribes whose lands had been protected by the European buffer. Economically, redevelopment of European areas by Africans was thought to be less promising than further development of existing African areas because most of the best land was in the latter and because the prospects of settlement schemes were viewed with pessimism. Conversely, territorial stability had both political and economic benefits. With delay of independence no longer feared, settlement no longer threatened African nationalism but rather post independence political stability. Emphasis on territorial stability rather than territorial expansion implied the security of existing tribal lands and the assuaging of fear based on tribal expansion. Larger tribes would accept territorial stability because they had gained through resettlement and all tribes gained the promise of assistance to their economic development. Economically, territorial stability and development of existing areas implied that competent remaining European farmers could continue their contribution to the country's development, a contribution particularly valuable in offsetting the initial economic problems of settlement schemes. Furthermore, development of existing African areas meant that funds could be channelled to the Africans where the economic potential was greater.

Thus, even before independence African leaders de-emphasized settlement as part of an evolving policy designed to achieve post-independence political stability through economic development of existing African areas

and territorial stability rather than further expansion. Implicit in this policy were a new spirit of non-racialism under which contributions to economic development by all races have been welcomed and a policy of reconciling political differences in the nationalist movement to facilitate contributions by all ethnic groups to development.

POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Post independence policy continues the emphasis on economic development of former African areas in preference to the resettled areas and expanding African areas by further resettlement. Economic development is also emphasized by comparison to social change and political development. In the Development Plan 1966-70, the emphasis on former rather than new African areas is justified by the greater agricultural potential of the former African areas. Economic development is given greater emphasis than social change because the creation of greater economic opportunities is thought to be the sine qua non for social change. "If projects do not offer benefits in excess of their costs, they cannot contribute to economic development and it is unlikely that they would make a substantial contribution to social change and improvement."¹

Four implications follow from this strategy. First, social change is defined in economic terms. The "social approach" to economic development in the plan means "to involve the people of Kenya at every step and to an increasing extent in the economic development of the nation."² Second, social change is assumed to follow naturally from opportunities for economic development. The plan does recognize the importance of changing traditional behavior patterns. But it argues that economic opportunities are sufficient in themselves to bring about these changes: "Development of the monetary economy will in itself generate opportunities that were not available in the traditional subsistence economy. These opportunities will in turn induce changes in behaviour patterns and incentives by making available to people a range of consumer goods that were not available to them before and by

¹ Kenya Development Plan 1966-70, p. 57.

² Ibid., p. 56.

opening markets in which they can sell their increased production."² Third, social change is to take place primarily through institutions designed for economic purposes. These institutions include schools, credit organizations, self-help schemes and cooperatives, and are justified in each case only by their place in the economic structure of the country. Fourth, since there is no discussion of political organizations, it is inferred that political organizations and processes have no role in the development process.

The success of this development strategy depends on its ability to elicit the popular participation necessary to achieve the desired levels of economic development. If participation is to be achieved, the institutions through which economic development is to be achieved must satisfy two basic requirements. They must translate economic opportunities into reality for the individual participants, and they must be channels suitably designed to permit and encourage participation by individuals in the development process.

Participation, however, can be achieved in at least two ways: (1) development of existing economic assets by the present owners, or (2) transfer of assets to new owners. The former approach implies assisting greater economic participation by those persons already in possession of economic assets who may not be fully involved in the modern economic sector. The latter, assisting persons without significant economic assets to acquire them as a prerequisite for participation in the modern economy. The present emphasis of rural economic development on former African areas means employing largely the former approach. The settlement schemes are the principal example of the latter approach.

The settlement schemes test the relevance of the development strategy to the task of achieving participation in the modern economy by transferring economic assets to new participants. The conversion of the highlands from European mixed farms to African small holdings raises a question as to whether the economic institutions employed by relatively large scale farmers have been converted to the peculiar requirements of the new small farmers.

² Ibid. p. 60.

Furthermore, most settlers are either newcomers to the modern economy or have experienced it only indirectly as employees of former European farmers. This prompts a question whether or not the institutions, particularly cooperative societies, designed to channel rural participation in the modern economy are effective with new participants.

Settlement Schemes: The Incomplete Transformation

A preliminary appraisal of economic development on the settlement schemes suggests that economic institutions have not fully succeeded in translating economic opportunities into reality for the settlers nor have they induced full participation by them. This has happened partly because opportunities for economic development have in practice been limited and partly because the assumptions of the development strategy regarding social change appear somewhat unrealistic.

A. Problems in the Economic Structure

When the high density schemes were established, it was widely held that they would not be economically viable. Especially within the last year, however, some high density schemes, particularly on the Kinangop, have produced crops in excess even of their quotas. Pyrethrum quotas, unfilled a year ago, have in some cases been doubled and trebled. Milk production substantially exceeds contract requirements on most Kinangop schemes.

Where such economic performance occurs, attention is called to the schemes' limited opportunities for further economic development. Overproduction in relation to quotas and contracts prevents the settlers from participating fully in the cash economy and is a depressant to development. Output also exceeds drying facilities for pyrethrum and canning facilities for milk with a similar effect. The deficiencies may well be remedied in time and merely reflect underestimation of production prospects. For pyrethrum, however, the value to the settlers of their increasing responsibility for production of this crop is qualified by the prospect of a diminished market resulting from the imminent competition of a Japanese synthetic. Forward planning may be necessary to adjust these scheme budgets for possible diminution of the market

for their principle crop. Milk production is adversely affected by the complexity of the marketing system. Prices have varied considerably depending on whether output was intended for sale as fresh milk, as manufactured milk, or for conversion to butter. They have also varied depending upon whether the farmer possessed a quota or a contract. Quota prices have been higher because the farmer undertook to contribute to the supply of fresh milk for sale throughout the year and to pay a penalty for non-delivery. Quotas are still used, but the Kenya Dairy Board now sells only contracts carrying no penalty for non-delivery and therefore a lower price. High Density settlement schemes operate therefore on contract, but settlers know about these price differentials without understanding the reasons for them. Politicians are, therefore, able to depress the incentive of producers by spreading rumours of price differentials. Marketing of general produce through central organizations is beset by communications problems. Settlers distrust the system whereby produce is evaluated and accepted or rejected at the central depot rather than on the schemes and also the delays in payment. Private traders reject crops or accept and pay for them on the spot. Settlers prefer the latter even though the size of the market or the price may be lower.

The problems of settler participation in the cash economy occur not only in marketing but also in production. One hindrance is the shortage of tractor equipment which is insufficient to plough more than half the arable land on most schemes. On some schemes, settlement cooperatives engage outside contractors for ploughing and harvesting, but their ability to do so is hampered by their weak bargaining position. Where a crop like wheat is involved, rigid timetables for ploughing, planting and harvesting prevent the cooperatives from dickering with contractors over terms of service. The inexperience of settlers with such contracts, however, increases the chances of misunderstandings and therefore unacceptable delays. Delays are caused, in any event, by the frequent impassibility of scheme roads. Such difficulties frequently diminish or eliminate the settlers' profit with predictable effect upon incentive.

These economic difficulties prevent the full participation of settlers in the cash economy. The main problem is therefore not to encourage cash crop production but to ensure that such difficulties do not destroy the incentive he has acquired. Perhaps agricultural planning presently underestimates the incentive of the farmer to produce cash crops and overestimates the suitability of existing economic arrangements for encouraging that incentive. The problem might perhaps be tackled in two ways. First, more agricultural education resources might be devoted to educating the farmer to the nature and problems of the economic process in which he is to participate. Particularly where farmers have shown willingness and ability to produce cash crops, this course might have beneficial effects on his ability to deal with the problems of such participation and therefore on his incentive. Second, removal of disincentives to production could be a principal objective in the allocation of remaining loan funds for settlement. For example, in the Kinangop drying facilities for pyrethrum and tractor equipment should receive first consideration. Objects of settler suspicion such as milk price differentials should either be adequately^{explained}/so as to eliminate distrust or corrected by allocating additional contracts or by directing settlers' efforts to the production of other crops.

B. Problems of Social Change

The theory that economic opportunities with induced social change leading to economic development assumes that development institutions translate these opportunities into reality for the participants. But development at the grass roots level on the settlement schemes is diminished not only by economic difficulties but also by an hiatus between administrative priorities and social requirements of the settlers. The administrative officers emphasize (1) production, (2) loan repayments, and (3) curbing the activities of dissident politicians. But the settlers' requisites for participation are very different: First, they require sufficient knowledge of the development process in which they take part and its difficulties if they are to combat ill-informed rumours spread by self-interested politicians. Second, instruction is needed not only in the importance and purpose of cooperative societies but also in ways and means by which they can take part in the society's activities.

Settlers might not resist election to leadership positions if instruction were given, for instance, on how settlers can deploy manpower on their shambas so as to compensate for their absence. Third, encouragement is needed for community development projects designed to overcome lack of trust among settlers which weakens the cooperative societies.

These unfulfilled social requisites leave settlers largely unprepared to participate effectively in the development process. Lack of preparation seems to stand behind the better known difficulties of the schemes: diversion of loan repayments to inappropriate uses, use of society's equipment for private rather than public purposes, frequent changes in society leadership and its weakness, and embezzlement of funds. Being among strangers in the society, unfamiliar with the process in which he takes part and unprepared to participate in the operation of the cooperative societies, the settler's behavior tends to be guided by unqualified self interest. The lack of qualification seems largely responsible for many of the difficulties.

Although substantial economic incentives through development loans, advisory service, and agricultural education have been offered, settlers have not apparently undergone the social change necessary to effective participation in development. Economic incentives by themselves are sufficient to induce production increases. Full participation, however, seems to include more than mere production and to be beyond the reach of purely economic incentives. The assumption that economic opportunities induce social change therefore seems to be oversimplified.

C. Problems of Administration

Since the settlers are not prepared to participate effectively in the cooperative societies, leadership remains in the hands of the scheme administrators. Since administrators are dependent upon government for their position, they naturally tend to observe requirements and restraints set up by their employers rather than represent perceived requirements of settlers to the administration. From the settlers' point of view, therefore, a leadership gap exists, proof of which lies in the hiatus between settler and administrative priorities.

This conflict of priorities reflects a fundamental disparity between centrally defined goals and some local prerequisites for economic development. Progress on loan repayment, for example, relates to a fundamental political objective of post independence development: eliminating and preventing "colonial" relationships with more developed countries. It is not the loan but the circumstances in which it was contracted that the Kenya government views with concern. "The settlement process was inherited from the British and was designed more to aid those Europeans who wanted to leave than the Africans who received the land. Our land problems should not be settled on terms decided in the United Kingdom. Instead our policies and plans in agriculture should be determined by our need to develop and financial support sought for these plans from several sources."³ The settlement loan is viewed as a vestige of colonial authority, contracted in the interests of non-Kenya citizens, and contrary to Kenya's principal objective of development. Removal of the loan obligation removes the vestige of colonialism and furthers the policy of non-alignment.

The difficulty arises because emphasis on loan repayment helps to substantiate the view that settlement, because it does not make an efficient contribution to development, is not in the country's best interests. Although some schemes have demonstrated ability to produce bumper cash crops, emphasis on loan repayment puts at least a temporary ceiling on further economic assistance for scheme economies. Water reticulation, pyrethrum dryers, and tractors are all investments of direct value in realizing maximum production on schemes. Although some progress has been made in equipping schemes with such production aids, the process is slowed down because crop proceeds which might be directed to these ends are absorbed by repayments. From the administration point of view, therefore, production excess of budgets and of processing and marketing facilities is an embarrassment because it stimulates the demand for additional development with which loan repayment obligations compete.

³ Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10 1963-5, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. p. 37.

Loan repayment drives a wedge between central goals and local prerequisites for development only if development is conceived in purely economic terms and if existing loan obligations are considered a bar to further investment in economic development. If these conditions apply, the Plan's concentration on economic development is unwise, in the case of settlement, since increased production cannot be accommodated. Since social change does not in any event appear to follow economic development on the schemes, administrative priorities might advisably be altered to concentrate more directly on problems of social change. Limitations imposed on the pace of economic development might profitably be turned to advantage by inducing requisite social change preparatory to the next stage of economic development.

Problems of Cooperative Societies

The problems of coordinating social and political change with economic development come to institutional focus in the settlement scheme cooperative societies. The societies are set up to perform such functions as marketing produce, supervising whatever processing of produce takes place on the scheme, operating scheme stores, supervising artificial insemination and dipping of cattle, and coordinating loan repayments. A cooperative society is headed by an elected committee comprising a chairman, a secretary and as many as 10 other members. The committee supervises a number of paid employees of whom the bookkeeper is perhaps the most important. The societies are supervised on behalf of the Department of Cooperative Development by cooperative officers and their assistants.

The common judgement on cooperative societies is that they suffer from inadequate management, and the members and elected officers from inadequate training. Such judgement is based on weakness and instability of cooperatives' elected leadership, widespread financial abuses often perpetrated by the leadership, and incapacity to manage the technical side. Steps have been taken by the Department of Cooperative Development to tighten financial control of societies by the Department and, to a lesser extent, to train elected cooperative officers for more effective general management.

The problems are more complicated than lack of training and administrative control. On the one hand the elected officers, relative to other settlers, do not lack educational attainments. While most settlers have been educated no higher than standard four, elected officials and bookkeepers generally have at least standard six and often some secondary education. Education of such persons for society leadership should not therefore be an impossible task. Similarly, management can easily be justified in the short run but, given the stated objective of the government to increase the responsibility of the societies for their own affairs, policy must eventually turn to improving rather than replacing leadership of the societies.

Despite the apparent leadership potential, settlement cooperatives have remained weak and the leadership has not been forthcoming, fundamentally because of the hiatus between administrative priorities and social requisites. The unfulfilled social requisites weaken settlers' support for the societies, especially when they are pushed by administrators into unpopular courses of action such as deducting substantial percentages of settlers' profits to meet loan obligations. The same deficiency increases the blame settlers place on the societies for problems of marketing and processing. Settlers therefore do not see societies as any improvement over middlemen, and in fact, many prefer to sell to middlemen thereby further weakening the societies. These sources of weakness feed sometimes potent opposition to the cooperative society centering around local 'politicians'. Opposition to societies is strengthened by evidence of corruption among elected officials creating leadership instability. Such corruption is increased because of reluctance of settlers on economic grounds to leave their shambas for society duty. Elected leaders often respond either by resigning prematurely or by taking compensation for themselves through embezzlement. These weaknesses make the societies dependent upon the administration for sufficient authority to carry out their enterprises, thereby weakening the only channel through which settlers' problems can be represented effectively to the administration, marketing organizations, or local government.

Since necessary social change does not appear to follow economic inputs, the absence of such change and the presence of economic problems strengthens tacit and active political opposition to the institutions of economic development. The apparent assumption of development strategy that political organizations have no place in the development process exposes the development process to dysfunctional political activity in the face of development problems. Attention to social requisites perhaps by more effective use of political leaders might help to create the degree of social change required for the next stage of economic development and shield the process of economic development from political activities which are dysfunctional to development.

CONCLUSION

Return of the "White Highlands" to the African people was a central objective of African nationalism in Kenya. Land Resettlement which in fact helped realize that objective was nevertheless initiated primarily to serve the interests of European farmers who wished to leave Kenya because they feared the consequences of independence. As independence approached African leaders began to de-emphasize expanding African areas by resettlement because of the interests it appeared to serve, the financial burden on the independent government, and the greater economic potential of existing areas. Emphasis on development of existing rather than new areas diminished the land based fears of tribes supporting KADU and of remaining European farmers and paved the way for the reconciliation of both with KANU.

The emphasis on economic development of former African areas has continued into independence and this has in turn meant emphasis on increasing participation of the modern economy by developing existing assets rather than transferring assets to new participants. Settlement development, however, is a major test of the latter approach. The development strategy emphasizes a "social approach" to economic development which means that social change admittedly necessary to economic development is assumed to be induced naturally by creation of economic incentives. On settlement schemes, however, social

change seems not to follow economic inducements in this way, but merely to stimulate production. Absence of social change permits negative political opposition to interfere with the loan repayments that must be met before further investment in economic development can be contemplated.

An alternative and perhaps more appropriate strategy would use the temporary ceiling on further economic development as an opportunity to work directly on social requisites for economic development in order to remove the bases for political activity presently dysfunctional to development and to provide a basis for future economic development.

No 412
Egbert Gerken

U.E.A. Social Science Conference,
December, 1966.

IDENTITY, STATUS, AND PRESTIGE

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present some preliminary results of a survey which at present is carried out in three different areas of Busoga. The material is taken from 200 interviews with homestead-heads, 100 each in Busambira (furtheron referred to as B.), a former kingdom some 30 miles east of Jinja which was one of Lloyd Fallers' areas when he did field work in Busoga in 1950-52 (Fallers 1956), and in Wairaka - Wanyange (furtheron referred to as W/W), two parishes some 3-7 miles east of Jinja on Tororo Road. The survey is part of a study on social change in rural areas of Busoga under the impact of industrialization and urbanization (Gerken 1966). Fieldwork is done since November 1965 and includes a time-budget for some 60 farmers, a women-questionnaire with a sample-size of 200 and a survey of homestead-heads the sample-size of which is 400. The interviews for this paper were administered during September, October, and November 1966.

Independent Variable

areas Influence of an urban center on its surrounding rural areas may be seen in:

- the demand for labour,
- the demand for agricultural products,
- the supply of cultural patterns,
- the supply of new consumer goods,
- the provision of urban services.

If one accepts the assumption that these influences are important for social change in the villages, differences in the pattern as well as in the rate of social change should be observable between rural areas according to their distance from the urban center. Distance, therefore, defined as traffic-time and -cost, was chosen as the independent variable. It was possible to keep other factors more or less constant. Although divided in some 15 kingdoms and more than 60 independent chieftaincies these units followed very much the same pattern in legitimizing authority, they share the same system of property and, with the exception of the extreme North and North-East have the same language (Fallers 1956, Fallers 1960, Richards 1959).

Approach

Where does social change become manifest in a way that a survey can provide material for description and explanation? In the beginning of my study it seemed tempting to me to take the actions and decisions of individuals as the starting point for two reasons: 1) a majority of processes of social change is brought about by the actions of individuals: individuals quit groups in the village and join other groups

in town, individuals deviate from the norms of one group (Clan) and endure its sanctions to fulfill the conflicting norms of other groups (on the working place) and enjoy their rewards. 2) Changes which might be effected by the "intrinsic logic" of a culture and/or the contact with another culture have importance for the actions of individuals and will probably become manifest in categories of "membership" and "conformity to specific norms" of groups around which these changes centre.

Action might be roughly analysed in three categories: conditions of action (environment), choice of goals, that is the norms and values which govern these choices, and choice of means to accomplish these goals, that is the instrumental norms which allow or forbid certain means of action. The most important part certainly consists in the norms which govern the choice of goals- or, if the norms are already internalized, the motivations for searching certain goals. The concepts of identity and status as a determining factor of identity seem to provide a possible framework inside which they might be described and explained.

The term identity was re-introduced to the social sciences by Erik H. Erikson (Erikson 1956) and was recently applied by Michael Banton to problems of class-, ethnic-, and race-alignment in West Africa (Banton 1965). Erikson defines identity or rather identity-formation as "...arising from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configuration which, in turn, is dependent on the process by which a society identifies the young individual, recognizing him as somebody who had to become the way he is, and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted." (Erikson 1956) Identity - formation is not confined to the end of adolescence but is a "lifelong development". It is not a substitute for "self" but is essentially a social term establishing where a person is situated, "... that is, cast in the shape of a social object by the acknowledgement of his participation or membership in social relations" (Stone 1962)

I think it is possible to take the concept of identity into role theory in very much the same way as this was done with identification translated as the acceptance of the complementary role in a collectivity (Parsons 1958). Identity, then, would describe a certain configuration of the roles a person integrates in a unique way which links it with groups of people who have some meaning for it, either positive or negative. (compare concepts of membership and non-membership in reference group theory. Merton 1957)

Status with Renate Mayntz may be defined as the sum of:
a) the role expectations placed on a social position, and
b) the prestige the holder of the position enjoys by virtue of holding the position, not by virtue of his personality. Identity is determined by status insofar its formation is dependent "... on the process by which society identifies the individual" (Erikson 1956) which in turn depends on the position which an individual holds in its social relations (in groups, collectivities, and social categories - I shall use these terms in the way they were defined by Merton. Merton 1957) and is expressed in the prestige it enjoys as the holder of that position.

from page 3. + The sample in Busambira was stratified to ensure at least $\frac{1}{3}$ non-farming population.

++ Therefore, and because the total number of this group is yet too small it will be combined with the farmers' group in the following tables.

Operationalization

The devices used in the questionnaire base on the idea that the impact of industrialization and urbanization is mediated through the supply of new social categories and new norms connected with these categories. Besides the traditional groups of ascriptive solidarity in family, Clan, and territorial community and categories like "cultivator on subsistence plus cash-crop level" new groups and categories in friendship, ethnic solidarity, occupation et al. become possible. Reference to these groups and categories will with some probability lead to conflicting role-expectations. These conflicts and their solution or non-solution through adjustment, new interpretation of norms, deviance or change constitute an essential agents for social change.

a) priorities

The questionnaire first tries to establish membership and conformity with at least one norm with as many groups as possible, some 25 altogether and then tries to find priorities between competing norms.

An example for this procedure is a hypothetical situation in which a father faced with the situation of not being able to pay the school-fees for his children is offered, one by one, 5 alternatives each related to a norm of another category: (a) selling a bicycle, (b) giving the groundnut-crop as security for a loan, (c) going to town for a job, (d) selling part of his land, (e) selling the whole kibanja. The frequency with which certain response patterns were chosen, analysed by residence and occupation are shown in Table I.

From 17 possible response patterns only 6 were chosen with some frequency. There is a strong resistance in both areas and in all occupations to give up what is looked at as the very basis of social and economic existence in Busoga: a home with a minimum of land around it (pattern 3-6). This holds true for Busambira where 98% of the respondents have a home of their own as well as for Wairaka-Wanyange where only 43% have a home of their own, the rest having houses somewhere else in Busoga. In fact, those answering in pattern 1 or 2 are not married and have no children and, therefore, following Soga values are not "bataka", persons with full social rights and responsibilities. I think one can interpret this as a clear priority of the norm to have a home before the norm of educating one's children.

A difference in residence as well as in occupation arises if the norm of landownership isolated as it is from the norm of having a home is involved. Here we find 69% in Busambira refusing to sell a piece of land in order to pay the school-fees for their children against only 34,4% in Wairaka-Wanyange (patterns 4 and 5). In occupation there is a difference between farmers (63,3%) and civil servants (37,9%) and industrial workers (38,4%) whereas the figures for "small businessmen" including traders, fish-mongers, village carpenters, and bicycle-repairers, are similar to those of the farmers (56,6%).⁺⁺ Possible explanations seem to be that land in the vicinity of the town actually commands a high price (1.000/- for a residential plot) whereas a resident of Busambira would have to sell at least a $\frac{1}{2}$ acre (average size of a holding in Busambira: 4 acres) to raise the school-fees for one child per one year in a primary school. For those to a less degree dependent on agriculture for their cash-income - although 68% of them is still actively involved in farming- land might be sold as long as the home with a minimum of land is not endangered. I would like to point to other figure: 29,3% of the residents in W/W do not accept looking for a job in town as an alternative to non-education whereas only 17% in B. do not (patterns 5 and 6). I would argue that people in W/W have a more realistic view of the labour market and the earnings possible than people in B.

⁺ and ⁺⁺ : see page 2.

b) social position

Factors affecting the social position of a Busoga might be divided into: i those sine qua non conditions of having a home and being or having been legally married (that is having paid dowry and/or been married in a ceremony) without which a man is not regarded as a mutaka. In B. only one respondent had no home and 9 had never been married, 4 of which are younger than 25. In W/W 12 respondents had no home and 29 had never been married, 25 of which are younger than 25 years. Of these 22 give marriage as their immediate goal. ii those variable factors the combination of which defines the social position of a Busoga in his society and/or different sub-societies: occupation, education, religion, membership in a ruling Clan v. a commoner Clan, position of father in Clan, village, and kingdom are the main factors. These factors are by no means independent. The position of the father is often decisive for the place the respondent takes in these dimensions. Having a high position in the kingdom and Clan and thereby having control over land, Clan-funds and access to the local Government he was able to finance the education of his son. Table II shows the relation of the position of father to occupation and education of respondent.

The relation between Clan-membership (ruling v. commoner Clan) might be seen in Table III. Members of one of the six major ruling Clans (that is those Clans which provide a traditional ruler recognized in the Busoga Local Government Ordinance) provide a considerably higher percentage of civil servants and a slightly higher percentage of industrial workers, to whom other criteria of selection are applied, than members of the other 350 odd Clans.

Religion as a factor of social position, too, is closely related to occupation and education, the most obvious reasons being the long-standing reluctance of Muslim fathers to send their children to missionary schools and the compliance of chiefs with the religion of the early European administrators. see Table IV.

A perhaps more interesting result is that there seems to have taken place a certain polarization of religions between Muslim/ farming and small business/ residence in some distance from town on one side and Christian/ civil servant and industrial worker/ residence near town on the other. The figures presented in Table V suggest that this is not only a result of Christians more likely to choose non-farming and non-rural positions thereby leaving Muslims in the majority in rural areas (only 10% of the adult males in Busoga are accounted as employees. Uganda Government 1965, Uganda Government 1965 a) but to a certain degree also the result of farming and rural population actually converting to Islam. The figures of Table V base on the religion of the father in comparison to religion and residence of the son. A different religion of father and son does not necessarily mean a conversion. Quite often a father joined a religion when his children were already born and left them with a free choice. But even then it seems striking to me that sons who do not opt for a non-farming position and a near-town residence or in any case do not succeed in achieving them should choose Islam against the preference of their fathers. The fathers of respondents in B. form a relation of 46/33/20 between Christians/Muslims/Fagans whereas their sons form a relation of 42/50/7. The figures for W/W show the inverse trend: 64/23/12 and 75/18/1 respectively.

c) prestige

In the pre-test stage of my questionnaire I tried to measure prestige by means of a Prestige-Scale (NORC 1947). Interpretations of similar rankings became extremely misleading as long as no information concerning the criteria of prestige-ascription was available. A preference of a small farmer v. a mechanic in a factory for example may as well be originated in a traditional orientation towards land-ownership, living near the grave of one's grandfathers, living in the community into which one is born as well as in a perfectly rational orientation counting for the possibly higher profit one might achieve out of a 10 acre farm. I, therefore, chose a dichotomous approach on the criteria of prestige-ascription. The respondents were given three choices each for a pair of a, for an outsider, modern and/or urbanized v. a traditional and/or rural position and were asked to state the reasons for their choice. I tried to keep constant certain factors which in the Soga system of values command some importance: inheritance of land, marital status and age. The pairs were chosen under the perspective of the traditional "stratification", giving an example for each of the three main strata: farmer, commoner-chief, and ruler. (see Table VI)

Reasons brought forward with a certain frequency might be roughly placed on two continua the particularism - universalism dimension of norms of orientation and the ascription - achievement dimension of acquisition of roles. (Parsons 1951)

On the particularistic end I would place mainly those criteria which follow more/less the chief-client pattern. Lloyd F. Fallers has stressed the point that Baganda and, one might well include, Basoga do not have an overall concept of class or a concept of stratum in which to place an individual human being, but tend to see the position of an individual in dyadic relations comparing it to another individual which is either its chief or its client. (Fallers 1964) This is very much the ascription pattern which "traditional" Basoga follow and which in fact is quite sufficient for reasons of orientation in a traditional society. An interesting point is the adjustment of this pattern to a situation with a highly differentiated division of labour or positions related to each other through the market. In the first choice, for instance, between a farmer owning 10 acres and living in some distance from the town and a mechanic in Nyanza Textiles the chief-client pattern may for each choice make a specific adjustment: The positions might be seen as positions in a single production line where a one-sided dependence is assumed. The position at the beginning of the line is superior to the position at the end on the ground that the latter depends on the first. Thereby, the farmer is superior because he produces the cotton which the factory uses and without which the mechanic would not have a job at all. Another possible adjustment is based on the idea that every institution above a certain size quite naturally must be a government department, a view which in the past was more or less justified. In this case the mechanic is placed into the chief's position being a man who is working with the government whereas the farmer has to pay taxes.

On the universalistic end criteria like income, independence in making decisions and permanence of job might be placed. The frequency with which civil servants and industrial workers refer to permanence probably reflects the situation on the labour market with everybody being aware of his possible dismissal. The farmer/ chief/ ruler choice, therefore, does not necessarily indicate a traditional status system.

On the ascriptive end criteria like "inheritance of position", "respected by his people", might be placed. On the achievement end criteria referring to specific performances, "giving advice", "defending our rights" might be placed. Answers referring to qualification were only given twice so that they are not shown in the Table VI.

The figures presented indicate that almost always industrial workers provide a considerably higher percentage of answers on the universalistic end (d, e) and on the achievement end (e) than both farmers and civil/servants, civil servants more often than not being more near to the farmers' point of view than to the view of industrial workers. Choice I, d and e combined: IW 64,3%, CS 38,5% F 45,6% Choice II, d and e combined: IW 46,8%, CS 18,5%, F 25,6% Choice III, g: IW 56,9%, CS 29,7%, F 11,1% These figures, seems to me, can perhaps be interpreted as indicating the breaking up of an overall Soga status system into at least two partial status systems. The discriminating factor between the different populations holding them seems to be not so much residence (rural - urban) but occupation which in turn is related to residence.

d) identity

"The Copperbelt miner is above all else an African as opposed to the Europeans, and an urban industrial worker as opposed to a rural farmer. But in West African cities neither of these identities has been so important as in Central Africa." (Banton 1965)

To raise material concerning identities I used two different sets of questions. +1. I presented a list of 14 possible affiliations and asked for priorities (an elaborate way of ensuring compliance had to be used), further on an open question in which respondents were asked to describe themselves,

+ I am indebted to Clife Davis, Martin R. Dornbos, and Marshall Serall for kindly allowing me to study their questionnaire on political identity in West-Uganda.

finally a question about terms the respondent never wants to be called.
2. As indicators for assumed ethnic and religious identities questions about work-mates and supervisors as well as the respondent's evaluation of proposed marriage-partners of his daughter were chosen.

Table VIII shows the figures for the first choice analysed by residence and occupation. Striking figures certainly are the preferences of industrial workers and, to a smaller degree, of W/W residents: almost 60% (35%) choose their Clan-membership as the most important part in a description of themselves whereas farmers and residents of B. more equally divide on marriage, Clan, and farming with a preference for marriage 51% (27%). The high priority for Clan-membership in W/W is not related to actual Clan-contact, where indicators of attendance of Clan-meetings (B. 56%, W/W 49%) and knowledge of the name of a Clan-leader (B. 92%, W/W 75%) do not suggest this. Partly, this might be explained with unmarried respondents taking to Clan-membership as a kind of family-substitute, partly, in an area with high Clan-intermixture (Table IX) and low population stability (Table X) the Clan-name may serve as an orientation symbol only whereas in stabilized areas the name of the respondent is sufficient and his position more or less evident. But this cannot explain the exceptional high figures for industrial workers. I think they must be seen in the context of ethnic identity.

Farmers and civil servants on their work-place as well as in village-life normally do not compete with members of other tribes. Basoga industrial workers however find themselves a minority in the factories of Jinja (23,6%, Uganda Government 1965) in a place which they regard as their own, or, at least, share with their brothers, the Baganda (10,3%). In the open question asking for further descriptive terms 40% of the industrial workers named their tribe whereas no civil servant and no farmer did this. From Fallers (Fallers 1956) one might safely follow that there has not been a strong ethnic identity in Busoga so far, in any case nothing as distinctive as in Buganda. I would argue, therefore, that industrial workers, asked to describe themselves, took to Clan-membership as a traditional way of expressing one's identity in order to express an ethnic identity which being quite new and without an elaborate ideological superstructure has no proper means of expressing itself.

A national identity has not yet developed although in a situation in which Kenyans, Ruandans, Sudanese take away much envied jobs this would have been possible. Kenyans, for example, are normally referred to as Luo, Samia, and Kikuyu. Marriage discrimination also does not indicate a special anti-Ugandan discrimination with Luo (B. 76, W/W 66) and Banyaruanda (B. 74, W/W 60) taking as many refusals as Teso (B. 77, W/W 56).

There is, however, a small percentage of answers among industrial workers (15%) related to a racial identity. A class identity is not manifest unless one interprets anti-Asian discrimination which is particularly strong among industrial workers concerning working-place and supervisors as a disguised class-identity. Banton's generalizations about development of class-identities in West-Africa (Banton 1965) do not apply in Busoga: no signs of either an intra-tribe class distinction. (The relation ruler - commoner chief - farmer used as it was only for judging relations between individuals did not develop into a class-distinction, partly, I would argue, because the main constituents of such a distinction: control over land, faded away in selling of land for cash which it is nearly impossible to reverse.) Or an inter-tribe class distinction becomes manifest. A possible explanation for this might be that the racial distinction places all tribes (that is, the majority of their members) into the lower class as far as industrial work-relations are concerned. There is, on the other hand, a high percentage both in B. and W/W of answers like "I am poor" (B. 37%, W/W 15%) mainly given by farmers but without a reference to a class of exploiters except Asian traders.

The results do not indicate identity based on settlement. The place of origin was only named three times in W/W, never in B. This fits in with Fallers' observation (Fallers 1956) that the solidarities mainly centre around family and Clan, to a small degree around the territorial unit. If contact with the mutalla-chief is accepted as an indicator, then the high percentage of those who never had a word with the mutalla-chief in a matter not related to tax-paying (73% in W/W, 50% in B.) supports this view. Even where the place of origin in Busoga has its distinct language (Bulamogi), it was never mentioned. The place of actual settlement was never mentioned neither in B. nor in W/W. It is, therefore, difficult to say whether in W/W with its low population stability (Table X) the

stabilized group, that is those who live there since the resettlement of the area in the early 1930s after the sleeping-sickness or are born there, serves as a community into which newcomers care to integrate. Table X suggests that no long-term residence is intended, but also temporal integrations, I would follow from my own observations, are exceptional cases and are not looked for, mainly, I would argue, because the traditional centres of solidarity, Clan and family, did not lose their strength. Easy transport which allows to keep contact even with distant relatives as well as the acquisition of new functions, prevented this.

References

- Banton, Michael 1965, Social alignment and identity in a West-African City, in: Kuper, Hilda (ed.) Urbanization and migration in West Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Erikson, Erik H. 1956, The problem of ego identity, in: Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. IV, No.1.
- Fallers, Lloyd A. 1956, Bantu bureaucracy, Cambridge.
- _____. assisted by S. Elkan, F.K. Kamoga and S.B.K. Musoke 1964, The modernization of social stratification, in: Fallers, Lloyd A. (ed.), The king's men. Leadership and status in Buganda on the eve of independence, London.
- Fallers, Margaret Chave 1960, The Eastern Lacustrine Bantu, London.
- Gerken, Egbert 1966, Social change in rural areas in Busoga under the impact of urban centers: a procedural paper, . Sociology series No.6.
- Merton, Robert K. 1957, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd revised and enlarged edition, Glencoe, Ill.
- National Opinion Research Center 1947, Jobs and Occupations: A Popular evaluation, in: Opinion News, vol.IX.
- Parsons, Talcott 1951, The Social system, Glencoe, Ill.
- _____. 1958, Social Structure and the development of personality: Freud's contributions to the integration of psychology and sociology, in: Psychiatry, vol. XXI, No.4.
- Richards, Audrey, (ed.), 1959, East African chiefs, London.
- Stone, Gregory P. 1962, Appearance and self, in: Rose, A. (ed.) Human Behaviour and social processes, London.
- Uganda Government 1965, Enumeration of employees, Government Printer Entebbe.
- _____. 1965 a, Statistical abstracts, Government Printer Entebbe.

ALTERNATIVES TO EDUCATION BY RESIDENCE AND BY OCCUPATION

TABLE I

PATTERNS OF ANSWERS								NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
RESIDENCE AND OCCUPATION	1 a D	2 bcde AAAA	3 bcde AAAD	4 bcde AADD	5 bcde ADDD	6 bcde ADAD	OTHER	
RESIDENCE— B	% 5	% -	% 23	% 52	% 17	% -	% 3	100
W/W	4,2	4,2	46,9	15,6	18,7	10,4	-	96
OCCUPATION— F	% 7,8	% -	% 25,6	% 41,1	% 22,2	% -	% 3,3	90
C.S.	-	13,8	37,9	37,9	-	-	10,4	29
I.W.	-	-	46,1	19,2	19,2	13,5	2,8	52
S.B.	-	-	39,1	34,8	21,8	-	4,3	23

Abbreviations:

- alternatives - a to sell a bicycle
- b to give groundnut crop as security for a loan
- c to go to town and look for employment
- d to sell a piece of land
- e to sell the kibanja
- A agree
- D disagree
- residence - B. Busanbira
- W/W Wairaka - Wanyange
- occupation - F farmer
- C.S. civil servant
- I.W. industrial worker
- S.B. small businessmen

EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS BY CLAN OR VILLAGE
POSITION OF THEIR FATHERS

TABLE II

POSITION OF FATHER	EDUCATION		OCCUPATION	
	No education or less than P VI	PVI and higher	farming a. small business	civil service a. private industry
has a position	% 45,6	% 54,4	% 50,0	% 50,0
has no position	69,5	30,5	73,7	26,3

OCCUPATION BY CLAN MEMBERSHIP

TABLE III

CLAN	OCCUPATION			TOTAL	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
	F a. S!B.	C.S.	I.W.		
major ruling Clan	% 47,7	% 34,5	% 17,8	% 100	72
other	72,3	12,6	15,1	100	128

OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION BY RELIGION

TABLE IV

RELIGION	OCCUPATION		EDUCATION		NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
	F, S. B.	C. S., I. W.	less than P VI	P VI and higher	
Christian	% 58,1	% 41,9	% 56,2	% 43,8	117
Muslim	73,2	26,8	81,2	18,8	68

RELIGION OF FATHERS BY RELIGION OF SONS (RESPONDENTS)
AND RESIDENCE

TABLE V

FATHER \ SON	CHRISTIAN		MUSLIM		PAGAN		TOTAL NUMBER IN B.	TOTAL NUMBER IN W/W
	B.	W/W	B.	W/W	B.	W/W		
Christian	34	61	1	4	7	10	42	75
Muslim	10	3	32	14	8	1	50	18
Pagan	2	-	-	-	5	1	7	1
Total Number	46	64	33	18	20	12	99	94

CRITERIA OF PRESTIGE AScription BY OCCUPATION

CHOICE	OCCUPATION	CRITERIA OF PRESTIGE AScription IN %								TOTAL IN %	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
		a chief-client	b land-control	c respect	d independence, permanence	e income, profit	f inheritance	g service	h other and failure		
I											
FARMER	F	18,5	12,3	-	24,7	20,9	12,3	-	11,1	100	20
V.	C.S.	26,9	26,9	-	7,7	50,8	7,7	-	-	100	22
MECHANIC	I.W.	-	23,1	-	12,8	61,5	-	-	2,6	100	13
II											
MUTALLA-CHIEF V. TAYLOR	F	45,6	14,4	-	17,6	7,8	12,2	-	2,2	100	30
	C.S.	37,0	29,6	11,1	7,4	11,1	-	-	2,8	100	29
	I.W.	38,5	12,7	-	19,1	27,7	-	-	2,2	100	43
III											
RULER III	F	19,5	8,5	8,5	33,9	-	18,2	11,1	-	99,7	30
V.	C.S.	-	-	18,5	33,3	-	18,5	29,7	-	100	29
AGRIC. ASST.	I.W.	10,9	-	-	23,9	-	21,7	36,9	6,6	100	43

IDENTITY BY RESIDENCE AND OCCUPATION

TABLE VIII

RESIDENCE	CHOICES														TOTAL NUMBER
	I am a(n) ...														OF RESPONDENTS
	married men	father	Moise... (Clan)	industr. worker	civil servant	trader	farmer	protestant	catholic	muslim	omuvezi	omkef iri	educated men	other	
B.	27	1	22	-	-	1	15	3	2	3	-	1	6	11	87
W/W	20	5	34	4	2	1	6	3	1	2	-	1	7	18	94
OCCUPATION															
F and S.B.	35	5	19	-	-	2	19	6	3	10	-	1	2	12	114
C.S.	6	1	10	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	29
I.W.	6	-	27	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	3	48

SIZE OF LOCAL CLAN GROUPS BY RESIDENCE

TABLE IX

RESIDENCE	RESPONDENTS LIVING IN CLAN GROUPS REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE					Total Number
	1 or 2 times	3 till 10 times	10 till times	32	33 times	
B.	44	23	-		33	100
W/W	52	48	-		-	100

PLACE OF RESIDENCE BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE
AND PLACE OF RETIREMENT

TABLE X

PLACE LENGTH	Busambira	Wairaka-Wanyange
Since birth or before 35	56	3
1936-50	20	18
1951 - 62	18	31
since 1963	4	45
total number	98	97
PLACE OF RETIREMENT		
wants to stay	89	34
goes back to birth- place	- 0	54
goes to other place	11	12
total number	100	100

No. 423.

~~Peter Marris~~

UEA Social Science Conference
December 1966

S-4

LENDING MONEY

"Neither a lender nor a borrower be" Polonius

In this paper, I have put down some very tentative thoughts on loans, firstly as they are used in financing small-scale African enterprises, and secondly as a service African businessmen give to their customers. These remarks arise out of research in progress, and may well need to be revised when the findings are more complete, and have been analysed. Meanwhile, I hope what follows will suggest a few ideas for discussion, in a field of development where there are many problems, little previous experience and knowledge to go by, but already hopeful progress.

The development of Kenya depends much on lending money - by foreign governments to the Kenya Government; by the Kenya Government to farmers, co-operatives, settlers, businesses; and by these in turn, sometimes, to their customers. Few of these loans are strictly commercial, in the sense that the lender is looking for the most profitable return on his investment. They are part of a development strategy, where the lender's aim is to promote economic growth as efficiently as he can, rather than to make the safest or largest profit.

The need for these loans usually arises because the investment is too uncertain, or the profit too small, to attract commercial capital. The borrower may have little or no security to offer, his credit-worthiness may be impossible to assess, the viability of his enterprise may be speculative. The purpose of the loan is, therefore, to supply a need for capital where commercial safeguards against bad risks, and sanctions against default cannot easily be applied. And the lender is looking for a different kind of return: even if he loses money, he has achieved his essential aim if

he has promoted a significant growth in the economy.

Such development loans cannot, then, be treated as if they were straightforward commercial loans. They involve a different kind of relationship between lender and borrower, where mutual trust and understanding are much more important. The lender cannot simply calculate the rate of profit that would justify the risk, and secure himself by legal contract against too severe a loss. He has to explain the kind of development he hopes to achieve, and find borrowers who want to achieve it, trusting very largely in the sincerity of their intentions.

His first problem, of course, is that his confidence may be abused. The borrower may not use the money for the purpose intended - a government builds a palace instead of irrigation works, a farmer gets a new wife instead of fertilizers and ploughs. But apart from such bad faith - as the lender sees it - there are, I think, great difficulties in working out the expectations and obligations of such a relationship between lender and borrower, even where the intentions of both are sincere.

Here I want to discuss a particular strategy of lending, which can be illustrated, for instance, by the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation's small industries loan scheme. A limited amount of money is provided for a revolving fund, which is lent at a rate of interest high enough to cover the cost of administering the fund, and to service the debt which the government itself may have incurred in setting it up. The loans are to be repaid by instalment over about seven years, so that the fund can, in fact, revolve. Since the purpose of the scheme is to promote African enterprises in a field where as yet few are established, it has little experience to guide it in assessing the viability of projects put to it, or the competence of the applicants. Nor can it insist too much on adequate security, so long as the scheme hopes to encourage talent held back for lack of access to capital - since some of these talented people will have little by way of security to offer. At the outset, promising projects are examined, and the hopeful ones financed, without strict regard for guarantees.

Inevitably, there are disappointments. Ventures fail through mismanagement, technical difficulties,

lack of a market. A new bakery attracts more determined competition from those already established, and cannot sustain a price-cutting war. A sawmill fails to obtain an allocation of forest timber. Machines do not turn out a satisfactory product. A partnership breaks up in recrimination, and when the books are gone through, a great deal of money has disappeared. Some of these misfortunes are bad luck, and could not have been foreseen, but meanwhile the revolving fund is being drained, and the whole operation endangered. The scheme has, then, to become tougher in self-protection. It begins to insist more strictly on security, and to control more closely the way the money is spent. So, for instance, the I.C.D.C. generally prefers to give loans for machinery, workshops, and other recoverable assets, rather than for working capital. And it pays for these itself, once the borrower has placed his orders, so that it can be sure that the loan is spent exactly as agreed. If the instalments are not repaid, it can then insist that the assets are sold up, and at least recover some of its money. It must, of course, be prepared for this, and has a responsibility to protect its resources. But the safeguards can have awkward consequences.

If an enterprise is chiefly dependent on government loans, then it needs government help as much, or more, for working capital as for machinery: otherwise there will not be enough money to keep the machines working. Once a business runs into difficulties, they quickly become cumulative. A machine breaks down: by the time it is repaired, the business has run out of money to fuel it or feed it supplies, so the business shuts down again. By then it is losing its customers, the I.C.D.C. is beginning to press for its instalments on the loan, and within a few months of starting, collapse may already be near. At the same time, since loan repayments begin usually six months after the granting of the loan - when the machinery bought with it may scarcely be installed and fully working - there is almost no margin to allow for unforeseen difficulties.

I do not mean to suggest that this is what happens to most of the enterprises supported by the I.C.D.C., or that the I.C.D.C. is wrong to guard its fund carefully. But there are some, I think, whose chances of success would be greater but for the conditions under which the loan is granted. That is, the regulations needed to protect the loan fund from depletion tend to

inhibit the flexibility needed to give every enterprise supported the best chance. A lending institution like the I.C.D.C. has therefore to make an uncomfortable choice. If it insists on its regulations, it may have to wind up enterprises which with more time, more advice, and perhaps more money could succeed: and it will still lose a part of its investment. If it relaxes its regulations, then it is likely to lose even more. The choice depends in part on what it takes as its criterion of success. If, fundamentally, the purpose is to promote viable new enterprises, then so long as this happens, it is less important that the loan fund may become exhausted in time through default. But, naturally enough, a public institution accountable for its management tends to become preoccupied with the protection of the fund.

It can happen, for instance, that an enterprise which could afford to repay its loan instalments instead uses the money for further development - hiring overseas advice, installing electricity, replacing unsatisfactory machines with more efficient ones. The managers of the business may well be right that the investment is crucial to their progress, and the returns will justify it. But the lending institution cannot look at it this way. The fund depends on regular repayment of a fixed sum on a fixed day. It does not stand to gain anything by deferring payment, though the business itself may become much more profitable. A loan scheme cannot compensate for its support of businesses which fail by a higher return from those which succeed. Considered simply as a financing organization, the scheme is not concerned with the development it has promoted, but only with getting its money back.

In general terms, this is the paradox. The government wants to promote economic enterprise, and enable people with talent and initiative to exploit it. Government only needs to provide capital itself, where commercial capital is not willing to invest - that is, where the risks are high. So, to fulfill their purpose, the loans must go where little security can be offered, where there is little previous experience, and a great many unknowns. Inevitably, there are losses, and in reaction, government is likely to take one of two courses. It may restrict its loans to those who have experience and adequate security, or impose tight regulations. If it does the first, it may become redundant, lending where private capital would be equally

willing to invest. And if it does the second, it may create conditions which many potentially viable enterprises cannot meet. It may also go so far in control that the borrower feels he has lost the initiative, and leaves the lending organization to run his affairs. When things go wrong, he looks to the lending body to tell him what to do next, while they expect him to assume the responsibility. Between the two, the situation may deteriorate irrevocably - the lender threatening to sue for his money, while the borrower is still petitioning for help and further funds. There is sometimes genuine confusion over the legal responsibilities the borrower has entailed. He tends to see the loan as part of a mutual co-operation in development - as indeed it is. But the lending institution tends to repudiate any responsibility for success or failure, insisting on the contractual commitment to repay, regardless of circumstances.

The relationship is, therefore, very difficult to establish on a basis of mutual understanding. Both lender and borrower share the belief that men with the initiative to start new enterprises deserve to be encouraged, and that this will create employment and a larger African share in the money economy. It is probably the African businessmen and progressive farmers who are doing most to pioneer the social changes in values and working habits on which development depends. But, though they share the same aims, the interests of lender and borrower tend to diverge as soon as problems arise. The first becomes preoccupied with saving his capital, the second with saving his enterprise. So, for instance, while the I.C.D.C. may be pressing for the repayment of its loan, the business is still talking of further loans, replacing obsolete machinery with more modern, diversifying its activities, or opening new branches to increase its market. And it seems that sometimes, to limit its risks, the I.C.D.C. may have been reluctant to grant enough for efficient machinery, and especially for working capital, to ensure the most promising start. And being short staffed, it cannot give much time to supervision and advice. By the time a business is in serious difficulties, it may be reluctant to approach the I.C.D.C. frankly, fearing that if it reveals the extent of its problems, it will only remind the I.C.D.C. of its indebtedness.

Given these difficulties, I wonder whether a loan represents most appropriately the kind of

relationship the I.C.D.C. is trying to establish with the small industries it supports. From its own point of view, loans have the disadvantage that the return is the same, irrespective of the success of the enterprise. It loses on failures which cannot repay, but cannot balance the loss by sharing in the profits of its successes. Having no part in the management, it cannot easily influence the operation of the business, once it has agreed the loan. From the point of view of the business, the conditions under which the loan is granted leave very little margin for unforeseen difficulties, and may even inhibit the proper use of the new assets for lack of uncommitted resources, while the obligation of the loan instalments easily makes the I.C.D.C. seem - through no fault of its own - less a partner in development than an intimidating creditor.

Would it make more sense to replace loans by the investment of equity capital in these businesses? This represents more nearly, I think, the kind of co-operation which government is trying to establish, and meets most of the problems discussed above. When an enterprise is well-established, government should be able to recover its investment at a profit; it has a right to be represented in the management; the capital it has invested does not have to be repaid on pre-determined dates, irrespective of the needs of the business; it could be less specific about the particular use of its contribution; and it would be much more continuously in touch with the progress of the enterprise. There should probably be, also, a central auditing service to supervise the book-keeping. No doubt there are disadvantages to such a scheme, too. There would no longer, for instance, be a strictly revolving fund - though I doubt whether it is very realistic to suppose that any such fund can be self-sustaining for long, given the high risks of promoting small businesses in new fields. So the alternative of investment seems at least worth considering.

If it is not practicable, then I wonder whether there might be more emphasis on advice and training, rather than loans alone. Fewer or smaller loans, backed by an advisory service, would, I think, in the long run contribute more to development. Advisory services are expensive - especially as they can be worse than useless, unless the advice is really competent and imaginative, and so need well-qualified personnel. But part of the cost might be saved by inviting businessmen

already established to volunteer their services as occasional consultants in their field, organized through the advisory service. Already some of the businesses get very useful advice in this way, learning from each other's experience. And I have never heard of anyone refusing advice, for fear of giving a competitor an advantage: African businessmen seem very ready to help each other in this way, with little sense of rivalry.

2

I turn now to another kind of lender-borrower relationship.

The granting of credit to customers is one of the most widely acknowledged reasons for the failure of African businesses. African shopkeepers themselves list credit amongst their outstanding difficulties, and they would advise a newcomer to business to give little or no credit at the outset. Yet it seems that nearly all of them do give credit, and often lose money by it. In one market centre near Nairobi, for instance, about 90% of the businesses give substantial credit, and more than four fifths of these have incurred bad debts. The amounts are not large - from less than a hundred shillings to five thousand, with about half of the businesses owed more than four hundred shillings which they are unlikely to recover. But since many of these businesses probably do not realize more than two hundred shillings profit in a month, the loss is serious.

These businesses do not give credit indiscriminately to all their customers, except for a very few. They give to regular and reliable customers, as they say, people they know, those with regular salaries, teachers and government employees, friends or prosperous farmers. But their judgement of who can be trusted is evidently not very sure, since they lose money just the same. And it is not always easy to take effective action against those who do not pay. Although most say they are prepared to take defaulters to court, only a minority have ever done so, and the outcome sometimes hardly justifies it. Each individual debt may be too small to justify the expense, especially as the debt may still not be paid, in spite of the court order. And many of the businessmen fear to make themselves unpopular by initiating prosecutions, when it comes to the point.

At the same time, only half the businessmen

in this market believed that they needed to give credit to retain customers. About two fifths give credit, lose money by it, and yet maintain that they need not do so to run a successful business. It is hard to say exactly why: they are influenced, I think, by prevailing custom, and by a sense of obligation to help people who could not otherwise afford to buy. But it seems clear that credit is not generally given simply to secure a commercial advantage. Most businessmen, if they set the loss of customers through refusing credit against the loss through bad debts of giving it, would almost certainly decide against credit. This is the advice they give, but do not follow. Credit seems at least in part a response to expectations in the community which they do not like to repudiate.

The relationship between a shopkeeper and his credit customers has, then, this in common with the relationship between government and the enterprises it lends to: in neither case is the money lent primarily for commercial reasons, but rather because the lender sympathizes with the borrower's needs, and believes that by helping him, he will be helping the progress of the community. And in both cases, it is hard to pursue defaulters ruthlessly without contradicting these altruistic aims. At the same time, the lender is open to exploitation, because he has few sanctions he can apply, is reluctant to make himself unpopular or cause hardship by applying them, and cannot easily judge who will prove trustworthy. With the shopkeepers as with government loans, part of the trouble lies in the different circumstances of lender and borrower, which make their interests hard to adjust.

The shopkeeper is buying his stock, usually for cash, and if he can get credit at all from his suppliers, it seldom runs for more than a month. So he works to a monthly cycle, while his customers are chiefly farmers, whose economic cycle is seasonal. It seems, once you think of it, odd that credit in an agricultural country should be tied to the monthly wage packet, when most people are not wage earners at all, but must wait for the harvest. But there is nothing the African shopkeeper can do about this, since his own access to credit is very restricted, if he has any at all - far more restricted than for the Indian shopkeeper with whom he competes, or the Indian wholesaler from whom he typically gets his stock, but who seldom trusts him with an advance.

At the same time, the farmer's attitude to credit may be influenced by a tradition of mutual help which is not governed by a strict timetable, especially where farming has not yet been greatly influenced by cash crops and government loans. A plough contractor in the coastal region, for instance, failed because his customers treated the service as they were used to treat help from a member of their community - as an obligation to be repaid as and when they could. But meanwhile, fuel had to be bought for the tractors, repairs paid for, loan instalments repaid. He was reluctant to take anyone to court, because he was genuinely concerned to promote the agricultural progress of his district, and did not want to discourage people from adopting modern techniques by associating them with legal prosecutions. The business failed, but he did succeed in demonstrating the value of using tractor driven ploughs, and he believes that if such a business were started again, people would now be more willing to pay promptly. Someone else will probably gain the advantage of his pioneering.

His experience can be compared with another plough contractor on a settlement scheme on the coast, who did very well, and now has several lorries and tractors bought with his own money, besides the equipment acquired through a government loan. Both men, as it happens, gained new ideas partly from their army experience, and while the one who failed had a few years primary education, the successful had no formal education at all. The different fate of their enterprises was not, I think, determined by differences in their competence or purposefulness, but rather by the difference between the communities in which they were living. The farmers on the settlement scheme were more familiar with the demands of a money economy, and they formed a more impersonal community from different regions, recently promoted by government action. So they were already conditioned to understand the need for prompt payment of the tractor's hire, and for sanctions against default.

As the country makes progress, I think successful businesses will give less and less credit, and more selectively. The businesses supported by the I.C.D.C. which I have met, who represent the more ambitious enterprises growing out of communities and market centres, are much less ready to give credit: about a third none at all, and the rest only cautiously. They have learned by experience. About a third have

accumulated bad debts in the past, sometimes running into thousands of shillings. A few have begun to use hire purchase agreements, or ask for security. So it seems that as businesses grow more sophisticated, and larger in scale, the prevailing practice of credit begins to disappear. There is a popular picture, which you may find in shops up and down the country - printed I think in America early in this century. On the left, a harassed man, head in hand, sits despairingly amongst a pile of papers. On the right, a prosperous looking gentleman with a comfortably round waist stands in front of his safe, smiling complacently. The caption on the left reads 'I have given credit' and on the right 'for credit come tomorrow'. (And when tomorrow comes, of course, the customer will get the same answer). The future seems to lie with a philosophy of strictly cash transactions.

3

Both these examples of a relationship between lender and borrower show how difficult it is to establish a pattern of obligation which is workable from both points of view, when the concern is not merely with a mutual calculation of financial advantage. The lender's desire to promote the well-being of the community makes strictly commercial terms inapplicable, but no other really satisfactory control takes its place. The outcome tends to be an uneasy hesitation between legal enforcement and a desire to maintain goodwill and co-operation for the future. In the end, businessmen are seeking to extricate themselves from a kind of relationship which causes more trouble than it is worth, while government may be wise to do the same, and look for other terms on which to co-operate in the development of private enterprise. (And it may be that the same is true of international loans to developing countries: the relationship is certainly uneasy, and fraught with a good deal of mutual disappointment). We need, I think, to search more imaginatively for ways of distributing capital for development, which can embody more effectively the mutual purpose, and establish a pattern of expectation which both parties can meet. In the promotion of enterprises, the solution may lie in a scheme of government

participation through equity capital; for retail businesses, in offering, perhaps, discounts to customers who deposit money in advance. But whatever the solution, it will have to be worked out in terms of social controls which people can abide by, and represent values and interests which they share.

The notion of 'security' sums up the whole problem. For security in the sense of attachable assets is only a means of achieving security in the wider sense of protection against risk. But in the circumstances of a developing country, like Kenya, ambitious to for rapid progress and new forms of economic activity, the risks are bound to be high. The question is not, I think, how to avoid risk, but how the risk can be most fairly distributed. The security which most people can offer is their land. But given the deep attachment to land, and the ultimate dependence on it for livelihood and protection against hardship, how many people can really afford to hazard their land for business ventures? When it comes to the point, will government be ruthless enough to demand this sacrifice as the price of failure? Is it after all fair that those who pioneer new enterprises should take so great a risk? I would guess that most businessmen, when they give their land as security, do not seriously consider the possibility that they will lose it. Nor, so far as I know, has anyone yet been forced to sell his farm through his business failure. The common practice of securing loans against land may well not be an equitable way of sharing risk, and recognising this, it may not be enforced.

In practice, the government is generally seen as the carrier of risk - not only by those who seek loans, but by banks which, it seems, seldom accept any responsibility to venture their capital in the promotion of the African economy. The government can take it all. But, of course, if the government did, indeed, shoulder all the risks, there would be little incentive to those who receive loans to make every effort to justify the privilege of a share in scarce development capital. So, on the one hand, the insistence on security from the borrower tends to force him, in principle, to risk his whole livelihood; while reliance on the government's ability to spread its risks, leaves the borrower too little committed. What is needed, I think, is a system which ensures that both government and businessmen, or businessman and customer, distribute the risks equitably, in terms of their own resources. That is, each undertakes a risk

Peter Marris

12

which, given his circumstances, is neither ruinous nor trivial. He will then carry a manageable share of the burden of insecurity which is the inevitable counterpart of progress. But in seeking to share this burden fairly, we need, I think, often to look for other ways to express it than the form of a commercial loan.

1st draft copy

No. 430.
J. R. Moris
U.E.A. Social Science Conference
December 1966
PL3 - 1

THE EVALUATION OF SETTLEMENT SCHEME PERFORMANCE:
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPRAISAL¹

Within the past year, both Kenya and Tanzania have experienced a major turnabout in governmental policy relating to land settlement. The change has come at a time when land settlement (especially settlement schemes) was under serious study by members of the academic community.² And yet, apparently, the academic viewpoint played little or no part in bringing about the decision to de-emphasize settlement as a form of rural development policy.

The situation is relevant to development studies for several key reasons. It is, first of all, a case study in the kinds of evaluation which are relied upon by administrators in making rural development policy. Of equal interest, however, is the fact that it is a topic about which social scientists--who like to think they have something important to say about development--had little explicit theory. Their inability to advise meaningfully on this topic has made clear the wide gap between potential and actual contributions of applied research to the process of governmental decision-making. I shall argue that what is at fault is our entire conception of the role of applied research, which limits severely the kinds of assistance which social scientists can render.

Finally, the topic has great intrinsic importance. Land settlement fills certain needs for agricultural transformation which cannot be met by any other type of agricultural organization. Yet the factors involved are exceedingly complex. Thus it becomes a fascinating topic for interdisciplinary study, the more so because there is so much room left for pioneering in the development of relevant social theory.

The Need for Systematic Evaluation of Land Settlement

That the climate of opinion about land settlement has changed within East Africa cannot be seriously doubted. We remember the period just after independence when Kenya and Tanzania alike looked to land settlement as a major solution to their rural problems. In Kenya's case, as is well known (and documented elsewhere), the nation looked to settlement as the prime mechanism for redistributing agricultural resources and simultaneously reducing unemployment. The Tanzanian expectations were set forth clearly by President Nyerere himself, in his 10th of December 1962 address to the National Assembly; they are also stated in the Five-Year Plan.³ Fundamentally, the intention was to revolutionize indigenous farming traditions through regrouping scattered farmers into modern and technologically advanced communities. Herein, then, the labels we have come to attach to the respective Kenya and Tanzanian efforts: for Kenya, the "Million Acre Settlement Scheme" representing a major portion of the former "white highlands" turned over to African hands; in Tanzania, the "Village Settlement Project" to encompass eight pilot projects in the first stage of much larger investment.

¹My opinions relate to an earlier period of field research on development schemes, under a grant from the Agricultural Development Council, Inc.

²Cf. work by Apthorpe, Yeld, Charlesly, Hutton, Clough, Shaffer, Chambers, Brown, Harbeson, Thomas, Meyers, Brain, Nellis, Georgulas, & Rweyemamu.

³Volume I, pp. x, 21, 23; Volume II, p. 27.

The change in government's official opinion about settlement within the four years of experimentation is striking. The official case against settlement has been ably stated in public. For Kenya, it can be found in the Sessional Paper on African Socialism and also in the Development Plan. For Tanzania, one should refer to the text of the address by the Second Vice-President Kawawa to the opening of a Rural Development Conference at the University College, Dar es Salaam, in April of 1966. What is the gist of these two, comparable, arguments? What can be inferred from them about the processes of evaluation which have been employed in re-assessing the value of land settlement? Are the arguments soundly based?

Tanzania's statement is the more candid. It points out, first of all, that the typical scheme absorbs some £ 150,000 to benefit only 250 families. The hope of recovering a full £ 120,000 from scheme households within 25 years was very optimistic. In hindsight, the pilot project schemes were over-capitalised. They did not require the machinery and steel house frames which were furnished on such a lavish scale. Secondly, settlers themselves showed far less enthusiasm, and were less willing to work, than were others on unassisted schemes. They seemed to expect everything from Government.

The Kenya statement argues that land settlement has met its declared objectives, that of demonstrating to landless Africans "the determination of the Government to open up new farming opportunities in the once forbidden areas." Henceforth Government will devote its main activities to the development of the former African areas. The reasons given are economic: it costs a net average of £ 750 per family and £ 25 per acre to install a household within a settlement scheme. By way of contrast, a very much smaller outlay on land registration and consolidation, £ 1 - 2 per acre and £ 5 - 50 per holding, stimulates "increases in efficiency and output far out of proportion to the cost of the process." In summary, "it is clear that, for the same total expenditure, development of the former African areas will provide employment for, and increase the living standards of, a much larger number of people than settlement."¹

At issue is not the veracity of the conclusions given. Few observers on the East African scene doubt that settlement, as implemented, has been a costly and sometimes wasteful experiment. Rather, what is disappointing is the all-or-nothing nature of claims made. They reflect economic criteria almost exclusively. There seems to be no awareness of settlement as an organizational type, which may be implemented in various ways, and which is appropriate to various situations. The economics of the specific program relied upon in the past are used to reject land settlement as a general policy. This is so in the face of the enormous diversity of settlement types which can be found in both Tanzania and Kenya, ranging from the most inexpensive to the most extravagant kinds of scheme.

In fact, it appears that Government does not distinguish schemes as such. It calls "settlement" whatever is done by the Settlement Agency, but not what is carried on by other departments. The Tanzanian statement is the most astonishing in this regard. Within the same text as criticized village settlements, there is expressed Government's firm commitment to resettlement programs:

Our second aim was the reduction of agricultural unemployment in the relatively densely populated areas by the development of river basins which, with water control, offer a large potential for resettlement from over-crowded areas. This second aim still remains our policy, and planning is proceeding to achieve it. (my italics)

Analytically speaking, resettlement of this type has all of the problems of village settlement, and several more besides. It, too, is capital intensive; it cannot recover the cost of basic services from settler gains; etc. But it happens to lie within the domain of another Ministry from settlement.

There would appear to be, then, an urgent need to define for government a clear concept of what settlement consists of, and to set out possible non-economic ways of estimating its contribution.

¹The revised Development Plan, 1966 - 1970. Pp. 125 - 126.

The Place of Settlement Schemes in Relation to Land Settlement Policy

Discussion of land settlement frequently bogs down in conflicting definitions of just what is at issue. This is perhaps inevitable where the topic is so broad, individual cases so diverse, and sustained investigation still in its infancy. At the outset, then, one must formulate some sort of working definition to distinguish land settlement as an area of inquiry. Clarification seems necessary both with respect to outlining settlement functions, and to delimiting settlement organization. How can a settlement scheme as such be differentiated clearly among the plethora of types of induced agricultural development?

A first and major confusion arises when land settlement is equated with only one function out of the several which might be involved. The process of occupying territory has many sets of separate activities, with special purposes at different stages. The importance of activities change as the use of land evolves, so that no single function can be identified exclusively as "land settlement." In sequential order, we can distinguish between: i) preliminary infrastructural requisites, ii) farm and scheme capital development, iii) production activities, iv) marketing activities, and v) farm and community services. Depending upon the initial condition of the land, certain activities may be unnecessary. Resettlement, for example, might not be required if the land is already populated; infrastructure in the form of roads and water supplies may already exist in many areas subject to settlement. Land settlement entails many functions, and these can be performed by a variety of agencies at successive periods.

Frequently, however, land settlement in a given country may take only one or two forms. Consequently, these forms come to be identified with land settlement generally. Historically, within East Africa, many schemes originated with the opening of new land cleared from tsetse fly or wild game. There were also attempts to move people from the mountains to the plains (e.g., Ilalo and Uluguru schemes in Tanzania), or to relieve population pressure by creating watering points in dry areas (Sukumaland). Discussion has tended to link land settlement inexorably to questions of population resettlement. On the other hand, those who were aware of the government's role in land settlement have often identified it as a form of centrally directed activity, "change from above." Neither image does justice to the complexities of the actual situation.

In visiting programs of land settlement, one soon comes to realize that there are many independent variables which can be expressed differently vis-a-vis each set of settlement functions. Each function has, from the organizational standpoint, several options: it can be corporate or individual, general or specialized, self-regulating or supervised. Marketing, for example, is sometimes left to individual farmers, sometimes given to a scheme cooperative, sometimes done by the scheme management, and sometimes handled by centralized national boards. Few programs provide institutional mechanisms for all of the settlement functions, and there are great differences in the institutionalization of each stage.

Thus a second type of confusion arises from the failure to distinguish between the organizational contexts of land settlement. For simplicity's sake, I have here reduced these to the three commonest forms; later, we will go into more detail. One finds, first of all, some land settlement which occurs in response to generalized settlement administration--perhaps where a department of government (Water Development, etc.) has created the infrastructure needed by farmers. In this sense many large government agencies may serve as a form of settlement administration: national irrigation boards, public works departments, tsetse fly control units, and so forth. At the other end of the spectrum, one may have a settlement scheme. The scheme is an individualized organization at "grass roots" levels, affecting farmers directly through their being incorporated into it. And, finally, one sees various kinds of combination of schemes with super-ordinate administration by the means of some kind of settlement Agency. The Agency then supervises one or more settlement schemes.

In the most complex combination, land settlement may be organized at all three levels, with a national ministry in charge of a specialized Land Settlement Agency which in turn supervises settlement schemes. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that settlement functions can be independently performed by any or all of these levels of super-ordinate administration. Schemes as such are not the only form of land settlement.

The distinction appears most clearly when one looks at instances where land settlement is sponsored without leading to the creation of settlement schemes. Many resettlement programs fall into this category. Here the common pattern is for some agency of government (or several in combination) to undertake public works of the types already mentioned: new roads, railway communications, dams, and perhaps marketing facilities. These investments make agricultural settlement possible in new areas without further concern. Occupation then occurs on a piecemeal basis, and new settlers are often either refugees or people without land in their home areas. Organizational means are provided to furnish the preconditions for settlement, but not to continue to take responsibility for it.

It is clear that instances of this type pose very different problems from the "scheme" variety. Settlement administration appears to have only a transitory relationship to farm production, mainly exercised in the recruitment phase of land development. To the sociologist, the split seems so wide that most attention is focussed on farmers themselves, and not upon the sociology of the government agency. The administrators leave farmers to their own devices in organizing themselves within new communities. With the passage of time the observer can no longer trace any connection between administrative measures and farm performance. Instead, the tendency is to concentrate upon settlers' lives before and after coming to the settlement area. This makes resettlement quite attractive to the sociologist, but it also means that his techniques for evaluation will be more akin to those which could be used to study the effects of land reform or new roads. Little is gained by trying to discuss schemes and resettlement within a common frame, except with respect to the initial phases of their development.

At the other extreme, one can have schemes per se without any form of higher level administration. One thinks of Farmers' Associations in northern Tanzania, where groups of farmers have banded together spontaneously to raise the investment capital for extensive farming on Western lines. Many Utopian farm communities are of this variety. There are also many borderline cases, where a scheme has outside sponsorship, but the sponsors do not themselves especially support land settlement. The Tanzanian regional government schemes were of this nature, where local government underwrote the initial capital development but could not continue supplying scheme requirements. Also, there are instances of schemes run by missions, by hospitals, by commercial firms, even by prisons. In any event, the determinants of scheme performance are for this type mostly localized to the individual case. Scheme structure takes on great importance, and the sociologist is likely to view the whole organization as a type of "total institution."

Traditionally, the largest amounts of public investment have been put into forms of land settlement which combine settlement administration at the national level with settlement schemes at the local level. Kenya's Department of Settlement, and Tanzania's Village Settlement Project, both under specialized parent Ministries, are of this type. Similarly, Tanzania and Kenya have both created specialized control of water development: in Tanzania, through a ministerial structure and in Kenya by means of the National Irrigation Board. In these cases land settlement has become closely identified with the activities of the intermediary bureaucratic agency, which supervises a number of individual schemes.

I would suggest, then, a preliminary grouping of land settlement programs into three classes according to their organizational characteristics:

- i) Land settlement which occurs in response to programs of infra-structural investment, usually organized by departments of government who provide similar services in non-settlement areas as well. There may be a settlement program, as a temporary expedient; but there are no settlement schemes as such.
- ii) Land settlement which consists in individualized settlement schemes, where farmers are members of organized residence groups, but which lack specialized assistance or supervision at a higher level.
- iii) Land settlement which includes settlement schemes and a coordinating agency with specialized administrative functions vis-a-vis settlement activities. The Agency often bears prime responsibility for ^{the} individual settlement schemes.

As defined, the topic of this paper deals only with the types which include settlement schemes as the dominant form of localized agricultural organization (two and three above). Furthermore, where schemes are closely linked to some form of supervisory Agency, it is the scheme and not the agency which is my concern. Obviously, there is a whole battery of techniques from out of public administration which could (and should) be used in estimating Agency success. But these techniques are not particular to settlement as such; the sociological factors are of greatest consequence at the lowest level, where the Agency is in direct contact with farmers through the means of a residential settlement scheme. It is only in this sense that we can talk about scheme performance as distinguished from the activities of supporting institutions.

In setting apart settlement schemes in particular from settlement programs in general, I am giving primacy to the criterion of residence organization. Residentially coordinated activities seem to be the central focus of what we mean by "a settlement scheme." Most uses of this label imply one or more of the following:

- i) The scheme is basically agricultural in its form of land-use, in the more broad sense of including both crop and animal husbandry.
- ii) Scheme farmers are affected through direct participation. The scheme has clear social boundaries, so that it has a definite group membership which farmers join and leave.
- iii) Scheme members share common residence, if but in the minimal sense that the scheme also has physical boundaries, i.e., a territory.
- iv) Scheme farmers are mutually interdependent for certain types of assistance. The farming activities of each household are not completely autonomous.

To these basic stipulations, one must add the ones which usually (but not always) apply:

- v) Scheme members accept some form of common specialization, usually centralized into a managerial structure with distinct roles and offices.
- vi) The scheme channels investment (and credit) according to standardized patterns for all members, and it creates certain unified facilities for the scheme as a whole.
- vii) The scheme makes a common claim upon many outside services, such as technical advice, education, health facilities, etc.
- viii) The scheme may answer to a non-scheme agency for meeting specified objectives.

It should be apparent that a scheme structure of this type has certain definite advantages for achieving rapid agricultural development. Among other things, it permits:

- i) Specialization on a larger scale than is possible with small holder production, without necessarily sacrificing the low cost advantages of the latter.
- ii) Continuing contact with farmers over long periods so that extended training in modern techniques can be achieved, and special skills can be diffused throughout the scheme.
- iii) Generating its own physical and social requirements through members common contribution and joint efforts (e.g., constructing schools, investing in equipment, etc.).
- iv) Concentration of physical investment to one place, allowing household services of a high standard to be offered through centralized, low cost organization.
- v) Central organization of the scheme labour force to meet special objectives.

We find that there are certain forms of agriculture which almost inevitably entail some sort or other of settlement schemes. Schemes are required wherever massive physical works necessitate the coordinating of many farmers' activities, as in large irrigation schemes. They are the easiest way of channelling farm unit investments to large numbers of farms simultaneously. They are useful for introducing new crops or techniques, and for testing in local conditions measures which have succeeded elsewhere. They simplify the problems of organizing new markets or new services. They allow complex forms of work organization, and they can guarantee specified standards of uniformity in husbandry practices. Thus they are ideal for safeguarding major national investments whose benefits cannot be realized without modern farming, or for opening up new lands in an orderly fashion.

Thus settlement schemes have an obvious association with the "transformation approach" to farming development. The modernization desired of farm "transformation" is fourfold: i) it is a revolution in the farmer's practices, launching him into modern farming, ii) it carries with it the substitution of contractual obligations for reciprocal obligations, and the farmer depends upon the national economy for his goods and services, iii) it implies a permanent change in status. Once "transformed" the farmer will be committed entirely to the modern sector.

The kinds of programs which require settlement schemes--opening up new areas of land, large scale irrigation projects, river basin control--are still planned in both Kenya and Tanzania. Although these might not be officially the responsibility of a settlement agency, they are identical to existing programs from the analytical standpoint. In fact, the new programs are even more capital intensive than the existing ones. They deserve very careful scrutiny indeed.

The remainder of this paper will be taken up with viewpoints for evaluating scheme performance. The structural aspects of scheme organization are sufficiently predominant so that one can speak meaningfully about scheme performance as an entity. There are many ways of measuring this performance, which make clear the very different consequences which flow from alternative choices in respect to scheme organization. And yet, I believe, an examination of the measures points away from schemes and towards settlement administration as being the source of current problems with settlement. In reality, it is not settlement schemes which have failed as a form of development policy--it is rather the settlement agencies themselves.

Ways of Evaluating Settlement Performance

Following is a list of various points of view which have been used in the study and evaluation of development schemes. Each entails certain assumptions about what is important, and therefore each tends toward a distinctive emphasis in its conclusions. The approaches used at the level of national policy are presented first, as these deal more with Settlement Agencies than with schemes per se.

1. Settlement as an expression of "National Style." In spite of great similarities the world over in settlement organization, certain types of settlement can become identified with a particular nation (cf., the Kibbutzim in Israel). Usually this comes through the political identification of a type of scheme with national goals, and thereby its incorporation into the national rhetoric. We note the commitment to "a transformation approach" in Tanzanian policy of recent years, and the "UPC group farms" of Uganda. The concern with national style necessarily deals with mass phenomena in terms of national goals and ideology, for which settlement is primarily a policy issue. As such, it can be analyzed in the same terms as in the following viewpoints, with the proviso that there is likely to be more concern about its mobilization functions.

2. Settlement as a form of development policy. Here, although still talking about settlement in national terms, we are concerned with the comparative justification for settlement vis-a-vis alternative measures for achieving agricultural development. The point of view relies upon other, more specific means of analysis to demonstrate its case. It takes as its 'givens' the nation's economic and manpower constraints. It usually includes attention to the structures by which settlement is implemented, and so is likely to be linked with the examination of the Settlement Agency as well.

3. Settlement as a means of rural transformation. This approach differs subtly from the first two in that specific rural goals are often paramount. It looks at the effectiveness of settlement as a mode of development in meeting specified targets, usually stated in terms of rural welfare: village communities, stabilization of agriculture, provision of modern services (housing, schools, hospitals, electricity, etc.) and so forth. It may incorporate a national commitment to modernity for rural areas. The emphasis is less upon the comparative effectiveness of settlement, and more upon its success in terms of unique goals. Thus settlement may be judged a success even if it makes special demands upon the general economy.

4. Settlement as a function of the Settlement Agency. Those in political science and public administration are particularly likely to equate the activity of settlement with its supervisory and executive administration within government. The focus is upon the departmental structure which controls the individual schemes, rather than upon the schemes themselves. One can employ a gamut of viewpoints which apply towards any small-scale bureaucracy: processes of decision-making, informal communications' channels, recruitment policies, administrative feedback, etc. The overall judgement tends toward a statement about the efficiency of the administrative department and the appropriateness of the goals assigned it.

5. Planning requirements of settlement. Again, the implicit assumption is that settlement occurs through directed change by government or some other superordinate agency. Here we move towards the criteria used in the original formulation of scheme plans, the measures which become standard procedures for implementing scheme organization, and the means whereby planning becomes a continuous activity in response to changing local situations. Many times the failure of a given scheme can be explained solely in terms of defects in the planning process itself, wherein the Settlement Agency made self-defeating choices. It would be useful to broaden the compass to include the processes of planning for settlement at local levels as well.

6. Settlement as a safeguard for other investment. Settlement has sometimes been used to safeguard other infrastructural investments—to occupy land cleared from tsetse, to utilize new roads or railways, etc. Its evaluation then becomes a matter of deciding what would have happened if it had not been done at all. It cannot then be evaluated independently of the magnitude of the accompanying investment.

To apply the foregoing viewpoints at the level of scheme performance, I have further differentiated the headings into two categories: i) scheme performance as measured against scheme goals, and ii) scheme performance as viewed in sociological analysis.

I

1. Scheme profitability: The overall economic performance of the scheme as a production unit. Standard accounting procedures are used first to do a rough input-output analysis of the scheme as a firm, and then to derive cost-benefit ratios. This would be the type of evaluation attempted by a business firm, to see if the scheme is succeeding. Does it repay its investments, irrespective of the levels of that investment? In the few instances where this has actually been attempted, there has been a tendency to rely upon first costs only, and also to discount intangible factors and benefits.

2. Scheme income by enterprise: Most "economic" analyses of scheme performance, as put forward by Settlement Agencies themselves, amount to little more than the statement of annual earnings on the major cash crops. Schemes which are categorized as to the type of crop or operation--tea, BAT (tobacco), sisal, etc. schemes--will be justified solely in terms of their aggregate production of that crop. The practice is especially common where new crops are being introduced through settlement schemes. The realization of crop targets is then taken as evidence of success, even where individual settler households cannot rely on the scheme for a living (e.g., group farms in Uganda and Tanzania, where the "scheme" is jointly producing a common field of cotton while settlers continue to live and work at home). The approach commonly neglects to include settlers' production of food crops in its estimation of scheme income.

3. Scheme farm profitability: In a few instances, full-scale input-output analyses have been conducted on individual scheme farms. These yield a good picture of the profitability of various farm enterprises. Their main weakness lies in neglecting to analyze farm consumption expenditure (school fees, etc.), and in the difficulty of getting accurate labour data. It must be pointed out, however, that even where settlers are succeeding the scheme as a whole may be failing for other, non-economic reasons.

4. Farm income, per settlement unit: This measure is very widely used. It is often looked at in conjunction with preplanned farm budgets, to see if the farmer attains a set target. Many of the early East African schemes had as their goal a specified cash income level per family, and no attention was paid to either foodcrop production or to household consumption. The measure is insensitive to variations in family size, and so it frequently gives misleading indications of farm family welfare. It may be linked to the idea that certain acreage sizes--sometimes uniform throughout the scheme--ought to produce a certain cash income under reasonable standards of husbandry. Failure to reach the target is then blamed upon the settler's poor farming, even where other causes obviously played a part.

5. Scale of unit investment: Following from an analysis of scheme and farm profitability, one may add the consideration of the ratio of absolute investment to returns per household (or individual) benefitted. The evaluation assumes an egalitarian goal of maximizing returns on investment and the number of families benefitted simultaneously. Usually, the criterion is applied by national governments with respect to scarce capital development funds. Thus they are very interested in schemes with a low unit cost and high returns per low absolute levels of public expenditure. It is less widely used in commercial schemes, where capital funds are no problem provided that the returns are assured.

6. Standards of living per household: Many schemes have specified for them certain goals which relate to the general standard of living on the scheme. These may be specified in concrete terms: a house with a cement floor, steel windows, and a tin roof; electricity to each scheme; piped water to each kitchen; indoor sanitation . . . There is a tendency to become dogmatic in insisting upon the contemporary idea of modernity, with the result that the scheme has very high unit costs.

7. Standards of scheme social services: The foregoing ideal for households is frequently expanded into a general commitment on government's part to provide the scheme with all the basic modern social services: with schools, a hospital, shops, a welfare hall, access roads, etc. In so doing a great strain is placed on the scheme management, especially if government decides after the fact to recover the costs from settlers' repayments. Commitments of this type often arise when politicians supervene in the activity of the Settlement Agency.

8. Degree of mechanization: Because of its association with modern agriculture, mechanization is frequently given as a goal for settlement production. Where agronomists have directed scheme planning, they have tended towards extensive, capital intensive methods. Even though the mechanization might pay for itself in commercial accounting terms, it makes heavy claim upon scarce capital, and it does not increase local opportunities for agricultural labour. It tends to: i) increase the scale of operations, ii) transform settlers from farmers into labourers, iii) increase scheme demands for specialized maintenance services already in short supply, and iv) make settler repayment of scheme costs very unlikely.

9. Rate of repayment: Many schemes are scrutinized solely in terms of the speed with which they repay basic capital investment--especially where the capital comes from abroad under stringent terms. Yet we frequently find that repayment expectations are completely unrealistic, and so very demoralizing to settlers. On Tanzanian schemes, for instance, the expectation was that 250 families could repay £ 120,000 in 25 years! Rates of scheme defaulting are meaningful only if the repayment schedule is realistically based in the first instance. Unfortunately, repayment statistics are the one form of data the scheme almost certainly keeps, and they tend to be used very widely in evaluating settlement to the exclusion of other measures.

10. Achievement of membership goals: Most schemes have set criteria for recruitment and eviction. The extent to which these criteria are followed is a very valuable indication of scheme authority. Membership goals are also of tremendous intrinsic importance, in determining the general caliber of settler who comes into the scheme. They create the pool of special skills among staff and settlers which will decide whether or not the scheme can evolve its own services and its own program.

11. Redistribution of resources: Many schemes are meant to redistribute the nation's resources, esp. to alter the access to agricultural opportunities. The success of the scheme can then be measured against the total number of households accommodated before and after settlement, and against the change in group composition which occurs. A common associated goal is to maintain previous levels of production while the transfer is taking place, and to exceed them in future years.

12. Protection of infrastructural investments: In some areas, settlement is required to make full use of expensive programs which open new territory, i.e. the northern railway in Uganda, the road to the north from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Otherwise shifting cultivators would move into the areas in question, and so negate much of the value of the public capital investment (which can be realized only under conditions of modern, cash crop farming). As has been pointed out, what is required is an evaluation "with and without" settlement to see what would have happened had it not been established; "before and after" evaluation may here be misleading.¹

13. Generation of new employment: One wants to know then how much employment the scheme creates directly, and how much is induced through subsidiary enterprises. Obviously, this goal affects other scheme decisions--what crops are grown, what operations are mechanized, etc. The evaluation tends to be linked to measuring how much the scheme has achieved political purposes. There is a real danger in attempting this measurement too soon after first settlement.

14. Utilization of spare skills: Some schemes such as estate-nucleus programs and mission training schools for youth are of value because they employ scarce skills which would not be otherwise available to the nation.

¹Christopoulou, "Land Settlement: some oft-neglected basic issues," The Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economic Statistics, Rome: FAO, vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 1 - 6. 1965.

15. Demonstration Effects: How much scheme behaviour and techniques become a model which diffuses to the outside, off-scheme area. This goal is very commonly adduced in support of settlement as a form of policy, and very seldom provided for in fact. Many scheme tendencies mitigate against achieving a demonstration effect: the feeling that scheme settlers are specially privileged through Government's lavish investment on their behalf, the scheme's desire to maintain separate social services, etc.

16. Meeting of Scheme Development Schedules: Most schemes have planned phases for their capital and social development. The fact that a scheme is "on time" in its development is not especially significant, but its failure to meet targets may be quite diagnostic of difficulties in other areas. So also, a comparative analysis of the areas in which the scheme meets its targets, and those where it does not, will usually reveal the sources of stress in scheme performance.

II

There are as well some useful external criteria of scheme performance, derived from public administration and sociology. These include: i) tests of internal efficiency, ii) the scheme's manpower commitments, iii) the realism of scheme expectations, iv) care in scheme recruitment, v) phases in scheme functions, vi) training requirements of scheme organization, and vii) degrees of scheme control. Not all of these can be developed at length here, but they are quite essential types of valuation in determining scheme effectiveness. In particular, I will develop the idea of the effects upon scheme life of increasing degrees of scheme control, since this trend seems to be marked in well-established schemes.

Tests of Internal Efficiency

There are a number of ways for determining if a scheme's management is reasonably efficient. Are settlers able to make their opinions felt in the center? Does scheme management show flexibility in meeting new demands and in anticipating changed circumstances? Does it meet settlers goals to their own satisfaction? Is it a channel of feedback to the Agency about the progress of settlement in its area? Can it take minor decisions in routine fashion, and does it have authority to act in all areas that require immediate decisions?

Commitment upon Manpower

Most schemes need to be reasonably self-sufficient in managerial and technical expertise. This means that fairly high level manpower are required in the managerial posts, and the scheme may easily exceed its quota of trained specialists in various fields. Nevertheless, one of the advantages of the scheme structure is its ability to train replacements for many of the skilled jobs. Some of its claims are, therefore, temporary to certain phases in scheme development. On the other hand, where major schemes are started without providing their necessary manpower, the scheme usually can force attention from already hard-pressed local personnel off the scheme. In Tanzania, it has been common for the Village Settlement Projects to take up a major share of the time and attention of regional level technical staff. The other possibility to be kept in mind is that the scheme may share its manpower with a larger area, or with other schemes.

Realism in Scheme Expectations

A lack of realism in scheme planning and in the drawing up of scheme regulations has very widespread effects throughout the scheme community. It is especially important in relation to loan repayment schedules, and to scheme development plans. Because loan repayment is so easily determined, the settler cannot escape from a poorly based schedule. He easily comes to feel victimized by the management, and he may become convinced that he is being cheated. The lack of realism thus creates among settlers a common awareness of injustice. The reference group so established may prove to be a continuing source of friction with the management long after the schedules are readjusted.

Care in Scheme Recruitment

Most schemes have fairly explicit guidelines determining who gets selected, under what terms he stays, and for what reasons he may be evicted. The care taken in following the directives is of immense importance to the success of the scheme: it has been claimed that the selection of settlers is the most important single decision of settlement authorities.¹ Recruitment determines the overall capacities of scheme membership, and eviction safeguards the scheme's right to make its demands felt upon the individual household. Originally, in the Tanzanian schemes the recruitment goals were spelled out very thoroughly:

- i) settlers were to have had farming experience,
- ii) they should be committed to farming as a profession,
- iii) they should prove themselves receptive to new ideas and methods,
- iv) they should be willing to do hard work,
- v) they should be married and have children,
- vi) they should have already been in contact with the money economy,
- vii) they should be willing to live in a community,
- viii) and they should be between 25 and 40 years of age.²

Achievement of such ambitious membership goals often conflicts at once with other aims, such as the localization of scheme decision-making. There have been many attempts to hand over the scheme's responsibilities in recruitment to cooperatives or to local party cells. In the process, however, the criteria are themselves usually changed to accommodate to local, non-technical considerations. Members get selected for their influence with local politicians, for their representation of wealthy lineages and clans, or for their ability to pay bribes to the selection committee. The dilemma can become quite acute. If local influentials are not consulted, they may oppose the scheme from its inception. And yet their participation in the selection of settlers may prejudice its future effectiveness.

Another conflict frequently arises over whether to give precedence to economic or to sociological considerations. Sociologically, it may be desirable to recruit groups of people who have already known one another and worked together in the off-scheme environment. Also, one wants to insure that settlers have a permanent stake in the future of the settlement. Economically, however, the scheme may realize its repayments per settler best by ignoring the extent to which settlers have outside investments. Their outside interests increase their income at the crucial period of early repayments, and they may open to them sources of private credit which cannot be matched by the scheme. Some of the best settlers in terms of yields may be those working on the scheme to meet target demands. In several Tanzanian schemes, the best settlers in the early years were Chagga who promptly returned to Kilimanjaro once they had achieved their income goals. So also in Kenya, where some businessmen are absentee tenants and yet have the wherewithal to make repayments promptly.

Perhaps the most damaging contraventions are those where scheme personnel use "brotherization" to recruit other office holders and to fill vacant scheme places. It is probably inevitable that applicants should be drawn from areas where word has gotten out about settlement opportunities. But genuine favouritism seldom escapes the notice of settlers, since recruitment is necessarily a rather public matter. "Brotherization" quickly leads to a loss of confidence by settlers in the fairness and impartiality of scheme management. Only a few instances are required to spoil scheme relations.

One could go far towards insuring scheme success by merely imposing rigid control over selection, to admit only those farmers who: i) had some capital of their own, ii) had worked outside their home area, and iii) had maximum education. The ability of the scheme to evolve its own services and its own style of life within the modern world is very dependent upon the quality of incoming settlers.

¹Christoupoulou, *op. cit.* ²Memorandum on Rural Settlement in Tanganyika
Dar es Salaam: the Government Printer, 1963.

Provisions for Household Modernization

There has been an unfortunate tendency in settlement schemes to define agricultural transformation only with respect to cash crop production and marketing. Their technical achievements in cash crop production are indeed impressive. African farmers can be taught a modern type of farming. This has been amply demonstrated on many schemes with many different crops.

But if one takes as his measure the broader, social objectives which are always mentioned as the ultimate goals of a scheme, there are very few examples of success. We continually see reference to higher educational standards, to better health, more leisure, higher incomes, etc. --all of which is supposed to flow from increased agricultural productivity. But on the ground it is disturbing to find how many schemes fail to realize these ideals. The scheme officials again and again react to criticisms of what is by reiterating what ought to be in the future. If one asks where the flowers are, one is told that the settler's wife is mightily enough too busy with food crops to plant flowers. If one asks where is the mechanic who services the scheme's tractors, we are likely to be told that the manager does the repairs himself, and that one of the farmers will be taught to do this when the need arises. If we ask where are the desks for students' books in school, we are told that they, too, will come in time as the scheme makes more money. In fact, all ingredients of modern rural life are still not quite yet arrived . . .

Flowers, of course, mean nothing in of themselves. But flowers on a doorstep say something very important about time, about leisure, and about attitudes. A woman who must plant the corn, weed the vegetables, carry the water, wash the children, supervise their play, clean the house, scare the birds, find the firewood, process the crops, store the food, cook, keep the fire going, and serve her family in countless other ways --this woman is not very likely to grow flowers on her doorstep. An African woman's work is hardest when she has several young children: at that time she is doing the work which in Europe or the USA would be done by a maid, a housewife, a farmer, and a schoolteacher all combined. (But in return when her children are grown the African wife delegates many of her hardest jobs to them.)

Let us look at what the division of work means on a settlement scheme. Most modern qualities of life presuppose greater leisure time: for teaching children, for cleaning a larger house, for preparing more frequent and varied meals. In fact, during the first few years on a scheme a woman's lot is no different than it would be in a traditional homestead; it may even be harder if the scheme is far from markets and the woman is given no help in cultivation. Even when the scheme meets its production targets, it does not improve home life. Unless the increased production is put at once to work to free women from carrying water and growing corn, the family will not enjoy a higher standard of household welfare. Whereas off scheme a woman can look to her increase in children to raise her income, on-scheme the more children the smaller the house-space available and the less clothes per child.

For this reason, if a couple does not change their way of life dramatically in their first few years on the scheme, they never will. Time is their worst enemy. Bad habits learned in the first few months of haphazard adjustment become permanent in time. The woman does not share her husband's income. He does not invest in water supplies or fuel for her. And, in time, more and more children make the goal of modernizing home life less and less feasible.

From this standpoint, settlement schemes show a complete lack of intelligent social planning. They provide for a higher income, but they do not give the family the things that release a woman to use her skill on their immediate behalf. As a result, in the long run schemes do not result in more modern communities. Their improvements affect only men, and once the man's family is grown and his land is divided between five to eight sons, the old customs inevitable creep in. Subdivision is then merely the end point in a two generation cycle of improvement followed by deterioration--a cycle which seems endemic in settlement areas.

Transfer of Production Traditions¹

Transformation agriculture is distinguished by the rate of social change which it posits for the rural farm. The substance of the sweeping changes desired is agricultural and economic; but the processes of change relied upon are no different from those required to bring about any radical social reorganization. Transformation agriculture is in essence the attempt to re-educate adults on a mass scale. Herein lies the reason why it is so often put into effect through some sort of settlement scheme, since common residence then gives a total institutional framework for carrying on extension efforts through all avenues of social discourse. These efforts are fundamentally educational; the scheme's success depends entirely upon settlers' mastery of new patterns of production. The magnitude of the effort is further compounded by the fact that so many African recruits do not have familiarity with the traditions they are learning. What they learn appears so novel to them that it is all a completely new experience. The degree of novelty dictates the amount of education which must be attempted.

Against this backdrop, let us list the types of new learning which have been demanded of settlers on various East African settlement schemes:

1. Learning of new techniques of livestock management on new breeds in situations where even slight mistakes can mean the loss of the herd.
2. Learning husbandry techniques for new cash crops, sometimes on crops which are new to the area and which require adaptation in production practices.
3. Learning the care and operation of tractors, and the use of different implements with them on new types of farming operations.
4. Learning to accept new forms of labour allocation, including coercive control over one's own daily activities--all without contracts or pay.
5. Learning new roles and offices relating to scheme organization: village headmen, scheme guards, etc.
6. Learning to budget expenses a year in advance, in spite of violent fluctuations in income derived from the scheme and in loan repayment demands.
7. Learning new procedures for banking and withdrawing one's cash.
8. Learning to depend upon new staple foods.
9. Learning to live as a villager instead of as a farmer, and yet to be deprived of the normal services of either a village or a homestead.
10. Learning to run a transport business to market one's own crops.
11. Learning to keep complete records of all legal transactions relating to scheme occupation.
12. Learning a new ideology about settlement and its purposes.
13. Learning a new system of scheme rules, rights, privileges, and sanctions.
14. Learning to participate in new forms of group leadership.

Of course, these types of learning are not of comparable difficulty. Nor are they required in every scheme. Some take years of practice and instruction for complete mastery; others can be acquired in a few afternoons. But in some way or other each must be learnt--there is no magic to allow the settler to ignore the changes he must make in his way of life.

Thus one sees the tendency for schemes to take on a very high "training load". Many items of new learning are not required, but are added measures imposed by the Agency without thought for their effects. New forms of residence, new types of labour organization, etc.--these are not necessitated by the farming system itself. But when the scheme tries to do too much, it easily ignores the essential period which the settler needs to adjust to his new circumstances. In consequence, many areas of life escape "untransformed".

¹These comments are drawn from a previous paper.

Degrees of Scheme Control

There is a final approach, derived from American sociology, which is perhaps the most potent of all for understanding tendencies in the evolution of settlement schemes--Irving Goffman's ideas about the nature of what he calls "total institutions". Goffman did not, of course, talk about settlement schemes as such. His list of total institutions (ships, hospitals, concentration camps, boarding schools) does not even mention instances of agriculturally based communities. Nevertheless, a settlement scheme does share many of the analytic characteristics which he describes. He, too, found it difficult to distinguish the "total institution" in a capsule definition:¹

. . . One conceptual peculiarity must be mentioned. None of the elements I will extract seems entirely exclusive to total institutions, and none seems shared by every one of them. What is shared and unique about total institutions is that each exhibits many items in this family of attributes to an intense degree.²

Goffman's discussion of these traits is long and thorough. I shall try to compress his ideas by concentrating upon those predictions which seem to hold true of many settlement schemes. The descriptive similarities are sufficient to require full explication in terms of underlying social processes (which Goffman does not attempt)--but that would be another paper in of itself. For present purposes, let us merely note the areas of similarity.

Total institutions are, in Goffmanesque language, social hybrids--part residential community, and part formal organization. They take their name from the attempt to provide the totality of a member's needs through organizational channels. They exhibit (in varying degrees) an "organic" division of labour, so that most tasks are centrally allocated. This leads to a marked split between the planners and those planned for, between "staff" and "inmates." The central provision of needs requires variations in work patterns from those generally prevailing; the work/payment structure within is distinct from that "outside." The degree of authoritative planning permits relatively small numbers of supervisory staff to control large numbers of inmates, who all do the same thing at the same time. Between staff and inmates "two different social and cultural worlds develop, tending to jog along beside each other, with points of official contact but little mutual penetration." The situation can be most easily analyzed under the two major headings: i) the staff world, and ii) the inmate world.

The staff in a total institution identify with its official objective of reforming inmates towards some ideal standard--in a settlement scheme, some version of its official goals./ Staff work has uniquely to do with people --"people work"--because its concern is with them as objects to be recorded and routed according to planned patterns. The incoming settler within the Kenya high density schemes is faced with, for example, an official offer form with space for his acceptance signature, a land registration form, a form on which he agrees to repay his loan and vacate his plot if he defaults, a certificate of acceptance, a copy of conditions of the loan, orders for ploughing, co-op registration forms . . . These forms say what the settler has done, and who has current responsibility for him. The individual accumulates a chain of information receipts fixing his position and performance.

Staff nevertheless justify their treatment of inmates in terms of the broad, moral principles which are a part of the institutional rationale. But in practice the instrumental, therapeutic goals "at the top" get transformed at bottom levels into consumatory, custodial concerns. The goal becomes getting fixed objectives accomplished with a minimum of fuss--which means that

¹Erving Goffman, "The Characteristics of Total Institutions," pp. 312 - 340. In, Complex Organizations, Amitai Etzioni, ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. (A shortened version from a symposium on social psychiatry.)

²Ibid., p. 313.

³Ibid., p. 315.

For the inmate, then, entrance into the institution requires some sort of "stripping and levelling process" to reduce his status to the common denominator within. He must learn to value the institution's own privilege system: its sources of prestige, its rewards, and its sanctions. He is subject to authority of the echelon kind: any member of staff has certain rights to discipline any member of the inmate class. Misbehaviour in one sphere of life--such as in defaulting in loan repayments--are held against one's standing in other spheres. Authority directs its concern to a host of minor items of conduct. The settler is constantly coming up for judgement in one context or other. In time, inmates come to live in chronic anxiety about breaking the rules, and they devise elaborate strategies for "staying out of trouble." Some inmates specialize in providing others with forbidden articles and services, in getting minor gratifications which are freely available in the larger society.

Naturally, not all of the foregoing description applies with equal effect to all types of schemes. The presence of households instead of individuals, and the lack of a reform motivation, make scheme life more easy-going. One suspects that Goffman's acquaintance with corrective institutions lies behind the negative tenor of his analysis. Nevertheless, the features he outlines are quite plain in the more authoritarian types of settlement--sufficiently so to suggest that all total institutions share certain common tendencies towards centralization at inmate expense.

If so, we have good cause for being sceptical about the effectiveness of centralized schemes for achieving certain of their officially designated objectives. The regulatory framework stifles settler initiative in many areas. Settlement households become, in time, more rather than less dependent upon the central organization. Settlers take increasing numbers of decisions to the management for action. They lose the sense of control over their own welfare. They may feel so insecure--even in the face of low eviction rates--that they refuse to invest in household capital goods. Settlement housing in total institutions schemes is often poorly repaired because settlers wait for the management to act on their behalf. Settler leadership becomes devoted to creating a bargaining position vis-a-vis management, not towards taking on a responsible role in local development. The expected devolution of scheme functions into settler hands never occurs.

On management's side, the total institution tends to neglect the welfare of either its inmates or of the larger society. Staff come to identify with the institution's continued well-being, at whatever cost. They concentrate exclusively upon the products which they can produce most easily. They welcome expensive capital developments which destroy the planned-for low unit costs. The scheme's very success with one crop may prejudice its future ability to respond to changed economic circumstances. When economic disaster eventually occurs, the staff may try to recover the institution's costs at tenant expense, never at their own expense.

In short, total institutions can be an efficient means of agricultural production. But they are not likely to achieve the other aims frequently given for land settlement: to demonstrate superior techniques for surrounding farmers to copy, to improve household welfare through raised incomes, to transfer leadership into settler hands, to generate new social services at no cost to the larger society, or to operate at low unit costs per settlement household.

It is therefore of urgent priority that sociologists pay more attention to discovering the dynamic factors responsible for these tendencies. Proper care in the planning stage ought to be able to anticipate the evolutionary trends in scheme development. Undue centralization can be prevented by assigning the functions of settlement to different organizations, and by precautions taken in the initial period of scheme adjustment. To achieve this, however, we must develop a much more precise notion of how schemes actually function.

the less independence inmates exercise, the better. Scheme management invades more and more areas of inmates' lives, always in order to "simplify" scheme operations. In interest of granting certain privileges to some inmates, other rights and standards are denied.

The process can be seen clearly in the phrases of the legal statutes which apply towards many of the more authoritarian types of settlement, such as in irrigation or forestry schemes. Here, for example, are a few of the stipulations contained in the Trust Land (Irrigation Areas) Rules which currently apply in Kenya:

- i) a tenant may not allow anyone else to occupy his holding or to cultivate it on his behalf, nor may he be absent for more than one month,
- ii) he shall maintain the boundaries of his holding, as well as all field feeder and drainage channels to the satisfaction of the manager,
- iii) he shall cultivate his holding according to a crop rotation laid down by the manager, nor may he hire or employ stock or machinery for cultural operations without the manager's prior approval in writing,
- iv) he may be charged for repairs done against his will to his own housing "to the satisfaction of the manager", whereas any structure built without prior written consent can be demolished (as can any crop planted in contravention to the manager's instructions),
- v) he may retain from his crop only enough for himself and "authorized dependents living with him", and the manager is not obligated to keep or sell separately the crops delivered to him by the tenant under compulsory regulation,
- vi) he may not keep more than his number of licensed stock, and he must dispose of their natural increase according to the manager's instructions

The regulations extend down to items as minor as ^{to} whether or not a tenant can cause "any motor vehicle to be driven within the area"!

A special problem is presented staff in their own relations to inmates, and in inmates' relations to outsiders. Most total institutions have rules designed to minimize staff-inmate contacts in equalitarian situations, where staff dominance cannot be enforced. Staff do not share recreation or housing with tenants, nor are staff bound to inmate rules. Staff have transport (often provided by schemes themselves) which inmates cannot use. Staff minimize inmates' outside interests and statuses, and any off-scheme connections by the inmate are viewed as being competitive with the scheme's well being. Because, nevertheless, inmates do not always behave according to what has been designed "for their own good", staff are forced to develop a verbalized "theory of human nature" to explain deviations from institutional norms. Social distance is formally prescribed, and inmates and staff talk about one another in terms of common institutional stereotypes. Social mobility between strata is restricted.

Outsiders may reinforce the management's hold over inmates by referring to management the affairs which settlers could normally control themselves. We find that many routine decisions--the location of new schools, the building of culverts, etc.--become the de facto prerogative of the scheme where elsewhere other departments of government are in command. The management may restrict scheme services to those living within its territory, thereby erecting a wall around the scheme's often superior facilities. Outsiders resent the scheme's access to government capital, and they may come to view inmates as a privileged minority. For these reasons "total institutions" seldom exercise a significant demonstration effect upon the surrounding countryside. The general populace views them with distrust, a feeling which increases in proportion to proximity to the scheme boundary.

Some Conclusions about Scheme Performance

Putting all of these ideas together, one can come to several tentative conclusions about settlement performance in East Africa.

The unconcern over matching types of schemes with appropriate objectives is striking. There appears to have been no awareness that scheme organization is itself a determinant of scheme performance. Highly capitalized schemes for 100 families have been started to meet the need for population movement; centralized schemes with tractors and steel frame houses organized to make a "demonstration effect" on surrounding farmers; unspecialized schemes without central management given to house urban unemployed who had never farmed before . . . There are many examples of schemes which have been expected to fulfill mutually incompatible goals. Full mechanization with the most modern, labour saving equipment does not also help solve rural unemployment. Nor can a scheme with fully provided services from the start expect tenants to pay all of the capital development costs. A scheme which takes in landless townsmen cannot also solve pressing production problems without outside assistance. The list of conflicting demands could be extended indefinitely--all testifying to a lack of forethought by those who planned the initial programs.

In fact, many of the problems of settlement seem to stem from the crash program basis of national efforts in all three countries. Uganda was offered tractors by the hundreds when it had no programs requiring them; Kenya was in political turmoil over the demands for more land at a time when thousands of landed European farmers were leaving; and Tanzania had released a frenzy of localized, self-help activity in agriculture when it created a new structure of regional and area administration. Agricultural technicians were faced with immediate political demands which left little time for planning or preparation. As a consequence, settlement programs ignored all of the lessons of the past. It is embarrassing now to read Arthur Lewis' comments on land settlement from twelve years ago, and to discover that most if not all of his guidelines were blithely ignored in contemporary program planning.

It is also clear that most schemes were asked to do too much too soon. They were sometimes located in areas for which no agricultural production systems of a modern sort had been evolved. Elsewhere, they were placed without respect to markets on the assumption that they could organize their own. They were given scheme budgets that were not derived from the area in which they were located. They were given repayment schedules which began before the first cash crop had been marketed--in a few cases, before it had been planted! They were expected to experiment in finding suitable construction techniques using strange materials. They were asked to introduce high value livestock where none had been grown before . . . Three of these factors have been so significant that they need further emphasis.

Throughout, planning has underestimated the risk factor involved in agricultural pioneering. We have no comparable statistics on the numbers of private farmers who have gone out of business in the process of creating a viable agricultural economy--but the total percentage is probably quite high. Yet schemes have operated under minimum provisions to cope with adversity. In several cases I know of schemes whose budgets were based on a sequence of the best three years in the past three decades. Surely more effort ought to have been devoted to arriving at realistic estimates of scheme risks.

Secondly, planners have allowed outside agencies and political pressure to dictate completely unrealistic repayment schedules. The consequences were manifold: the Settlement Agency is revealed as lacking local information and the flexibility to adjust its demands, the tenant or settler feels unjustly put upon and loses the incentive to try to meet his further payments, and the Agency feels unwilling to apply pressure to recover funds it knows ought to be kept by the settler. Either the Agency is forced into ignoring its own rules about repayment--and thereby encouraging an avalanche of further defaulters--or the settler must go further in debt to private sources.

Thirdly, it has been almost universal to underestimate the amount of effort required to solve marketing problems for a new scheme. In visits to schemes which were successful I often noted that the manager usually spent in excess of two days a week on marketing and transport problems. Finding and holding new markets is a demanding task for even the most skilled manager: to expect a settler cooperative to succeed without transport or technical expertise would appear very foolhardy. Yet instances were found where neither production nor marketing problems had been solved--and untrained settler committees were held responsible for doing both!

To these, I would like to add a fourth and fifth factor which override all others in importance: the scheme's technical base, and the scheme's success in recruitment. Failure in these two areas is, I believe, the most common reason for poor scheme performance by existing settlement schemes in East Africa. Where schemes have high value cash crops, and where careful recruitment of staff and settlers has been followed, the other difficulties do not seem sufficient to halt scheme development. But no amount of other assistance can overcome the lack of a viable production base and willing farmers to make it pay.

Taking stock, then, one sees that these problems are less those of settlement schemes, and more those of Settlement Agencies. In supervised forms of land settlement, the determinants of scheme performance lie ultimately with the agency and not with the scheme. For as long as agencies impose upon schemes unrealistic demands, it will be very difficult to evaluate the potential of schemes as such. To date, at least, settlement agencies within East Africa seem more at fault than do settlement schemes in those instances where schemes have shown poor performance.

The Contribution of Social Scientists to Land Settlement Evaluation

The question arises, therefore, why government statements seem to blame settlement schemes and settlement farmers, rather than settlement agencies, for current difficulties with this form of development policy.

The shift in blame is explicit in the Tanzanian case, and implied in the Kenya arguments. We have seen that Tanzania cited settlers' passive, complaining attitude as a main reason for starting no new schemes. Yet we have also seen that passivity is a prominent characteristic of total institutions anywhere. Government itself chose a form of settlement scheme which was extreme in its capital requirements and in its centralization. If these were the reasons for now abandoning settlement, should not the Agency in charge of preliminary planning be blamed rather than the policy in general? Similarly with respect to the Kenya charge that schemes have shown relatively modest gains from high unit costs of investment. Kenya has a relatively large pool of skilled African farmers who could have made dramatic improvements on the land which has been settled. There are also forms of settlement with relatively low unit costs, as where existing estates are used as the nucleus for new schemes. If these alternatives were not used (in interest of political considerations), is land settlement as such at fault? Surely the contemporary objections to settlement schemes cannot be taken too seriously when other departments of government are being encouraged to press ahead with plans for even larger and more expensive forms of land settlement.

There can be little doubt that much of Government's motivation comes from the pressure of private criticism. In Kenya, especially, a series of articles hostile to settlement by Leslie Brown (titled under such heads as "Burden of Debt" etc., in the Kenya Weekly News) had telling effect. They furnished the critics of settlement--found in government as well as without--with a fund of unsympathetic data. In Tanzania, the Ministry of Agriculture found its role in national development in large part taken away and assigned to settlement. There was, therefore, much behind the scenes criticism of land settlement going on constantly.

The point is, then, that new programs are going to receive evaluation in any case--whether or not Government tries to do so in systematic fashion. Attempts to keep researchers out only make a program the more vulnerable to private criticism which continues unabated. It is much preferable that the settlement agency itself conducts continuing evaluation using the latest survey techniques. Indeed, however, this was precisely what the Tanzanian Government attempted with respect to its Village Settlement Project when it invited the participation of researchers from Syracuse University.

The Tanzanian and Kenya decisions cannot be blamed upon a lack of structure for evaluation: Tanzania has made heavy use of its Syracuse research team, and Kenya has mounted a major study of settlement through its Farm Economic Survey Unit. There has been no lack of applied research by social scientists, who have been studying settlement off-and-on for the past five years.

I raise this issue because I believe that sociological analysis of settlement would have come to a predominantly favourable conclusion concerning its success. In the face of tremendous odds, individual schemes were achieving remarkable results--results which compare well with those achieved through settlement anywhere in the world. In fact, I would argue that East Africa has much to teach other areas of the tropical world about how to implement certain types of land settlement. Why, then, has the decision about settlement relied exclusively upon economic criteria?

I should like to suggest two major reasons, which distinguish economics as a field from the other social sciences (but especially from sociology). It appears to me that economics is the only discipline which has a theoretical apparatus that relates directly to the topic at hand. Economists can estimate farm and scheme profitability. They have a language for talking about the activities of a firm which apply directly to schemes as well. But they are not nearly as well versed in comparing the supervisory agencies, whose activity is viewed as lying within the sociology of bureaucracy or within public administration. Hence the decision about settlement has used what theory seemed most well developed, and scheme economics were made to bear the evaluation for the effectiveness of the Agency itself.

Had sociologists been able to talk coherently in theoretical terms about settlement, I am sure they would have been listened to. But sociology goes about the development of its theory quite differently from economics. In economics, there is no stigma attached to serving as a participant in the decision-making processes about which one's theory applies. The economist/consultant is a familiar figure in government and in industry. He makes his conclusions felt directly, and he seldom waits for "applied research" to tell him what theory might be relevant. Thus he receives a constant stream of ideas which relate to economic theory, and his theory comes to relate quite directly to the phenomena with which he is engaged at the action level.

Sociology, on the other hand, prefers to believe that participation is a source of bias rather than a source of relevance. Theory, so we are told, precedes the research situation. It must not begin with practical topics; rather, practical topics are described in such terms that they relate somehow to general theory. The problem with settlement, however, is that the jump from detail to theory is an awesome one indeed. Hence when asked to assist, the sociologist goes straight into a long period of "applied research" from which he never emerges. I believe that this explains why, after years of research, we have yet no body of usable concepts from sociology which relate closely to land settlement as a topic. We have insulated ourselves from the need to develop such ideas, and so we have nothing to pass on to those who must make decisions on the basis of informed opinion.

In short, I take the point of view espoused by Zetterberg: what is needed is not more applied research (which can only prove ideas, but not derive them); what sociology must provide is applied social theory. In the final test what matters to government is the sociologist's grasp of relevant theory, not his research methodology.

In concluding, I would like to refer to Appendices I, II, and III, which illustrate the kinds of activity required in applying social theory. The first is a preliminary working classification of settlement scheme types, designed to rank them in such a way that their relationship to associated characteristics will become clear. The typology is based upon the criterion of organizational complexity. It is meant to distinguish schemes according to their demands for outside assistance, ranging from the one extreme of non-assisted, non-scheme land settlement to the other of completely dependent agricultural communities of the total institution variety. With further development, classifications along similar lines will allow discussion to proceed with greater precision reflecting the actual complexities of settlement organization. This development is a sine qua non for the evolution of responsible "feedback" about scheme success within governmental circles.

The second appendix presents a list of topics which seem to relate to the study of a settlement scheme. The list is meant to accomplish three purposes: i) to indicate the areas in which one wishes to search for relevant social theory and useful field indicators, ii) to delineate general areas for participant observation and interviewing, and iii) to suggest topics which can be used to compare different schemes.

The third appendix gives the requirements for success in settlement as listed by Arthur Lewis and supplemented from the foregoing discussion. In addition, I have suggested a few sociological indicators of scheme success. Eventually, one hopes to have a comprehensive set of proven 'rules of thumb' which will reflect cumulative experience in all areas of rural development. The phrase 'development studies' will then have acquired real meaning, and perhaps we will be able to speak of 'development sociology' in the same way as now we refer to development economics.¹

¹My ideas as expressed in this paper owe much of their substance to extended discussion with colleagues who are also studying land settlement. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my debt to Robert Chambers and to members of the Syracuse team studying Tanzanian settlements. The field work was done through the aegis of the East African Staff College in the summer of 1965, when the Tanzanian and Kenya governments kindly gave every assistance to us in arranging visits to numerous schemes.

APPENDIX I
A TYPOLOGY OF SCHEMES

TYPE OF SCHEME:	ASSOCIATED CHARACTERISTICS:				
	Low %	Low	Low	Low	Farmer
	New	Super-	Spec-	Legal	Autono-
	Learning	vision	icлиза-	Con-	mous
			tion	trols	
<p>1. <u>Settlement without Schemes through programs of investment in infrastructure.</u></p>					
<p>Tsetse clearance, Sukumaland water development, Some forms of group farms, Terracing programs, Spontaneous colonization of areas opened by roads, railways, etc. Resettlement.</p>					
<p>2. <u>Schemes without Settlement Programs: cooperative residence</u></p>					
<p>Spontaneous farmers' associations Some forms of TANU & Utopian schemes Refugee settlements. Cooperative farms Religious settlements</p>					
<p>3. <u>Schemes without Settlement Programs: managerial specialization</u></p>					
<p>Farm estates Assisted owner schemes</p>					
<p>4. <u>Schemes with supervision by a generalized agency</u></p>					
<p>Hospital & treatment schemes, leprosaria YMCA training schemes Mission schemes Some types of commercial schemes Forestry Dept. tree clearing schemes Prison farms TANU Youth League schemes, Litowa County Council, Regional schemes Various international assistance schemes</p>					
<p>5. <u>Schemes with supervision by an agricultural agency</u></p>					
<p>Outgrower & estate nucleus schemes Commerical agric. schemes (BAT, Meka, etc.) Ministry of Agriculture schemes Grazing schemes Group Farms, Estate private schemes Credit schemes Marketing schemes World Food Program Schemes Some forms of state farms Tractor service schemes</p>					
<p>6. <u>Schemes with specialized supervision by a Settlement Agency</u></p>					
<p>Village Settlement Project Pilot Schemes High density schemes Low density IBRD schemes National Irrigation Board Schemes</p>					
	High %	High	High	High	Farmer
	New	Super-	Spec-	Legal	Depen-
	Learning	vision	icлиза-	Con-	dent
			tion	trols	

APPENDIX II
A TOPICAL OUTLINE ON SETTLEMENT¹

Some topics for observation and comparison to find related social theory:
(Points are not raised in any particular order)

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Recruitment of settlers | 41. Black marketing |
| 2. Recruitment of staff | 42. Market centres |
| 3. Allocation of land to settlers | 43. Duka centres |
| 4. Allocation of land to staff | 44. Minority groups |
| 5. Land use rules | 45. Labourers |
| 6. Land inheritance | 46. Use & supply of water & fuel |
| 7. Permanence of settler commitment | 47. Scheme communications |
| 8. Permanence of staff commitment | 48. Housing |
| 9. Settlers' livestock husbandry | 49. Disease problems |
| 10. Settlers' agricultural practices | 50. Nutritional problems |
| 11. Agricultural yield variability | 51. School teachers |
| 12. Staff agricultural practices | 52. School fees |
| 13. Food crops | 53. School leavers & careers |
| 14. Cash cropping | 54. School wastage |
| 15. Settler previous experience | 55. Family size & planning |
| 16. Staff mobility | 56. Mission activity |
| 17. Settler mobility | 57. Scheme voluntary associations |
| 18. Specialized settler occupations | 58. School committees |
| 19. Specialized scheme occupations | 59. Clan committees |
| 20. Basis of scheme segmentation | 60. Development committees |
| 21. Scheme rules | 61. Village organization |
| 22. Scheme rewards & privileges | 62. Opinion leadership |
| 23. Scheme sanctions & eviction process | 63. Prestige |
| 24. Disputes, dispute settlement | 64. Aspirations |
| 25. Allocation staff benefits | 65. Leisure |
| 26. Staff rotation | 66. Social deviance |
| 27. Popularity of staff categories | 67. Women's role on scheme |
| 28. Staff-settler kinship ties | 68. Place of the aged on scheme |
| 29. Staff-settler friendship ties | 69. Poverty & wealth on scheme |
| 30. On-off scheme farming contrast | 70. Marriage & bridewealth |
| 31. Non-scheme service staff | 71. Funerals & rituals |
| 32. Non-scheme technical services | 72. Friendship networks |
| 33. Relations to statutory boards | 73. Factionalism |
| 34. Local government (County Council) | 74. Village histories |
| 35. Tax & other assessments | 75. Management-settler myths |
| 36. Pay out arrangements | 76. Target ideology |
| 37. Credit, private & public | 77. Folk history of the scheme |
| 38. On-scheme businesses | 78. Political penetration |
| 39. Settlers' investments | 79. Scheme reference groups |
| 40. Co-operative societies | 80. Demonstration effects |

¹An abbreviated working outline of a longer checklist on settlement, prepared jointly by R. Apthorpe, R. Yeld, R. Chambers, R. Meyers, B. Brown, S. Charlesly, and myself in February of 1966. The points are meant for application to the study of an individual scheme rather than for evaluating settlement policy.

APPENDIX. III

A. SOME SOCIOLOGICAL INDICATORS OF SCHEME SUCCESS:

1. Do settlers identify with the scheme when they are off-scheme? Are they then proud to be members of it?
2. Do settlers identify with scheme decisions? Are they willing to accept responsibility for scheme decisions?
3. Do settlers identify with modern reference groups?
4. Do settlers invest in permanent household improvements? Is their commitment to the scheme secure?
5. Does the scheme generate its own services through settler activity and investments?
6. Is there spontaneous diversification of occupations and crops through settler initiative in taking advantage of new opportunities?
7. Is there settler participation in work distribution, and do settlers regard the system with satisfaction?
8. Are there recognized channels for getting feedback to scheme management, and is there public machinery for resolving disputes?
9. Do staff members try to gain places in the scheme, and is there a low turnover of new staff?
10. Do those born on scheme try to maintain their place in it for life?

B. SOME REQUISITES FOR SCHEME SUCCESS:¹

1. Choosing congruent objectives & scheme organizational type⁺
2. Choosing the right place & the right crops
3. Choosing the right settlers
4. Physical preparation of the site
5. Settler capital, esp. working capital
6. Organization of group activities
7. Acreage per settler
8. Land tenure conditions
9. Realistic repayment regime, esp. vs. risk⁺
10. Sufficiency in managerial skills⁺

¹From W. Arthur Lewis, "Thoughts on Land Settlement," In, Agriculture in Economic Development, Carl Eicher & L. de Witt, eds., New York, 1964. (reprinted from the Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 11, 1954.)
The points starred are my own addition to the seven criteria given by Lewis.

SOME PROBLEMS OF EAST AFRICAN CRIME STATISTICSI. Unknown Crime.

The principal difficulty in considering crime statistics in East Africa as elsewhere (1) is that they do not represent an exclusive enumeration of crime i.e. a crime is either reported or it does not exist or rather is assumed not to exist. Any published crime figures show a highly selected sample of offences reported to the East African central governments' police representing no more than statistics of law enforcement (SELLIN 1951.494) and will not represent cases reported to formal tribal authorities and dealt with by local courts or cases dealt with by customary law outside these local courts and cases which are not reported to any agency for reasons of geography, modesty, fear and indifference.

The 'dark' figure of unreported crime is likely to be far larger than figures for Europe and America because of geographical, police and legal factors and the preference of most people for criminal offences to be settled by traditional methods.

Thus these crime statistics only represent a minority of offences known to the central government police and depend on the following factors.

a) Geography. The convenience of the police station to the injured party is important and there is a hypothetical ratio between the importance of the crime and the distance to the police station which would show in the police figures. Central Government police stations are concentrated in the principal townships and are situated on the main roads. Large areas are without policing in the sense of permanently resident police and there appears to be little regular patrolling outside towns and industrial areas because of staff shortages and problems of cost in countries where the budgets are based on development plans of economic conception. A minor theft ten miles from a police station would not be reported but a similar offence at a distance of two hundred yards would. The Uganda Police have stated that the immediate consequence of the erection of a new police station is a substantial increase in reported crime. The physical convenience of reporting is of paramount importance as there are no other means of getting information to the police - in the absence of a rural telephone system they cannot be rung up and information by letter except for very serious offences will not receive quick attention. If the police are to control crime in the absence of a national home communication network they have to be physically present in detachments which does not have to be the case with European and North American police forces.

b) Ratio of police to people. While the ratio in Kenya and England in 1963 was 645 and 541 respectively, that of Uganda is very much lower at 1220 people per policeman. These ratios are even more extreme when they are considered on a district basis although some allowance must be made for local government police forces who may exercise further social control and whose cases may not be passed to the central government police force. Although there are some striking differences in district crime rates which may be attributable to cultural and social differences, the presence of the police to whom a report can be made personally may be a more important factor. (Table I) A visit to roundabouts in Nairobi on any week day rush-hour will show police waiting for certain types of offences e.g. going right from the left-hand lane; any traffic constable can fill up his summons book by standing there and his illness or transfer to another beat will mean a reduction in such offences. The limit to criminality in these

(1) East African Crime Statistics have been taken to include from the three countries their published reports for Judiciary Police and Prisons, internal unpublished reports of serious crime, daily and annual returns of reported crime, and court returns of cases heard and their judgements.

circumstances is the ability of the courts to handle more than a fixed number of cases in a certain number of working days and how far the police can push this number up without incurring the latent hostility of the judiciary - a serious factor in the smooth hearing of more important cases in the courts.

The judiciary cannot stop the police bringing cases but they can suggest informally that some reduction in petty cases might be effected. Such a suggestion would result in the transfer of more cases into the jurisdiction of local courts or the informal settlement of cases in the police station without the details being recorded (GOLDMAN 1963:101).

The ratio of police to people is extremely important because the population of East Africa is expanding and without a corresponding increase in the police, this ratio is similarly expanding. Thus the situation seemed to be in Buganda (TANNER 1965) that the freezing of police expansion and a population growth of 3.2% per year was resulting in a decline in reported crime. From this the government may have been led to conclude that the police were becoming increasingly efficient in controlling and reducing crime, and therefore economies could be made in the police establishment without danger to peace and good order. In the crime projection for Buganda (Table II) it has been estimated according to the expected population increases that on the 10801 per year average reported crimes for 1960-64, the police should be prepared to deal with 12959 reported crimes in 1970 and as against 14768 crimes if the true crimes figure for 1964 alone is taken. This estimate being made on the unlikely assumption that crime and criminal activity will not go above the existing level of efficiency and frequency.

Another important consideration in examining the police to population ratio is the number of police available on any day for the prevention and detection of crime. If it can be accepted that the police are never likely to be ahead of crime every policeman used outside crime duties represents a reduction in this ratio. State visits, public celebrations, political meetings and presidential tours will all deplete the active police force for several days. The Buganda Emergency in May 1965 onwards necessitated the provision of police guards for ministers without any increase in police establishment.

In another way the geographical distribution of police is very uneven even where the ratio is low as in Kampala. The low density residential areas containing senior civil servants, government ministers, ambassadors and ex-patriate managers and specialists is relatively well provided with police and telephones, while high density areas may be correspondingly under-staffed.

Another factor to be considered in the police to population ratio is the adequacy of training combined with experience. The numbers of police available is no indication of their ability to solve and prevent crimes and the result of any shortage of men and experience is likely to be the concentration of the better police in the capital cities and important commercial areas such as the Mwadui diamond mine.

c) Acceptability of the legal system. Citizens do not often report crimes in East Africa because of a western conception of duty to the state. Here the state is too new as a political entity or too old a traditionally alien body to supply the motivation for anything more than a minority of crimes reported. A crime such as murder may be reported to evade responsibility by a local authority or to enlist the police in the recovery of stolen property but perhaps not if the aggrieved persons wants satisfaction against the criminal (TANNER 1965 b). The English judicial system is too long - drawn out to inspire the aggrieved citizen with any feeling that his wrongs are being set right. It has been remarked that in Pakistan and India the law of the police and courts is not the law of the people (HOEBEL 1965:45 and COHN 1965: 104-108) and the situation is the same in East Africa. In fact in East Africa there is a judicial system on which nationalism and independence has made virtually no impression at all; whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter to the average citizen criminal law is still largely carried on in an foreign language under rigidly codified laws according to an alien code of criminal procedure and resulting in punitive rather than compensatory sanctions.

They do not believe in the jurist postulates of the central government courts that all are equal under the law, relations by contract rather than by status, the case to be settled by itself without regard to ancillary factors and the necessity of clear cut decisions. As opposed to India and Pakistan, East Africans faced with Europeans judges and magistrates and served largely by Asian lawyers, have not attempted to embrace the statutory law system. Law students in the University of East Africa tend to be openly contemptuous of customary law as a system having any usefulness for the modern African state.

Perhaps the average litigant would have gone along with the English based legal system if only compensatory rather than punitive sanctions had been allowed. The absence of compensation as the primary theme of criminal justice has alienated the majority of East Africans from considering the courts as a source of justice. A criminal remarks on capital punishment that "it seems that by killing a murderer, government is making the murderer suffer for the murder. But for me if my son has been murdered, there is nothing at all, neither government nor the murderer pays me anything".

This need for compensation rather than impersonal punishment exists from this level of the murder down to the smallest of Penal Code offences which results in the courts being used when there is no chance of private settlement or in circumstances which permit the court case and its judgement to be used to harass an opponent towards an ultimate extra-court settlement.

II. Police and Court statistics.

in/ There is a tendency to seek statistics which are as accurate as possible and for this end court statistics tend to have greater validity. This classification of greater validity may well exclude from the statistics crime/which police opinion is convinced that they know the criminal but cannot make the evidence stick. Each case coming to court has a clearly defined charge and decision but such cases only represent a minority of cases reported to the police (Table VI). The Uganda Police in 1963 were able to prosecute in 38% of penal code cases reported to them and this includes cases in which the accused has been found not guilty and discharged. The same minority of judicially proved cases shows in the Mbale Police district of figures for 1964 (Table III) in which 103 out of 178 cases heard by the central and 79 out of 149 by the local courts resulted in convictions.

A further difficulty is that the cases coming to court are a sample self-selected by the nature of the crime and the availability of the necessary evidence. The police in Uganda attribute much of the high rate of murder (Table I) to drink and seek greater control over brewing and selling; to a certain extent they are right as convictions show a very high proportion of homicides and attempts to be due to quarrels at beer parties or after drinking (Table VII) but cases involving drinks may well be the easiest to detect, arrest and gain a conviction.

Another difficulty to be expected is the problem of reconciling the statistics of different government departments and a case is recorded showing different figures in Kenya for persons condemned to death by the courts and received into prison (READ 1966).

An additional source of crime statistics are the central government courts monthly returns of all cases registered, pending and heard with the accused's name, age, alleged offence and the court's decision. From these details it is possible to find the proportions prosecuted on any type of charge and found guilty and the range of sentences related to the place and time of prosecution and to a particular magistrate. A study of traffic cases in Mombasa for 1960 and 1964 show that prosecutions of Asians have doubled while those of Africans have increased by one third and Europeans halved. In 1960 Asians and Africans were fined a mean of 29/- and Europeans 23/- while in 1964 the mean for Asians had risen to 35/-, that for Europeans to 46/-, while for Africans it had declined to 19/-. The main difficulty in this type of analysis is that the existing laws are modified by amendments and the extent of legislation is constantly

increasing so that more laws have been amended or passed in East Africa in the few years of independence than during the colonial period. This increases the possibility of being prosecuted in general as well as making selective prosecutions for political and other purposes more likely.

Court statistics are also of greater value because the language of the courts is English in which the judges and magistrates are competent even if it is not their mother tongue. So an important factor in the possibility of crime statistics being of limited value in the furtherance of crime suppression or control is that police returns and case records are made in English which with the almost total Africanisation of the police force, means that no one at the case level is recording the evidence in his own tongue; this is mentioned not so much in criticism of the standard of English used but in surprise that so much is used correctly. It is unlikely at present that the police officer concerned has reached more than Cambridge School Certificate English and may indeed not be so high. An example of a report received by the Uganda CID outlines some of the difficulties in such a system for which at the moment the police have no alternative. "At 8 p.m. the deceased fetched food and went to his hut to eat. In about 30 minutes Miryamu was heard by wife of Yowana saying that she was sorry to stay alone with a dead body in the house and went on, Kasonga is dead lying in his hut. Yowana's wife came out and saw Kasonga's hut on fire. Kasonga was burnt to death in the hut. Circumstances of his death suspicious".

It has already been noted (BEATTIE 160. 49) that the greater the number of reporting agencies the greater the variations possible in interpretation of a crime and its allocation to a particular section of the law; the allocation of offences under the sections for grievous harm, common assault, aggravated assault and attempted murder is particularly difficult.

The Mbale police district returns for 1961 and 1964 show differences in totals which must be partially accounted for by inconsistencies in recording procedures. The total crimes against the person have doubled with common assault matching this increase while aggravated assaults have remained the same, attempted murder increased seven times, and grievous harm declined by a third. These Mbale district police returns were taken entirely at random and the differences between the years and their possible explanations were discussed at a seminar on police statistics held at the Uganda Police College. Apart from the problem of an inadequate knowledge of English, the reliability of reports must vary with the intelligence of the writer, whether he went to the scene of the crime or is relaying a report, pressure of work, experience of police work and other factors.

There are mistakes of fact, misconceptions of instructions and carelessness. Some examples of these can be found in the same Mbale police district returns. They show that no cases at all were awaiting trial at the end of 1961 other than 4 murder cases in the central government courts and none at all for lower courts at the end of 1964, a clearly impossible situation.

It has also been suggested that the value of crime statistics decreases as the distance from the crime itself in terms of procedure increases (BEATTIE 1955. 178). With murder as an example the event to conviction in time may take six months involving police at station, district and headquarter levels, the law officers, lawyers, a preliminary hearing before a magistrate and the actual trial in the transformation of a social event to a legal fact.

Consistency is even more difficult to obtain even if it were possible to issue and obtain adherence to uniform instructions, because of police transfers. It is doubtful whether in recent times any police station in East Africa has had the same reporting officer for serious crimes over a two year period. An example of such inconsistencies were shown in the same Mbale statistics when 1961 had 24 frivolous, vexatious or false complaints with only two for 1964, both connected with murder cases.

This would suggest that frivolous cases in 1961 were settled informally and the parties sent away without record being made in the police station occurrence books. Similarly the drop in grievous harm and aggravated assaults in 1964 (Table III) while there has been an enormous increase in common assaults from 270 to 680 suggests that the recording officers have taken the easier charge whenever possible. This course of action may have been necessitated by the absence of qualified doctors who would have been able to give the specialist evidence necessary for even attempting a conviction.

Another major difficulty facing the East African police is the absence of maps in some areas or the reluctance to use them when available for recording the location of crime. It is not disputed that the police concerned know where the crime was committed but the records must record this location not only in terms of political boundaries but where within any political area. The location of crime on political boundaries between chiefdoms, sub-chiefdoms and districts has already been noted (TANNER 1966). The importance of geography in crime can be shown in the reported murder rates for Buganda in 1934 (Table IV) which vary between 2.7 in Kyaddondo to 194.9 in Buruli counties. Since some of these rates appear to be low in comparison to Indian (ELWIN, 1943) and Ceylonese figures (STRAUSS, 1953) and some high in comparison to figures for American Negroes (WOLFGANG, 1958) and most East African tribes (BOHANNAN, 1960) this spacial and possibly tribal distribution of all serious crimes must be a necessary subject for concern and research.

III. Problems of interpretation.

It is important to realise that police statistics in East Africa are not produced for the scrutiny of an interested public and the analysis of specialist sociologists. Rather they are produced under some bureaucratic compulsion by overworked police officers who are both self-conscious of their inaccuracy and unaware of the real benefits which can accrue from a more complex, accurate and expensive system of statistics. It may also be that they are produced more in defence of their budget allocation than in explanation since comment on any police question is more likely to be criticism than congratulation. It is not surprising therefore that published police reports are sociologically empty documents and that the police are defensive in relation to deeper enquiries.

It is therefore necessary to treat official statistics with extreme caution not so much to dispute their accuracy since few police officers would suggest that they are accurate, but to regard their manifest inaccuracy as indications of problems rather than statements of exact facts. To regard the wide variations in homicide rates (Table I) as the beginning of an enquiry rather than its end, particularly as the case details show the total to be made up almost entirely of violent deaths with the almost complete absence of deaths by poisoning. From this it might be possible to conclude that poisoning does not occur but the infrequency of inquests, rapid burial in a hot climate and the lack of facilities for autopsies make it possible that only a minority of murders are investigated.

It is not possible to state whether the high number of reported arson and murder cases in Ibale district in 1963 was due to the presence of the police or to a social trend towards violence, just as the low number of cases in Kigezi district may be due rather to the small numbers of police just as much as to the theoretical peacefulness of the people (YELD, 1967). Perhaps we should conclude that the murder rates quoted are very much the minimum probable figures. In terms of the unitary states which are being developed in East Africa it is perhaps a better sign to have high rates of reported crime than to imagine that the absence of reported crime is due to better behaviour of the people and the smooth function of the government's law and order policies.

Police statistics can at least be used as a basis for becoming aware of the realities of human behaviour. Crime is too often looked at as un-African, a result of colonialism and the injection of alien values. This is racist nonsense that can only prevent a proper understanding of social reality - crime cannot be abolished and usually can only be partially controlled.

In a series of informal enquiries with Makerere university students, none denied that they had stolen and a majority admitted marihuana smoking. There is no reason to suppose that unknown and unrecorded crime in East Africa is not extremely common and as common as in other studies (WALLERSTEIN 1947: 102). In the same area of stereotyped conceptions figures for sex offences - rape, indecent assault, buggery and bestiality may be explained by suggesting that these offences are contrary to African custom and therefore do not occur. Further that rape and indecent assault can only occur when women do not conform to customary procedures about not going to collect water alone for example and that anyway these acts should only give rise to civil suits for physical rather than mental damage. However the majority of such offences are not reported because of the modesty, fear or disgust of the potential complainant, the shame of both the families concerned and the inability of anyone to comprehend the value of the probable statutory penalties.

Crime statistics show quite clearly that sex offences do occur in African communities which are reported to the police and that their pattern may be comparable to rural communities in other parts of the world where the countryside provides better opportunities for finding victims (WALKER.1965:26) there are moreover some grounds for thinking that there may be a high reporting rate of heterosexual offences against younger women because of the economic and social factors related to their marriages and bride-wealth payments.

It is also difficult to analyse criminal behaviour or indeed criminal deviance when much of the recorded cases in certain fields may be police instigated. Western police forces do not have to undertake a number of activities in support of revenue collecting which are normally carried out by other agencies. In East Africa in disregard of any possible effects on their public relations, the police often favour drives in pursuit of the minor petty criminals connected with licenses, tax, transport permits and immigration. Police forces in America and Europe would hesitate to antagonise the public to this extent except under the gravest circumstances related to murder or very serious theft. The case list for traffic offences for Mombasa (Table V) shows the monthly totals to fluctuate wildly; July, August and September giving 485, 368, 663 cases respectively and then the enormous rise to 1732 in November so that the total cases filed in October were 1578 and in November 2859. This cannot be due to fluctuations in traffic offenders but to police emphasis on different types of offences in different months or particular officers having campaigns because they feel that it is particularly necessary.

Finally the primary purpose of crime statistics must be to explain the present in order to be able to assist in the prevention of future crime. To this end an understanding of motive is essential though it is not available in police details of cases and can only be found from reading court judgements. Even in these the details as to motive are likely to be absent in the majority of penal code cases and only to be found in murder and attempted murder where premeditation is an essential ingredient to the charge.

The motives attributed by the police (Table VII) for homicide and attempted homicide for 1961 to 1963 are essentially easy explanations of immediate causes - indeed no police force has the specialist staff or the need to attempt to find the real causes of such offences existing as they do in multiple roots of the personalities of all the persons involved. The quarrel at beer part which claimed 158 deaths or near deaths in 1963 can hardly have been entirely fortuitous (BONANNAN 1960.257) just as 147 cases of wife beating or domestic disputes give the circumstances of the offences not the motives.

IV. Conclusion.

East African crime statistics, particularly in published reports should be treated with extreme suspicion except as a basis for further enquiry. This suspicion is forced on the sociologist because of the serious problems which the police themselves have to face in recording crime, and reluctance of the general public to report crime particularly to sparsely distributed central government supra-tribal police forces.

References cited

- Beattie. R.H. 1955. Problems of criminal statistics in the United States. J.Crim. L. C and Pol Science 46
1930. Criminal statistics in the United States
J. Crim. L.C and Pol Science 51.
- Bhannan P. 1960. African Homicide and Suicide.
- Cohn. B.S. 1965. Anthropological notes on disputes and law in India.
American Anthropologist Vol. 65. No.6 Part 2.
- Elwin. V. 1943. Maria murder and suicide.
- Goldman. N. 1963. Differential selection of juvenile offenders
for court appearances. New York N.C.C.D.
- Hoebel. E.A. 1965. Fundamental cultural postulates and judicial
law making in Pakistan.
American Anthropologist. Vol 65. No.6 Part.2.
- Read. J.S. 1966 Some legal problems in East Africa.
Conference on Penal Problems in East Africa.
University College, Tanzania.
- Sellin. T. 1951. The significance of records of crime.
67 Law Quarterly Review.
- Strauss and Strauss. 1953 Suicide, Homicide and Social Structure in Ceylon
Am. J. Soc. Vol. LVII No. 5.
- Tanner. R.E.S. 1965a. A projection of expected crime in Buganda and
Busoga for 1970. Prepared for the Commissioner of
Police, Uganda. Unpublished.
- 1965b. The selective use of legal systems in East Africa
East African Institute of Social Research Paper No.393.
1966. Cattle theft in Musoma, Tanzania, 1958-59.
Tanganyika Notes and Records. July.
- Wallerstein. J. S and Wyle. C.J. 1947. Our law-abiding law - breakers.
Probation. March - April.
- Walker. N.1965. Crime and punishment in Britain.
- Wolfgang. M.E. 1958. Patterns in criminal homicide.
- Yeld. R. 1967. Personal communication.

Table I.

UGANDA POLICE POPULATION RATIO AND REPORTED ARSON AND MURDER CASES

	RATIO POLICE TO POPULATION. 1963	ARSON 1963	MURDER REPORTED 1963	MURDER RATE 1963. LESS PENDING FALSE CASES PER 100,000 POP.
Karpala	50	13	48)
E. Mengo	3258	} 50	} 280) 15.92
W. Mengo	2637)
Mubende	1129	115	32	24.11
Masaka	2386	6	105	12.86
Busoga	1598	56	112	8.8
Mbale	1844	159	136	22.96
Tororo	4353	73	20	1.12
Teso	4163	162	107	17.85
Toro	2795	304	52	5.96
Bunyoro	1972	20	18	9.66
Ankole	5839	44	40	2.89
Kigezi	7726	27	31	1.87
Acholi	2472	49	54	11.67
Lango	3936	52	23	2.55
W. Nile	5734	62	16	2.13
Karamoja	653	5	92) 33.65
Total	1220		1166	10.87
England & Wales	541			
Greater London	454			
Kenya	645			

TABLE III.

UGANDA REPORTED OFFENCES AGAINST PERSON
MEALE POLICE DISTRICT 1961 and 1964

	Total Reported up to 31 Dec.	Pending	Referred to African Courts	Total	Complaint due to Mistake of Law or fact	Frivolous, Vexatious or false complaint	Closed Undetected	Accused dead or Insane	Total	Brought Before Central Courts	Brought Before Lower Courts	Convicted	Order made Under Section 314(1)(b) or 318(1)(a) of the C.P.C.	Acquitted	Dismissed	"Nolle Prosequi"	Awaiting Trial	Convicted	Acquitted	Dismissed	"Nolle Prosequi"	Awaiting Trial
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
<u>1961</u>																						
16. <u>Murder</u>	57	9	-	20	2	-	17	1	28	28	-	17	-	6	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
17. <u>Manslaughter</u>	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	17	-	16	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18. <u>Attempted Murder</u>	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19. <u>Attempted Suicide</u>	14	-	-	3	-	1	2	-	11	10	1	9	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
20. <u>Grievous Harm</u>	51	2	13	5	-	-	5	-	31	15	16	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	15
21. <u>Common Assault</u>	179	8	140	52	11	15	26	-	79	16	63	10	-	2	4	-	-	3	2	-	-	58
22. <u>Aggravated Assaults</u>	54	-	19	13	4	1	8	-	22	8	14	7	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	13
23. <u>Other Offences.</u>	89	-	35	28	4	7	16	1	26	8	18	6	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	16
<u>TOTAL</u>	563	19	207	123	23	24	74	2	214	102	112	80	-	11	7	-	4	4	5	-	-	103
<u>1964</u>																						
16. <u>Murder</u>	90	9	-	33	-	2	31	-	48	48	-	1	1	7	3	2	34	-	-	-	-	-
17. <u>Manslaughter</u>	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	52	-	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18. <u>Attempted Murder</u>	14	-	-	11	-	-	11	-	3	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19. <u>Attempted Suicide</u>	8	-	1	4	-	-	4	-	3	3	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20. <u>Grievous Harm</u>	33	-	5	6	-	-	6	-	22	16	6	15	1	1	-	-	1	1	2	3	-	-
21. <u>Common Assault</u>	680	15	377	152	20	-	132	-	136	24	112	19	2	1	2	-	-	72	4	36	-	-
22. <u>Aggravated Assaults</u>	52	2	22	6	-	-	6	-	22	10	12	6	1	-	1	-	2	5	4	3	-	-
23. <u>Other Offences</u>	116	5	34	36	6	-	30	-	41	22	19	11	3	2	5	-	1	1	3	15	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	1,045	33	439	248	26	2	220	-	327	178	149	103	13	11	11	2	38	79	13	57	-	-

Table II.

(B) Buganda and Mubende less greater Kampala

Estimated population 1964 = 2,194,000 x 1.2
 1970 = 2,643,000

Based on true crimes 1960-64

(Crimes reported less pending, falso, mistaken, mental cases)

Crimes	Average crimes 1960-64	Estimated true crimes 1970	True crimes 1964	Estimated true crimes 1970
1. Against lawful authority Penal Code 42 to 111	437	524	431	517
2. Injurious to the public Penal Code 112 to 181	108	127	161	193
3. Against the person Penal Code 184 to 243	1202	1442	1703	2043
4. Against property Penal Code 252 to 321	4376	5251	4462	5354
5. Misc. Penal Code Crimes Penal Code 326 to 378	58	69	63	75
6. Other laws	4622	5546	5489	6586
7. <u>Total</u>	10801	12959	12309	14768

Reported Murders 1964.

Table IV.

Province Buganda

County	Estimated Population	Reported Murders	Rate Per 100,000.
KYADDONDO	238,651	9	2.7
BUSIRO	149,495	36	24.1
SINGO	176,686	49	27.7
MAWOKOTA	96,438	14	14.5
BUTAMBALA	47,139	4	8.48
GOMBA	63,114	12	19.01
BUSUJJU	33,650	17	50.5
KYAGGWE	321,679	87	27.04
BUVUMA	2,812	0	0
BURILI	27,190	53	194.9
BULEMEZI	255,604	56	21.9
BUGERERE	102,544	35	34.1
SESE	6,171	0	0
MAWOGOLA	39,093	7	17.9
KABULA	9,654	1	10.3
KOKI	33,466	4	11.9
BUDDU	426,624	75	17.5
BUWEKULA	42,077	6	14.2
BUGANGAZZI	25,821	5	19.3
BIYAGA	48,010	8	16.6
	<hr/> 2,145,929		

Table V.

Resident Magistrate's Criminal Court.

MOMBASA. No. of Cases filed during 1964 64/1.

<u>Month.</u>	<u>Tr.</u>	<u>Tr.Tic.</u>	<u>MM Cases.</u>	<u>Crim.</u>	<u>TOTAL.</u>
Jan.	584	526	229	397	1736
Feb.	403	317	230	387	1337
Mar.	456	234	258	327	1275
Apr.	606	295	597	547	2045
May	582	415	479	351	1827
June	539	254	404	406	1603
July	485	282	494	437	1698
Aug.	268	563	493	340	1669
Sept.	663	337	503	325	1828
Oct.	644	220	407	307	1578
Nov.	1732	360	371	296	2859
Dec.	565	360	281	251	1457
	<u>7527</u>	<u>4263</u>	<u>4752</u>	<u>4371</u>	<u>20912</u>

Table VI.

POLICE DISTRICT	Population (1959 Census)		Police Establishment			CID Establishment			Population per 1 Policeman	FINAL CODE CASES								
	Number	Dacoity per Sq. Mile	1961	1962	1963	1961	1962	1963		Total Reported			Cleared up by Arrest & Prosecuting			% of True Cases cleared up.		
										1961	1962	1963	1961	1962	1963	1961	1962	1963
Kampala	46,735		948	899	927	163			50	11985	12164	10725	5346	3688	2659	51	33	26
E. Mengo	612,640	120	179	173	188	-	156	143						999	-	-	30	-
W. Mengo	725,255	158	268	266	273	-	-	49	3258	-	3539	-	-		1151	-	-	31
Total Mengo	1,337,895	140	467	439	463	-	-	105	2890	5510	7630	6035	1429	2150	2052	28	30	36
Mengo	99,377	37	See	See	88	-	-	26	1129	See W. Mengo		1230	See W. Mengo		252	-	-	26
Masaka	443,877	117	191	185	186	36	33	40	2386	2493	2818	2458	412	565	729	18	2	34
Busoga	677,410	197	428	424	424	57	57	63	1598	5427	5651	4357	1322	1052	1342	26	22	33
Mbale	366,580	225	188	195	199	36	36	44	1844 2637	2975	3158	3771	713	595	962	25	27	26
Tororo	400,432	254	75	92	92	6	12	13		4353	1691	1645	1435	393	407	416	26	29
Teso	457,875	106	111	105	110	-	-	21	4163	1844	2208	2601	549	769	1406	33	42	58
Toro	349,354	74	119	125	125	-	14	15	2795	1856	2333	3551	676	595	1348	40	28	40
Bunyoro	128,198	27	65	65	65	-	-	-	1972	752	1075	1051	202	364	285	30	40	28
Ankole	531,135	90	86	91	91	-	-	21	5839	1217	1478	1555	426	543	684	38	41	53
Kigezi	494,488	260	64	64	64	-	-	10	7726	878	978	1069	292	424	442	37	48	43
Acholi	206,846	27	113	116	116	-	14	15	2472	1537	2128	2099	626	1036	966	43	51	50
Lango	354,111	79	90	90	90	-	-	-	3936	1331	1484	1480	337	553	773	35	39	55
W. Nile	435,756	73	76	76	76	-	-	-	5734	1098	1186	950	456	389	433	46	27	46
Karamoja	172,397	16	268	268	264	-	-	-	653	988	843	1073	255	243	276	28	30	29
Railway (S. Police)	-	-	124	136	134	-	-	-	-	522	596	557	140	161	109	30	26	20
TOTAL	6,536,531	86	(4) 5270	5247	5357	(5) 571	413	624	(6) 1220	42104	47375	46007	11574	15524	15134	30	31	33
England & Wales	(7) 47,023,000	-	-	(8) 87,000	-	-	-	-	541	(10) 896020				(1) 212539			24	
Greater London	(7) 8,172,000	11323	-	(8) 18,000	-	-	-	-	454	-								
Kenya	6,450,000	29	12422	12262	11873			506	645	43570	46499	45790	(11) 18762	(11) 21557	(11) 20123	(11) 43	(11) 47	(11) 44

(1) - Bugisu 304075 dacoity 329
 Mbale 13569 " 1508
 Sebei 40536 " 69
 Total 357980 " 225

(2) - Bukedi only. This district is covered by Mbale and Tororo thus the comparisons are not strictly correct.
 (3) - The Railway Police have stations at Kampala, Jinja, Tororo and Gulu, and posts in these districts.
 (4) - Totals include all police such as drivers, matrons, radio staff etc., not included in the District figures.
 (5) - Totals include all staff such as HQ and the district figures.

(6) - Related to all police, including drivers, matrons, radio staff etc.
 (7) - 1963 census
 (8) - 1964 strength figures. Most forces in U.K., particularly Metropolitan, are under establishment.
 (10) - Indictable offenses
 (11) - Cases resulting in conviction and % of true cases resulting in convictions.

International African Institute Conference -LAW - Addis AbabaPROCEDURAL INFORMALITY, RECONCILIATION ANDFALSE COMPARISONS

by J. van Velsen

INTRODUCTION

Law in African societies has long been a favourite subject of professional and amateur anthropologists and of persons with legal training. As a result there is a large body of descriptive literature on substantive law but very little attention has been paid to the actual operation of the legal rules.

Epstein (1954 ; p.1) suggests two explanations : 'the apparent simplicity and lack of formality in Bantu judicial proceedings' and concentration on the more exotic aspects, e.g. the oath and the ordeal. One might add that, as in the case of other popular subjects such as magic, witchcraft and sorcery, the literature on African law is bedevilled by impressionistic and ethnocentric opinions on the part of European writers. (After all, for many of them the very reason for being in Africa was or is to convert the African peoples to the spiritual values and techniques of European cultures). Moreover, much of this literature would seem to be based on formal interviews and hypothetical cases : 'What would A - or a court - do if B did such-and-such?'. But the study of law in action requires intensive observation guided by comparative analytical concepts. Courts have to be seen in a wider context than the merely legal-technical one. What happens in the courts is but one aspect of the problem of social control and the solution of disputes. This leads me to another factor which might explain the over-emphasis in the literature on description (and, frequently, mere cataloguing) of legal rules. I will argue in this paper that most writers - including those with a legal training - have a very imperfect understanding of the operation of their own native legal system with which they tend to measure) African legal systems. Particularly in Britain the study of legal systems is still dominated by legal technicians ; the role of courts and judges in social life has barely begun to attract attention. As a result the description of African legal systems and their comparison with European systems are usually based on stereotyped and idealised notions of the latter. This comparison usually results in highlighting the dissimilarities between African legal systems on the one hand and European (or 'Western' or 'our') legal systems on the other hand. Indeed, this contrast has become an assumption whose validity is only rarely submitted to the test of empirical data. This contrast has itself hardened into a stereotype. My contention is that we are confronted by the problem of false comparison, *viz.*, the comparison of dissimilar data which are treated as if they were similar. In this paper I want to examine some of the assumed contrasts between African and European court procedures. The paper's focus will be on two aspects of the problem : the informality of court proceedings and on conciliatory procedures in courts.

The African societies from which I draw most of my data are characterised by a relatively simple technology which does not allow a producer to produce a substantial surplus over his own subsistence requirements. Related to this are other features : there is little specialisation or economic differentiation. Consequently, with some notable exceptions (e.g. Rwanda) there are no classes or categories with a wide range of critically opposed economic and political interests or with other different values. In other words there is a great degree of homogeneity in cultural values. Moreover, more interaction between individuals is limited within a relatively small geographical area. These interactions create permanent relationships which serve a variety

of ends , e.g. economic, political, kinship, and so forth. Following Gluckman (1955; p.19) I will call them 'multiplex' relationships in contrast to 'simplex' (Or, as Gluckman calls them, 'single interest') relationships. Thus, between persons bound by multiplex relationships a disturbance in, say, their political relationship is likely to affect their, say, economic and kinship relationships. Although most interaction is between people bound by multiplex relationships, simplex relationships also occur, e.g. between persons from more distant areas. Where multiplex relationships prevail judges and litigants and, indeed, the litigants themselves interact in relationships whose significance ranges beyond the transitoriness of the court or a particular dispute. In other words, they are all citizens who today are structurally differentiated in court but tomorrow may be working together in the same work party. Moreover it is not unusual to find that judges combine their judicial duties with administrative ones. Thus Gluckman (1955; p.21) has pointed out that amongst the Lozi ' the judges try to prevent the breaking of relationships, and to make it possible for the parties to live together amicably in the future. ... Therefore the courts tend to be conciliating ... In order to fulfil their task the judges constantly have to broaden the field of their enquiries, and consider the total history of relations between the litigants, not only the narrow legal issue raised by one of them. ... the court's conception of " relevance" is very wide, for many facts affect the settlement of the dispute. This applies particularly to cases between blood-kin and between fellow-villagers.' In more ephemeral relationships the court 'narrows its range of relevance.'

It should be noted that this thumbnail sketch refers primarily to rural, tribal (' traditional') societies in Africa and not to the conditions prevailing in urban, industrial areas. The reason is that most of the literature on African legal systems is based on the tribal areas. And it is on these tribal data that writers base their comparison (contrast) between African and European or ' our' legal systems.

Many authors refer to 'European' legal systems when in fact they mean the English and/or American common law system. With a few exceptions I will also limit my comparison to the latter. The context in which the English and American legal systems operate is that of highly industrialised societies with a market economy with considerable specialisation and economic and political differentiation. There are classes with divergent economic and political interests. These societies are characterised by heterogeneity rather than by homogeneity. Simplex relationships between persons who live in close proximity or at great distance are common. There are also legal specialists (amongst whom are many judges) who possess a body of esoteric, technical knowledge. In many courts the actors (judges, litigants, police, witnesses, etc.) are not usually involved in more than ephemeral, simplex relationships with one another. And, ideally, the judiciary and the executive are separated.

Presented in this way the contrast between African tribal societies and the industrialised societies of Britain and America is sharp. In fact, as I will show, many writers present us with such a contrast: polar opposites instead of a continuum. It is true that there are some striking differences between industrialised and tribal societies, e.g. the higher incidence of simplex relationships in the former between persons who live at great distance and may never even have met. As Mair (1963; p.13) points out, it is a matter of ' the scale of social relationships ... In the small-scale society of simple technology the field of people's relationships is confined ... in that the same persons and groups cooperate for all the important purposes of life. The large-scale society has at its disposal techniques of communication all over the world, and means of establishing impersonal relationships for specific transactions... Every member of the large-scale society is party to a great number of relationships, some ephemeral, some lasting, which do not overlap. 'Yet many features of tribal society including very probably, multiplex relationships, are found in industrial societies even if they are not as prominent in the latter. Likewise in the field of law there are many more similarities (e.g. in procedure), between industrialised and tribal societies than most writers allow for. This point is obscured by the fact that comparative references to (and, indeed, the literature on) the British and American legal systems are almost exclusively confined to the superior courts completely ignoring the courts at the bottom of the courts' hierarchy where we find the magistrates' courts, the Small Claims Courts and so forth.

This applies to writers such as Bohannon, Cardozo, Pound, Epstein and Gluckman who treat the subject with greater sociological perspective than the majority of the legal authors. Whilst the superior courts may be more important, from the point of view of legal doctrine, it seems to be generally accepted that the inferior courts are more important as forums of dispute-settlement since the bulk of litigation starts and ends there. Thus Lloyd (1954; p. 276) points out that 'the exceptionally high status of the judiciary in England is far more easily maintained by reason of the very small number of the higher judiciary ... This exceptional situation is rendered possible by the large amount of judicial business conducted in England by lay benches of magistrates or by special tribunals.'³

FLEXIBILITY OF PROCEDURE

The following case which I recorded in a court of lay magistrates in Manchester in 1956 shows some striking procedural similarities with what has been recorded in African courts. ⁴

THE SAILOR AND HIS WIFE

The undisputed facts of the case were that Beecham, a coloured sailor, had been living in concubinage with Dorothy Mandy, a white woman, for seven years until 1955 when she went to live with Taylor whom she married not long before the trial. Taylor was a coloured friend of Beecham's. The other participants in the trial were: the two lay magistrates - a man and a woman; the court clerk, trained in law; and the solicitor representing Mrs. Taylor.

The solicitor told the court that in February 1956, Beecham had on three occasions threatened Mandy (as she then still was) with violence if she did not return to him; she was living with Taylor at the time. On one of the occasions Beecham was alleged to have threatened Mr. Taylor also. Mrs. Taylor gave the same story from the witness box. Beecham was then told by the court that he could cross-examine Mrs. Taylor. Instead of questioning her on the evidence she had given, Beecham kept asking her questions which had no direct bearing on the matter of the threats. For instance, he asked her whether she did not remember that day when he lent her 10/-. The woman's solicitor intervened to ask when that event took place. On being told that that was the previous year he objected that the court did not want to hear what had happened the previous year but only matter relating to the threats. This happened several times: Beecham making statements - often in the form of questions - which were meant to show his concern and friendship for Dorothy Mandy and the solicitor rejecting them as irrelevant. Before she stood down Mrs. Taylor said that her husband was in court and could give supporting evidence.

When it was clear that Beecham would not cross-examine Mrs Taylor, he was told by the chairman that he could give his own statement, either from the floor or under oath from the witness box. He opted for the former. From the way he reacted to the Chairman's announcement I got the impression that Beecham's decision was not the result of a calculation of the relative tactical advantages. Rather, he seemed to consider it of minor importance where he gave the evidence from: he had his story and he was going to give that, wherever he stood. In his evidence Beecham told the court that Mrs. Taylor had told a pack of lies. In order to support this allegation he told several stories to show that she was a confirmed liar. Again, he kept harking back to the more distant past and, again, he was repeatedly told by the clerk that he should stick to the point at issue, namely the threats. Otherwise Beecham's evidence was meant to show how friendly he had always felt towards Mrs. Taylor (the loan of 10/- was but one of the background stories to prove this). Another part of his evidence was intended to show that he had never had any desire for violent revenge after she had left him for Mr. Taylor: 'If I wanted to beat her why should I not have done so before? Why should I have waited until February [1956], more than half-a-year after she left me?'

The solicitor got up and drew the bench's attention to the fact that Beecham's evidence contained several attacks on the character of Mrs. Taylor and he, therefore, wondered whether he might be allowed to cross-examine Beecham even though he had not given his evidence on oath. The court clerk, answering for the court, pointed out that the bench was bound to give greater weight to the woman's evidence on oath and could ignore Beecham's evidence. The chairman did not allow the solicitor to cross-examine Beecham. The chairman next asked whether the complainant wanted to call Mr. Taylor as a witness. The solicitor answered that he did not intend to call him as he was not present on the occasions of the threats which were the subject of the trial; he, the solicitor was not concerned with any threats uttered to Mr. Taylor, which was the only matter on which he, Mr. Taylor, could give evidence.

The chairman then bent down to the clerk and asked him what sort of penalty the alleged offence carried. After receiving the clerk's answer he conferred in a whisper with the other magistrate and said that it was a question of one word against the other. They both agreed that they had their doubts regarding the veracity of the woman's story because the solicitor did not want to call Mr. Taylor. (I had been allowed to sit with the magistrates and could therefore hear their whispered conversation. I also discussed some points of the trial with them afterwards). Prefacing the bench's decision the chairman remarked that they found it difficult to get down to the truth since the two stories were so conflicting and that if Beecham had threatened the woman as alleged - he did not want to say that he had - he would have committed a serious offence. He dismissed the case.

The first point to be noted in this case is the contrast between what one might call the 'common-sense justice' approach of the lay people (viz. the magistrates and the litigants) and the more technical, legal approach of the lawyers (viz. the court clerk and the solicitor). The magistrates ignored the lawyers' opinion regarding the greater weight of the woman's sworn evidence against Beecham's unsworn story. They also overruled the lawyers' technical objection to the 'irrelevancies' in Beecham's evidence, namely his desire to give the history of the dispute. In a discussion afterwards one of the magistrates told me that she thought that Beecham 'ought to be given a chance to tell some of the background facts because he obviously considered that a part of the dispute' and she added that legal cliché: 'Justice must not only ... etc.' Thus the lay actors in this court saw the dispute in terms of a conflict in a personal relationship whereas the lawyers treated it rather as a breach of a legal rule. That the attitude of the bench in this case was not exceptional is clear from the following summary of Magistrates' court procedure: '... magistrates usually show the greatest reluctance to cut short anyone concerned with the proceedings who desires to speak, however irrelevant or tedious his remarks. ... The result is that the court must struggle to do the work normally performed in other courts by solicitors, namely to listen to the whole story as it is poured out, to ignore what is irrelevant, and then to analyse the legal issues involved, and marshal the evidence. In order to cope with the usual volume of work in these circumstances, the procedure is less formal than in other courts. ... the magistrate attempts to reach a solution which acknowledges plain facts and meets the real problem causing the trouble.'

To me the course of the Beecham-Taylor trial was most revealing: it was very reminiscent of what I had observed in African courts. It also seemed to contradict the current, oversimplified contrasts between African and 'our' legal procedures. To mention but one example, Hammond-Tooke (1962; pp.214-215) contrasts the informality and apparent nonchalance of Bhaca court procedure, its tolerance of irrelevant evidence and its preoccupation with 'restitution and a restoration of the social equilibrium' on the one hand with the 'polemics of legal casuistries' and 'our own preoccupation with the niceties of legal procedure' on the other. This assumption might be true if all 'our' courts were superior courts. But the case described above and the quotations from Archer and Giles make it clear that the contrast

is much less sharp when we compare African courts with inferior courts. This is as true in America as in Britain. For instance, Ploscowe(1953; p.10) describes the inferior criminal courts of America as courts of 'grievances' which attempt 'to do substantial justice, without too much regard for the niceties of civil and criminal jurisdiction. ... and a sort of court of equity. It is the nearest approach to justice in the market place of Oriental tradition.' As in the case of the English magistrates' courts, these inferior criminal courts, as the author points out, 'are the most important tribunals in the land, because they influence for the better or for the worse far more lives than any other court.' (p.12). Myers (1953;pp. 23-4) writing on small claims courts also stresses their conciliatory aspects (I will return to this point later) and their flexible procedure.

To summarise the arguments so far, the generally assumed contrast as regards precedural flexibility between African and European courts, does not appear to be related primarily to the fact of their being African or European, or to their operating in a tribal or in an industrialised society. We noted the procedural features which are particularly associated with African courts may also be found in English and American inferior courts. I suggest that this supposed contrast is the result of a false comparison which is in turn based on the false assumption that all European courts operate in a similar social context and have the same procedure, in brief, that all European courts operate like the superior courts.

RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is another feature which is supposed to characterise African court procedure in contrast to European procedure. Elias and Gluckman have pointed out that it would be wrong to make this contrast too sharp by assuming that a similar aim is not found in European law (Elias 1956); pp.268 seq.) even if only in a semi-judicial form (Gluckman 1955); pp.77-8). Unfortunately, both authors, again, limit their comparison to superior courts, ignoring the expressly conciliatory functions of many inferior courts. For instance, in American small claims courts 'the trial judge, prior to trial, is required by statute to make an earnest effort to settle the controversy by conciliation.' (Myers 1953; p. 23).

This answers the question whether reconciliation is a feature of the European as well as the African judicial process. Another question is whether the aim and practice of reconciliation is as evident in the former as it is supposed to be in the latter. The following quotations are a, necessarily limited, selection from a large body of literature which stresses the great significance or even dominance of reconciliation in African judicial procedure. Lambert(quoted in Phillips 1945); p.65) writes with reference to the Kiambu District in Kenya: 'The judicial system of the European culture involves justice by decree and the granting of exclusive rights to an individual; the African system involves justice by agreement and the maintenance of social equilibrium.' Holleman(1950; pp. 53-4) similarly sees a sharp contrast and states that, both in the past and at the time of his writing, the Shona chiefs of Rhodesia ' would settle rather than decide, appease and reconcile rather than enforce.' Bohannan (1957; pp. 19, 61-5. et passim), too, stresses that, ' to determine a modus vivendi, 'to effect a mutually acceptable settlement between the litigants, is the aim of a Tiv court, but not ' to apply laws'.

I share the views of Epstein (1954; p.2) and Gluckman (1955; p.55) that although reconciliation is an important value, it is not an 'ultimate, almost mystical, value' of African courts to which legal norms are sacrificed. However, the majority of writers on this topic would appear to start from the assumption that 'judgement by agreement' and ' judgement by decree' are mutually exclusive alternatives. And by concentrating on the conciliatory aspects of African courts, they tend to ignore the judges' task of applying laws. I suggest that this one-sided approach is related to the fact that the literature in this field generally inadequate attention to the different stages of the judicial process and thus fails to note at which stage it becomes possible or, indeed, imperative, to effect reconciliation. In general writers identify reconciliation with the court's decision; they fail to distinguish in this respect between the two decisions any court .. /6

anywhere must make, namely a decision as to the relevant facts and the appropriate legal rules to be applied (this is the judgement or verdict), and the decision as to the appropriate sanction for the judgement (this is the award or sentence). For instance, I quoted earlier Holleman saying of the Shona chiefs that they 'would settle rather than decide.' One is inclined to ask: decide what? - points of law or award? In addition, he expresses his view that instances of a Shona chief who 'summarily disposes a lot of cases per session by concise interpretation of the relevant points of law and snappy judgements' are likely to be 'innovations rather than renovations of Shona procedure' (p.54). I doubt the validity of this view, I am sure that such an interpretation does take place and is bound to take place or otherwise there would be no court or law. In any case 'snappy judgements' and 'Concise interpretations' are not necessarily concomitants, nor does 'concise interpretation' necessarily exclude reconciliation, as is clear from the author's brief summary of Shona procedure later on (p.60). There it also becomes clear that the 'discussions and bargaining' over the amount of the compensation ('reconciliation?') come after one of the parties has been 'convinced that he has been wrong and that he must acknowledge his guilt and responsibility; in other words, after 'the relevant points of law' have been settled. Bohannan, (1957) too, does not distinguish between a court's judgement and its subsequent sanctions. However, his case records plainly show that the courts do apply legal rules even in the face of strong protests from one of the parties (e.g. his cases 8 and 9), and that the Tiv courts' aim of a mutually acceptable settlement between litigants refers to the courts' sanctions rather than to their judgements. Thus in case 9 argument centred on the amount of the compensation to be paid by the accused. The owner of the stolen property was dissatisfied with the amount suggested by the court and 'shouted that the case was being decided "by force": that is, sufficient consideration had not been given to arriving at a settlement in which both parties could concur.' The facts of the case were not in question and it would appear that, apart from the accused himself, the general consensus among the members of the court and the public was that the accused's action approximated to theft. Similarly, Allott (1960; p.68) relates a court's attempt 'to win the agreement of both sides' to the court's 'decision' in general.

We should more clearly distinguish between the various stages of the African and any other judicial process. This would help uncover the aims (and their realisation) of the courts and also the role of the latter in social life. The first stage to be distinguished is the pre-trial stage. Courts are a means (only one of the means) of social control, aiming at preservation of peaceful co-existence of the members of a community despite divergent interests. This is not the truism it sounds - particularly with regard to the study of law and courts in Britain - if one considers that 'In western (or at least English) legal procedure [which, one might add, is in some categories of courts largely in the hands of a highly specialised class of professional lawyers] litigation is often treated as a sort of game, with the judge as umpire holding the whistle, blowing when one party gets offside, and awarding the victory to the side which most goals.' (allott 1960; p. 68).

The point is that both in African (tribal) and in European (industrialised) societies pressures tend to be brought to bear upon disputants to compromise their disagreements so as not to worsen and disrupt social relationships even further through taking matters to court. This aspect of the judicial process has received a fair amount of attention in the literature in respect of African legal systems. (The same cannot be said in respect of European legal systems). There are, for instance, some useful accounts on moots by Beattie (1957), Abrahams (1965), Bohannan (1957) and others. However, as I indicated earlier, such pre-trial attempts at reconciliation are by no means foreign to European legal systems either, even if they are, presumably, not as prominent. (One can only presume this until more work has been done in this field). I have already quoted Gluckman and Elias to that effect and I also mentioned the compulsory reconciliation procedure of American small claims courts. Another example can be found in Emmett's description of a Welsh village (1964; p. 89): 'In Llan parish informal methods such as friendly compromise, fear of public opinion, the need to co-operate and finally ostracism, keep most disputes between people out of court, and ... make English justice ... only a final and extreme resort.'

But once these conciliation attempts have failed and a dispute reach-

- 7 -

reaches the courts, it enters a more formal stage of the judicial process, viz. the stage of judicial examination. This is the second stage when the court, any court, hears the litigants' - generally conflicting-stories, determines the legal points at issue, selects the appropriate legal rules and applies them to selected ('relevant') facts. Finally, once a case has been made out, the court must give its judgement on the correctness, or otherwise, from the legal point of view, of the acts of the respective litigants, using certain legal norms as its measure. The court must pronounce on the rights and wrongs of the case. Only thus - by upholding the law - can the court fulfil its social task of regulating relationships. At this stage of the judicial process there is little room for reconciliation: relevant legal rules may be bent (e.g. by interpretation) but they should be applied and not ignored. At this stage the court is primarily concerned with rights and interests which go beyond those of the litigants in a particular case, viz. the rights and interests of all the members of society who organise their lives on the assumption of the general and persistent validity of the legal rules which the court is called upon to defend. The reconciliation of the litigants (i.e. the attempt to repair their relationship), which may have been attempted before, may be attempted again, but at a later stage. Gluckman's statement (1955; p.22) that 'The kuta [Lozi court] should not achieve a reconciliation without blaming those who have done wrong' might be summarised as: 'No reconciliation without law' and would hold true for this stage of the judicial process in courts anywhere.

I want to refer briefly to some of the reasons why pre-trial means of reconciliation are not resorted to or, if resorted to, are unsuccessful. Feelings between the disputants may be running too high for a variety of reasons (e.g. the particular dispute may be the culmination of a series of previous ones) and there may be no countervailing interests between the parties strong enough to effect a reconciliation without recourse to court. Reconciliation may fail in disputes between persons involved in multiplex relationships; it is particularly likely to fail if disputants are bound by a simplex relationship.

Another possible reason for the failure of pre-trial reconciliation is that what is at stake is not so much the redress for damages suffered through the actions of one of the parties as a legal issue (or a non-legal issue in legal dress, e.g. a matter of status which either or both parties consider sufficiently important to invite an authoritative, public pronouncement on it. I suspect that it is this motivation for litigation which causes some people to be described as litigious. I have argued elsewhere with reference to the Tonga of Malawi that as a result of the prevalence of multiplex relationships, interests which are capable of exact, legal formulation, that is, which are actionable (e.g. debts arising from non payment of bridewealth) tend to overlap with interests which are incapable of being so defined and therefore not actionable in court (e.g. political claims). (van Velsen 1964) ; pp. 125 seq. 314-6, Case 18, et passim). The frequency of disputes which is such a striking feature of Tonga society is not an indication of social disintegration as has often been said. Instead, it serves - as ritual or other public ceremonies do in other societies - to analyse and re-assert publicly, personal relationships and values. Similarly, political and other non-actionable issues may be pursued in court in the guise of other, actionable claims. From this it follows that in that type of dispute the safeguarding of present and future interests is of prime importance whilst the sanctions for the infringement of rights of the ostensible dispute are of secondary importance or even irrelevant. Indeed, I was told of instances of persons who had been awarded damages in court telling their opponents later, back at home, to forget about them or, if the damages had already been paid over at the court, returning them to the losers. Meek (1950; p. 342) reports something similar from the Ibo: ' " Trials", therefore, were often nothing more than an organised expression of public opinion, and served the purpose of allowing grievances to be aired, a litigant's object being, frequently, to vindicate his character publicly, rather than mulct his opponent in damages.'

Pre-trial reconciliation, then, may be either impossible or inappropriate. This supports the view that somewhere in the judicial process there should be an explicit pronouncement by the court on the legal issues - the rights and wrongs - involved in any particular dispute. Even when reconciliation is the prime social requirement, the legal issues are not ignored. .. / 8

It is clear, therefore, that the desirability and possibility or otherwise of effecting reconciliation as part of the judicial process are not directly related to the incidence of multiplex relationships. Indeed, I have argued that just because two persons have a multiplex relationship, the legal issues in one set of interests can be submitted to a court's judgement in order to clarify the non-legal issues in another set of interests. To effect reconciliation and thus prevent the legal issues from being publicly scrutinised by a court would defeat the purpose of the proposed lawsuit. Therefore, analysis of the absence or presence of reconciliation should take into account not only the nature of the relationship between the litigants (and possibly judges as well) but also the stated or unstated purpose of litigation.

After the legal norms have been reinforced through application at the stage of judicial examination, another opportunity occurs for reconciliation or other re-adjustments of the particular relationship and interest of the litigants, if that is socially desirable. This is the third and final stage, namely that of the sanctions of the judicial process. The court has to take a second decision, *viz.* what sanctions, if any, to attach to its first - legal - decision. The nature of this second decision is rather different from that of the first decision; the latter is the result of a process of logical reasoning. But the court's second decision is less logical; it is more flexible, more overtly susceptible to considerations of expediency, more adaptable to non-legal desirabilities. The awards in similar cases may vary considerably between different courts (in the same society) or on different occasions in the same court. There is greater scope for the judges to express their personal, non-legal feelings about the case or the litigants.

It is by no means unusual to find judges in English courts carrying out their duty of applying and defending the law in the stage of judicial examination and then applying, in the third stage of the judicial process, only a token sanction, e.g., *ld. damages*. In this way, judges may signify their opinion, on general, social rather than legal grounds, that, for instance, the particular case is a bad one without moral right on either side, or that more substantial damages would do the litigants' relationship more harm than good. Conversely a severe sanction following a legal judgement on a minor legal wrong may signify a judge's strong moral or political disapproval of the act.

I noted previously that contrary to what most writers state or imply, reconciliation is not a concomitant of all stages of the judicial process or of the decision of the court. Attempts at reconciliation, if any, are peculiar to the pre-trial stage and the court's second decision. Ample support for this view can be found in the literature, even though the differences in the nature of these two decisions are not made clear. For example, although Epstein (1954; pp.20-1) does not distinguish between judgement and award in relation to reconciliation, he does imply this distinction when he writes that the African urban courts of the Copperbelt in Zambia do not 'ignore the right-duty element of the case ... for reconciliation is achieved on the basis of the litigants' recognition of wrongdoing.' Earlier I quoted from case 9 in Bohannon (1957) which brings out the same point.

At this stage of the judicial process the conditions for reconciliation are likely to be rather different from what they were before the trial. The dispute has been brought into the open and the trial may have engendered more heat and increased the desire on both sides to fight the case to the bitter end. Alternatively, with the legal issues settled the conditions may be more propitious for repairing the social damage. Moreover, Epstein (1954; p.33) records the following rather different type of reconciliation. In a marital dispute the court sent the litigants home with this warning 'But now you must all go and try and live harmoniously together. There will be no compensation, but if the matter is brought before the court again there will be a serious case.' Gluckman (1965a; p. 13) gives a similar example of admonitory reconciliation.

In societies where permanent, multiplex relationships prevail (often referred to as face-to-face or small-scale societies) pressure is likely to be applied to stem or repair any damage which might result from a conflict in one set of relationships between two persons lest other sets between the same two persons - and others closely associated with them - also get disrupted.

One can, therefore, expect reconciliation to be a conspicuous feature of the legal process. Conversely, because in Western, industrialised ('our') societies relationships are assumed to be predominantly simplex, reconciliation is not expected to be significant feature of the legal process and few writers in this field pay any attention to it. However, although investigation into this problem in Western societies has hardly begun, I argued earlier that reconciliation may well be of greater significance than has generally been assumed. The following statement (quoted in Giles 1949; p. 34) describes conditions not dissimilar from those in which African courts operate: 'The whole essence of the local administration of justice (in Britain) and the great value of the functions of justice are that they do administer justice amongst people with whom they are acquainted and of whose lives and family history they know something.'

On the other hand, it is possibly an oversimplification to assume that in small-scale societies the pressure for reconciliation operates equally, in all courts reconciliation is likely to be of less importance in the superior courts. In the first place, the very fact that a dispute has reached a superior court might be an indication that the litigants are prepared to 'fight it out' and are therefore less amenable to reconciliation. In the second place, the higher in the hierarchy the court the less the judges are likely to be involved in the litigants' relationships and therefore the less likely they are to feel the pressure for reconciliation. Thus, Rattray writes (1929; p. 388): 'The question of possible reconciliation of the parties - which, as I shall endeavour to show, was such a marked feature of the lower unofficial tribunal - did not enter into the province of the (higher) court.'

Finally a passing reference to the supposed penal character of European legal systems and the greater stress on compensation in African law. This problem is related to that of reconciliation and the general social aim of solving conflicts both of which tend to be associated particularly with tribal societies. For instance, after allowing for the fact that 'the nature of the legal system is always closely linked with the political structure' and that in tribes with a strong chieftainship 'punishment was an important element', Epstein (1951; p.36) states that 'it is clear that many Africans see in the matter of compensation one of the major differences between English and African customary concepts.' And he refers to 'an injured husband being entitled to claim compensation' for his wife's adultery. Whilst I am inclined to agree with Epstein's general point, I wonder whether the conventional distinction between compensation and penalty is entirely valid. Can one really maintain that material compensation for an injury which is not even physical and which cannot in any way be assessed materially, is indeed purely compensation and not a penalty? The fact that the people and the court themselves make this distinction does not necessarily make it a useful or a valid analytical distinction.

Conclusion

When courts operate in conditions where litigants, judges and possibly other participants in the legal process are bound by multiple relationships, one can expect a greater preoccupation with examining social conflicts and repairing social damage rather than with the breaches of legal norms. Such orientation leads to procedural flexibility of which reconciliation is an aspect. When functioning in this fashion courts clearly are a means of social control. I noted that in this respect the literature tends to draw a sharp distinction between African and European legal processes. The latter are supposed to adhere to strict law and procedure whilst the former are mostly described as geared to reconciliation and flexibility in procedure.

With regard to the African side of the comparison, I have argued, firstly, that as far as the aim of reconciliation is concerned, this is not equally dominant at all stages of the judicial process - it is, in fact, of minor significance at the middle stage - and does not, in any case, exclude the application of law. On the contrary, the work of Epstein and Gluckman on African law convincingly describes how courts support the two basic principles of their, and any, legal system - the continuity and certainty of legal rules - and at the same time,

meet the demands of equity. Secondly, I have suggested that the aim of reconciliation is not a necessary corollary of small-scale, face-to-face societies; it does not necessarily feature in each and every trial. The litigants' aim in taking their dispute to court as well as the social structure affects the course of individual trials. I gave an instance from the Tonga where in certain circumstances the litigants' main aim is to get the court's judgment on a legal issue in order to settle amongst themselves, out of court, another, related issue. Another type of trial in which adherence to strict law is the dominant aim is found in superior courts (where they exist) as reported from the Ashanti. However, even though reconciliation is not an inevitable aspect of the judicial process in African societies, it is undoubtedly a very prominent one.

Turning to the other side of the comparison, *viz*, the Western judicial process; we noted that most writers assume that procedural informality and the aim of reconciliation, which are supposed to mark the African judicial process, are absent from 'our' courts. But what do we know of 'our' courts and the social structure in which they operate? For instance, what do we know of the types of cases - and the types of relationships involved - which are brought before the magistrates in Britain? Whilst there is considerable literature on the social structure of African communities and also a fair amount on the resolution of conflicts, with regard to Western, industrialised societies the study of social structure is still in its infancy: the incidence and significance of multiplex relationships has hardly begun to attract attention yet, although what little literature there is in this field makes one suspect that simplex relationships are not quite as dominant as is often assumed. As for the study of the judicial process within its social setting, this has really not begun yet. And it is particularly the inferior courts - with which, I suspect, the African parallels are closest of which we know least. I have attempted to show that most comparisons between African law, and Western law are based as regards the former on over simplifications and, as regards the latter, on untested assumptions. (One of the most fallacious assumptions is that all courts are alike and identical with superior courts.) This has led to false comparisons ending in contrasts which are too sharp.

As a prerequisite for the comparative study of judicial processes I suggested a distinction between the three stages: (1) pre-trial reconciliation - if any - preventing dispute going to court; (2) judicial examination, resulting in the court's judgment: the most 'legal' stage; (3) decision as to the sanctions - if any - for the judgment: renewed opportunity for reconciliation but under different conditions. We thus break the problem up into more manageable - and therefore more easily comparable - parts. Each of these parts (stages) should first be studied in relation to the others within the same judicial process. After that we will be in a better position to make a comparative analysis of the judicial process as a whole in different societies. This approach might avoid global, over simplified comparisons of the 'either --- or' type, *viz*, 'the' African judicial process is informal and reconciliatory (meaning: the whole judicial process and all judicial processes in Africa), whilst 'the' (i.e. the whole and each European judicial process is concerned with the application of strict law.

I have also suggested that we should distinguish between different types of courts within the same society. I would suspect that we would find many features generally associated with African courts, also in Western courts, especially in inferior courts. At present, however, most of the literature on Western legal systems is concerned with the superior courts and is largely of an esoteric, legal-technical nature. (This applies particularly to Britain; in America there has been for some time a slightly greater interest in the social aspects of the legal system.) One would expect greater stress on formality and greater adherence to strict law in superior courts. For, as I have argued for the superior courts in tribal societies, disputes which appear in these courts are likely to be, for one reason or another less amenable to reconciliation and demand the application of strict law. Moreover, in Western societies these courts are more highly

professionalised than others and often seem (at least to the ordinary citizen) rather remote from the life of the society whose legal norms they are expected to uphold.

FOOTNOTES

1. There are some notable exceptions, e.g. the work of Bohannan, Epstein, Gluckman and Gulliver.
2. This is, really, only a guess, a generalisation with very weak supports. As I will point out again later, our knowledge of the social structure of Western industrialised societies is very scanty indeed and riddled with assumptions. For instance, it is usually assumed that in Western, industrialised societies (particularly when they are seen in contrast to tribal societies) permanent, multiplex relationships, if present at all, are of little sociological significance. Personally I suspect that particularly in the inferior courts (more especially those in the rural areas) multiplex relationships may assume greater significance between litigants and possibly between them and the other actors in the courts.
3. See also Duhamel (1959), p. 37: 'The Justices of the Peace.. have, since feudal times, formed the backbone of the administration of English justice.' Also Giles (1949), p.8.
4. Although I have attended a number of hearings, I have not had the opportunity yet to make a systematic study of the law in action in magistrate and similar courts. This case was the first I ever heard in an English magistrates' court and through it I discovered the wider prospects of 'our' law beyond the law reports and text books. Unfortunately I had no opportunity to investigate the social background - outside the court - of this case.
5. Archer (1956), pp 109-10. Similarly Giles (1949) with regard to divorce cases: 'More often than not the parties come straight into 'a magistrates' court from the street. Their evidence has to be extracted there and then, whereas for the Divorce Court Judge, it is carefully sifted in advance by solicitors who specialise in the work and is presented by experienced barristers.' (p.9) and: 'The common tendency is for the Clerk because of his constant preoccupation with legal forms and procedure to be too regardful of the letter of the law, and for magistrates impatient of restraints they do not understand to ride roughshod over them in fulfilling what they consider to be the spirit of the law.' (p.31.)
6. For similar conditions in German, Austrian and Swiss courts, see Bedorrd (1961); also Feifer (1964) on courts in Moscow. We noted earlier that Gluckman relates the Lozi judges' wide conception of relevance to the type of social relationships they are dealing with. In a later work (1965b; p.188) he writes that a Priori one might expect that judges backed by powers of enforcement might be inclined to shorten the listening process in order to come to a decision more quickly - in other words, to narrow their conception of relevance. He adds that such an expectation could not be supported from his Lozi material. My foregoing data would not support such an expectation in relation to European courts either.
7. Epstein and Gluckman who, (as quoted above) reject the mysticism of reconciliation and stress the necessity for a judicial decision, could have driven their points home more effectively if they had made the distinction between the two types of decision clear.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahams, R.G.
1965 'Neighbourhood Organisation: A Major Sub-System among the Northern Nyamwezi'. Africa XXXV, 2 pp. 168-86
- Allott, A.N.
1960 Essays in African Law
Butterworths, London
- Archer, Peter
1956 The Queen's Courts
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth
- Beattie, J.H.M.
1957 'Informal Judicial Activity in Bunyoro',
Journal of African Administration IX, 4, pp.188-95
- Bedford, Sybille
1961 The Faces of Justice
Collins, London
- Bohannan, Paul
1957 Justice and Judgment among the Tiv. Oxford
University Press
- Duhamel, Jean &
Smith, J.D.
1959 Some Pillars of English Law
Pitman, London
- Elias, T.O.
1956 The Nature of African Customary Law
Manchester University Press
- Emmett, Isabel
1964 A North Wales Village
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
- Epstein, A.L.
1954 'Some Aspects of the Conflict of Law and
Urban Courts in Northern Rhodesia' Rhodes-
Livingstone Journal XII, pp.28-40
- 1954 Judicial Techniques and the Judicial Process,
Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 23
- Feifer, George
1964 Justice in Moscow
The Bodley Head, London
- Giles, F.T.
1949 The Magistrates' Courts
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
- Gluckman, M.
1965 a The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence
Yale University Press
1965 b Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society
Basil, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Gulliver, P.H.
1963 Social Control in an AFRICAN Society
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
- Hammond-Tooke, W D.
1962 Bhaca Society
Oxford University Press
- Holleman, J.F.
1950 'An Anthropological Approach to Bantu Law (with
special reference to Shona Law)', Rhodes-
Livingstone Journal, X, pp.51-64
- Lloyd, Dennis
1964 The Idea of Law
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth
- Mair, Lucy
1963 New Nations
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London
- Meel, C.K.
1950 Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (2nd ed.)
Oxford University Press
- Myers, Frank H.
1953 'The Small Claims Court in the District of
Columbia.' The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science. Vol. 287

Phillips, Arthur
1945

Report on Native Tribunals

Ploscowe, Morris
1953

'The Inferior Criminal Courts in Action.' The
Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science. Vol. 287

Rattray, R.S.

Ashanti Law and Constitution
Oxford Press University

Van Velsen, J.
1964

The Politics of Kinship
Manchester University Press

DEVELOPMENT BY EXHORTATION

A study of nation-building
over the radio in Tanzania

DRAFT, not to be quoted

Introduction

This is an era of nation-building. Since World War II half a billion people have become citizens of new nations where the objective is to achieve the impressive elements of organization that characterize the modern nation-state. Their almost universal problem is that they have the form but not the substance of nationhood (Pye, 1962, p.3). The extent of basic social change involved in this process touches the lives of all these peoples shaking the intellectual, moral and emotional foundations of their individual worlds. Many are forced or will be forced to abandon cherished ways of living, they will suffer the pain and discomfort of being torn from the old and the known, in the process of change. The real choice for the peoples of Africa to-day is not whether to change but how, how fast and in what direction. Furthermore, the pressure for development causes the proportion of contemporary change that is planned or is a consequence of deliberate innovation to be extremely high in all parts of the world.

The nation-building process and the efforts to coordinate and plan for a nation's future is of course planned change, nation-building as such is nothing else than planned political, economic, and social change. This is no simple task. Acceptance of new values and the changing of preferences is difficult for the individual and difficult to bring about for a government. The fundamental change in motivation to accept new idea about the nature of the world and of human relations is not caused only by exposing people to the prospects of new standards of material life. The modern world, including tax collectors and community development assistants is sometimes perceived as a foreign threat which should properly be resisted and distrusted. So, instead of having to cope with an agitated enthusiastic population set on nation-building, many governments in transitional societies are confronted with the problem of a disturbingly apathetic public which is non responsive to all appeals to action on the part of a small group of impatient activists within the government (Bendix, p.).

It is obvious that mass communication media play a crucial role in this context. They must be used to contribute to the feeling of nation-ness, as the voice of national planning, and to prepare people to play their new parts and their role as a nation among nations (Pye 1963, p.38f).

The role of the radio is especially relevant in developing countries where newspapers readers are scarce and newspaper production is low as in Tanzania (Standard 12- 15.000, Nationalist 4.000?, var. Swahili and vernacular newspapers 10.000). (Lerner 1958, Widstrand 1966) This has also been recognised in the current Tanzanian Five Year plan (I,p.75).

This paper, was originally presented at the University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference in Nairobi December 1966. For comments and a lot of listening I am indebted to Mr. S. Maleko and Mr. S. Mlatie.

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the radio in nation-building process in Tanzania, the "nation building" content of its transmissions and how these are presented. A descriptive, quantitative survey of the content is given and the facts are discussed against the background of results of other communication research. No attempt has been made to estimate the response elicited by the programmes (cf. Widstrand, 1966, p.6). The second quarter of 1966 was chosen and Radio Tanzania's broadcasts were followed daily for 72 days. Several programmes some of them daily specially designed as nation-building programmes or with general educational content, were examined, mainly in the Swahili Programme. A random sample of ¹⁰¹⁸ days were listened to during the approximate 30 hours daily broadcast in all channels. One news broadcast (of the five daily in the Swahili programme) was listened to every day. For comparison reference is made to C. Widstrand "Radio and Adult Education in Tanzania" (1966), where a similar survey of the adult education content was made during the third quarter 1965.

Radio Tanzania: Present Programme Structure

Radio Tanzania broadcasts daily over several channels:

The National Programme in Swahili, the Second Programme in English, the Third Programme in Swahili and English, the Commercial Service, mainly in Swahili, but with short periods in English and Hindustani. There is also an External Programme broadcasting in several languages every evening and a School Broadcast Programme.

Table 1.

Radio Tanzania, all channels.

Total broadcast time, (except school broadcast), average per week 1966:	minutes	% of total
Swahili Programme	4,845	37.97%
Second Programme	2,685	21.05%
Third Programme	600	4.74%
Commercial Service	4,095	32.11%
External Programme	525	4.11%
School broadcasts	(700)	(5.49)
	<u>12,750</u>	<u>99.98%</u>

Table 2.

Radio Tanzania, all channels.

Distribution, all channels (except school radio) average per week 1966:	minutes	% of total
Light music plus entertainment	7,899	61.95%
News and newsprogrammes	1,885	14.78%
"Spoken word", (category programmes, religion, idhaa, talks etc.).	2,966	23.26%
	<u>12,750</u>	<u>99.99%</u>

The Swahili Programme

The Swahili Programme is broadcast daily over several wave-lengths. It reaches almost all parts of Tanzania. The distribution of the programmes is approximately as in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3.

Radio Tanzania Swahili Programme, time per category, average per week 1966.

	minutes	% of total	no. of Items/week	% of total
Light music	(2,610)	(53.86)	(81)	(38.2)
Light music + entertainment	2,985	61.60	95	44.8
"Spoken word"	<u>1,860</u>	38.38	<u>117</u>	55.19
	4,845		212	
Repeats	195	4.02	8	

Table 4.

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme, time per type of programme, average per week 1966.

(A)

<u>Light Music</u>	minutes	% of channel total	Items
Jambo	555		14
Various orchestras	345		21
Chaguo Lango (My choice)	30		1
Salaam zenu (Your greetings)	420		10
Maombi yenu (Your request)	180		5
Rafiki zetu (Your friends)	630		14
Adhuduni tulivo (Soft noon music)	60		4
Toka Kuzini (South African music)	15		1
Matindo wa Fujo (twist etc.)	15		1
Beni ya wiki (band of the week)	60		2
Wawili pamoja	30		1
African music, ngoma	60		2
Mashairi	30		1
Maishi ni afya (mixed programme music and commercials)	<u>135</u>		<u>3</u>
	2,610	53.86%	81

(B)

<u>Entertainment</u>	minutes	% of channel total	Items
Zabwa Zabwa (name of artist)	30		2
Sauti ya Mimi (Voice of Mimi)	15		1
Makoromo Hall	90		2
Kikulacho (commercial sponsor)	45		3
Akili ni Mali	30		1
Mhezo wa wiki (Play of the week)	30		1
General entertainment	<u>135</u>		<u>4</u>
	375	7.73%	14

(c)	<u>"Spoken word"</u>	minutes	% of channel total	% of spoken word	items
(1)	<u>Idhaa</u> (programme advertisements)	70	1.4	3.76	14
(2)	<u>Religious programmes</u>				
	Christian 95				
	Moslem 110	205	4.23	11.02	20
(3)	<u>News</u>				
	Taarifa ya Habariza	490			35
	Habari za Ulimwenga (News of the World)	105			7
	Umoja wa Mataifa Wiki Hiki (U.N. this week)	15			1
	Gazetini (from the newspapers)	30			2
		640	13.20	34.40	45
(4)	<u>Sport</u>				
	General	45	0.92	2.41	2
(5)	<u>Quiz programmes, lectures, etc.</u>				
	Kuoliza si Ujinga (To ask it not to be silly)	30			2
	Mwangaza wa Elimu (BBC topical programmes)	30			2
	Books and films	45			2
	Swahili	60			2
		165	3.4	8.87	8
(6)	<u>"Nation-building" programmes</u>				
(a)	<u>"Category programmes"</u>				
	Wanajeshi (for sold- iers)	60			2
	Watoto (for Children)	30			1
	Ukarasa wa Wanawake (Womens' page)	60			2
	Ushirikia (Co-ops)	30			2
	TANU	30			1
	Vijana (Youth, made by FYL)	60			2
		270	5.57%	14.51%	
(b)	<u>General education (at least intended)</u>				
	Maisha marefu (Good life)	15			1
	Liambe Taifa (Kivu- koni programme on Tanzanian civics)	15			1
		30	0.6%	1.6%	

"Spoken word" (cont'd)

	minutes	% of channel total	% of spoken word	items
<u>(6)(C) Information</u>				
Shambani wiki hi (The shamba this week)	60			2
Halmashauri ya Mazao (National Agriculture Products Board Programme)	30			2
Radio Magazine (a mixed pro- gramme)	60			2
Moto Moto Tanzania (news from all parts of Tanzania)	210	4.77%	11.2%	7
Uhuru na maendeleo (Freedom and progress, features of projects in Tanzania.)	75			3
	435	8.97%	23.38%	28

Table 5.

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme. "nation-building" programmes

	minutes	% of total broadcast, all channels
"Nation-building programmes" (Cf. Table 4:6).	735	5.76%
Moto Moto Tanzania	210	1.64%
News and news programmes	640	5.01%

The domination of the light music - entertainment sector is apparent and follows generally accepted programme policies in Europe and North America, "we must give the audience what it wants". It is a moot question whether the audience really wants light music and cigarette ads and whether this is not a self generated effect, i.e. the radio creates an artificial need for something "modern", "European" for "people with brains" etc.

The Second Programme

The second Programme broadcasts 2,685 minutes per week. 255 minutes/day during weekdays and longer transmission hours Saturdays and Sundays. Many of the items in the Swahili programme occur here proportion between lightmusic - spoken word is almost the same as in the Swahili programme. To listen to the programme it is necessary to have a good command of English. It has not been considered necessary to make a detailed analysis of the contents.

The Third Programme

The Third Programme broadcasts 120 minutes/day except Sundays and Fridays. It contains news, language courses, music and productions for specialized audiences (drama and art critiques and surveys etc.). 23% of the material broadcast is in Swahili and consists of items that have been produced in the Swahili Programme (Habari ya Ulinwengu, Ushirikia, Uhuru na Sheria, Kiambie Taifa etc.).

The Commercial Programme

The Commercial Programme broadcasts 4,095 minutes/week, mainly in Swahili. In the beginning in October 1965 it was a 15 hour programme. This has later been cut to 10 hours/day. The language is now Swahili and English (840 m/week). The Hindustani items have been taken out since some October 1966. The Programme is mainly devoted to commercials, light music and to news.

The External Programme

This programme broadcasts 1 h 45 m/day and contains mainly news in English, Portuguese, Ovambo, Sena, Zulu and Herero, and some music.

For the schools there are daily broadcasts during term for primary schools and secondary schools (700 m/week). Programmes are geared to school syllabi and contain 10 minutes of news. Additional material in the form of pictures is provided and a small booklet is also produced.

The Programmes chosen for the study

The programmes chosen for the study all come from the Swahili Programme. They were programmes that here have been called "nation-building" programmes. This admittedly a very vague description, but it is clear that some programmes are especially crammed with nation-building material, such as reports of regional affairs and achievements, others in this group are educational or informational, featuring Tanzanian problems and projects. The breakdown of broadcast time and no. of items are seen in Table 6 Together with the small sector of other spoken words programmes of the Swahili channel these are the only programmes where an attempt is made to contribute to the solving of the problems that have been mentioned by way of introduction.

All Moto Moto Tanzania were chosen and a random sample of the others. Due to various circumstances (all day listening other channels, bad reception, days off) only 64 of 72 could be analysed of the Moto Moto Tanzania. 68 news broadcasts were chosen with altogether 732 items.

Table 6

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme, programmes chosen for content study during secon quarter 1966:

Name	No.	No/ items	Time Sche- duled minutes	Time Broad- cast	Dead time	Dead time pro- grammes	%of time sch- eduled	%of swahi- li pro- grammes	% Spoken word
Moto Moto Tan- zania.	64	368	1,920	1,773	147	2.3	92.34%	4 %	10.32%
Uhuru na Maende- leo	3	3	90	85					
Halmashauri na- Mazao	7	17	95	89					
Uhuru na sheria	1	8	15	14					
Shambani wiki hii	1	8	30	28					
Radio Tanzania	1		20	19					
Radio Magazine	5	29	150	143					
Maisha Marefu	10	50	150	143					
Ukarasa wa wana- wake	7	27	210	202					
Gazetini	5	17	70	62					
	38		830	785	45	1.2	94.52%	1.71%	4.46%

Moto Moto Tanzania (Hot hot Tanzania)

This is a programme broadcast everyday, beginning at the same minute as the Commercial Service opens, a fact which presumably would be reflected in a coverage analysis. It contains news from all over Tanzania, reports of speeches by the resident, the Cabinet or the senior Civil Servants. It is one of the only sources for the speeches given by Regional and Area commissioners not reported in the press. It is a good indicator on what is said from tribunes and platforms all over the country.

A summary of the content of the 64 programmes is given in table 7.

Of the programmes studied two were substituted by two speeches by the President, one denouncing rumour mongers (May 14th) and his speech on Union Day (April 27th). Two of them were repeated May 18th was also broadcast on May 21st, May 30th was also broadcast on June 8th. These programmes have been included in the table.

Table 8.

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme, contents of Moto Moto Tanzania second quarter 1966.

<u>EXHORTATION</u>	minutes	% of total programme time
(1) of leadership, civil servants, etc.		
(a) <u>further training</u>		
Learn more about job, be industrious, leadership must be efficient, be faithful	44	2.5
(b) <u>behaviour in job</u>		
good examples, cooperate with public, don't be high, don't forge don't be corrupt, examples of bad behaviour-police, work within powers granted	82	4.6
(c) <u>duties</u>		
explain policy of Tanu, register vital statistics, make towns more beautiful, make people pay their taxes, help and work with Tanu, encourage people to fulfil 5 Year plan	72	4
(d) <u>Co-ops</u>		
should serve public, should cooperate with TANU, better strong than weak	44	2.5
(e) <u>seminars for civil servants opened</u>		
join more seminars	57	3.2

(2) of the general public

	minutes	% of total programme time
(a) <u>increase agriculture</u>		
grow more cotton, grow cotton better reap cotton early, reap cotton at appropriate time, grow vegetables, grow more, form block farms, grow more wheat, grow more cashew use manure, grow more cows, fight hunger by growing more, grow tobacco better, grow better tobacco, grow more tobacco, modernize agriculture, use fertilizers.	333	18.78
(b) <u>Education</u>		
Teach illiterates, eradicate illiteracy, join Tapa, attend schools learn baby care, learn to read, read more read better, attend domestic courses attend adult classes, learn more,	64	3.6
fight poverty, ignorance and disease.	69	3.9
(c) <u>Health</u>		
fight disease, modernize houses, use latrines, dig wells, drink clean water, eat chakula bora, more health measures in hotels and bars. cleaner pombe, cleaner meat	77	4.3
(d) <u>Modernization</u>		
use more modern implements, raise standard of living, preserve food for future use, use modern standards increase T's wealth, 5 year plan can be achieved	6	3.5
(e) <u>Co-ops</u>		
Join coops, self help schemes, form coops	47	2.7
(f) <u>role of women</u>		
join UWT, womens' place not kitchen don't prevent wife from UWT job, encourage woman leadership	26	1.5
(g) <u>TANU NUTA TYL</u>		
join, pay Tanu fees, abide to Tanu rules, youth being prepared for leadership of Tanzania (19)	77	4.3
(h) <u>citizens' obligations</u>		
pay taxes promptly (65), participate in nation building (31), preserve peace, obey law and order, fulfil plan, join National Service (10)	175	9.9
(j) <u>ideology, national or oparty</u>		
be proud of national culture have confidence in leaders, eradicate imperialism, move to less populated areas don't be lazy, work hard (36), stop drinking use good manners, don't backbite others	74	4.1

	minutes	% of total programme time
(3) <u>Good example of others</u>		
party achievements, good agricultural results, police stations, schools hospitals inaugurated, councillors praised, lios killed, co op achievements, UWT achievements gifts to funds, Tanzania Childrens society, Tanu, literacy awards	200	11.3
(4) <u>Bad example of others</u>		
bad roads, not cradicated tse tse, bad health conditions, bad hygienic conditiond in shops	22	1.24
	1,525	86'

GENERAL INFORMATION

(1) Agriculture

bees useful, importance of bees rain destroys crops, rains sinking price of cotton explained village settlement dropped

55 3.1

(2) Education

general problems explained, teaching through radio, maths taught in Swahili, law explained

21 1.2

(3) TANU TYL UWT

personal changes, election results chairmans role explained, Tanu in action role of TYL role of UWT, role of women in T, YWCA jubilee

86 4.9

(4) Ideology

unity, selfhelp, obedience explained sabasabacelebrations, Uhuru Torch, prisoners released, unity of Africa

36 2.0

(5) General

news, murders accidents visits MPs, RCs, Councillors, population growth police, necessity of roads dona

40 2.2

(6) Ngomas and songs in praise of President

10 0.6

248 14%

Total 1,773

Many programmes feature the President and cabinet members :

....10/-.

Table 9.

<u>Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme, President and Cabinet in Moto</u> Moto Tanzania			
	No.	minutes	% of total programme time.
Programmes featuring the President: use ox plows, grow more tobacco, increase T's wealth, pay taxes dri- nk less, work hard five year plan can be achieved, freedom is right, raise standards of living, song in praise of	10	75	
The 2nd Vice President use good manners, join National service, don't be lazy, join Tanu pay taxes, grow more cotton use more tractors, participate in co-ops. land is origin of wealth in T.	5	62	
Minister for Home affairs		3	
Comworks		4	
Comworks Junior minister	2	16	
Education		3	
Finance, Junior Minister		1	
Agriculture and Wildlife	5	54	
Housing	2	33	
Lands and Settlements and vice presidents office, junior minister		15	
Regional affairs (Mr. Kambona was away during most part of the period under study)		13	
		7	
	24	286	1.61%

Table 10.

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme Content of sample of "nation-building" programmes, second quarter 1966.

<u>Educational</u>	items	minutes	% of channel total
Uhuru na Sheria descriptions of court proceedings	8	14	
Hamashauri ya Mazao history of products educational play	5	43	
Shambani cast or oil, nutrition	2	4	
Maisha Marefu baby nursing, venereal diseases, health questions	8	43	
Ukarasa wa Wanawake homekeeping, child care sick care, food preservation gardening	7	33	
		<hr/> 133	
<u>Informational</u>			
Halmashauri ya mazao explanation new prices boards activities	3	14	
Shambani talks on skins leather, destructive animals being destroyed, wildlife preser- vation training, tourist industry	4	10	
Radio Magazine seminars for civil servants exhibitions, journalism and wildlife as careers, econ agree- ment USSR -T, rains	6	24	
Maisha Marefu Health educt seminar, committee meetings, pests	4	15	

	No.	minutes	% of total programme time.
<u>Information(contd.)</u>			
Ukarasa wa Wanawake women in National Service Police Force, Red Cross, UWT branch activities, Badge Day Binti Leo Magazine, personal news, UWT seminars, schools etc.	20	151	
Gazetini political information presidents speeches and newspaper comments, co- op inquiry, Africa Day	12	48	
Uhuru na Maendeleo visits to factories, interviews with workers, buy Tanzania week Radio Tanzania	2 1	85 20	
<u>Exhortation</u> general public		366	
Halmashauri ya Mazao fix stable prices	2	6	
Shambani join cooperative farms fight hunger	2	13	
Radio Magazine President: condemns high salaries, rumor mongers, grow more tobacco, build country increase production govt. unable to meet tractor costs vice presidents: eradicate imperialism, workers should not be afraid of employ- ers, youth should have good manners, be obedient, return to villages, join TYL, be good examples join National Service, become farmers, make town beauti- ful	6 12	50 48	
Maisha Marefu eat good food, build latrines (23) be vaccinated, drink clean water wear clean clothes, prevent epide- mics, pregnant women to attend clini- cs, prevent disease, eradicate disease cell chairmen to be clean, live in good house	39	82	

Table 9 continued

	No.	minutes	% of total programme time.
<u>Ukarasa wa Wanawake</u>			
join UWT, play role in development			
lack of leadership retards progress, join cooperatives	5	26	
<u>Gazetini</u>			
stand firm in international affairs	1	4	
<u>Good example of others</u>			
<u>Radio Magazine</u>			
red cross, Tanu			
freedom fighters U.N. work	6	26	
<u>Gazetini</u>			
settlers, air wing			
government	3	5	
<u>Bad example of others</u>			
<u>Gazetini</u>			
peasants lazy, settlements not functioning, leadership in TFA not good	3	7	
<u>Various items</u>			
<u>Halmashauri ya Mazao</u>			
music praising the activities of the board	6	16	
<u>Ukarasa wa Wanawake</u>			
music for women	1	6	

Newsprogrammes

There are five broadcasts / day of news in the Swahili programme. They contain mainly the same items, the evening news very often being continued for two more broadcasts next day.

Some of the items of foreign news have a pronounced positive or negative content. This has been marked in Table 13 and follows a pattern consistent with the foreign policy preferences of Tanzania. It is interesting to note however that home news from the U.S. does not exist except for two items on race riots, whereas almost all other countries in the world are represented in the news.

The distribution between Home news and Foreign News is uncommon for a developing country where home news items usually take much more space. It was not possible to time the items, but Home News items tend to take up more time than the foreign news.

It is also interesting to note the almost complete absence of items that make some 25 - 30 % of American and European News broadcasts; crime accidents and sport.

Table 11

Radio Tanzania, Swahili Programme, Taarifa ya Habari, second quarter 1966.

	% of total no. of items
Home News	42.62%
Foreign News	57.37%
of which Africa	25.95%

Table 12

Radio Tanzania Swahili Programme, Taarifa ya Habari, detailed content of news programmes, second quarter 1966.

HOMES NEWS	items	% of total
<u>The President</u>		
speeches, travels	32	
<u>Vice Presidents</u>	13	
Cabinet ministers	23	
	68	9.28
<u>Celebrations, state</u>	13	
foreign visits	9	
<u>Information</u>		
(a) Trade, industries, general development in T, new cinemas, hotels, new currency	44	
(b) NUTA, TANU COOP, news from organization co-op commission.	17	
(c) National Assembly new legislation, budget	14	
(d) International congresses in Dar, U.N. Commission on colonization(6)	17	
(e) crime, accidents	5	
(f) sport	5	
(g) Various items Mwanza Zoo, Uhuru Torch (9) jobs, etc.	22	
	122	16.66%

... 15/-.

Exhortation reported(a) Direct to the people

	items	% of total
pay tax, pay bicycle tax. buy more, increase production, increase literacy, eradicate illiteracy, eat more fish, use insecticides, dip cattle, don't sell infected meat, increase livestock, pay council overdraft, cooperate with TANU, be Tanzanian, be African, stop drinking, use ox plows,	40	

(b) Good examples of others reported

schools opened, hospital opened, money collected for Tanzanian Childrens society, TANU offices, UWT; agricultural production increased, cattle production increased, production figures of cotton, tobacco, literacy certi- ficates; roads inaugurated	52	
---	----	--

(c) Bad example of others reported

cows not attended to, tsetse, bad agricultural practices; civil servants get fired, mismanagement of public funds	8	
--	---	--

	100	17.65
TOTAL	312	42.02

FOREIGN NEWS

Mention of other countries:

	items	positive	nega- tive	% of total
<u>Africa</u>	2			
Kenya	21			
little election				
Uganda	16			
coup d'etat May 11th				
E.A. co-operation	6	2	4	
CAU	5			
Frelimo	2	2		
Rhodesia	31		31	
U.K. and Rhodesia	22	3	19	
Zambia	20	20		
Other English speaking African countries	15			
Other French speaking African countries (Congo K (12)	19			
North Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia	17	7	10	
South Africa	14	190	14	25.95

<u>Europe</u>	items	positive	nega- tive	% of total
U.K.	32	15	10	
France	13	11		
Other countries	23			
U.S.S.R.	16	9	2	
and West Germany and U.K.	3		3	
	1		1	
<u>Asia (except Vietnam)</u>				
China	9	7		
India	7		5	
Indonesia	8	2	4	
Other countries	17			
<u>South and Central America</u>	14			
<u>US.A.</u>				
race riots	2		2	
vs Cuba	1			
vs China	11		11	
vs USSR	4	1	2	
and Tanzania	4	4	1	
<u>Vietnam War</u>				
in Vietnam	5			
demonstrations in other countries	3	3		
USSR in Vietnam	1	1		
USA in Vietnam	10		10	
International sport	5			
International accidents	3			
the moon	6			
International celebrations	2			
International conferences	30			
U"N", I.L.O.F.A.6 etc				
	420			57.37
TOTAL	732			100

It may be interesting to try to sum up the exhortation, resp. information-education content of both news and "nation-building" programmes. News items scores have been "weighted", in this case by allocating one minute to each item. This is not exactly true of course but will do for a calculation of this kind (732 items in 640 minutes).

Table 13

Radio Tanzania. Swahili Programme, summary of "nation building"
second quarter 1966.

	minutes	% of channel total	% of all channels
Information	737	1.52	0.57
Education	137	0.28	0.10
Exhortation			
direct	1,570	3.24	
good example of others	283	0.58	
bad example of others	37	0.07	
total	1,890	3.90	1.48
Various items	22	0.05	
Total	2,786	5.75	2.18

Some comments on the findings.

1. A quantitative survey has been given of the content of the Swahili programme during the second quarter of 1966. As the programme structure is rather rigid, and the same items or programmes return regularly, it is fair to assume that the picture given of a substantial part of the material broadcast over the channel is representative. It may then be of interest again to stress a few points on the practical application of the use of radio in the nation-building process.
2. A major point that has to be made first, is that the radio is not used to its full capacity. When bringing "news" into the "nation-building" group of programmes we find that of the Swahili channel time 5.75% and of the total broadcasting time over all channels only 2.18% of the time is used for items with "nation-building" content in Swahili, the official and most important language in Tanzania. Of these 2.18%, only 0.7% is spent on information-education and 1.48% of total broadcasting time is spent on exhortation items, the value of which for effective change in public opinion may be seriously questioned. This discussion hinges of course on the concept of "Nation-building" programmes, which can be challenged as rather arbitrary. But even if some more of the small "spoken word" sector is brought in it is quite clear that the radio, which is one of the most powerful media of mass persuasion, is hardly used at all, and when used it is in a way that may be discussed. This was also found when analysing the radio programme with regard to its adult education content (Widstrand 1966). This is clearly unsatisfactory.
3. The form of presentation of most of the "nation-building" material is also unsatisfactory, except perhaps in the Ukarasa wa Wanawake. The presentation of information is not very much to do a about other than on the editorial side. One sometimes feels a certain lack of imagination and fresh ideas, which may be mainly reflects staffing difficulties: understaffing and lack of trained Tanzanian radio editors and programme producers.
4. There are many ways of bridging a difference in opinion and the ensuing result mainly depends on the intensity of the opinions held and on the magnitude of the dissonance. It is clear that the magnitude of difference between opinions in the nation-building context is large (c.f. introduction). Opinions on and basic values regarding habitual ways of living are very strong, indeed. It has been shown several times that the effect is usually very poor if one tries to convert opinion on controversial matters over the radio (for references cf. Widstrand 1966). It would seem, however, that this is exactly what one tries to do. It is difficult to know what principles, if any, are guiding this exhortation process. A set of highly questionable propositions can be extracted from the content summary of the communications: the theory of the impact of the brilliant example of others and the deterrent affect of the bad example of others; the theory of the self-evident importance of the subject matter, the drearier, the better; the theory of the impact of iteration of slogans, the theory of the inherent immorality of certain acts, like being lazy; the theory of the inherent lazyness of the African farmer or the toiling masses plus minor things like literacy makes people happier and development is building of latrines. (The concentrated form in which the basic themes of the exhortation are presented in the preceding content summary is necessary for the analysis. Admittedly it makes them look delivered with all the subtlety of a sandbag like the exhortations from the national press on some pages in this paper

but they do not reflect only on the editorial skill but also on the basic content of the message).

By showing the good performance of others it is theoretically possible to bring the persuasive effects or group norms into play. But only, and this is hardly ever the case in national radio broadcasts, if the group identifications of the audience can be brought actively into play "we, the local TANU group", "we, the Wachagga", "we, National Servicemen" will this work. Otherwise it is easier for the audience to distort or evade the message, "this not for us", "that will work here", "it is may be good in Dar es Salaam but not here".

It is totally impossible to exhortate anyone to work by calling him lazy. For, people work when they are motivated to work, and if they dont work they have most of the times, valid reasons for not doing so. They definitely resent being called lazy. If the amount of work is considered not to be enough for the fulfilment of the national objective, then one has to find ways to motivate people to increase their contribution, and this is not done by calling them lazy.

Even if the source has a high prestige and is trustworthy statements of that kind may backlash on the source, the audience - and this is the easiest way for them - reevaluates the source, and tend to be immune to further communication (Hovland, Harvey and Sherif, 1957, p. 212; Sears and Friedman 1961, p. 409; Manis 1961, p.83). Finally accepted propositions are not generally true everywhere: in my opinion it is more important to personal happiness to be able to perform simple arithmetic operations than to be able to read and anyone who has tried the pit water wells along the ocean coast knows that there are other possibilities for hygienic development with the sea close at hand than to dig latrines in the sand.

This is not the place to outline a programme of action, but it may be permitted to make a few suggestions. Various experimental and audience survey results show clearly that mass media operate very directly upon attention, information, tastes and images (Pool, 1963, p. 250 f). Testes and images are satisfied by the large musical and entertainment secoter. This could futher be used by introduction of educational factors in the presentation of material basically meant to entertain to make the initial impact substantial and to sustain the interests of the listeners. The exhortation and reports on exhortation should be substituted by well presented information.

One of the best way of using the radio is to use it to focus attention on certain aspects of national development. To show that an issue is important to create an image, whether around the concept of nation-building, good health or lesser matters, is one of the great possibilities of the radio. This is not done by the iteration of slogans, but needs careful political and editorial planning. But it would be worthwhile.

References:

Hovland, C.I.; Harvey, O.J., & Sherif, M. "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Reactions to Communication and Attitude Change" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55, 1957, p. 244-252.

Hovland, C.I., & Weiss, W., "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness;" Public Opinion Quarterly, 15, 1951, p. 635-650.

Manis, M. "Interpretation of Opinion Statements as a function of Recipient Attitude and Source Prestige", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 1961 p. 82 f.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, "Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process", in, Pye, L., ed., Communications and Political Development, Princeton University Press 1963.

Pye, L., Communications and Political Development, Princeton University Press 1963.

Sears, D.O., and Freedman, J.L., "Organizational and Judgemental Methods of Cognitive conflict Resolution", American Psychologist, 16, 1961, p. 409 f.

Widstrand, C., Radio and Adult Education in Tanzania, Adult Education Studies, No. 1, Institute of Adult Education, University College, Dar es Salaam 1966.

**SONGAMBELE
CALL: 'GUARD
THE NATION'**

**KAWAWA RAPS
SELFISHNESS**

**MEDICAL STAFF TOLD
'DON'T SLACK'**

**Mwalimu
condemns
drunkenness**

Nationalist Reporter
PRESIDENT Nyerere yesterday urged the people of Mbozi district at a mass rally to discard drunkenness and utilise their time and energy to develop Mbozi and the nation.
He also urged them to increase the acreage of their farms and the production of coffee.

**Watch out enemies,
Police Force urged**

**NO PROGRESS UNDER
CHAOS, SAYS SIJAONA**

**Save nation
from shame,
urges Tanu
Chairman**

the public meeting, and this started off a massive vaccination move.
Earlier Mwalimu was given Shs 2074'75 cents as a contribution of the Mbozi people to the National Children's Fund.
The President leaves today on a two-day visit to Sumbawanga.

**Parents urged to send
children to school**

THE Tanganyika African National Union Secretary-General

**KARUME CALLS FOR
UNITY TILL VICTORY**

"Nationalist"

**ALL MUST
FIGHT
DISEASE**

THE battle against disease

**Work hard
our motto
—Barongo**

THE Regional Commissioner for Ruvuma Region, Mr. E. Barongo, urged

Grow more tobacco—Mwalimu

President Nyerere who was on an inspection tour last week end of work being carried out by co-operative unions did not do so

**BIBI TITI URGES:
GROW MORE SISAL**

THE Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika leader Bibi Titi Mohamed

**Grow more
cassava call**

THE Area Commissioner for Masasi, Mr. A. S. Kabana

CALL FOR BIGGER FARM OUTPUT

TANZANIA must be self-reliant, said the Kilosa Area Commissioner, Mr. A. Lyanda, at a Saba Saba rally in Kilosa. Addressing a crowd of several thousand, he added that...

Nyerere says push idlers into action

MUNANKA CALLS FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY

... resumed last week.

is
is
ty
st

Kawawa hits at laziness

Mrs. Karume urges more self-help

AVOID DEBTS

AYS LUSINDE

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

TOLD TO 'WAKE UP' YOUTH 'MUST

HELP SOLVE PROBLEMS'

All must help says Karume

Lameck's call on health measures

Sir Roy who wa...

'Idleness a brake to progress'

The Regional Executive Secretary

Cell leaders told to set good example

Sawe urges science in agriculture

Lusinde urges crop increases

Education must serve our national needs—Sawe

THE Chief Education Officer, Mr. J. A. Sawe, said yesterday that school pupils must be taught how to make the best use of soil and how to raise crops for food, cash...

All must join in - Kawawa

Exalt self-reliance spirit—Kambona

... Wednesday. classes organized by Nita...

'Teach the people how to spend'

STUDENTS TOLD: MAKE USE OF HOLIDAYS

MAKE USE OF LAND — KARUME

'BE INDUSTRIOUS'

2nd. VP URGES: FIGHT FAMINE
 HE people of Mtwara Region should expand their farms...

g to the realm not the ideal not however

VP hits at lazy youths

Tanzania youths must know the C

NYERERE CALLS FOR GOOD CHARACTER

GOOD character and conduct on the better than want of the equipment fr

People told 'stamp out smuggling'

WASONJO URGED TO ADVANCE

ARUSHI'S Regional Commissioner, Mr. A. Mwa-

Teach youths to make sacrifices — Eliufoo

Increase skill, officers urged

CULTURAL REVOLUTION URGED BY MCOMIA

28-11-62

Husbands, Wives urged to cooperate

The Dar es Salaam Area Commissioner Mr. Mustafa Songambele had urged husbands to co-operate with their wives in order to realise the aims of the country's agricultural development. He said that they were suffering from tuberculosis.

Mr. Mwakangata, however said he was pleased to learn that the Wasonjo was one of the tribes in Tanzania which traditionally knew how to irrigate their farms — a knowledge which snatched them from the whole year.

Strengthen party call

THE Minister for Regional Administration He appealed to all leaders of the country to advocate cultural revolution among the people, and said the promotion of culture was one of the nation's objectives under the Five Year Plan.

The Minister donated 100/- towards a maternity ward being built through self-help by Same

TANZANIA MUST MOVE FASTER

The Parliamentary Secretary in the far them Second Vice-President's Office, Mr. R. Wambura said that Tanzania

cont day 1 The hold Terms

re
ees
50/-

**Students urged:
serve nation**

excell
cents
was
India.
The
declin
BR. b
cated
as the

**'Rates must
be paid
on time'**

Fight to drive out ignorance—Mgonja

KARUME WARNS INTELLECTUALS

(“Nationalist” Reporter)

ZANZIBAR, Wednesday.

THE first Vice-President, Mr. Abeid Karume this afternoon gave a serious warning to people who isolate and discriminate themselves because of their educational advances and

**Karume hits
at lazy
workers**

Standard Correspondent

Zanzibar, Wednesday.
The First Vice-President, Mr. Karume, today warned Government employees not to neglect their duties.

V.P. rebuffs lazy youths

SEMINAR URGES BETTER WAYS

AN urgent need to intensify research control the disease in areas where it prevails was discussed in the seminar. It was suggested that more general use of

Maswanya calls for cattle revolution

THE Minister for Lands, Settlement and Water Development, Mr. S. A. Maswanya, asked the settlers to assist in the clearing of the ranch on self-help basis. He also paid tribute to the people of

**Value of manual
work stressed**
THE Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, told Shinyai Secondary School students that it was the Government's aim to educate children up to Standard VII.

KAWAWA APPEAL FOR FASTER COURT WORK

THE Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, yesterday appealed to the public to help in the reduction of all unnecessary delays in all levels of criminal court

T
DC
N
TH
h.
C

**People with brains smoke
Sportsman cigarettes.**

**Ignorance
a setback
—Siyovelwa**

**N.S. youths
duty to
build nation
— Karume**

**STUDENTS
URGED TO
JOIN T.Y.L.**

THE Coast Regional Commissioner, Mr. S. Kitundu, is currently touring secondary schools in the region to encourage pupils to establish Tanu Youth League branches. He has so far visited Minaki and Pugu Secondary Schools; and the Aga Khan Boys' and Girls' Secondary Schools, in Dar es Salaam.

As a result of his visit to the Aga Khan Boys' Secondary School, some 20 pupils have applied for the League's

**CRITICISM MUST
BE HEEDED
SAYS KAMBONA**

Fifty of the students are women

CAUSE LIST

Degree in English.

He is married and has two children. tragedy. There were two

NUTA CALLS FOR WORKERS' COOPERATION

**'HELP POLICE TO
COMBAT THEFTS'**

1. Canada and the

'LEADERS ARE

**PEOPLE'S
SERVANTS'**

**ENGINEERS
URGED
TO SERVE
SOCIETY**

ENGINEERS should be prepared to

**UTILIZE ALL
LAND CALL
BY KARUME**

Women
to join

**'Youth should foster
unity and stability**

**Defence is
your duty
pupils told**

'Speed up tax
payments'

**Kigoma youths
told 'Join TYL'**

Kigoma Correspondent
The district secretary of
Tanu Youth League in Kigoma,
"Changuvu" Boma, has
youths in

**NEW BID TO
RAISE CO-OP
EFFICIENCY**

Mtwara Region Co-operative

**HONOUR CONSTITUTION,
TANU MEN TOLD**

E.R. Yeld.

U.E.A. Social Science Conference,
December 1966.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN KIGA PATTERNS OF MARRIAGE;
AN ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN KIGA MARRIAGE IN
THE 1930'S AND THE 1960'S

Kiga marriage in the early 1930's has been described by Edel, a social anthropologist who worked in Kigezi, in South West Uganda in 1932 to 1935. In this paper I am attempting an analysis of some aspects of continuity and change in Kiga patterns of marriage through a comparison of Edel's data in the early 1930's and my own field research in Kigezi in 1965 to 1966. The analysis is made in terms of the impact which other factors of political, social and economic change have had on Kiga marriage. These aspects of change in the economic and social structure of the neighbourhood communities studied, are analysed only in so far as they form the context in which marriage takes place. Similarly changes in conjugal role relationships are discussed only in so far as this is necessary to understand problems of marriage stability. The emphasis will be on structural aspects of marriage, particularly in changes in patterns of marriage formation and problems of marriage stability.

In 1933 the majority of Kiga were still living in patrilateral extended family homesteads. Prior to the setting up of a District Administration in Kabale in 1913, these extended family groups had been the largest autonomous units in Kiga society. Kiga social structure is patrilineal. While Kiga recognized exogamous clan groups, sub-divided into lineages of varying depth, there is no reliable evidence for the existence of clan heads or lineage heads, nor any corporate group functions beyond the extended family. Clan and lineage segments were in a constant state of feuding, and the general insecurity of life and property was one important factor promoting the solidarity of the extended family household. The head of the extended family was its most senior male, the father living with his married sons and their wives and children, or the eldest of a group of brothers living together with their children. The family head had ultimate authority over all the members of his household. He controlled the family estate in land and livestock, settled all disputes between its members, and acted as representative of the family in the relationships of any of its members with other families, notably in disputes or marriage arrangements. Before the joint attack of Christian missions and government administration on the spirit cult of Nyabingi, extended to a comprehensive ban on all Kiga traditional religious practices, during the late 1920's, the authority of the extended family head was supported by the ancestor cult, since only the family head had access to the spirit huts. Since any sickness or misfortune could be attributed to the action of an ancestral spirit, and only a placatory offering would relieve the sufferer, the family head was in a strong position to enforce obedience and respect on family members.

Marriages were arranged by the family head and it was he who allocated the cattle and goats for bride-wealth payment. Marriage links tended to recur between pairs of lineages or neighbourhood areas of different clan groups. Kiga explain this in terms of the need for security and the need to keep a track on bride-wealth cattle. In view of the general insecurity as a result of clan feuding, raiding from Ruanda and Congo, and also the lack of any wider political authority controlling personal violence and theft, it was unsafe for Kiga to travel outside the immediate neighbourhood area controlled either by the extended family, or by other families related by kinship or affinity with

whom friendly relationships had been maintained. Since some movement was necessary both to exploit new land in shifting cultivation, to find pasture, to acquire certain specialised craft goods such as iron hoes, spears, and bracelets, or to have access to salt, it was necessary to establish continuing links with families and lineages in neighbouring clan areas through marriage. Continuing rights over and interest in the actual cattle paid as bride-wealth, tended to consolidate these links. When bride-wealth cattle were passed on to establish marriage for the bride's brother, this had to be socially recognised in a beer party given for the previous owner or owners of the cattle. A special relationship was also created between brother and sister, and sister's husband, when the brother had been married with his sister's bride-wealth cattle. In divorce, the actual cattle paid in bride-wealth, or their offspring, not just the equivalent number of livestock, should properly be returned to the husband's father. If the same cattle were passed backwards and forwards between affinal related families and lineages, they were more easily recoverable. If a marriage was well established and children born of it, a calf of the bride wealth cattle should be returned to the husband. It is unnecessary here to detail all the links created between affines through the interest in bride wealth cattle, and in the maintenance of ties of friendship. The point which should be made is that the interests of the extended family and localised lineages were of the greatest importance, both in establishing marriages and in maintaining them. Hence spouses were chosen and marriages were negotiated by the family head through arrangements with his wives' kin or sisters' affines. Hence also divorce was difficult, since many interested parties were involved in the return of bridewealth cattle, and since many other affinal links would be affected by the breakdown of a single marriage. Edel writes (Note 1) that "although the formal marriage was the normal one, elopements did occur. If they involved running away to a lover, some kind of love magic was usually blamed. More often it was rather a matter of running away from home, in protest against an arranged marriage. If a girl who runs away stays away for several nights and at a man's home, the elopement is considered a de facto marriage. Her father should then declare that he will have nothing further to do with her. But the marriage has no legal status, it can be legitimized subsequently by the payment of a bride price if the irate father can be won over. Otherwise the children are not members of their father's family." "The girl's father has a permanent claim upon them and may demand the bride price at the marriage of his granddaughter."

Kiga marriage was ideally polygynous. Early marriage for girls, at the age of 15 or 16, compared with later marriage for sons, who were dependent on the availability of bride-wealth cattle, allowed some surplus of girls of marriageable age. The presumably higher death rate of adult males in feuding, may also have resulted in a larger proportion of adult females. According to 150 marriage histories which I collected from 100% samples in 3 neighbourhood areas, only 14 out of 138 women had contracted more than one marriage during their lifetime, and none had contracted more than two marriages. This compares with 39 out of 115 men who had contracted two or more marriages during their lifetime. A higher proportion of men in the age group 50 and over had contracted more than one marriage, (26 out of 38) as compared with those who had contracted only one marriage (12 out of 38). Table 1 gives a breakdown of the number of marriages contracted by men and women in the two age groups under 50 and 50 and over. Polygyny was largely, but not entirely, restricted to household heads, since they controlled the distribution of livestock, but if there were more daughters than sons in a matri-segment, the eldest brother could use his sister's bridewealth to take a second wife before the death of his father. A large number of wives and children were desirable, since wives were responsible for the bulk of subsistence agriculture, the men being involved mainly in clearing new ground, building, hunting and fighting. The larger the extended family household, the greater the economic and physical security for all its members. Brothers and half brothers were in duty bound to fight together in

vengeance feuding and, under the direction of the family head, to protect each other's property and wives and children.

In terms of economic security, a large domestic group gave insurance against individual crop failures or destruction by animals. It also ensured against current local famines, since numerous affinal and matrikin ties could be invoked in other areas in begging gifts of grain to tide over the period till the next harvest. Nevertheless, under normal conditions the constituent matri-segments of a polygamous extended family group acted to a considerable extent as a separate unit of domestic economy. Allocation of property and inheritance among the Kiga follows the house property complex. Each wife had her own hut and grain stores, and her own plots for cultivation. Subject to her duty to provide meals for her aged parents-in-law, she cooked only for her husband and for her own children. Apart from assistance to her mother-in-law, co-operation between the women married into an extended family group depended entirely on personal friendships.

We have noted that a young man was dependent upon his father for the bride wealth cattle with which to form a marriage, and for the negotiations in procuring a wife. On marriage, he and his bride lived in his mother's hut, and were fed by her for a period of anything from six months to one year. Sons were not allocated land before marriage, nor could they build their own hut in their father's homestead, without the father's permission. The new bride cultivated with her mother-in-law on her mother-in-law's plots until the first harvest. At the harvest of each crop, the young wife would be given a share of it by her mother-in-law, and when the rain grain crops, sorghum and finger millet, were harvested, her husband would be allowed to build her separate hut and grain stores. After the harvest, sections of the mother-in-law's plots would be allocated to the new wife who would then cultivate them on her own during the next season. A young couple might not be self-supporting in foodstuffs for the first two years of their married life, and until they had reached the stage of domestic viability, the wife would be expected to continue working for her mother-in-law or the wife of her husband's elder brother with whom she had lodged on joining the household. She would however, be assisted by her own mother who would rally her female relatives and friends in her home neighbourhood to make a substantial collection of baskets of grain and legumes to be taken as a gift to the daughter in her new home during the first year of marriage.

The concept of domestic viability however, has to be seen in relation to the balance of family size and resources within the conjugal unit at any one point in the domestic cycle. While the young husband and wife might be self-supporting in foodstuffs after two years of marriage, the birth of children reduce the wife's productive time in cultivation, until the first born child was 8 or 9 years old and could look after its younger siblings and begin to help with water and firewood collection and in cultivation. At the same time young children involve an extra strain on food resources. Moreover full domestic viability demanded not only foodstuffs, but also a herd of goats from which skins for clothing were obtained and from which meat could be used in offerings to ancestral spirits at times of misfortune.

Even with the establishment of security in the 1920's, and the attack on the Kiga ancestor cult which released two of the most important constraints supporting the unity of the extended family group, the difficulties of achieving domestic viability in the subsistence agricultural economy of the early 1930's bound the conjugal family unit to the extended family household for some years after marriage. The death of the family head was the most usual point for the dispersal of the extended family household. Up to this time expectation of inheritance of remaining livestock and cattle would bind sons to their father's homesteads. Kiga valuation on the solidarity of the extended family group made for disapproval of the expression of independence by a son in hiving off from his father's homestead during the father's lifetime,

and the remaining brothers would attempt to exclude him from their father's inheritance. Although there were customary rules of inheritance and of division of the family estate during the lifetime of the household head, there was also considerable room for manoeuvre and favouritism. Theoretically each wife of a polygynous marriage should receive an equal share of the various types of land necessary for cultivating the variety of crops, with a possible extra share for the senior wife. The sons of each wife should also receive an equal share of land from their mother's portion. Theoretically also a man's cattle should be allocated in equal proportions to his wives and inherited by their respective sons. There were limitations on this equality of distribution in that the cattle received from a daughter's bridewealth should be reserved for the marriages of her full brothers and not for her half brothers. However, since the household head had ultimate control of all resources of the domestic estate, he could ignore these rules and allocate cattle and other livestock to a favourite wife or son or take an extra wife for himself. Inheritance disputes between the sons of separate matri-segments of a polygynous family most commonly led to the dispersal of an extended family household after the death of its head. Assuming that the household head died in old age, at this point also the married sons were likely to have achieved full conjugal domestic viability. The matri-segment was thus the unit of domestic economy and the channel through which the domestic estate was distributed, both in allocation of resources during the family heads lifetime, and in inheritance after his death. This independence of the matri-segment was expressed in other domestic arrangements, for instance, each wife of a polygynous marriage cooked food for her husband every evening, whether or not the husband was sleeping in her hut that night. If there was to be a feast, whether a marriage or the first fruits ceremony after the harvesting of sorghum, each wife separately brewed beer and cooked food. In the case of the first fruits ceremony, the members of the household would go to the hut of each wife in turn to eat and drink. No woman had any authority over her co-wife's children who lived in their own mother's hut until they married.

The mother-son tie is strongly emphasised by the Kiga, partly no doubt as a result of the inheritance system and partly since a woman depended very much on the support of her sons and their wives in her old age. A woman's eldest son supports her property rights in land and livestock against other matri-segments, and if necessary against the father. Since an ageing family head will have married younger wives who will be cultivating for him and who are likely to be favoured by him, a first or second wife cannot expect support from her husband in her old age but will turn to her adult sons. Hence the importance which women attach to the birth of sons. This was reflected in the numerous incidents of accusation of witchcraft against co-wives if a woman failed to bear sons, or accusation of poisoning if her sons died in childhood. Hence also the jealousy with which women guarded their own children from other wives, taking them up into the hills when cultivating rather than leaving them at home in the care of another woman, and instructing their children never to accept food or drink from another woman of the household lest it be poisoned.

In the traditional developmental cycle of Kiga domestic groups the conjugal family unit started as a dependent section of the husband's father's extended family household, gradually achieving independence as a unit of domestic viability. It might split into component matri-segments as the stage of viability was achieved, particularly with the marriage of younger sisters or of the eldest daughter of the first wife which brought bride-wealth cattle for the husband to take a second wife. The final stage was a gradual separation of interests between the original spouses as the wife became economically self-sufficient with the help of her children and independent of her husband's control with the achieving of adult married status on the part of her sons. When a wife is past child bearing age and has sons old enough to care for her, the husband ceases to perform any of the customary services for her

such as in renewing the thatch of her house or repairing her granaries. These services must be performed by her sons. Any help which she may need in cultivation or cooking is performed for her by her daughters, including married daughters, while water and firewood are collected by her sons' unmarried children.

Edel speaks of Kiga marriage in the early 1930's as "fairly permanent. Divorce can and does occur, but many attempts are made to resolve difficulties. There are no formal causes that are legally sufficient for divorce. It is entirely a matter for negotiation between the families. Divorce proceedings can only start with a woman's going home to her family. If she does not do this, he cannot send her away, though he can make life extremely uncomfortable for her." (Note 2) Reasons for the stability of Kiga traditional marriage may be imputed to various factors. A woman's only access to land and a position as more or less domestic head of her own matri-segment, was through marriage. Once married into an extended family, her rights to land for herself and her sons were assured. As a widow she remained as the inherited wife of one of her deceased husband's sons by a senior wife or one of his younger brothers. So long as she was reasonably industrious and well behaved she could expect the support of her father-in-law against any ill-treatment by her husband. Since the father-in-law had chosen her and had friendly ties with her own patrikin, they could bring pressure to bear and if she was not well treated in her husband's home they would be unlikely to give any of the customary gifts to her or her children such as a cow or goat at the birth of her sons. If she was lazy and so severely beaten by her husband that she ran home to her father or brother, the case would be settled at her own home. Since it was difficult to return the bride-wealth, as the cows would have been passed on for one of her brother's marriage, every effort would be made to induce her to return to her husband. If reconciliation was achieved, the restoration of good relationships between the respective families was marked by a beer party. If the wife held to be principally at fault, her father or brother would provide the beer. If the husband had been found principally at fault, he should provide the beer for his in-laws. If the wife refused to return to her husband, her position in her parent's home was a difficult one. She had no rights to cultivate land but would be expected to assist her mother, if still alive. She had no hut of her own, and her brothers' wives might be jealous of her presence, particularly if her own mother had died. They would accuse her of coming to 'eat their food'. Whenever they could find her slightly at fault they would say that it was no wonder that her marriage had failed since she had such a character. Her father and brothers would be displeased since they would have to return the bride-wealth cattle.

As a result of these informal sanctions, most divorced women remarried within a year or two. This however might have to be an elderly or poverty stricken man, perhaps as a junior wife in a polygynous household, since reputedly lazy or disobedient wives would only be taken on as a last resort. Perhaps it should be added here that the qualities in a girl looked for by a father's brother when negotiating a marriage for their son, stress physical strength and character, both in terms of the ability and willingness to work hard in cultivation. Obedience comes a near second. Probably the strongest reason for a woman's reluctance to seek divorce was the fact that she had no right to the custody of any of her children. Both boys and girls, except for nursing infants, stayed with their father. She could expect that young children would not be well treated in their father's home once she had left, since they would be put under the charge of one of her co-wives or her mother-in-law. If a wife died, her children might be well cared for by the husband's mother, but in the case of divorce the dispute between husband and wife was likely to have involved the mother-in-law on the side of the husband. Unless she was divorced while still young or childless, the alternative preferable to divorce would be to stay in her husband's household and gradually establish her own independence as head of her matri-segment with the growth of her sons.

FACTOTORS OF CHANCE.

I shall first summarise briefly the broad factors of economic and social change which have impinged on Kiga society since the 1930's. An account of Kiga patterns of marriage as seen in 1965 will then be analysed in terms of the detailed impact of these changes. Changes which were introduced prior to the 1930's have already been briefly mentioned. The imposition of a centralised District Administration in Kigezi occurred at first with European officers and Ganda agents and later, during the 1930's with the appointment of Kiga chiefs. This has affected many aspects of Kiga social organisation. The security made possible by District Administration allowed for greater mobility of Kiga population, both in the search for new land and in trading: Inevitably this reduced the importance of affinal ties between extended family groups which had previously been one important basis of insurance against violence. It also made possible the dispersal of the extended family household. The appointment of local chiefs at a Miruka level with their assistants the Batongole, tended to undermine the authority of family heads, since junior members of the extended family could appeal to Miruka chiefs to settle their disputes informally, and if necessary appeal to the official courts at sub-county level.

The administration also forbade the use of physical violence to enforce discipline within the family, such as flogging and tying to a post, which had previously been an unchallenged prerogative of fathers and family heads. Wives could also bring complaints against husbands when beaten. The achievement of independence by sons in particular, and the younger generation in general, is frequently referred to in common conversation at the present time, with the use of the verb 'okwetegyeka' (to become free.) Fathers bemoan it and the indiscipline of sons and their refusal to help their fathers in old age. Sons use it as a justification for refusing to work on the family estate, including cultivation and herding duties, for their new freedom to frequent drinking places, in bars or at private homes, and for any other activity of which their fathers disapprove. The gradual control of vengeance feuding and the security of Kiga from external threats from Ruanda and Congo raiding parties, rendered superfluous a previously important male function, that of protecting wives and children and the crops and cattle of the family from attack and theft.

The introduction and spread of Christianity, and particularly in the early days, the attack of the administration on all traditional cults, strongly affected previous authority patterns. It undermined one of the strongest sanctions of the authority of the family head, his exclusive right of access to the ancestor spirits. Since the Christian missions were the first to introduce formal education and since the duties of chiefs necessitated some education, chiefs have tended to be increasingly both younger educated men and also

Christians of one or other denomination. More recently also the products of mission and government schools have formed a local elite of teachers, clerks, catechists and technical assistants in the various district government departments, who are accorded the prestige previously enjoyed by family elders and who are influential in setting up new value standards in patterns of marriage. The missionaries directly attacked aspects of traditional Kiga marriage, notably polygyny, widow inheritance and enforced marriages by parental arrangement. Baptism was refused unless a man abandoned all his wives except one, whom the Kiga term a 'ring wife'. Catechists and church teachers supported girls who refused to marry the man of their father's choice and young men were encouraged to make their own choice of spouse. Nevertheless the missions upheld the legality of bride-wealth payments and refused registration unless the full bride-wealth had been handed over.

To continue in a rough time sequence, by the beginning of the 1940's the problem of over population and land shortage was becoming serious in the South Kigezi mountain area, particularly within a twenty mile radius of Kabale, the

the District Headquarters. Unclaimed bush land was no longer available for cultivation and competition over material resources of the extended family estate inevitably became more acute. Since cultivation had encroached on hill pastures and owing to the decimation of large numbers of cattle through rinderpest and through faulty rinderpest inoculations in 1944, competition was as acute for bride-wealth cattle and goats as for land. Many family heads were no longer in a position to satisfy the material needs of all their sons from the family estate. According to Veterinary Department livestock census figures for South Kigezi a large reduction in cattle population took place in the 1940's. There has also been a considerable decrease in the number of goats from the 1950's to the present day, mainly due to sale of stock.

In 1946 a large scale resettlement scheme was started lasting until 1960 and aiming to transfer some 100,000 persons from the Kabale zone into North Kigezi and later into Ankole and Toro. During the late 1920's the first intended labour was introduced, for road work and portage for Uganda agents/government officials. Kiga, unlike the neighbouring Hutu from Ruanda, were slow to take up the opportunities of labour migration in Buganda. It was not until 1955, when a Kigezi recruitment agency was set up aiming to encourage Kiga to labour outside the District in company estates and mines and on the railways, on a six months contract basis, that large numbers of Kiga became labour migrants. The recruitment agency operated until 1960, by which time Kiga may be said to have become accustomed both to company labour in Toro and to short term labour migration to work on Ganda farms. Kiga labour migrants who are now in employment at Kilembe mines or Toro estates are, for the most part, unmarried men or recently married men or those who have to all intents and purposes abandoned their families in Kigezi. The average period worked by unmarried or recently married men is 3 to 4 years, but a minority are in permanent employment. The labour migrants going to Buganda are predominantly the poorer subsistence farmers, married men of all ages up to about 45, who go for 3 or 4 months annually or every other year in order to earn sufficient money for tax payments, school fees, clothing or drinking. With labour migration, and to some extent before labour migration with the increased possibilities of trading, has come the influence of/cash economy in the homeland area. Some of the principal effects of this are seen in the commercialisation of land and cattle, the commuting of bride-wealth to money payments, the availability of wage labour in the homeland area, and the commercialisation of beer brewing which has affected all areas. In general, labour migration and the money economy have been an additional factor in helping to break down old patterns of authority. Since the young men have an advantage in seeking labour outside the district, it is they who have access to cash earnings and hence are increasingly expected to find their own bride-wealth payments. Through resettlement or purchase of land in Kigezi or other districts they may also be free of dependence on their fathers for land allocation. At the same time they have no clear responsibilities for economic contributions to their father's household.

Change in patterns of district administration, the influence of missions and the growing popularity of school education have all contributed to changing values with regard to marriage. General trends can be outlined although the degree to which new values are activated varies very much in different age groups and according to varying economic status and religious affiliation. Freedom of choice of spouse is now very largely accepted as legitimate by all groups but gives rise to some confusion for girls who, according to Kiga traditional propriety should appear as unwilling partners to marriage. Edel mentions this as already a problem in the 1930's. (Note 3) Monogamy, stressed by the missions, is by no means universally accepted as an ideal form of marriage. It tends to be accepted by the serious converts of both Roman Catholic and Protestant churches of both sexes, and it is accepted more fully by the educated elite than by other social groups. A tendency for wives to be accorded a higher status in marriage than formally is a value change supported by missions and administration, for instance in dispute settlements by minor chiefs. Wives

in general certainly have greater access to protection from ill treatment in present day appeal to Miruka chiefs and courts, and have begun to establish precedents of acceptable behaviour by husbands which they put forward in support of their cases in marital disputes.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE 1960's

A discussion of aspects of continuity and change in Kiga marriage patterns at the present time is based on intensive field studies made over the course of 1 year from August 1965 to August 1966 in two sub-county areas. One is in the over-populated area of Kyanamira in South Kigezi and one in an original settlement area in Bugangari in North Kigezi to which the first settlers went in 1946 to 1949. Towards the end of this period of research 150 marriage histories, including histories of informants' previous marriages, were collected from all the married couples living in 3 neighbourhood areas. Some of the relevant quantitative data from these histories is given in Tables 1 to 12 at the end of this paper.

Present day patterns of marriage formation

It has been noted that it is generally accepted by Kiga of all age groups at the present time that young persons both boys and girls should be allowed free choice of a marriage partner. In the 1930's this was possible only in a secondary marriage or to the extent that limited choice was allowed to a son to express his preference for 1 among a selection of 3 or 4 girls chosen by his parents. For a woman the only preference which she could exert in marriage was as a widow. At the death of her first husband she would have a limited choice as to which of her deceased husband's brothers or sons by a senior co-wife should inherit her. In Table 2, 'Choice of spouse' categories 4 to 8 in the age groups 50 and over show the extent to which girls' marriages were arranged without any exercise of choice on their part, (41 out of 50). In categories 5, 6 and 7 (in various types of arranged marriages) the girls had not seen their husbands before they were taken to the husband's father's home during the marriage ceremonies, or were captured by the husband's kin. In category 4 they had been previously acquainted with the husband since childhood by growing up in the same neighbourhood or on occasional visits with their mothers to the husband's kinfolk (the girl's matri-kin or affines). Conversely among girls married in categories 1 to 4 in the age groups under 50, 68 out of 96 girls stated that they had freely accepted marriage proposals without parental pressure. However, except in the youngest age group, under 21, choice of spouse still takes place for the majority within the traditional contexts either of the neighbourhood, of kin groups already related affinally to the families of the young couple, or by parental arrangement. Parental arrangement in the modern context however implies that the boy takes the initiative rather than his parents. He may ask either his parents, elder siblings or any relative of his parents generation to look for a suitable girl, or he may choose a girl and having ascertained her consent ask a senior relative to approach the girl's guardian on his behalf. It can be seen (from Table 2 categories 1 and 2) that there is a tendency among the age groups below 40 for marriage to follow meetings between young persons independent of any previous ties of relationship or friendship between their respective parents. Nearly all the informants stated that such meetings had taken place either at the market or when attending church. In the age groups over 30 these independent meetings had all taken place at mission classes for preparation for baptism. The conditions allowing for this change towards independence in choice of marriage partner lie in the greater security which has come with the establishment of district administration, in changing patterns of authority and in changing values. With the establishment of law and order, local markets have been set up and women and girls have the freedom to take surplus food stuffs for sale. The biggest daily market is in the centre of Kabale town, with subsidiary weekly markets near local trading centres. Since young men congregate in the town, seeking

employment or frequenting the bars, independent meetings between young persons are now possible outside the traditional context of immediate neighbourhood and kin group. All 24 of the elopements in category 1 had occurred after independent meetings of the young couples in the market or at church. Nine of these couples had met in the market and eloped the same day. Fifteen had met for the first time at the market or church and eloped within the period of 1 month.

The question of elopements best illustrates the changing patterns of authority and values. Kiga elopements are not, in the modern context, as they were in the 1930's, a reaction against parental control over choice of spouse. In the neighbourhood areas studied only 1 case was found of an enforced marriage against the wishes of the girl. This was a case where a pagan father threatened to curse his daughter and turn her out of his homestead if she continued to refuse marriage to a boy whose father had offered 3 cows for her bride-wealth. The eloping couple go to the home of the boy's father, without the knowledge of the girl's parents, but often with the prior encouragement of the boy's parents. After 2 or 3 days either the boy himself or his father or other representative go to report to the girl's father. Occasionally there is a show of anger on the part of the girl's father but this is short lived so long as there is some evidence on the boy's part that he is ready to start negotiations over the bride-wealth. He has to take a gift of money generally about shs 20/-, or the equivalent of 1 goat, to the girl's father as 'eigambo' or the 'money for permission to speak'. Once this has been brought the 'ekyiro' or fine is fixed which may be any amount between Shs. 20/- and Shs. 200/- (the equivalent of a goat or a cow respectively), depending on the known resources of the boy or his father. The 'ekyiro' is an adaptation of a traditional fine exacted in excess of the bride-wealth payment if any insult had been made by the boy or any of his close relatives against any of the girl's close relatives. If the boy can produce nothing for 'eigambo' or 'ekyiro', the girl's father may try to send her brothers to bring her back home by force, but so long as these payments are made, the legitimacy of the elopement is accepted by all parties concerned and little stigma is attached to the act. My justification for calling this behaviour 'elopement' is that Kiga themselves use the same verb 'okusigura' for traditional elopements, which were generally in reaction to forced marriages or resulted in socially unrecognised de facto marriages, as for the modern variety of socially recognised de facto marriages followed by legitimisation through transfer of bride-wealth. Moreover there appears to have been a gradual change in attitudes towards elopement. The love magic mentioned by Edel for the 1930's was given as a reason in all the marriages by elopement in the age group over 40. Evidently the shame attached to elopement on the part of the girl had to be justified by some action which would show that she had been an involuntary partner. With the increasing number of elopements social attitudes have changed and elopements are no longer considered as shameful.

While freedom of choice and elopement have become or are fast becoming accepted forms of behaviour, (see table 3) economic difficulties of bride-wealth payments, mission attitudes on correct forms of marriage and continuing traditional attitudes to marriage are complicating factors. Among the reasons given for elopement Kiga men most commonly stress the economic one. In the traditional Kiga arranged first marriage, the father paid the whole bride-wealth in advance of marriage. Bride-wealth was paid in livestock from the father's herd and had to be made at one time. The amount of livestock was subject to lengthy negotiations and finally calculated on the basis of the known livestock wealth of the father, and the expected benefits of the affinal connection with the girl's family. The amount of bride-wealth varied from 1 or 2 goats to as much as 20 cows. The average for those in the age group over 60 was around 2 cows and 1 bull (or the equivalent in goats) subject to considerations of age and quality of the livestock.

Since the 1930's owing to the decrease in livestock in the South Kigezi area and the introduction of a money economy, there has been shift in the locus of responsibility for bride-wealth payments from fathers to sons seeking marriage. The payment is still made to the father or other guardian of the girl. Table 4, showing the 'sources of bride-wealth payments illustrates this. Of those in the age group over 50, only 8 out of 49 bride-wealth payments had been met entirely by the bridegroom from his own earnings, whereas in the age group 50 and under, just over half (32 out of 62) of the bridegroom had paid the whole of their bride-wealth themselves. A common pattern in such times is for contributions to the bride-wealth to be made by the father from his own herd of cattle or goats or from the cattle given from the sons' sister bride-wealth, while the son himself is responsible for finding any cash payments required. Table 5 (a) illustrates the modern tendency for bride-wealth to be paid wholly or partly in cash rather than in livestock among the age groups under 50.

Brides' fathers vary in their request for livestock or cash payments. If bride-wealth is paid for their daughters in livestock they are more likely to be held responsible by their wives and sons for using the livestock for the bride-wealth payments of her brothers.

If on the other hand, bride-wealth is paid in cash there is no such obligation. Wives and daughters are not normally informed as to how much cash has been paid for a daughter's bride-wealth, only an already married elder brother of the bride has a right to know and so control over the disposal of the cash payment, since he is the guardian of the property rights of the matri-segment. Livestock on the other hand cannot be hidden from members of the family. The father may use bride-wealth in money on house improvement, purchase of land, building a shop or merely spend it on drinking. Thus social responsibility of the family head for the traditional redistribution of daughter's bride-wealth to be used to establish marriages of their brothers holds only where payment is made in traditional kind. There is a further factor involved here in the attempts by missions and the district authority to restrict bride-wealth payments. The first public discussion about the restriction of bride-wealth was in 1927 when a Protestant missionary brought the case of his houseboy to the notice of the District Commissioner. The father of the houseboy's chosen girl demanded six cows for bride-wealth, but the houseboy and his father had only 3 cows. The District Commissioner convened a special meeting of all Saza chiefs to discuss the problem, at which it was decided to restrict bride-wealth payments to not more than 1 cow and 1 bull or 1 cow and five goats. Despite the fact that chiefs were given powers to confiscate all the animals found to have been paid in excess of the legal maximum, and in addition to impose a fine on the father of the girl for 'extortionate demands'. Kiga did not accept the administrative decision and continued to pay bride-wealth in excess of the legal maximum. This excess tended to be paid in cash for ease of evasion of chiefs' control. In 1945 the then District Commissioner, being concerned at the number of fines imposed for excess bride-wealth payments, increased the maximum payment to 2 cows and 1 bull, which he found to be the average payment at the time. The Protestant church leaders accepted the increase, whereas the Catholic Fathers insisted on 1 cow and 1 bull as the maximum for their church members. Chiefs were further discouraged from fining persons for infringement of the bye-law and there is now no longer any control by the administration, although in the marriage register at Kyanamira sub-county, bride-wealth payments are consistently recorded as 2 cows and 1 bull. Kiga refusal to accept a maximum bride-wealth is based on the fact/bargaining over bride-wealth is institutionalised behaviour. With the increased possibilities for the differentiation of wealth from the 1940's onwards, Kiga have become eager to capitalise on their daughters' bride-wealth payments. Many factors now enter into the calculation. On the side of the daughters 'worth', a father now considers that he has a right to recoup the expenses of his daughter's school education from her prospective husband.

The most extreme cases of high bridewealth demands are made for qualified women teachers or nurses. In several cases of teachers' marriage negotiations occurring in Kabale and Kyanamira in 1965 to 1966, over 2,000/- plus some goats or a cow were demanded and paid for bridewealth of a woman teacher. Fathers and husbands both accept the calculation that married women teachers will continue working for some years and the high bridewealth is based on the expectation of the future income for the husband. Prospective husbands known to be in well-paid employment, or who have some craft training, also have to meet high bridewealth payments for the girl of their choice, in the same way that in the 1930's a large number of livestock was demanded from a bridegroom whose father was known to have large herds, and great prestige attached to both parties to the transfer. Two examples may be given in illustration. The first is an uneducated Kiga man who had secured permanent employment at Kilembe mines (at an unskilled wage rate at Shs. 4/50 a day). At the age of 25 he married by elopement, and had to pay Shs. 100/- for 'eigambo', and Shs. 200/- for 'ekyiro'. The wife was by these payments established in the home of the husband's father, and the husband returned to work at Kilembe. After 1 year, when he returned on annual leave, the girl's father brought pressure to bear for bridewealth payment, threatening to take his daughter back if bridewealth was not paid. The husband then handed over Shs. 500/-. After the second year, again on return for annual leave, he paid the remaining bridewealth of 1 cow and Shs. 300/- (a total including fines of 1 cow and Shs. 1,100/-). A second case is that of a self trained tailor with education up to primary 3 who married in the proper channels in 1959 at the age of 20. His bride was something of a modern beauty although without education and modern earning power. The tailor had to pay a total of 1 cow, 1 bull, 10 goats and Shs 1,000/-. The cattle were from his sister's bridewealth. The 10 goats from his father's herd and the Shs. 1,000/- from his own earnings.

Kiga youths today complain of high bridewealth demands and give this as the principal reason for elopement. The facts are extremely complicated to analyse. Bridewealth payments increasingly tend to consist of a mixture of livestock, cows and goats, and money payments, and a mixture of fines and official bridewealth payments. To convert the varying qualities of livestock into a cash equivalent, bearing in mind that current values of livestock and opportunities for cash earnings have fluctuated over the 30 to 35 year period under consideration, makes the task of comparing and quantifying bridewealth virtually impossible. A very crude attempt has been made in Table 5 (B) to give some indication of the trends. None of the informants giving marriage histories were members of the present day elite, so that these payments represent the sons of peasant farmers and petty traders in both home and settlement areas. There is no significant difference in bridewealth payments as between the homeland area in South Kigezi and the North Kigezi settlement area in Bugangari. Although they must be treated with some scepticism, the figures tend to support the Kiga view that bridewealth payments have increased during the last 30 years. In the age group over 50, in 21 cases bridewealth was less and in 21 cases bridewealth was more than the 'tribal average' of 2 cows and 1 bull. In the age groups 50 and under, in 26 cases less than the average was paid and in 42 cases more. Alleged increase in bridewealth demands have to be balanced not only against new opportunities for cash earning and reduction in herds of livestock, but also against Kiga attitudes to bridewealth in reference to neighbouring tribes with whom they have come into contact through labour migration. In the 1930's the possibilities for marriages with non Kiga women were restricted to 'famine brides' from Ruanda. These were not very common. In the sample of 150 marriage histories there were 3 Ruanda famine brides, i.e. girls brought over from Ruanda by their fathers at a time of famine and 'exchanged' for baskets of food from Kiga men. Nowadays Kiga men have contact with Nyankole, Toro and Ganda through labour migration and resettlement and compare the high Kiga bridewealth with that asked for Toro girls about Shs. 100/-, and for Nyankole girls about Shs 200/- to Shs 250/-. In Toro at least there appear to be more girls who are prepared to enter temporary de facto marriages at the man's place of work without any subsequent demand for legitimisation of marriage through transfer of bridewealth. Reference to non Kiga

societies affects the attitudes and value judgements of Kiga men at the present day towards the institution of bridewealth payments in Kigezi.

It can be seen that the majority of cases in which more than 2 cows and 1 bull were paid in the 50 and under age categories were arranged marriages. To this extent Kiga youths may be held to have some economic justification for elopement. When individual cases are examined however this is extremely difficult to establish. Elopement very rarely takes place as a direct result of high bridewealth demands by the girl's father, for the simple reason that eloping youths do not enter into negotiations with their future fathers-in-law until after elopement. They assume that high bridewealth will be demanded and that if they get the girl to elope they will be in a better bargaining position. The difficulties of sorting out the economics of elopement may be illustrated from one case where the youth did in fact enter into negotiations with the girl's father before eloping. In this case the girl's father asked for 2 cows and 1 bull. The youth's father said that he could not find this amount of livestock. The youth persuaded the girl to elope. 4 goats had to be paid as the fine for elopement. Subsequently 2 cows and 10 goats were handed over as official bridewealth. According to the informant 6 goats were at this time considered as the equivalent of 1 bull. According to this calculation elopement resulted in an excess payment of 8 goats (4 for a fine and 4 in excess of the bridewealth originally asked for). The informant denied that he lost anything since he 'gained a wife'. In fact he may have been right since it was his father who paid the whole bridewealth and fine. Where a youth knows that his father has cattle available, elopement may be merely a way of forcing his hand. This brings us to another problem about Kiga elopements, namely why, in the majority of cases where the boy's father is not able to pay the bridewealth, and where the youth knows that he must eventually earn the bridewealth payments himself, does he not go off to earn money in labour migration and establish his marriage according to custom by pre-payment of bridewealth in a lump sum before marriage? Part of the answer has already been given, that he expects to get away with lower bridewealth payments after elopement. Another reason is that he is able to pay bridewealth after elopement by installments, so that even if he ends up by paying the same amount or even more including the fines, he feels this less on the 'never-never' system. Again it is a common attitude that a youth has not 'lost' if he has 'gained a wife'. It may be asked here what is the advantage of gaining a wife if, as in most cases, this means that the husband must go off in labour migration to Toro or Buganda a few months after marriage in order to earn money for his marriage debts. The answer here is that he hopes to gain both rights to land and to start a family. After the initial period of 1 month's confinement in her husband's father's home the young wife is expected to start cultivating in her mother-in-law's plots. At the end of 6 to 9 months she will receive her share of the harvest and part of the plots to cultivate for herself for the next and subsequent seasons. It is therefore in a young man's interest to marry young, and in so doing to claim his rights in his father's land. Nowadays if he does not marry before his younger brothers, he may find that he has been squeezed out of his inheritance. In Kiga tradition, children, both boys and girls, had to be married off in order of seniority of birth, but at the present time this is disregarded. This is both because of the tendency for sons to be responsible for finding their own bridewealth payments and because of the likelihood that brothers will show unequal industry or capacity for earning, and because younger brothers cannot be expected to wait indefinitely while their elder brothers are away in labour migration. Since in any case the young couple are dependent on the husband's mother for support until after the first or second harvest, and since the husband hopes that his wife may be bearing a child while he is away earning the marriage debts, the logic in elopement according to current economic conditions is evident. Parents of both the boy and girl may favour elopement because of the saving of the not inconsiderable expense involved in marriage feasts. Relevant factors in the change in attitude toward the utility of large feasts are, in the case of subsistence farmers,

land shortage and hence lack of surplus crops and particularly goats required for the feast. There are now also alternative ways of disposal of surplus crops by sale. Last but not least there is the decline in the social significance of affinal ties.

Traditional attitudes favouring early marriage are still current among all age groups, and tend to discourage postponement of marriage until enough bridewealth has been saved. With exception of those in professional employment, Kiga youths are still expected to marry at around 18 years old, although now with opportunities for wage migration, many do not marry until 30 to 35 years old. There is a Kiga verb 'okuhangara' meaning to go beyond the age of marriage, which may be used of a man around 25 years old. Considerable stigma is attached to the prolongation of bachelorhood among both boys and girls. Parents begin to put pressure on sons at any time after the age of 20, pointing out likely girls, criticising sons for not earning and saving money for bridewealth, and asking why they are refusing to bring grandchildren into the family. At about 24 to 25 years old, friends and relatives will start commenting, and asking the father if his son is physically abnormal. For girls, again with the exception of those in professional employment, the problem of early marriage is even more acute, since they cannot leave the district in labour migration and since there is no accepted alternative livelihood for Kiga women other than in marriage. Hence the readiness of most Kiga girls to elope at the present time. In all the neighbourhoods studied, there was at least 1 spinster over the age of 30, who aroused comments of pity or derision from neighbours. Above this age group, spinsterhood is unknown, since with polygyny even crippled and reputedly lazy girls could find a husband.

What are the present sanctions for the continuance of bridewealth payments or how long can institutionalised bridewealth payments be expected to continue under the present trend towards increasing elopement? The constraints that lead to the continuing pattern of arranged marriages, with bridewealth being fully paid before marriage, appear to be the result of new rather than old patterns of value. Arranged marriages are found principally among the elite group and among the families of serious converts to Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant. It has already been pointed out that the elite tend to be established church members, although not all regular churchgoers belong to the elite. Nevertheless the value patterns of the two groups arise from the same source, that of European Christian missionaries. Despite attacks on many other aspects of traditional Kiga marriage, both Catholic and Protestant missions have upheld the legality of bridewealth payments, and insist on bridewealth being fully paid before church registration and marriage ceremonies are arranged. In the case of the Catholic Church, the sanctions against elopement and also the pressure to pay bridewealth very soon after elopement, are not merely non recognition of the marriage tie, but also the withholding of sacraments to the young couple and to their respective parents until such time as the marriage is legalised by full payment of bridewealth, i.e. the stipulated 1 cow and 1 bull in the case of Catholics. For children of regular church going Catholic parents, this can be a sufficient constraint against elopement, and a sufficient reason for fathers to contribute as far as possible for their sons' bridewealth before or after elopement. For the Protestants there is no sanction of withholding sacraments, but among the 'Abalokoli' or 'saved Protestants', moral censure on both the young couple and their parents for allowing elopement is strong. The Abalokoli evangelical movement has been particularly widespread in Kigezi, possibly because it originated among leaders of the Ruanda mission, whose first headquarters were in Kabale. The emphasis of morality among the Abalokoli is on abstention from alcohol and smoking and family life, with particular condemnation of sex 'immorality' including polygyny and elopement or any premarital sex activity, including modern dancing. Sanctions of 'shame' are activated principally in the regular sessions of public confession. If a public confession of a child's elopement is not made on the first occasion, some other church member will stand up to 'confess' his uncharitable feelings against his neighbour for allowing the elopement of his child! Although in the settlement area these sessions of public

confession have been abandoned, in the Kabale area they are still held and the influence of the parental generation of 'saved ones' is still strong. Among the elite the sanctions against elopement mainly attach to the prestige of a white church wedding. Even Miruka chiefs, with a salary of Shs. 150/- per month, will run into considerable debt for the sake of a white wedding. In addition, for teachers, any infringement of the correct marriage code, through elopement or adultery, is sufficient cause for dismissal from the service by the local district education authorities. One married teaching couple had been forced to marry by the district education committee when it became known that the girl was pregnant. They were later dismissed from the service, when the headmaster reported that the wife was using herbal 'magic' to distract her husband's attention from other women!

The problem of why bridewealth is paid up after elopement at all, is more difficult. In traditional Kiga marriage we have seen that the transfer of bridewealth is one among numerous links between lineages and neighbourhood areas with a continuous history of inter-marriage. Transfer of bridewealth in traditional parentally arranged marriages is a form of social recognition of the affinal tie and return gifts from the bride's father are expected so long as the wife is well-treated in her husband's home. These return gifts take the form of a cow or goat presented to the husband at a coming-out ceremony after the first month's confinement of the wife. Substantial gifts of crops and beer are expected at the first ceremonial visit of the kinsfolk and neighbours of the young wife to her in her new home. A cow or a goat was normally presented soon after the birth of the first child or the first son. Depending on the resources of the wife's natal family, further gifts of food or beer might be brought annually at harvest time or at the birth of subsequent children. Some change might be expected in matters of bridewealth transference when young couples elope after independent meetings, and when their respective kinsfolk have no previous ties of friendship. Change might be expected also as a result of the commuting of bridewealth from tangible livestock to money payments, which may be immediately consumed in expenditure or which may be concealed from members of the bride's family except her father or elder brother. If it is true that bridewealth payments were traditionally closely linked not only to the particular marriage tie involved, but also to more generalised affinal links between families, this was largely in the context of the pre 1930 conditions of political and economic insecurity. It might be expected that the institution of bridewealth would be undermined under conditions of political security and economic development, when new bases for the formation of ties of friendship, arising from education, religion, and common journeys to labour migration, are able to replace those of affinity. Free marriage choice means that there is a looser network of affinal ties of family members, and hence less social pressure by other members, who in traditional marriage would be linked by the bridewealth cattle, for the maintenance of good relations. Resettlement of Kiga has involved a spatial separation of young people from their respective families of origin of distances from 50 to 200 miles.

The question of return marriage prestations by the wife's kin during the course of the marriage is extremely difficult to illustrate in any tabulated form. Nevertheless it is clear, from a study of the 150 marriage histories, that the extent of gifts by the wife's kin has decreased steadily in the younger age groups below 40. This is evidently partly because gifts of food, beer, and livestock were made as expressions of goodwill and affinal solidarity, but there were no institutionalised occasions when such gifts were obligatory. Even on the occasions of the coming-out ceremony and the birth of the first child, gifts depended on the resources of the wife's kin at the time. With the present day possibilities for sale of excess crops, the reduction in herds of livestock, and the pressure of new material demands, it is not surprising that such non obligatory gifts have decreased. Gifts of 1 or 2 baskets of grain or pots of beer are recorded among the younger age groups, as compared with 20 to 30 baskets of grain and 5 to 6 pots of beer during the lifetime of parents of spouses in the

older age groups. Gifts of livestock at the birth of a daughter's child, which were common among the age groups over 50, are now extremely rare. There is no clear correlation between the amount of bridewealth payments and the amount of return gifts among any age groups. This is probably because gifts from the wife's kin depended as much on the quality of treatment of the wife in her husband's home, and the absence of marital disputes and complaints by the wife, as on the quantity of original bridewealth transferred. There is some indication that the amount of gifts from the wife's kin is correlated with close proximity of the affinally related families and with parental arrangements for marriages. This is largely where traditional patterns of marriage are carried on and where affinal links and neighbourhood friendship in the modern context coincide. All these questions are linked with other factors affecting Kiga marriage stability and with Kiga expectations concerning conjugal roles. They must therefore be held over until after a fuller discussion of these latter aspects of Kiga marriage.

THE CONJUGAL FAMILY

A full analysis of the trend towards the emergence of the conjugal family in its separate and independent household and of the effects of this on conjugal role relationships is not possible within the limits of this paper. However since this has considerable relevance to Kiga marriage stability, it is necessary at least to outline the trends. In the South Kigezi neighbourhood areas studied, out of a total of 504 married men, 77 were living in monogamous conjugal households, 25 in polygynous households, 36 in conjugal households with 1 or more dependent relatives, most commonly the husband's mother, and 344 in patrilateral extended family households. There were 22 denuded families consisting of a woman and her unmarried children, either widows or deserted wives, both remaining on the husband's land. (See Table 6) In the neighbourhood area studied in Bugangari settlement in North Kigezi, the trend towards the emergence of the conjugal household was much more marked. 40 out of 82 unmarried men were living in conjugal family households, and only 16 out of 82 in patrilateral extended family households. This is also supported by random samples taken in 3 other Kiga settlement areas in Ankole and Toro. (See Table 7)

Broadly the trend towards the emergence of the independent conjugal family in its separate household as compared with the patrilateral extended family pattern of the 1930's, is associated with the release of constraints of security and religious sanctions operative up to the late 1930's. It is also related to new economic opportunities for independence on the part of married sons through trading, sale of crops, wage labour and purchase of land. In the settlement area the conjugal pattern is associated with the availability of land and consolidated holdings, and with the initial movement away from the extended family in the home area to take up new land in resettlement areas. The pattern of patrilateral family households which still predominates in the overcrowded homeland of South Kigezi, is however qualitatively different from the traditional pattern of the pre 1930's. The patrilateral extended family household at the present time occurs at the two extremes of the domestic cycle. In the overcrowded homeland, where a son has no access to land and livelihood other than through marriage and dependence on allocation from his father's estate, he must remain with his young wife in his father's homestead, or go off in labour migration, leaving his wife alone in his parent's home until the young couple have reached a stage of domestic viability and can establish their own conjugal homestead. This is normally not possible within the first 3 to 5 years of marriage. The new conjugal homestead may be adjacent to his father's or at a distance of some miles on a site chosen from a plot allocated to him from his mother's fields, or at a distance of up to 100 miles on resettlement land in Ankole or Toro. At the other end of the domestic cycle, extended family households are found to consist of old parents still living with one or more of their married sons and dependent on them and their grandchildren for services in their old age. In the latter type, the father has very little control over

his married son except in so far as the father still has freedom to allocate his remaining undistributed land and livestock, and the son who remains in his homestead may be eager to please him in order to gain a larger share than his (usually elder) brothers, who have left the parental homestead on achieving domestic viability.

The relatively small number of polygynous family households reflects both the success of the missions in attacking polygyny, and changing economic conditions. With shortage of land, a plurality of wives becomes an economic problem rather than an asset. Land may have to be purchased for a second wife, or one or both wives moved to a settlement area. Other indices of social status have replaced the mere size (in numbers of wives and children) of a man's household. These new indices include a larger house with corrugated iron roofing, educated children in salaried employment, a shop, or merely spare cash with which to pay for one's friends' drink. It is interesting to note how the Kiga have solved the problem of disposing of surplus wives of a polygynous household. Abandoned wives are not divorced nor sent away from their husband's land. The abandoned wives take over the role of the senior wives past child-bearing age in the traditional Kiga polygynous households in becoming heads of their respective matri-segments. The husband remains with the chosen 'church or ring wife' in the original homestead and either plants a cactus fence between the hut of the church wife and the abandoned wife or builds a new hut and compound for the abandoned wives, each on her own allocated section of the husband's land. If the abandoned wife already had a married son it is he who is expected to build his mother's new homestead rather than his father, or the mother may simply transfer herself to her married son's already independent homestead. There was not a single case in the neighbourhood areas studied where a wife who had been abandoned for religious reasons was divorced or left her husband's land. This response to the mission attack on polygyny illustrates the continuing strength of the matri-segment and the mother-son tie at the present day. It also points to the principal expectations which a Kiga woman has in marriage, namely the security of land and children. If she stays as head of her matri-segment on her husband's land, she continues to live with her children and receives support from her sons in her old age. If she leaves to seek remarriage, she abandons her rights to land and her children have to remain in the ex-husband's household to be cared for by the chosen church wife. Unless she has a son old enough to stand up to the father as guardian of the property rights of the matri-segment, her younger sons are likely to be pushed out of their rights over land and cattle in the family estate by the children of the church wife. The same principle holds for deserted wives where the husband has 'disappeared' in labour migration or to a settlement area. So long as she remains on the husband's land, the rights of a deserted wife are secure. Adultery is condoned for a woman whose husband is not present over a period of some months, and if she has been abandoned while still relatively young, she may raise children by other men without any fear that her husband's brothers can remove her from the land or sue her father for the return of bridewealth. Since a woman is in any case responsible for the maintenance of herself and her children from cultivation of the land, the absence of her husband in labour migration or desertion or effective abandonment by a baptised husband, makes little economic difference for her. She has to provide clothing for herself and her children and school fees which she might otherwise expect from her husband, and she may have to employ labour for the repair of buildings if her sons are not old enough to help, but at the same time she is free from the responsibility of feeding the husband and has complete control over the disposal of all her crops and small livestock.

Land shortage in the South Kigezi homeland has resulted in an increase in economic independence for the wife. Where land is sufficient only for household subsistence, with no available plots for cash crop cultivation, it is the wife who becomes the 'breadwinner'. Husbands are forced into temporary or long term periods of wage migration shortly after marriage to earn bridewealth debts, and later to find money for tax, school fees, clothing and drinking money. With lack of alternative occupation on the home farm, drinking involves

a major part of the husband's time when he is at home. Whereas previously beer brewing and invitations to drink freely were part of the regular activities of the extended family household, under the supervision of its head, the brewing of beer has now become commercialised, and men require cash to buy drinks at the many local bars or at private homesteads. The absence of husbands allows the wife greater control over the resources of the domestic estate and encourages increasing independence, not only within the household in the domestic economy but also in control over the children and outside the household in social relations with neighbours and in extra marital sex activities. The husband's cash earnings in labour migration are held to be his personal property. Having met his obligations for tax, maintenance of housing and school fees, and annual gifts of a dress to the wife, he is free to spend his money as he likes. The wife rarely knows the amount of her husband's earnings, and both have separate hides for their money, the husband from earnings in labour migration or trading and the wife from sale of crops during his absence. In the home area marital disputes are frequent, both over property rights and role relationships. This statement is based on an analysis of the disputes brought for informal settlement to the Miruka Chiefs and Abanyantsi (elected or appointed neighbourhood leaders) and catechists and family elders in 5 neighbourhood areas in Kyanamira sub county, South Kigezi over the period of 18 months. In the home area over three quarters of the disputes were between members of the extended family, mainly over allocation of the family estate. Although the majority of these disputes were between fathers and sons or brothers and half brothers, the disputes inevitably gave rise to marital conflict between husbands and wives, since the wives take the side of their sons against husband or against the sons of co-wives.

It should be emphasised that the above factors of increasing differentiation of roles, responsibilities and interests of spouses do not hold for the settlement areas, where there is a 'fit' between the new norms of conjugal roles, stressing values of conjugal partnership, improved status of the wife, and independence of the conjugal couple from their respective kin groups on the one hand, and economic conditions on the other. Frontier conditions in the early years of settlement stress the husband's role in land clearance, assistance in the first cultivation of land and protection against animals. Subsequently mixed cash crop and subsistence farming together with large and consolidated land holdings give ample occupation for both spouses on the home farm, and have tended to result in marital co-operation in all agricultural tasks. A real economic and marital partnership results, with consultation between spouses over sale of crops. This contrasts into old age, partly because with frontier land still available, with emphasis on independence for sons even before marriage, settlers' sons tend to leave off from the parental homestead in search of new land. In the settlement areas the availability of land results in infrequent conflict between spouses over allocation of property and resources. This is particularly so in polygynous marriages where the separate matri-segments tend to be established on spatially separate land holdings. In Bugungu settlement area the overall number of disputes was much less proportional to the population than in the homeland area. Disputes arose mainly between unrelated neighbours over boundary and land rights as a result of lack of control over land allocation in this early settlement area.

The same pattern of conjugal partnership is found in the home area among the more serious groups of Christians, partly as a result of value change, partly because the household resources are less likely to be spent in drinking, and more emphasis is laid by both spouses of land, cash crop cultivation, and in the spending of husband's earnings on school fees and house improvements. Among serious Christian peasant families conjugal role differentiation in the domestic economy occurs, but there is greater consensus over goals and greater emphasis on new value patterns of conjugal partnership. This is particularly true among the Abalokoli Protestants. These patterns apply also among the elite in the home area. Husbands in

professional work are expected to support their wives and children from their earnings, and frequently have to do so if the wife and children are removed from the home farm to the place of work. Wives may be contributory earners as teachers, or may be expected to perform new roles in higher standard of home making or in caring for children, while as we have seen, both Christianity and school education tend to result in acceptance of new norms in conjugal partnership by the elite.

MARRIAGE STABILITY: THE FACTS

The interest of this brief outline of changing conjugal role relationships for the present paper lies in the fact that despite the differences in conjugal roles and responsibilities and despite the economic and social changes which have impinged on patterns of marriage over the last 30 to 40 years, Kiga marriage remains highly stable. This is true both over time i.e., comparing the 1930's with the 1960's, and comparing the marriage histories of different age groups of living informants, and in comparing the home and settlement areas which display such different patterns of conjugal role relationships at the present time. In the 150 marriage histories, there were only 2 cases of divorce, defined by the return of bridewealth. In 1 of these cases divorce was sought by the wife who believed that the husband's senior wife was poisoning her children, since all 4 of her children had died in childhood. The marriage had been parentally arranged with a transfer of 3 cows and 4 goats as bridewealth. It was terminated after 10 years by the return of the bridewealth when the wife convinced her father that her suspicions of the poisoning were true. In the second case the wife was a Nyarwanda who had eloped to the husband, but the marriage had been legalised by a subsequent bridewealth payment of 2 cows and 1 goat. After 8 years of marriage, the husband drove her away and succeeded in winning his divorce suit with the wife's father on the grounds that she was lazy and refused to cultivate. This illustrates a new right of husbands and wives to sue for divorce or to separate on grounds of non-fulfilment of conjugal roles.

There were 19 cases of separation, but without return of bridewealth. This includes 1 polygynist who on baptism separated with 3 wives and kept the 4th, and 1 exceptional man who had a succession of marriages before the present 6th and lasting one. The first lasted 2 years, the second, third and fourth lasted 2-3 weeks each and the fifth lasted six years. No bridewealth was paid for the first 4 marriages and only 1 goat for the fifth marriage. It is difficult in a case of this nature to decide what constitutes 'marriage'. Referring to Tables 8 - 12 for the numerical data, if we take the transfer of bridewealth as the definition of marriage, this excludes 7 'marriages' still lasting despite no bridewealth payment, with a range of marriage duration from 2 - 64 years, the mean being 16 years. We also have to exclude 10 'marriages' in which no bridewealth was paid and which ended in separation after a mean period of just under 1 year (the range of duration being from 2 weeks to 3 years). Should one then exclude all marriages in which only an elopement fine has been paid? And should one exclude all marriages for which complete bridewealth has not been transferred? Since marriages are now socially recognized by Kiga both when the elopement fine has been paid and in all marriages established over a number of years, whether or not any bridewealth has been paid, I have preferred to include all cases, even including temporary unofficial marriages lasting a few weeks. This new social recognition of de facto marriages now includes the affiliation of children to the father despite non payment of bridewealth. Table 8 shows the reasons for termination of previous marriages of the 150 informants. Table 10 gives an analysis of the marriages which ended in separation according to the type of formation of marriage, the bridewealth transferred, whether the marriage was polygynous or monogamous, which party initiated the

separation, or whether this was on religious grounds, and the fate of the wife following separation. Table 11 analyses : all 150 marriages correlating bridewealth transfers with the fate of the marriage. The figures show a tendency for marriages formed without any transfer of bridewealth to end in separation, but this is not so where an elopement fine only or partial bridewealth has been transferred. Some reasons can be given for the stability of the 7 marriages in which no bridewealth had been paid. (See Table 9)

Three of these were famine brides from Ruanda for whom no bridewealth was demanded except for immediate gifts of foodstuffs. In one marriage with a Kiga woman, her parents were dead and she has no guardian interested in demanding bridewealth. Two were marriages with wives previously married, hence with increasing competition for husbands due to monogamy and increasingly late marriage by men on account of wage migration, both the women and their kin were thankful that they had found a married home and were unwilling to press for bridewealth. In the last case the woman is childless and therefore, if she leaves her present husband, she is unlikely to find another who would pay bridewealth for her. Although barren women might be welcomed in traditional polygynous households, few Kiga men would risk marrying an 'only' wife if she was suspected of being barren. In the 5 cases where marriage is still lasting although only an elopement fine has so far been paid, 2 marriages are only 1 year old and there is still the possibility of bridewealth payment by installments. One girl has no guardian to press for bridewealth, her father died after the payment of the fine, and 2 have lasted 7 and 10 years respectively with no reason for non payment of bridewealth other than the husband's skill in evasion/contentment with the marriage so that the husband is under no pressure to pay. The cases of separation are listed in Table 12 more fully, giving stated reasons for the separation and listing other factors likely to be relevant to marriage stability in the Kiga context. Cases 1 to 4 are directly related to value change, involving the conversion to Christianity of the polygynous husband and the abandonment of 'surplus' wives, all of them beyond child bearing age and all with adult sons who had been allocated part of their father's land and who became the guardians of their mothers. Case No. 6 is also a result of economic and value change. Since both sons of this wife, the senior wife of a polygynous household, had moved off to independent but adjacent homesteads instead of remaining in their father's homestead: the old mother preferred to transfer to the household of one of her sons when she could no longer cultivate since she could expect support only from her sons and their wives. Cases No. 7 and 8 were due to the pressure of new economic conditions. In one the husband deserted to resettle and in the other he failed to fulfil his marital obligations by staying away in labour migration. In the latter case the wife was young enough to remarry. Having proved herself fertile, but having only 1 child, she preferred remarriage to permanent separation. In the former case, since the wife was past childbearing age and had an adult son, she preferred to remain on the husband's land with her children. The 11 remaining cases (Nos. 9 - 19) cannot be directly to any specific factors of economic and social change. They are to varying extents 'frivolous' marriages. In all cases except one, the marriage had been formed by elopement or capture with no subsequent legalisation by transfer of bridewealth. The 5 cases in which the marriage lasted less than 1 month can at best be termed failures of trial marriage. Since no bridewealth had been transferred, both parties were free to end the relationship at will. Case No. 12 is interesting in that the wife feared the security of her marriage, since after 3 years and despite the birth of a child the husband still refused to pay bridewealth. This wife subsequently married a deaf and dumb man who paid bridewealth by arrangement with her father and this marriage was preferable to her on grounds of security.

KIGA MARRIAGE STABILITY: THE UNDERLYING FACTORS

With apologies for some inevitable repetition, I shall now summarise all the main factors related to Kiga marriage stability in an attempt to isolate those factors which appear to be most important in accounting for a continued high rate of stability despite fundamental economic and social changes affecting Kiga marriage patterns. Kiga traditional marriage in the pre 1930's was jurally stable, meaning by this that there was a low frequency of divorce in marriage properly established through payment of bridewealth. This marriage stability was found in the context of the demands of the pre 1930 social and political structure. Autonomous patri-lateral extended family groups required strong links with families and lineages of other clans for protection in travel and feuding, for security of land and property rights and as a form of economic insurance. Traditional marriage stability must therefore be seen as causally connected with the strength of affinal ties between kin groups. Marriages by arrangement, the transfer of bridewealth cattle and return prestations from wife's kin during the course of the marriage, were all part of the pattern of establishing and maintaining strong affinal links. The conjugal tie was based on an economic relationship and the desire for children. Wives and children in their economic capacity were both a necessity for the survival of the extended family group, both in terms of current subsistence on the land and future numbers, and were prestige bearers both for the particular husband and for the extended family head. In the context of the polygynous family household there was little if any concept of companionship between spouses. In the Kiga case this is born out by the fact that Kiga separation of conjugal interests and activities increases with age and the woman's establishment of ties of friendship in her husband's father's homestead, with husband's brothers' wives and other women in the neighbourhood, and becomes complete with the marriage of her eldest son and the passing of the woman's childbearing period. This is particularly apparent in the case of inherited wives. Disputes between co-wives are almost entirely over question of property allocation and over jealousy between wives over the number of their children, particularly sons, often resulting in accusations of poisoning and witchcraft between co-wives. Similarly, favouritism of one wife by the husband is always referred to by Kiga in terms of unequal property allocation by the husband to that wife or to her children. Competition between wives to strengthen the conjugal tie is therefore in terms of future security for the wife and seldom in terms of sexual interest or companionship.

The maintenance of marriage ties once formed, was associated with customary rules of patrilineal succession and inheritance and the allocation of land and cattle according to the house property complex. A married woman could expect economic security as an affiliated member of her husband's extended family group. During her husband's lifetime, if he was absent or incapacitated she could expect help from her husband's brothers. This right of assistance was linked with the right of brothers to sexual access to each others' wives in each in each others' absence. If her husband died a wife would be inherited by a family member and her continuing rights to the land were secure. Since all her sons inherited equally from her portion of the husband's estate, all sons remained as resident members of the father's household. Patrilineal affiliation of children prevented the wife from taking them with her on separation or on divorce or remarriage. She could rarely expect help or shelter from a daughter's husband in the event of separation, since there were customary patterns of avoidance between a woman and her sons-in-law. If marital disputes arose, it was the duty of the husband's father to solve the quarrels. The economic and religious sanctions of the father's authority gave him considerable control over his sons' treatment of their wives, and it was a matter of prestige for the family head that marital disputes should be kept within the

extended family group i.e., that recourse to settlement outside the extended family should be a last resort. If protection from the husband's father failed and the wife was severely ill-treated, she had the right to return home to her own father or brothers where her case would be judged by her own kin when the husband came to retrieve her. The difficulties of returning the bridewealth and the inter-linked marriage ties with other members of her/husband's lineage, made for pressure by her own kin to sustain the marriage. The husband was encouraged to treat his wife well by a series of non-obligatory return prestations from the wife's father.

and her

her

his wife's

There were constraints on the wife to sustain her marriage since she had no satisfactory alternative form of livelihood. She would have to abandon her children to her husband to be looked after by husband's mother or co-wife. Although she had the ultimate rights of support in her father's or brothers' homestead, she had no rights to land there and there would be difficulties with her brothers' wives. There were also constraints on the husband for the maintenance of the marriage. There were no legally valid reasons for divorce. The husband would have to drive his wife to leave by severe ill treatment. In so doing he put himself in the wrong both with his own father and father's brothers and with kin, and might find himself fined a goat and several pots of beer without succeeding in obtaining the return of the bridewealth. He had to ensure the support of his children, and other wives would be unwilling to support them on their own land. If the wife's children were old enough to support themselves, the sons' rights over the property allocation of their mother were inalienable, and it was unlikely that all the bridewealth for the marriage would be returned if the woman had born many children. A better solution to divorce was therefore the effective abandonment of the wife and her children to fend for themselves. This was made easier since the wife was in any case responsible for the maintenance of herself and her children, and the division of labour on sex lines after the first few years of marriage gave the wife freedom to establish her own ties of co-operation with female neighbours, her own kin if living near, and especially with her children.

Many factors of economic and social change have affected the context within which Kiga marriages are formed and sustained. There has been a general weakening of the bases of affinal ties resulting from political and economic security since the 1930's. By economic security here, is meant principally protection against theft and raiding of cattle and crops and the control of periodic famine by administrative measures. At the same time the political economic and religious 'raisons d'etre' of the co-residential patri-lateral extended family have been destroyed, again weakening the sanctions for the maintenance of marriages of members. In dispute settlement the husband's father no longer has sanctions for his authority over sons and their wives. The tendency for independence and separate residence of conjugal households has weakened control over conjugal relations by family elders. There has been an almost complete abandonment of customs of widow inheritance, and a decline in the frequency with which brothers accept responsibility for assistance and protection of each others wives. This is co-terminat with the separation of conjugal households of brothers, and with the acceptance of the wife's freedom to refuse the rights of sexual access of her brothers-in-law.

Free marriage choice and increasing acceptance of elopement have reduced the frequency of inter-linking marriages between kin groups and continuing affinal ties over the generations, and this has tended to reduce parental interest in the maintenance of a particular marriage. There is evidence of less frequent return prestations from the wife's kin in support of the marriage, partly on account of declining interests in affinal connections, partly because there are alternative profitable ways of disposing of surplus food crops, beer and livestock, which compete with non-obligatory return prestations.

Distance of conjugal households from their respective kin groups is also a contributory factor here. Resettlement has brought considerable difficulties in the maintenance of relations with kin. Free movement of young persons and choice of spouse from other areas has contributed to distance of a married woman from her own kin. The wife has less need to depend either on her husband's kin or on her own kin in marital disputes at the present time, since/ she now appeal to catechists, Miraka chiefs or elected neighbourhood elders, and if necessary seek asylum in their houses. Increasing separation of economic interests between spouses in the home area, among subsistence cultivators, has resulted in the superceding of the husband's principal role in clearing new land and in the protection of the lives and property of wives and children both in fighting and dispute settlement. Shortage of available land means that a higher proportion has to be used for the growing of subsistence crops. Since this is the responsibility of the wife, her economic independence from the husband is increased. Moreover the modern availability of wage labour means that she can fairly easily dispense with her husband's help even for traditional male occupations.

she

REASONS FOR THE CONTINUING STABILITY OF MARRIAGE

From the above analysis of social and economic change as it affects the context of Kiga marriage, we should expect to find increasing conjugal instability, if not jural instability, of marriage in the homeland area of South Kigezi, among the majority of subsistence peasant cultivators. The position, as we have seen, judging from the 150 marriage histories and from intensive studies in 4 home neighbourhood areas and in 1 resettlement area, is that Kiga jural marriage remains highly stable. If we take conjugal instability as the extent of residential separation of spouses without legal marriage breakdown through the return of bridewealth, we must accept that despite these economic and social changes, Kiga conjugal marriage remains stable. (9 out of 19 of the cases of separation were breakdowns of patterns of cohabitation which were never legalised as marriage through the transfer of bridewealth, a result of the increase of freedom of choice of spouse and of elopement. In 6 of the 19 separations occurring in legal marriages, there is no qualitative change from the traditional pattern of separation of spouses after the childbearing age of the wife and with the marriage of the first son. The only difference in these separations is that following the demands of church leaders, some evidence of distinct residence is required, either a fence or the building of a new house. We are left with a ratio of 5 out of 150 cases of conjugal separation. In one of these the wife became insane and the separation cannot be attributed to processes of social and economic change. Two cases were desertions. These are extreme cases among many instances of temporary abandonment of wives and children by the husband in labour migration. It is difficult to determine the point at which such desertion should be called 'separation'. Although the husband may not be fulfilling any of his conjugal roles, and although he may have set up a temporary cohabitation with a woman of another tribe at his place of work, or the woman may be having adulterous relations with other men in the home area, with or without the birth of illegitimate children, there is still the expectation or possibility that the husband may return to the home family. The final case of separation, when the wife was dismissed by the husband, illustrates a new right of husbands to terminate the marriage, in this case made easier by the fact that the full bridewealth had not been transferred. This right of the husband to dismiss his wife may be related to the breakdown of/support for marriages at the present time.

kin

Since in general both jural and conjugal marriage remains stable, and

according to my analysis in the Kiga context, for the same reasons, I am treating both aspects together, although separating the factors involved in the different social groups in the home area and in the settlement area. It would seem that despite strain on the marriage tie among subsistence cultivators in the home area, which is illustrated in the high frequency of marital conflict, constraints on the wife are the principal reason for the maintenance of jural and conjugal marriage stability. Most of these constraints have already been described so that it remains only to summarise them. The continuing patterns of land allocation according to a house property complex and patrilineal inheritance by sons, is carried over into the context of increasing tendency towards monogamous marriage. In other words, whether a polygynous or monogamous marriage, and whether in effective conjugal marriage or separation, the wife has rights of usufruct over land allocated to her in the first/of marriage, so long as she remains on the land. This land/divided into equal allocations between her sons on their marriages or after the death of both parents through inheritance. Given the increasing difficulty for a wife to find a new spouse and continuing difficulty for a woman to support herself other than through the context of marriage, giving her rights to cultivate her husband's land, it is in a woman's interest to maintain her jural marriage at all costs, in order both to remain on the land and with her children, her sons supporting her in old age. Difficulty of remarriage is increased with the tendency to monogamy. Difficulty of returning to her father's or brothers' home is increased with the breakdown of ties of kin solidarity, independence of brothers' conjugal households, and the greater economic burden constituted by a returned sister in conditions of land shortage. Solutions for a situation of intense marital conflict can be found most easily by temporary or permanent desertion of the husband, either in resettlement with one wife, or in labour migration. This results in some form of conjugal separation, but not in jural marriage breakdown. From the point of view of the husband, temporary or permanent abandonment of his conjugal roles is also the easiest way out of marital conflict. Since if his children are still young, he must somehow provide for their care, and since the offending wife's land allocation must pass to her children, there is little to be gained by activating his new right to dismiss the wife. Moreover Kiga men still value the security of having land in the South Kigezi homeland area, and hence they must have a wife remaining on this land to protect their rights in it vis a vis their brothers and half brothers. Rates of returnees from settlement areas were fairly high up to the middle of the 1950's, mainly on account of climatic conditions and ill health from malaria in settlement areas. Permanent labour migration does not offer security for old age. Nor is there necessarily security of employment on company mines and estates in Toro. Dismissal on account of strikes, absenteeism, sickness, or reduction in pay roll, are all potential hazards for Kiga wage labourers.

These factors relate also to the problem raised earlier in this paper as to why bridewealth payments are in most cases paid within 3 to 5 years despite elopement and weakening kin support of the marriage. The young wife normally puts pressure on the husband to make the bridewealth payment to her father. This is partly because her own relations with her parents and brothers suffer so long as bridewealth has not been transferred. The young wife, particularly in her husband's absence in labour migration, and if her married home is within a day's walking distance of her father's home, expects to return frequently, normally once a month for a period of 2 or 3 days. So long as bridewealth has not been paid, her father and or brothers will criticize her for not bringing bridewealth which one of her brother's can use for his own marriage. Not infrequently the daughter's elopement may be a cause of abuse by the father or her mother. Also she feels that her rights to land in her husband's father's estate are not secure so long as bridewealth has not been transferred. The young wife is normally allocated some plots after elopement, but in some cases she continues to work with her mother-in-law until bridewealth has been transferred. From the husband's point of view,

he is anxious to make his wife feel secure through the transfer of bridewealth. If he fails to pay anything within the first year, the girl's father or brothers may put pressure on her to return, and attempt to arrange a marriage for her with another man who has bridewealth available. If the husband is at the time absent in labour migration, she may be persuaded to remain at home on one of her normal visits until the husband comes with bridewealth. Should the wife leave her father's homestead, the husband has no longer any rights to the land allocated to him by his father. If the husband pays part of the bridewealth by installment, and his wife bears children, and has been allocated adequate land by his parents, he can feel reasonably secure that she will remain. Hence the comparative stability of marriages in which partial bridewealth has been transferred, or at least a substantial elopement fine made. (See Table 9)

In the settlement areas and among certain social groups in the home area, value change in the expectations of conjugal roles and responsibilities have run parallel to changes in the economic context of operation of the conjugal household, with a resulting new level of stabilisation of marriage.

A number of points can be made in relating the Kiga material to current social anthropological theory on marriage stability. Gluckman (note 4) has put forward the hypothesis that high bridewealth and rare divorce are inter-related but that high bridewealth is the result of rare divorce or expectations of stable marriage. This point has been criticised by Sanwell (note 5). However Gluckman was discussing comparisons between different societies in which there were prevailing tendencies for high bridewealth payments and low rates of divorce on the one hand, and low bridewealth payments and high rates of divorce on the other. Sanwell has made his criticism on the basis that the correlation does not hold among the Khasi comparing differential rates of bridewealth payment and marriage stability as between marriages of individuals within the same society. He says that "the payments made to effect a marriage can hardly be said to be an expression of or recognition of its stability".

In the Kiga case individual variations of bridewealth payments do not affect the stability of marriages, since virtually all marriages are jurally stable. The exception in the Kiga case at the present day is in the case of the fragility of 'marriages' in which there has been no payment of bridewealth. These must be taken at best as marginal marriages, and the examination of individual cases would tend to support Gluckman in that bridewealth was not paid because neither spouse was embarking on 'marriage' with any expectation of permanency or that non expectation of bridewealth payments on the part of the wife's father and brothers resulted in strong pressure on her part to return home within the first year of marriage. There is some further support of Gluckman's hypothesis in the Kiga reasoning which is frequently given in explanation of high bridewealth payments for Kiga wives in comparison with lower bridewealth paid among the neighbouring Nyankole and Toro. Kiga say that their women have a high reputation as faithful and hardworking wives, 'faithful' here implying that they can safely be left alone on the homeland with their children and expect to be still found there 5 to 10 years later, assuming that bridewealth has been paid, but not in terms of sexual fidelity. This reputation is itself, as we have seen, the result of other factors which constrain the wife to hold/the jural marriage bond. Inter-tribal jural marriage is still rare among the Kiga. It is found with Ruandan famine brides for whom no bridewealth is paid. Temporary cohabitation with non Kiga girls in Toro or Buganda seems to be fairly frequent, but I have found no case in which such girls were brought home and established on the land in Kigezi. In the settlement areas Kiga brides are at a premium despite higher bridewealth compared to local Ankole and Toro wives, and the explanation is always in terms of the justified reputation for hard work of Kiga girls, obviously a very

important quality in a settler's wife. Moreover most first generation settlers are already married with at least 1 or 2 children in South Kigezi before they decide to resettle. This is because resettlement is seriously considered only as a result of insufficient land for family support in the home area, and land shortage is felt mainly only at the point of increase in size of the conjugal household. The majority of settlers are first sons or sons of senior wives of a polygynous household who cannot expect to receive more land until all their younger brothers have married.

Schneider's point (note 6) that a distinction should be made between conjugal and jural marriages and that there should be a clear distinction as to different aspects of stability, is important. In the Kiga case however, there appear to be the same underlying reasons accounting for jural and conjugal stability, at least in terms of rates of divorce and 'separation' in which the husband is not expected to return. The Kiga case would seem to show that it is necessary to make a careful balance sheet of the various aspects of change. On the one hand there may be changes in the expectation of conjugal relationships and roles which include value changes, and on the other hand changes in the rules of jural marriage or mechanisms for the maintenance of jural and conjugal marriage in terms of the kin context in which marriage takes place. In the Kiga case of settler communities and the elite group, conjugal marriage stability continues under conditions of marked economic and social change, but on account of new rather than traditional factors. This relates to Fallers' analysis of increasing instability of marriage in Basoga as due to "the breaking up of stable communities and the consequent destruction of the social structure which forms the context for marriage" (note 7) he speaks of a "greater frequency of separation where there/resettled communities and the absence of large lineage clusters and under conditions in which there is greater possibility for independent survival of divorced or separated women". The Kiga material shows that neither resettlement nor the 'destructive' influences on the social structure which forms the context for marriage will necessarily result in jural or conjugal marriage instability. Whether or not such social changes result in instability may depend on the parallel rates of value change and economic change and the possibilities for achieving a new level of conjugal stability. The Kiga material on the peasant communities in the homeland area in South Kigezi, tends to support Fallers' analysis, but here change in the social and economic context of marriage has resulted in role strain and conflict but not in instability as defined in terms of permanent separation. Perhaps here some wider definition of what constitutes 'conjugal instability' is necessary, although any definition of instability other than permanent residential separation would be extremely difficult to apply cross-culturally. In the Kiga case there is a greater possibility for survival of widows or deserted or temporarily abandoned wives, but only in the context of jurally stable marriage, since there are few alternative avenues of subsistence for women except in terms of access to the husband's land.

Fallers has reformulated Gluckman's hypothesis that "divorce is rare and difficult in those (societies) organised on a system of marked father right and frequent and easy to obtain in other types." Fallers reformulation was, "where a woman, either through the complete transfer of her childbearing properties or by other means, is socially absorbed into her husband's lineage, patriliney tends to stabilise marriage, where a wife is not so absorbed and thus remains a member of the lineage into which she was born, patriliney tends to divide marriages by dividing the loyalties of spouses. The hypothesis could, perhaps, be generalised to cover corporate groups of whatever type. Common corporate group memberships tend to reinforce the marriage bond, different corporate group memberships to work against it."

In the Kiga case, married women were never fully absorbed into their husband's lineage, they remained members of their father's lineage and had rights of support in their father's extended family in the event of marriage breakdown. Continued agricultural co-operation between mother and married daughter

was common and in cases of infertility the wife had recourse to the spirits of her paternal ancestors and not to those of her husband's family. Her child bearing properties were however transferred to the husband's family, and this we have seen was an important aspect of Kiga marriage stability. It would seem that in the Kiga case the stability of marriage is dependent primarily on the system of land allocation according to the house property complex and on patrilineal inheritance and succession, combined with the absence of other opportunities for livelihood for women outside marriage, and with the need of the men to obtain security of land in the home area of South Kigezi through regularised jural marriage. Although continuing Kiga marriage stability cannot be associated with any strength of corporate kin groups at the present time, nevertheless the systems of property allocation and inheritance and the consequent attitudes of Kiga towards the desirability of stable marriage are based on the previous structure of strong corporate kin groups, and have so far succeeded in combating counter tendencies of social and economic change working towards the disruption of the marriage tie in the homeland area of South Kigezi.

-
1. Edel M.M. The Chiga of Western Uganda 1957. p. 56
 2. Edel. 1957 p. 73
 3. Edel. 1957 p. 64
 4. Gluckman M. "Kinship and marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and Zulu of Natal", in African Systems of Kinship and Marriage ed. Redcliffe-Brown and Forde 1950. p. 192.
 5. Sanwal. R.D. "Bridewealth and marriage stability among the Khasi of Kumaon". in MAN Journal of the R.A.I. Vol. 1. No. 1 March 1966.
 6. Schneider. D.M. "A note on bridewealth and the stability of marriage", in MAN 53. 1953 pp. 55-7
 7. Fallers L.A. "Some determinants of marriage stability in Busoga: a re-formulation of Gluckman's hypothesis", in Africa 27 1957 pp. 106-21.

Table 1.

TOTAL NUMBER OF MARRIAGES OF MEN AND WOMEN
FOR SAMPLE OF 150 MARRIAGE HISTORIES.

Number of marriages	MEN			WOMEN		
	Under 50	50 + over	Total	Under 50	50 + over	Total
One	64	12	76	93	31	124
Two	10	9	19	7	7	14
Three	2	9	11	0	0	0
Four	1	3	4	0	0	0
Five	0	4	4	0	0	0
Six	0	1	1	0	0	0
Total	77	38	115	100	38	138

Table 2.

CHOICE OF SPOUSE.

Age groups (Age of Husband).

	20 + under	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	over 60	Totals
1. Elopements after independent meeting of young couple.	5	5	5	5	4	0	24
2. Free meeting & choice of spouse uninfluenced by kin groups but subsequently marriage arranged through family channels.	1	5	4	2	2	4*	18
3. Free choice but partners met within context of existing kin relationships e.g. one partner visiting kin in area of the other. (Elopement or Arranged)	1	5	3	7	2	1	19
4. Spouses grew up in same village or related affinally (Elopement or arranged.)	0	8	5	7	5	7	32
5. Arranged marriages with varying degrees of choice or veto by husband only.	1	6	6	2	6	6	27
6. Arranged marriages with no choice for either husband or wife.	0	1	4	5	3	6	19
7. Marriage by capture. (of woman) and "famine" brides from Rwanda.	0	0	1	2	3	3	9
Marriage by inheritance. (Widows.)	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Totals:	8	30	28	30	26	28	150

* All marriages between elderly persons previously married or ineligible. 2 cripples, 1 old couple both previously widowed, 1 "cheap" widow as 2nd wife, 1 ex prostitute as 2nd wife.

Table 3.

MARRIAGE FORMATION.

	Present age groups (Age of husband)						Totals
	Under 21	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60	
Bridewealth paid in advance by father	-	3	7	11	11	15	47
Bridewealth paid in advance by ego	1	7	8	4	5*	8*	33
Bridewealth paid in advance by father + ego +/- or other relatives	1	3	2	2	4	1	13
Negotiations preceded marriage but some bridewealth debt	1	1	-	1	1	1	5
Elopement but bridewealth paid within 3 months by ego	-	3	2	4	-	-	9
Elopement but bridewealth paid within 3 months by father	-	3	1	1	-	1	6
Elopement - bridewealth paid between 3-12 months by ego +/- or father	-	2	-	2	1	-	5
Elopement - bridewealth paid between 1-3 years by ego	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Elopement - bridewealth not yet paid after 3 years	1	-	2	3	4	-	10
Elopement - bridewealth paid by installment over a period of 5 years	4	7	5	2	-	2	20
Totals:	8	30	28	30	26	28	150

* All secondary marriages.

Elopement for age group over 50 here includes captured brides.

Table 4

SOURCES OF BRIDEWEALTH PAYMENTS.

<u>Whole Payment.</u>	Under 21	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60	Totals
From father's herd (or ego's herd in secondary marriage)	-	4	4	8	10	16	42
From sister's bridewealth cattle (or daughter's bridewealth in secondary marriage)	3	2	3	6	6	6	26
Donated by brother	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
From father's wage earnings	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
From ego's wage earnings	4	10	6	12	4	4	40
Totals:	7	16	13	26	23	26	111

Partial payments from several sources

From father's herd	1	5	2	3	1	1	13
From sister's bridewealth cattle	-	3	9	1	1	1	15
From other relatives - father's brother and brother	1	1	5	1	2	1	11
From father's wage earnings	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
From ego's wage earnings	2	7	11	4	4	2	30
Totals:	4	17	27	9	8	5	70

Numbers differ from age-group totals in Table 2. and 3. as partial payments are counted once in each category.

Table 5. (A)

TYPE OF BRIDEWEALTH.

ELOPEMENTS.

<u>Age groups:</u>	All livestock	Mixed livestock and cash	All cash	Totals
Under 21	1	3	1	5
21-30 years	1	4	8	13
31-40 years	2	6	1	9
41-50 years	6	4	1	11
51-60 years	3	3	1	7
Over 60 years	1	2	-	3
Totals:	14	22	12	48

ARRANGED MARRIGES.

<u>Age groups:</u>				
Under 21 years	1	1	-	2
21-30 years	5	6	4	15
31-40 years	14	1	4	19
41-50 years	11	4	4	19
51-60 years	15	-	-	15
Over 60 years	18	6	1	25
Totals:	64	18	13	95

Table 5 (B)

AMOUNT OF BRIDEWEALTH

<u>ELOPEMENTS</u>	Less than 2 cows & 1 bull	2 cows & 1 bull	More than 2nd cows & 1 bull	Nothing	Totals
<u>Age groups</u>					
Under 21	1	1	5	1	6
21-30 years	5	4	4	2	15
31-40 years	6	2	1	1	10
41-50 years	6	3	2	1	12
51-60 years	5	1	1	1	8
Over 60 years	1	1	1	1	4
TOTALS	24	12	12	7	55
<u>ARRANGED MARRIAGES</u>					
<u>Age groups</u>					
Under 21	-	1	1	-	2
21-30 years	3	3	9	-	15
31-40 years	3	6	10	-	19
41-50 years	2	6	11	-	19
51-60 years	5	3	7	-	15
Over 60 years	10	3	12	-	25
TOTALS.	22	17	43	-	95

Table 6.

NUMBER OF ADULT MARRIED MEN LIVING IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF
HOUSEHOLD CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL DOMESTIC
GROUPS IN THE SOUTH KIGEZI AREA.

Type of household:	Number:
In patrilateral extended family	344
In conjugal family	77
In polygynous family	25
In conjugal family plus dependents	36
Denuded families	22
	<hr/>
Totals:	504

plus
The above figures are for two miruka areas/three neighbourhood valleys,
all in Kyanamira sub-county, South Kigezi.

Table 7.

NUMBER OF ADULT MARRIED MEN LIVING IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF
HOUSEHOLD CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL DOMESTIC
GROUPS IN SETTLEMENT AREAS.

Type of household:	Bugangari*	Bitereko	Bisheshe	Bigodi	Totals	
	N. Kigezi	Ankole	Ankole	Toro	f.	%
In patrilateral extended family	16	10	2	1	29	14
In conjugal family	40	14	47	28	129	61
In polygynous family	6	10	9	3	28	13
In conjugal family plus dependants	9	-	-	1	10	5
Denuded families	11	1	-	4	16	7
Totals:	82	35	58	37	212	100

* Area of intensive study.

Table 8.

REASON FOR TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE.

<u>REASON</u>	<u>MEN</u>			<u>WOMEN</u>		
	Under 50	50 + over	Total	Under 50	50 + over	Total
Death of spouse	1	14	15	6	17	23
Divorce	5	1	6	3	0	3
Separation (Quarrel or desertion)	1	4	5	3	2	5
Separation (Religious)	0	2	2	1	4	5
Totals:	7	21	28	13	23	36

Temporary "marriages" terminated but bridewealth never handed over = 11.

Table 9.

DURATION OF MARRIAGES FOR WHICH LESS THAN FULL BRIDEWEALTH HAD BEEN PAID.

<u>Bridewealth</u> <u>payment</u>	Still lasting	Mean duration	Separation	Mean duration	Total marriages
None	7	17 yrs. 4 mths.	9	65 weeks	16
Elopement fine only	5	12 yrs. 2 mths.	0	-	
Partial bridewealth	8	6 yrs. 6 mths.	1	2 yrs.	9
Totals:	20		10		25

Table 10.

ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGES WHICH ENDED IN SEPARATION.

Type of formation of marriage	Bridewealth paid	Type of marriage	Reason for Separation	
Arranged 9	Full bridewealth 9	Polygynous 8	Religious	4
Capture 2	Part bridewealth 1	Monogamous 11	Wife left on own initiative	8
Elopement 8	No bridewealth 9		- sent away by husband	5
			-deserted but stayed on husband's land	2
Totals: 19	19	19		19

Fate of wife

Stayed on husbands' land	6
Remarried	6
Unknown	4
Returned to father or brother	2
Homeless	1
Totals:	19

...

Table 11.

FATE OF MARRIAGES CORRELATED WITH BRIDEWEALTH TRANSFERS.

Bridewealth	Separation or divorce		Marriage lasting		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No payment	9	56%	7	44%	16	100%
Elopement fine only	0	0%	5	100%	5	100%
Part payment	2	11%	8	88%	9	99%
Full payment	10	9%	109	91%	120	100%
Totals:	21		129		150	

Table 10.

ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGES WHICH ENDED IN SEPARATION.

Type of formation of marriage	Bridewealth paid	Type of marriage	Reason for Separation	
Arranged 9	Full bridewealth 9	Polygynous 3	Religious	4
Capture 2	Part bridewealth 1	Monogamous 11	Wife left on own initiative	8
Elopement 8	No bridewealth 9		- sent away by husband	5
			-deserted but stayed on husband's land	2
Totals: 19	19	19		19

Fate of wife

Stayed on husbands' land	6
Remarried	6
Unknown	4
Returned to father or brother	2
Homeless	1
Totals:	19

Table 11.

FATE OF MARRIAGES CORRELATED WITH BRIDEWEALTH TRANSFERS.

Bridewealth	Separation or divorce		Marriage lasting		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No payment	9	56%	7	44%	16	100%
Elopement fine only	0	0%	5	100%	5	100%
Part payment	2	11%	8	88%	9	99%
Full payment	10	9%	109	91%	120	100%
Totals:	21		129		150	

Table 12.

Reason for sep.	Marriage formation	Transfer of b/w	Type of m	Duration of n.	Number of children	Number of adult sons at sep.	Age of wife at sep.	Fate of wife after sep.
1. Conversion to + RC	arr.	F.P. 5 c., 4 g.	pol.	18 yrs.	5	1	43	stayed on h's land with son
2. Conversion to + RC	arr.	F.P. 10 c., 6 g.	pol.	27 yrs.	4	1	48	stayed on h's land with son
3. Conversion to + RC	arr.	F.P. 10 c., 6 g.	pol.	44 yrs.	9	3	64	stayed on h's land with son
4. Conversion to + RC	arr.	F.P. 1 c., 150/-	pol.	20 yrs.	7	1	48	stayed on h's land with son
5. Wife became insane, husband refused respons. for her	arr.	3 c., 8 g. F.P.	mon.	?	1	0	?	homeless - vagabond.
6. Transferred to adult son's independent home when too old for work	arr.	F.P. 1 c., 9 g	pol.	40 yrs.	2	2	65(+)	lives with son
7. Wife left as husband away in labour migr. + neglected her	arr.	F.P. 10 g	mon.	5 yrs.	1	0	25	returned to bro. subsequently re-married
8. Desertion by husband to resettle in Ankole with younger wife	arr.	F.P. 7 c., 20 g.	pol.	30 yrs.	3	1	48	Stayed on h's land with son

Table 12. (continued)

<u>Reason for sep.</u>	<u>Marriage formation</u>	<u>Transfer of b/w</u>	<u>Type of m.</u>	<u>Duration of m.</u>	<u>Number of living children</u>	<u>Number of adult sons at sep.</u>	<u>Age of wife at sep.</u>	<u>Fate of</u>
14. Wife "dismissed" for suspected 'witchcraft' against her husband.	elope.	None	pol.	1 mth.	0	0	21	At home with fa.
15. Wife "dismissed" as came with children by a former husband husband feared "trouble"	elope.	None	pol.	1 mth.	0	0	36	Remarried
16. Wife "dismissed" as she was lazy and infested with giggers	elope.	None	mon.	2 yrs.	0	0	18	Returned to fa.
17. Wife left	elope	None	mon.	2 wks.	0	0	20	Remarried
18. Wife left	elope.	None	mon.	3 wks.	0	0	25	Remarried
19. Wife left (known to be a wandering wife)	elope	None	mon.	3 wks	0	0	32	Remarried

F.P. = Full Payment P.P. = Partial Payment c. = cows g. = goats pol. = polygynous Mon = Monogamous
 + = Christianity R.C. = Roman Catholic b/w. = Bridewealth sep. = Separation elope. = elopement
 m. = marriage arr. = arranged h. = husband bro. = brother fa. = father

This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence.

To view a copy of the licence please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>